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
VÖLKERBUND

THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

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THE TRAGEDY OF DISARMAMENT

TWO PROMISES AND THEIR FATE

"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments...."

"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes to" disarm.

"The representatives of the Governments here represented declare their firm conviction that the entry into force of these Treaties and Agreements will contribute in a high degree to induce a moral relaxation of tension between the nations and, by consolidating peace and security in Europe, will prove an effective means of accelerating the disarmament contemplated in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League."

"They undertake to co-operate sincerely in the work of disarmament, and to endeavour to give practical effect to the same."

So ran **Article 8 of the Covenant of the League**. So ran the **Introduction to the Locarno Treaties**. So ran the **condition precedent** to the fulfilment of these two pronouncements.

The condition precedent was fulfilled; but the two pronouncements remained empty words. Why?

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One's thoughts stray backward to a day just five years ago—**February 2nd 1932**.

On that day, to the solemn accompaniment of church bells pealing in the League of Nations city, Geneva, the doors of the **Disarmament Conference**—after how many delays, how many postponements—were at length thrown wide to the accompaniment of the wishes, hopes and prayers of the peoples in every country. Appeals beyond number were received from millions and millions of petitioners, organisations of mothers, wives, former front-fighters, war invalids, war mutilated, war prisoners, war widows and orphans, organisations of all professions, churches and youth associations, all clamouring passionately, threateningly, beseechingly, pitifully, hopefully, warningly for Disarmament, Disarmament, Disarmament. Ten millions of these petitions were on view conspicuously in the glass cupboards of the Lobby to the rooms where the Conference met; and every day the Delegates of the 64 nations which took part in the Conference passed them by as they crossed the Lobby on their way to the meetings. "**A cry for peace rises to our ears, and must be heard!**" In these words the Head of the Belgian Delegation, Premier Hymans, summed up the message of all these manifestations.

The cry was not heard. Bare and deserted, the famous glass house in which the Conference met now stands, a sight for curious tourists; and somewhere in the new Palace of the League the ten million Petitions lie packed in bundles, unheeded, forgotten. Yellowing papers, thick with dust! Accusing papers! Silent witnesses against those who came to the Conference with the high hymn of peace and disarmament on their lips and their armour on their backs, to prove to the world how easy it is to attend a Disarmament Conference without putting off one's armour first.

Search the no less yellowed pages of the records of the Conference, and you find the **history of the greatest illusion** the world has ever known. But it was an illusion which had power to hold the nations after the War under its spell. It came to them as a legacy from the millions of the fallen, a sacred trust inscribed after the catastrophe in the Paris Peace Treaties and sealed by the Covenant of the League. But the power of its appeal to those who had emerged from the War was not sufficient to give it that overwhelming momentum which was needed to sweep aside all obstacles. The force of the ideal was shattered by the attempts to give it practical shape and form—a form which would allow the highly armed countries to keep their armaments and even increase them, without allowing the disarmed countries any appreciable improvement of their means of defence.

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The focal point of the struggle for disarmament was the **conflict between highly armed France and disarmed Germany**—on the one hand the fight by Germany for equality of rights and fulfilment of the promises to disarm which were made in 1919, and on the other hand the French thesis of security and all that diabolical dialectic which hovered between "disarmament" and "security" and forms of words left purposely in the vague, intended as they were, not for the attainment of peace or disarmament, but for the maintenance of the status quo established by the Treaties of 1919.

All the world knows how the conflict ended. Refusal to recognise the German claims of July 23rd 1932 led to the withdrawal of Germany from the Conference, and subsequently on October 14th 1933—after continual departures from the principle of equality of rights laid down in the declaration of the Five Governments on December 11th 1932—to the final abandonment by Germany of both the Conference and the League.

The path of Disarmament narrowed as the path of Security widened. "The reports of disarmament are becoming rarer and

rarer and shorter and shorter," wrote Mussolini at the time, "while the news of fresh armaments on land, at sea and in the air are every day fuller and more frequent." An exact picture of the endless discussions which were proceeding at Geneva! And all the while the Powers with France at their head were busy arming and straining every effort; and the purpose of their efforts was not merely to retain the independent position which their armaments enjoyed—politically, they were free to arm as they pleased without reference to others, and technically they had the necessary plant and equipment to do so—but also to conclude ententes and military alliances and with the aid of these diplomatic combinations, backed by an accumulation of military strength, to hold the presumptive adversary in check. All this, it is hardly necessary to add, in the name of the defence of their threatened security and in the interest of Peace! When at the beginning of 1934 England, Italy, and Germany sought to rescue what was left of Disarmament, half strangled by now under the mountainous mass of documents, the death-blow to the cause was given by the French answer of April 17th. Security had swallowed up Disarmament.

No less a person than the former Premier and present War Minister **Daladier** described what happened from that moment onwards in the following words, in a speech delivered by him at a Radical-Socialist demonstration at Bauge on March 15th 1936: "The famous **Note of April 17th 1934** threw over a logical and just Plan for equal, simultaneous and effectively controlled disarmament, which would have made it possible for Europe to inaugurate a new order without endangering the true interests of France, but on the contrary defending and protecting them." **That sentence places the responsibility where the responsibility lies.** The events that followed—the restoration of German Defence sovereignty on March 16th 1935, the Defence Law of May 21st 1935, and the so-called **German rearmament**—were no more than milestones on the retreat from an enterprise, the legal basis of which had been shattered by that Note. It was only logical that Germany should **arm to catch up the others**, to make good the damage done by 15 years of one-sided disarmament in a world of heavily armed neighbours—an **eleventh hour effort to bring the German armaments up to the level of those Powers who were not prepared to fulfil their obligations or allow the crushing superiority they enjoyed to be one whit diminished.**

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Of the mighty stream of Hope and Faith on which the idea of Disarmament was borne when the Conference opened at the beginning of 1932, there remained only a tiny runnel of water which was in the end lost in the wilderness of disillusionment, mistrust and efforts to consolidate existing hegemonies. The world of ideas in which Disarmament had lived and moved and had its being was shattered; and, in place of disarming, the world began to rearm. The system of security which the League was to have established brought no security. The Disarmament Conference had been its great effort to establish security. When that failed, its place was taken by Rearmament. The very countries which had given it to be understood at the Conference that they were prepared to accept restrictions of what they had hitherto cherished as the most sacred function of their sovereignty, the right to determine their own armaments, were now at pains to assert their sovereign right more vigorously than ever and to lay down the measure of what they considered adequate protection of their national security.

It was no fault of Germany's. Over and above the full and complete disarmament carried out by her in accordance with the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, she never ceased to make contributions to the cause of Disarmament. Countless proposals were put forward by her, on quantitative and (when that failed) on qualitative disarmament, on the limitation and (when that failed) on the stabilisation of armaments, on the prohibition of aggressive weapons and (when that failed) on the limitation of their use, on the humanisation of war, on the localisation of war, on the elimination of war for an initial period of 25 years. Perhaps the greatest irony in the whole story of Disarmament is the fact that the country to which even to-day the blame for the failure of the efforts made is often ascribed was responsible for the initiative which led to the negotiation of the only instrument of disarmament that ever actually emerged from the discussions—the Anglo-German Naval Agreement!

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Thus it was that the idea which had moved the world, the idea of consolidating universal peace by universal disarmament, withered and wasted and was found wanting. There remained only the other alternative, the inevitability of which, in the absence of a Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Mussolini had throughout endeavoured—unhappily, in vain—to impress upon the Conference, the alternative of **ARMAMENTS COMPETITION**.

The Pact with Bolshevism

The Alliance and Armaments Bloc: Russia, France and Czecho-Slovakia

Public opinion throughout the world is by now almost unanimous in regarding the **Franco-Russian and Czecho-Russian Pacts of mutual assistance of May 1935**, and their corollary in the shape of the intrusion of Russian Bolshevism (with the Soviet Union and the Red Army at its back) into the community of European States, as **one of the most momentous developments of the post-war period** in so far as the efforts of the European community to establish peace and arrive at an agreement in the matter of armaments are concerned.

The attention of all countries is increasingly focussed on the ominous designs of the Soviet Union in the field of international politics. Without exaggeration it may be said that the destructive machinations of the Soviet State organs and the Komintern—operating now separately, now together—are beginning slowly to become apparent even to that section of the world on the shores of the Lake of Geneva which still believes, or has hitherto believed, in the possibility of a “refining process”.

The **Temps** itself in a pair of articles which it published on **October 11th and December 1st 1936** under the impression of events in Spain was compelled to admit—not, of course, without the usual side-hits at Fascism and National Socialism—that “there are all too many indications of the **Soviet Russian design to divide Europe into two blocs of powers** which are bound in the end to conflict with one another. In spite of all official statements the Moscow Government is profoundly imbued with the revolutionary spirit of pure Communism in its integral form. The present policy of Moscow appears to be to compel the Liberal and democratic Governments of the West of Europe under pressure of the popular masses led by the Communist organisations to take up a position by the side of Soviet Russia in opposition to the authoritarian States....

“There are unhappily all too many indications,” the **Temps** added, “that the Komintern, which may be called the political armament of the Soviet system, is obstinately set on the attainment of its aims of social disintegration, and is exerting all its strength to prepare for the world revolution—it has indeed no other object, no other *raison d'être*—and, as a means to world revolution, to prepare for war. **Revolution as the prelude to war or war as the prelude to revolution**—that is the formula on which Communism has lived and moved and had its being ever since it first made its appearance in the world.”

In No. 138—140 of this periodical on the negotiations for the Eastern Pact we dealt with the previous history of the movement, and predicted that **April 17th 1934**, the date of the famous Barthou Note, would be found to be at the same time the **date of birth of a new Franco-Russian military alliance** of the pre-war model with its point directed, now as then, against Germany.

That prognostication was confirmed by the “indiscretion” of Archimbaud, Reporter for the French Defence Estimates, in the French Chamber on November 23rd 1934, when he let fall the remark that the help of the Russian Army had been offered to France in the event of a conflict with Germany. Shortly afterwards the co-operation of France and Soviet Russia was officially announced by the publication of the Protocol drawn up by Laval and Litvinov at Geneva on December 5th 1934. It announced briefly that neither of the two Governments would enter into negotiations with a third party independently or without the consent of the other. The *Echo de Paris* tore the veil from the face of these undertakings when it observed laconically that “The Agreement guarantees France against a new Rapallo and Russia against the risk of a direct Franco-German understanding”.

We asked at the time, since when a peaceful understanding had been a “risk” and since when a reconciliation of Germany and France had been a “danger”. We added: “The future will show which is the greater risk for Europe—the risk of a Franco-German understanding or the risk of the two Agreements concluded in May 1935 by France and Czecho-Slovakia with the Soviet Union.”

The “future” of which we spoke was not long in coming. A bare two years sufficed to reveal the tragic consequences for the peace of nations which attended the unhappy policy pursued by Barthou, the policy which in deplorable ignorance of German—and, still more, of Soviet—policy was to culminate in the Pact with Bolshevism and the crystallisation of the existing grouping of Powers and Alliances for the maintenance of French security and the repression of Germany.

A general increase of mistrust in Europe was the sequel to this Pact of coalition, the text of which was so drafted as on the surface to come within the framework of the Covenant of the League. From that moment onwards all the plans and proposals of European diplomacy for the settlement of the most burning issues have come to nothing, while **all countries have continued to arm at an ever increasing tempo.**

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In the meantime it has been conclusively demonstrated that the **Soviet Government and international Communism are one and the same thing.** The essential unreality of the assurances which the Agreement between Stalin and Laval contained as to the cessation of the underground activities of the Komintern in France, and the disclaimers of world-revolutionary objectives, is bitterly realised by now in France, and by none more than by the French Government itself.

The process of bargaining with Bolshevism which was then introduced has left patent evidence in its trail of the determination of the Soviet rulers to let loose the world revolution and swamp mankind in the flood of levelling and disintegrating Marxist doctrine.

It is no longer a question of a struggle waged—more or less—with intellectual weapons, a struggle in the world of ideas. It is a struggle of current realistic policy, such as **Radek** foretold some years ago. “Each day,” he wrote, “**of the continued existence of the Soviet Union is a great work accomplished for the world revolution.** The world revolution is on the march. For the moment it is not accompanied by the movement of flags waving in the breeze or the sound of the guns of the civil war. Budenny is not yet watering his horses in the Rhine, and the Cossacks are not yet fighting in the streets of Paris in support of the French worker. But he who has ears to hear may hear the work of the pioneers of the Revolution.”

In our special number on the Red Army (No. 126-130) we spoke of the revolutionary objectives of the Soviet Union, and explained how the rulers of the Soviet State in their efforts to **rearm, and enormously expand, the organisation of their Army invariably regard such rearmament and expansion as the prelude to the world revolution.**

The very oath which the conscripts of the Red Army take embodies an obligation to direct all their actions and all their thoughts towards the high object of freeing the workers of the whole world, and to give their strength and their lives to the cause of Socialism (as interpreted by Bolshevism).

The design of making the Red Army the **shock brigade of the proletariat of the world** has been voiced with increasing frequency in recent years by the rulers of Soviet Russia. Previous quotations in this sense may here be supplemented by additional extracts. They constitute one more proof of the cynical frankness of Soviet military circles.

That **Marshal Tukhachevsky** is an apt pupil of Lenin's is apparent from his book on “**The Red Army and the Militia**” in which he proclaims the duty of preparing for the revolutionary war. “One thing is certain,” he writes, “and that is that, if once a Socialist revolution obtains the mastery, it is obviously entitled to extend its sway. It will resort to brute force in order to operate directly in neighbouring countries one after another till it has spread throughout the world. Its most powerful instrument in the process will necessarily be its military strength. Thus we see how necessary it is for the Socialist Revolution to be enabled by means of its Army to undertake offensive operations, first in neighbouring territories the other side of its frontiers, and subsequently, as the course of events may indicate, further afield.” And in another passage he writes: “Can we envisage our military activities as confined within the borders of the Republic? Of course not, for the reason that we have no serious military objectives within the Republic.... Consequently every activity of our Republic must be closely correlated with the objective of the World Revolution; and this is true in the first instance of the organisation of our Red World Army.”

These world-wide aims of the Moscow politicians and statesmen, which are in reality the ultimate objective of all Moscow's policy, were very plainly formulated at the end of 1935 in an **appeal broadcast by the Russian wireless on the first anniversary of Kirow's death.** The speaker said: “We shall win the whole world to Communism. Our belief is based on the fact that the

lever has been created by the Bolsheviks, and it is in the hands of the Party. It is in the hands of Comrade Stalin and many millions of the unconquerable Soviet people." The message is all the more significant in that it emphasises the **close connection of the Party and the Government** as the guarantee of the fulfilment of the aims in view. In the same sense Stalin in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army is described in the Moscow Press as "Marshal of the Socialist Revolution and Marshal of the Communist movement of the whole human race".

Another symptomatic feature in this connection is a **speech of the War Commissary Voroshilov on the subject of the Red Army**. He argued that no country would be able to catch up the lead gained by the specially trained parachutist troops of the Red Army, and added: "There are no such countries, and I think I shall not be wrong in saying there never will be, until the power of the Soviets extends to other countries." The conclusion which these remarks suggest is hardly, one would say, that the vast armaments of Russia serve a purely defensive purpose! The same Voroshilov himself said that the enemies of the Soviet Union have no intention of surrendering the field to the Socialist State. Such a conception of the national right of self-determination of other countries is a sufficiently clear indication of how the objectives of the future are visualised. The nature of these objectives was very plainly set forth in a speech delivered by Voroshilov in Kiev on the conclusion of the autumn manoeuvres on the Polish frontier. "The Army and the people must so organise their defence as to be able under all circumstances to beat the enemy on his own territory." In the same speech Voroshilov also made the notable declaration that "We are ready for war, and we propose to wage it on foreign soil".

Similarly **Marshal Budenny** at a meeting of the Council of Nationalities in January 1936 when he spoke of the **division of labour as between the Red Army and international Communism** made no attempt to disguise his admission of the fact (to quote his actual words) that "the Red Army is sure of victory for the reason that it has at its side the Komintern of the Bolsheviks, while its leader is Stalin, the leader of the masses of the world's workers, who will lead the army into battle for the victory of the Communist cause".

On this subject of the world revolution as the aim and object of the Soviet State Stetzkyi, the responsible chief officer of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R., made the following declaration on January 25th 1935: "So long as capitalism continues to exist outside the Soviet borders, our country as the **shock brigade of the world proletariat**, our Socialist State which is fighting, and will continue to fight, against capitalist encirclement and for the victory of the Socialist world revolution, will assume the **dictatorship of the proletariat**. One thing, one little thing, we should never forget, when we are thinking of our country's destiny. To fulfil that destiny, the power of the Soviets must prevail throughout the world. To that end it was born."

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How right was the Swiss **Federal Councillor Motta** in his **great speech to the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 19th 1934**, when he warned the delegates of the dangers attaching to the admission of the Soviet Union to the League in the following words: "The object of Communism is world revolution. Its nature is such, and its will is such, as to force it to conduct propaganda in other countries in support of that object. It is a natural law of its existence that it should seek to spread beyond its own borders. It is denying itself, if it ceases to do so. To be true to itself, it must be the enemy of all, for it threatens us all.... The League of Nations will be embarking on a dangerous enterprise, if it attempts to reconcile fire and water. But the die has been cast."

Once again in his **speech of June 10th 1936**, on the occasion of the debate in the Swiss **National Council** on the resumption of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., Dr. Motta hit the mark, when he said: "Between the Soviet Government and the Communist Party there is a partial identity of personalities and a disconcerting solidarity of ideas and interests. Moscow's influence is everywhere operative. The Third International waves aloft the burning torch in Western Europe, and celebrates the union of Communism and Anarchy in those countries. Moscow's influence works as and where it can; and Communist tactics assume every form and every shade."

The double face of Soviet Russia's Janus head stirred even **The Times** on one occasion to comment. It was in connection with the Soviet protest in Geneva against the severance of diplomatic relations by Uruguay, when the Russian representative endeavoured to argue that the Komintern and the Soviet Government were independent bodies. The Times then wrote that the assertion of the Soviet Government that it has nothing to do with the Communist International is a masterpiece of legerdemain, if not of shamelessness: This perpetually identical answer to all

complaints in regard to the activities in foreign countries of the "Agency for the World Revolution" is as much as to say that Stalin qua Head of the Soviet Government can take no responsibility for the behaviour of Stalin qua leading member of the Executive Committee of the Komintern. To run two businesses under different names, the Times added, one open and above board at a League of Nations Assembly, and the other secret and underground with the purpose of undermining the Governments of other States and remodelling their order of society, is a practice which cannot be reconciled with friendly or honourable relations. The results of international intrigue of this kind cannot well be anything but international mistrust. To plot the crime of civil war and at the same time to profess adherence to the principle of international war is a communist contradiction in terms.

Actually it was the **French Press of the Right** which wrote of **Litvinov's** attitude at the end of September 1936 as being tantamount to **torpedoing the League of Nations**. That was when he had succeeded by his lobbying activities at Geneva (in the matter of allowing the Abyssinian delegation to continue to sit in the Assembly) not merely in keeping Italy once more away from the League, but also in delaying still further the diplomatic conversations on the calling of the Five-Power Conference. It is true, at the Extraordinary Session of the Council at the beginning of December Litvinov's all too transparent game failed; but at any rate he had attempted through the agency of the Spanish Foreign Minister del Vayo—behind whom loomed the shadow of the Ambassador Extraordinary to Madrid, Rosenberg—to exacerbate the divergencies of opinion to such an extent as to induce a "Frente popular" of League diplomatists to give their blessing and recognition to the Bolshevisation of Spain.

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If there are any who still believe in the alleged "turning over of a new leaf", the supposed "democratisation" of the Soviet Government and its executive agent, the Komintern, they may be recommended to read the many hundreds of pages on the World Revolution in the **Reports of the Seventh World Congress of the Komintern** which was held in August 1935. At this Congress the General Staff of the World Revolution issued a new pass-word in regard to the ways and means of overcoming the world's opposition to the blessings of bolshevisation. The delegates were recommended to try the tactics of the "Trojan horse", or (to use a more modern and more Russian metaphor) to try the parachutist tactics of the Red Army—that is to say, to despatch advance troops to do the work of destruction on foreign ground behind the enemy's back. The parachute diplomacy of Litvinov was to prepare the ground for such attack.

And here is the **Epilogue to the Eighth Extraordinary Soviet Congress** in Moscow from the pen of the **representative of the Swiss paper Neue Zürcher Zeitung**. He writes on December 13th:

"The idea was that there should be a great profession of faith in the Stalin system, which was to be represented to all observers in and outside Russia as a modern system of government embodying genuine democracy and real freedom in contrast to the 'medieval spirit of the European dictatorships'. And the result? A gigantic public meeting all in the manner of the established Bolshevik propaganda. Not a trace from beginning to end of the Congress of the 'dignity', the 'high tone' which were to have marked the beginning of the 'new era'. The introduction of the new Constitution no less than the abuse of imaginary enemies remained from first to last along the lowest lines of party polemics and petty vituperation. Not once in the course of the torrent of oratory of the past two weeks was it possible to feel that the leaders of Soviet Russia were looking forward, or that they had any conception of the meaning of the words 'democracy' or 'freedom' which they had continuously on their lips. **There is no change in the position in Russia.** Stalin himself, with the brutality which he has always shown, put an end to all illusions from the outset which may have attached to the announcement of a democratic Constitution, leaving no room for doubt as to the continuance of the dictatorship of the proletariat even under 'the freest Constitution in the world'....

"While on the one hand the results of the discussion of the Stalin Constitution can only be an occasion for disappointment and disgust in presence of so much duplicity, the speeches dealing at the Congress with the foreign policy of Russia leave an impression on the other hand that the Moscow Government does not mean, or know how, to contribute to a genuine relaxation of the international tension, but is on the contrary continuing to lie in wait to spy out the weaknesses of its opponents....

"So the political situation is as it was. **Only the military strength of Russia is growing**, and leaving its imprint in ever greater measure on the character of the Soviet regime. The fact is that Stalin hopes by means of the Army to consolidate the system and his own personal predominance, and so to keep democracy under, though the name 'Democracy' is good enough to serve him for business purposes."

I. The Red Army

The greatest fighting machine in the world

"The greatest fighting machine in the world!" With this headline the **Daily Express** on December 8th 1936 introduced its report of the details given by Stalin on the last day of the Eighth Soviet Congress in regard to the rearmament programme of the Red Army. It was no more than the truth.

The Red Army to-day is the most powerful army ever formed in the history of the world. Down to the end of 1934 its **peace strength without short service territorials** was not more than 562,000 men according to official figures: but its establishment was then raised to 940,000. In fact its strength at the end of each training year, **including short service territorials**, had for some years past been in the neighbourhood of 1,300,000 men. Under the service system which prevailed down to the end of 1934 there was

- a standing army of cadre troops, representing one-third of the whole, with two years' service, and
- a militia of territorials with a short period of service, representing two-thirds.

But from the beginning of 1935 the position was reserved, and the Army was reorganised as

- a standing army of cadre troops, representing two-thirds of the whole, with two years' service, and
- a militia of territorials with a short period of service, representing one-third.

The transition to the new system is not yet complete. But a **Decree** issued by the Soviet Government on **August 10th 1936** announced that the **age of conscription** for Soviet nationals liable to military service, which was fixed under the Defence Act of 1930 at 21, would in future be **reduced to 19**. For the purpose of the transition to the new age, provision was made for the calling up of 1½ years of recruits in each of the next four years. That meant that in the autumn of 1936 the recruits of the year 1914 and half of those of the year 1915 were to be called up: in 1937 the second half of the year 1915 and the whole of the year 1916 were to be called up: in 1938 the whole of the year 1917 and half the year 1918 were to be called up: and in 1939 the second half of the year 1918 and the whole of the year 1919 were to be called up. From 1940 onwards a full year's quota of recruits was to be called up annually. The motive for this Decree cannot have been solely the desire to make good the gaps in the lean War years, as these gaps are by no means the same problem in the Soviet Union—owing to the vast numbers of the population—as they are in other countries; nor is there in fact any reference to this consideration in the Decree itself. Moreover the lowering of the age of conscription does not effect the length of the period of service. This will still be to the 40th year of age, and will in future be divided into the following stages:

- From 19 to 24 with the colours,
- From 25 to 34 with the Reserve, 1st Ban,
- From 35 to 40 with the Reserve, 2nd Ban.

The effect of the Decree of August 10th 1936 will be to bring the peace strength of the Red Army gradually up to something between 1.8 and 2 million men. The conscription of 1½ years of recruits each autumn will enable the Red Army to man the existing cadres of the peace army (hitherto consisting, as to one-third, of short service territorial troops) with men serving their full service. The Defence forces, when the operation of the Decree is complete, will probably consist only of a standing army of cadre troops with two years' service, which will set the territorials at present serving for short periods free for enrolment in reserve formations.

This increase in the numbers of the Red Army gains in significance from the recent statement of **Gusjev**, a high Soviet official, to the effect that "Socialist upheavals in some West European country may at any moment involve us in a revolutionary offensive war: nor is it out of the question that we may be compelled to initiate a revolutionary war with the object of provoking the revolution in the West—in which case it is essential that our strategy should be of a definitely offensive character."

If these considerations are taken into account—as they unquestionably must be in presence of the sanguinary developments in Spain and the intensification of Soviet machinations in France and other West European countries—the concentrated effort of the Soviet Union's rearmament in the last year and the last year but one acquires new meaning.

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The peace organisation of the Red Army at present comprises some 100 Rifle Divisions and (probably) 30 Cavalry Divisions, at least 160 Artillery regiments, a number of Pioneer and Signals formations and a large number of special troops such as Gas formations, Railway troops etc. In addition, there are Corps, Army

and Command troops consisting of strong Artillery formations with modern heavy and extra-heavy artillery, and further Pioneer and Signals units, together with special troops at the disposal of the Higher Command. Some 9 to 10 million **trained reserves** are already available. Theoretically therefore it would be possible in war to mobilise 10 to 11 million men. The recent reduction of the age of conscription will increase the number of available reserves by 1940 by some 2 more million men, bringing the total up to **approximately 13 millions**.

A further important factor to be taken into account in this connection is the activities of the **Komsomol** (the Communist Youth Association) and the **Osoaviakhim** (Association for the Promotion of the Study of Aviation and Chemical Warfare). Both Associations have been responsible for new efforts in the last year and last year but one in connection with the pre-military instruction of the Soviet youth. In compliance with the watch-word of the Fourth World Congress of the Communist Youth International ("Military preparation of the World Revolution and intensification of the United Front agitation") the **education of the young in the purely military sense** has been carried vigorously forward. What is true of the Komsomol is equally true of the Osoaviakhim. The latter's activities include training of young persons before they are called up to active military service, training of persons not called up, organisation of Air and Gas Defence societies, training of airmen, parachutists, cavalymen, artillerymen etc. In its schools the so-called Voroshilov marksmen, Voroshilov pilots and so on receive their instruction. The Osoaviakhim is now projecting a scheme for the establishment of 431 Clubs to teach the young how to fly. In 1935 a naval squadron of Osoaviakhim pilots was formed in the Baltic. Similar squadrons are to be formed in the Far East, on the Black Sea and on the other coasts of the U.S.S.R. The Red Army provides the aircraft for the training of the young airmen. The latest report of the Osoaviakhim states that up to the present over a million young persons have passed a test in parachuting, while an equal number passed a motor-driving test, and nearly half a million passed a test in the care of Army horses. The **membership** of Osoaviakhim already exceeds **13 millions**, and will continue to grow. There can be no question as to the value of the services which this Association renders to the Red Army, not merely because of the military training which it gives, but also because of the help it will be able to give the Red Army in the event of mobilisation in virtue of its organisation and the training of its members.

The development of the Red Army in the years 1935-36 has not been confined to the increase in the number of effectives. Considerable progress has also been made with the provision of **war material**, which has been feverishly pushed forward. Marshal **Tukhachevsky** was able to note at the end of January 1935 that since 1933

- the number of machine guns in the Rifle and Cavalry Divisions had increased by more than 100 per cent,
- the number of machine guns for the Air forces and tanks had increased by more than 700 per cent,
- the number of tanks had increased by more than 450 per cent,
- the number of anti-tank guns had increased by more than 950 per cent,
- the number of heavy artillery pieces had increased by more than 100 per cent.


At the annual Session in 1936 of the Central Executive Committee he was in a position to announce that "We are now in a position, as and when the Government desires, to put into the field at any given point an armed force ready for battle, and fully armed and equipped. **The preparedness of the Red Army is greater than that of any other Army.**"

The following points should be noted in this connection.

In addition to the increase in the stocks of war material in the years 1935-36 there was a marked improvement in the country's capacity for the production of war material. In particular, a great part of the artillery was brought up to modern standards by the improvement of gun materials, projectiles, explosives, detonators and so on. The Signals Corps have greatly developed their wireless equipment. The number of wireless stations has been increased by 1750 per cent. In the matter of arms the Red Army has made great progress, though there are no doubt a number of shortcomings still to be made good. At the beginning of 1936 the New York American wrote (January 12th 1936) that the Red Army was the greatest war machine at present in the world. Between 1932 and the end of 1935 the following improvements were introduced according to Russian official sources. As a result of the increase in the number of effectives the number of Rifle Divisions has been raised by 22 and the number of Cavalry Divisions by 3, with the addition of 758 light and 25 heavy batteries. In 1932 the number of light machine guns was 13,000 and the number of heavy machine guns 10,000;

Fighting


The new Belgian
reconnaissance and fighter
two-seater Renard R 32



Soviet Russian fighter one-seater Z.K.B. 19

Capacity: no particulars available

Armament: 2 machine guns on either side of the fuselage with fire between the blades of the airscrew. Bombs beneath wings



The English big gun one-seater Fairey Phantom

Maximum speed: 400 km. per hour


Armament: one 20 mm. big gun and 4 machine guns



Czech fighter one-seater Avia 534

Maximum speed: 388 km. per hour

Armament: 2 machine guns or one 20 mm. aircraft big gun. Light splinter bombs




Polish big gun fighter one-seater P.Z.L. P.24


Maximum speed: 404 km. per hour

Armament: two 20 mm. aircraft big guns and one or two machine guns


Aircraft




The new French fighter one-seater Loire 250
Maximum speed: 485 km. per hour in 4,000 m.
Armament: two 20 mm. big guns and 2 machine guns



The English fighter one-seater Gloster F 7/30 Gladiator
Maximum speed: 418 km. per hour, Armament: 4 fixed machine guns



French light fighter one-seater Les Mureaux 190-Cl.
Maximum speed: about 480 km. per hour in 4,000 m.
Armament: one 20 mm. big gun firing through revolutions of airscrew, and one fixed machine gun in each wing



The new French fighter one-seater Dewoitine D 513
Maximum speed: 480 km. per hour in 4,850 m.
Armament: one 20 mm. big gun and 2 machine guns

at the end of 1935 there were 20,000 light and 12,000 heavy machine guns—an increase of 7,000 and 2,000 respectively. Three years ago there were 2,400 light guns and 600 heavy guns: at the end of 1935 the numbers were 4,500 and 700—an increase of 2,100 and 100 respectively. The increase in the numbers of **tanks and armoured cars** is also very striking. In 1932 there were only 350: at the end of 1935 there were 3,500, some of them extra-heavy types, representing an increase of 3,150. In 1932 Russia had only one mechanised brigade: at the end of 1935 she had 10 mechanised Divisions. Further efforts have since been made to increase the stocks of armaments. The position in regard to **armaments as at the end of 1936** is probably as follows:

Light machine guns, not less than 25,000,
Heavy machine guns, not less than 14,000,
Anti-tank guns, not less than 1,600,
Light guns, not less than 7,500,
Heavy guns, not less than 1,200,
Modern tanks, not less than 6,000.

The **motorisation and mechanisation** of all arms has been proceeding systematically for years past.

Increased attention has latterly been directed towards the development and reinforcement of mechanised formations and tank troops. In addition to a number of mechanised Rifle Divisions, there are now a quantity of mechanised brigades and strong mechanised Cavalry formations. All reconnaissance sections, anti-aircraft, Corps and Command artillery, Pioneer and Signals formations are now motorised. The increase in the case of the Tank Corps is fantastic. The Grand Manœuvres of the Red Army in the autumn of 1935 and 1936 drew the attention of the whole military world. Vast masses of new formations of a novel character were concentrated in a relatively confined space in order to enable the modern ideas of the leaders of the Red Army to be practically tested. It was the day of the machine. Machine guns, guns, small tanks—landed by parachute from heavy aircraft behind the enemy's front!—and heavy armoured tanks were thrown into action by the hundred, affording practical illustration of the belief of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and People's Commissary of National Defence, Marshal **Voroshilov**, that the **war of the future will be a war of machines** placed at the soldier's disposal and employed by him skilfully and effectively with an eye to victory. The technical military Press of the Soviet Union deals exhaustively with the problems of the organisation, direction and use of armoured tanks, which are brigaded in some cases in the Red Army in mixed formations. A great part is played in these speculations by "distant operation groups", "distant support groups of Infantry" and "close support groups of Infantry". **There is no question as to the great improvement in the equipment of the Tank Corps, which in the case of a number of types is reflected in the doubling of the speed of the tanks. The monthly output is said to have been brought up to some 200 tanks (light, medium and heavy).** The most modern types receive special attention. A large number of tanks able to swim have recently been built: a Soviet paper published a picture (at the beginning of this year) of the crossing of a lake by one of these units in close formation in line ahead! The North American fast Christie tank has also been acquired in large numbers: it can move up to 160 km. per hour on wheels or caterpillars as required. With the marked increase in the number of tanks, there has been a concomitant increase of attention to the problem of training the tank troops. Ruthless offensive tactics are taught as the first requisite. **Budenny's Cavalry army of 1920 has been transformed into the armoured army of Voroshilov of 1935. The 10,000 odd armoured vehicles (including 6,000 modern tanks), the 150,000 odd motor tractors and the 100,000 and more Army motor vehicles place the Red Army ahead of all other armies of the world in the matter of motorisation.** In his own words Voroshilov has broken up the old arms and made tank leaders out of cavalry officers and airmen out of infantry officers.

* * *

The development of the **Soviet Air arm** has kept pace with that of the tanks in every respect. The organisation has been much improved, and the training has been systematically developed. The Air arm of the U.S.S.R. is designed to carry the offensive beyond the Soviet frontiers far into the territory of the victim of the offensive, and to land destructive, sabotage and propaganda units behind the enemy front, before the enemy is able to defend himself. These units are combined in the Parachute formations, the so-called Minjar troops. Marshal Tukhachevsky has been at pains to foster the development of this formation. In the discussion of the Army Estimates for the current year he put the number of trained parachutist troops at 60,000. Their training rests mainly with the Osoaviakhim. The New York American announced in January 1936 that since 1932 the Air arm of the U.S.S.R. had increased the number of aircraft from 1,700 to 4,300, including 1,500 bombers with a useful load capacity of 8 tons and a range of 1,250 miles. The personnel of the Red Air Force, it added, had been expanded during the previous 3 years from 12,000 to

40,000 men. **The total number of aircraft of all types, to judge by the number of existing formations, must now be 6,000.** This figure represents the establishment of aircraft, assuming all formations to have their full budgetary number of first line aircraft. It is by no means certain that all formations are up to establishment however: there are in all probability a good number of shortages of strength. The whole of the new material produced by the Soviet aircraft industry in the immediate future will probably be used, not for the establishment of new formations, but to fill up shortages in existing formations and to create a material reserve. But even so the fact remains that **the Air arm of the U.S.S.R. is at present in numbers ahead of every other State.** That it is proposed to increase this advantage is apparent from Tukhachevsky's utterances at the 1936 Party Congress, when he said: "When once we can begin serial production, as we shall be able to do by 1937 at latest, there will be no overtaking us. We shall then be in possession of many times as many aircraft as we have now." The Soviet air armament is served at present by 74 industrial establishments, of which 28 are for the construction of aircraft, 14 for the construction of motors and 32 for the construction of accessories and equipment. In 1929 there were only 26 such establishments in all: in 1932 there were 54: and in 1934 there were 62. The problem of the supply of sufficient staff to man all these aircraft has been solved, in spite of the rapid growth of the numbers of planes, by the aid of the Osoaviakhim. For years past the Osoaviakhim with its 1,500 gliding and flying schools has been training large numbers of young Bolsheviks to become pilots and mechanics. The Chairman of the Air Committee of the French Chamber, Bousoutrot, after a visit of inspection in company with other members of the Committee to Soviet Russia, expressed the opinion that the Red Air arm was amply supplied with aircraft, trained personnel and above all airports. The Reporter of the Air Committee, Hymanns, added that every Soviet city had an aerodrome for training airmen and another for training parachutists in addition to a military aerodrome. The aircraft, he said, were built and fitted on American lines, so that with serial production a very large output was possible. The well known French aircraft builder Louis Bréguet told a representative of l'Intransigent at the end of August last that he had been in a position in the course of his enquiries in the Soviet aircraft and motor works to convince himself of the truth of what he was told by the Managements of the works—namely, that the five biggest motor works and the four principal aircraft works were capable of producing 5,000 aircraft a year! According to Russian official statistics the production of aircraft in the year 1936 was already at the end of August some 92 per cent higher than the total production for the year in 1935. In the near future therefore the Red Air arm should be as powerful as those of all the other countries of Europe put together.

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In pursuance of the Soviet Government's **Decree of August 10th 1936** lowering the age of conscription, the necessary steps have been taken, especially in **Western Russia**, to house the **million odd recruits who were called up in the autumn of 1936.** As there was not sufficient barrack accommodation available, huge barrack camps have been erected in the neighbourhood of a number of places. According to the information available the greater part of the new troops called up in the autumn of 1936 are being quartered in districts to the West of Moscow—that is to say, in the Western frontier zone of the U.S.S.R., where a number of new aerodromes have also been erected. Other indications point plainly to the conclusion that **the Government at the present time regards the West as more important than the East.** Work has proceeded energetically during the last two years on the development of the **field fortifications** which run along the whole of the Western frontier from Lake Ladoga to the Black Sea. Groups of the population not regarded as politically reliable have been transported on a large scale from the Finnish, Estonian, Latvian and Polish frontier districts to other parts of Russia. The disposition of the troops in the Western districts of the U.S.S.R. had already been considerably strengthened by the establishment of new formations and new garrisons before the publication of the Decree of August 10th 1936. The operation capacity of the Red Army has been greatly improved by the construction of communications and the deliberate adoption of a policy of **gradually eliminating the worst shortcomings of the communications system.** Three great double-tracked railways running parallel in the direction of the Western frontier have been built. The road system is being increased and improved by the labour of tens of thousands of political prisoners. A beginning has just been made with the construction of two autostrades from Moscow to Kiev and from Moscow to Minsk. Minsk is less than 100 km. from the Polish frontier. The Moscow—Minsk autostrade will also touch the city of Smolensk, which is a point of military importance for the North-West front of the U.S.S.R. The Polish paper Kurjer Polski comments: "The direction of the road towards our frontiers and the rate at which it is being built are sufficiently clear evidence

of the military objects of its construction. Poland cannot but be interested in the matter." The Polish military organ *Polska Zbrojna* published further details of **Soviet preparations on the Finnish frontier**, such as the

- Development of Leningrad as a land fortress and naval base,
- Development of Kronstadt as a naval fortress,
- Development of the island of Kotlin as a submarine base,
- Erection of an underground Air Force base near Fort Gorki opposite Kronstadt,
- Erection of 12 air bases on the Northern littoral of the U.S.S.R.,
- Erection of Army air ports in Petrosavodsk, Kem, Uchtua, Pääjarvi, Kandalak, and Murmansk,
- Construction of five new highroads from Leningrad to the Finnish frontier,
- Development of the parallel railway lines Leningrad—Alexandrovsk and Vologda—Archangelsk,
- Construction of new railway lines between Parandova, the Northern shore of Lake Vyg, Uchtua, Petrosavodsk, Lake Onega, and Repola.

A fundamental change has been made in the areas of certain military districts.

The very sparsely populated area North-East of Leningrad (roughly, the area East of the line from Vologda to the White Sea) has been split off from the Leningrad military district and made into a North Russia Military Commissariat.

The former military district of the Ukraine has been divided into two independent military districts, one in the West with the name of Kiev Military District, the other in the East with the name Charkow Military District.

The former military district of the Volga has been shorn of its Northern area, which is now to be known as the Ural Military District with Svendlovsk as its Headquarters.

The former military district of Siberia is now divided into three independent parts. The westernmost of these parts, extending as far as the 96th degree of longitude, retains the name of Siberia Military District. Next to it comes the Trans-Baikal Military District with Headquarters in Chita: its Eastern border runs East from Strjetensk and then West of the Amur Railway in a big curve to Kolymsk on the Arctic. The third part is **the area of the Army of the Far East**.

A pamphlet published in the middle of 1936 by the Japanese War Ministry, in which a **comparison is made of the strengths of the Japanese and Soviet Armies**, gives amongst other things the following particulars.

When Japan began to follow out her present policy in Manchukuo, there were only 4 Infantry Divisions and 2 Cavalry Divisions in garrison in the Soviet-Manchurian frontier region, making a total of about 55,000 men. Today in the same area there are not less than 15 Infantry and 3 Cavalry Divisions, representing a concentration of more than 260,000 men. In addition the U.S.S.R. has over 900 aircraft, 800 tanks and 500 armoured cars on the frontier of Manchukuo. There are 100 heavy bombing aeroplanes in station at Vladivostok. Since 1932 the U.S.S.R. has sunk over 1½ milliards of roubles in the construction of fortified works along the Manchurian frontier. These works consist of small forts 50 to 100 metres long in groups of three or four. There are in all some 6,000 of them. Strategically they are not intended for defence; but they play a very important role as a base of operations in an offensive war. The strength of the Japanese forces in Manchukuo is only one-sixth of that of the Russians on the other side of the border. When it is realised that the U.S.S.R. is maintaining in the Far East alone an Army as strong as the whole standing Army of Japan (250,000 men altogether, organised in 17 Divisions, and 1,000 aircraft), and that Moscow is proposing to strengthen and develop her military position in the Far East to a still greater extent, it will be appreciated that all these preparations cannot be directed against any other than Japan.

The above particulars may be supplemented from the following information published by the technical paper *France militaire* in September 1936. According to this organ the Soviet army in the Far East is in three main groups, viz. the Baikal-Mongolian Army with 85,000 men and 350 bombing aircraft, the Amur group with 32,000 men and 150 bombing aircraft, and the Vladivostok Army with 40,000 men and 250 bombing aircraft. The three Army Groups dispose in addition of strong bodies of special troops, fortress artillery, Frontier Defence formations and naval detachments. *France militaire* also states that the Soviet fortifications on the Manchurian frontier have an average depth of 6 kilometres. The separate forts are connected with one another. They are strongest and most highly developed along the Amur River. They are all built underground. Behind this 6 kilometre zone further special defensive works and underground garages for tanks and armoured cars have been constructed. The fortifications of Vladivostok, which date from before the war, have been replaced by modern works.

* * *

In order to carry out this gigantic scheme of armaments, the **military expenditure of the U.S.S.R.** has been **repeatedly and extensively increased** during the last two years. The Defence estimates for 1935 proved insufficient, in spite of the very large amount (6½ milliards of roubles), to finance the armaments expenditure projected. The actual expenditure was in fact **8.2 milliards of roubles**, i.e. 1.4 milliards or 26 per cent more than the estimates. For the year 1936 the estimates were **14.8 milliards**; 21 per cent of the entire Budget for the year was thus allocated to armaments. As the Army Estimates have hitherto been largely exceeded in each year, it is presumable that the same will be the case for 1936. All these figures, it should be borne in mind, represent only the amounts of the actual Army Estimates in the Budget for each year, as officially published by the Soviet Government. They accordingly constitute only a part of the total expenditure on armaments, as they do not include the vast sums expended every year on the **development of the heavy industries, the chemical industry and communications**. The primary and principal object of these forms of expenditure is the creation of a modern armament-producing industry and a system of transport designed for military purposes. The Soviet armaments industry is now probably already in a position to supply the needs of the Red Army.

The **armaments budget for 1937** shows a further increase of 5.3 milliards of roubles as compared with 1936, bringing the total expenditure up to **20.1 milliards**. To this must be added the budget of the newly created People's Commissariat for the Armaments Industry totalling 2.3 milliards. In two years therefore the expenditure on armaments has been more than trebled by the U.S.S.R.

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But even this accelerated measure of rearmament of the year 1936 is not enough for the Soviet Government. On the last day of the **Eighth Congress of the U.S.S.R.** in Moscow at the beginning of December 1936 Stalin gave **particulars of the Soviet armaments programme**, the completion of which (as the Daily Express wrote) will give the U.S.S.R. a combination of land, sea and air forces representing the most powerful fighting machine the world has ever seen.

It appears from the report in the Daily Express that the plans for this new vast programme of armaments were decided on at a three-day session of the U.S.S.R. Council of Defence, at which the War Minister Voroshilov, his deputy Tukhachevsky, the Chief of the General Staff Jegorov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Far East Blücher, and the Cavalry Commander-in-Chief Budenny were present.

The whole Plan is divided into five main sections dealing (according to the Daily Express correspondent) with the following subjects:

1. Creation of a line of fortifications 2,000 miles long on the Western and Eastern frontiers of the U.S.S.R. against Germany on the West and Japan on the East, similar to the Maginot Line in France.
2. Increase of the standing army to 3 million men within two years, i.e. increase of the present strength of effectives by a round 100 per cent.
3. Trebling of the Soviet Air forces within the same period. Training of another 50,000 pilots within one year.
4. Establishment of a special People's Commissariat for War Industry under the personal control of the War Minister Voroshilov.
5. Further transference of the armaments industries into the interior of Russia as a measure of defence against enemy attacks from the air.


Work on the new line of fortifications is to begin at once. On the Western frontier of the U.S.S.R. alone 300,000 workers will be set to work as soon as the actual construction of the fortifications is begun.

* * *


"The Soviet Union—an armed camp!" Such is the headline with which the *Berner Bund* of January 12th heads an interesting article by a Special Correspondent on the Russian armaments. The *Berner Bund* appends the following comments:

"What, it may well be asked, are these feverish armaments, carried through at the expense of the unfortunate Soviet subjects who have already been bled white, leading up to? The measure of the Soviet Union's purely defensive requirements has long since been exceeded; for the U.S.S.R. is strategically in a far more favourable position than any other Great Power in Europe, and does not even need an army with the peace-time strength of the French Army. **Moscow's armaments** can only therefore be regarded as **purely offensive in character**. Eastern Europe is well aware of the fact, though it may not always proclaim its knowledge openly. But, one asks, how long will it be before Western Europe begins to realise that a black cloud is gathering in the East of our continent which one day may annihilate our two-thousand year old civilisation in a single catastrophic hailstorm?"


Reconnaissance and




Italian reconnaissance aircraft Romeo Ro 37
Maximum speed: 325 km. per hour
Bomb load: 150 kg.
Range: 1,150 km.



Belgian reconnaissance aircraft Fairey Fox Mk. IV
Maximum speed: 350 km. per hour
Armament: 2 fixed machine guns, one machine gun on circular pivot
Bomb load: total of 240 kg.
Range: 900 km.



The new French adaptable aircraft Potez 63
Maximum speed as fighter three-seater or light bomber:
460 km. per hour. Ordinary flying speed: 320 km. per hour



English adaptable aircraft Handley-Page H.P. 47
Maximum speed: about 275 km. per hour
Armament: one fixed machine gun and one machine gun on circular pivot
Bomb load: total of 800 kg. or one torpedo

adaptable aircraft



New English adaptable aircraft from Parnall Aircraft Ltd. for bomb and torpedo discharge

French fighter multi-seater and heavy bomber Amiot 144.
Maximum speed: 400 km. per hour in 4,000 m.
Armament: 4 double machine guns (one 20 mm. big gun projected)
Bomb load: total of 2,000 kg. with range of 2,000 km.
Crew: 4-5 men



Polish adaptable aircraft PZL 23 for distant reconnaissance, bombing and depth attack
Maximum speed: 380 km. per hour in 4,000 m.
Armament: one fixed Browning machine gun and 2 mobile Vickers machine guns
Bomb attachments under fuselage for 6 bombs of 100 kg. each



The French fighter multi-seater Breguet 460 M5.
Maximum speed: 385 km. per hour in 4,000 m.
Armament: 2 double machine guns and one machine gun.
Bomb load: up to 1,200 kg.

II. France's Army Organisation

Recognition of these considerations has not however penetrated unfortunately to all quarters, and least of all to France. The Quai d'Orsay has been at pains of late to deny that the Pact with Soviet Russia has anything in the nature of a "Super-valuation of values": but it has not for one moment disowned the Pact. Authoritative personages have explicitly asserted the same standpoint without intermission right up to the present time. In August 1936, for example, the Reporter for the Army Estimates, M. Archimbaud, summed up the whole debate in the Chamber and Senate on the pros and cons of the Pact in the following terms: **"It is our duty to uphold our alliance with Russia. We shall be told, Russia is a Soviet State. That has nothing to do with the matter. A country chooses for itself the system which suits it. The Soviets offer us the support of their armies, and we should do wrong to reject their offer."** Premier Leon Blum, speaking to the National Council of the French Social Democrat Party on November 8th 1936, also asserted that the Pact signed by Laval retained its full value. The Foreign Minister Delbos made a statement to the same effect in the French Chamber on December 4th.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the attitude of the two last-named French statesmen in the matter of the maintenance of the Soviet Pact is governed by considerations of the maintenance of the Front populaire bloc, for which the support—or, at any rate, the tolerance—of the French Communists is essential. The line which the present French Government follows is only in accordance with the **general line of foreign policy in France since 1919**, which seeks salvation solely in collective alliances and unremitting rearmament directed against Germany. Through all speeches of responsible French Ministers there runs like a red line the note of certain fixed principles; and those principles may be formulated as follows: "Our country's interests are identical with the interests of peace. If France is to speak with authority, she must be respected. If she is to be respected, she must be strong; and strong she is, and her armaments are the source of her strength. A weak France would be a temptation, an easy prey, and so a danger to peace."

This is the famous **"continuité" of French policy**, from which no French Government, whatever its colour, has ever diverged. The idea has never been better defined than in an article which appeared in the *Temps* of January 30th 1936, when the Laval Government was succeeded by that of M. Flandin. The *Temps* took the opportunity to make the point that, apart from nuances of detail, Flandin's policy could not possibly differ from that of his predecessor, the policy (namely) of collective security. That policy, the *Temps* continued, was based on two principles—loyalty to the League of Nations as the guardian of the Peace Treaties and the closest cooperation with Great Britain. From these two fundamental principles the *Temps* deduced a number of others, such as the need for careful consideration of any new international commitments going beyond the framework of the Covenant in all their consequences, however remote, the need of all Members of the League to put themselves in a position to meet the obligations devolving on them in virtue of their membership, and in particular the need for Great Britain to increase her armaments in order to be in a position, as in 1914, to land an Expeditionary Force on the Continent at the earliest possible date.

That policy is also the policy of the Delbos-Blum Government, as appears plainly from the **Government declaration of June 23rd 1936**, in which it was announced that the military strength of France had never been stronger than it was today. The declaration recognised the sincerity of the Führer and Chancellor's desire for peace, based on his experiences as a soldier at the front. It did not linger over accomplished facts, and disclaimed unprofitable polemics over the occupation of the Rhineland. But, having said so much, it proceeded to develop on broad lines the traditional programme of French foreign policy, the policy of alliances with military clauses, now called "regional Pacts"—but their "regional" character is at once vitiated by provisions making accession open to outside interested parties as well as neighbours. One such outside interested party is Russia; and of Russia the Blum Government declaration was at pains to assert that France counted on the aid of her powerful friends in the U.S.S.R. The declaration included a reference in the traditional pactomaniac sense to the value of the Pact system, not only in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and in the Danubian basin, but also in the Mediterranean! Of which Pact system the only fruits to date are the demonstration of the impracticability of any such system at all: as to which, see Foreign Minister Delbos' statement in the French Chamber on August 2nd 1936.

It is too little realised to what an extent France was rearming at a time when there was not the slightest pretext for so doing in the shape of any breach by Germany of the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty. In the years 1931-1934—that is to say, at a time when satisfactory results could still be anticipated from the Disarmament Conference—France expended 61,821,000,000 francs according to her Army Estimates alone, as notified by her to the League of Nations and published by the latter in its Armaments Year Book. The actual expenditure on the French Defence Forces was very much higher, as much of the expenditure was covered by other Estimates. On a conservative calculation of the total amounts expended by France on rearmament during the period of the Disarmament Conference, we arrive at a total which justifies the statement that the purely defensive requirements of the country were greatly exceeded. The former "Généralissime" Weygand admitted as much in an article on "L'état militaire de la France" in the *Revue des deux mondes* of October 15th 1936, in which he attacked the prevailing view that France needs an "army of defence". From the military standpoint, he argued, such a view is nonsensical and dangerous. What France needs is an army inspired with the offensive spirit without which no army can exist.

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The high quality of the warlike spirit, i.e. of the training, of the officers and men of the French Army was shown in the World War. The French officer and the French soldier are well known for their glowing patriotism, their readiness to sacrifice themselves, their stubbornness and tenacity. The **selection and training of the higher commanders and of the General Staff officers** has always been good. In addition to the long established military schools like Saint-Cyr, the Ecole Polytechnique, the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, the Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires and the training courses for officers of all arms, a new military academy, the Collège des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, was founded in the autumn of 1936. The courses at this academy, which are attended by 10 officers or officials of the Army, 5 officers of the Air Force, and 5 officers of the Navy, together with one higher official from the different Ministries—making a total of not more than 30 at a time—last for four months. According to statements made by the War Minister Daladier on November 4th 1936 to the Army Committee of the Chamber, it is proposed to increase the French corps of officers, which at present numbers in the case of the Army some 32,000, and to facilitate the promotion of non-commissioned officers to be officers. The numbers of the professional soldiers are also to be increased from 144,000 to 160,000. The reason for these increases was stated by M. Daladier to lie in the fact that the new fortifications require standing garrisons. To facilitate and improve the training of the men, **compulsory pre-military training from the age of 18** is to be introduced in the schools and through the **Sport organisations**. Conscripts are to receive some months' training in a Training Camp before they are actually called to the colours. Greater attention is also to be paid to the **training of reservists**. In place of the present single period of training for reservists of 3 weeks, there are in future to be two trainings of 14 days each. The material of war, so M. Daladier explained, changes every day; and the reservist must be familiarised with the new material. He added that there could be no question for the present of reducing the **two years' service**. The two years represented a minimum which was not open to discussion.

Since the World War France, after a transitional 3½ year period in 1928, introduced one-year service. But by 1930 the conviction prevailed that in the so-called "lean years" (i.e. the years 1936-1940, when the falling-off in the birth rate during the War means a shortage of recruits) it was not possible to keep the Army up to peace strength. This view found backing in the spectre of German rearmament. At first in the years 1933-1935 France sought a remedy for this state of things by increasing the number of coloured troops in France, transferring troops for the purpose from North Africa in sufficient number to form two complete new Divisions. The number of long service men and specialists was also increased by facilities in connection with the conditions of re-appointment and improvement of prospects. A considerable increase of the Garde républicaine mobile was also put through, and more extensive use was made of the power to retain men with the colours after the legal period of service. When all these expedients failed to meet the needs of the situation, an Order was issued on April 1st 1935 increasing the period of active service from one to two years until 1939 in the first instance, with a transition period of 1½ years for the recruits called up in April 1935: the previous practice of two conscriptions in the year was

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at the same time abandoned, and replaced by a single conscription in the autumn of each year. In addition, in all fortification areas and in a number of other recruiting areas in Northern France the recruits were called up for the first time in the autumn of 1935 one month before the time, in order to bridge over the interval when all the recruits in the depots are untrained. In conjunction with the introduction of the two-year period of service, steps were taken to make the conscription more rigorous for all recruits in the home country as well as in the oversea possessions and in foreign countries, and to increase still further the numbers of coloured troops in France. Facilities and favourable conditions were also offered to volunteers prepared to join the colours before the legal period of service, as a means of keeping up the peace strength. The efforts made were not without result. From 547,000 men in 1934 the peace strength rose in 1935 to the neighbourhood of 575,000 men. The effect of the two-year service, the increase in the numbers of long service men and specialists and the various other measures was to raise the **effective strength of the Army in 1936 to not less than 652,000 men without the Air Force of some 42,000 men, and the 47,000 men of the Gendarmerie and Garde républicaine mobile.**

This numerical increase in the effective strength was followed by a far-reaching **reorganisation and strengthening of the Army cadres.**

Since 1935 no less than 12 Fortress Infantry regiments, 7 Alpine Fortress battalions and a number of Fortress Artillery formations have been created in the **fortified areas.** The organisation of the staffs of the Fortification Commands and of the troops garrisoning the fortresses has been tightened up and adjusted more closely to requirements. The fortifications themselves, which as a result of the unparalleled expenditure of the preceding years had already been developed into the most powerful girdle of fortresses that the world had ever seen, unique alike in strength and in extent, were still further strengthened.* Although the so-called Maginot Line from Basle to beyond Longuyon facing the German frontier has frequently been characterised, even by French observers, as a defensive barrier without a gap, work is proceeding continuously to strengthen it by the introduction of new fortified works in the main shock terrain and by the development of the ground in front. The work has been specially energetic in this sector since the transference of troops to the frontier on March 7th 1936. In all parts of the fortified front not completely immune from attack by tanks obstacles have been erected over a continuous depth of several kilometres in the shape of row upon row of deeply planted or cemented rails. The gap which was left free until the Saar Plebiscite between Wittingen an der Saar and St. Avold was fortified in the year 1936. On the Belgian frontier work proceeded at feverish speed on the fortifications round Maubeuge and Valenciennes. According to the **remarks of M. Daladier before the Army Committee of the Chamber on November 4th 1936** it is proposed, in consequence of the announcement of Belgium's future neutrality policy by the King of the Belgians, to **extend the French girdle of fortifications along the Belgian frontier as far as the English Channel,** and to accelerate the completion of the works involved. A number of strategically important points are to be strengthened by block-houses. At the same time dams are to be erected in order to enable wide tracts of country to be inundated at short notice. For these new fortifications a sum of 500 million francs is to be appropriated in the first instance. At the same time the **French frontier with Switzerland** is to be fortified by a long chain of **forts in the French Jura and in the so-called Huningues area.** M. Daladier was at pains to observe in this connection that there were difficulties in the way of the fortification of these areas owing to the existence of certain neutral zones under existing treaties, e.g. in the neighbourhood of Basle, so that it would not be possible to push the line of fortifications right up to the frontier. The treaties to which he alluded are those containing the so-called **"Huningues clause"** which was taken over in the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 from the Peace Treaty of Paris of 1914. The clause is to the following effect:

"Inasmuch as the fortifications of Huningues have constituted a standing source of anxiety to the city of Basle, and in order to afford the Swiss Confederation a new proof of their confidence and good will, the High Contracting Parties" (France, Prussia, Austria, England, and Russia) "are agreed to cause the fortifications of Huningues to be dismantled. On the same grounds the French Government undertakes not to re-erect the said fortifications at any time or for whatever reason, or to replace them by other fortifications, within a distance of three miles from the city of Basle."

In this connection it must however be added that, according to reports which have appeared in the Press, France began to take measures of defence in this zone immediately after the announcement of the German resumption of equality in matters of Defence

and the re-occupation of the Rhineland by German troops. The preparations for these measures are stated to date back to 1933. Two large permanent camps have been established in the first instance, according to the reports in question, in the Haardt and in the Alsatian Jura, and these have been occupied since the German re-occupation of the Rhineland by French Chasseurs and Moroccan riflemen in succession. These troops—their strength is stated to have amounted to two regiments—have been employed on the erection of dug-outs, tank traps and concreted gun positions. The artillery positions already prepared between Oltingen and Kemps are to be guarded and protected by barbed wire fences. There is no information as to the erection of block-houses or forts in extension of the Maginot Line in this direction. But, even if the obligations of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 are upheld and observed by France, the demilitarisation of the three-mile zone at Huningues should not constitute any obstacle to defence of the French frontier in this region in view of the technical developments—especially in respect of the range of gun-fire—of the last 121 years.

Since 1935 there has further been a marked **strengthening of the Infantry and Cavalry Divisions and Army troops in the frontier districts.** Four Divisions (the 1st, 14th, 15th, and 43rd Infantry Divisions) have been brought nearly up to war strength. The Artillery regiments have been increased: three coloured Infantry regiments have been moved to Belfort, Châlons, and St. Dié; and further coloured battalions have been moved to the frontier of the Saar. Three coloured Infantry regiments were transferred for the purpose from North Africa to France; and one coloured Infantry regiment was formed, and the 4th North African Division was reformed, in Epinal, the Divisional Artillery regiment attaching to it being established expressly for the purpose. The armoured car battalions and "dragons portés" belonging to the light mechanised (formerly 4th Cavalry) Division were brought up to establishment.

Of the total number of 28 Infantry Divisions (many of them mechanised), 3 Cavalry Divisions (till recently 4), 2 light mechanised Divisions (till recently 1), 2 independent brigades of Spahis, and 3 Cavalry groups of 11 regiments in all in the home country, **no less than 7 Infantry Divisions, one light mechanised Division and one Cavalry Division** are posted in the immediate vicinity of the **German frontier.** They are reinforced by the formations in three **"régions fortifiées"** and certain separate **"secteurs fortifiés,"** the strength of which is considerably over that of 3 Infantry Divisions, as well as by powerful Air Forces and formations on the most extensive scale of the general Army Reserve. An interesting light is thrown on the position in this connection by the answer which was given by the War Minister, as reported in the technical periodical *France militaire* on October 8th 1936, in reply to a number of enquiries by politicians in regard to the transfer of officers to the unpopular posts on the German frontier. The War Minister stated on that occasion that over 60 per cent of the Infantry officers in the home country were required for service in these posts! He declined accordingly to relieve officers who had served in the front line in the war from duty in these districts, or to introduce a rota of officers for service there. We shall be erring on the low side rather than the high side if we put the peace establishment of the other ranks of the so-called **"troupes de couverture"**—which are intended (as above stated) for what are openly admitted in France to be offensive, and not defensive, operations—at 160,000 men.

The troops in the interior of the country are also being reorganised and reinforced on a far-reaching scale. In connection with the reorganisation of the Cavalry Divisions in 1935 one Cavalry regiment was transferred from the Paris military district to Strasbourg, and another Cavalry regiment in Lorraine was reinforced and distributed over a number of posts nearer to the German frontier. In the autumn of 1936 there was a further reorganisation of the French Cavalry, in the course of which a number of Cavalry units were disbanded; but the net result, owing to the creation or reinforcement of other Cavalry units, was to strengthen the Cavalry forces as a whole in very considerable measure, particularly in the case of the mechanised formations.

In certain Artillery regiments the number of Sections was increased; and 7 workers' Sections were established for the Artillery regiments, and 16 for the Tank regiments. In the Train 9 new squadron formations were established out of existing units, and 2 new squadrons were formed. Lastly, the Garde républicaine mobile was reinforced by the addition of three new "legions" i.e. regimental formations; and further increases are projected, so as to bring its total numbers up to 27,000 men in 1937.

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The principle underlying all these recent processes of rearmament is the **mechanisation of the Army.** Mechanisation is the keynote of the policy of the French High Command. The new French armaments programme, for which the War Minister Daladier, in agreement with the General Staff, obtained the approval of a

*) See our special number "France's Watch on the Rhine" (No. 158-160).

Bombing




French bomber Bloch 131-B 5

Armament: one 20 or 23 mm. big gun and two machine guns,
one above and one below the fuselage
Range: 1,000 km. with load of 1,000 kg.



English bomber and carrier Bristol 130

Carries 24 infantrymen with complete equipment
or 2,000 kg. bombs



Handley Page H. P. 54
Harrow

Newest English heavy
bomber: can also be used
as troop-carrier

Italian heavy bomber

Savoia S. 79 B

Maximum speed: 420 km.
per hour

Bomb load: over 2,000 kg.
Range: 3,350 km.




Fighter, distant
reconnaissance and light
long distance bombing plane
Caudron Renault 670
Armament: 2 to 4 big guns
and one machine gun

aircraft




French heavy night bomber
Farman 221-BN 5
Maximum speed: 277 km.
per hour in 4,000 m.
Armament:
2 double machine guns,
one in nose of fuselage
and the other on top of
fuselage in a protected
emplacement, and a
machine gun in bottom
of fuselage
Bomb load: 2,000 kg.
Range: 2,000 km.
Crew: 5 men



The heavy French day bomber Bloch 200
Maximum speed: 295 km. per hour
Armament: 2 double machine guns and one machine gun
Bomb load: 1,200 kg., Range: 1,000 km.



The Soviet heavy bomber Ant 6
Maximum speed: 300 km. per hour
Armament: 4 double machine guns
Bomb load: up to 3,000 kg.
Range: 2,000 km. with 1,500 bombs



The new English light
long distance bomber
(quick bomber)
Fairey Battle
Bombs are suspended
in fuselage
Capacity, is being kept
secret for the present

Cabinet Council at the beginning of September 1936, provides for further mechanisation of all arms and the Infantry in particular. In all new Infantry Divisions the artillery (including heavy guns) is to be mechanised completely on very modern lines with noiseless eight-cylinder motors with pneumatic tyres, while the transport of the Infantry is to be entirely by motor lorry. Another new feature is the introduction of a 2.5 cm. Hotchkiss armoured defence gun in all Infantry regiments and also in the Cavalry. A beginning has been made with the mechanisation of this gun by what are called "chenillettes," viz. armoured caterpillar munition waggons: the greater part of the Infantry units have been equipped with these. At the parade in Paris on July 14th 1936 each Infantry regiment had some 12 of these new guns with it. The machine gun companies of the Infantry regiments have also been equipped with trench mortars and Infantry guns. Armoured Divisions as such do not form part of the French organisation. The tank troops, whose equipment is continually being expanded and improved, are attached in part to the Divisions and military districts for training purposes. They consist at present of in all **27 tank battalions with not less than 4,500 tanks.** The two light mechanised Divisions, to which reference has already been made, also have armoured cars which are equipped with heavy machine guns and in some cases light guns and are more or less capable of movement across country. According to Press reports it was further decided in September 1936 to proceed with the **creation of a definitely aggressive force in the shape of an "armée de choc."** The nucleus of the armée de choc is to be the Divisions already motorised, and it is to consist exclusively of long service men. The Artillery has also been again reorganised, a large number of Artillery regiments being mechanised: about one half of the Corps artillery units are now mechanised. The Army artillery has long since been mechanised in its entirety by the introduction of motor traction for the guns in carriages capable of movement across country.

These far-reaching measures of mechanisation, taken in conjunction with the introduction of the two-year period of service, the increased use of coloured troops in the home country, the multiplication and **modernisation of arms and equipment,** and the reinforcement of the frontier garrisons and more intensive training of reservists have immeasurably increased the striking power of the French Army in recent years. The present effective strength is 652,000 men without the Air forces, Gendarmerie or Garde républicaine mobile, and their armament consists of **some 16,000 light and 18,500 heavy machine guns, and some 1,650 light, 350 anti-aircraft, and 1,300 heavy guns** (without counting the quantities of armaments in forts and depots, coastal defences and Air defence posts), together with the 4,500 tanks to which reference has already been made; and these figures gain in significance when it is remembered that some 14 per cent of the total French population have already seen service. **France in case of war should be able to draw on more than 4.6 million trained white reservists and at least 1.5 million trained coloured reservists.**

Over and above these forces France has her powerful **Air Force,** the rearmament of which and its development as an independent arm have made notable progress. The increasing speed and growing strength of the armament of the French bombing aircraft have gone pari passu with the development of the one-seater fighting planes, which now attain maximum speeds of close on 500 km. an hour. By contrast with the defence armament of the bombers, the aircraft gun of the one-seater fighter planes is assuming increasing importance. A large number of the one-seater fighters are armed with one to 2 aircraft guns in addition to 2 to 3 machine guns. The planes with more than one seat are said even to have 2 to 4 fixed guns built into the plane with one moveable machine gun on a special carriage. French fighting plane types with more than one seat include, in addition to the well-known Amiot 143 and Potez 54 patterns, the newly developed Amiot 144 and Bréguet 460 which attain maximum speeds of 350 to 390 km. an hour. Of the reconnaissance planes, the Mureaux 117 is amongst others conspicuous with its "ceiling" of over 10,000 metres altitude. The heavy bombers Farman 221 and 222 are also said to develop a speed of 325 km. an hour and to have a range of 2,000 km. even with a load of 2,000 kg. of bombs! The wireless connection between plane and plane and between the planes and the ground and vice versa is also said to have made great progress in the past year. The whole training of the Air arm is being radically reorganised at the present time, and is being centralised in Salon de Provence and in Istres. **The personnel of the Air Force** at present consists of not less than **2,700 officers and 39,000 non-commissioned officers and men.** In addition, the Naval Air Force has a **personnel of some 6,000 men.** Altogether the French forces in the air comprise some 3,500 pilots and 2800 observers and machine gunners.

At the head of the Air arm is the Minister for Air, who is also President of the Supreme Air Council (Conseil supérieur de l'Air). This consultative body is composed of the higher Commanders of the Air Force, and its views are taken in connection with every decision of importance. The Minister as Supreme Head of

the Air Force and of the Air Council has under him the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force and the three Inspectors for the independent Air Forces, Instruction, Reconnaissance squadrons and Oversea staffs, and since the spring of 1936 the Inspector of the Air Defence organisation. The Naval Air Force and the active Air Defence organisation of the Navy are under the Minister of Marine.

France is divided into 4 Air Districts. North Africa forms a 5th Air District. In each Air District there are a number of Air Brigades or Half-Brigades. The latter comprise bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance squadrons according to the duties they have to perform, together with a number of flights and airship battalions. The independent Air Force consists of bomber and fighter squadrons of the formations in the Air Districts. All other formations belong to the so-called Aviation de coopération.

The number of first line war-planes (bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance planes) is at present **some 3,000.** To these must be added **some 2,000 serviceable second line planes.** There are also 5 anti-aircraft regiments of 6 Sections each for **Air Defence** purposes: most of these regiments consist of 2 batteries of 7.5 cm. anti-aircraft guns on self-propelled carriages, trailers or semi-fixed emplacements. Some Sections are composed of mechanised anti-aircraft machine gun companies with 13.2 mm. Hotchkiss machine guns. The Home Air Defence has a quantity of batteries, some of them in emplacements, around Paris, in the industrial centres and in the frontier and coastal fortifications.

An extra-budgetary **Armaments credit of 3.5 milliards of francs** was placed at the Air Minister's disposal in the years 1934 to 1936 **for the re-armament of the French Air arm.** It has been used for the complete modernisation of standard materials, for the accumulation of reserves of munitions and the preparation of the ground organisation for the event of war. Of this credit, 1.8 milliards were allocated to the year 1936. The regular Air Estimates for that year amounted to 900 million francs. In the next four years 1937-1940, in addition to the regular Air Estimates (the amount of which has still to be fixed), four extraordinary annual appropriations of 550 million francs each are projected for the renewal of aircraft material. On October 27th 1936 the Cabinet further approved a new Air armaments programme to cost 5 milliards, under which the number of first line aircraft hitherto contemplated is to be increased by 50 per cent, and the increase speeded up, so as to place in the field 1,500 faster and more powerful aeroplanes of the most modern type available. The personnel is also to be increased by 1,000 officers and 10,000 men.

Within the framework of the rearmament of the French Air arm it is proposed, according to a semi-official announcement on November 6th 1936, to **create an Air Infantry.** Its units are to be composed of light Fusilier detachments, who are to be put into action in war-time behind the enemy's lines. There are to be two groups of this Air Infantry, who are to be stationed at Rheims and in Algiers. Each of the two groups will consist in the first instance of a company of Fusiliers and a transport squadron. They are to be landed by parachute or by direct landing on the ground behind the enemy's lines. It is proposed in time to develop these companies into battalions, and later into regiments, following the Soviet Russian example.

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The increased expenditure on the expansion of the Air arm and the **total Defence expenditure of the last few years,** so far as known from the figures published officially, show that the French Government is determined, with all the resources at its disposal and without regard to the financial effect on the country, still further to increase the striking power of the Army and the national defence forces in a marked degree. When, for example, it was found that the **armaments expenditure for 1935 could not be met out of the resources of the Ordinary Budget**—the Defence expenditure on the Army alone totalled 12.3 milliards of francs—a **special credit of 1.4 milliards** was appropriated by the procedure of an Emergency Decree. In the year 1936 again—the budget year is identical with the calendar year—the sum of 15.6 milliards, which is shown as the figure for the Defence expenditure in the Ordinary Budget, is no indication of the actual expenditure incurred for this object, since special credits were continually applied for and accorded for particular purposes (generally not clearly indicated) to an extent far greater than in any previous years. In addition to these special credits, the 1936 Budget was saddled with heavy supplementary expenditure in connection with the extensive transport of troops to the Eastern frontier, the intensified expansion of the fortress girdle, the creation of new establishments of troops, the acceleration of the process of mechanisation, the doubling of the soldiers' pay and simultaneous all-round increase in commissariat charges, and the big increase in the wages of all workers in State establishments. To cover all this expenditure, **special credits to a total of 8.5 milliards** have been voted and made available over and above the Ordinary Budget expenditure on Defence. At a meeting of the Army Committee of the Chamber on Novem-

ber 4th 1936 the French War Minister further announced that in 1937 no less than 19.5 milliards of francs would be devoted to expenditure on armaments, viz. 14 milliards on current requirements, 5 milliards on the reinforcement of war stocks, and 0.5 milliards on the new fortifications on the Belgian frontier. At the beginning of the current year it was further reported in an English paper that the **French armaments budget for 1937** would amount to as much as 24½ milliards of francs, of which 14 milliards were to be allocated to the Army, 5 milliards to the Air arm, and 5 milliards to the Navy.

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The French preparedness for war is also being intensified by the **transference of the armaments industry** from the frontier districts in the East and the surroundings of Paris to the West and South of France: further progress has been made with this process. Again, the number of depots of supplies and stocks, which the increasing mechanisation of the Army renders necessary, has been steadily increasing throughout the country. Efforts are further being made to increase the stocks of fuel well beyond current requirements with an eye to the eventuality of war. In the middle of July 1936 the Bill for the **Nationalisation of the Armaments Industry**, which had been foreshadowed in the initial Governmental statement to the Chamber and Senate by the Blum Cabinet was approved by the Chamber by an overwhelming majority and promulgated as the **Law of August 11th 1936**. This Act gives the Government powers to nationalise by decree, in whole or in part, all private factories which produce arms, munitions, tanks, aeroplanes, or warships. Undertakings which are not yet nationalised are made subject to specially strict measures of control. Up to now three arms factories have been nationalised; and the President of the Republic has issued a Decree concerning "the supervision of private armaments firms and the trade in war material." The Decree is of a drastic character—as is also the Law on the Nationalisation of the Armaments Industry—as the following summary of its contents will make clear.

Article 1. Purpose of the supervision introduced by the Law of August 11th 1936 concerning the Nationalisation of the Armaments Industry is:

1. to supervise the production and purchase of war material,
2. to obtain information as to the processes of manufacture employed, and to follow the movement in the volume of production,
3. to supervise the execution of the provisions of the Law,
4. to ascertain the amount of profits earned by the undertakings, and to supervise the expenditure on entertainment and similar purposes and advertisement.

Article 2. No undertaking may produce war material without Government permission.

Article 3. The inspecting authorities in application of the above provisions will inspect all concerns which are so equipped as to make it possible for them to produce war material. Machinery and plant suitable for the purpose is to be removed.

Article 4. To obtain permission to produce war material, the entrepreneur must be of French nationality. Companies must be directed by French nationals, and the majority of the shares must be in French hands.

Article 5. Undertakings accorded permission to produce war material must notify the Government authorities of all orders received, and many not execute the same without special permission for the purpose.

Article 6. The inspecting authorities have access to the premises of undertakings which have permission to produce war material. The latter must afford access to any plant they are required to show.

Article 7. Undertakings with permission to produce war material must furnish schedules of the orders received and the position in regard to their execution at dates to be specified by the inspecting authorities.

Article 8. In order to enable profits to be ascertained, undertakings subject to supervision must keep books showing the costs of production. Expenditure on entertainment and similar objects and on advertisement must be shown separately.

Article 9. War material may not be imported or exported without Government permission.

Article 10. Firms engaging in the import or export of war material must have special Government permission, which is subject to revocation at any moment. Their profits and their expenditure on entertainment and similar objects and advertisements will be subject to supervision.

Article 11.

Article 12.

Article 13. To facilitate the execution of current regulations in regard to expropriation in the case of discoveries having an important bearing on National Defence, undertakings subject to supervision are required to inform the Government authorities of all discoveries and improvements.

Article 14. Permission to produce war material may be withdrawn in the event of offences against the above provisions.

Article 15.

On October 17th 1936 the French Air Minister further ordered the nationalisation of all factories and works of any importance in connection with military aircraft. For the construction of aircraft there are in future to be four companies. Each of these **four new State companies for the manufacture of aircraft** will be entrusted with the production of material for a particular district. At the sitting of the Army Committee of the Chamber on November 4th 1936, to which reference has already been made, the War Minister Daladier was insistent on the fact that strikes and occupations of works ("stay-in" strikes), such as have frequently taken place during the recent period of internal political tension, will under no circumstances be tolerated in the State armaments factories. Any delay in the production of armaments, he said, is a crime against the national security. France is called upon to make great sacrifices in the cause of National Defence, and cannot tolerate any delay in the process of national preparation. Amongst other measures, he added, the Brandt works, hitherto engaged mainly in the production of trench guns and armoured defence guns, have been transformed into a research institute; and a Bill is in preparation to create a nucleus of engineers and technicians (corps de maitrise) for the armaments industry.

* * *

France therefore is exerting every effort to push forward with the process of rearmament and, in the words of the resolution adopted by the Army Committee of the Chamber on November 13th 1936, "to strengthen the national defences to the utmost."

III. Moscow's road to Prague

The armaments of Czecho-Slovakia

"The Pact of Mutual Assistance of May 16th 1935, which followed close on the heels of the Franco-Russian Pact of May 2nd, may be relatively cautious in its wording; but its purpose is plain enough for any who have eyes to see. It is the complement of the Franco-Russian Alliance, without which the latter is without practical value. The mighty Bolshevik State is enabled by it to thrust itself some hundreds of kilometres further into the heart of Europe. Czecho-Slovakia, taking (as ever) her policy from France, has assumed the risk of making herself the spring-board of the Soviet Union in Europe, the area for the concentration of her Allies' military forces, and the practice-ground for the penetration of the moral values of Bolshevism."

The preceding sentences, taken from the **Frankfurter Zeitung** of June 26th 1935, are a pertinent description of the **significance of the Alliance between Moscow and Prague**.

* * *

The political aim of Czecho-Slovakia, a State made up of the most heterogeneous fragments of the former Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, is the maintenance of the national frontiers as determined in the Peace Treaties after the conclusion of the World War. Czecho-Slovakia's efforts for their maintenance are in her eyes threatened by the fact that Germany and Hungary are her

neighbours. Her argument as given to the world is always based on military considerations, though the facts are against her; for neither of the two countries named have ever made even the slightest attempt in the course of the 18 years for which the frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia have existed to menace them by the adoption of military dispositions—unnatural as the line of these frontiers undoubtedly is. **The real reason for the sense of insecurity of the Czecho-Slovak State** is to be found in the fact that the frontier-line was drawn in defiance of geographical and national affinities. The large minorities—there are 3.5 million Sudete Germans, 750,000 Hungarians, 462,000 Ruthenes and 75,000 Poles as compared with 8.7 million Czechs and Slovaks—are the best proof that this is so, while the fact that with a total length of nearly 1,000 kilometres the State has only an average width of 200 kilometres speaks for itself. For the maintenance therefore of her national frontiers to which (as stated) Czecho-Slovakia looks as her political aim, the only resort is thought to be a policy of extreme and one-sided military defence measures. This attitude on the part of Czecho-Slovakia has from the first been determined, and still is determined, by the powerful political and military influence of France: **Czecho-Slovakia is the strongest base of French military policy on the Eastern frontier of Germany.**

A **Secret Treaty** between the representatives of France and Czecho-Slovakia for mutual military support and political cooperation between the two countries was concluded directly after the War in 1918. It was directed primarily against Germany, since it was provided that it was to be operative "in the event of the peace of Central Europe being endangered by Germany, or the Articles of the Versailles Treaty not being observed, or disturbances taking place within Germany, or steps being taken by Germany to rearm." Special stipulations were also included for military cooperation in the event of union of Austria with Germany. In 1921 the Secret Treaty was extended by the **inclusion of Czecho-Slovakia in the Franco-Polish Military Alliance**, the point of which was also directed against Germany. In 1924 Czecho-Slovakia further concluded a **Treaty of Friendship and Alliance** with France; and the **Guarantee Pact of Locarno of 1925** also served to cement the relations between the two countries. At the same time, in order to have a backing on the South against Hungary, who had never ceased to uphold her demand for revision of the forcible provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, Czecho-Slovakia combined with Roumania and Yugoslavia in the **Little Entente**: she had already concluded a treaty with Yugoslavia four years before in 1920—**21 for military cooperation** in the event of Hungarian aggression. Furthermore, she extended her relations with Poland, with whom she had had an understanding since 1921 for the observance of "mutual benevolent neutrality", by the conclusion in 1925 of special Agreements with a view to common action against Germany in the event of German aggression. Disputes with Poland, which have been increasingly frequent in recent years, and above all the example set by France, led Czecho-Slovakia finally in **May 1935** to conclude the **Military Alliance with the U.S.S.R.**, under which she becomes the **field of concentration for the Soviet military forces**—a fact which no assertions to the contrary on the Czecho-Slovak side can alter.

Czecho-Slovakia is a particularly striking example of the close and direct connection between the foreign and the military policy of a country. Following the example of France and the U.S.S.R., Czecho-Slovakia has engaged in recent years in a policy of rearmament, which is supposed to safeguard and ensure the peace of Europe but in reality serves only, as the example of France and the U.S.S.R. shows, to create new political tension which is bound to endanger peace. In the first Army order issued after Masaryk's retirement by the newly elected President of the Republic, Dr. Beneš, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Czecho-Slovak Defence forces, it is stated that "all the necessary steps are being taken to keep pace with the chief countries of Europe and to finish the work and complete the preparations devolving on us at the earliest possible date". The sense of the above remarks of the President of the Republic was underlined by the Minister for National Defence by the unmistakeable addition of the words "Let us see to it that we are prepared!" **Colonel Moravec** of the Czecho-Slovak General Staff in his book "**War possibilities and the Campaign in Abyssinia**" which appeared at the end of 1925 was even more explicit. He wrote:

"Future wars will begin, without declaration of war, by the invasion of motorised units. Czecho-Slovakia has therefore to take the necessary preparatory action in order to make the frontiers impassable for mechanised arms, and to train and equip her peace forces for fighting with mechanised formations. A wall of fortresses must be erected on the frontier on the lines of the French girdle of fortresses on the Franco-German frontier: the number of aerodromes must be increased: the airsheds must be camouflaged; and centres of importance must be evacuated so as to leave no objective for the initial attack from the air. Czecho-Slovakia is the strong point thrust forward into the foreground of the line of battle of the Little Entente, and as such is also the link between the U.S.S.R. and France. The garrison of this

fortress must be under arms within a few hours of the outbreak of war, and must be able to hold out until help is at hand from the Soviet Ally".

The special importance which Colonel Moravec attaches to the **armament and training of mechanised units** receives every consideration in the armament of the Czecho-Slovak Army. No small progress has been made in the course of the last two years in this connection. Until the last two years the Czecho-Slovak Army had only one battalion of armoured cars: it has now an establishment of 3 armoured car regiments and one battalion of motor vehicles, while the number of tanks has been brought up to about 200. The mechanisation of the Artillery has also made progress. Of 16 light artillery regiments, one more has been mechanised, so that there are now 4 mechanised light artillery regiments in all in reserve. Part of the heavy artillery is also in process of being mechanised. The extra-heavy Artillery and the anti-aircraft artillery are already mechanised. A number of machine gun companies are to follow suit. Latterly, following the French example, there is a movement in favour of completely mechanised Divisions, of which there have hitherto been none in the Czecho-Slovak Army. As a beginning, large formations are to be motorised in the near future, civilian cars being used extensively for the purpose. Legislative action to encourage the production of civilian motor vehicles is promised with this object. The newspaper *Ceske Slovo* published some remarkable comments by leading personages in the political and economic world at the beginning of 1936 on the coming motorisation of Czecho-Slovakia. The Premier Dr. Hodža complained of the slow progress made in this direction, and asserted that the motor vehicles at present available were too old to be of much use for the purposes of national defence. He urged accordingly the need for motorisation of the country on a grand scale, and announced the impending introduction of a law to develop motor traffic. Representatives of the military element also urged the national duty of increasing the numbers of motor vehicles, and in particular motor lorries, in the interest of national defence.

The second demand of the General Staff officer already quoted (Colonel Moravec) for the **erection of a "wall of fortresses on the frontier on the lines of the French girdle of fortresses on the Franco-German frontier"** has also met with an enthusiastic response in Czecho-Slovakia. No modern fortifications being available, a beginning has been made with the protection of the most important points in the country by barriers. These barrier fortifications are said to be needed because it "is not possible to cover all needs by attack: there are cases where defence is indicated". A sufficiently clear admission that the **armaments of Czecho-Slovakia are not intended merely for defence, but are on the contrary designed in at least equal measure for attack!** From the observations of the Minister for National Defence it may be gathered that it is intended to fortify the most important lines of entry into the country, especially on the Northern frontier against Germany, by fortress constructions. Hungarian Press reports state that the construction of these fortresses—i.e. of the Czech "Maginot line"—has already begun at Grulich on the border of the County of Glatz. The line is to stretch from this point South-West via Schildberg-Zwittau-Policka, and then over the Bohemian-Moravian plateau as far as Iglau, and East over the Altvater Mountains and the Hutschin district via Troppau-Ostrau as far as Teschen. In addition to these fortifications, which are known as the second line of defence, there is to be a first line of defence running parallel to the Erzgebirge and the Riesengebirge from the neighbourhood of Pardubitz North-West via Gitschin to Turnau, where it turns South-West via Melnik-Kladno to Pilsen. The valley of the Waag is intended to serve as a third base, so that the ridge of the Lesser Carpathians will bear the brunt of the defence.

Great strategic importance also attaches to the **development of the road and railway system** of Czecho-Slovakia, work on which has recently been speeded up. The Minister for National Defence said in this connection: "The chief requirement is the acceleration of the work proceeding for the improvement of the system of communications in certain parts of Slovakia and the construction of communications between Moravia and Slovakia. The Army Administration is particularly concerned to create long distance road communications, which are in the economic as well as in the military interest of the country. Up to the present only a few beginnings have been made with the expansion of the road system." It will be gathered from the above remarks that the chief problems in the case of the road system are thought to consist in the creation of passages across the Western Carpathians and the development of road communications in Slovakia. Similar considerations govern the problem of railway development. The Ministry of National Defence drew up a joint plan with the Railway Ministry in 1935 for the "extension of the railway system by the construction of new main lines in accordance with economic and defence requirements". It was specifically stated in this connection that "the Army Administration was specially interested in the quickest possible completion of the whole plan for the

extension of the railway system", particularly in the matter of the double-tracking of existing railways as well as in the building of new lines. In the summer of 1936 the new Slovak line Cervena Skala-Margecany had already been opened to traffic. It forms a second connection from West to East in central Slovakia in addition to the former main line from Sillein (Zsolna) to Kaschau (Košice). Other lines, on which work has already been begun, will afford improved communication between the valleys of the March and the Waag and between Bohemia and Moravia.

In this connection attention must be drawn to the fact that, according to an announcement made by the Roumanian Finance Minister Antonescu in August 1936, 95 millions of the Kč. 200,000,000 loan which Roumania recently obtained from Czecho-Slovakia is to be used for the development of the railway connections between the two countries. As there is already a good direct railway connection between Prague and Bucharest through Slovakia via Kaschau, it is assumed in political circles in Bucharest that the 95 millions will be used, not for the development of existing rail connections, but for the construction of a new line from the Czecho-Roumanian frontier to the Roumano-Soviet frontier straight across the Bukovina. The French paper *L'Œuvre* was able to report in the middle of July 1936 that the Roumanian Cabinet had decided to give Czecho-Slovakia permission to build a short railway of the kind indicated through the Bukovina to link up the Czecho-Slovak railway system with that of the U.S.S.R. *L'Œuvre* described this concession as a symptom of Soviet penetration into the basin of the Danube, and as a reply to the Austro-German Treaty of July 11th 1936.

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But this is not the only field in which Czecho-Slovakia is endeavouring to establish as close connections as possible with the Soviet Union. The importance of Czecho-Slovakia as a point d'appui for the Air forces of the Red Army in any future war is best shown by the feverish activity displayed by Czecho-Slovakia in the development of modern aerodromes and the reorganisation and expansion of her military Air arm. The character of the Czecho-Slovakian Air arm is out and out offensive. Construction centres on bombing and fighting types as the main arm. The existing **stocks of aircraft** in the possession of Czecho-Slovakia are as follows:

Number of companies	Number of planes
12 short distance reconnaissance	(about) 180
6 long distance reconnaissance	" 60
12 fighter	" 145
8 heavy fighter	" 120
8 day bomber	" 80
9 night bomber	" 55
and	
1 defence flight	" 10
<hr/>	
making a total of 1st line planes	(about) 650
Add second line planes	" 720
and 1 Gendarmerie Aircraft Section	" 80
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Total present aircraft	about 1,450 planes

The personnel of the Air arm amounts to some 10,000 men. The number of air regiments was increased during 1936 from 6 to 7. Two new air regiments are to be formed. The bomber regiments constitute a separate brigade. In war they and the greater part of the fighter formations are to be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Command for offensive operations, while the reconnaissance formations are assigned to the separate Army Commands. The Air arm is under the direct orders of the Minister of Air Defence, whereas the Air Defence force consisting principally of anti-aircraft artillery does not form part of the Air arm and is under the provincial Commands in Prague, Brünn, Pressburg and Kaschau. The Air Defences have at present 4 anti-aircraft regiments of 3 Sections each (each Section consisting of 2 batteries), as well as 4 searchlight batteries and a number of emplaced batteries for the protection of industries against air attack. For tactical purposes the country is divided into four Air Defence districts, each a separate Command, viz. Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Western Slovakia. In addition to the existing schools for pilots, a number of centres were founded last year for the training of young airmen, the object being (as in the case of the **Masaryk Air League**, an organisation founded in 1935 under Government control) to stimulate the interest of the young in the possibilities of the air. Since the beginning of 1935 civilian flying has also been brought into the service of the preparation for war. The construction of airports is being vigorously pushed forward. By the spring of 1936 the number of airports already totalled 33. Since then 23 airports have been planned and in part constructed in the area East of the Moldau and South of the Elbe alone, i.e. in the area bounded by the Bohemian and Moravian frontier

ranges. The existing depots of petrol have been increased by the construction of new crude oil depots at Pressburg (Bratislava), Kralup, Prague, Olmütz (Olomouc) and elsewhere. All these constructional operations go far beyond the limits of the national requirements, and are explicable only in the light of the **close military cooperation of Czecho-Slovakia with France and Soviet Russia**. How close that cooperation has become in the course of the past year may be gathered from the following statement of facts.

The French General Staff instructed General Schweisguth to intimate to Prague that France would welcome the introduction of U.S.S.R. officers as instructors for the technical branches of the Air arm. Accordingly in January 1936 a body of 24 Soviet officers were sent to Czecho-Slovakia, followed by another detachment of 48 officers in May. They have been employed mainly in connection with the Air arm, but also in technical establishments and for instructional purposes. A Joint Supreme Command for the air forces of France, the U.S.S.R. and Czecho-Slovakia stationed in the last named country in case of war is to be established with a Frenchman as the holder of the post. At the instance of the Soviet Air Commission, 36 new aerodromes are to be constructed in Czecho-Slovakia for use on mobilisation. They will have only one runway to begin with. In March 1936 a Commissary came specially from Moscow to propose to Czecho-Slovakia that certain cadres of the Soviet Air Force should be moved to Czecho-Slovakia at once. A Soviet company has erected large camps in Slovakia with spare parts for aircraft. Not less than 50 motors are to be always available in each camp. There is an air services three times a week over the line Kiev-Uzhhorod Nitra: it is used almost exclusively by the military and for diplomatic bags. The former Soviet Military Attaché Surik spent three weeks in company with Major Porman and the Czecho-Slovak Major Linai visiting the aerodromes under construction at Uzhhorod Nitra, Rachod, Kaschau (Košice), Sillein (Zsolna), and Munkacs (Mukačevo); work on these aerodromes began in the summer of 1936. In Munkacs there are already two sheds, each 2,480 metres square, and one shed 4,280 metres square which is nearly finished. Similar sheds are being erected in the other aerodromes. Roumania has also allowed Soviet war aircraft to use the airport at Czernowitz (Cernăuți). **The U.S.S.R. proposes in the event of war to send not less than the following numbers of aircraft to the support of Czecho-Slovakia in the air:** 1 squadron of 30 reconnaissance planes, 3 squadrons each of 30 bombing planes, 1 special formation of 9 heavy bombers and 3 squadrons comprising a total of 324 fighting planes. The above particulars are taken from foreign sources: it may be added that since the beginning of 1936 military and civilian deputations from the U.S.S.R. have been noticeably active in Czecho-Slovakia.

Prague has issued denials of all the above assertions, in particular those with regard to the erection of Soviet aircraft bases on Czecho-Slovak soil. The unfortunate thing is that on the Soviet side there is no such reticence! A Russian paper *Na Strana* actually published a map on February 8th 1936 in which it was unkind enough to show "New air bases in Czecho-Slovakia". The bases marked on the map were Munkacs (Mukačevo), Ungvár (Uzhhorod), Kaschau (Košice), Pressburg (Bratislava), Olmütz (Olomouc), Brünn (Brno), Iglau (Iglava), Pardubitz (Pardubice), Reichenberg (Liberec), Prague, Budweis (České Budejovice), Pilsen (Plzen), Karlsbad (Karlove Vary) and Eger (Cheb). Points d'appui also under construction are shown in Rahov, Pistyan, Weinern and Trenčín.


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Czecho-Slovakia has also been busy developing her Army on very extensive lines. The two-year period of active service, which was first introduced in December 1934, was carried into practical effect for the first time in 1935: the previous period of service had been 14 months only. The main reason put forward for the introduction of the two-year service was the desire to have a larger standing army permanently with the colours so as (amongst other things) to facilitate mobilisation. **The effective strength of the Army**, including the Gendarmerie which is organised on purely military lines, was thus increased from 137,000 to **202,000 men**. The former cadre units with the exception of one Infantry battalion and one Artillery Section have been strengthened to form Infantry Divisions. The peace strengths of the former active Army units have also been considerably increased, while there is a complete change in the military area organisation as a result of the provisional appointment of 7 Corps Commanders. Of the new Army Corps, 2 are in Bohemia, 2 in Moravia, 2 in Western Slovakia, and one in Eastern Slovakia. The number of professional officers, which is at present over 10,000, is to be increased. In 1935 one horsed Artillery Section, 2 Telegraph battalions and one Motor battalion were added to the establishment in addition to the 3 armoured car regiments of which mention has already been made: the Minister for National Defence further took occasion in the Defence Committee of the House


Aircraft




English machine gun chamber Williamson G 22




Vickers-Armstrong 3.7 cm machine big gun mounted on the nose of a Blackburn-Perth flying boat



Double machine gun on the Italian Savoia-Marchetti S 81 bomber



Arrangement of the two 23 mm. big guns and of the two machine guns in the pilot's seat of a Dutch Fokker G 1 used as a fighter




Oerlikon pivotal ring mounting showing aiming gear and (below) gun trigger worked by the foot




Outside view of French 6-seater battle plane and bomber Breguet 460


armament




Nose of fuselage of French 6-seater battle plane Amiot 143 with machine gun turret and bomb marksmen's stand




Machine gunner in fighting turret of a Soviet bombing plane



Arrangement of stern cover of a French multi-seater battle plane



20 mm. Madsen gun firing
300 shots a minute



Mechanically operated machine gun turret in nose of fuselage of the English medium bomber Boulton-Paul „Overstrand“

of Deputies to announce his intention of raising new Cavalry regiments in Slovakia as a part of the extremely comprehensive armament programme for 1936. The technical armament of the Army is to be strengthened by an increase in the number of tanks and Air Defence machine guns in the case of the Infantry and by the equipment of the Cavalry with these heavy Infantry arms. In addition, the anti-aircraft artillery is to be expanded, and the Artillery is to be armed with the new 8 cm. field gun M 30.

The present Czecho-Slovak Army is made up of:

- 7 Army Corps (the Corps Commands date from the end of 1935, until which time there were no Army Corps),
- 12 Infantry Divisions of 2 Infantry brigades each, composed of 4 Infantry regiments each,
- 2 Mountain brigades,
- 4 Cavalry brigades.

It is announced that certain Divisions will be mechanised.

Increased attention is being paid to the training of the troops. Soviet officers are frequently employed in this connection. A military display on a scale which for a small country like Czecho-Slovakia is enormous took place in 1935, when all 12 Infantry Divisions and all 4 Cavalry brigades took part in the manoeuvres with a view to their instruction. The Corps organisation was also given its first trial on this occasion. The 1936 Autumn Manoeuvres were the largest that have ever taken place in Czecho-Slovakia. Considerably over 100,000 men of all arms took part in them. The object of the manoeuvres, as officially announced, was to test the results of the year's training by the practical co-operation of the Army, the semi-military forces and the civilian population. In order to make the manoeuvres as like war as possible, the Railways, the Posts, the Civil Service and the whole population of Eastern Bohemia, the theatre of manoeuvre, were brought into the scheme of operations. The Divisions had already been organised in 3 Infantry regiments (in lieu of the former 4 Infantry regiments) in the 1935 manoeuvres. The new formation will probably be retained in case of war, when it is proposed to constitute a field army twice the strength of the peace army. The field army is to be composed of some 32 Divisions of Infantry, each consisting of 3 Infantry regiments, 2 Mountain Divisions, 4 Cavalry brigades and strong Army troops such as heavy, medium and light mechanised Artillery, 3 armoured car regiments, anti-aircraft artillery, Pioneer and Signals formations and so on with an armament of some 9,000 light and 3,500 heavy machine guns, and 800 light guns, 200 anti-aircraft guns and 450 heavy guns. As replacement and garrison troops have to be added to the numbers of the (duplicated) active forces and the large Army troop units and Supply formations, it may be assumed that the initial war strength of the Army of operations will be from 700,000 to 800,000 men. The total number of trained reserves is put by the Czecho-Slovak Press at 2,700,000 men.

Nothing is so illustrative of the immense efforts made by Czecho-Slovakia in connection with armaments as the extraordinary increase of the Army Estimates in the 1936-37 Budget. The official expenditure therein stated shows an increase from Kč. 1,595 millions in 1935-36 to Kč. 2,015 millions in 1936-37, i.e. an increase of some 25 per cent! But the figure Kč. 2,015 millions has to be increased by other expenditure, which appears in the budgets of other Ministries but is none the less devoted exclusively to the needs of the Army and the national defence. The Kč. 290 millions of expenditure on the Gendarmerie must also be reckoned in with the expenditure on the Army in view of the military character of the Czecho-Slovak Gendarmerie. The total expenditure on the Army and national defence thus attains a figure which cannot be much under 3 milliards of Czech crowns! That total represents some 35 per cent of the entire Czecho-Slovak Budget for 1936-37, as compared with a proportion of 25 per cent in the preceding year.

To finance the process of rearmament at even more rapid rates, a Law was brought in by the Government in the spring of 1936 for the issue of an internal National Defence Loan of unlimited amount, redeemable in 50 years with taxation facilities for subscribers. The Explanatory Statement attached to the Law stated that the present political situation was such as to call for a powerful modernised national defence force, and such a force called for exceptional outlay which could not be met out of normal budgetary resources. The Chamber and Senate passed the Law on May 27th and 29th respectively. The subscriptions to the Loan brought in a total of Kč. 2,568,000,000. This amount has to be added to the Kč. 2,015,000,000 of the Ordinary Budget for the current year and the Armaments Fund (of Kč. 315,000,000 annually till 1947) which was voted on a previous occasion, if a correct picture of the gigantic armaments expenditure of Czecho-Slovakia is to be obtained.

A comparative statement of the separate items of expenditure shows the points at which the chief increases are to be found:

	1934	1935	1936
	(in millions of Czech crowns)		
Air	58.2	58.2	87.4
Engineers	4.4	6.3	8.3
Telegraph and Telephone . .	6.9	10.9	37.1
Mechanisation	25.1	35.3	80.2
Artillery armament	1.8	2.2	23.3

The Czecho-Slovak Law concerning the Defence of the State of May 15th 1936 represents a legislative achievement which, in substance and scope, is unparalleled in the past history of States. It covers every conceivable potentiality in connection with the totalitarian mobilisation of the nation and State for purposes of defence. The first three measures in execution of the Law concerning the Defence of the State were issued on June 22nd. The first of these declares 140 Districts to be Frontier Districts, in which the military authorities are given extraordinarily extended powers. In Bohemia there are 55 such Frontier Districts, in Moravia and Silesia 22, in Slovakia 51, and in Carpathian Ruthenia 12. From the nationalist standpoint the measure is directed principally against the German and Hungarian minorities. Economic activities are restricted right and left in the Frontier Districts. Without the approval of the military authorities, for example, it is forbidden to erect public buildings, to build roads or streets, to manufacture arms or munitions, to establish metallurgical or chemical factories or to construct water power or electrical works. The whole of the Forest Administration is placed under military control. The second executive measure places the whole of the trade in arms with foreign countries under the supervision of the military authorities. The third executive measure regulates the taking over by the military of patents and permits of military importance.

The Ministry of National Defence is further empowered to declare particular cities and places fortified places, in which case the Army receives extended powers within a radius of 10 kilometres.

Lastly by an Emergency Decree of November 1th 1936 the Government created a "State Defence Guard", which must be regarded as a permanently available frontier defence formation of a military character, inasmuch as it is organised and trained on military lines and its members are subject to military law. Its special duty is to protect the inviolability of the national frontiers—by which is meant the permanent occupation and guard of the frontier fortifications erected, or to be erected, on the frontiers under the Law concerning the Defence of the State. This is tantamount to the creation of a special military formation for the frontier districts, the strength of which is still undetermined, over and above the active Army and the Gendarmerie.

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The moral of the above facts may be deduced from the following story.

When the King of Roumania paid his visit to the Czecho-Slovak President at the end of October 1936, His Majesty according to a report published by the French paper L'Oeuvre said that it was no part of the Roumanian Government's intentions to restrict the defence potentialities at the disposal of Czecho-Slovakia or, for that matter, the Little Entente in the event of an aggression coming under the provisions of the Czecho-Slovak Military Agreement with the Soviet Union. At the same time, he added, the Roumanian Government was not anxious to see Czecho-Slovakia become the scene of an intrusion of the Red Army into Central Europe, or the focus of Soviet propaganda in the heart of Europe: any such development would threaten to disturb the peaceful basis of the Little Entente. So much for the King of Roumania. But a very different view is taken by the General Staff Colonel Moravec in his study of war, to which reference is made above. Colonel Moravec writes:

"The stronger morale is based on progress, and progress is found in the States with democratic or Bolshevik Constitutions—that is to say, in the States which are under Soviet or French leadership. The weaker morale is found in the States with Fascist dictatorships—that is to say, Germany, Italy and Japan. Czecho-Slovakia has taken her place with the progressive bloc, in whose keeping her future is safe, the bloc (that is) of the satisfied States who are the guarantee of the world and peace in presence of the land-hungry, unruly, war-loving peoples."

IV. The introduction of two-year military service in Germany

In an interview which he gave to a representative of the Figaro on the occasions of the diplomats' meeting in Paris which followed on the Funeral ceremonies in London, the **Czecho-Slovak Premier, Dr. Hodža**, denied that the **Pacts of Mutual Assistance** had any hostile character, and insisted that they left the door open for others to come in. But he added in a pregnant sentence that **"Germany will cease to constitute a permanent menace on the day she finds herself faced with a strong wall both on the East and on the West."**

It would be difficult to find a more pertinent description of the sense and object of these Pacts.

What is happening in Soviet Russia will in any case be of the first order of importance in view of the political combinations—i. e. the deliberately anti-German system of Pacts—with which recent developments in Russia are bound up. But the significance of these developments is enhanced by the accompanying military phenomena which presuppose the existence of understandings of a very intimate nature indeed.

It is common knowledge that the Pacts of Mutual Assistance are based on previously prepared plans of the General Staffs concerned. The Press in the countries concerned has not failed to give the necessary publicity by beating the war-drums to the visits for study or manoeuvres of French, Czecho-Slovak and Soviet officers and officials between Paris, Prague and Moscow, Moscow, Prague and Paris, Prague and Paris, Prague and Moscow, and so on.

No one was entitled to object when Germany proceeded to draw the moral of the political aspects of the new Alliance, and to shake off the burden of the disadvantage at which she was placed in the demilitarised zone, which events had rendered no longer tolerable either in the political or in the military sense.

But the Soviet Government's Decree of August 11th 1936, which

startled the world just after the meeting of the Locarno Powers which was supposed to be aimed at a general relief of tension, could not pass unnoticed by the German Government, since its effect was to bring the Russian peace-time Army up to nearly four times the strength of the German peace-time Army. Hence the **Law of August 24th 1936 introducing the two-year period of military service.**

The situation of the previous year was repeated. In the spring of 1935 Germany, having for years deferred all attempts to bring her armaments up to the level of those of other Powers, did not take her decision on March 16th to introduce compulsory military service until she had found that all her offers of general and comprehensive disarmament were in vain. In the same way on the present occasion the decision to increase the period of military service was not taken until corresponding action had taken place on the part of other Powers.

When France introduced two-year service in 1935, **General de Cugnac** said: "The two-year military service is not merely necessary for our security. It may save us a war. If France does not have the courage to impose a longer period of service on her sons, she will create the impression that she is of those peoples who have not sufficient energy to defend themselves. By resort in all calm to the two-year period France is giving expression to her will not to admit any enemy to her territory. The possessor of fortresses, of war material, of powerful armies gives outward and visible signs of his determination to be master in his own house and to ward off attack from whatever quarter it may come. That is the best way, the only possible way, of making clear to others that invasion will not pay."

These observations of the well-known French military writer appear to us the best justification of the German action, which once again has done away with conditions of one-sided military superiority that could not fail to give rise to grave anxieties both from the standpoint of German security and from the standpoint of the European situation as a whole.

Moscow's penetration into the Danubian and Balkan area

I. The attitude of Roumania

The introduction of the Soviet Union into the field of European politics, and into Central and South-Eastern Europe in particular, has naturally not been without its effect on the other countries in this part of the world, especially the two other partners of the Little Entente—namely, **Roumania and Jugoslavia**. Here again the action taken by Belgium has not been without influence. It has strengthened the latent opposition both in Roumania and in Jugoslavia to closer relations, or even to any relations at all, with the Soviet Union.

A glance at the map is sufficient to show that there is one gap in the Paris-Moscow-Prague system of Pacts; and the gap is Roumania. So long as Poland will not take a hand—and of a change in Polish policy there is at present not a sign—and the bridge between the Dniester and the short Czecho-Slovak—Roumanian frontier strip is not assured, the Pacts system is (so to say) somewhat in the air. To bring this "stratospheric system of agreements", as it has often been called, down to Roumanian earth was, and still is, the aim of the diplomacy of the three Powers. There was a possibility in the time of the former Roumanian Foreign Minister **Titulescu**, whose sudden throwing overboard from the Tatarescu Cabinet at the end of August 1936 came as a general surprise, that these efforts would be successful. In December 1935 Titulescu had described the Russian friendship as a geographical necessity for the defence of the Dniester frontier. But these geographical references touched the weak spot in the policy of Russo-Roumanian rapprochement—namely, the still unsolved problem of Bessarabia, the Roumanian sovereignty of which Russia persistently refuses to recognise: and without an explicit guarantee of Roumanian territory, including Bessarabia, even Titulescu appears to have been unwilling to conclude a Pact of Mutual Assistance on the Prague model, as appears from a statement which he made in July 1936 to a representative of the Roumanian paper *Universul*. But he took occasion at the same time to refer back to the statement he had made in 1935, and added that a "political rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., which is already allied with the Allies of Roumania, is the best means of making existing relations with our Allies effective." It would appear however that Titulescu's great skill in the handling of foreign policy failed him when he came up against the crucial problem—the problem (it may be) of the destiny of the Roumanian race—of the maintenance of the independence and security of the Roumanian State in presence of the expansive efforts of the Bolshevik colossus. The unconditional alignment of Roumania with the policy of Paris was bound to be questioned when Paris allied herself with Roumania's traditional

adversary, and Prague hastened to follow suit and join the Alliance. At any rate Titulescu fell in face of the opposition of the King, the Premier Tatarescu and the General Staff.

But, before he fell, he was able nevertheless to bind his country more closely to the countries of the Pacts system. At the beginning of April 1936 an Agreement was signed in Bucharest between Roumania, the U.S.S.R. and Czecho-Slovakia with regard to air traffic between Moscow and Prague, under which the Roumanian aerodromes at Jassy and Cluj (Klausenburg) were thrown open to use by Soviet aircraft. The military significance of such an Agreement is sufficiently obvious. It enabled the U.S.S.R. to camouflage the transfer of aircraft in peace-time from the Ukraine to Czecho-Slovakia, where (as already stated in connection with the armaments of the last-named) aerodromes have already been built, or are under construction, for the purpose. That this assumption is not without substance is shown by the fact that, according to a Press statement in Bucharest in August 1936, representatives of the Air Forces of Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, France and the Soviet Union were to meet at a Conference to arrange for uniform air action in the future. In the middle of July 1936 the *Ceuvre* announced that the Roumanian Cabinet had given its assent to the construction of a railway connection by Czecho-Slovakia through the Bukovina to the Soviet railway system in the Ukraine. There are no economic, traffic or trade grounds for the construction of the line; and the Czecho-Slovak and Soviet Press accordingly gave prominence to the high strategic value of such a connection between the two countries. The Roumanian Legation in Berlin in the meanwhile issued a denial of the existence of any such proposal! The proposal is to build a double-tracked line from Czernowitz to Mohilev, which represents the shortest way between Czecho-Slovakia and the U.S.S.R. without passing over Polish territory. The proposed "Red Express", as was pointed out by a Hungarian General Staff officer, Colonel Nyiry (retd.), in the Hungarian papers *Nemzeti Ujsag* and *Uj Nemzedek* at the end of August 1936, opens a way into the heart of Europe and constitutes the greatest possible danger to peace. The purpose of the proposed line can only be to facilitate the influx of Soviet troops into Central Europe.

It goes without saying that the transference of Roumania's foreign policy to the hands of the former Finance Minister **Antonescu** does not represent any change in the matter of the opposition to Hungary's revisionist claims. On this subject both King Carol and Antonescu have taken every opportunity in the last three months to restate their standpoint in respect of the inviolability of the Roumano-Hungarian frontier. Antonescu went so far as to repeat Titulescu's formula that "Revision means War". "There is no question therefore of any loosening of the links represented by the

Alliance with France of June 10th 1926, the Alliance with Czecho-Slovakia of April 23rd 1921, the Alliance with Yugoslavia of June 7th 1920, and the Statute of Organisation of the Little Entente of February 16th 1933. The change is rather in the direction of a fuller appreciation of the true interests of the country, a certain divergence in the approach to current problems and a greater freedom of action. The results are apparent in the resumption of the connection with Warsaw, the strands of which Titulescu had severed, and the attempts to rehabilitate the Roumanian-Polish Treaty of March 26th 1926, which in its original form was directed against the U.S.S.R. Perhaps it may be said that there is now a disposition to replace the Moscow orientation which Paris and Prague would like to see by a judicious attitude on the lines of Poland and Yugoslavia of the cross-bench order.

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The above observations point the moral of the decisive importance of Roumania for France and her Allies in the accomplishment of their political and military aims. The importance, which would in any case attach to a country whose geographical position makes it the bridge between the Soviet Union and Czecho-Slovakia, is intensified by the circumstance that **so far as numbers go Roumania is the strongest military Power in the Balkans.** To maintain and strengthen the national integrity is "the country's highest task", as the King and Premier were at pains on more than one occasion to point out after the introduction of the **Defence Estimates for 1935-36** with a total of no less than $6\frac{1}{2}$ milliards of lei or **28.5 per cent of the total Budget.** The **Defence Estimates for 1936-37** show an increase to $7\frac{1}{2}$ milliards or about **33 per cent of the Ordinary Budget.** They include appropriations of **2.6 milliards for new armaments** and **1.3 milliard for the Air Force.** But these sums were not sufficient for the completion of the rearmament programme; and an Economic Agreement was accordingly concluded with France in March 1936 for the delivery of French armament to Roumania to a value of 1.2 milliards of French francs. In return, Roumania has agreed according to the Parunka Vremie to cede her petroleum royalties to France for a period of twelve years. At the beginning of August 1936 Roumania concluded a new Agreement for the delivery of tanks with the Skoda Works in Czecho-Slovakia, the Czecho-Slovak Government at the same time according Roumania a credit of KČ. 200,000,000 in connection with the last Czecho-Slovak Armaments Loan. Negotiations are also proceeding at the present time between the Roumanian Government and the Skoda Works for the erection of a new explosives factory in Roumania with a view to closer cooperation between the armament industries of the two countries. A further Czecho-Slovak credit for Roumania of KČ. 500,000,000 was concluded, according to The Times, on January 20th 1937: it is to be used for war material to be obtained from Czecho-Slovak firms, as well as for the development of railways and roads on Roumanian territory which connect up with Czecho-Slovak railways and roads. Reference in this connection must further be made to the Roumanian Premier's recent announcement that the new Government proposes to devote itself with all its energy to the strengthening of the Defence forces, and that a new credit of 5 milliards of lei will be required for the purpose.

The reorganisation and modernisation of the Roumanian Army have made considerable progress recently as a result of the large armament credits and contracts for the delivery of war material. The **Army**, which is constitutionally a standing army based on compulsory service and organised on a territorial basis, has a **peace strength of some 225,000 men**, and is organised in peace in 7 Army Corps with 21 Infantry Divisions, 2 mountain rifle Divisions, 1 Guards Division, 4 Cavalry Divisions, and one corps of Gendarmerie and another of Frontier Defence guards. In war it should be able to put in the field an initial concentration of some 40 Divisions, viz. 35 Infantry and 5 Cavalry Divisions. In addition to the field army of the strength stated, Roumania can draw on some **1.5 million reinforcement troops** for lines of communication and home service as well as for the replacement of gaps in the front line. The three youngest years of recruits can be called up by the War Minister without consulting Parliament. The **aircraft** at present comprise some 200 fighter planes, 230 reconnaissance planes and 50 bombers, i.e. in all **480 first line aircraft** with **some 800 second line aircraft.** The anti-aircraft defences comprise 2 anti-aircraft regiments, while 2 searchlight companies and 8 anti-aircraft machine gun Sections are in process of formation. The reorganisation of the Artillery is already complete in its main lines. The peace-time Artillery consists of 323 batteries of light field guns and howitzers, 42 batteries of heavy guns and 16 batteries of anti-aircraft guns. The artillery armament consists of 1811 light and 168 heavy guns. A striking feature in the armament of the Artillery is the extensive experimental introduction of new gun types. In the Infantry, for example, the 40 and 47 mm. anti-tank defence guns of the Skoda Works and the double-barrelled 70/37 mm. gun of the same Works have been introduced. The Skoda 75 mm. mountain gun is at present under trial for the mountain Artillery. The Divisional Artillery is to have the Skoda 75 mm. field gun,

1928 model, and the new 105 mm. Schneider howitzer. The 150 mm. Skoda gun with a range of 23,650 metres and the 220 mm. mortar with a range of 15,000 metres have been introduced in the heavy Artillery. The anti-aircraft Artillery is armed with the 37 mm. Hotchkiss and the 76.5 mm. anti-aircraft gun from the Skoda Works. On the other hand the armament of the Infantry and the number of tanks are not up to modern standards. The peace cadres of the Divisions are only in part up to strength. Only 228 Infantry battalions are up to their full peace strength: they have some 4,000 light and 1,000 heavy machine guns. The **Tank Corps** consists at present of one regiment with a total of **90 tanks** including second-line tanks. The rearmament of the Roumanian Army will therefore in all probability take the form in the near future of filling up gaps in the case of the several arms and bringing the stocks of arms and equipment up to standard.

II. The attitude of Yugoslavia

In contra-distinction to France, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, all of whom resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on June 9th 1934, Yugoslavia has **not to date recognised the Moscow Government**, and is accordingly opposed to any sort of connection with Communism. In view of her opposition to an Austrian restoration and the return of the Hapsburgs, Yugoslavia's attitude in the matter of her Alliances with France (November 11th 1927), Czecho-Slovakia (August 14th 1920) and Roumania (June 7th 1921) and her membership of the Little Entente is governed by the same considerations which condition the attitude of Roumania. But under the active individual governance of the country by the late **King Alexander**, who fell a victim to the assassin on October 9th 1935 in Marseilles, and the vigorous and energetic **administration of Stojadinović**, a distinct relief from the unconditional vassalage to France was induced. The course of the conflict in Abyssinia strengthened this tendency; and it was still further strengthened by the absence of any response to the protest which Belgrade and the other Powers of the Little Entente addressed to Paris on the occasion of the introduction of compulsory military service in Austria.

The first stage in this development is to be found in the Treaty of Friendship concluded between **Yugoslavia and Poland** in 1926, which has been followed, particularly of late, by a marked rapprochement between the two countries. At the **end of May 1936**, for example, important **Agreements** were concluded **between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries**, Colonel Beck and M. Stojadinović; and the striking observation was let fall in this connection that the two States would "**never allow others, without us and without our cooperation on terms of equality, to decide as to our destiny.**" That reaction to the efforts of those who seek to direct and influence the natural course of development of peoples by reference to abstract doctrines or arbitrary political projects is altogether intelligible. It is the States of medium size which have the worst experiences in this connection. More than once they have had occasion to observe how frequently obligations incurred as a means of self-protection lose value as time goes on and assume the aspect of bonds of dependence, which conflict with the free development of national interests and may even obstruct such development altogether. It is only natural therefore to find an increasing recognition of the desire to revert to more reasonable methods of international cooperation. Recent visits of Roumanian, Turkish and Bulgarian statesmen to Belgrade should be interpreted in the light of these considerations. They are evidence no less of the political activity of Yugoslavia.

The **policy of Balkan emancipation** in pursuance of the **murdered King Alexander's dying words "Keep watch over Yugoslavia!"** has led, in addition to the closer relations with Poland and their corollary (since the fall of Titulescu) in the shape of increased friendliness with Roumania, to the preparation of better relations with Hungary, and at the end of December and beginning of January a **reconciliation with Bulgaria.** This last was the work primarily of King Boris and the late King Alexander and his successor the Prince Regent Paul. Pending publication of the text of the Agreement, it would be superfluous to discuss it in detail. But, inasmuch as it could never have been concluded under the provisions of the Statute of Organisation of the Little Entente and Balkan League of November 9th 1934—the members of the Balkan League are Yugoslavia, Roumania, Greece and Turkey—without the consent of all the parties to the two bodies in question, it is obvious that there was no side-stepping on the part of Yugoslavia, but that the object was to **pave the way to a general understanding in the Balkans** on the principle of the old saying "**The Balkans for the Balkan peoples.**" The Agreement has since been signed (January 24th 1937).

The aspirations towards a general understanding in the Balkans were the basis of the Turkish efforts which led up to the Treaties with Bulgaria on October 18th 1925 and March 6th 1929 and, above all, the Treaty with Greece of October 30th 1930. Bulgarian opposition prevented the realisation of these aspirations for the

time being; but the "eternal enmity" between Turkey and Greece was successfully converted into "eternal friendship."

The consent of Roumania and Greece to the new Agreement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, having regard to the continued opposition of the former to the Bulgarian claims to the Dobrudja and of the latter to the Bulgarian demand for access to the Aegean, is clear evidence of the fact that Jugoslavian aspirations, if not yet realised, are well on the way to fruition. Much will depend on whether it is found possible in the middle of February, when the Permanent Council of the Little Entente and of the Balkan League meets, to reconcile the interests of the two bodies with those of Bulgaria or—as Belgrade and Ankara would like—to induce the Bulgarian Government to join the Balkan League.

A further problem of great importance for the Belgrade Government is the problem of Yugoslavia's **relations with Rome**. These are over-shadowed by the antagonism of the two countries in regard to the command of the Adriatic, Mussolini's "amarissimo mare" (his "most bitter sea"), and by Mussolini's encirclement policy embodied in the Treaties with Hungary, Austria and Albania. The tension between the two countries reached its highest point in the course of the Sanctions War against Italy, when Yugoslavia declared her readiness in the Mediterranean Agreement with England to accept the military consequences in the event of sanctions leading to conflict in the Mediterranean.

Two more recent developments appear however to justify hopes of "**Peace in the Adriatic**." The first of these is the new Italo-Yugoslav Commercial Agreement, which came into force on October 1st 1936 putting an end to the last vestiges of the unhappy sanctions era. The second is the Speech of the Duce at Milan, in which he said that the atmosphere as between Italy and Yugoslavia had greatly improved of late, and that the moral, political and economic conditions were now such as to afford a sufficient basis for the establishment of genuinely friendly relations between the two countries.

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The Yugoslav Army ranks as the best in South Eastern Europe. The spirit of the Serbian soldiers especially is excellent, and the consolidation of the Army as a unitary body is increasingly noticeable. The **peace strength** is at present **148,000 men**, including the Frontier Defence Force which is under the War Ministry with a strength of some 9,000 men and the Gendarmerie of some 20,000 men, which is under the Ministry of the Interior for purposes of administration and disposition but under the War Ministry for purposes of training, discipline and reinforcement. The effective strength of the Army is considerably increased in summer by calling up reservists. The peace-time Army is organised in 5 Armies, each of which consists of 3 Infantry Divisions, one medium Artillery regiment and draft units. In addition there is a Guards Division composed of one Infantry regiment, one Cavalry brigade and one Field Artillery regiment, and 2 Cavalry Divisions. Each Infantry Division is composed of 3 to 4 Infantry regiments, 2 Field Artillery regiments and draft units. In all there are 58 Infantry regiments, viz. one Guard regiment, 56 line regiments and one Fortress Infantry regiment, with 158 battalions including 2 cyclist battalions. An Infantry regiment consists of 2 to 4 battalions and one Infantry gun Section: a battalion has 3 to one rifle companies and one machine gun company. A Cavalry Division consists of 2 brigades, each of 2 regiments, one cyclist battalion and one mounted Section. Altogether there are 40 squadrons including machine squadrons. The artillery of the peace-time Army is composed at present of 148 light, 45 heavy and 16 anti-aircraft batteries with a total of 832 light and 180 heavy guns. There are 46 companies with **some 120 tanks** and one gas battalion. There are some 43 land and 9 naval flights of aircraft with a total of **about 830 first and second line aircraft**.

The development of the Army has been impeded to no small extent by the financial difficulties with which Yugoslavia has had to contend ever since the formation of the Yugoslav State at the end of the war, and that, in spite of the fact that for years past 20 per cent and more of the total annual Budget—a very high percentage for a country like Yugoslavia—has gone towards the Defence expenditure. The **Defence Estimates for 1936-37** amount to **2,309 milliard** dinars as compared with 1,999 milliards in 1935-36. To this total there must be added a sum of 687 million dinars for non-recurrent expenditure on armaments. The increase in the Defence expenditure for the current year is therefore 997 million dinars. The increase is to be devoted mainly to covering the weak spot in the Army, namely the armament, especially of the Infantry, armoured troops and Air arm which is by no means up to modern standards and requires to be improved and completed. It was not therefore merely on financial grounds that modern technical weapons had to be dispensed with almost entirely at last year's manoeuvres. This year there are to be no manoeuvres, in order

to enable the modernisation of the Army to be speeded up and the military situation pro tanto improved. Yugoslavia has been compelled in the past to rely to excess on the support of her Allies owing to the inadequacy of her own armaments production. The development of the native armaments industry is accordingly receiving increased attention. The copper works at Bor and the iron works at Zenica are to be expanded for the purpose. A recent decision of the Cabinet provides for the construction of 3,000 km. of new railways; and this very large extension of the existing railway system is based in no small measure on strategic considerations.

In time of war Yugoslavia can already command the services of **2.5 million trained troops**, which will enable her to double her peace-time Army at the outset, provided there is no shortage of stocks of arms with which to equip the reservists. There are in addition formations of irregulars (the so-called "Sokols") which will be available in large numbers in the event of war: vigorous efforts are being made in connection with the training and military efficiency of these bodies.

III. The arming of Turkey

The Turkish defence forces which, unlike the armaments of the other States that suffered defeat in the World War, were not subjected to any restrictions in principle by the Treaty of Lausanne, have been built up in the course of the last twelve years by the energetic President of the Turkish Republic, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, in execution of the **Law of January 14th 1924 concerning the Constitution of the Defence Force** into a notable factor in the establishment of the authority of the Turkish State. What has been achieved in this direction could only have been achieved on the basis of a close internal concentration of the strength of the Turkish people by raising their morale and cultivating the national spirit. A long period of peace made possible the deliberate and consistent completion of this process of national revival; and Turkish foreign policy during the period made possible the maintenance of peace. A series of Treaties and Agreements with European and Asiatic peoples enabled Turkey to eliminate elements of danger which still subsisted as a legacy of the past in Asia Minor, in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. Reference need only be made at this juncture to the following items in the list of treaties and Agreements so concluded.

A factor of decisive moment for the new-born Turkish Republic in its struggle against the Western Powers and Greece was the Treaty of Neutrality concluded with the U.S.S.R. in 1921. This Treaty embodied the revulsion, which was a feature of Moscow's policy at this time, against the imperialistic designs of Czarist Russia on Constantinople and the Straits. It was supplemented at a later date by a Naval Agreement and a Treaty of Alliance. The military character of the Turco-Soviet friendship was vividly illustrated by the participation of the Russian Marshals Voroshilov and Budenny in the decennial celebrations of the Turkish Republic. Since that time Turkey has taken a great part of her war material from the Soviet Union. But Turkey aspired also to rank as a European Power, and to play an active part in the political shaping of South-Eastern Europe. The conclusion under her auspices of the **Balkan Pact** in February 1934 was the fruit of these aspirations. The Pact is a Treaty of Security between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Roumania for the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. Its intimate connection with the Statute of the Little Entente has also exercised a favourable influence on the relations of Turkey with France. Turkey has further been successful in the creation of a notable political standing for herself in the Mediterranean by constituting herself the centre of a group of small States bordering on the Aegean who aim at independence and freedom from the interference of the Great Powers. In the course of the Italian war in Abyssinia England approached this group of countries with a view to the conclusion of Naval Agreements as a backing for the English policy in the Mediterranean at the time; and Turkey took good political advantage of the occasion to free herself of the last vestiges of the restrictions imposed on her sovereignty in respect of the Straits — a legacy of the World War which had always been galling to Turkish national feeling. Under the new **Straits Convention of Montreux of June 22nd 1936**, which is concluded for a period of 20 years in the first instance, Turkey resumes military and political sovereignty over the Dardanelles, and with it the right, which was withheld from her in the Treaty of Lausanne, of re-fortifying the Straits. It is noticeable however in this connection that the Soviet disclaimer of former Czarist Russian policy in regard to the Straits, which figured in the Turco-Soviet Neutrality Treaty of December 17th 1925, was to a certain extent renewed in the **Convention of Montreux**, Article 16 of which was so worded — at the instance of the U.S.S.R. — as to limit the general prohibition of

the passage of warships and auxiliary vessels of belligerent States through the Straits by a provision allowing passage in future in cases coming under Article 23 (contingencies arising in connection with League of Nations obligations), and cases arising under Pacts and Agreements concluded by Turkey within the limits of the Covenant of the League, even to warships and auxiliary vessels of belligerents.

On July 20th 1936, after the signature of the Montreux Convention, the zone of the Straits was again occupied by Turkish troops. The fortification of the Dardanelles has since been pushed forward vigorously. Chanak Kaleh is to be the Headquarters of a General officer's Command, and will be the site of the biggest Turkish wireless station. A strip of land 19 km. wide on both shores of the Dardanelles has already been declared a military zone. Aircraft may not fly over it except along specified routes fixed by the Government; and it may only be inhabited by Turkish nationals. The islands of Imbros and Tenedos are again being garrisoned. Another result of the recovery of Turkish sovereignty in the Dardanelles will probably be the building of a strategic railway connection with Gallipoli. No change has so far been made in the matter of the demilitarisation of the Turco-Greco-Bulgarian frontier zone. But in the meantime Turkey is making vigorous efforts in connection with the armament and development of her Defence forces.

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The peace-time Army of Turkey, which is based on compulsory military service, has an establishment of 20,000 officers and 178,000 men; but only 140,000 are kept with the colours on grounds of economy. There is in addition a very well trained Gendarmerie of 40,000 men, organised on military lines, which is available in support of the Army in war or on mobilisation, and Frontier troops to the number of 10,000 in 17 battalions. The war strength may be put at 1,300,000 men. The Defence expenditure for the period 1935-36 amounted to 57 million £ Turkish. The Army is at present organised only in cadres which it will take some years to bring up to strength. The whole of the forces are divided into 4 Army Inspections and 10 Army Corps. Each Army Corps contains 2 Infantry Divisions of 3 regiments each (9 battalions) and one Field Artillery regiment of 6 to 9 batteries. To these must be added Corps troops consisting of one Cavalry and one Field Artillery regiment, one Pioneer battalion, 1 Signals Section and one Motor battalion. Outside the corps formation there are 5 Cavalry Divisions (of 3 regiments each, consisting of 4 Cavalry squadrons and one machine gun squadron and one Horse Artillery Section), 3 separate mountain brigades (of 2 mountain Infantry regiments each with mountain artillery), and Railway troops, anti-aircraft troops with modern mechanised searchlight equipment, Pioneer and Armoured car troops. The last named have at present only a nucleus of light Soviet tanks. The number is to be brought up to 150 to 200 tanks. Great attention is paid to mechanisation. The provision of material is difficult for the reason that most of it has to come from foreign countries, as Turkey has up to the present had only a few powder and cartridge factories and one factory for the repair of mines and guns. The Air Force is being expanded at an accelerated rate under a Three Years Plan laid down by the Supreme Council of National Defence. There are at present some 440 aircraft, mostly French. The financing of the Air arm, which was previously left mainly to the Turkish Air League, was taken over to an increased extent by the State in 1936, when the Ordinary Budget was raised from 0.9 to 4.5 million £ Turkish for the purpose. The Grand National Council voted a further £4,000,000 sterling in June 1936 for National Defence purposes, including in the first place the strengthening of the Air arm and the anti-gas defences, and the improvement of the Sivas-Erzurum railway and the road from Trebizond to the Persian frontier. Orders were placed in Poland in the summer of 1936 for 40 P.Z. L. 24 aeroplanes with French Gnome-Rhône H.P. 1,000 motors. These one-seater fighter planes are to have special motors and armament more powerful than those of the machines of the same type in use in the Polish Air Force. They will be fitted with two 2 cm. Oerlikon guns. The Turkish airmen receive part of their training in Moscow in gliding and the use of the parachute. The Air Defences are also being pushed of late. A gas mask factory has been erected in this connection at Angora. The network of communications has also been improved and extended in recent years on strategic grounds, and the Turkish Army will have increased powers of movement and a well ordered system of reinforcement and supply lines in consequence, which will greatly enhance its striking power. The upshot is that, in spite of the incomplete state of her armaments, Turkey is already a far more formidable opponent in the event of attack than she was at the time of the World War.

IV. Greece's defence force


The purpose of the Greek Army is to afford military backing to the peace policy which Greece has pursued for many years past. The geographical conformation of Greece, the difficulties of which have not been eased by the large increase of territory of the last few decades, forces the country to follow a foreign and strategic policy of neutrality. Common frontiers with Albania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey make Greece a Balkan State. But on the other hand her extended coast-line, behind which there is in many parts only the narrowest of hinterlands, and the possession of a large number of islands, large and small, make her also a Mediterranean Power. The Balkan Pact of 1934 guaranteed the inviolability of the frontiers of Greece. It is moreover certain in the light of the last Session of the Balkan League of May 1936 that the only obligation incumbent on Greece to take military action under the Balkan Pact is in the event of an attack by Bulgaria alone on one of her neighbours—a contingency which, in view of the military weakness of Bulgaria, may be ruled out as a practical possibility. In any other eventuality—for example, the case of Jugoslavia and Roumania being involved in a conflict in Central Europe, or the case of Bulgaria and Albania being in alliance with an extra-Balkan Power in a war—Greece is only bound to observe neutrality. As a Mediterranean Power also, Greece aims at the cultivation of good relations with Italy, England and Turkey, similar to the relations she has established with the Balkan Powers on the mainland. With Turkey, whose Balkan activities in the past have frequently been the occasion of political differences and even warlike complications, Greece is connected since the conclusion of the Alliance of October 1930 by ties of sincere mutual friendship. The relations of Greece and England are traditionally friendly, and have been strengthened still further by the restoration of the Monarchy, as was clearly shown by the Agreements concluded between the two countries on the occasion of the sanctions taken by the League of Nations against Italy. There can be no question that in the event of war Greece will always be prepared to offer the British Navy points d'appui, as she did in 1935 when the tension in the Mediterranean in connection with the Abyssinian conflict became acute. While there are no serious difficulties in the way of an understanding on Mediterranean issues between Greece on the one hand and England or Turkey on the other, relations with Italy are considerably more complicated. The Italo-Greek Pact of Friendship of 1928 has not yielded any practical fruits. The occupation of Corfu by the Italians, the alliance between Italy and Albania, and above all the powerful Italian fortifications on the twelve islands of the Dodecanese, situated as they are in the very middle of the Greek archipelago to which Greece has for years past laid claim, are obstacles in the way of an understanding between the two States.

As a bulwark to the policy of neutrality it was resolved at an extraordinary meeting in February 1935 of the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army, Navy and Air forces, with the War Minister in the Chair, to fortify the land frontiers in accordance with the most modern methods of military fortification. The Government provided the Army Command with the necessary funds for the purpose in the shape of 1 to 1.5 milliards of drachmae. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, commenting on this decision, said: "The aims of Greece are wholly peaceful; but we are compelled to protect the inviolability of our native land. Although Greece has taken no step up to now which might give rise to misunderstanding, our neighbours do not appear to have the same intentions as we have. We are therefore compelled to protect our frontiers. In close accord with the Government, the General Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force have set up a Committee of expert officers which will at once proceed to work out plans. The work of fortification will begin immediately." Some months later the Government decided to push forward energetically with the reorganisation of the whole of the Defence forces. The step was needed, as the Army and Navy had suffered considerably in cohesion and striking power as a result of the internal political differences of which they had frequently been the focal points. Since the restoration of the Monarchy the Defence forces have been purged to a considerable extent of party politics, and the ground cleared to enable them in future to confine themselves to their purely military duties.

Defence expenditure has steadily increased since 1932-33: in 1935-36 it totalled 2,444.7 million drachmae.

The Greek Army is based on compulsory military service. It has a peace strength at the present time of some 85,000 men. It is organised in 2 Army Inspections with 4 Army Corps of 3 Divisions each, of which two are directly under the War Minister, one separate Infantry regiment, the Evzone Guards in Athens, 2 Cavalry brigades and the Air Force Command. In all there are 24 Infantry regiments, 4 separate Infantry and mountain rifle battalions, 7 Frontier Defence battalions, 4 Cavalry regiments, 6 mountain Artillery regiments

Bombs




French air bombs (weight 50, 100, 300, 400, 700 and 1,800 kg.)



Bombs suspended under the stern of the Italian Savoia S. 72 night bomber




Stowage of four 200 kg. bombs in the French multi-seater fighting and bombing plane Amiot 143



Finnish Utter bombs manufactured by the Bofors gun factory (weight 12½, 25, 50 and 100 kg.)



Stowage of a 270 kg. bomb and of two 45 kg. bombs in the English bombing plane Northrop 2 E



Four 100 kg. bombs on the under-surface of the French reconnaissance plane Bréguet 273

and one separate Artillery Section, 2 light and 2 heavy Artillery regiments, 2 Pioneer regiments, one Telegraph and one Railway regiment, one Pontoon battalion, 4 Motor Sections and one separate Motor company. The **war strength** of the Army may probably be put at **600,000 men**. There are likely however to be difficulties under present conditions in arming and equipping an army of this strength; and concentration is rendered difficult by the backward development of the railway system. Mobilisation is organised on the French system; and the training of the Army, which has been for a number of years past in the hands of a French Military Mission, is also mainly on French lines. The armament and equipment of the Greek Army is not yet uniform. The number of armoured cars and tanks is not known: nor is information available as to the extent to which the individual arms have been mechanised. The armament and equipment of the Army is held up by great difficulties owing to the financial position and the absence of an adequate Greek armaments industry. The same is true of the construction and expansion of the **Air Force**. Of the two Army Air Divisions (with Headquarters in Athens and Thessalonica respectively) and one Naval Air Division, which are projected, only a part of the 1st Army Air Division with Headquarters at Athens) and a part of the Naval Air Division have been formed: they have between them **some 150 aircraft** mainly of French and English manufacture.

The Supreme Command of the Army has hitherto been in the hands of the War Minister in peace-time. It is not known whether any change has been made in this, as in other similar respects, since the restoration of the Monarchy. The War Minister has under him the Chief of the General Staff, who is Commander-in-Chief of the Army of operations in war-time, the Inspector of Army Training, the Inspectors of Arms and Supplies, the Sanitary and Veterinary Services, and the Army Inspectors who are in charge of the supervision and review of the Army Corps in respect of their training and preparation for mobilisation and concentration. There is also a National Defence Council with the Premier as Chairman, which is responsible for the co-operation of all Ministries in case of war, and a Supreme War Council under the War Minister which deals with questions of organisation and equipment. The Supreme War Council also reports on all preparatory action in connection with armaments with a view to war and all questions connected with fortifications and general aspects of National Defence.

V. Bulgaria's enforced disarmament

The **Peace Treaty of Neuilly** forbade Bulgaria to maintain a standing army on a basis of compulsory military service as before the World War. For the defence of her frontiers she was permitted only to have a voluntary army with a strength of 20,000 men including officers and non-commissioned officers. In addition she was allowed a Frontier Defence Force and a Gendarmerie, both of which are under the orders of the War Ministry. The Frontier Defence Force may not exceed 3,000 men, and the number of their machine guns may not be above 45. The strength of the Gendarmerie was fixed at 6,800 men, of whom however only 6,300 might be armed with rifles. The military disarmament thus imposed on Bulgaria as one of the conquered States of the World War by the conquerors has been pregnant with consequences in so far as her recovery after the war was concerned. The experience of past years has shown that owing to her military weakness Bulgaria is not even able to guarantee her internal security. The people and the country have been exposed to severe Communistic unrest and disturbances. Frequent changes of Government and perils to internal peace and order have done Bulgaria infinite harm. As a means of combating disruptive Bolshevik tendencies in her midst, Bulgaria introduced compulsory labour—she was the first country in Europe to do so—with a view to education in patriotic principles and the cultivation of a national spirit in her young people. So long as she is deprived of the right freely to decide as to the constitution of her own Defence forces, compulsory labour serves to a certain extent to take the place of compulsory military service.

Having regard to her internal difficulties, Bulgaria has been at pains in recent years to keep clear of any commitments in the field of foreign policy and, in particular, to avoid military commitments of any kind which might impede the progress of internal recovery. Bulgaria did not join the Balkan League concluded in 1934 between Turkey, Roumania, Greece and Jugoslavia*) in view of her efforts for revision of the Treaty of Neuilly. On the other hand she has endeavoured to obtain from the conquering States some relief from the provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly which bear so heavily on her people. Italy, who has so often pressed for

revision of the Peace Treaties, has supported Bulgaria in her representations in this matter.

Although the Treaty of Neuilly has not yet been set aside and replaced by a treaty more favourable to Bulgaria, certain concessions have nevertheless been made which go to mitigate its incidence. Bulgaria has thus been enabled to develop her Army in a manner more consistent with political conditions. It now consists of 4 Army Corps composed of 10 Infantry Divisions and one light Division and one mountain brigade in course of formation. There are also Corps troops which are at present composed of 3 Cavalry brigades of 3 regiments each and one horsed Artillery Section, some heavy Artillery regiments and Engineer regiments. Army troops comprise one Signals and one Railway regiment, one cyclist and one motor battalion, 2 tank companies and one Air regiment of 3 groups, one training group and one Naval Aircraft Section. There are at present some 70 to 80 aircraft, made up of 3 fighter flights, 3 reconnaissance flights and one bomber flight. The peace-time Army, consisting at present of 108 battalions, 30 to 40 squadrons, and 78 light and 24 heavy batteries, has an average strength in the winter months of 20,000 to 40,000 men, and in the summer months of 60,000 to 80,000 men. In **war-time** Bulgaria should have some **150,000 trained troops** at her disposal, with a reservoir of some 200,000 untrained men to draw on.

VI. Albania

Albania has been an independent Kingdom since September 1928. The Italian Treaty with Albania of 1926, which was expanded in the following year into an offensive and defensive alliance, was the prelude to the Italian Protectorate over Albania which took shape in the Treaty of 1936. The extent of Italian influence in Albania is shown by the fact that the Head of the King's Military Cabinet is an Italian General. The Albanian Army is in other respects also subject to powerful Italian influence. Albanian officers frequently receive training in the Italian Army.

The Army, Frontier Defence, Gendarmerie and Navy are under the National Defence Command. The Army is based on compulsory military service with 1½ years' active service. It has a **peace strength** of some **9,000 men**. It is organised (including the battalion of the Royal Guard) in 3 reinforced Infantry regiments with a total of 204 machine guns, 22 mountain and other batteries with a total of 64 guns, 9 companies of Engineers (including 4 Pioneer companies), 4 Signals detachments, one Pontoon company and one Tank company with 8 tanks. According to statements in the English Press the Tank company is about to be expanded into a Section. It is also intended to form 3 Divisions in war out of the 3 reinforced Infantry regiments: there are at present **40,000 trained men** to draw on for the purpose.

The Frontier Defence force of some 1,350 men consists of 4 battalions with a total of 14 companies. The Gendarmerie of 3,234 men is scattered about the country in small detachments. It is organised in 10 District Commands.

VII. Hungary's military insecurity

Since the ratification of the Pact of Mutual Assistance on May 16th 1935 between Czecho-Slovakia and the U.S.S.R. there has been a remarkable revulsion of opinion on the part of public opinion in Hungary, as in other countries, in the view taken of the Communist problem. Until the signature of this Pact the Communist problem, so far as it directly affected Hungary, had been regarded purely as a matter of internal politics; and the general feeling was that, since the complete repression of the Communist supremacy of Bela Kun, there was no longer any serious danger of Bolshevism. This is no longer the position. **Communism in the military-imperialist form is now a matter of foreign politics, and has assumed the dimensions of a direct menace to Hungary.** Count István Bethlen, the former Premier, was the first to draw his countrymen's attention to the changed situation. In an article appearing at the turn of the year 1935-36, which attracted much notice, he pointed out that **the Pact must involve a complete reshuffle of international values in Central Europe.** Count Bethlen's warning found a ready response on the part of numerous leading politicians in Hungary. The full measure of the danger then became apparent, as details became known in regard to the increasing development of Czecho-Slovak "air nests" in the neighbouring districts of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.

The **Treaty of Trianon of June 4th 1920** created a stump-Hungary, shorn of two-thirds of its historic possessions and crippled in the military sense. The main gains resulting from the cessions of territory which were imposed on Hungary went

*) For the Bulgarian-Jugoslav understanding of January 24th see under "II. The attitude of Jugoslavia" above.

to the three Succession States, as they are called, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia. But the Hungarian nation has never down to this day accepted the settlement which the Trianon Treaty imposed. The ultimate object of all Hungarian foreign policy without distinction of persons is, and will remain, the revision of the Treaty. To prevent such revision, and further to forestall a restoration of the Hapsburgs, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia joined together in 1920-21 to form the Little Entente. The political isolation to which Hungary was thus condemned continued until 1927, when Hungary sought and found escape in the shape of a Treaty of Friendship with Italy, who supported the revisionist claims of Hungary, as did certain circles in England. In the years that followed—and especially after 1933, when the then Honved Minister Gyula Gömbös was entrusted by the Regent, Admiral Horthy, with the additional portfolio of Prime Minister—the maimed and mutilated Hungary of the Treaty of Trianon became an increasingly powerful factor in European politics. Avoiding the numerous rocks with which the foreign policy of Hungary is beset, particularly in the Danubian basin, Gömbös was able to steer a course which powerfully contributed to raise the prestige of his country and to make its friendship an object of more than one country's political attentions notwithstanding its initial handicaps of almost complete military defencelessness and a weak economic position. The Rome Protocols concluded between Italy, Hungary and Austria in 1934, which were tantamount to a political and military alliance, and the friendship with National Socialist Germany materially assisted the recovery of Hungary which the last few years have witnessed. The premature death of Gömbös in October 1936 deprived Hungary of one of those statesmen who have never ceased from the moment of the collapse in 1918 to inspire the Hungarian people with that spirit which must always be the primary prerequisite of any moral and political revival—the spirit of national self-respect. The world today looks to Hungary as to a people united in its resolve to spare no effort in its endeavours to reassert its right to political and military equality.

Under the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon the **Hungarian Defence force (Honved)** is no longer based on compulsory military service: it is a mercenary army of which the Regent is the Commander-in-Chief. The effective Command is in the hands of the Honved Minister, assisted by the Chief Commandant and his subordinate Inspectors. Hungary is forbidden to form a General Staff or to make reparations for mobilisation. The Army, which has an **aggregate strength of 35,000 men**, is organised in 7 Infantry brigades of 42 battalions in all, each with 3 rifle companies and one machine gun company, and 2 independent Cavalry brigades of 23 squadrons in all, including 8 machine gun squadrons. There are also 26 light batteries, including 2 anti-aircraft batteries, with 105 light guns in all, 20 Pioneer companies and 7 Signal companies. The Air Force which is under the Supreme Command of the Air Department in the Honved Ministry, is this year to be organised in 2 reconnaissance squadrons, 4 fighting squadrons and 4 battle squadrons. The battle formations constitute the 1st Air Brigade in Budapest. The number of aircraft at the end of 1936 was stated to be **270 first line planes**.

Hungary has neither fortresses nor medium or heavy artillery, armoured cars or tanks, to enable her to defend herself in case of attack. In view of the political tension in Europe and the intensified armaments of her neighbours, Hungary's security is seriously endangered; and her insecurity is notably enhanced by the Military Pact concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Czecho-Slovakia, and by the efforts which are being made to secure the use of Roumania as a passage for the transit of Soviet troops to Central Europe. These developments more than justify Hungary in her demand for the suspension of the disarmament limitations of the Treaty of Trianon, and in her claim for military equality, to enable her to prevent a repetition of the Communist experiment already made on her soil with its sequel in the shape of the invasion of foreign troops in 1919.

VIII. The new Austrian defence force

The **Treaty of Saint Germain**, which (like the Treaty of Versailles) was enforced by threats of violence on the part of the conquerors in the World War in September 1919, deprived Austria of the principal territories of the former Dual Monarchy, and at the same time forbade her to maintain an army on a basis of compulsory service and compelled her to introduce a professional army. The strength of the latter was not to exceed 1,500 officers, 30,000 men, 90 light guns, 60 trench mortars and 450 machine guns; but as a result of the economic and financial difficulties of the country this strength was not in practice attained until the autumn of 1933, when internal political developments provided an occasion for the expansion of the Army. The critical position in Austria in 1922 had already compelled the Government to apply to the

League of Nations for assistance: Austria had been a member of the League since the end of 1920. The so-called Geneva protocols of October 4th 1922 in regard to the financial reconstruction of Austria gave her the financial aid which she required; but she was forced in return to submit to political and economic conditions which, taken in conjunction with the League of Nations Loan accorded to her by the Lausanne Protocol of July 1932, constituted a grave menace to her independence. Austrian foreign policy in the succeeding period was accordingly directed towards the cultivation of good relations with the neighbouring countries as a means of countering the political and economic isolation to which she was condemned.

It was not until the conclusion of the Triple Entente with Italy and Hungary in March 1934 that Austria obtained a modicum of support in the field of foreign policy. A special Annex to the so-called Rome Protocols embodied an Italian guarantee of the political independence and territorial inviolability of Austria. But the whole political status of Austria remained nevertheless in suspense, partly as a result of the growing differences with National Socialist Germany (which were not brought to an end until the German-Austrian Agreement was concluded with the friendly co-operation of Italy on July 11th 1936), but mainly as a result of the growing insecurity in Austria herself and the continually increasing political tension between the other States of Europe. In presence of this situation with the menace which it involved to the continued existence of the Austrian State, the Federal Government of Austria decided on **May 2nd 1936** to send a Memorandum to the Powers announcing the **introduction of compulsory military service in Austria**. In a comprehensive accompanying statement the Government justified its action, on the grounds of the educative effects of the measure, on which (it explained) its decision was primarily based; but, with a view to the eventuality of the measure being attacked on the ground of the provisions of the Treaty of Saint Germain, it went on to put forward the following additional considerations.

"1. The Treaty of Saint Germain imposes upon Austria a number of forcible measures of a military character, but at the same time explicitly promises in the introduction to Part V that the almost complete unilateral disarmament and demilitarisation of Austria will be followed by action for the limitation of military armaments on the part of the other signatories of the Treaty.... The Federal Government must point out that Austria has fulfilled all her obligations without exception, whereas in all the other States concerned the tendency has been to an alarming extent in the very opposite direction.

"2. Recognition of the facts as described, which do not conform either to the letter or to the spirit of the Treaty of Saint Germain, by the other parties to the Treaty is clearly implicit both in the declaration of the Five Great Powers of December 11th 1932 and in the published statement of the results of the Conference of Stresa (Point 6), as also in the fact that in the proposals submitted to the Disarmament Conference by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald Austria was assigned a peace strength for her Army of 50,000 men.

"3. While it is true that in the official texts to which paragraph 2 above relates the proposed concessions to Austria in the matter of military equality are made conditional on the conclusion of Pacts of Security, it must be pointed out that Austria has always been, and still is, the first to welcome and support any proposals for the establishment of a system of treaties affording an effective guarantee of Central European security, as does for instance the proposal embodied in the recent Rome Protocol of January 7th 1935. It is plainly not Austria's fault if these efforts have not up to now made much progress, and are in fact in danger of coming to nothing.

"In this connection the Federal Government feels bound once more to give expression to its conviction, freely arrived at without legal quibbling or antagonism in relation to any other State, that lasting peace in Europe is inconceivable except on the basis of complete and unqualified elimination of every sort of discrimination between the former conquerors and the former conquered, and the rejection root and branch of all measures of force which go counter to the natural rights of peoples and as such are derogatory to the national sentiment of those on whom they are imposed. Such measures can only be regarded as a legacy of the unhappy state of mind engendered by the late War.

"4. While the military clauses of the Treaty of Saint Germain are accompanied by certain undertakings to be fulfilled by the other parties to the Treaty, the obligation imposed on Austria to maintain her independence is explicit, and is not conditional on the fulfilment of any corresponding obligations by the other parties to the Treaty. It is Austria's firm intention to fulfil her obligation in this respect. It is therefore a demonstration of Austria's desire conscientiously to observe these essential provisions of the Treaty of Saint Germain, which are at the same time elements of the existing European order, when in presence of the grave dangers with which the international situation is beset she is concerned

to do everything in her power to maintain her independence in relation to all parties."

In conclusion it is added that the Law imposing compulsory military service is an exercise of Austria's sovereign rights.

A month before the publication of the Memorandum to the Powers on the introduction of compulsory military service, an Act amending the Federal Constitution which was necessary for the enforcement of the measure indicated in the Memorandum had become law on April 1st 1936: this was the Act concerning "Compulsory Universal Service for Public Purposes". Under its provisions all Austrian citizens of the male sex from the beginning of their 18th to the end of their 42nd year may be called up "for service for limited periods with or without arms for public purposes." The Act purposely avoids the use of the expression "military service" in deference to the provisions of the Treaty of Saint Germain; but it may be regarded as tantamount to the re-introduction of compulsory military service. Finally on June 1st 1935 the new organisation of the Federal Army in its expanded form came into force.

As at present reorganised, the Austrian Army has an establishment of 44,000 men forming 7 Infantry Divisions (in lieu of the former 6 mixed brigades), one "mobile Division," a Mountain brigade and Army troops consisting of one independent Artillery regiment with one horsed light section and 2 mechanised heavy sections, one Bridging battalion, one Army Pioneer section, one Army Telegraph section and 2 Air regiments: it is proposed to form a third Air regiment. The aircraft at the disposal of the Air Force have hitherto consisted mainly of reconnaissance, fighting and school planes. The Air arm is in short only in process of formation; and the same is true of the anti-aircraft arm, which at present consists only of one 8 cm. anti-aircraft battery and one anti-aircraft machine gun company.

The Divisions, as ultimately organised, are to consist of:

- 3 Infantry regiments of 3 battalions each,
- 1 light Artillery regiment of 3 sections, each of 3 batteries of 4 guns,
- 1 reconnaissance section composed of mobile troops,
- 1 Pioneer battalion,
- 1 Telegraph battalion,
- 1 Air Defence section, and the requisite Supply units.

The "mobile Division" is composed of one mechanised Jäger brigade of 4 mechanised Jäger battalions, one brigade of 2 regiments of dragoons, one armoured car battalion and one mechanised Telegraph battalion. Mechanised field batteries will be attached to the mobile Division as required.

A good deal was done in the course of last year to improve the hitherto highly inadequate armament and equipment. The Infantry was given the light 8 mm. machine gun M 30, the 9 mm. machine pistol M 34, the light 8 cm. trench mortar M 33, and the 4.7 cm. Infantry gun M 35 for anti-tank defence. The Artillery has once more the 15 cm. howitzer as its medium gun. Special attention is being paid to the motorised units. The six-wheeled cross-country 1½ ton fast lorry and the heavy tractors for the medium Artillery guns all come from Austrian factories. The single armoured car battalion at present in existence has 2 companies of light two-men tanks and one company of quite new eight-wheeled heavy road armoured cars which can move readily across country. Each regiment of the Infantry is to be given one motorised machine gun company and one company of 9 Infantry guns.

The Austrian Federal Army at present comprises the following troops:

Infantry.

- 1 Guard battalion,
- 17 Infantry regiments (Nos. 1 to 15, Tyrolean Jäger regiment, Tyrolean Rifle regiment),
- 5 independent battalions (Field Jäger battalion No. 2, Alpine Jäger battalions Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5),
- 4 motorised Jäger battalions.

Armoured unit.

- 1 battalion.

Artillery.

- 1 independent Artillery regiment,
- 6 light Artillery regiments (A 7th light Artillery regiment is in process of formation).

Cavalry.

- 2 dragoon regiments.

Air Force.

- 2 Air regiments with ground organisation,
- 1 anti-aircraft machine gun company,
- 1 anti-aircraft battery.

Pioneers.

- 7 battalions,
- 1 Bridging battalion,
- 1 Army Pioneer section.

Telegraph.

- 8 Telegraph battalions,
- 1 Army Telegraph section,
- 8 independent Telegraph platoons.

Motor units.

- 7 Divisional motor sections.

The above troops are distributed between the following Divisional Commands:

1 Division with Headquarters at Vienna,	Vienna,
2 Division	" Vienna,
3 Division	" St. Pölten,
4 Division	" Linz,
5 Division	" Graz,
6 Division	" Innsbruck,
7 Division	" Klagenfurt,
Mobile Division	" Vienna.

The higher Command of the Army, as hitherto exercised, has been modified by the re-establishment of the position of Chief of the General Staff for the armed forces as from April 1st 1936. Apart from this measure there is no change in the supreme Command, which rests as before with the Federal President. The effective command is in the hands of the Federal Minister for National Defence; and the National Defence Ministry is the highest central Army authority.

The Treaty of Saint Germain laid down that the war organisation and war strength of the Austrian Federal Army were not to vary from the peace organisation and peace strength. Provision has now been made, under the new Law concerning compulsory Federal Service for Public Purposes, for economic measures in the event of war. Apart from this provision, Austria has no special laws for the defence of the country or economic preparation for war.

The completion of the new Army organisation, under which the Army is to have a peace strength of 50,000 men, will entail considerable increases in the strength of the cadres; and these increases can only be effected by degrees as budgetary resources or credits are available. The Army Estimates for the budget year 1936-37 amounted to 126.43 million Schillings (which represents 6.6 per cent of the total budget expenditure). This was the highest Army vote since 1918; but it is nothing like enough to cover the new expenditure which is proposed. The legislature has accordingly already indicated its assent to the provision of larger credits for the Army in the 1937-38 Budget. In addition, a Federal Law enacted by the Federal Government imposes a contribution in the nature of a capital levy on the Provinces and the City of Vienna by deduction from their shares in the credits for joint Federal expenditure for the year 1937 to the tune of about 14,000,000 Schillings.

To further the development of the Air arm, the National Defence Minister addressed an appeal to the population at the end of September 1936 to make a voluntary contribution. "Austrians!" so the closing word of the Appeal ran, "The Army turns to you for aid. It asks for a demonstration of your confidence and a sacrifice. It does so, because the sacrifice is not for the benefit of private or particular interests of any kind, but in the interest of the defence capacity of our Fatherland."

The Federal Government took a further decision in connection with the reconstruction of the Defence forces when it promulgated a Law on October 10th 1936 disbanding the numerous Austrian defence associations then in existence. Their place is to be taken by the new Front Militia. A new Law of October 14th 1936 concerning this "Militia of the Fatherland's Front" says that the function of the Front Militia is to enrol volunteers capable of defence service in independent formations. Men still liable for service may also be included. The administration of the Front Militia is attached to the Ministry of National Defence. The Front Militia may be called up in case of war or for training purposes by its General Commandant in agreement with the Minister for National Defence.

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"Chains, which we had wrathfully borne, are snapped!" Such was the heading of the public notices announcing the introduction of compulsory military service. By this step Austria has laid the foundations for the reconstruction of her Defence forces and made it possible to prepare for the eventual establishment of a dependable system of national defence.

The Arming of Poland and the Baltic border states

Poland

Poland has learnt from past history that her national security must be based on her Army, and can be so based without constituting a threat to others. A new military type has come into being in Poland, whose development dates back to the Rifle Associations and Legions of the World War and culminates in the Polish Army of the present day. The credit for the successful accomplishment of this vast process of development rests first and foremost with the late Marshal Piłsudski, whose death took place the year before last. To the end of his life Piłsudski remained War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Army to the neglect of all other openings for the exercise of power, in order to preside personally over the educational period. The Polish Army of today is in the fullest sense therefore his creation. Piłsudski's successor in the supreme command of the Army, Inspector-General Rydz-Smigly—who is today, after the President of the Republic, the most powerful personage in Poland in the political, as well as in the military, hierarchy—takes his stand on the Piłsudski tradition in just the same measure as the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck. To say which is to say that Poland relies primarily on her own resources: that is to say, the policy which she follows as a great Power is conditioned solely by considerations of Polish interests. While Marshal Piłsudski was alive, alliances and security pacts were concluded to ease the path of peaceful development. But in recent years the position has been changing and always to Poland's disadvantage. The limited capacity of Poland in respect of the production of armaments made it impossible for her to keep pace with the military armaments of her neighbours, while political developments in Europe—and the activities of the Soviet Union in particular—involved her in dangers for which she was not responsible. On the one hand Czecho-Slovakia concluded her alliance with the U.S.S.R. under which she became the base of operations for the Red Army. On the other hand Poland's alliance with Roumania lost value as a result of the complaisance shown by the former Roumanian Foreign Minister Titulescu in his relations with the U.S.S.R. The Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Baltic States were holding military conversations in Moscow. It was no adequate answer to the problems posed by the situation that the Polish Premier's Order of July 15th 1936 made the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Rydz-Smigly, the second personage in Poland after the President of the Republic, so that he became the superior officer of all civilian officials including the Premier himself! The semi-official comment issued at the time of the Order revealed the underlying grounds for the decision to confer these full powers on General Rydz-Smigly. The special situation in which the Polish nation is placed, so the comment ran, and the special geographical and historical circumstances by which the destiny of Poland is governed, make it essential for the Supreme Commander of the Army to be given a place in the political framework of the State of such a special kind as will enable him to concentrate the whole of the defence of the nation and subordinate all other problems to this. Only a month before the issue of the Order the Express Poranny pointed out, in connection with the Government's applying for an Enabling Act, that "the problem of the strengthening of the national defences is the problem on which the realities of Poland's position turn."

The foundation of Poland's power is her Army; and in presence of the continuous increase of international tension Poland's chief concern was bound under the circumstances to be the problem of how to strengthen her military position. It is true, the former War Minister General Składkowski, in the discussion of the 1935-36 Budget in the Budget Committee of the Diet, was able to say that the Polish Infantry was the best armed infantry in the world. It was all armed, he explained, with a new Mauser rifle, with the Model 25 carbine, the Browning heavy machine gun Model 30 and the grenade-thrower Model 30. The equipment of the Pioneer and Signals formations, he added, was being modernised, and new Vickers tanks with 6.3 cm. guns were being introduced. Poland had now an armaments industry of her own, capable not only of supplying the standing Army but also of arming the extra-military formations and associations with modern weapons. But the result of all these measures has been to swell the Army's budget to such an extent that since 1932 it has not been less than 768 million zloty or 35.7 per cent of the total Budget of the country. The 1936-37 Army Estimates are also put at the same figure (768 million zloty); but the amount is not sufficient to supply the current demands or to provide for renewals of out-of-date material. The Government accordingly has established a special "National Defence Fund" and appealed to the sacrifice of the population. All contributions received pass into this Fund; and according to reports published in the Press they already represent considerable sums. In addition, in a number of factories the workers have resolved to work unpaid overtime in order to provide the Army with aircraft, machine guns, tanks etc. But the

voluntary contributions are not sufficient to provide the Army with all that it requires; and new resources had to be found for the purpose. Accordingly in the course of General Rydz-Smigly's visit to Paris an Agreement was signed on September 6th 1936, under which Poland is given by France a credit of 2.6 milliards of francs spread over 5 years, to be used partly for the purchase of war material in France, partly for the erection of armament factories in Poland and as a second instalment of the Railway Loan for the construction of the line from Eastern Upper Silesia to Gdynia. Provision was also made for permanent cooperation between the General Staffs of the two countries. It has still to be seen whether the expectation expressed in the Echo de Paris (No. 20,779 of September 7th 1936) will be realised, and the rearmament of the Polish Army with French aid will give new life to the Franco-Polish Pact of Mutual Assistance of 1921. A change in the Polish attitude to Soviet Russia, of which Paris also has hopes, is not probable under present circumstances for reasons alike of internal and external policy, since the inclusion of Poland in the ranks of the "Popular Front" Powers would mean the sacrifice of Poland's independence.

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
Constitutionally the Polish Army is a standing army based on compulsory military service and organised on a territorial footing. It has at present a peace strength of 272,000 men, to which must be added a special formation of about 32,000 men for the defence of the Eastern frontier. There is also a militarised State Police force of some 29,000 men, and a further 140,000 young persons undergoing military training. The Army in peace-time is organised in 30 Infantry Divisions, one Cavalry Division and 12 brigades, 324 light (including 4 mechanised) and 112 heavy (including 11 mechanised) batteries, 28 anti-aircraft batteries and one anti-aircraft machine gun group. There are further 63 Pioneer and Railway companies, 90 Signals companies and 8 armoured battalions with some 600 tanks. Latterly the number of armoured battalions has been increased by two to 10; but it is not known to what extent tanks are available for the new battalions. No notable changes have been announced in the organisation of the peace-time Army at the date of publication of this number. The Army Air Force is composed of 2 groups (Air Group I with Headquarters at Warsaw and Air Group II with Headquarters at Cracow). Each group has 3 regiments. The total strength of first line aircraft is about 660. The Naval Air Force in Putzig and Pinsk has some 110 front-line aircraft. With second line planes the total number of Army and Navy aircraft is about 1550. In war-time it may be assumed that all the peace-time formations will be mobilised, and at the same time form nuclei for the creation of Reserve and Reinforcement units. Air Force, heavy Artillery and armoured units will in all probability be used as Army troops. The probable war strength of Poland including the peace-time Army is 3.6 million men. This would give a field army of not less than 60 Divisions with corresponding Cavalry, L. of C., home and replacement units. The Polish Army is further armed with some 7,000 light and 4,100 heavy machine guns, and 1,350 light and 422 heavy guns.

The following notable changes have recently been made in connection with the higher command of the Polish Army. On May 13th 1936, as a sequel to the entry into force of the new Constitution of 1935 and as a further step in the process of reorganisation made necessary by the death of Marshal Piłsudski, an Order was issued by the President of the Republic dealing with the organisation of the Supreme Command and the position of the Inspector General of the Army in particular. Under this Order the President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in peace-time: but the actual command is in practice exercised, subject to his supervision, by the Inspector General of the Army and the Minister of War. The President issues fundamental regulations in regard to the organisation of the Army, e. g. in regard to the duties and rights of the soldiers, and promotes and retires the officers. The Inspector General is in peace the Head of the whole system of National Defence. He is responsible amongst other things for the working out of plans of operations and mobilisation schemes. He supervises the training of the Army in conjunction with the War Minister as the Army's Head. The former Council of National Defence, now to be known as "Defence Council of the Republic," has still the President of the Republic as its Chairman: the President may be represented by the Inspector General of the Army. The members of the Council are still the War Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the Finance Minister and the Minister of Commerce and the Chief of the General Staff. In war the Inspector General is Commander-in-Chief. The most important feature of the new Order, according to the French technical periodical France militaire, is the extension of the powers of the Inspector General, whose position is made


Anti-aircraft



English 7.62 cm. anti-aircraft gun mounted on motor trailer



French 7.5 cm. anti-aircraft gun in semi-fixed emplacement



Vickers-Armstrong heavy anti-aircraft 12.7 mm. machine gun on double carriage



Vickers-Armstrong transportable 75 mm. anti-aircraft gun in fire position


guns




Czecho-Slovak 8.35 cm. anti-aircraft gun with 18 km. range



Soviet anti-aircraft guns



Bofors 7.5 cm. naval twin barrel anti-aircraft gun on pivotal carriage



Italian 75 mm. anti-aircraft gun



Listening apparatus and anti-aircraft gun in French girdle of fortifications

permanent and independent of Cabinet changes. The present holder of the position, General Rydz-Smigly, has further been given a dominant position in the State by his appointment on July 15th 1936 to rank after the President of the Republic in Poland. The circumstance that on November 11th 1936 he was also given the rank of Marshal—on the day, that is, which Poland celebrates as that of the restoration of Poland's independence as a nation—lends to his new appointment a political tinge which outweighs the military significance of the occasion: up to now the only Marshals of Poland have been Piłsudski and Foch.

On July 9th 1936 the creation of a post of Inspector of Air and Anti-Gas Defence was announced. The new post, which was created at the instance of the War Minister by the President of the Republic in agreement with the Inspector General of the Army, is under the latter's command. All organisations, whether of a military or civilian character, which are in any way connected with Air or anti-gas defence are subject to the new Inspection.

It may be noted in connection with the organisation of the land defences of Poland that an Order of the President of the Republic in September 1936 declared the **Hela peninsula** which projects into the sea in front of the port of Danzig to be a fortified area in its entirety. The new fortified zone includes a three mile strip of the littoral on each side of the peninsula in addition to the peninsular area itself. This Order is part of the Polish maritime rearmament programme, and is closely connected with the proposed development of the Gdynia ship-building yards, which are to be completed by 1941.

The introduction of the so-called "**substitution for military service**" system is expected in the near future. The idea is to exact a form of Labour Service for the purposes of national defence and the more urgent communal needs. So far as details are available in regard to the regulations to be issued for the purpose, all persons liable to military service, who are not called up for active service on grounds e.g. of health, will in future be required to give 30 days' unpaid labour, viz. six days a year for five years. The obligation is binding with certain exceptions, which are commonly allowed even in the Army itself, on all fit male persons. It is also stated that in future all Polish students will in future be compelled to undergo six-week courses with the Voluntary Labour Service organisation recently taken over by the War Ministry and placed under military direction.

The Baltic border states

In the light of current European developments special significance attaches to the so-called Baltic border States because of their geographical position. The Baltic littoral has for ages served as a historic route for the passage of armies from East to West and from West to East; and for centuries it has been the point of division between the conflicting interests of great Powers. Today the Baltic States are primarily interesting in the military and political sense for the reason that they block the way into Europe for the Soviets, for whom there is no more convenient route than that which leads along the Baltic coast. The Baltic railway system is relatively well developed, and admits of the rapid concentration of large numbers of troops at a number of different points of invasion. The Baltic countries also afford a favourable theatre for the movement of motorised units, whether on land or in the air; for the approaches by the air are short, and there are a fair number of roads in good order on the ground. Even if the transport of troops by land should not prove feasible with the speed which future wars are likely to postulate, vigorous activity in the air, with the Baltic countries as the point of departure, is a possibility which cannot fail to strike the eye. In addition it has to be borne in mind that the Baltic Fleet of Russia has recently been developed on an extensive scale—in particular, by the provision of aircraft-carrier vessels of the most modern type. A very peculiar importance therefore attaches to the **Baltic countries from the standpoint of Soviet strategy**. The Baltic States are the **terrain on which the Soviet forces will deploy**.

Considerations of this special geographical and politico-military situation have found their reflection in Estonia and Latvia in the **movement in favour of the maintenance of strict neutrality**. Since **November 1st 1923** the two countries have been associated in a defensive alliance which has had its fruits in the shape of a wide measure of agreement on military issues and foreign policy. But it was not until **September 12th 1934** that it was found possible, after long and difficult negotiations at Geneva, to conclude an agreement with Lithuania (initialled at Riga on August 29th 1934) in regard to "**Understanding and Cooperation of the three Baltic States**." This is the so-called **Baltic Pact**. It provides for close cooperation in foreign politics between the three parties by means of periodical meetings of the Foreign Ministers, mutual information in regard to negotiations with foreign countries and united action in relation to other States; but it does not touch the so-called "specific" questions, i.e. the special problems of the foreign policy of the several States. Lithuania alone has such special problems still to solve—the problems, that is to say,

which are associated with Vilna and Memel; and the effect of the Pact is that the other two parties are not prepared to allow these problems to be raised, so far as they are concerned, lest they should be forced thereby to take decisions of a difficult and possibly far-reaching character, as a result of which they may eventually find themselves a football in the conflict of the great Powers.

But here again the growing sense of the danger of military alliances and mutual assistance obligations, the new strength of Germany, the renewal of Polish efforts to induce the border States to cooperate on unified lines of policy and, on the other hand, the efforts of Moscow to include the Baltic countries in the Pact system, and the simultaneous collapse of the Geneva system of collective security—in a word, the numerous and rapid political changes in Europe and the growth of political tension have brought the border States face to face with grave problems of the maintenance of their security, and have led them seriously to consider their present situation and future prospects. The numerous Conferences of the last two years are ample proof of the difficulties experienced.

The Moscow system of Pacts, with which the border States are associated under the Pact of Non-aggression of 1932 and the London Protocols of July 4th 1933, has begun since the **Franco-Russo-Czecho-Slovak Mutual Assistance Treaties** to assume a different aspect in their eyes. Since that date moreover **Soviet attempts at interference in the Baltic area** have been more marked. Up till now they had observed the limits of military and diplomatic courtesy; but their **failure** to evoke any favourable response led the Party Secretary of the Leningrad Executive Committee and Chief Commissary of the Communist Party for North-Western Russia, Shdanov, to make a speech at the Eighth Russian Soviet Congress (to which allusion has already been made) on November 29th 1936, in which he gave expression to **open threats to the address of Finland, Estonia and Latvia**. These tiny countries, he exclaimed, are the seat of great adventurers who would like to place their soil at the disposal of the Fascist great Powers as a basis of operations. These tiny countries should beware, lest the Soviet Union opens wide the window which has been given back to them and, with the help of the Red Army and under the command of proletarian leaders, takes a look to see what is up.

The echo aroused by these words (in spite of all efforts subsequently made to water down their significance) in Riga, Reval and Helsingfors was naturally very great. Latvia and Estonia are less disposed than ever to take a hand at the short end of the Soviet lever, and so endanger the political bridge by which they are connected across the seas with the unmistakeably anti-Soviet Finland, which now (as ever) constitutes a barrier from the Arctic to the Gulf of Finland shutting off the Scandinavian peninsula from the Soviet State.

It is intelligible therefore that the Commanders-in-Chief of the three countries should be concerned to establish military defence forces which, however small in numbers, are strong in arms and equipment.

Estonia

In spite of the smallness of her population of barely 1.1 million, Estonia disposes under her compulsory military service system of a **standing army** which now numbers **14,000 men** together with some **100 military aircraft** and a Frontier Defence Force organised on military lines of 1,200 men. **The probable war strength of the Estonian Defence forces may be put in the neighbourhood of 150,000 men**. Some 25 per cent of the total budget of the country (17.6 million krooni in the year 1936-37) is earmarked annually for Defence expenditure. More than two years ago, at the end of 1934, General Laidoner said in a broadcast speech: "If a people will not defend itself, if it has not the courage to do so, it is lost: it cannot retain its independence. If we all concentrate our strength, we need not fear that we shall succumb. Our chief source of strength is the knowledge which we have that there is no reason why future generations of our people should be weaker than those who fought in the War of Liberation in 1919-20 and gave Estonia her independence as a State." On a subsequent occasion General Laidoner argued that even a small country like Estonia ought to foster belief in the duty of self-defence as the key-stone of its policy. At the celebrations of the Polish National Festival in Reval on May 3rd 1935 General Laidoner made a special point of the close connections between the two countries Poland and Estonia, and urged the claims of their common task as wardens of the peace between Eastern and Western Europe. Never, he said, would the two countries stand by and allow foreign troops to march through their territory. The Polish and Estonian forces stood side by side in defence of that resolve. The period of military service, which had been cut down in previous years in the Estonian Army on grounds of economy, was again lengthened on January 1st 1935. Since that date it has been 11 months in the case of the Infantry, Artillery, Armoured Trains and Pioneers, 12 months in the case of the Cavalry, Tank Regiments and Signals, and 15 months in the case of the Wireless operators.

Latvia

Latvia has a standing Army with compulsory military service. With a population of 1.92 million, Latvia maintains an Army with a **peace strength of 23,500 men**, including an Air Force of 550 men with **some 130 aircraft**. In addition there is a Frontier Defence Force organised on military lines of 1,200 men. **In case of war** the total number of trained reservists, including those who had their training in the former Russian Army, should amount to **some 200,000 men**. Under the amendments to the Military Service Law approved by the Latvian Cabinet at the beginning of January 1937, recruits with physical malformations and weak health are also required to do military service even where they are excused from active service with the colours. The Defence expenditure 1936-37 was 32.5 million lats.

Lithuania

Lithuania has continuously increased her expenditure on armaments in recent years. In 1935 it was some 66 million lits, in 1936 some 75 million lits, and the Estimates for 1937 are for 81 million lits. This increased expenditure has not been used merely for the expansion and improvement of arms and equipment, but also for increase of the effectives. The number of Infantry regiments has been raised by two to 9; and one special Infantry formation has also been instituted consisting of 2 independent companies, each with a heavy machine-gun Section. Each of the existing 3 Infantry Divisions has had a squadron of Divisional Cavalry attached to it. The Cavalry Brigade has been reconstituted as a separate formation. A beginning has been made with the establishment of a new 4th Division; and it is significant to note that its Headquarters are in the Memel district. On January 1st 1935 a new Law concerning the Army Command came into force. Under this Act, the President of the Republic remains the Supreme Head of all the armed forces of the country. He is assisted by a Council of National Defence composed of the Ministries chiefly concerned, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and the Head of the Military Supply Department. A feature of special importance is the creation of the post of Commander-in-Chief by separating the two posts of Head of the Army Command and Chief of the General Staff, which had previously been united in the person of the Head of the General Staff. A further feature of importance is the establishment of an Army Arms Department, and the creation of a Council of War consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General Staff, the Head of the Military Supply Department and the garrison Commanders. It is also noticeable that the Law brings the Head of the Riflemen's Association under the Commander-in-Chief. Moreover the Riflemen's Association, which has 55,000 members and is the largest and most important para-military organisation, has been converted by a Law of June 11th 1935 into an organisation under the Ministry of National Defence, directly subject to the Commander-in-Chief. Its members have since been organised in military formations (companies, squadrons, batteries etc.) and subjected to strict military discipline. Under the new Statutes the Riflemen's Association is intended to form a national military body, and its object is to be the strengthening of the national powers of resistance and of the forces of national defence. The Head of the Association is a high officer on the active list, appointed by the President of the Republic. The Commanders in war are also the Heads of Districts throughout the country.

The Lithuanian Government further passed a new Military Service Act on June 10th 1936, which was published on July 8th.

All Lithuanian male nationals are liable under this Act to military service. Persons whose position prevents their serving for health or other reasons (which are specified in detail in the Act) are compelled to pay a so-called War Tax for 15 years. Persons failing to do their military service forfeit their civic rights, in addition to other penalties provided by the Act, and are ineligible for the public service. The period of active service remains 1½ years under the new Act: but the War Minister is empowered to increase the period to 24 months or in certain cases to reduce it to 12 months. He is also empowered to call up women with special expert qualifications in time of war for special service under military discipline.

The **peace strength** of the Lithuanian Army is at present **30,000 men**; the probable **war strength** is **200,000 men**. The **Air Force** consists of one Air regiment of 6 flights with **90 first and 20 second line aircraft**. Lithuania's defences are based politically on Soviet Russia. The 15th anniversary of the Lithuanian Pact of Non-Aggression with Soviet Russia was the occasion of very special celebrations in 1935. The Lithuanian Minister in Moscow referred on that occasion to "the boundless might of the U.S.S.R. as the main foundation of the peace of the world." The frequent interchange of visits between Soviet and Lithuanian military heads and the military discussions which take place between the two countries are sufficient evidence of the good understanding that prevails between the two States.

Finland

The **peace strength** of the Finnish Army (some **30,000 men**) has not been increased in recent years. The Army is organised in 3 Infantry Divisions of 26 battalions (including 3 cyclist battalions), 2 Cavalry regiments of 10 squadrons (including 2 machine-gun squadrons), 19 light and 22 heavy batteries of Artillery (including coastal defence batteries), and 3 anti-aircraft batteries, 5 Pioneer companies, 8 Signals companies and one Tank company with some 16 tanks. The **Air Force** is auxiliary to the Army and Navy: it consists of 5 Army flights and 8 naval flights comprising **some 120 first line aircraft altogether**. A Government Order of May 1st 1936 reorganises the Frontier Defence Force on military lines: it corresponds to an independent brigade. Five Frontier Defence Districts, each with a Frontier Defence Detachment (corresponding to an independent battalion), have been formed in the Districts of Karelische Nase (Carelia Point), Salmi, Joensuu, Kainuu and Lappmarken respectively.

In case of war the National Defence Act provides for the immediate concentration of the standing Army on the frontier with only a slight stiffening of reservists. It is intended to serve as a screen for the formation of a territorial Army within the country, based mainly on the Riflemen's organisation, the strength of which is at present some 100,000 men, with provision for their training in peace time. **The total war strength of the Finnish Army may be put at some 300,000 men.**

The 1937 Budget Estimates show what for Finland is a remarkable increase of armaments expenditure under the Vote for the Ministry of National Defence. They include an appropriation of 16 million Finnish marks for the expansion of the Air arm in presence of the position on the Eastern frontier and the steadily increasing armament of the Soviet Union.

In the last few years the Baltic border States have embarked on a remarkable modernisation of their national defence organisation. In every case they have strengthened and renewed their material by the introduction of modern arms and mechanised units, particularly tanks and aircraft.

Position of the "Neutrals" in the play and counter-play of alliances and armaments

I. The Scandinavian states

At the close of the World War, when the League of Nations was set up to act as the warden of peace in Europe and throughout the world, the Scandinavian countries were eager to cooperate. For years they were active on behalf of the aims of the League, trusting in the hope of a genuine reconciliation of the peoples. Above all they were "the pioneers of Disarmament." But even the Scandinavian countries have been forced in recent years to recognise that, under the influence of the Powers by which it is controlled, the League has been increasingly untrue to its principles, and can no longer be regarded—particularly since the break-down of Disarmament—as a factor of security in the international situation. The effect has been steadily to intensify the demand for a policy of concentration of the Northern Powers, strict neutrality, and increased measures of national defence in presence of the uncertain international situation.

Sweden

Sweden was the first of the Northern countries to draw military deductions from the political developments of recent years. In the spring of 1935 the Journal de Genève observed that "Sweden in the course of 125 years' neutrality has displayed a confidence which at times may be thought to have been excessive. As a loyal member of the League of Nations Sweden enthusiastically followed its advice to disarm. The Defence Act of June 12th 1925 did not indeed alter the character of the Swedish defence organisation, based as it is on compulsory service with a short period of service: but, in order to create an independent Air Force within the very modest financial limits which the Swedish Parliament was prepared to approve for the purposes of National Defence, the Army and Navy were drastically cut down." One of the leading Swedish newspapers, the Stockholms Tidningen, reported some days later that the Swedish Army had been reduced under the Defence Act of June 12th 1925 from

12 Divisions, including 6 Reserve Divisions, to 4 Divisions, while the Reserves had been done away with altogether. The **total strength of the Army** thereafter amounted to some 35,000 men in the summer months, some 57,000 men in the autumn manoeuvres, and in winter only some 12,000 men, although Sweden has a population of 6.14 million inhabitants with a high standard of physical fitness and military capacity under modern conditions, and industries with notable natural resources in the shape of ores, water power and timber. The trend of political developments in Europe led Sweden in 1930 to appoint a Commission of 13 members, including 3 officers, to elaborate a plan for the reorganisation of the National Defence. The Commission reported in 1935 recommending the Government to strengthen the organisation of National Defence in consideration of the increased tension in the international situation and the changes in the strategic position of Sweden resulting from the development of the Air arm.

The reform of the Defence forces, which was announced in the King's Speech at the opening of the 1936 Session of the Swedish Parliament on January 11th, was approved by both Houses of Parliament in the middle of June 1936. The effect was to enable the Defence forces to modernise their entire organisation, to lay the foundations for the creation of a tank and armoured car formation, and considerably to expand the Air arm. The final figure for the **whole of the Defence expenditure for the period 1936-37** was fixed at **148 million crowns**, representing an increase of some 30 million crowns over the figure of the previous Budget. The total is made up of appropriations of 79.75 millions for the Army, 27.80 millions for the Air Force, 38.75 millions for the Navy and coastal defence artillery, and 1.70 millions of expenditure for all three Forces in common. The new Defence Budget for the period beginning July 1st 1936 will therefore be some 24 per cent higher than its predecessor. It includes provision for a marked acceleration of the process of **strengthening and modernising the existing war material**, which is to be completed within the next three budget years instead of in ten years as originally proposed. Of the 79.5 million crowns devoted to improvements in military and naval armament, 50 millions are to be made available in three instalments of 17, 17 and 16 millions respectively in the next three Budgets in order to bring the armed forces to a condition of war preparedness. The remainder of the programme is spread over the following years down to 1946. Each arm will in future have its own Head: hitherto only the Air Force had its own Head. There is now to be a Commander-in-Chief of the Army and another of the Navy. The period of service is to be raised from 140 to 175 days. The number of officers in the Army is to be increased from 1,686 to 2,112, and the number of N.C.O.s and men from 6,241 to 6,706. The **peace organisation of the Army** is to be as follows:

- 4 Divisions: 1 Division, Headquarters Kristianstad,
- 2 Division, Headquarters Östersund,
- 3 Division, Headquarters Skövde,
- 4 Division, Headquarters Stockholm.

Noorland units.
Gotland units.
Certain army troops.

It is not yet settled what troops will be allocated to the different Divisions in the peace-time Army.

In case of war, the Army is to consist of 6 Divisions, one Light Brigade and Army troops. Each Division will then be made up of 3 Infantry regiments, one Cavalry battalion, one Artillery regiment, one Divisional Signals company and one Pioneer battalion. The Light Brigade will consist in war-time of two regiments of Cavalry (the Body Cavalry regiment and the Skanska Cavalry regiment), one Cavalry battalion, one Artillery Section, one Signals and one Pioneer Company. The Army troops will include in war-time one tank unit, one Artillery unit, one Signals unit, one Pioneer unit and one Army Service unit, together with Intendance and Ordnance units.

The **Air arm** is being completely reorganised. It will in future constitute a separate arm of the Defence Forces. It is being brought up to the following strength (note that in Sweden a 'squadron' is called a 'flotilla' and a 'flight' a 'division'):

- 2 medium heavy bombing flotillas of 3 divisions each, each division consisting of 12 planes,
- 2 light bombing flotillas of 3 divisions each, each division consisting of 12 planes,
- 1 fighter flotilla of 3 divisions, each of 15 planes,
- 1 Army air flotilla of 3 divisions, each of 12 planes,
- 1 Navy air flotilla consisting of one torpedo and one long distance reconnaissance division, each of 12 planes, and
- 1 short distance reconnaissance division of 8 planes.

Further, the cruiser Gotland is equipped with 8 planes, 2 catapults and tow-sail. The effect is to increase the **total number of front line war aircraft** from 100 to 257 aircraft. The training school is transferred to Ljungbyhed, and is given the name of Air

War School. A separate corps of air officers is in process of formation. The completion of this programme of reorganisation of the Air arm will take years. It is also proposed to strengthen the anti-aircraft resources considerably. There is at present one anti-aircraft regiment with 4 anti-aircraft batteries and one search-light battery.

Special significance attaches in the national defences of Sweden to the unrestricted possession of the **island of Gotland**. In the hand of a foreign Power, Gotland might not merely serve as a first-rate air and naval basis: its possession would give the enemy the command of Southern Sweden and the most important parts of the country from the military point of view. For this reason the island has always constituted a separate military district, and has a coastal artillery corps for its defence. In order successfully to meet an enemy invasion of Northern Sweden, the fortress of Boden at the point of intersection of the Bottensee-coastal railway and the "riksgränsbau" has been developed into the strongest fortified point in the North of Europe. Örebro and Boden together constitute a separate military district. A strategic railway running parallel to the Bottensee-coastal railway has also been in process of construction during the past year in the interior of Northern Sweden.

* * *

Sweden's determined initiative in the matter of the reform of her Defence Forces and the protection of her people is held up as a model in the patriotic Press of all the other Scandinavian countries. Newspaper articles have pointed out to the Governments of Norway and Denmark that only a "defence programme securely based on the will of the people can constitute a firm support for the foreign policy which Scandinavia wishes to pursue and the neutrality she wishes to uphold."

Denmark


Danish policy is based on retention of the Danish territorial acquisitions after the war in North Schleswig and defence of the passages from the Baltic to the North Sea, namely, the Öresund, the Greater and the Lesser Belt. The capital Copenhagen is exposed to attack from the air and from the sea as a result of its position at the entry to the Öresund and the weakness of its fortifications. Denmark's defences are nevertheless very slight, so that there is an earnest desire for mutual co-operation with the other Scandinavian States.

The Danish Army since 1932 has been a skeleton army. Military service is obligatory on all citizens: but of the 14,000 who annually become liable for service only some 8,500 are actually called up. The period of training is 150 days in the Infantry and Artillery, 365 days in the Cavalry, and 200 days in the Air arm. The law provides for two further periods of service of 25 days each.


For these periods it is usual to call up four years, so that there is commonly an army of 12,000 to 15,000 men available for the autumn manoeuvres. The peace strength of the Army is 32 Infantry battalions, 14 squadrons including 5 cyclist and 2 armoured squadrons, some 1,200 light and 290 heavy machine guns, and 96 light and 36 heavy guns. Tanks have not yet been introduced; but the mechanisation of the Army is proceeding. The country is divided into two Divisional districts; and this organisation holds good in **war-time** also, when there should be an army of **150,000 troops fit for field service**. The Air Force is divided into the Seeland Air detachment and the Jutland Air detachment; the latter is in process of formation. There are at present 7 flights with 30 fighter aeroplanes, 20 reconnaissance planes and 10 bombing planes. The Balloon Park has two captive balloons and one dirigible with a low-power motor. Including second-line planes, there should be **some 120 aircraft** altogether for Army purposes. The **Naval Air Force** also has 3 naval air flights with some **30 planes**. The anti-aircraft forces consist of 8 mechanised anti-aircraft batteries and a number of anti-aircraft machine gun companies. There is also a civilian "Air Defence" in the shape of the Rekyll Corps with guns of its own and a volunteer Air despatch-rider service under military direction.

Denmark is alive to the importance of a Defence Force capable of effective action, as was recently made clear by the utterances of the Danish Premier at the opening of the autumn Session of the Danish Parliament, in the course of which he took occasion to say that the frontiers of Denmark would be afforded protection by means of improvements in the Army and Navy, and that the Defence forces would be equipped in such a manner as to enable them to fulfil their duty of upholding Danish neutrality.


Tanks




France: 11 t. Renault tank D 1. 1935




France: 6 t. Renault tank AMR 1934




France: 74 t. break-through tank 3 C



England: 3.1 t. Vickers CL floating tank




England: 12 t. Vickers tank Mk. II 1927/29



England: 16 t. Vickers tank M 1935



U.S.S.R.: 10.2 t. Christie fast tank M. 1934



U.S.S.R.: 33 t. heavy Soviet tank M 11

(see table on page 37)




Italy: 5.6 t tank Fiat 3,000 B




Italy: 3.3 t. Fiat-Ansaldo M 1933




Poland: 6 t. Vickers-Armstrong gun tank



Poland: 2.48 t. small tank TK. 3. 1932




Czecho-Slovakia: 6 t. light Adamov tank A H 43



Sweden: 11 t. medium tank Landsverk 10 (1931)



Belgium: new light tank



Sweden: latest Swedish tank for cross-country and road movement: the caterpillar gear can be added in 20 seconds

The Netherlands Premier's significant words can only be interpreted as meaning that the Netherlands, who are not at the moment a member of the Council of the League, reserve the right to review for themselves any unanimous decision of the Council as to the aggressor, before they come to a decision in regard to the passage of foreign troops over Dutch territory. The purpose of the Netherlands Premier in making such a declaration was no doubt to proclaim inside and outside his native country the sincere desire of the Netherlands for the maintenance of a policy of unconditional, independent neutrality.

In view however of the increasing international tension and the enhanced importance attaching in consequence to the first of the two questions above-mentioned, the Netherlands Army authorities were led in the course of 1935 to prepare a far-reaching project for speeding up the modernisation of the Netherlands defences.

The **Speech from the Throne** accordingly at the opening of the new Session of the States General in the autumn of 1935 referred to the question of Defence in the following terms: "In view of the changed international conditions, proposals will be laid before you for certain special measures in regard to the means of defence of the Kingdom." The proposals in question were not embodied in the Ordinary Budget for the year: but in **November 1935** they were laid before the Chamber in the form of a **"Bill concerning the Establishment of a special Defence Fund for the Modernisation and Strengthening of the National Defences in the course of the next four years."** Of the total sum of 53.4 million guilders which was to be raised by loan, 31 millions were for the Army to modernise and increase the existing forces of Artillery, armoured cars, aircraft and anti-aircraft guns and to develop the frontier fortifications, while the balance of 22.4 millions was for the Navy.

In his remarks in the course of the debate on the Defence proposals in the **Second Chamber in the middle of February 1936** the Netherlands Premier **Dr. Colijn** was at pains to explain that the military measures put forward by the Government were not directed against any country, but were intended solely to safeguard the Netherlands' security. The Netherlands Government did not suggest that anyone cherished a deliberate intention of encroaching on Netherlands sovereignty. In introducing their proposals the Government had merely taken into account the complete transformation of the international situation. Since the failure of the disarmament negotiations, they had seen one country after the other proceed to develop its own armaments. Only the Netherlands still remained unprotected on every side. The defence measures of other countries could not be left out of account: on the contrary, they were an occasion for intensified activity on the part of the Netherlands. The Government did not anticipate or expect direct attack by any great Power; but it was none the less desirable to bring the national defences up to such a degree of strength as would avail—as in the years 1914-1918—to convince any belligerent that he had nothing to gain from a violation of Dutch neutrality.

A few weeks later the Government stated in reply to a question in the First Chamber that no conversations had taken place between the Netherlands General Staff or any other General Staffs, and any statements to the contrary were false. The Government had no intention of deviating from its traditional policy of declining military conversations with the General Staffs of other countries, or of discarding the principle of neutrality in the strictest sense of the word. When Belgium later made her declaration of neutrality, the Netherlands, true to their own principles, gave it their unqualified approval.

For the proper understanding of the new expansion of the Netherlands defences, it is necessary to bear in mind that the **Army under the Defence laws is a skeleton militia based on universal service** organised (generally speaking) on a territorial footing. The active period of service is 5½ months and some 35 days repetition periods of training. In the case of the horsed artillery and Air Force active service is for 12 months and in the case of the Cavalry 15 months. The Army in the home country has hitherto been organised in 4 Divisions and one Light Brigade, the latter consisting of one cyclist regiment with three training companies, 2 Cavalry regiments consisting of 10 squadrons (two of them with machine gun sections) and one armoured car squadron, as well as one horsed artillery corps with two training batteries. Each of the four Divisions is divided into 2 brigades of 3 Infantry regiments, each with 2 training companies, and one light Artillery regiment with two horsed training batteries. The 4th Division has in addition one heavy artillery regiment of 2 motorised batteries and one field section. There are also available as Army troops one heavy artillery regiment, one anti-aircraft corps (each with two motorised training batteries), one regiment of engineers consisting of one battalion of Pioneers and one battalion of Railway troops, Signals and search-light formations, and a "Corps" of bridging and boat mine-laying units. The **total strength of the peace-time army** in the summer months is **some 20,000 men**. In the training exercises in September of each year the number rises to some 35,000 men, and sinks again in the winter to some 15,000 men. **In war** the Netherlands can put into the field more than **300,000 men odd**. The **Air arm** in the home

country consists of 24 flights with some **270 aircraft** and an Air personnel of about 1,200 officers and men. The ground anti-aircraft defences consist of one anti-aircraft section of 2 batteries and emplaced anti-aircraft guns. The **land fortifications** have hitherto consisted of the "Fort Holland" as the principal centre of resistance. It comprises the new Holland waterway, the fortified point of Amsterdam, the fortified point of Hollandsch Diep and Volkerak and the fortifications at the mouth of the Meuse and the Haringvliet. The entry to the Ysselmeer is also protected by the Helder fort. The defensive strength of these fortified positions is supplemented by the possibility of inundating extensive areas.

The new military proposals contemplate the fortification of the Eastern parts of the country. A large number of blockhouses and casemates are to be constructed on the chief crossings of the Meuse, the Waal and the Yssel. So far as the development of the Army is concerned, the principal changes are in connection with the speeding up of mobilisation and the **increase of war material**. A sum of 10 millions is allocated for the purchase of anti-aircraft guns, and 4½ millions are to be used for the purchase of aircraft.

The Infantry are to be equipped with anti-tank and Infantry guns, and the process of mechanisation is to be carried further, which in view of the admirable condition of the Netherlands road system is likely to be repaying. In addition to the sums available out of the **Defence Fund**, the Ministry of National Defence submitted a Supplementary Estimate to the 1935 Budget in March 1936 for a further 300,000 guilders for the purchase of 12 armoured cars, to be stationed together at Herzogenbusch in the South of the country, as also for increased expenditure on the replacement of older types of motors and the strengthening of the Military Police force. There is also to be a special Frontier Defence Force for the continuous occupation of the newly erected casemates.

* * *

The Government proposals for the reorganisation and reinforcement of the Netherlands armed forces are still regarded by the majority of the Chamber and by leading personages in the country as inadequate. The Government are aware of this feeling, and recognise the necessity of further strengthening the national defences. They announced in the middle of November 1936 that they were making preparations for further action in the matter, but would hold such action up until after the Elections to the Chamber in 1937, i.e. for half a year or more. The new proposals are likely to include a not inconsiderable increase in the numbers annually called up, a lengthening of the period of service and the introduction of a third training for the reservists.

But all these measures of rearmament, like the references to foreign politics in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the new Session of the States General in September 1936, are no more than a confirmation of the traditional Dutch policy of cautious international cooperation without adherence to one Power more than another, the policy of neutrality with the single object of cultivating friendly relations with all countries and eschewing the formation of groups for the organisation of military predominance.

III. Switzerland*)

It was not until the year 1933 that Switzerland made a serious beginning with the execution of military reforms made necessary by the geographical situation of the country and long since indicated as essential alike by historians such as Prof. Carl Meyer, international lawyers such as Prof. Dietrich Schindler, and military leaders such as the late General Wille, Colonel of Division Bircher and others. In December 1933 a first extraordinary credit of 82 million Swiss francs was made available for the necessary rearming of the Army and the extension of the Aircraft resources of the country. The Law of September 28th 1934 improved the conditions of military training; and at the end of 1934 a further 6 million Swiss francs were made available out of the Labour Employment Fund for constructional work on fortifications. But these measures were not sufficient to ensure the proper defence of the country. Ever since 1919 the Swiss General Wille had been putting forward a list of measures designed to prevent a violation of the national frontiers. He placed them in the following order of importance. "Strengthen the striking power of our men by every possible means: provide with that object for a sufficient number of men on the frontier line: and, lastly, build fortifications. An offensive war will do more to protect our country than any mere defence. Those who want to attack us must be made to know that only very greatly superior numbers will be able to force us into purely defensive action." The proposal which was drawn up in 1934 for the reorganisation of the Army and the strengthening of its armaments showed that the Swiss Federal Council had drawn the moral from the failure of the League of Nations and the collapse of the Disarmament Conference, and were alive to the fact

*) The history of Switzerland's neutrality has been dealt with at length in No. 166/170 of this periodical, pp. 16 ff.

that the existing organisation of the Army was no longer adequate for the defence of Swiss neutrality. The international tension of the year 1935 completely convinced the Swiss Confederation that the surest means of upholding one's neutrality in the event of military complications between neighbours who are great Powers is a strong army. A „Neue Truppenordnung“ (New Army Regulations) had long been in preparation with the object of adapting the Swiss militia army to operative requirements by reorganisation, and increasing its striking power and power of resistance by modernising and strengthening its armament. For this purpose however the appropriations proposed were no longer adequate. A **Defence Loan of 235,000,000 Swiss francs** for the purpose of strengthening the national defences was approved by the Federal Assembly in **June 1936**. The **message of the Federal Council** to the Assembly on this occasion referred to the strained international situation, and proceeded:

“It has been shown that the Treaties by which the victor Powers hoped to retain the position they had attained as a result of the outcome of the War and to keep the peace have not kept pace with the development of events. Switzerland has in more than one respect a key position in the centre of Europe. The localisation of any war that may break out appears to be out of the question in view of the obligations under the League of Nations and the numerous separate Agreements, so that the position of a State situated in the heart of Europe is every day more critical. Even if a conflict should break out in the Danubian basin or in the Balkans, our neighbours and the League will be involved by their sympathies in the matter—even, it may be, against their own will. Our military and political neutrality is admitted in principle; but it may very easily happen in connection with some issue that is on the border-line between the military and the economic—such as the question of sanctions—that difficulties will arise which will give an enemy the looked-for pretext for dragging Switzerland into the war on the ground that we have infringed our neutrality.”

In the early part of June 1936 the National Council approved the proposed Loan, and a few days later it received the assent of the Council of State. The **Bill for the Strengthening of the Swiss National Defence** thus passed into law.

The way in which the credit is distributed shows that the greater part is intended for the strengthening of the Air and Frontier defences. The appropriations for the different objects of expenditure are as follows:

	Swiss francs
Passive Air Defence	12.3 millions
Ground defence	48.2 „
Aircraft	55.3 „
	<hr/>
	115.8 millions
Frontier Defence, new arms and munitions	21.0 millions
Fortification works	25.0 „
	<hr/>
	46.0 millions
Light troops	14.1 millions
Artillery	26.0 „
Engineers	5.6 „
War bridging material	4.3 „
Sanitation service	0.8 „
Corps and Reserve material	8.0 „
	<hr/>
	58.8 millions

The appeal to the readiness of the people to make sacrifices by subscribing to the Defence Loan yielded a total sum of 332 million Swiss francs. The Federal Council decided on October 23rd 1936 to take over the whole of the amount subscribed—i.e. to include the 97 millions by which the amount of the subscriptions exceeded the amount originally proposed for the Loan—and to pass it into a Fund for Special Purposes of National Defence, created for the purpose. The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* remarked in this connection that the additional odd 100 millions were urgently required for increased expenditure on the development of the national defences. It is not anxiety as to the inflow of the millions in question, the writer added, which bulks largest in the minds of the responsible Army authorities: it is rather anxiety as to the magnitude of the military requirements which the feverish armaments of other countries have imposed on Switzerland. “It is an open secret,” he continued, “that the Defence Programme on which the 235 million credit is based was the bare minimum that the Army authorities could accept consistently with their consciences, and that the figures originally submitted by the Military Department were very much bigger. We are called upon today to strengthen our defence forces as soon as possible, in order in the near future to have an army at our disposal which will inspire respect in other countries, not merely by its determination to defend the national soil, but also by the material strength of its armament. If we are to deepen the impression in the minds of our neighbours of our readiness to defend ourselves, our first business is to strengthen our front line.

We are not therefore in a position to meet, for example, wishes that are expressed for heavy financial outlay on passive anti-air defences in the interior of the country, unless we have first made adequate provision for the military equipment of the fighting force. The Federal Council in its Message on the provision of new arms for the Infantry in November 1933 made no concealment of the fact that the amount for which it was asking was a bare minimum that would sooner or later have to be supplemented; and the Message accompanying the present Defence credits expressly states in a number of different passages that any considerable cuts can only be tolerated temporarily, and that new expenditure will be required to make good the consequences in the immediate future. For instance, it may be pointed out that the 235 million Programme does not yet make it possible to attempt the replacement of all the 12 cm. wheel belt guns, which are not up to modern requirements, by modern 10.5 cm. guns; and again, cuts have been made in connection with the motorisation of the heavy artillery which will have to be made good at an early date. The position is much the same in the case of the active Air Defence and the Frontier Defence: both have to be created from the beginning, and both will call for heavy expenditure accordingly.”

* * *

The above particulars give a picture of the difficulties which stand in the way of a thorough reform and rearmament of the Swiss Defence forces. But they also serve to show that the Swiss people is fully conscious of the urgent need for quick and comprehensive measures which will ensure the national defence of the country. The comprehensive measures of rearmament, which have now been made possible as a result of the big military credit made available, are closely connected with the „Neue Truppenordnung“, the purpose of which is the reorganisation of the Swiss Army as a whole. The Council of State and the National Council unanimously approved the Law, after it had been passed by the Federal Council, on September 30th and October 6th 1936 respectively. The „Neue Truppenordnung“ will now be prepared in 1937 and come into force on January 1st 1938.

The strategic considerations on which the new Constitution of the Swiss Army is based are formulated by Federal Councillor Minger, the Head of the Swiss Military Department, as follows. The object of Switzerland in a future war, he says, must be to cover the flank of all neighbouring States in such a way that they all realise there is no danger of surprises against which they have to guard on the part of Switzerland. The reorganisation of the Swiss Army, he explains, is to be based on this conception of its rôle as the protector of its neighbour's flanks, taken in conjunction with the defence of the national neutrality in the sense solely of frontier defence and refusal to allow the country to be used for the passage of foreign armies; and the same is true of the measures taken to strengthen the country's armaments.

The object of the new Constitution of the Army is therefore, apart from the strengthening of its striking power by more modern and more mobile armaments, to provide for:

1. reinforcement and reorganisation of the Frontier Defence in a manner taking into account the prospect of warlike operations at the present day being initiated without notice given,
2. speeding up of the process of mobilisation, and of
3. the preparedness of the Divisions for immediate operations.

The main demand of the military authorities, apart from their insistence on an adequate Frontier and Air Defence force, is for simplification and acceleration of the concentration after mobilisation. The method adopted is to recruit and mobilise the Divisions and brigades, each for itself, within the narrowest possible area immediately behind the frontiers. This arrangement makes the mobilisation and concentration independent to a large extent of the railways, the short distances involved in the concentration being covered by quick marches on foot. The essential difference between the new system of Army organisation and the old (dating from the year 1924) which is still in force lies, not so much in the fact that the present 6 heavy Divisions of 6 Infantry regiments each are to be replaced by 9 lighter Divisions of 3 Infantry regiments each, or that the present Divisional formations of 5 Mountain brigades are to be replaced by 4 independent Mountain brigade formations, as in the proposed division of the Army into three categories of troops for Frontier Defence, Cover and March purposes respectively.

The real new feature is the **Frontier Defence troops**. Their object is to protect the mobilisation and concentration of the cover troops and, with the aid of the powerful frontier barriers, to prevent surprise invasions by motorised columns. With this object they can be mobilised separately from the other troops, and be available for use within a few hours. Each Cover Division is to have a Frontier Defence brigade, which will be under its orders in peace as well as in war. In case of war the Frontier Defence troops—after fulfilling their function as brigades—will be attached to the Divisions for transference as needed to other parts of the

front which may be threatened by the enemy. The Frontier Defence troops will be recruited from the "Elite" (Auszug), the Landwehr and the Landsturm of persons liable to military service who live in the neighbourhood of the frontiers: they will be separate from the Divisions. Their armament is to be highly mechanised: they will have automatic arms, infantry guns, anti-tank guns and their own artillery. Till this can be carried through, there are to be standing Frontier Defence companies. One such company was to be formed, according to Federal Councillor Minger, in 1936; and others will follow in 1937.

The rest of **the Swiss Army**, apart from the Frontier Defence troops, will be organised **under the new system** as follows:

- 3 Army Corps of 9 Divisions including 3 Mountain Divisions (viz. 3, 8 and 9 [Gotthard] Divisions),
- 4 Mountain brigades for Unterwallis (the lower Valais) including the garrison of the fortress of St. Maurice, Oberwallis (the upper Valais), Ticino (under the Gotthard Division), and Graubünden (Grisons) respectively,
- 3 light brigades to reinforce the frontier defence,
- 7 Artillery regiments independent of the Divisional artillery, 3 motor gun (12 cm.) regiments, 2 heavy 15 cm. and 2 light 12 cm. field howitzer regiments,
- 3 Air regiments with a total of 21 Air companies,
- 10-11 anti-aircraft regiments.

These formations will be divided into Cover and March troops. The purpose of the Cover troops is to protect the mobilisation and concentration of the mass of the Army. They will be recruited territorially like the Frontier Defence troops, so as to be available for use at the shortest notice. Cover troops in the West will be the 1 and 2 Divisions, in the North the 4, 5 and 6 Divisions, and in the East the 7 Division. On the South front there will be the 4 independent Mountain brigades. The 3 and 8 Divisions around Bern and Lucerne will be the March troops. From their central situation they can be thrown into the line at any point in case of invasion as the immediate reserve to reinforce the Cover troops at the point of attack: they are real Mountain Divisions. The 9 Division is the only Division which does not conform with this organisation in Cover and March troops. It will continue to be known as the Gotthard Division; and as such will provide the garrisons to man the St. Gotthard fortifications out of its permanent cadres of mobile nucleus troops.

The Division will in future consist of 3 Infantry regiments—but the 2, 6 and 9 Divisions will each have 4 regiments, while 14 "extra-regimental battalions" will be used for special purposes—1 field artillery regiment, 1 motor gun section, 1 Mountain artillery section (this only in the case of Mountain Divisions), 1 motor infantry gun company, 1 reconnaissance company (consisting of 1 squadron, 1 cyclist company and 1 armoured car detachment), 1 sappers battalion, 1 telegraph company, 1 Sanitation section, 1 Commissariat company, 2 Infantry park companies and 1 munition motor lorry company. Under the new system each Division will have about 500 automatic arms, 63 infantry guns and trench mortars and 44 to 52 guns.

Mountain brigades will in future consist of 2 to 3 Infantry regiments, 1 motor infantry gun company, 1 motor cyclist company, 1 Mountain artillery section, 1 to 2 motor gun sections, 1 artillery observation company, 1 to 2 sapper companies, 1 Telegraph company and the corresponding train.

Light brigades will consist of 2 regiments, each of 3 squadrons, 1 cyclist battalion with 1 motorised light machine gun company and 3 companies directly under Brigade Headquarters: of the three last-named companies, one will be armed with light machine guns, and the other two with infantry gun and sapping and mining material respectively.

The three future Army Corps, each under a separate Corps Command, will each have 2 to 4 Divisions or mountain brigades, 1 light brigade, 2 to 3 artillery regiments, 1 pontoon battalion, 1 telegraph company, 1 sanitation transport section, 1 field hospital and 1 munition motor lorry section. **In time of war** the Federal Council will have power to form a **fourth Army Corps** in addition to the three peace Corps.

A beginning was made with the **introduction of the new arms** under the Law of 1935; and the process will be carried further and faster, now that the necessary funds have been made available by the Defence Loan, in conjunction with the new Army system. Automatic weapons are to be introduced, especially in the case of the light troops: the latter will now include cyclist and motor cyclist units in addition to cavalry, which it has been decided after initial hesitations to retain. The principal automatic arm contemplated is the light machine gun with carriage. The heavy machine gun squadrons have been abandoned in favour of the Infantry. On the other hand the light troops are to have motorised infantry guns. The Frontier Defence troops' armament is to consist primarily of light and heavy machine guns, so as to enable them to contend with hostile armoured cars. In addition to existing stocks the following new arms are to be procured: 552 light machine guns, of which 324 will be with carriages, 36 heavy machine guns, 207 infantry guns and the corresponding armoured

cars. It is not quite clear from the Defence Bill whether these provisions relate only to the arming of the light troops, or if the Frontier Defence troops are included. As for the Artillery, the basic arm is to be the 10.5 cm. gun, which has been tested since 1933 and has proved its worth; and in principle one section of 2 to 3 batteries of heavy motor guns is to be attached to each Army unit, on the theory that every Army unit should have, generally speaking, as many field and mountain batteries as it has battalions. In the first instance 25 out of date 12.5 cm. motor gun batteries will be equipped with the new wide range motor gun. In the light of the experiences gained at the last manoeuvres there appears to be a certain reserve in regard to the mechanisation of the artillery in view of the character of the Swiss terrain; and the same is the case in regard to the Tank arm, the use of which in very broken country is restricted by natural obstacles within definite limits.

On the subject of **fortifications**, the Defence Bill speaks only in summary terms. The proposed new works are not likely to take the form of the grand scale connected works laid out on the St. Gotthard and at St. Maurice. It is more likely intended to erect smaller works to serve as a barrier to motorised and armoured enemy troops. Fortifications of this kind are contemplated on all the frontiers.

In the matter of **motorisation** the „Neue Truppenordnung“ makes very extensive demands. The greater part of all the motor lorries in the country are to be commandeered in this connection; but the number will not be sufficient to satisfy all Army requirements. It is therefore proposed to issue regulations to facilitate the ownership of motor vehicles by private persons, or to procure the necessary park by purchase on a large scale as Corps material.

The **Air arm** is also to be developed greatly under the Defence Bill: the Defence Loan is to be devoted, as to one-quarter of the whole or 55.3 million Swiss francs, to the acquisition of new military aircraft. A first series of 40 aircraft available for different purposes (bombing, fighting, reconnaissance etc.) are to be delivered in the near future. In an interview which the Head of the Swiss military air force, Colonel Bardet, gave to a representative of the Tribune de Geneve at last year's manoeuvres of the Air arm—the first since 1928—he said amongst other things that "new fighter and bomber types are under study, which will be able to develop a speed of up to 450 kilometres an hour. Over and above the replacement of out of date types by more modern machines, it is proposed that the Swiss Air arm should be increased gradually by some 300 new planes, and brought up to a total of some 550 to 600 planes." These aircraft are in future to be constructed in the Confederation's own works at Thun: hitherto there have been no military aircraft factories in Switzerland. The chief type under construction at present is the C 35 aeroplane. It has a speed of 340 km. per hour, and a capacity for the discharge of 200 kg. of bombs, and can be fitted with a 20 mm. gun and 2 machine guns in the wings and one machine gun in the stern. Side by side with the increase in the number of aircraft, provision is made for extension of the number of observers and pilots this year under training. The existing **total personnel of the Air arm**, consisting of 230 officers and 3,000 non-commissioned officers and men, is to be **brought up to a total of 6,000 men**, not including anti-aircraft formations. The „Neue Truppenordnung“ makes provision for 3 Air regiments in addition to the Staff of the Air troops. Hitherto there have been no Air regiments in Switzerland, but only 5 Air sections and 1 Air Staff section—a total of 18 companies in all. The new Air regiments will be divided into 2 to 3 sections, each section consisting of 3 to 4 companies, so that there will be 21 companies in all.

The Air arm thus strengthened will be under a unified Command, which will also assume the direction of the civilian anti-air defences. Proposals have also been put forward for a breach in the underlying principle of the Swiss militia army, in the case of the Air arm as in the case of the Frontier Defence troops, in the sense of establishing a corps of long service airmen available for use at any moment. After the „Neue Truppenordnung“ has been put into force, the Swiss Air arm will have available in the first instance:

3 regiments of 35 flights viz.	
6 fighting flights of, in all	54 planes
29 flights available for different purposes, in all	232 „
	total 286 planes.

The anti-aircraft defences consist at present of one anti-aircraft section of 3 companies of 8 guns each. There are also anti-aircraft guns available in different localities for civilian defence. 48 million Swiss francs of the Defence Loan are to be used for the development of the anti-aircraft artillery. It is proposed, amongst other things, to form 30 batteries of 7.5 cm. guns, 63 batteries of smaller calibre guns and special machine guns. Furthermore, the passive Air defences are to be considerably strengthened by an appropriation of 12.3 million Swiss francs from the Defence Loan.

These comprehensive measures of rearmament are clear evidence of Switzerland's intention to spare no financial or material effort in order to provide for the country's safety by the maintenance of the best possibly armed neutrality.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITALY'S NATIONAL DEFENCE

In Rome on October 27th 1930 the Fascist troop commanders were summoned to the Palazzo Venezia to report.

"A hard year lies behind us. So many comments have appeared on the subject of my speeches in Tuscany and in Milan that I propose now to comment on them myself. The intention of those speeches was to tear the mask from the face of that insincere Europe which talks of peace in Geneva and prepares everywhere else for war."

As he spoke, Mussolini took out a bulky document, held it up in front of him, and continued:

"In this book there are noted, day by day, the military preparations made in the years 1927, 1928, 1929 and 1930. In presence of these preparations could I hesitate to arouse the Italian people to face the situation created? Those from whom I have torn the mask have of course endeavoured to twist the thing round and represent Italy as the only wolf in a peaceful flock of sheep. But that is too childish. **Fascist Italy is arming in proportion as the others arm.** When words suffice to settle disputes between nations, I am ready to attach real value to them. But it must be made clear that we are arming, morally and materially, not for attack but in self-defence."

In August 1934 the manoeuvres had been completed with a mass of men and material engaged on either side. Before a gathering of Generals and 2,000 higher officers of all arms Mussolini made his famous "Tank Speech."

"We are a warlike nation, and are like to become increasingly warlike, for that is what we want to be. As I am not afraid of words, I add that we are a militarist nation. To complete our armaments, the whole life of the Italian nation, political, economic and moral, must be adjusted to military necessities."

At Avellino on August 30th 1936 the Grand Manœuvres were once more completed, and millions of people listened to the Duce's broadcast.

"I want the Italian people to take my words absolutely literally. It is not in spite of the Abyssinian War, but because of it, that Italian arms have now a greater striking force than ever before. At any moment at a simple word of command we can mobilise 8,000,000 men within a few hours. The Italian people should know that its peace is assured, within and without the frontiers; and with its peace the peace of the world is assured. We shall not join in the nonsensical talk of perpetual peace, for that is at variance with Fascist doctrine. We want to live at peace with all countries, and to keep peace as long as it can be kept; and for that very reason we are ready to make our daily concrete contribution with a view to cooperation in the peace work of the peoples."

"But after the disastrous failure of the Disarmament Conference, and in presence of the competition in rearmament which has already begun and can no longer be arrested, as also in consideration of the political position, the watchword for Fascist Italy can only be: **'Strong, ever stronger, strong enough to face all eventualities and to look destiny, in whatever guise, firmly in the face!'** To this supreme categorical imperative the whole life of the people must be, and will be, subordinated."

At Bologna on October 24th 1936 the 10th Division of Black Shirts had been reviewed; and Mussolini in his speech looked back on the last ten years of Fascism, which he divided into three periods. The third period, he said, began with the year 1934 and its sign was Empire. **A people without space could not live, and must suffocate. A people with a thousand-year old culture like the Italians was entitled to a place in the sun.**

"From this city of Bologna," he proceeded to say, "which in past centuries held up the torch of human wisdom, I wish today to send out a message to the world, a message which is to go over Alps and seas, a message of peace, peace in work and work in peace. **At this turning point between the 14th and 15th years of the Fascist calendar I raise aloft a big olive branch. But—mark you!—the olive branch waves above a forest of 8,000,000 bayonets.**"

These speeches, rounded off and completed by the Milan Speech of November 1st 1936 (for text of which see No. 171/175 pp. 31-32), embody the main aims of Fascist policy. The third period of Fascism has been taken a great step forward thanks to the iron determination and energy of the Duce. The accounts with the Allies left over from the World War have been settled: the place in the sun has been won: the conquest of Abyssinia has given Italy the wider space she needed for her existence: and Italian prestige throughout the world has been strengthened.

"It was only because the Roman legionary was invincible," the Duce wrote in an article at the end of September 1936, "that he was able to say proudly to the world **'Civis Romanus sum'**."

The Duce has certainly spared no pains to seek and ensue that "armed peace" of which he spoke in his Milan Speech by strengthening the Italian Defence forces. His assumption of the War Ministry in 1933 was a landmark in the development of the Italian Army. A new military era began after a period of some years during which the situation in regard to the national defences had been to a certain extent at a standstill and the military resources of the Italian people were not fully exploited. With Mussolini as War Minister far-reaching reforms were carried through in the Army by Committees specially appointed for the purpose. In September 1934 fundamental legislation was submitted to the legislature, and passed by the latter at the end of the year, on the **military preparation of the Nation**. The legislation in question consisted of three Acts on the **principles of pre-military instruction**, on the **establishment of military courses** (*cultura militare*) at middle-grade and higher schools, and on the **introduction of post-military education** respectively. Under these laws all Italians capable of bearing arms undergo compulsory military instruction from their 15th to their 55th year, even though not taken by the Army. The laws constitute a notable addition to the **Law of February 1932 on the disciplina di guerra**, which imposes an **obligation in case of war on all persons not called up for active service, including women**, to take a **"share in the moral and material defence of the country"** between the ages of 17 and 70. This latter Act embodies, in addition to provisions for the organisation of the "internal front," preparations for the expropriation of all sources of the nation's strength. It subjects, not only all individual Italians of either sex, but also all corporations and undertakings to a form of military discipline. The Law of 1925 on the Organisation of the Nation for War, which contains the expression "totalitarian war," had already extended the rights of the State to all industrial activities within the country. Its provisions have recently been extended by the establishment of the **office of Commissioner General for War Industry**, which is responsible for the control and allocation of the resources of war industries in the interest of national defence. Its duties include the distribution of the available raw materials for war manufactures, the allocation of orders to the different branches of industry, the control of imports, prices and the use of labour. The Commissioner General is the Chairman of the Civil Mobilisation Committee and is directly under the Head of the Government in the latter's capacity as Chairman of the Supreme Commission of National Defence. As a corollary to the mobilisation of the whole of the country's material resources in preparation for war, and as a supplement to the legislation of December 1934 on pre-military and post-military training, steps were taken at the beginning of 1936 to introduce a system of **"military books"** viz, military passports containing particulars of the current physical and moral development and military preparedness of the **"cittadino soldato"** (i.e. the citizen who is called upon to do military service in any form) from his 15th to his 32nd year. The introduction of a uniform period of service for one year for all Italians, which was at the same time proposed, was intended to emphasise the equal incidence of the military obligation on all: but the period of service has not hitherto been reduced from 18 to 12 months, as intended, and in the light of recent political developments in Europe is not likely to be so reduced for the present. A novel feature was the introduction of compulsory service in the case of the Air arm.

The education of the Italian people in the idea of national defence has produced a marked change in the attitude of the whole nation as well as of the individual Italian. One instance of this is the **decision of the Fascist Party leaders of May 19th 1936** which, in pursuance of the oath taken by the Italian people before the Duce on May 9th 1936, enrolls all Fascists capable of bearing arms between the ages of 21 and 55 in the Militia "in order to confirm the warlike spirit of the Black Shirts and the character of the Roman People." The military situation of Italy is not affected by this decision, since the existing legislation already imposed an obligation to take part in the national defence in time of war on all persons between the ages of 15 and 70, including persons not called to active service: but the decision nevertheless lends new meaning to the conception of the "Nation in arms." As an English paper, the Daily Telegraph, observed, the effect of the Party's decision is to show an additional 1 to 1.2 million names on the rolls of the Militia, which will bring the total strength (including the present 500,000 members) up to 1.5 to 1.7 million men. By a stroke of the pen the entire Militia is given a permanent military organisation with an equipment which does not fall short of that of the Army in any respect.

The **Volunteer Militia** is composed of the **Ordinary Militia** and the **Special Militias**. The Ordinary Militia, serving under the Fascist Party decision above-mentioned until the 55th (hitherto 50th) year, consisted down to the autumn of 1936 of 6 main group headquarters, 33 group headquarters, 122 legions, 13 supplementary legions and 6 independent cohorts. Since October 1st 1936 the organisation of the Militia has been adapted to military requirements in the event of mobilisation, and now consists of General Headquarters in Rome, 14 zone headquarters in Turin, Genoa, Milan, Bologna, Bolzano, Trieste, Florence, Ancona, Rome, Aquila, Naples, Bari, Palermo and Cagliari, and 29 battalion group headquarters which are for the most part in the same place as the headquarters of the 30 Infantry Divisions.

The **Legions**, the number of which is gradually to be increased to 150, are under the battalion group headquarters.

Each Legion is sub-divided into:

- 1 "Youth" **battalion** (destined to be called up for military service in the Army);
- 1 "Senior" **battalion** (for local service, air defence, coastal defence and the like. Note that the coastal batteries in Italy are manned by the Militia);
- 2 **additional cohorts**, one for each of the two battalions to which they are attached, manned by reservists after their service with the colours.

The following are the **effective strengths** of these formations:

- 1. 1,321 officers and 6,581 men permanently serving on the staffs or in the cadres.
- 2. 36,974 officers and 416,635 men liable to enrolment for service in the Militia, including Black Shirt battalions, but not including 5 Black Shirt Divisions at war strength which at the end of 1936 were still in East Africa.
- 3. 165 officers and 722 men permanently serving in the Air Defence and Coastal Defence Militias.

The **Air Defence Militia** and the **Coastal Defence Militia** have lately been combined in so far as their higher commands are concerned. There is now a single Inspectorate for the two with 6 joint legion groups. Under these are 14 legion headquarters for the Air Defence Militia with 10 independent cohorts, and 2 separate legion headquarters with 2 independent cohorts for the Coastal Defence Militia. The joint Inspectorate of the two Militias is under the General Staff of the Army or Navy, according as the units concerned are military or naval, in respect of service organisation, training, disposition and material: in administrative and personal matters the Inspectorate is under the General Headquarters of the Volunteer Militia. In time of war, the various units of the two militias become subordinate in all respects to the armed force which has jurisdiction over the area.

The following effectives of the special militias are in addition permanently in service:

with the		Officers		Men
Railway militia	14 Legions	=	327*)	4,525*)
Post and Telegraph militia	12 Sections	=	80	520
Frontier militia	16 Centuries	=	128	2,100
Road militia	19 Sections	=	31	425
Port militia	3 Legions	=	41	844
Forest militia	9 Legions	=	328	3,672
Colonial militia	2 Legions	=	88	2,890
totals =				1,023 14,976

The original function of the Militia was primarily internal: to it was entrusted the maintenance of public order. Until the outbreak of the Abyssinian War only relatively small elements of

*) Some 21,000 additional effectives can be drawn, as required, from the Railway staffs.


Armoured cars

Table showing the size, power and armament of the armoured cars illustrated


Country	Armoured car	Width	Length	Height	Movement on roads		Crosses trenches	c.c. = cross-country capacity l.c.c. = limited cross-country capacity	Wades to depth of	Number of crew	Armament
		m.	m.	m.	forwards	backwards					
France	Berliet T.V.-P.C. 8 ton	2.18	5.03	2.66	60	55	Yes	c.c.	70	4-5	1 machine gun, 1 gun, 1 anti-aircraft gun
France	Panhard Kégresse-Hinstin M 29 6 ton hybrid	1.78	4.75	2.46	55	50	Yes	c.c.	120	3	one 3.7 cm. gun, 1 machine gun
U.S.S.R.	Ford 9 ton amphibious	2.10	5.28	2.42	65	7	—	l.c.c.	—	4	one 3.7 cm. gun, 2 machine guns
U.S.S.R.	Ford 7 ton	1.92	4.93	2.43	70	8	—	l.c.c.	60	4	one 3.7 cm. gun, 2 machine guns
Czecho-Slovakia	Skoda P. A. 2 7 ton	2.20	6.20	2.60	60	60	—	l.c.c.	60	5	one 3.7 cm. gun, 2 machine guns
Czecho-Slovakia	Skoda P. A. 4 8.7 ton	2.08	5.94	2.69	60	60	—	l.c.c.	60	5	one 2 cm. machine gun, 2 machine guns
Sweden	Landsverk 181 6.2 ton	2.00	5.60	2.33	70	40	—	l.c.c.	60	4-5	1 automatic gun, 2 machine guns
England	Vickers-Guy (1929) 9.25 ton	2.35	6.58	2.86	50	8	—	l.c.c.	—	6	2 Vickers machine guns
Austria	heavy car	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Italy	Fiat M. 1934 6.8 ton	1.91	4.60	2.23	75	40	—	l.c.c.	—	4-5	one 4.7 cm. gun or 2 machine guns in pivotal turret




France: Berliet T. V.-P. C. 8 ton




France: Panhard-Kégresse-Hinstin M. 29 6 ton hybrid armoured car




U.S.S.R.: Ford 9 ton amphibious armoured car




U.S.S.R.: Ford 7 ton armoured car



Czecho-Slovakia: Skoda P.A.4 8.7 ton armoured car



Czecho-Slovakia: Skoda P.A.2 7 ton armoured car




Sweden: Landsverk 181 (1933) 6.2 ton armoured car



England: Vickers-Guy (1929) 9.25 ton heavy armoured car



Italy: Fiat M. 1934 6.8 ton armoured car



Austria: heavy armoured car

the Militia ranked as part of the Defence forces, namely, 2 or 3 battalions of assault Militia troops to each Division of the regular Army, which were attached to the latter for training or manoeuvre purposes. The position changed considerably with the outbreak of hostilities in Abyssinia in the autumn of 1935. The Militia was expanded by the enrolment of new Black Shirt battalions, but also by additions to other arms, to such an extent that in the course of the Abyssinian campaign no less than 5 Militia Divisions at war strength were sent to East Africa. They were to be brought back to Italy by the end of 1936 and there to be demobilised. Their military achievements side by side with the regular Army Divisions were given full recognition in the Decree-Law of January 12th 1936, which provided amongst other things that "The entry of Black Shirts into Militia formations which are sent to Africa is equivalent to entry into the Royal Army. Service in such formations, including service already so performed before the publication of the present Decree, is in every respect on the same footing as service in the Army." The above provision definitively puts an end to the distinction between the volunteer Militia Divisions sent to East Africa and the regular Divisions. In the ordinary way members of the Militia on mobilisation are called up individually to the Army units to which they belong; and only the assault battalions of the Black Shirts are attached to the regular Divisions as units. The effect of the Decree of January 12th 1936 is to constitute the Militia Divisions in East Africa a part of the Army. The Black Shirts in these Divisions are subject to military law like regular soldiers. The new Italian Defence Law links the Army and the Militia even closer together, as the Militia (to which every person capable of bearing arms belongs) has the whole of the pre-military and post-military education in its hands. Membership of the Militia ceases only during the 18 months of active service. The reservist from the Army serves four more years in the general Militia and after that in the **Territorial Militia**, the equivalent of the German Landsturm and similar organisations in other armies.

* * *

The principle "Strong, ever stronger," the principle of "armed peace," has been systematically applied in the development of the **Italian Defence forces**. The first step to be taken, as a condition precedent to all other action, was the solution of the officer question. The average age of the officers' corps had to be lowered, and higher standards of performance to be enforced. The Grand Manoeuvres in the autumn of 1935 and the campaign in Abyssinia were evidence of the success achieved by the work of recent years in raising the standards, the joy in responsibility and the power of decision of the officers' corps. The new regulations with regard to promotion contained in the **Officers Law of June 1934** made possible the lowering of the average age of the officers' corps by the openings for advancement which it held out, while it at the same time opened up the possibility of increase in the total number of officers. The need for such measures was intensified by the Italian decision in March 1935, in view of the international situation, not only to keep the 1913 and 1914 classes with the colours for an indefinite period, but also to call up the whole of the 1911 class. The effect of this decision was to give Italy a total of some 600,000 fully armed men under arms in April 1935. This figure was largely increased by the calling up of reservists in view of the campaign in Abyssinia: In the summer of 1936 Italy had about a million men still under arms. Since that date considerable numbers of the mobilised formations in East Africa have been brought back to Italy and demobilised. At the present time there are not more than about one Colonial Division (White) under arms in East Africa. At the end of 1936 the **organisation of the home troops**, after demobilisation of the last of the active Divisions brought back from East Africa, will be as follows:

- 29 Infantry Divisions,
- 3 mechanised Divisions,
- 3 mobile Divisions,
- 5 Alpine Divisions, hitherto called 'Brigades'.

The Italian Army is accordingly composed of:

- 95 Infantry regiments, of which 4 are mechanised,
- 13 regiments of Bersaglieri,
- 11 Alpine regiments,
- 12 Cavalry regiments,
- 32 Divisional artillery regiments, of which 2 are mechanised,
- 3 mobile artillery regiments,
- 5 mountain artillery regiments,
- 13 Corps artillery regiments,
- 1 independent Corps artillery Section,
- 10 Army artillery regiments,
- 5 anti-aircraft regiments,
- 1 independent anti-aircraft Section,
- 1 coastal artillery regiments, including one independent Section,
- 4 tank regiments,
- 3 independent tank Sections,

- 12 engineer regiments,
- 1 independent engineer battalion,
- 2 bridging regiments,
- 2 mining regiments,
- 1 Railway regiment,
- 1 airship battalion,
- 1 chemical regiment,
- 13 motor centres.

The above tabulation would make the present strength of the **Italian peace-time Army some 442,000 men**, including 34,000 airmen, 50,000 Carabinieri, 25,000 Revenue Guards and 10,000 standing Militia. To this total there have to be added a further 30,000 men in Libya and the newly created Colonial Army of 60,000 men in East Africa, details of the organisation of which are given below.

The discussion of the Army Estimates for the year 1936-37 in the Italian Chamber and the measures since taken are clear evidence of the contemporary military preparedness of Italy in Europe and East Africa. The utterances of the Under-Secretary of State for War, General Baistrocchi, on this occasion gave a clear picture of the position of Italian rearmament preparations and of the reform of the Army. A decisive feature in this connection is the conversion of the previous peace formations into cadres which can at once be filled up in war-time by calling up the reserves. The cadres are so planned as to enable 1.25 million men to be incorporated in the formations at once in addition to the troops already serving. The training of the officers required under this plan, General Baistrocchi explained, is being carefully carried forward. The reorganisation of the Army is being based on offensive principles in the light of the lessons learned from the Abyssinian campaign. The principle of the offensive was formulated by General Baistrocchi in the Chamber in the following terms: "The new theory," he said, "which is based essentially on the assumption of a war of movement, is in accordance with our dynamic Fascist mentality and our political, military and economic circumstances. A short war, a violent and unceremonious war—that is what we look to: but should circumstances beyond our control make that impossible, our people and our Army will know how to wait, ready to strike as soon as the possibility arises." To take others unawares instead of letting oneself be taken unawares by others—that is the principle of Italian military policy: the initiative must never be allowed to pass to the enemy.

This is the principle behind the continued **mechanisation**. The 12 Cavalry regiments are to be completely mechanised: at present they consist of 3 mounted squadrons, one horsed heavy machine gun squadron and one squadron of 15 fast tanks. The Bersaglieri regiments, which constitute the nucleus of the mobile Divisions, have already been reorganised, and now consist of one cyclists battalion (for which lorry transport is proposed), one mechanised battalion on lorries and one battalion of 2 companies, one of which is on motor cycles with a total of 18 light machine guns while the other consists of 12 fast tanks with in all 24 heavy machine guns. The mechanisation of the Artillery has also been carried forward. The IInd and IIIrd Sections of the three mobile artillery regiments have been provided with motor train transport: similarly with the heavy artillery, the transport of which by lorries is now only exceptional. All anti-aircraft artillery is now mounted on lorries. The Supply services are also extensively mechanised.

The former 8th Infantry Division has been reorganised as a mechanised Division, and the mechanised Trento Division, which made its first trials at the autumn manoeuvres of 1935, has been reconstituted. Each of these mechanised Divisions consists of 2 Infantry regiments and one light machine gun battalion on lorries, one motorised Field Artillery regiment with one Section of 75 mm. guns and one Section of 100 mm. howitzers, each Section being made up of 3 batteries of 4 guns each with motor train. In war the mechanised Divisions will have in addition one tank battalion, one heavy machine gun company on motor cycles, one engineer company and sanitation and Commissariat services, all motorised.

The three mobile Divisions are now finally organised on uniform lines. Each comprises a Divisional Staff, one Cavalry brigade staff, 2 Cavalry regiments, one regiment of Bersaglieri, one Section of fast tanks, and one mobile Artillery regiment of three Sections, of which the Ist (horsed) Section consists of 75 mm. guns, the IInd Section of 75 mm. guns on lorries, and the IIIrd Section of 105 mm. guns also on lorries.

There are three **mobile tank Sections**, each of which is attached to one of the three mobile Divisions. Each of these Sections is divided into 2 to 3 squadrons; and each squadron has 15 fast tanks of the Ansaldo-Fiat model, which develop a speed of 45 km. an hour. They carry crews of 3 men each and are armed with one heavy machine gun firing 4,000 shots.

The **Mechanical Transport Service** is also to be expanded. It has been composed hitherto of a Brigadier General, 40 mechanical transport officers, and officers, non-commissioned officers and men

commandeered for the purpose from all arms of the Army. By the close of 1937 it is to be built up to an establishment of 7 Colonels, 25 Lieutenant Colonels, 84 Majors, 287 Captains and 145 Lieutenants and Second Lieutenants by means of transfers from other arms. The total establishment of 539 officers will be divided, as in the fighting units, into "Command" and "Mobilisation" officers. The necessary non-commissioned officers and men will be found from volunteers and commandeered men with previous experience of motor transport.

But in spite of this very far-reaching process of mechanisation it remains true, as Mussolini has said, that "the individual is the soul of the Army, and it is on the Infantry that the Army must be built up." The Infantry has accordingly been equipped with new weapons—heavy hand grenades, trench mortars, machine guns, tanks and anti-tank guns. Every Infantry regiment will in future have over 150 machine guns, trench mortars and guns, together with a corresponding park of motor transport attached to the several Divisions. The men who are to lead the troops are being given special training in the principles of the war of movement. The **armament** of the Army consists of some 7,500 light and 3,500 heavy machine guns and 1,300 light guns, 130 anti-aircraft guns and 800 heavy guns. New regulations have also been issued in the case of the General Staff. The **General Staff** of the Army is in future to consist of two categories:

- a) the actual General Staff officers—viz. 135 Colonels, and 99 Lieutenant Colonels on the Staff.
- b) the officers attached to the General Staff—viz. Majors, Captains and Lieutenants of the different arms.

This reorganisation implies a reduction in the numbers of Staff officers, but should mean an improvement in the quality. It will in any case make possible the training of a large percentage of officers in Staff duties on whom the country can fall back in the event of mobilisation. Two Deputies are to be attached to the Chief of the General Staff, one for the active Army and one for the national defence services. The latter will be in charge of the organisation of the military zones, the Air Defences and Coastal Defences, and the Air Defence of the population. The military division into 13 Corps districts and 31 Divisional districts remains only as an organisation of the active troops. The territorial forces, the conscription and mobilisation services, the home defence organisation and the pre-military and post-military training services will all be based on the military zone organisation, in order to leave the troops completely free for their military duties. There are now 8 zone groups, 28 military zones and 100 military districts. The national defences have also been reorganised on thorough-going lines. **The Supreme Council of National Defence** has been greatly strengthened by the addition of further Ministers, the Marshals of Italy, the Admirals of the Fleet and the Marshals of the Air Force. It consists of an Executive Committee, consultative Committees and a General Secretariat.

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The Italian Defence forces will be profoundly affected by the **decision of the Italian Government of September 12th 1936** to create a **Colonial Army** for normal peace-time service. The decision is based on the view that the Home Defence Estimates should not be saddled with the defence of the Colonies and their frontiers. The Colonial Army is to be raised in the first instance for East Africa only, and is to be composed of volunteers.

The **Colonial Army for East Africa** (*Armata Coloniale per l'Africa Orientale*) will have a **peace strength of 60,000 men**, of whom 20,000 will be white Italians and 40,000 coloured troops. The Supreme Command under the Viceroy will consist of a General Staff and Inspectors of Artillery, of the Pioneer Corps, of the Black Shirts and of the special services. The Officers Corps will be entirely Italian, and will have a strength of 2,500, of whom one-fifth will be reserve officers. The number of non-commissioned officers will be 1,800. Non-commissioned officers and men will engage for 2 years. The officers, who will constitute a special Corps of Colonial Officers, will be required to undertake to serve alternately 5 years in Africa and 2 years in Italy. During the two years of their service in Italy they will be replaced by active officers, so that there will be a standing exchange of officers between the Colonies and Italy allowing of normal facilities of training and promotion.

The Colonial Army will be organised as follows:

1. White troops (*Reparti d'Africa, bianchi*):

- a) The Viceroy in Addis Ababa will have under him at his own direct orders the "Savoy Grenadiers" Division, made up exclusively of white troops. It will consist of 2 Grenadier regiments, 1 Artillery regiment of 2 groups, 2 Pioneer companies, Sanitation services etc., and 1 Black Shirt Motor Section which will enable the Division in case of emergency to be transported to the remoter regions of the Colony.

- b) The Commandant of Addis Ababa will have under him 4 Black Shirt battalions and 8 Black Shirt batteries of fortress artillery, all separate from the "Savoy Grenadiers" Division.

- c) Each East African Government will have a reserve for the frontier districts made up of a total of 9 fully mechanised Black Shirt battalions, each with 2 machine gun companies, one armoured car company and one company of fast motor cars. In addition there will be 4 groups of mechanised artillery, 4 groups of anti-aircraft artillery and 7 companies of colonial artillery.

2. Coloured Colonial troops (*Reparti coloniali*):

These troops, who will be led by white officers and coloured non-commissioned officers, will be divided into 17 Colonial brigades. Each brigade will be divided into 4 Infantry battalions of 3 rifle companies and one machine gun company each, one group of 3 batteries (of which one will be a gun battery and the two others trench mortar batteries), one Pioneer company and one Field Hospital. Six out of the 17 brigades will have a group of 2 squadrons of Cavalry in place of the fourth Infantry battalion.

The native troops will consist of 62 Infantry battalions, 51 batteries, 12 squadrons of Cavalry, and 17 Pioneer and other technical companies.

In addition, the **Workers Army**, which will shortly be brought up to some 150,000 men, will be organised on military lines on the model of the Fascist Militia, and will have its own uniform and equipment.

"Italy wants peace but is not afraid of war," said General Baistrocchi in the Senate; and it is in this spirit that she is continuously improving her military preparations. Italy has also made mighty efforts in connection with her air armaments in order, as far as in her lies, successfully to maintain her present supremacy in the Mediterranean in this branch.

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The Air arm is a separate arm of the Italian defence forces as a whole under the Head of National Defence. The Supreme Command of the Air arm is divided into 9 Departments. The Air Ministry is the supreme administrative authority. The Colonial air formations are under the Ministry for the Colonies.

The Italian air forces are an "organic and professional unit with specialised applicabilities," and for tactical purposes are under the Chief of the Air Staff: the last named has a deputy Chief under him. The Chief of the Air Staff is responsible in the case of the "independent Air Force," i.e. the offensive arm of the Air forces, for disposition, training and administration. In the case of the Army and Navy air formations he is responsible only for their training and administration, the respective military and naval authorities being responsible for their disposition.

The air forces in Italy are grouped in four different organisations according as they are Air Force proper, Air Force Engineer Corps, Air Force Administrative Troops or Schools. The air forces in the home country are divided into the independent Air Force, the Army Air Force and the Navy Air Force. The cadres of the organisation and the numbers of the higher formations (regiments and groups) are fixed; but the number of flights and their grouping are not fixed. Side by side with the horizontal tactical grouping there is a vertical administrative grouping, for the purpose of which Italy is divided into **4 air zones** with headquarters at **Milan, Padua, Rome and Bari** respectively. To supply the personnel for these services, a Decree was approved in the summer of 1935 providing for the immediate attainment of the strengths laid down in the fundamental Law of 1931. The number of officers' posts was at the same time increased from 2,861 to 3,061, and instructions were issued for the temporary calling up of a number of Reserve officers not exceeding 1,500 and for the promotion of non-commissioned officers to officers' rank. The chief problem that presented itself in connection with the expansion of the Air arm on the extensive scale indicated was the problem of training the personnel, as more and more time is required for this purpose with the development of modern technical improvements in the construction of aircraft. To obtain the requisite numbers of airmen and air experts, two courses were held in the spring of 1935 and in the spring of 1936, which were attended by 1,300 pilot pupils and 4,750 specialists in the former case and 1,500 pilot pupils and 4,200 specialists in the latter case. It was stated by General Valle that the numbers of new pilots under training in the two years 1933 and 1935 were as 1:10 respectively; but the requirements have since risen. Italy will shortly have 10,000 trained pilots at her disposal. To find this number, it has already been announced that the element of compulsion will shortly be intro-

duced: Italy will be the first country to apply the system of compulsory service to the Air arm. Industry and the Fascist Party do a great deal to further the training of young airmen. In the spring of 1936, for example, the Party instituted pre-military courses in flying for the purpose. The pre-military training of airmen, which is followed immediately by active service with the Air forces, includes the training of specialists, for which there are special pre-military courses at the universities and in the schools of the big industries.

In the summer of 1936 the Italian Air forces were composed of the following formations:

I. Air Force. 2 Divisions (a third Division was formed at Bologna in October 1936), 6 brigades, 16 regiments, 82 groups, 78 flights composed as follows:			
30 fighter flights	=	360 planes	
12 battle flights	=	144 "	
12 day bomber flights	=	96 "	
24 night bomber flights	=	192 "	
78 flights	=	792 planes	792
II. Army. 3 regiments and 2 independent groups, 11 groups, 20 flights composed as follows:			
25 reconnaissance flights	=	300 planes	300
III. Navy. 3 regiments and 2 independent groups, 2 groups, 34 flights composed as follows:			
4 fighter flights	=	48 planes	
12 bomber flights	=	144 "	
14 reconnaissance flights	=	168 "	
4 mixed flights	=	48 "	
34 flights	=	408 planes	
Add aircraft carried aboard ship	=	74 "	
		482 planes	482
IV. Colonies. 4 independent groups, 12 flights . = 144 planes			
Add aircraft of units transported to East Africa for the war, and subsequently reconstituted in the home country = 340 "			
		484 planes	484
V. First line aircraft at schools = 250 planes 250			
Together, first line	=		2,308
second line (about)	=		692
Total aircraft available for war purposes			3,000

As regards anti-aircraft defence, the Army has 5 anti-aircraft regiments, each of 2 to 3 Sections of 2 (in war-time 3) anti-aircraft batteries and one searchlight battery each. The mixed artillery regiment in Cagliari (Sardinia) also has a further anti-aircraft Section. In addition there is the Anti-aircraft Militia, to which reference has already been made, with 15 legions and 14 independent cohorts.

The peace-time organisation of the whole Air arm is elastic. The cadres of the arm as laid down by law can be filled up as requirements arise with new war formations.

The reconstruction and rearmament of the Army and Air arm and the campaign in East Africa have between them swelled the Italian Defence expenditure of the last few years to an enormous extent. At a meeting of the Cabinet towards the end of 1935 the Finance Minister made a statement from which it appeared that:

- the financial year ending June 30th 1935 (i.e. the year 1934-35) closed with a deficit of 2.03 milliards of lire, 975 millions for extra-ordinary expenditure in East Africa and 840 millions for subsidies to the Railways being included in this figure;
- the 1936-37 Estimates (i.e. the Estimates for the year beginning July 1st 1936) totalled 20,291,000,000 and included the following Ordinary expenditure on armaments:

Army . . .	2,291,000,000 lire, i.e. 168 millions less than in the financial year 1935-36,
Navy . . .	1,545,000,000 lire, i.e. 279 millions more than in the financial year 1935-36,
Air arm . .	970,000,000 lire, i.e. 130 millions more than in the financial year 1935-36.

The Ordinary expenditure on armaments accordingly rose from 4,565,000,000 lire in the financial year 1935-36 to 4,806,000,000 lire in the financial year 1936-37. The "Extra-ordinary expenditure for East Africa"—for which 12 milliards of lire had been voted down to the end of May 1936—are not included in this figure; nor is the sum of 300 millions from the Air Renewal Fund of April 1st 1935, for which provision is made in the 1936-37 Budget.

A further 140 million lire were appropriated in October 1936 for the construction of new Airports in the basin of the Po and along the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian littorals, as well as in Sardinia

and Sicily. This total includes 7.4 millions for the Airport of Orvieto, 15.2 millions for that of Alghero (Sardinia), 10.6 millions for that of Comiso (Sicily), 6.3 millions for that of Naples, 1.5 millions for that of Salerno, 1.4 millions for that of Rieti, and 13 millions each for Viterbo, Tarquinia and Siena, 17 millions for Perugia and 10 millions for Treviso. The work on these Airports is to begin at once.

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That Italy of the present day is a powerful military Power, equipped with the most modern equipment and trained by the most modern methods, emerges clearly from a comparison of the defence forces of Italy at the end of 1936 and the defence forces as they were in 1914.

In 1914 Italy had some 250,000 men under arms: in 1915, when she declared war on Austria, the number was 550,000. At the end of 1936 Fascist Italy had over 440,000 men in the home country and 90,000 men in Africa under arms, in addition to a Workers Army of 150,000 men in East Africa. In 24 hours Italy can mobilise 1.25 million fully trained soldiers without drawing on any of the troops stationed in East Africa. Official figures published by the Fascist Party give the number of men between 21 and 54 years of age on which the Italian Defence forces can draw as over 7,838,000 men.

Portugal's anti-communist effort

Portugal suffered severely for a long time after the World War from internal anarchy; and peace and order were not re-established until 1926, when General Carmona and Senhor Salazar assumed political power as President of the Republic and Premier respectively. Knowing their own minds and sparing no efforts in the attainment of their aims, the two statesmen have since then suppressed all Communist activities in the country, and have created the conditions under which Portugal has been able in the last few years to make steady progress in respect alike of her internal and her external policy. It is therefore with a very special attention that Portugal is now following the sanguinary events in her neighbour's territory. The danger of the Spanish Civil War spreading to Portugal is enhanced by the existence of a common frontier 1,200 kilometres in length and by the fact that Communist refugees from Spain have been the agents of a revival of Bolshevik propaganda on Portuguese territory. A victory for Spanish Bolshevism in Spain would be tantamount to war from the Portuguese point of view. In its struggle against Communism the Portuguese Government has the support of the national party União Nacional and the youth organisation Mocidade Portuguesa, as also of the recently founded Legião Portuguesa, an organisation of men of military age which came into being in connection with the struggle against Bolshevism: but above all it has the support of the whole of the armed forces of Portugal, which are firmly on the side of the nationalist Government, as was shown recently when a Communist mutiny which had broken out on two small warships in Lisbon harbour was at once put down by the loyalist troops.

Portugal's Defence forces are based on compulsory military service. Constitutionally they are organised in a Home Army and a Colonial Army. The Home force comprises the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Colonial Army may be used on occasion in the home country. Portugal is divided into 4 military districts, Oporto, Coimbra, Tomar and Evora, the Government district of Lisbon, and the two Military Commands, the Azores and Madeira. The conscription is organised in 23 recruiting areas.

Before the young Portuguese is called up for active service, he is compelled to undergo a pre-military training in his youth from his 14th year onwards. Compulsory military courses are held at all schools and universities. In the 17 months of his active service with the colours in the Army he spends 5 months in the recruits school and 12 months with the troops.

The peace-time Army is organised in 21 Infantry regiments of 67 battalions in all, 9 Cavalry regiments of 36 squadrons in all, 5 light Artillery regiments of 61 batteries in all and 4 heavy Artillery regiments of 25, together with 5 anti-aircraft batteries. There are in addition 2 Pioneer regiments of 11 companies in all, a Railway and a Signals regiment, a Motor battalion of 2 companies, and 2 Tank companies with some 15 tanks.

The Colonial Army consists of 28 (coloured) Infantry companies, 5 Depot, 3 machine gun and 7 Police companies (part coloured), and a squadron of Cavalry, 4 batteries of Field Artillery and one mountain battery.

The peace strength of the Home Army including the National Guard and the Revenue Guards is some 31,000 men, while that of the Colonial Army is about 10,000 men. The Army is armed with some 1,000 light and 250 heavy machine guns, and 300 light and

150 heavy guns including coastal artillery. **The probable war strength of the Home Army is at present in the neighbourhood of 870,000 men.**

In the air Portugal has a total of 16 flights, distributed under separate Sub-Commands in the War Ministry, Ministry of Marine and Colonial Ministry. The distribution is as follows: the Army has 2 fighter flights, 2 bomber flights and 2 reconnaissance flights, the Navy has one fighter flight, one bomber flight and one reconnaissance flight, and the remaining 7 flights (all reconnaissance flights) comprising 70 planes are stationed in the Colonies. The Home Army and the Navy together have some **160 planes**. Portuguese recognition of the importance of a strong air fleet is apparent from an Order issued on June 9th 1936 increasing the expenditure on the Air Force and on military instruction in the Estimates of the War Ministry by a total of 140,000 escudos.

A Law of August 1935 introduced a far-reaching change in the command of the Portuguese Defence Force by the institution of three supreme military authorities, since constituted under the direction of the competent Ministers from the highest officers of the Army, Air Force and Navy, as follows:

1. Supreme Army Council.

Its powers extend to changes in the organisation of the Army, to the maintenance and development of the land fortifications and war material, and to the work of military institutions and establishments. It is the final instance in questions relating to the promotion of officers.

2. Supreme National Defence Council.

Its powers extend to all questions of national defence, protection of the civil population, food supply and safety of transport routes in war-time: also to questions of industrialisation. It is responsible for determining the main lines of military policy.

3. Supreme Military Council.

It has the decision in all matters of armaments, and the organisation and employment of the striking forces of the country on land, at sea and in the air.

* * *

The Portuguese Defence Force is today unquestionably in a position, in virtue of its intrinsic value, strength and composition, to fulfil the task which is incumbent on it of defending the neutrality declared by the Portuguese Government in relation to the Spanish Civil War, if necessary, in arms. For "Portugal has no wish," the Portuguese Foreign Minister Senhor Monteiro explained, "to see an invasion of communism within its borders. We do not want to see our cities burnt, our ancient monuments blown to pieces, our women violated and our countrymen pitilessly slaughtered. The Portuguese Government means to protect the independence of the country at any cost, to defend Western culture and to maintain public order. That is the greatest service Portugal can render to the peace of the world."

Belgium's armaments in the light of political power shifts

The foreign and military policy of Belgium in the past 17 years has been conditioned mainly by the following considerations.

When the neutrality of Belgium was brought to an end under Article 31 of the Versailles Treaty, and replaced by the new situation which that Article established, in 1919, Belgium became a member of the League, but without making any of the reservations made by Switzerland. In the following year Belgium concluded a Military Convention with France on September 7th 1920, which in itself constituted a violation of Articles 20 and 21 of the Covenant of the League. In further violation of Article 18 of the Covenant the Convention was never registered with the Secretariat of the League. Its contents accordingly remained secret: but its existence was made public by the registration and publication of the accompanying Notes of September 10th and 15th 1920. In 1921 Belgium further concluded a defensive alliance with England, and was a party in 1925 to the Locarno Treaties, under which she became, not merely a guaranteed Power, but a Power guaranteeing the status quo in Western Europe. As a consequence she was forced into a one-sided adherence to France and the French rearmament policy, which was shortly patent to the world in the shape of a joint programme of development of the Armies and fortress systems of the two countries and the reorganisation of the Belgian Army on French lines. On the Northern and Eastern frontiers of Belgium there has recently been erected a dense series of fortifications which are meaningless unless regarded as a continuation of the Maginot line. On the Western frontier, i.e. on the side exposed to France, Belgium remained without defences; and the whole of her Defence forces were at the same time organised on lines which ran parallel to those of French military policy. It was this development that gave rise to an internal opposition which gathered strength at every moment. The Flemish section of the population, which after the repression of the first few years after the War was again beginning to raise its head, was increasingly opposed to the effortless subordination to France. The first recognition of the existence of this feeling was the declaration by the Minister M. Hymans on March 4th 1931. It did not amount to much. It was not till three years later that a statement was made by the Count de Brocqueville on March 6th 1934, which made a lasting impression. In the meantime speeches and articles in the Flemish Press multiplied their attacks on the one-sided connection of Belgium with France and their demand for the denunciation of the Secret Agreement of September 7th 1920.

The strength of the Belgian ties to France was again manifest in connection with the discussion by the Belgian Chamber of the proposals submitted by the Belgian Cabinet at the beginning of February 1936 for the extension of the period of active service in the Army and the vote of an additional Supplement to the Budget of some 140,000,000 francs. The War Minister Devèze defended the demand for this rearmament with a reference to the dangers of an eventual invasion from the Dutch frontier; and he added that the frontier defence troops must be put in a position to spread destruc-

tion in the districts adjacent to the frontier in good time, and to keep these areas under fire until reinforcements—i.e. reinforcements from France—could arrive! The Government proposals for extension of the period of military service were rejected by the Parties in the Chamber on a first division at the end of February, the voting being largely attributable to the introduction of a Flemish resolution in Parliament on February 20th for the denunciation of the Franco-Belgian Secret Agreement. In the discussion of the Flemish motion in the plenary meeting of the Chamber on March 11th the Flemish deputies argued that Belgium, like certain of the Balkan States, was reduced to nothing more than a section of the French military block. The Belgian defences were directed simply and solely against a single neighbour. The Premier van Zeeland thereupon announced that the Military Convention with France had been terminated only a few days before and replaced by a new Agreement which only provided for permanent contact between the General Staffs. The Premier's statement was not calculated to allay the anxiety in the country. The Flemish Nationalists and the Fleming members of the Catholic Party contended that the new Agreement with France was no improvement in so far as the independence of Belgium was concerned. In Parliament and in the country they argued for the return to an independent policy of voluntary neutrality. After the new Elections of May 1936, which strengthened the ranks of the Flemings and brought the Rexists for the first time into Parliament, the new Foreign Minister of the van Zeeland Cabinet, M. Spaak, at a reception of the Press on July 20th declared in favour of a **policy of neutrality**. A storm of indignation in the Francophil Press was the sequel; but a semi-official announcement was made short afterwards notwithstanding to the effect that in any new Locarno Treaty Belgium would decline to accept the position of guarantor of any foreign country's frontiers, and that her efforts would be directed solely towards the negotiation of a guarantee of her own frontiers.

In his Speech to the Council of Ministers on October 14th 1936 the King of the Belgians himself referred to the need for a reshaping of Belgian military policy in the light of internal and external political developments. (The text of M. Spaak's speech and that of the King of the Belgians will be found in No. 171-175 of this publication, page 30.)

What weighty grounds were there in the field of foreign politics to induce the King of the Belgians to make these startling public statements with regard to Belgium's desire for a foreign policy of her own—statements, be it noted, which gave the death-blow to the spirit, if not to the actual letter, of the Agreements with France? The answer is to be found in the **Note sent from Brussels on October 23rd** to the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay in reply to enquires from London as to the Belgian attitude in regard to the proposed Five Power Conference. The following are the comments of the **Brussels Correspondent of The Times** on the contents of the Note (The Times, October 23rd 1936):

"The Note makes it clear that the Belgian Government, like the

British Government, view with dismay the **recent tendency** towards the formation of **rigid and antagonistic blocs in Europe** and that they are determined to hold themselves aloof from it. In the circumstances of 1936 the obligations assumed under the original Locarno Pact are too heavy to be borne by a State of Belgium's size and military strength. Article 1 of the Locarno Pact, by implication, placed Belgium on terms of equality with the Great Powers, and under it Belgium has the same responsibility as the other Powers for the maintenance of German and French territorial integrity. Though the assumption of this obligation was much criticised by the Flemings at the time, it was generally felt that it could be safely shouldered. Germany was largely disarmed, the Rhineland was demilitarised, and the League looked like becoming a nucleus of a dependable system of collective security. Moreover it was felt that the new treaty had made a vital contribution to the maintenance of Belgian security.

"In 1936, the Note explains, everything is different. German rearmament, precipitated by the Barthou Note of April 17th 1934, has culminated in a remilitarisation of the Rhineland and has completely altered Belgium's position in relation to Germany. The collapse of collective security in the face of Italy's war against Abyssinia has so weakened the League that it is now felt to be almost useless as an instrument for the maintenance of peace. Finally, **the development of the French system of alliances,** with the aim of counterbalancing Germany's growing military strength, tends to **divide Europe into precisely two such antagonistic pro-French and pro-German groups** as it was the aim of Locarno to dissolve.

"Until the change of policy enunciated by King Leopold, and confirmed in the Belgian Government's Note, the Belgian National Defence Plan was based on the possibility of a new German sweep across Belgian territory into France. Fortifications were built and strategic flooding points were created with the aim of enabling the Belgian forces to fight a delaying action so as to hold up the invader until assistance was forthcoming. But, as King Leopold has explained, under modern conditions the enemy could strike so quickly that, no matter how soon Belgium's allies came to her assistance, she would have to face the first staggering onslaught alone. And, in the Belgian view, a violation of Belgian territory would be all the more likely if, as the result of **staff conversations with the French army,** Germany were in a position to argue that the triple line of Belgium was merely a continuation of the Maginot line.

"Against this background the Belgian Note goes on to argue that in the light of recent events Belgium can best contribute towards Western security, if the national defences are so strengthened as to offer the maximum deterrent to any aggressor, and **if at the same time Belgium, like Great Britain, holds aloof from all systems** and thereby does not provide a potential aggressor **with the excuse that she forms part of a hostile ring.**

"The Belgian Government holds the view that this change of policy is an advantage to Great Britain also. So long as Belgian independence remains of paramount importance to Great Britain—so long, that is, as the British frontier 'begins upon the Rhine'—it is in the British interest that Belgium should remain absolutely neutral, and should pursue a policy 'exclusively and entirely Belgian'. By so doing she claims to be reducing the danger of being drawn into a war whose origins lie elsewhere, and therefore of forcing Great Britain to take part in a struggle for the defence of Belgian integrity which, but for irrelevant pacts and alliances, would never have been threatened."

The Note reveals in the first place the **one-sided interpretation hitherto given by France and Belgium to the Locarno Pact,** inasmuch as they persisted, in spite of the English and Italian guarantees, in their policy of a military alliance and General Staff conversations. It is easy to read between the lines—as some of the comments in the English, French and Belgian Press did not fail to do—that **the new French policy of alliance with the U.S.S.R. was the primary reason for Belgium's reconsideration of her position.** The policy of the Franco-Russian Alliance, in the words of one of the Flemish deputies in the Belgian Chamber, left Belgium more than ever at the mercy of that "military determinism" which was bound to involve her in any and every French conflict. The Belgian public and the Belgian Government rightly felt that the **Franco-Russian Pact had introduced an incalculable element of danger into the political system of Europe.** When, after the initial rift in the shape of the revision of the Franco-Belgian Military Alliance on March 6th, Belgium decided definitively to abandon the system of assimilated Franco-Belgian policy which she had practised for the last fifteen years, and to free herself completely from the commitments it entailed, her decision was due in the last analysis to nothing else than **the feverish French mania for the conclusion of Pacts with dangerous, automatically operating obligations,** and the exaggerated French insistence on "formulas" ("Peace is inseparable", "collective security" and the like) with their accompaniment of "sanctions" and "mutual assistance", the effect of which, to quote the striking

expression of Maurice Bourquin, "is no more and no less than to invite the peoples to throw themselves into the burning, fiery furnace." (See „Grundsätzliche Betrachtungen zum Problem der kollektiven Sicherheit“ by Maurice Bourquin in the Europäische Revue, No. 11/12, pp. 758 ff.)

The speech of the King of the Belgians was the prelude to a lively exchange of views between London and Paris as to the significance of the new policy of neutrality which it proclaimed. The anxieties to which it gave rise in the minds of the French and English Cabinets, were (as the Press comments showed) in connection with the idea of collective security, the one-sided Belgian obligations to the Western Powers on the land and in the air, the arrangements between the different General Staffs, the problem of policy in relation to the League of Nations, the right to march through Belgium, and so on and so on: the proposal for a Western Pact also appeared to have been torpedoed by the Royal utterance. The extension of the fortifications in Northern France along the Belgian frontier was another sequel to the Speech.

As to the Western Pact, Belgium was and is prepared to participate, but not (as the King clearly stated) in the former character of a guarantor of other countries' frontiers, and not unless Holland is prepared to participate as well. The Belgian Foreign Minister further made it clear that Belgium would adhere to the Locarno Treaty and the Agreements of April 1st 1936 pending the conclusion of a new Western Pact between the former Locarno Powers. The Foreign Minister's announcement was indicative of the Belgian inclination—to which subsequent interpretations of the King's speech and the General Staff arrangements which followed also gave expression—not to strain Belgian relations with France and England too far. The Belgian declaration of neutrality applies therefore only to future negotiations: the former agreements remain in force for the present. In his **speech on foreign policy in the Chamber on October 28th 1936 the Foreign Minister (M. Spaak)** stated that Belgium would still be ready in the future to take part in any reasonable form of collective action within the limits of conditions clearly defined. Belgium was anxious to fulfil her obligations; but the obligations must be laid down in plain and exact terms, explicitly circumscribed in such a manner as to admit of no misunderstanding. Belgium intended to pursue **a purely Belgian foreign policy,** having regard to her geographical position, her traditions and her capacities. There was no question of a reversion to the pre-war neutrality, since Belgium meant to remain a member of the League. The Foreign Minister then referred to the system of collective security. It was perhaps the ideal system of ensuring the maintenance of Peace, but only if organised on comprehensive and effective lines; and it could not be said to be so organised at the present time. Belgian foreign policy would therefore be based on the maintenance of complete independence. Its object would be to make it perfectly plain to each of her neighbours that Belgium did not propose to allow her territory to be used either for the transit of troops or as a strategic base. Such a policy postulated a strong Belgium. The military and the political issues were consequently inseparable.

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The Belgian Foreign Minister proceeded in this connection to discuss **the new military proposals** which had been approved by the Government on October 14th and submitted to Parliament on October 27th. The object of the proposals was to protect Belgium from the disasters to which she would be exposed in the event of her being involved, notwithstanding her declaration of independence, in a new war. The explanatory statement attached to the Bills embodying the proposals (the central feature of which was the extension of the period of active military service which the Government had already tried to carry through Parliament in the spring of 1936) speaks of the necessity of not merely defending the frontiers, but also of maintaining large concentrations of troops in the interior of the country to cope with the eventuality of attacks by enemy troops introduced into the country by sea or by air.

The proposals start from the assumption of a sudden invasion of the country without previous declaration of war. In the view of the Belgian General Staff the national defences are not at present in a position to repel such an invasion. The Joint Military Committee, on whose studies the military proposals were admittedly based, expressed the opinion that the technical developments of recent years, and in particular the progress of mechanisation, had changed the whole face of the problem of continuous defence of the frontiers. The danger of a surprise invasion at the present time, they added, differed in toto from what it was at the time of the military reforms of 1928, both in its military and in its technical aspects.

The continuous defence of the frontiers, if it was to be effective, now called for the concentration of all the means of defence, active and passive. The most effective form of passive

defence was the execution of destructive measures. For these it was necessary to keep a sufficient number of trained men in the technical units of the Army permanently under arms throughout the year. The active defence of the country should be based mainly on the cyclist companies, the Ardennes chasseurs, the Cavalry, the fortresses of Liège and Namur, the Infantry regiments, the machine gun battalions, the Infantry batteries and the Signals Corps. The anti-aircraft defences also called for considerable reinforcement.

Study of the land defences of Belgium since the War shows a steady reduction in the expenditure for these purposes during the years 1922 to 1930. In the year 1926, for example, some 1,000 officers and several thousand non-commissioned officers were placed on the retired list. There was no change until the Liberal deputy Devèze became War Minister in 1932. It was true, as the Military Correspondent of the *Handelsblad van Antwerpen* observed in an interesting article on October 22nd 1936 on the effects of the Belgian declaration of independence on the French system of defence, that "the General Staffs of France and Belgium had worked together in the closest contact ever since the Armistice of 1918, and this cooperation was intensified after the conclusion of the Locarno Pact in 1925." But the position was fundamentally altered when the deputy Devèze assumed the post of War Minister. The Military Correspondent of the *Handelsblad van Antwerpen* continued: "When the Chief of the Belgian General Staff disagreed with the views of the French Generals Weygand and Gamelin, and proceeded to develop Antwerp as the principal fortress in Flanders, he was forced by War Minister Devèze to resign. The result was to make the Belgian girdle of fortifications on the Eastern frontier the natural extension of the French Maginot line. Longwy is the point of juncture, and the line runs on from there by Arlon, Bastogne and Hervé to Maaseyck on the Dutch border, Liège and Namur representing a second line of defence in the rear. The Belgian declaration of independence at one stroke laid open the French front on the North. The Northern front of France, which runs from Longuyon by Montmédy—Maubeuge—Valenciennes—Lille to Dunkirk, is divided into a number of physically different regions. Strong military forces are distributed over North France. At Lille, the Headquarters of the 1st Army Corps, there is the 1st Infantry Division. At Amiens, the Headquarters of the IInd Army Corps, there is the 3rd Infantry Division. The VIth Army Corps at Metz has three Divisions, and the XXth Army Corps at Nancy four Divisions. To these forces must be added the Fortress troops and the so-called *Réserve mobile de couverture*, large mechanised formations. It is, to say the least of it, not improbable that in future there will be large concentrations of French troops in the North; and such a measure would presumably be countered on the Belgian side by the transfer of equivalent forces to the French frontier."

Until the King made his Speech to the Council of Ministers on October 14th 1936, the Belgian Army regarded itself as the advance guard, so to say, of its Allies' armies with the duty in war of resisting the enemy on the Eastern frontier with all its strength until such time as the Allied armies could come to its relief. Belgian military policy was largely based on this conception of the Belgian Army's function in the event of war.

At a vast expenditure of money and effort Belgium has been engaged for a number of years past in the execution of a programme of **development of the girdle of fortresses on the Eastern frontier**, and the work is nearly complete. In the years 1935-36 the execution of the programme went forward systematically. A line of blockhouses along the Belgian-Luxemburg and Belgian-German frontiers from Arlon via Bastogne and Vielsalm to Eupen (which, according to the War Minister Devèze, is intended to serve as a "wasp's nest" in the path of an invader penetrating into the Ardennes) was steadily carried to completion. In the neighbourhood of Eupen-Malmédy fortifications were for the first time pushed right up to the German frontier. The modernisation of the Fortress of Liège and its extensions to the East via the Hervé plateau to the line Jalhay—Limburg—Henri-Chapelle—Homburg, and to the North as far as the point where the new Canal Albert branches off from the Meuse, are complete, together with a great part of the constructional work in the areas concerned (in particular, the strong points of Battice and Eben-Emael): a number of other works are close on completion. The defensive works on the Meuse between Eben-Emael and Maaseyck, and on the Northern frontier of Belgium between Maaseyck and Turnhout, the modernisation of the North-East front of Antwerp and the erection of a bridge-head South of Ghent are all complete. The strongest defences of the Belgian North-East frontier will in future be the Canal Albert and the fortified works along its course. The construction of this waterway, which runs from Liège through the district South-West of Maastricht and Hasselt and North of Diest and Herenthal to Antwerp, has been pushed on energetically; and several stretches of the Canal have already been opened to traffic. Lastly in continuation of the "réduit national", which runs with its front towards the South-East from Courtrai to Ghent on the Lys and from Ghent to Antwerp on the Scheldt, a bridge-head

6 km. deep has been created South of Ghent by means of a line of blockhouses.

The following additional military measures have been taken to strengthen the Eastern front. The 14th Infantry regiment was moved in August 1935 to what are in future to be its permanent headquarters in Huy and Liège. The 1st Infantry regiment was concentrated two months later (i.e. in October) in Verviers. The effect of these movements was to bring the troops of the 3rd Division, which is the Division chiefly concerned with the defence of Liège and its advanced forts, close together in a narrow area. One Infantry regiment of the 3rd Division was also strengthened in the course of the summer of 1935 by a section of Frontier cyclists. The 1st regiment of mounted chasseurs was moved to Beverloo to take the place of the 14th Infantry regiment when the latter was moved to Huy and Liège: the 1st regiment of mounted chasseurs had previously been garrisoned at Mons. A section of the 1st anti-aircraft regiment was also transferred from Brussels to Liège with the specific object of taking over the listening service on the whole length of the Eastern frontier.

Belgium may be said therefore to have taken steps on an extensive scale for the protection of the Eastern frontier. In addition, the striking power of the Army has been considerably increased by improvements in the Artillery, mechanisation of an increased number of units and the establishment of Reserve Divisions.

As to **mechanisation**, it should be noted that the part-mechanisation of four out of the six regiments of Cavalry was completed according to programme by the end of 1935. The four regiments are now composed of one horsed half-regiment of 2 carabineer and one machine gun squadrons, and one mechanised half-regiment of one motor cyclist squadron, one armoured car section and one anti-tank battery of eight 4.7 cm. guns. In the march past in Brussels on April 8th 1936 the new armoured cars of the part-mechanised Cavalry were shown for the first time. The armoured squadrons of these regiments consist of 12 caterpillar armoured cars with high turrets carrying one heavy machine gun. In the course of 1936 the establishment was increased by the addition of two motorised regiments ("cavaliers portés") combined in a single brigade, to be formed on mobilisation. The new brigade is to form part of the Corps troops at the disposal of the Commander of the Cavalry Corps, and to constitute a mobile reserve. The cars are requisitioned. At the Cavalry Corps manoeuvres at the beginning of July 1936 a brigade of this kind was formed out of reservists, and transported in 70 requisitioned lorries.

Reference must further be made in this connection to two legislative measures affecting the mobilisation of private cars. A Law of March 22nd 1935 imposed certain restrictions (not further particularised) on the owners of motor busses for the public conveyance of passengers "in the interest of security, National Defence etc." As the measure was countersigned by the War Minister, it may be taken to have introduced an obligation to hand over all motor busses in the event of mobilisation, as a peace-time measure of preparation for meeting certain requirements of the Army's transport. Another Law of March 31st 1936 further extended these restrictions to all public motor conveyances. The idea is presumably to borrow a leaf from the book of the French General Gallieni, who used taxis for the transport of troops at the battle of the Ourcq in September 1914: Belgium is making preparations to do the same.

The **Artillery** is also being further **mechanised**. All three Corps artillery regiments are to be motorised. Each of the three Army Corps is to have a mechanised battery of eight 4.7 cm. guns; and so is the Cavalry Corps. Mechanised batteries of this type have also been introduced with the Infantry regiments. Certain Divisions have been given "escort" battalions composed of 2 companies of 4.7 cm. armoured anti-aircraft guns. Apart from fortress artillery, Belgium has 353 light and 199 heavy guns.


Special efforts are being made in the Belgian Army in connection with the continued training of **reservists**. In March 1936 the 9th Division, one of the six Divisions of first-line reservists which it is proposed to form on mobilisation, was constituted at its war strength and did service training for 14 days. The reservists called up were those of the years 1930, 1931 and 1932. They were used to constitute the 16th, 17th and 28th Infantry regiments. The strength of these formations and the numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers serving were exactly the same as in war-time. In October 1936 the 10th Division served a similar period of training. Two Reserve Divisions will in future do training in this way every year. In addition, a Law of April 11th 1936 extended the general training periods for reservists as follows:

In the case of reservists of the Infantry, cyclists, Cavalry, Artillery and Pioneers, from 42 to 58 days.

In the case of reservists intended to serve as Reserve officers or non-commissioned officers, from 42 to 74 days.

This Law came into force on January 1st 1937.


Army mechanisation:



St. Chamond wheeled and caterpillar tracked 80 H.P. motor lorry for gun transport (France)




Latil four-wheeled artillery tractor driving over shell-hole (France)



Pavesi P 4-110 heavy artillery tractor (Italy)



Alfa-Romeo hybrid tractor with double steering-wheel for reverse movement (Italy)



Vickers-Armstrong tractor with 40 mm. machine gun in anti-aircraft fire position (England)



Panhard-Kégresse-Hinstin 16 H.P. hybrid car as means of transport for "dragons portés" (France)


Special vehicles




Landsverk 210 armoured motor cycle (Sweden)




Smoke-screen generator mounted on Renault M17 tank frame (Poland)




Landsverk 192 artillery tractor (Sweden)



K.H. 50 wheeled and caterpillar tracked artillery tractor (Czecho-Slovakia)



English Mark III caterpillar car for transport of infantry with kit



Czech armoured draisine trolley with machine gun pivotal turret

The parliamentary discussion and approval of the new military proposals—which the Chief of the Belgian General Staff announced as likely to cost 2½ milliards of francs—was to be completed by December 1st 1936, that being the first date for the calling up of the 1937 class. After long debates, in the course of which the Socialists made counter-proposals in regard to the period of service which were turned down by the Government, the Committees of the two Chambers approved the proposals as a whole at the end of November. The Premier, M. van Zeeland, thereupon announced that the Government, while adhering in principle to the 18 month period of service, was prepared to limit the enforcement of the extended period to a trial of five years, i.e. until 1941, in the hope of the decline in the birth-rate being made good by that time—in which case the one year period would again become the rule. The Government Parties were not prepared however to accept this proposal. Instead, they brought in a new amendment reducing the period of service (beginning with the 1937 class) from 18 to 17 months in the case of the Infantry, part of the Ardennes chasseurs and the cyclist regiments, and raising it to 12 months—it had hitherto varied between 8 and 12 months for the bulk of the recruits—for all other troops. With this amendment, which the Government accepted, the Bills were then passed by a large majority of the Chamber on December 3rd 1936. In future something like three-fifths of the annual conscription will serve 17 months. The annual contingent, which under the old law was supposed to be 44,000 men but—owing to the many exemptions granted—in fact averaged only 41,000 trained men per annum, is now to be brought up to 47,000 by restricting the exemptions as also by a provision that the establishment of each year is to be increased by the shortage in the strength of the previous year. Furthermore, the Minister for National Defence brought in a Bill in the Chamber at the end of 1936 raising the contingent of recruits for the year 1937 to 84,000 men. In addition 4,000 professional soldiers with three to five years' service are to be enlisted for the Fortress artillery, the anti-aircraft batteries and the mechanised Cavalry: these, in addition to the 2,000 volunteers already serving in the cyclist units. Until the new system of professional elements is in working order, the recruits of the three arms mentioned will serve for 15 months. Special measures are also proposed for the year 1937 to enable a sufficient number of trained men to be kept permanently with the Colours. The mechanisation of the Cavalry will be completed in the course of 1937. The preparations for destruction on the frontier as a measure of national defence are to be extended and intensified, and the development of the fortifications behind the zones of destruction is to continue. As a measure of frontier defence on all fronts, the Bill proposes a redistribution of the headquarters of the Infantry regiments. From 1938 onwards two Infantry regiments will be transferred from the interior of the country to Turnhout (in the province of Antwerp) and Tongres (in the province of Limburg), so that the striking force on the North and North-East

frontier will in future be composed of five Infantry regiments, while the remaining Infantry regiments will be garrisoned in Flanders (3 regiments), in the South (3 regiments), in the Hennegau (3 regiments) and in Brussels (3 regiments). The system of marching battalions of fully trained men for the initial occupation of the frontiers on the outbreak of war, one such battalion to each regiment, will be retained for the time being. The **redistribution of stations** of the Infantry regiments, so far as at present known, is as follows:

1st Regiment of the line	Verviers,
2nd Regiment of the line	Ghent,
3rd Regiment of the line	Ostend,
4th Regiment of the line	Bruges,
5th and 6th Regiments of the line . .	Antwerp,
7th Regiment of the line	Tongern,
8th Regiment of the line	Turnhout,
9th Regiment of the line	Brussels I,
Grenadier regiment	
Carabineer regiment	
11th Regiment of the line (1st battalion)	Beverloo,
11th Regiment of the line (IInd and IIIrd battalions)	Hasselt,
12th and 14th Regiments of the line (IInd and IIIrd battalions)	Liège,
14th Regiment of the line (1st battalion)	Huy,
13th Regiment of the line	Namur,
Ardennes chasseurs	Arlon, Bastogne, Vielsalm,
1st Regiment mounted chasseurs . .	Mons,
2nd Regiment mounted chasseurs . .	Charleroi,
3rd Regiment mounted chasseurs . .	Tournai.

Of the total of 7 Infantry and 2 Cavalry Divisions of the peace-time Army, 26 Infantry battalions, 2 cyclist regiments, 2 Frontier cyclist battalions, 1 Air regiment, 1 anti-aircraft Section, 2 Engineer regiments, 3 part-mechanised Cavalry regiments and 9 light and heavy Artillery Sections with the corresponding number of Army troops are stationed on the Eastern frontier for its defence; and this list does not take into account the numerous batteries of the forts of Liège and Namur. In other words, one-quarter of the 77,000 men of the peace-time Army are stationed in the Eastern frontier provinces and in the area of the Liège fortress. For the maintenance of her proposed unconditional neutrality, Belgium would now be in a position out of her trained reservists to put in the field, if required, a field army of some 650,000 men, that is to say, 19 Infantry Divisions, 2 Cavalry Divisions, with some 1,500 light and 460 heavy machine guns, and an Air Force (under present conditions) of some 520 aircraft including second line planes, 2 anti-aircraft regiments with 16 anti-aircraft batteries, and 2 searchlight formations with 6 searchlight batteries.

GREAT BRITAIN

I. POLICY AND ARMAMENTS

"We would have been ready to conclude a Disarmament Convention, and have not indeed yet abandoned all hope of doing so. But in the world as it now is the strengthening of our own defences is not only a consummation devoutly to be wished: it is a consummation which comports an imperative national obligation."

To something like this common denominator all the speeches with which responsible English statesmen in the past year have justified rearmament—and rearmament on a scale such as has never been known in England before in time of peace—can be reduced. It is a kind of general absolution. "In the world as it now is . . ." No question but that the argument is a strong one! And the English people, which has failed more than once of recent years to comprehend what its Government was about, has understood this much that, in a world which is arming, England cannot remain "disarmed," particularly as her rearmament is not only or primarily in the interest of English security, but also in the interest of the strengthening of the League of Nations, the development of collective security and—through collective security—the cause of peace. We have even the satisfaction of observing—a little late in the day, it is true—the alacrity and the insistence with which the French Press welcomes and gives prominence to the new English recognition of the dangers inherent in one-sided disarmament on England's part. This one-sided disarmament is the cause of the disturbance in the balance of power: it has been a useless sacrifice for a utopian ideal. At last it has been realised that Germany had a case when for the last ten years she urged the senseless character of the one-sided disarmament imposed on her by

force. England today is paying the price of past disarmament in the shape of rearmament on the most gigantic scale.

"In the world as it now is!" But the speakers have unfortunately forgotten to explain to their audiences why the world has become what it now is, and why England must rearm. For we are under no illusions as to what they mean by "the world": they mean amongst other things Germany, and perhaps they mean principally Germany.

An answer to this question has not yet been given: but light is thrown on the matter by the armament debates in both Houses of Parliament in the United Kingdom and by the numerous speeches made by responsible English ministers then and on other occasions in recent years.

Their argument is that the crisis, through which Europe has been passing since 1935, is not due to the reintroduction of compulsory military service and the concurrent rearmament of Germany, since Germany did not proceed to take this step until the authors of the Versailles Treaty had violated and ignored for seventeen years the true principles of Versailles, which on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points were intended—and were expected by English public opinion equally—to establish new forms in international relations. Accordingly the key to a solution of the armaments question was never in Germany's hands. The crisis through which Europe has been passing since 1935 was a consequence rather of the Abyssinian issue. Later it was intensified and rendered acute by the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet alliance, which made an end de facto of the security in the West created by the guarantees of the Locarno Pact and led inevitably to the restoration by German troops, of complete sovereignty in the

demilitarised Rhineland zone, as also by the open interference of Soviet Russia in events in Spain.

As a result of the crisis arising out of the Abyssinian question, Mediterranean issues of vital importance for England's interests as a Great Power were raised; and these were closely linked up with problems of the Near, Middle and Far East. It should not be forgotten in dealing with the political developments which followed that the Suez Canal is a vital artery of the British Empire. Herein lies the whole explanation of the whole Mediterranean policy of England and the need for the maintenance of strong military forces in Egypt and the English possessions in the Mediterranean.

But, as the English Premier Mr. Baldwin stated at the time in the House of Commons, England's strength is not complete even though her prestige is great. It was the lesson of the hour for England. She was driven to creating for herself the strength which she lacked, if she was to be able to give her policy the requisite backing and to be able, should the need arise, to proceed to the final consequences which her policy implied. There were two ways of doing this. She might secure the support of Allies, or she might develop her own resources.

She did both. In the Abyssinian conflict she not only concluded far-reaching understandings and agreements with France for close cooperation of their respective forces at sea, on land and in the air; she also made certain of the support of the States bordering on the Mediterranean littoral. These last however were not in a position to render her adequate military aid in the shape of naval and air forces in case of need; and England proceeded accordingly to arm herself. The King accordingly announced in the Speech from the Throne that the fulfilment of British international obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the necessary protection of the British Empire made it imperative to take steps to deal with the shortcomings in the national defences.

England therefore drew the conclusion from the Abyssinian War that **never again must it be possible for a foreign Power to override England's will.** It is this categorical imperative which, far more than the necessities of defence which are put forward to the outside world as her motive, that is responsible for England's decision to rearm. It is not difficult to prove that this is so. The English **Armaments White Paper** for example of **March 1936** expressly says:

"... Although in the circumstances created by the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, His Majesty's Government were able to make the dispositions which the situation required, they were embarrassed by the decline in the effective strength of their armaments by sea, land and air. ... It was only possible to safeguard the position in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea by denuding other areas to an extent which might have involved grave risks.

"... In any event, collective security can hardly be maintained unless every member of the League of Nations is prepared to make a contribution, adequate in relation to its resources, to the strength of the whole.

"We cannot excuse our own weakness by pointing to the strength of our neighbours. Our weakness would prevent us from playing our due part in enforcing collective security, ... It is essential therefore that the relation of our own armed forces to those of other Great Powers should be maintained at a figure which will be high enough to enable us to exercise the influence and authority in international affairs which are alike required for the defence of vital British interests, and in the application of the policy of collective security."

The rearmament of England which has been in progress since 1935 is therefore an expression of the **English determination** to be able, where they wish to have a say, to **say it with emphasis.** Since Mr. Eden's statement in the House of Commons on November 5th 1936, be it remembered, Great Britain is determined **once again to take the lead in foreign policy.** A strong fleet and Air Force and an Army ready to be thrown into the scale as required are in future to lend to English political Notes that emphasis which has been so painfully lacking in the last two years.

In his **speech at Leamington on November 20th 1936**, in explanation of the rearmament programme, Mr. Eden gave a still clearer outline of British obligations; and in his interpretation of the latter he took occasion to indicate the **guiding principles of British foreign policy** as a plain and unmistakeable peace policy in the following terms:

"These arms may, and if the occasion arose they would, be used in our own defence and in defence of the territories of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They may, and if the occasion arose they would, be used in defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression in accordance with our existing obligations. They may, and if a new Western European settlement can be reached they would, be used in defence of Germany were she the victim of unprovoked aggression by any of the other signatories of such a settlement. Those, together with our Treaty of Alliance with Iraq and our projected Treaty with Egypt, are our definite obliga-

tions. In addition our armaments may be used in bringing help to a victim of aggression in any case where, in our judgment, it would be proper under the provisions of the Covenant to do so. I use the word 'may' deliberately, since in such an instance there is no automatic obligation to take military action. It is moreover right that this should be so, for nations cannot be expected to incur automatic military obligations save for areas where their vital interests are concerned."

It is noteworthy that, in specifying the circumstances under which the British defence forces are to be used, Mr. Eden mentions Germany only conditionally—the condition being that a new Agreement is concluded in Western Europe as a substitute for Locarno.

On **December 14th at Bradford** Mr. Eden repudiated the reports, which had been in circulation as a result of the Leamington Speech, with regard to an alliance with France and Belgium and a movement towards the formation of a Bloc, and again expressed a wish for cooperation with Germany, not merely for the purpose of concluding a West European Pact, but with a view to the establishment of a new European order as a whole. He further attacked the false interpretation of his remarks in regard to the geographical spheres of influence of Great Britain. Though British vital interests might be found in certain clearly defined areas, the British interest in peace was world-wide. Great Britain therefore must be on the alert at all times and in all places: it was not possible for her to disinterest herself in this or that part of the world in the vague hope that events in such a part would not touch her. She could not seek her security alone in the glass house of Western Europe.

The latter utterance unquestionably embodies an allusion—not unconnected, perhaps, with the visit of the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, to London—to the **East of Europe**, which region however plainly excludes in English official eyes the Soviet Union: England believes herself to be fully assured against the danger of Bolshevik influences. In spite of the grave handicaps to the political development of Europe which the intrigues and machinations and actual interventions of the U.S.S.R. and its Bolshevik agents in Europe constitute—as to which the Spanish Civil War affords an object lesson to the whole world—the British Government still holds fast, as Eden's speeches show, to the policy announced in the communiqué published on March 31st 1935 on the occasion of Mr. Eden's visit to Moscow, the policy (that is to say) embodied in the statement that "friendly cooperation between England and the U.S.S.R. is of great importance in connection with the general efforts for the collective organisation of peace."

* * *

In an **end-of-the-Session speech on December 19th** in the House of Commons Eden once more made the point which he had put previously to the House on November 5th, with regard to the cordial relations between England and France as the two great Democracies of Western Europe. England might, he said, look forward with confidence to further and closer relations between the French and British Governments; and the same was true of Belgium, from whom an assurance had been received that Belgium adhered to her existing obligations. (Anglo-Belgian friendship had been specially emphasised on November 27th by Mr. Eden at the reception of the Belgian Premier van Zeeland by the British Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Eden on that occasion referred to the vitally important interest of Great Britain in the independence and integrity of Belgium, and was at pains to specify that Great Britain would come to Belgium's aid in the event of unprovoked aggression directed against the latter.)

The **tension** which had developed in the **Mediterranean** as a result of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict was finally terminated—after the numerous references to the subject by Mussolini in his public utterances (the last of which was his Milan speech on November 1st) and the corresponding replies by Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Sir Samuel Hoare and Eden—by the **Gentleman's Agreement of January 2nd 1937.** The "steel castles" established in the mean time by Great Britain at her various Mediterranean points d'appui have however remained in situ, it having been conclusively demonstrated that the paper castle of Geneva is not an adequate defence of Great Britain's world-wide interests.

II. REARMAMENT

The rearmament programme of Great Britain extends to all three branches of the Defence forces—Navy, Army and Air Force. The increase in armaments, on the need for which renewed emphasis is now being laid, was first initiated by the English Defence Estimates for 1935-36. The grounds for the rearmament

programme were stated in the White Paper of March 1935—to with obvious allusion to Germany—to lie in the fact that in their present state the Defence forces were no longer sufficient to ensure the protection of the British Empire, having regard to the armaments of other countries, and must accordingly be strengthened in order to bring them up to current standards. The Navy Estimates in recent years had been kept, generally speaking, at a level which enabled the requisite replacement building to be carried through: but the **Army and Air Force Estimates** had been cut down from £62,300,000 to £53,000,000 in the course of the years 1922-1932. Since the last named year they had been slowly rising. The total Estimates and Supplementary Estimates for the Army and Air Force for the financial years 1935-36 and 1936-37 compare as follows with the totals for 1934-35: the figures are in millions of £ sterling.

Arm	1934-35 Budget total	1935-36			Increase over 1934-35 total	1936-37			Increase over 1935-36 total
		Estimates	Supplementary Estimates	Total		Estimates	Supplementary Estimates	Total	
Army	39.60	43.55	1.35	44.90	5.30	49.28	6.60	55.88	10.98
Air Force...	17.56	20.65	1.61	22.26	4.70	39.00	11.70	50.70	28.10
Royal Arsenal...	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.29	0.29	0.29

With the exception of the chapter "Lodging and Transport" there is an increase under every head in the chapters of the earlier of the two Budgets (1935-36). The item "Armaments" shows by far the biggest increase. About one-half of this total, viz. £1,087,000 out of £2,111,000, went to Artillery munitions, the expenditure on which in 1934-35 was only £680,000. The expenditure for motor transport in 1935-36 was 110 per cent more than in the previous year: that for motor transport capable of movement across country was 54 per cent more: and that for Signals equipment searchlights and bridging material as much as 240 per cent more.

In the current 1936-37 Budget the total armaments expenditure on the Army and Air Force shows an increase as compared with 1935-36 of £34,370,000 or about 37 per cent*). The increase in the Air Force alone is nearly 128 per cent! The major part of the 1936-37 increases in the case of the Army is not for expansion of the effectiveness so much as for reorganisation, and in particular the acquisition of war material and mechanisation. The heading "Armaments" again shows an increase, as in 1935-36, this time of nearly 50 per cent. Half of the total was again allocated to the replenishment of artillery munition stocks. In order to bring the production of munitions for the Army into line with the postulates of the White Paper on National Defence and the Speeding up of Production, the post of Director General for the Manufacture of Munitions was created in July 1936.

An **Army Order** issued by the Secretary for War at the end of **December 1935** was of paramount importance in connection with the **reorganisation and modernisation of the Army** which is at present armed with some 10,000 light and 4,200 heavy machine guns and some 1,900 light and 500 heavy guns. The purpose of the proposed reorganisation was stated in the following terms. The Infantry was to be reorganised in such a way as to make it possible to reduce the size of the Divisions while increasing the fire-strength of the auxiliary arms. The tactical cooperation of the Infantry units was to be improved, and their subsequent development facilitated. Infantry training and the increase of establishments in war-time were to be simplified. The present Cavalry Division was stated to be lacking in the rapidity of movement, range of action and fighting strength required under present-day conditions from mobile troops engaged against mechanised units; and it was added that the Tank Corps must be able under certain circumstances to command the support of equally mobile troops capable of being thrown into action in terrain unsuited for tanks.

The central points of the Order were therefore:

1. The regular Army to be more powerful, more mobile and faster-moving.
2. The Cavalry to be restored to its old position as a battle arm and as the strategic advance-guard of the Army.

Drastic changes were accordingly projected in the organisation of the Infantry Brigades, which correspond tactically to the Infantry regiments of an army like the German Army, while at the same time the Cavalry was to be mechanised on a far-reaching scale. A so-called Mobile Division was to take the place of the former Cavalry Division. Details of the proposed **new organisation** are as follows.

*) Meanwhile the British Government at the beginning of February 1937 announced an Armaments Loan of £400,000,000 with a free hand in the matter of expenditure on armaments.

The reorganisation of the Infantry, which is to be completed in the current financial year (1936-37), is to take the form of a reduction of the 4 battalions of the present Infantry brigades to 3, and the formation of 2 machine gun battalions as Divisional troops with each Division. The mechanisation of the Infantry has made great strides. It is probable that in a future war the whole of the Infantry of a Division will be transported in omnibuses.

The present Cavalry Division consisting of 2 horsed brigades and Divisional troops is to be combined with the Tank Corps in a mechanised "Mobile Division." It will be composed of 2 mechanised Cavalry brigades (each consisting of 2 Cavalry motor regiments and one Cavalry light tank regiment) and 2 mechanised Divisional troop units. In Egypt there is one mechanised Cavalry brigade consisting of one Cavalry armoured car regiment and 2 mechanised Cavalry regiments. The following Tank troops are at present available—one Tank regiment consisting of one light tank battalion and 3 mixed tank battalions with one Army tank battalion. It is proposed to form 3 more Army tank battalions, so that in the future four out of the five Divisions stationed in the home country will each have one Army tank battalion. The reorganisation of the Tank Corps will be spread over a considerable period. The number of tanks may be put at about 600.

According to the **White Paper on National Defence of March 3rd 1936** four new Infantry battalions are also to be formed to reinforce the garrisons in the Mediterranean. The existing Army formations are to be radically modernised and equipped with the newest forms of armament and modern material, and supplied with adequate munitions and other war equipment. Special attention is being directed to the armament of the Field Artillery, which is being completely renewed. The mechanisation of the Artillery and the whole of the Supply Services is also to be taken in hand.

The **establishment of the regular Army** in the home country and overseas was increased in 1936 from 152,200 to 158,400 men without Air troops. Including the 57,524 British troops in India, there is an establishment of **altogether 215,924 men without the Air arm**. This establishment is at present about 10,000 men short. The Army Reserve will be some 121,000 strong at the end of the financial year 1936-37. At the end of July 1936 the English War Minister stated in the House of Commons that the Supplementary Reserve, founded in 1924 primarily as a technical reserve and numbering at the present time some 22,000 men, was to be augmented by a new Infantry reserve formation of (at the outset) 17,000 men, to be open to young unmarried men between 17 and 25 years of age, who were prepared to bind themselves for six years' service with an option of an extension for a further four years. Candidates who accept this undertaking will undergo training in the first year for 26 weeks with an active Infantry regiment, with subsequent periods of training of 14 days in each subsequent year. Referring to the grounds for this new formation, The Times wrote at the end of July 1936 that it was hoped on the one hand to stem the shortage of recruits, since some of the reservists might be expected after the first half-year to remain with the colours, and on the other hand to provide the regular Army with a valuable reserve of trained young persons.

Another notable change in the organisation of the regular Army is the decision to entrust the ground defence against attack from the air and the defence of the coasts of England, Scotland and Wales to the Territorial Army. This decision relieves the regular Army of all those duties which have hitherto stood in the way of its immediate use as an expeditionary force. In the House of Commons debate on the Government declarations with regard to the Defence programme at the beginning of November 1936 the question was raised as to the part to be played by the British Defence forces on the Continent in future wars, and it was asked whether it was proposed to prepare an expeditionary force for the purpose. The then First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Samuel Hoare, replied that it was better to speak of a "**force of all work**" rather than an expeditionary force, as the latter appellation presupposed that events would follow the same course as in 1914. The "force of all work" would consist of 5 Divisions, and would be armed and equipped in such a manner as to be available "under any conceivable circumstances." Sir Samuel added that the present position differed appreciably from that of 1914. In 1914 there were definite obligations and an actual Plan drawn up by agreement between the French and English General Staffs: there were no such obligations at the present time.

* * *

In the case of the **Territorial Army**, which for technical reasons cannot be modernised simultaneously with the regular Army, a beginning is to be made with the **improvement of the** at present inadequate **armament and training**. It should be explained that the Territorial Army, like the regular Army, is based on the voluntary system. But, whereas the regular Army is a voluntary professional army with twelve years' service, of which 7 years are

served with the colours and the rest in the Reserve (from which the establishments are brought up to strength on mobilisation), the Territorial Army is a voluntary body with a form of militia training. The volunteers for the Territorial Army bind themselves only for four years' service in the home country and overseas. The importance of the Territorial Army in relation to the field army to be formed in case of war is to be found in the British Regulations which lay down that the Territorial Army provides the cadres for the expansion of the peace-time army in case of war, so as to form a national army. It has also the duty of supporting the regular Army in operations overseas in case of war. But the use of the Territorial Army for this purpose depends on the scope of the warlike undertaking. There is a distinction underlying British Defence legislation between minor wars (i.e. colonial operations or wars against minor Powers) and major wars (i.e. wars against great Powers). In the case of the latter the Territorial Army is required to put into line its 12 Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division, and Army, Air Defence, Coast and Home Defence troops. These are then reinforced and, if necessary, sent overseas according as they are needed.

The above-mentioned particulars show the peculiar significance of the Territorial Army in relation to the Defence preparedness of Great Britain. The organisation of the higher direction of the Territorial Army in the War Office was taken in hand in 1935 and concentrated, in order to bring it into closer connection with the regular Army and to speed up its mobilisation in case of need. The proposal to reduce the number of Territorial Divisions from 14 to 12 with a view to constituting Air Defence formations for London and the big industrial centres in the Midlands and in the North was carried through in 1935 to the extent that the ground defence of the London Air Defence organisation was reinforced by the conversion of a Division of the Territorial Army into an Air Defence Division, while the Air Defence forces were reinforced by 4 new anti-aircraft Sections in the home country and three such overseas. In the middle of December 1936 a second Territorial Division was converted into an Air Defence Division for the districts North of London. The White Paper of March 3rd 1936 says that it is proposed further to speed up the renewal and modernisation of the coastal defences and fortified ports of the home country, and to extend the reorganisation of the Air Defence in the South East of England for the protection of the important industrial districts in the Midlands and in the North. In November 1936 the War Office announced the establishment of 3 batteries and 7 companies of new anti-aircraft troops to strengthen the existing defences of the capital against attack from the air. Over and above these extensions of the Air Defence and coastal defence of the Territorial Army, the Secretary for War announced in the House of Commons in July 1936 that the Defence Corps which had been created in 1934 as a special branch of the Territorial Army would be replaced by National Defence companies attached to the local Infantry battalions of the Territorial Army. The new National Defence companies are to be recruited from former soldiers of 45 to 60 years of age. They are intended to defend important points in the country in case of war. Their total strength is to be 8,450 men.

* * *

Great Britain has always had peculiar difficulties in connection with recruiting. There was for example a shortage on the establishments on January 1st 1936 of the following numbers of officers and men:

Regular Army . . .	8,639 officers and men
Territorial Army . .	54,140 " " "

In November 1st 1936 the numbers were:

Regular Army . . .	10,724 officers and men
Territorial Army . .	43,838 " " "

These difficulties are largely due to the physical unfitness of the applicants at the recruiting stations. In the military service year ending March 31st 1936 no less than 53,000 persons in the whole of England were rejected by the examining Committees as unfit. The majority of these rejections (24,000 men) were applicants for service in the Army; the Air Force, which has an even higher standard than the Army, rejected only 8,500. These striking figures are sufficient explanation of the fact that the numbers of the Army are still very much below its budgetary establishment. A vigorously organised recruiting service with its headquarters in London is now engaged in an active campaign to secure the requisite man-power for the Army by every possible means. The recruiting posters which are to be seen all over England are sufficient evidence of the psychological effect on the population of military age. Certain regiments conduct their own propaganda to attract recruits to their ranks. The serving troops endeavour by propaganda marches, the exhibition of anti-aircraft defence guns and similar public demonstrations—the great annual air manoeuvres at Hendon are an instance—to arouse the interest of the nation

in its national defence. This extensive propaganda has increased the numbers of recruits for the Territorial Army to a certain extent, but not to the extent required to bring the establishments up to strength. The numbers would no doubt be much higher but for the fact that nearly two-thirds of the applicants are physically unfit. The Labour Party, as may be seen from the House of Commons debates at the beginning of November 1936, attributes this deterioration in the physical fitness of the English people to the prevailing unemployment and low wages and their corollary in the shape of under-nutrition of large sections of the population. Mr. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty in a former Labour Government, pointed out on this occasion that, according to a Report of the League of Nations, not less than 50 per cent of the British population were under-nourished. The Government, in presence of this heavy percentage of physically unfit applicants at the recruiting stations, has recently considered the possibility of reducing the physical qualifications required. The intention is, according to a report which appeared in *The Times* at the end of October 1936, in future to have four grades of fitness, of which the first three would be enforced in the case of service in the Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry, while the fourth would be applicable to service behind the front line. How serious the recruiting issue is for Great Britain may be gathered from the speech delivered by the War Minister Duff Cooper on November 20th 1936, in which he said that, if there was no change for the better in the near future in the recruiting for the Army, the present system of volunteer recruits would break down. The warning uttered on this occasion can hardly be understood otherwise than as meaning that the system of voluntary recruiting will have to be replaced by some form of compulsory service.

The prevailing anxiety in regard to the recruiting figures was referred to by Lord Stanhope at length on November 19th 1936 in the House of Lords. The numbers had been insufficient, he explained, ever since 1933. In 1933-34 there were 28,696 applicants for the Territorial Army; in 1935-36 there were only 23,815. In the current financial year (1936-37) the War Office hoped to get some 40,000 men. But, even if these numbers presented themselves, they would not be sufficient to fill the natural gaps and occasional deficiencies, since the Territorial Army had now to reckon with an establishment of 191,500 men. To bring it up to that figure, 86,000 additional men were needed! In the case of the regular Army the position was still worse. For the year 1936-37 35,000 recruits were wanted; and the War Office could only count on some 21,500. The shortage was, in other words, increasing. As for the newly created Supplementary Reserve (Infantry class), the recruiting was altogether insufficient. In the first two months only 850 applicants had presented themselves.

* * *

The position in regard to recruiting for the Air arm is very much better. Special orders were issued extending and increasing the recruiting and training of the airmen, in order to meet the active demand for personnel for the regular Air Force.

This active demand for personnel for the Air arm is due to the fact that it is the British Air Force which has had the largest rearmament programme of the three Defence forces. In previous years the British Air Force was kept within quantitatively low limits—though the quality of the Force was always high—in anticipation of successful results from the disarmament discussions at Geneva: but at the end of 1934 the Government decided to embark on air rearmament on a very big scale indeed. This unexpected action on the part of England was said by English spokesmen to be a consequence of the increased air armaments of the European countries, and Germany in particular, and of the resulting increase of tension. Faced with the fact that in view of these developments insular position and a strong Navy were no longer an adequate defence against attacks from the air, the English Parliament proceeded in May 1935 to approve an **extensive rearmament programme for the British Air arm**. The Air Minister on this occasion took the line that the strength of the British air forces must always be adjusted to that of the largest air fleet within striking distance of Great Britain. The programme accordingly proposed that the British Air Force should be strengthened by 71 squadrons and brought by the end of March 1937 up to 123 squadrons with 1,500 first line planes, not including 490 planes in service with the Fleet Air Arm and overseas. The personnel of the Air Force was to be increased at the same time from 32,000 to 55,000 men.

Further action is to be taken in the financial year 1937-38, when a beginning is to be made with the execution of the new Air programme announced in the White Paper. Under the new programme a total of 129 home squadrons are to be formed with some 1,750 first line planes. To this number are to be added 4 new auxiliary squadrons for the Territorial Army. Five Army squadrons, which are already in being, are to be increased to seven. The existing 25 oversea squadrons, consisting of 273 first line planes, are to remain at that strength until the end of March 1937. By the end of

March 1939 they are to be increased by 12 squadrons, consisting of 144 planes, so as to bring the total up to 37 squadrons consisting of 414 planes. Great Britain now has a total number of some 3,500 first line planes in the home Army, in the Navy and overseas, together with training and second line aircraft. Under the rearmament programme the figure is to be increased by the end of March 1937 to a total of some 5,000 planes. Meanwhile the personnel of the Air arm at home and overseas has risen to 68,875 men including 13,250 reservists, while the number of trained pilots has risen to over 5,000.

The development of the Air arm, and in particular the increase in first line aircraft, in the three branches of the British air forces under the Rearmament Programmes is shown in the following table:

	1934	April 1935	Jan. 1936	July 1936	April 1937	April 1938
At home	548	583	691	802	1,500	1,750
Overseas	267	273	273	273	273	423
Fleet Air Arm	180	190	190	190	217	357
	995	1,046	1,154	1,265	1,990	2,530
Second line planes.....	800	900	1,154	1,265	3,000	3,750
Total	1,795	1,946	2,308	2,530	4,990	6,280

This comprehensive programme is evidence of the British intention to use the Air arm in the future to play a decisive part in the general scheme of defence of the Empire. The closer connection established in the year 1935 between the three branches of the Defence forces, Army, Navy and Air Force, under a Minister of Defence in the Committee of Imperial Defence is intended to throw light on the general question of the use of the forces and to promote a solution of the problem of the concentration of the defence of the Empire. At a Defence Congress of all parts of the Empire, to be held in connection with the King's Coronation in 1937, these urgent problems of Imperial defence will be discussed with the Heads of the Dominions and put on a new footing.

In the foreground of the British air rearmament is the problem of the air defence of the home country. All the Air forces of the home country are accordingly to be combined in the Metropolitan Air Force. An Order issued by the Air Ministry in June 1936 announced fundamental changes in the command and administration of the Air forces. The object of the reorganisation, to quote the comments of the Morning Post Air Correspondent at the time, is to increase the striking power of the Air arm by bringing its peace strength up to a point approximately equivalent to war strength. In future there will be four independent Commands under the supreme command of the Air Ministry as under:

1. The Bomber Command at Uxbridge for all bombing squadrons.
2. The Fighter Command at Stanmore, to which the reconnaissance, Army observation and auxiliary air squadrons will belong.
3. The Coastal Command at Lee-on-the-Solent for all flying-boats and the squadrons for general sea reconnaissance. This Command comprises a special branch for land training of squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm.
4. The Training Command at Ternhill (Salop) for the training of all airmen other than the naval airmen.

The Daily Telegraph observed at the time that the establishment of the Bomber Command, to which the official announcement itself gave the most prominent place, was tantamount to complete acceptance of the position of bombing aircraft as constituting under present conditions the first line of air defence.

The main object of the British defence programme is the defence of the home country by an Air arm of the highest possible strength and striking power and a strong fleet backed by the anti-aircraft defence organisation, said Sir Thomas Inskip, the Minister of Defence, in November 1936. He added with reference to the progress made with the air armaments that the Government believed the new British aircraft types to be second to none in other countries. From 1937 onwards till 1939 and 1940 the manufacture of aircraft would increase steadily. The number of workers employed by the aircraft industry had risen from 30,000 in April 1935 to 58,000 in June 1936. The stock of planes other than first line planes was already very large. The majority of the planes at present being produced at high pressure were, he said, intended as second or third or fourth line planes, as the organisation of the aircraft industry was only gradually being built up. The British Air Ministry announced at the end of October 1936 that six big firms had been given an order to erect 8 factories. The construction of the factories would be financed by the Government. As soon as they were ready, they would begin to produce, and train the staff of employees required for war.

The organisation of the armaments industry was indicated as one of the main features of the Rearmament Programme when the latter was first announced. The process of "industrial mobilisation" was accordingly pushed forward energetically, Government-owned works being extended while private works already manufacturing armaments or works considered capable of adaptation for the purpose were instructed to extend their plant for the production of war material. In addition, the Government proceeded to build up what is known as a "shadow industry"—that is to say, it caused certain selected firms to erect additional works at the Government's expense to be held in readiness to produce armaments in time of war. On the other hand the Government does not propose for the present either to appoint a special Minister of Munitions or to nationalise the armaments industry.

* * *

The rôle which History has assigned to the regular Army in the defence of the Empire remains still what it has been for centuries. That part of the Army which remains in the home country is the principal training-school and nursery for all the land forces. In war it constitutes the strategic reserve, which is held in readiness to be sent in whole or in part to reinforce the forces overseas or to be thrown in to some new field of operations elsewhere. The Minister for Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, has himself stated that the strategic position of Great Britain does not permit of the Army being restricted to the defence of the home country's coasts. If Great Britain, he said, is ever again involved in war, whether for the maintenance of collective security in conjunction with others or in virtue of the operation of an alliance against unprovoked aggression, she will not be able to abandon the struggle until her security is re-established—which is tantamount to saying, she will be compelled to make every effort until she has won the final victory.

The duties of the Army may be particularised as follows, though any such enumeration necessarily involves a good deal of overlapping.

1. Provision of drafts for service in the overseas possessions under the Cardwell system.
2. Maintenance of an Expeditionary Force, a "force of all work", consisting (when brought up to full strength by the calling up of reservists) of 5 Divisions and one Mobile Division, to reinforce the troops in India and overseas as required, and to implement international commitments.

In the last named connection the Expeditionary Force may play in the first instance a rôle as a diplomatic weapon. The stronger it is and the better armed it is, the more effective it will be for diplomatic purposes. Hence the great importance attaching to the exploitation of modern technical possibilities in connection with (a) mobility and (b) armament. The composition of the Expeditionary Force will depend on the nature of the operations proposed and the character of the theatre of war in each case.

3. Participation in the general defence of the British Empire in the event of war against one or more Great Powers.

III. ENGLAND'S REARMAMENT CAMPAIGN


Towards the end of 1934 (on November 28th) the alleged German armaments were the occasion of a lengthy statement in the House of Commons by Mr. Baldwin, at that time acting Prime Minister; and it was plain to all that his utterances were not directed towards any revival of the disarmament negotiations which had foundered ever since the preceding June, but were intended rather to provide the justification for the British rearmament programme on which it was now proposed to embark with all sail spread.

Mr. Baldwin's speech had been preceded in the course of 1934 by a number of statements by British statesmen, which in their turn followed on the speeches made at the end of 1933 on the occasion of the German action of October 14th, all of which will be found reproduced with comments in No. 83-84 of this periodical.


The striking feature of all these utterances was the underlying tendency of the English movement for Rearmament and, as the kernel of the movement, the demand for a stronger Air Force.

These motives were especially apparent in the debate which took place in both Houses of Parliament on November 29th 1933, and in the speeches by Mr. Baldwin and the then Air Minister Lord Londonderry on that occasion. The latter's demand for parity with the next strongest Air Powers was based on references to the air rearmament of the United States, Japan and the U.S.S.R. When Baldwin the day before said England could not continue at her present state in respect of her air forces, and alluded in this connection to difficulties made by certain States


Anti-tank defence




French 13.2 mm. anti-tank machine gun in position to fire on tanks



Vickers 4 cm. machine big gun on pivot mounting




Bofors 4.7 cm. gun




Oerlikon 2 cm. machine gun on tripod mounting for anti-tank and anti-aircraft defence



2 cm machine gun (Holland) for anti-tank and anti-aircraft defence



Vickers 4.7 cm. gun (elevation)



Skoda gun with exchangeable bore (shown in the illustration above with inserted 3.2 cm. anti-tank defence bore)

whom he must not name if any progress with disarmament was to be had, he cannot have included Germany under this heading for the simple reason that he went on to say, either let there be disarmament down to the German level or an approximation of armaments, i. e. disarmament of the highly armed down to a middle line and rearmament of the disarmed up to the same level. Germany therefore had no place in the origins of the British movement to rearm.

The Rearmament movement was accompanied by a process of enlightening the British public as to the dangers of inadequate air defences. Special attention was drawn to the air rearmament of various hitherto unarmed countries and the creation of independent Air Forces as a specially menacing aspect of such rearmament. Long before Germany left the League and the Disarmament Conference, voices were to be heard in the English Conservative Press calling for increase of the English Air Force to a total of 3,000, 5,000 and even 10,000 planes: see the speeches delivered at the Conservative Party Congress in Birmingham at the beginning of October 1933. Even though such demands were not taken seriously in any responsible circles, it was none the less the case that the feeling in favour of strengthening the English Air arm had grown to such an extent that a Parliamentary debate on the position in regard to British security in the air had become inevitable.

But the Rearmament movement which was apparent in the debate of November 29th was still hampered by the attachment of the majority of the English people to a policy of disarmament. Lord Londonderry was compelled to make a further statement on December 7th, in which he explained that his remarks in the House of Lords on November 29th did not mean that the British Government had any intention of changing their policy for a policy of air rearmament. His Majesty's Government still took their stand, he said, on the policy embodied in the English Draft Convention of March 16th 1933.

We find British statesmen expressing this view as early as the beginning of 1934. But Baldwin's speech in the House of Commons on February 8th 1934 showed that the British Government was taking up an increasingly defensive position in relation to Baldwin's own Party with their eager advocacy of Rearmament, as well as against other supporters of the Rearmament movement. Baldwin still hoped for a Convention which would fix the "limits up to which we could arm. It would be our duty to make ourselves as competent as we might up to that limit, because on an equality of armaments you will find that is what every nation will do, what every nation must do if it is to make itself fit to be the colleague of other nations when the time comes that sanctions have to be enforced. . . . It can be but a short time before it becomes known whether the prospect is favourable for the British draft or whether it is going to end in failure."

A month later on March 8th a statement by the Under-Secretary for Air, Sir Philip Sassoon, made it clear that the decision to increase the Air Force by 4 to 6 squadrons was now definite. The reasons for this step, as stated by Sassoon, were as follows: "The world has reached a critical point of extreme delicacy in the matter of disarmament. Last year I expressed the hope that the Disarmament Conference would come to a satisfactory agreement for the limitation and reduction of air armaments. That has not yet been done. . . . Throughout all the discussions which have taken place upon the subject we have been foremost in advocating general disarmament in the air to the lowest level on which international agreement can be secured. We have put forward definite proposals to that end. We have in fact followed a policy of studious moderation in the matter of air armaments for over 15 years. Far from accepting our proposals, farther yet from following our example, other nations have steadily increased the strength of their respective air arms until they far outnumber our own. . . . In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that it is impossible for this country to hold in abeyance the ten-year old programme of 1923, now so long overdue for completion. We cannot afford to accept a position of continuing inferiority. We have made it plain that this country must, so long as air forces exist, have parity in the air, howsoever that parity be attained. . . ."

"If other nations will not come down to our level then inevitably our national and Imperial security demands that we must begin to build up to theirs. . . . We do not want at this stage to put forward a programme of construction which might prove to be the starting-gun for a race in air armaments."

Remarkable insight into the position of Germany was also shown by Baldwin, when he made the interesting remark that, whatever the ultimate motive that made Germany at the moment so anxious for her air force, it was a case of the same feeling of apprehension as Winston Churchill had noted in the case of the English people. "The real danger to peace is a very strong Air Power on the one hand and a defenceless nation on the other. . . . The Government will not relax their efforts, if a Convention on our lines fails, to try to get an Air convention alone among the

countries of Western Europe. . . . If all our efforts fail, the Government will see to it that in air strength and air power this country shall no longer be in a position of any inferiority to any country within striking distance of our shores."

Again in the House of Lords on May 7th the British Government was called upon to defend its new policy in rebuttal of the charge of sabotaging the Disarmament Conference by its hesitant and fluctuating attitude. The opposition manifested evoked a striking statement by the Under-Secretary of State, Earl Stanhope, to the effect that France was not prepared to accept the English disarmament proposals with or without guarantees. The British Government, he said, would have been glad to go a long way to meet other Governments, had there been a chance of acceptance by the latter of their proposals.

A new note was struck in the story of British armament policy by the House of Commons debate of May 18th, which was concerned mainly with the question of the League of Nations and its reform, as well as with the position in regard to sanctions. The then Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon in a long speech described the latest phase of the Disarmament discussions in the spring of 1934, and noted Germany's acceptance of the British Memorandum of January 29th as a particularly helpful contribution, and contrasted it with the negative attitude of France. In succession to Sir John Simon, Mr. Baldwin spoke on the question of sanctions. He said:

"One of the conclusions to which I have been driven as a result of my close study of these questions during the past twelve years is that there is no such thing as a sanction that will work which does mean war. In other words, if we adopt sanctions, we must be ready for war; and, if we adopt them without being ready for war, we are not honest trustees of the nation. . . . Nothing could be a worse guarantee to the world, or a more cruel deception of the people of this country, than to say that they will guarantee peace by arms and then not be ready to do so. If this country is going to enforce a collective guarantee or collective sanctions, it means that they must make this country a great deal stronger than it is today."

That was the key-note for the new political watch-word "Collective Security equals Rearmament." With this for its watch-word, the Conservative Press proceeded in the next few weeks to multiply and magnify its allusions to the coming Armaments Programme, while the three Defence Ministers Lord Londonderry, Lord Hailsham and Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell made speeches up and down the country to a similar effect to prepare the public for what was to come. Lord Londonderry himself declared without further periphrasis in the House of Lords on June 27th that the Disarmament Conference had failed, and that England must now proceed to rearm in the air. His colleague from the Admiralty on June 23rd made mock of the "dream of international disarmament." These observations gave rise to vigorous criticisms on the part of Liberal and Labour speakers on July 14th; and Sir John Simon and the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Eden, were at pains to smoothe the ruffled surface of the waters by declarations to the effect that the Government would continue in the future as in the past to do all in its power to rescue the Conference, though it must not lose sight of the consequences of an eventual collapse. They would however in any case wait till the end came. On which Mr. Churchill in his robust manner expressed satisfaction at the prospect of the Conference coming to an end and "passing into history," with the result that it would now be necessary to double the English Air Force.

* * *

On July 19th there followed the long awaited announcement in the House of Commons of the new Air armaments programme (the Five Year Plan) by Mr. Baldwin with explanations of the reasons which had led to rearmament on so gigantic a scale.

In the meanwhile the negotiations and exchanges of Notes between Great Britain, Italy and Germany for the rescue of the Disarmament idea—if in no other shape, at any rate in the form of limitation based on an approximation of armaments—were shattered by the French "No" of April 17th; and on June 10th after stormy proceedings in Geneva the Disarmament Conference was duly buried. At the beginning of June the French Foreign Minister Barthou and the French Generalissimo Weygand had paid their visits to London. The visits not unnaturally gave rise to a great deal of comment, the effect of which Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on July 30th—in a speech which, incidentally, embodied a plea on behalf of the Eastern Pact and the entry of Russia into the League—endeavoured to minimise.

The comments which he sought to minimise were by no means however the work of their authors' imaginations; and they were fed by the fact that in his speech on July 30th Mr. Baldwin at times was thinking aloud to such an extent as to invite conjecture as to the substance of the conversations which had taken place

between the British and French General Staffs. The warning of the Labour Party, Major Attlee, that his Party, if it came into power, would not recognise any secret agreements had a singular ring.

Baldwin under these circumstances was entitled to say in his explanation of the reasons for the Rearmament Programme that experience showed there was no longer any prospect of early results in the matter of armament limitation.

In reply to a vote of censure moved by Lord Ponsonby against what he described as a policy calculated only to foster new competition in armaments and, as such, to endanger the peace of the world, **Lord Londonderry** repeated in the House of Lords on **July 23rd** the old grounds for rearmament. He described again the new American, French, Italian, Russian and Japanese Air armament programmes, and added: "The first four of these countries already have Air Forces which largely exceed our own. **The numerical strength of the Air Forces of France and Russia are indeed approximately twice that of the Royal Air Force. No responsible Government with any regard for its overriding duty to ensure by all means in its power the safety of the people of this country could allow our Air Force to remain any longer in a position of such tremendous inferiority.**"

On **July 30th** there followed the full-dress debate in the House of Commons on the Five Year Plan, in the course of which the Labour Party moved a vote of censure similar to that debated in the Upper House.

In his great speech in justification of the Government Baldwin began by arguing that, in order to set an example to the other countries, England had postponed the completion of the 1923 Programme in its entirety for ten years; but he added, the rest of the world had not followed her example. He again referred to international obligations, and said that he gathered from the "whispering gallery of Europe" that the English contribution to collective security was thought to be a weak one. He noted the general increase in air armaments and the general tendency towards acceptance of a form of strategy in which the aeroplane was treated as the primary offensive arm. That was the explanation of the fact that France and Italy were increasing the number of their bomber and battle aircraft. **If Germany had the right, or seized the right, to rearm, she had every argument in her favour from her defenceless position in the air to try and make herself secure.** It was a regrettable circumstance that there was no evidence of any of the nations, who were participants in the Disarmament negotiations or advocates of a Disarmament Convention, themselves ceasing to rearm. If other nations for whatever reason, good or bad, increased their armaments, England must do the same to a certain extent, if her contribution to collective security, and so to the deterrence of aggressors, was to be of any value at all.

The proposals of July 19th were, he contended, a notable advance towards the requisite parity, even though the expenditure figures as they stood were not sufficient for the attainment of that parity—which was the end ultimately in view—within the next five years. No Government dare take the responsibility of leaving the country "in the world as it is today" in a state of defencelessness; and therefore no time was to be lost in bringing the national defences into order.

But there was another argument which figured prominently in Mr. Baldwin's speech. It is an argument which is highly characteristic of the disarmament negotiations, and indeed of all international negotiations. This was his plea for **the need of a strong backing with which to bargain.** In countering the charge of sabotaging the Disarmament negotiations, Baldwin argued that it might have been possible to influence the course of events at the Conference more effectively, if British armaments had themselves been stronger than they were. The British representatives at Geneva had not always an easy task in making proposals which involved much greater concessions from the more heavily armed nations. They got tired of descanting on their own country's virtue in not having increased her armaments. It was quite possible that the reason why so little was achieved at Geneva was that England had so little to bargain with. **Sir John Simon** followed up this argument by observing in his speech which followed that of Mr. Baldwin that "It is difficult to carry through an agreement for the reduction of armaments, if you have carried your own disarmament to such a point that you can make no contribution." For these reasons a rearmament programme could not prejudice disarmament agreements, and might possibly assist them.

Thus was launched the new watch-word in the armaments discussion, namely, **"Through Rearmament to Disarmament."**

It was in this debate that Baldwin let fall his unhappy aphorism that **England's frontier lies on the Rhine.** His exact words were as follows: "Let us never forget this! Since the day of the air the old frontiers are gone. When you think of the defences of England, you can no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover. You think of the Rhine. That is where today our

frontier lies." Taken in conjunction with Baldwin's other remarks on the menace to England from the air and the loss of the protection hitherto inherent in her insular position, the meaning of the remark in Baldwin's mouth was no doubt that which was given to it some days later by **Lord Hailsham** in the House of Lords debate on **November 14th**, when he replied to a number of vigorous repudiations of the expression. There was no suggestion, he maintained, of England having any particular hereditary enemy on the Continent: the reference was merely to the fact that in view of modern developments it is vitally important for England not to be open to attack from the Low Countries or from any other point within striking distance of the British coast. (As regards the Low Countries, i. e. Belgium and Holland, Lord Hailsham had himself stated in a speech at Torquay on June 15th that England must be able to use them as points d'appui for her air forces.) According to this view therefore Baldwin might just as well have said that England's frontier was on the Seine. But that he could not do—in spite of the French refusal of any further negotiations on disarmament on April 17th and May 30th—in presence of the understanding entered into immediately after that refusal on the occasion of the French diplomatic and military visits to London.

Unfortunately therefore it was not Lord Hailsham who had the last word, when he expressed the hope that this "coined phrase" had been explained satisfactorily once and for all: the last word was with Churchill, when he said that the Baldwinian aphorism would speedily go round the world.

Striking it is to note how in the course of all the subsequent armament discussions France who, with certain other countries, had hitherto always figured as the opponent par excellence of disarmament, now vanishes from the scene, her place in the minds of the speakers being taken—more or less avowedly—by Germany and "the German peril". The new watch-word from now onwards afforded French propaganda a ready opportunity of utilising the "English frontier on the Rhine" motif as on the one hand the explanation of the English Rearmament Programme, and on the other hand—with infinite variations—as an argument in favour of the French policy of encirclement of Germany.

From all these speeches it is clear that in 1934 England was preparing to abandon the traditional basis of her armaments policy. It was equally clear that the rearmament programme was not attributable in any respect to qualitative defects in her air forces, but that it was a question of quantitative strengthening. That was plain from repeated utterances by the responsible Ministers to the effect that England's Air arm might only take fifth place in the list of the air armaments of the Great Powers, but that the quality of this limited English Air Force was regarded by the others as a model for themselves.

But these speeches went also to show that the grounds for the Rearmament were at no time to be sought in Germany's efforts to restore her national defences, but were on the contrary the very same grounds on which Germany was entitled to justify her own rearmament in imitation of the others' example.

* * *

With this concentration on Germany begins as from the end of 1934 the second phase of English Rearmament policy. The Guildhall Speech of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald on November 10th was the prelude: the debate in the House of Commons on November 28th was the play: and the English White Paper of March 1st 1935 was the transformation scene.

The famous debate of November 28th took place, it will be remembered, as a result of an amendment moved by Winston Churchill to the Speech from the Throne of November 20th, in which it was asserted that the strength of the national armaments, and the national air armaments in particular, was no longer such as to ensure the peace, security and freedom of the country. Churchill's exposition of the grounds of his thesis was such an outrageous misrepresentation of the German armaments and the menace they constituted for Great Britain and the peace of the world that Baldwin was compelled in his answer to tone them down in no small degree: but what he said contained nevertheless allusions to the "secrecy" of the German armaments and the "dark Continent" which were hardly calculated effectively to enforce his warning against panic.

On March 4th 1935 the British Government brought out the notorious **Armaments White Paper of March 1st 1935.** It bore the initials of Ramsay MacDonald; but its contents were entirely similar to what Baldwin had said on November 28th. As in the latter's speech, the chief blame for the new problems of Rearmament was put on Germany, who was charged (as Mr. Baldwin had charged her) not merely with rearming on a bigger scale than before, but also with having left the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference and thereby having brought disarmament to a standstill.

The reception of the White Paper was not, it will be remembered, a good one even in England itself. The comments on the British policy and its latest move, which it evoked from the Opposition both in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons on March 11th and 13th respectively, were far from flattering.

"There has never been a wholehearted support of the Disarmament Conference. The declaration of Germany's rights was mentioned, but the failure of any action to implement that declaration was not mentioned. The whole dismal story of the failure of the Disarmament Conference was passed over You cannot cast out Satan by Beelzebub. The suggestion that greater armaments are required in order to carry out our obligations under Locarno and other Treaties was repudiated by the author of the Locarno Treaty, Sir Austen Chamberlain, himself on November 18th 1925 There was a reference to increasing armaments in Germany, Russia, Japan and the United States of America. Why was there no reference to France? If it is true that we, to fulfil our obligations under the League Covenant, the Locarno Treaty and the Air Pact which is proposed, must have a great and powerful Air Force, it follows equally that Germany must do the same That part of the White Paper which is most strongly criticised even by the supporters of the Government is the part in which Germany and Germany's rearmament are represented as the pretext for our rearmament. It cannot be said that German rearmament comes as an unexpected contingency: it was an unavoidable development, which cannot in any circumstances serve as justification for the rearmament of others."

Mr. Baldwin and Lord Hailsham made shift to meet these objections of the Opposition speakers by a certain withdrawal from the one-sided view of the situation and a reference to the gigantic armaments of the U.S.S.R. Baldwin at the end of his speech summed up the arguments he had advanced in the striking and true enough statement that "A country which shows itself unwilling to make what necessary preparations are requisite for its own defence will never have force, moral or material, in this world." He left it to Sir John Simon to make the requisite obeisance to outside opinion with a protestation of British adherence to the League of Nations and the ideal of collective peace and a reassertion of British eagerness to strengthen both. He proceeded in this connection to give Article 8 of the Covenant an interpretation which is unquestionably correct but was never allowed to be mentioned in the course of the Disarmament discussions. He said that, while national armaments are a function of national security, their expansion must be in correct ratio to the national security, and such ratio presupposes allowance for the strength of the armaments of neighbouring Powers. A sentence in Austen Chamberlain's amendment to the effect that general disarmament cannot be obtained by the method of unilateral disarmament reduced Sir John Simon's ratio to a shorter denominator.

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No more talk of the French and Italian armaments! And no wonder! In the interval the Anglo-French understanding of February 3rd had been brought to fruition; and on the horizon there was already visible in outline the realisation of France's dream of a "Stresa front" and the inclusion of Italy in the "girdle of security" enclosing Germany.

The single dissonant voice was a notable speech by the Under-Secretary of State, Sir Philip Sassoon, on the Air Estimates on March 20th. He once more included France and Italy in his list of the four countries whose air forces exceeded those of England, and once again warned the public against the serious inferiority of Great Britain as compared to the air forces of France and Russia. He made a further allusion in passing to the proposal, which was again on the tapis, of an Air Pact between the Western Powers in the following brief and pithy words: "Until such time as we can persuade other nations to disarm, a stronger British Air Force will enable us to play our part more effectively in the Air Pact which is even now under discussion by the Western Powers." The said Air Pact, first suggested by Baldwin on March 8th 1934, had silently been lost sight of since then in the course of the armament debates, and was not resuscitated until the London Agreement of February 3rd after an explicit reference to its potentialities by the International Peace Council in a manifesto published on November 8th 1934.

These utterances of Sassoon's were entirely in accordance with the British rearmament policy; and it was no happy prelude therefore to the Western Air Pact negotiations—to which the proposals of the German Memorandum of April 16th 1934 might have lent valuable weight—when the only step Germany could take in answer to the British White Paper (the restoration, namely, of German defence sovereignty on March 16th 1935) was met by the knock-out blows delivered on April 14th and 17th at Stresa and Geneva respectively. The new line of policy was equally apparent

from the English Blue Book on the Air Pact negotiations. The Air Pact negotiations, as we have seen, had been driven underground by the British rearmament movement a year and more; and after February 3rd 1935 and the French demand for "All or nothing," followed by the conclusion of the Franco-Russian and Czecho-Russian Pacts of Mutual Assistance and later by the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, they never got going again. But in the British Blue Book the attempt was made to create the impression that Germany was the obstacle when, in the light of the three events named and the resulting European tension, she expressed the view that further negotiation was not at the moment advisable and had best be held over until such time as the position was clearer and the tension less acute. This, without any reference to the fact that French policy with its obsession of Pacts had stipulated, with the consent of Great Britain, that the Air Pact after its conclusion should become part and parcel of the common brew—East European Pact, Danubian Pact and all the others—for cooking in the Geneva kitchen according to the accustomed stew recipes.

On May 21st 1935 the Führer and Chancellor delivered his second great Reichstag speech, in which the grounds for the action taken on March 16th were indicated in detail, and the main lines of German foreign policy were summarised in 13 points which included a fresh offer to reduce and limit armaments and an expression of willingness to accede to the Western Air Pact. The draft of a proposed Pact was forwarded to the British Foreign Office on May 28th. A sigh of relief went round the world. Baldwin himself described the speech in the House of Commons on May 22nd as a ray of light; and The Times on the same day wrote: "For all men and nations of good will this is indeed a supreme moment for achieving a practical limitation of arms."

The good will of Germany and of the German Führer found an echo alas! in England alone. On June 18th an Agreement was signed between the two countries in regard to the naval strengths of both Fleets, which finally laid the spectre of naval rivalry which had poisoned Anglo-German relations before the War, and had begun since March 16th once more to raise its head in England. It was the first Armaments Agreement. It had succeeded at last in breaking the magic circle which hitherto had barred all progress in the matter of armaments!

Alas! It was to be the last—as well as the first Armaments Agreement: for all further proposals of Adolf Hitler were swallowed up in the sandy wastes of Abyssinia, in the Narrows of Suez and Gibraltar and in the waters of the Red and Mediterranean Seas.

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The third phase of British Rearmament policy now begins with the intensification of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict and the resulting deterioration in Anglo-Italian relations in view of the English initiative in the voting and enforcement of sanctions at Geneva against Rome. In our three Abyssinian numbers we described the details of this engrossing drama, by the end of which the issue was no longer the fate of the Empire of the Negus, but the position of the British World Empire in Africa and in the Mediterranean, whose interests, as opposed to those of the new Imperium Romanum, coincided so happily with those of the League of Nations.

So we see the British ship of State (after a shift of command, it is true, at the beginning of June from MacDonald-Simon to Baldwin-Hoare) proceed with swelling sails and a strong current of increasing propaganda—not uninfluenced, perhaps, by the famous Peace Ballot conducted by the English League of Nations Union at the beginning of 1935, when millions voted in favour of a national declaration on the League of Nations and the Disarmament question—safe into port in the shape of the November 14th elections. All the well-known catch-words were pressed into the service of the Rearmament programme, and a new one was coined, to suit the palate of the many circles of the British population to whom Fascism and National Socialism are alike distasteful, in the shape of the slogan "Democracies versus Dictatorships." For once an English Election cry with an international outlook! In spite of repeated utterances by Baldwin and other Ministers in a contrary sense, this catch-word has been taken up and used—and still is used—particularly by French propaganda with much zest, the new friend from Moscow being unconcernedly included without fuss in the higher circles where the Democracies do congregate.

On July 11th 1935—Mr. Eden's abortive visit to Mussolini had already taken place in June—the new Foreign Minister Sir Samuel Hoare delivered his first speech as Foreign Minister on British foreign policy in the House of Commons. The greater part of his points might have been made by his French colleague in the French Chamber. From the cornucopia of his ideas Sir Samuel proceeded to produce . . . one and all of the conceptions, so dearly beloved and so ardently ensued in Paris, in regard to London and Stresa, the indivisibility of peace and the much acclaimed collective security. The Air Pact, once the special favourite of England, which only in the preceding February was to have been given

priority over all other objects of negotiation, was relegated to a position which, if not secondary to the East European and the Danubian Pacts, was at any rate no more than on an equal footing with them—a position very different to that which it had previously held in British representations; and at the same time Germany was told—two months after the German declaration of readiness to accede to the Pact—that it was up to her to take the first initiative in the matter and to make a new contribution towards the success of the negotiations. A specially warm section of the speech was devoted to the “deep and abiding” friendship with France, “our old and intimate collaborator.” The Naval Agreement with Germany was almost the subject of an apology. It had been the first, and it should be the last, bilateral agreement. A “practical and understanding realism” would in future be shown in relation to Germany.

The whole speech contained not one word in regard to the armament proposals of May 21st. The sole reference to them was to be found at the close of the speech by the Minister for League of Nations Affairs, Mr. Eden, in which he observed in elegiac tones: “The French Government, for whatever reasons, rejected the German offer last year to agree to an air force not exceeding 50 per cent of that of France, and an army at parity with the French at a figure of 300,000. Was not that a basis upon which we should all be most anxious to agree today? There is no policy more costly to the tax-payers and to peace than the policy of missing the bus.”

On September 21st—the Italo-Abyssinian conflict was already verging on war—the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, for the first time raised a warning voice when, speaking at Floors Castle, he said that Great Britain could only fulfil her mission as the peace-maker of Europe, if she was armed and the strength of her armaments was recognised by others.

“We have tried,” he said, “unilateral disarmament in the hope that other countries would follow our example. It has proved to be a complete, a costly, and a dangerous failure. The time has come now when we must face realities, when we must bring our forces up to the minimum required for our own self-respect, when we must recognise that in this workaday world disarmament must follow, and not precede, the establishment of a sense of security.”

“Peace through Rearmament” and “Security first.”

Such was the watch-word with which—in conjunction with all the others—the country went to the polls amid the turmoil of the Elections on November 14th. The drum-fire had had its effect on the British public: the Government were returned by an overwhelming majority; and with flying colours they proceeded to Geneva to take over the command of the International General Staff for Sanctions, there established, in the struggle with Rome.

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The subsequent course of British Rearmament was conditioned by the impression created by the sanctions war as it was in the beginning, as it was when in full course, and as it was at the end. The position as it was at the middle of the period is reflected in the new Armaments White Paper of March 3rd 1936.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking on March 6th at Edgbaston said that all other measures were overridden both in importance and in urgency by the programme for the reorganisation of the country's defence forces. It was the biggest, the most far-reaching and the most progressive programme of the kind ever put forward in England.

In the debates in the two Houses of Parliament on March 9th, 10th and 17th it was made perfectly plain that, while the British Government still hoped for an understanding in the matter of armaments, it was essential for the fulfilment of their obligations under the Covenant of the League, as well as in the interest of collective security and for their own defence, that the position in regard to the British armed forces should be overhauled (see Baldwin on March 9th, Chamberlain on March 10th and Sassoon on March 17th).

On May 14th, after Mussolini had in the interval proclaimed the annexation of Abyssinia, Baldwin remarked offhand in the Albert Hall that he put as the first object the safety of his own country and of the Empire and, “next to that or (say) side by side with that,” the peace of Europe and the peace of the world.

There was a great discussion of Rearmament again at the Conservative Party Congress in Margate on October 1st and 2nd, in the course of which the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Samuel Hoare, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking for Mr. Baldwin, made the following declarations of principle in the light of the lessons of past experience. Hoare said: “The first of these lessons is the futility of one-sided disarmament. The weakness of the British Empire—even the supposed weakness of the British Empire—has been proved by bitter experience to be a disturbing factor in the field of international politics . . . Secondly, we can on no account agree to any disarmament proposals which would stereotype our relative weakness. If, as we all hope, in the future we can arrive at any general limitation of armaments, it must be on the assumption that our programme has been completed and not on the basis of any intermediate status quo.” (These remarks were repeated by the speaker in the House of Commons on November 10th.)

Chamberlain said: “We shall proceed with our plans, whatever the Opposition may say. No one can pretend that we have not given Disarmament a fair chance. But as no one else has followed our example—on the contrary, other nations are all arming on a gigantic scale—we should have failed in our duty to our own people if we had not taken steps to repair our deficiencies with all speed. As to the measure of our rearmament, the Government of the day alone can take the responsibility of fixing it. It is futile and dangerous to attempt to distinguish between the armament necessary for our defence and what is required for the fulfilment of our international obligations.”

In the meanwhile there had ceased to be anything to fear from the side of the Opposition. The Labour Party at its Party Congress in Edinburgh on October 6th fell into line with the Rearmament Front for the strengthening of the League of Nations and the system of collective security, and voted in favour of providing the necessary armed forces to join in the collective security system!

The Rearmament Campaign was won.

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In his last Guildhall Speech on November 11th 1936 Baldwin, the unwearied standard-bearer and fighter in the Rearmament campaign, attacked what he called the unintelligible insanity of European rearmament. He could have pointed the moral of that insanity to better effect, had he quoted from an unpublished Memorandum of the War Office, from which he would have seen that in 1932 Germany had indeed an army of 100,000 men, but neither reserves, nor aircraft, nor heavy arms of any kind, and was only waiting until the highly armed Powers should at length make up their mind to fulfil the obligation they assumed in 1919 themselves to disarm.

The German people too, to quote the words of the Labour member of the House of Lords, Lord Strabolgi, is tired of humiliations being put on it here, there and everywhere.

Furthermore, to quote the words of another speaker in the same debate, Lord Halifax, the German people has been undergoing in recent years a necessary and steady process of education on these matters.

And it has followed precisely the same course, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, as the English people has followed under Baldwin.

And that is

The course which was indicated alike by
Honour, Freedom and Security.

The illustrations in this Number are taken from the following publications: the German periodical “Luftwehr” published in Berlin, the German periodical “St. Christophorus” (published by E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin), Georg W. Feuchter's “Die Luftwaffe der Gegenwart” (E. S. Mittler & Sohn), Heigl's “Taschenbuch der Tanks” (publ. J. F. Lehmann, Munich), Fritz Holm's “Die Waffen der Luftstreitkräfte” (publ. Verlag “Offene Worte”, Berlin), and Pierre Barjot's “L'Aviation militaire française” (publ. J. de Gigord, Paris).



...nicht. Als ges...ut, rorder
...del., eldeten sich insgesamt nur 12 (!) „Frei-
...ilige“.

Artikel 8 der Völkerbundssatzung

Die Bundesmitglieder bekennen sich zu dem Grundsatz, daß die Aufrechterhaltung des Friedens eine Herabsetzung der nationalen Rüstungen auf das Mindestmaß erfordert.

Telegraphische Meldung

Washington, 3. Januar. Senator Pittman, Vorsitzende des Ausschusses für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, gab vor dem Senatskomitee eine Erklärung ab, daß der Gesetzentwurf, den er nach Zusammentritt des Kor... und des Neutralitätsgeset... fenausfuhr an bürge... lierten werde, americ... nung.

17.10.33
VOL D
cop. 2

VÖLKERBUND

THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

No. 186

MARCH 19, 1937

3 d.

The Struggle to Realise and to Assure European Peace

I. Speech delivered by Adolf Hitler, Führer and Chancellor, before the German Reichstag, on January 30th, 1937

Text of the Foreign-Political Declaration

Four years ago, when I was entrusted with the Chancellorship and therewith the leadership of the nation, I took upon myself the bitter duty of restoring the honour of a nation which for fifteen years had been forced to live as a pariah among the other nations of the world. The internal order which we created among the German people offered the conditions necessary to reorganise the army and also made it possible for me to throw off those shackles which we felt to be the deepest disgrace ever branded on a people. Today I proceed to bring to a close with the following few declarations: —

First: The restoration of Germany's equality of rights was an event that concerned Germany alone. It was not the occasion of taking anything from anybody or causing any suffering to anybody.

Second: I now state here that, in accordance with the restoration of equality of rights, I shall divest the German Railways and the Reichsbank of the forms under which they have hitherto functioned and shall place them absolutely under the sovereign control of the Government of the German Reich.

Third: I hereby declare that the section of the Versailles Treaty which deprived our nation of the rights that it shared on an equal footing with other nations and degraded it to the level of an inferior people has thereby found its natural liquidation in virtue of the restoration of equality of status.

Fourth: Above all, I solemnly withdraw the German signature from that declaration which was extracted under duress from a weak government, acting against its better judgement, namely the declaration that Germany was responsible for the war.

The revindication of the honour of the German people, which was expressed outwardly in the restoration of universal military service, the creation of a new air force, the reconstruction of a German navy and the reoccupation of the Rhineland by our troops, was the boldest task that I ever had to face and the most difficult to accomplish.

Today I must humbly thank Providence, whose grace has enabled me, once an unknown soldier in the War, to bring to a successful issue the struggle for the restoration of our honour and rights as a nation.

I regret to say that it was not possible to carry through all the necessary measures by way of negotiation. But at the same time it must be remembered that the honour of a people cannot be bartered away; it can only be taken away. And if it cannot be bartered away it cannot be restored through barter; it must simply be taken back.

That I carried out the measures which were necessary for this purpose without consulting our former enemies in each case, and even without informing them, was due to my conviction that the way in which I chose to act would make it easier for the other side to accept our decisions, for they would have had to accept them in any case. I should like to add here that, as all this has now been accomplished, the so-called period of surprises has come to an end.

As a State which is now on an equal juridical footing with all the other States, Germany is more conscious than ever that she has a European task before her, which is to collaborate loyally in getting rid of those problems that are the cause of anxiety to ourselves and also to the nations.

* * *

If I may state my views on those general questions that are of actual importance today, the most effective way of doing so will be to refer to the statements that were recently made by Mr. Eden in the British House of Commons. For those statements also imply the essentials of what must be said regarding Germany's relations with France. At this point I should like to express my sincere thanks for the opportunity which has been given me by the outspoken and noteworthy declarations made by the British Foreign Secretary.

I think I have read those statements carefully and have understood them correctly. Not to linger in a maze of detail, I propose to single out the leading points in Mr. Eden's speech, so as to clarify or answer them from my side.

In so doing, I shall first try to correct what seems to me to be a most regrettable error, the assumption namely that somehow or other Germany wishes to isolate herself and to allow the events which happen in the rest of the world to pass by without participating in them, or that she does not wish to take any account whatsoever of the general necessities of the time.

What are the grounds for the assumption that Germany wants to pursue a policy of isolation? If this assumption in regard to German isolation be a conclusion which must necessarily be drawn from what are presumed to be Germany's intentions, then let me say this: —

I do not believe at all that a State could ever mean to declare itself intentionally disinterested in the political events taking place throughout the rest of the world, especially when this world is so small as Europe is at the present day. I think that, if a State should really find it necessary to take refuge in such an attitude, then the most that can be said is that it has been forced to do so under the coercion of a foreign will imposed upon it. Now, in the first place, I should like to assure Mr. Eden that we Germans do not in the least want to be isolated and that we do not at all feel ourselves isolated.

During recent years Germany has entered into quite a number of political agreements with other States. She has resumed former agreements and improved them. And I may say that she has established close friendly relations with a number of States. Our relations with most of the European States are normal from our standpoint and we are on terms of close friendship with quite a number. Among all those diplomatic connections I would give a special place in the foreground to those excellent relations which we have with those States that were liberated from sufferings

similar to those we had to endure and have consequently arrived at similar decisions.

Through a number of treaties which we have made, we have relieved many strained relations and thereby made a substantial contribution towards an improvement in European conditions. I need remind you only of our agreement with Poland, which has turned out advantageous for both countries, our agreement with Austria and the excellent and close relations which we have established with Italy. Further, I may refer to our friendly relations with Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Spain etc. Finally, I may mention our cordial relations with a whole series of nations outside of Europe.

The agreement which Germany has made with Japan for combating the movement directed by the Comintern is a vital proof of how little the German Government thinks of isolating itself and how little we feel ourselves actually isolated. Furthermore, I have on several occasions declared that it is our wish and hope to arrive at good cordial relations with all our neighbours.

Germany has steadily given its assurance, and I solemnly repeat this assurance here, that between ourselves and France, for example, there are no grounds for quarrel that are humanly thinkable. Furthermore, the German Government has assured Belgium and Holland that it is ready to recognise and guarantee these States as neutral regions in perpetuity.

In view of the declarations which we have made in the past and in view of the existing state of affairs, I cannot quite see why Germany should consider herself isolated or why we should pursue a policy of isolation. From the economic standpoint there are no grounds for asserting that Germany is withdrawing from international cooperation. The contrary is the truth. On looking over the speeches which several statesmen have made within the last few months, I find that they might easily give rise to the impression that the whole world is waiting to shower economic favours on Germany but that we, who are represented as obstinately clinging to a policy of isolation, do not wish to partake of those favours. To place this whole matter in its true light, I should like to call attention to the following bare facts:—

1. For many years the German people have been trying to make better commercial treaties with their neighbours and thus to bring about a more active exchange of goods. And these efforts have not been in vain; for, as a matter of fact, German foreign trade has increased since 1932, both in volume and in value. This is the clearest refutation of the assertion that Germany is pursuing a policy of economic isolation.

2. I do not believe however that there can be a lasting economic collaboration among the nations on any other basis than that of a mutual exchange of commercial wares and industrial products. Credit manipulation may perhaps have a temporary effect, but in the long run economic international relations will be decisively influenced by the volume of mutual exchange of goods. The state of affairs at the present moment is not such that the outside world would be able to place huge orders with us, or offer prospects of an increase in the exchange of goods, if we were to fulfil I know not what extraordinary conditions. Matters should not be made more complicated than they already are. If international commerce is ailing, that is not due to Germany's refusal to assist it, but is due to the fact that disorder has invaded the industrial life of the various nations and has influenced their relations with one another. But Germany cannot be blamed for these two things, and especially not National Socialist Germany. When we assumed power, the world economic crisis was worse than it is today.

I fear however that I must interpret Mr. Eden's words as meaning that in the carrying out of the four years plan he sees an element of refusal on Germany's side to participate in international collaboration. Therefore I wish it to be clearly understood that our decision to carry out this plan is unalterable. The reasons which led to that decision were inexorable. And since then I have not been able to discover anything whatsoever that might induce us to discontinue the four years plan.

I shall take only one practical example. In carrying out the four years plan our synthetic production of rubber and petrol will necessitate an annual increase in our consumption of coal by a margin of something between 20 and 30 million tons. This means that an extra quota of thousands of coal miners are assured of employment for the rest of their active lives. I must really take the liberty of asking this question: Supposing we abandon the German four years plan, then what statesman can guarantee me some economic equivalent or other, outside of the Reich, for these thirty million tons of coal?

I want bread and work for my people. And certainly I do not wish to have it through the operation of temporary credit guarantees, but through solid and permanent labour, the products of which I can either exchange for foreign goods or for domestic goods in our internal commercial circulation.

If by some manipulation or other Germany were to throw these 20 or 30 million tons of coal annually on the international market for the future, the result would be that the coal exports of other countries would have to decrease. I do not know if a British states-

man, for example, could face such a contingency without realising how serious it would be for his own nation. And yet that is the state of affairs.

Germany has an enormous number of men who not only want to work but also to eat. And the standard of living among our people is high. I cannot build the future of the German nation on the assurances of a foreign statesman or on any international help, but only on the real basis of a steady production, for which I must find a market at home or abroad. Perhaps my scepticism in these matters leads me to differ from the British Foreign Secretary in regard to the optimistic tone of his statements.

I mean this, that if Europe does not awaken to the danger of the Bolshevik infection, I fear international commerce will not increase but decrease, despite all the good intentions of individual statesmen. For this commerce is based not only on the undisturbed and guaranteed stability of production in one individual nation but also on the production of all the nations together. One of the first things which is clear in this matter is that every Bolshevik disturbance must necessarily lead to a more or less permanent destruction of orderly production. Therefore my opinion about the future of Europe is, I am sorry to say, not so optimistic as Mr. Eden's. I am the responsible leader of the German people and must safeguard its interests in this world as well as I can. And therefore I am bound to judge things objectively as I see them.

I should not be acquitted before the bar of our history if I neglected something—no matter on what grounds—which is necessary to maintain the existence of this people. I am pleased, and we are all pleased, at every increase that takes place in our foreign trade. But in view of the obscure political situation I shall not neglect anything that is necessary to guarantee the existence of the German people, although other nations may become the victims of the Bolshevik infection. And I must also repudiate the suggestion that this view is the outcome of mere fancy. For the following is certainly true. The British Foreign Secretary opens out theoretical prospects of existence to us, whereas in reality what is happening is totally different. The revolutionizing of Spain, for instance, has driven out 15,000 Germans from that country and has seriously injured our trade. Should this revolutionizing of Spain spread to other European countries, then these damages would not be lessened but increased.

I also am a responsible statesman and I must take such possibilities into account. Therefore it is my unalterable determination so to organize German labour that it will guarantee the maintenance of my people. Mr. Eden may rest assured that we shall utilize every possibility offered us of strengthening our economic relations with other nations, but also that we shall avail ourselves of every possibility to improve and enrich the circulation of our own internal trade.

I must ask also whether the grounds for assuming that Germany is pursuing a policy of isolation are to be found in the fact that we have left the League of Nations. If such be the grounds, then I would point out that the Geneva League has never been a real League of peoples. A number of great nations do not belong to it or have left it. And nobody has on this account asserted that they were following a policy of isolation.

I think therefore that on this point Mr. Eden misunderstands our intentions and views. For nothing is farther from our wishes than to break off or weaken our political or economic relations with other nations. The contrary is the truth. I have already tried to contribute towards bringing about a good understanding in Europe and I have often given, especially to the British people and their Government, assurance of how ardently we wish for a sincere and cordial cooperation with them.

* * *

I admit that on one point there is a wide difference between the views of the British Foreign Secretary and our views; and here it seems to me there is a gap which cannot be filled up.

Mr. Eden declares that under no circumstances does the British Government wish to see Europe torn into two halves. Unfortunately this desire for unity has not in the past been either voiced or listened to. And now the desire is an illusion. For the fact is that the division into two halves, not only of Europe but also of the whole world, is an accomplished fact.

It is to be regretted that the British Government did not at an earlier date adopt its present attitude that under all circumstances a division of Europe must be avoided; for then the Treaty of Versailles would not have been entered into. This Treaty brought in the first division of Europe, namely a division of the nations into victors on the one side and vanquished on the other, the latter nations being outlawed. Through this division of Europe nobody suffered more than the German people. That this division was wiped out, so far as concerns Germany, is essentially due to the National Socialist Revolution; and for that I think I can take some credit to myself!

The second division has been brought about by the proclamation

of the Bolshevik doctrine, an integral feature of which is that they do not confine it to one nation but try to impose it on all the nations.

Here it is not a question of a special form of national life in Russia but of the Bolshevik demand for a world revolution. If Mr. Eden does not look at Bolshevism as we look at it, that may have something to do with the position of Great Britain and also with some happenings that are unknown to us. But I believe that nobody will question the sincerity of our opinions on this matter, for they are not based merely on abstract theory. For Mr. Eden Bolshevism is perhaps a thing which has its seat in Moscow, but for us in Germany this Bolshevism is a pestilence against which we have had to struggle at the cost of much bloodshed. It is a pestilence which tried to turn our country into the same kind of desert as is now to be seen in Spain; for the habit of murdering hostages began here, in the form in which we now see it in Spain. National Socialism did not try to come to grips with Bolshevism in Russia, but the Jewish international Bolsheviks in Moscow have tried to introduce their system into Germany and are still trying to do so. Against this attempt we have waged a bitter struggle, not only in defence of our own civilization but in defence of European civilization as a whole.

If in January and February of the year 1933, when the last decisive struggle against this barbarism was being fought out in Germany, Germany had been defeated in that struggle and the Bolshevik field of destruction and death had extended over Central Europe, then perhaps a different opinion would have arisen on the banks of the Thames as to the nature of this terrible menace to humanity. For since it is said that England must be defended on the frontier of the Rhine, she would then have found herself in close contact with that harmless democratic world of Moscow, whose innocence they are always trying to impress upon us. Here I should like to state the following once again.

The teaching of Bolshevism is that there must be a world revolution, which would mean world-destruction. If such a doctrine were accepted and given equal rights with other teachings in Europe, this would mean that Europe would be delivered over to it. If other nations want to be on good terms with this peril, that does not affect Germany's position. As far as Germany itself is concerned, let there be no doubts on the following points:—

1. We look on Bolshevism as a world peril for which there must be no toleration.
2. We use every means in our power to keep this peril away from our people.
3. And we are trying to make the German people immune to this peril as far as possible.

It is in accordance with this attitude of ours that we should avoid close contact with the carriers of these poisonous bacilli. And that is also the reason why we do not want to have any closer relations with them beyond the necessary political and commercial relations; for if we went beyond these, we might thereby run the risk of closing the eyes of our people to the danger itself.

I consider Bolshevism the most malignant poison that can be given to a people. And therefore I do not want my own people to come into contact with this teaching. As a citizen of this nation I myself shall not do what I should have to condemn my fellow-citizens for doing. I demand from every German workman that he shall not have any relations with these international mischief-makers, and he shall never see me clinking glasses or rubbing shoulders with them. Moreover, any further treaty connections with the present Bolshevik Russia would be completely worthless for us. It is out of the question to think National Socialist Germany could ever be bound to protect Bolshevism or that we, on our side, could ever agree to accept the assistance of a Bolshevik State. For I fear that the moment any nation agreed to accept such assistance, it would thereby seal its own doom.

I must also say here that I do not accept the opinion which holds that in the moment of peril the League of Nations could come to the rescue of the member States and hold them up by the arms, as it were. No, I don't believe that. Mr. Eden stated in his last address that deeds and not speeches are what matters. On that point I should like to call attention to the fact that up to now the outstanding feature of the League of Nations has been talk rather than action.

There was one exception and in that case it would probably have been better to have been content with talk. In this one case, as might have been foreseen, action was fruitless.

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Hence, just as I have been forced by economic circumstances to depend on our own resources principally for the maintenance of my people, so also I have been forced in the political sphere. And we ourselves are not to blame for that.

Three times I have made concrete offers for armament restriction or at least armament limitation. These offers were rejected. In this connection I may recall the fact that the greatest offer

which I then made was that Germany and France together should reduce their standing armies to 300,000 men; that Germany, Great Britain and France, should bring down their air force to parity and that Germany and Great Britain should conclude a naval agreement. Only the last offer was accepted and it was the only contribution in the world to a real limitation of armaments.

The other German proposals were either flatly refused or were answered by the conclusion of those alliances which gave Central Europe to Soviet Russia as the field of play for its gigantic forces. Mr. Eden speaks of German armaments and expects a limitation of these armaments. We ourselves proposed this limitation long ago. But it had no effect because, instead of accepting our proposal, treaties were made whereby the greatest military power in the world was, according to the terms of the treaties and in fact, introduced into Central Europe. In speaking of armaments it would be well to mention in the first instance the armaments possessed by the Power which sets the standard for the armaments of all others.

Mr. Eden believes that in the future all States should possess only the armament which is necessary for their defence. I do not know whether and how far Mr. Eden has sounded Moscow on the question of carrying that excellent idea into effect, and I do not know what assurances they have given from that quarter. I think however that I ought to put forward one point in this connection. It is quite clear that the measure of a country's defensive armament should be in proportion to the dangers which threaten that country. Each nation has the right to judge this for itself, and it alone has the right. If therefore Great Britain today decides for herself on the extent of her armaments, everybody in Germany will understand her action; for we can only think of London alone as being competent to decide on what is necessary for the protection of the British Empire. On the other hand I should like to insist that the estimate of our protective needs, and thus of the armament that is necessary for the defence of our people, is within our own competency and can be decided only in Berlin.

I believe that the general recognition of these principles will not render conditions more difficult but will help to release tension. Germany at any rate is pleased at having found friends in Italy and Japan who hold the same views as ourselves; and we should be still more pleased if these convictions were widespread in Europe. Therefore nobody welcomed more cordially than we did the manifest lessening of tension in the Mediterranean, brought about by the Anglo-Italian agreement. We believe that this will first of all lead to an understanding which may put a stop to, or at least limit, the catastrophe from which unhappy Spain is suffering. Germany has no interests in that country except the care of those commercial relations which Mr. Eden himself declares to be so important and useful. An attempt has been made to connect Germany's sympathy for Nationalist Spain with some sort of colonial claims.

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Germany has no colonial claims against countries which have taken no colonies from her. Germany has suffered so much from Bolshevism herself that she would never take advantage of another unfortunate people in the same plight to extort concessions now or for the future. Our sympathies with General Franco and his Government are in the first place of a general nature and, secondly, they arise from a hope that the consolidation of a real National Spain may lead to a strengthening of economic possibilities in Europe. We are ready to do everything which in any way may contribute towards the restoration of order in Spain.

But I think that the following considerations should not be left out of account.

During the last hundred years a number of new nations have been created in Europe which formerly, because of their disunion and weakness, were of only small economic importance and of no political importance at all. Through the establishment of these new States new tensions have naturally arisen. True statesmanship however must face realities and not shirk them. The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The German nation and the German Reich are likewise realities. And for my own fellow-citizens I should like to state that the Polish nation and the Polish State have also become realities. Also in the Balkans nations have reawakened and have built up their own States. The people who belong to those States want to live and they will live. The unreasonable division of the world into nations that have and nations that have not will not remove or solve that problem, no more than the internal social problems of the nations can be solved through more or less clever phrases.

For thousands of years the nations asserted their vital claims by the use of power. If in our time some other institution is to take the place of this power for the purpose of regulating relations between the peoples, then it must take account of natural vital claims and act accordingly. If it is the task of the League of Nations only to guarantee the existing state of the world and to safeguard it for all time, then we might just as well entrust it

with the task of regulating the ebb and flow of the tides or directing the Gulf Stream into a definite course for the future.

But the League of Nations will not be able to do the one or the other. The continuance of its existence will in the long run depend on the extent to which it realises that the necessary reforms which concern international relations must be carefully considered and put into practice.

The German people once built up a colonial Empire without robbing anyone and without violating any treaty. And they did so without any war. That colonial Empire was taken away from us. And the grounds on which it was sought to excuse this act are not tenable.

First: It was said that the natives did not want to belong to Germany. Who asked them if they wished to belong to some other Power? And when were these natives ever asked if they had been contented with the Power that formerly ruled them?

Second: It is stated that the colonies were not administered properly by the Germans.

Now, Germany had these colonies only for a few decades. Great sacrifices were made in building them up and they were in a process of development which would have led to quite different results than in 1914. But anyhow the colonies had been so developed by us that other people considered it worth while to engage in a sanguinary struggle for the purpose of taking them from us.

Third: It is said that they are of no real value.

If that is the case, then they can be of no value to other States also. And so it is difficult to see why they keep them.

Moreover, **Germany has never demanded colonies for military purposes, but exclusively for economic purposes.** It is obvious that in times of general prosperity the value of certain territories may decrease; but it is just as evident that in times of distress such value increases. Today Germany lives in a time of difficult struggle for foodstuffs and raw materials. Sufficient imports are conceivable only if there is a continued and lasting increase in our exports. Therefore, as a matter of course, our demand for colonies for our densely populated country will be put forward again and again.

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In concluding my remarks on this subject I should like to note a few points concerning the possible ways of promoting a general pacification of Europe, which might also be extended outside Europe.

1. It is in the interests of all nations that the individual countries should possess internally stable and orderly political and economic conditions. They are the most important conditions for lasting and solid economic and political relations between the peoples.

2. The vital interests of the different peoples must be frankly recognised. Mutual respect for these vital interests alone can lead to the appeasement of the essential needs of the nations.

3. The League of Nations, to be effective, must be reformed, and must become an organ of the evolutionary concept, and must not remain an organ of inactivity.

4. The relations of the people towards one another can only be regulated and solved on a basis of mutual respect and absolute equality.

5. It is impossible to make one nation or another responsible for armaments or for limitation of armaments, but it is necessary to see this problem as it really is.

6. It is impossible to maintain peace among the nations so long as an international irresponsible clique can continue their agitation unchecked.

A few weeks ago we saw how an organised band of international war mongers spread a mass of lies which almost succeeded in raising mistrust between two nations and might easily have led to worse consequences than actually followed.

I greatly regret that the British Foreign Secretary did not categorically state that there was not one word of truth in those calumnies about Morocco which had been spread by these international war mongers. Thanks to the loyalty of a foreign diplomat and his Government, it was possible to clear up this extraordinary situation immediately. Supposing another case arose in which it turned out impossible to establish the truth so readily, what then would happen?

7. It has been proved that European problems can be solved properly only within certain limits. Germany is hoping to have close and friendly relations with Italy. May we succeed in paving the way for such relations with other European countries! The German Reich will watch over its security and honour with its strong army. On the other hand, convinced that there can be no greater treasure for Europe than peace, it will always be a reasonable supporter of those European ideals of peace and will be always conscious of its responsibilities.

8. It will be profitable to European peace as a whole if mutual consideration is always shown for the justified feeling of national honour among those nationalities who are forced to live as a minority within other nations.

This would lead to a decisive lessening of tension between the nations who are forced to live side by side, and whose State-frontiers are not identical with the ethnical frontiers.

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In concluding these remarks I should like to deal with the document which the British Government addressed to the German Government on the occasion of the occupation of the Rhineland.

I should like first to state that we believe and are convinced that the British Government at that time did everything to avoid an increase of tension in the European crisis, and that the document in question owes its origin entirely to the desire to make a contribution towards disentangling the situation of those days.

Nevertheless, it was not possible for the German Government, for reasons which the Government of Great Britain will appreciate, to reply to those questions.

We preferred to settle some of those questions in the most natural way by the practical building up of our relations with our neighbours, and I should like to state that, complete German sovereignty and equality having now been restored, Germany will never sign a treaty which is in any way incompatible with her honour—with the honour of the nation and of the Government which represents it—or which otherwise is incompatible with Germany's vital interests and therefore in the long run cannot be kept.

I believe that this statement will be understood by all. Moreover, with all my heart I hope that the intelligence and goodwill of responsible European Governments will succeed, despite all opposition, in preserving peace for Europe. Peace is our dearest treasure.

Whatever contributions Germany can make towards preserving it, these she will make.

II. The Attitude of England and of France

From the speech delivered by Mr. Eden, British Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons, on January 19th, 1937

I should like now to say a few words on the general international situation. I crave the attention of the House because what I have to say is, perhaps, of rather more gravity than what is ordinarily said by a Foreign Secretary in the course of a debate. I am leaving to-morrow for Geneva to attend one of the three regular meetings of the Council. We shall there be confronted with a formidable agenda, which is in itself an indication of the important part, whatever its critics may say, that the League plays in international affairs. It will be our objective to try to emphasize and widen that part.

But before leaving for that session there are certain remarks that I want to address to the House. In recent speeches I have endeavoured both in the House and in the country to outline the objectives of our foreign policy at this time and the means by which those objectives might be realized. I am not going to attempt

to repeat those speeches, yet in the first speech made in the New Year there are certain factors that we have to face. His Majesty's Government are at present engaged in the active prosecution of the re-equipment of their three fighting Services. Though we are convinced that this is an indispensable means to our objective, it is not our objective. This remains, as I have previously stated, the negotiation of a European settlement and the strengthening of the authority of the League of Nations. We are prepared to cooperate in the common work of political appeasement and economic cooperation, and if this work is to succeed it needs the collaboration of all. If that collaboration is forthcoming there cannot be any doubt in the minds of anyone in the House or elsewhere that we can create a better, saner, and more prosperous Europe in a world of peace.

How is that to be done? Not only must the world reduce its expenditure on armaments because it is already lowering its standard of life, but it has to learn the ways of economic coope-

ration so that the standard of life can be raised. Let us never forget that our objective in this country must be the prosperity of all, by which I mean the raising of the standard of life in the countries in which it is to-day low as well as its further improvement where it is to-day comparatively high.

We are willing to help towards a further advance along the line of increased economic opportunity, but this should be in our view on one condition. Economic collaboration and political appeasement must go hand in hand. If economic and financial accomodation merely result in more armaments and more political disturbance the cause of peace will be hindered rather than helped. On the other hand, a new and freer economic and financial collaboration based upon solid and wellconceived political undertakings will be a powerful aid towards the establishment of a unity of purpose in Europe. (Cheers.) Ultimately, and fundamentally, the objects of all honest political endeavour in whatever country must be the raising of the standard of life. We know well enough from the resources of science to-day that that can be done if it is undertaken in an atmosphere of peace and mutual confidence.

In engaging upon this task there are certain things which we do not accept. We do not accept that the alternative for Europe lies between dictatorship of the Right and the Left. (Cheers.) We do not accept—and let me make this quite clear—that democracies are the breeding-ground for Communism. We regard them rather as its antidote. We are not content to see Europe arming feverishly under the contending standards of rival ideologies. There is a better way. We know it, and we wish to enter upon it. And so I must close this review with a few words about Germany.

The future of Germany and the part she is to play in Europe is to-day the main preoccupation of all Europe. Here is a great nation of 65,000,000 people, in the very centre of our Continent, which has exalted race and nationalism into a creed which is practised with the same fervour as it is preached. All the world is asking at this present time whether these doctrines are to lead Germany, whither they are to lead all of us. Are they to restore the position of a great Power in the centre of Europe, enjoying the respect of other Powers both great and small, and using the manifold gifts of her people to restore confidence and prosperity to a world heartily sick of feuds and antagonisms, and ardently desiring a return to normal conditions of work and partnership; or are they to lead her to a sharpening of international antagonisms and to a policy of ever greater economic isolation?

Europe is to-day seriously asking herself what are the answers to these questions, for Europe cannot go on drifting to a more and more uncertain future. She cannot be torn between acute national rivalries and violently opposed ideologies without bearing scars which will last for a generation. Germany has it in her power to influence a choice which will decide not only her fate but that of Europe. If she chooses cooperation with other nations, full and equal cooperation, there is nobody in this country who will not assist wholeheartedly to remove misunderstandings and to make the way smooth for peace and prosperity. But it is idle to imagine that we can cure the evils from which we are suffering by mere palliatives; no mere local remedies will suffice. There must be no reserve or evasion on the part of any nation, whatever its ideology, whatever form of government it prefers for itself, in its cooperation with others and abandoning any form of interference in the affairs of others.

So we cannot cure the world by pacts or treaties. We cannot cure it by political creeds, no matter what they be. We cannot cure it by speeches, however lofty and peace-breathing they may be. There must be the will to cooperate which is unmistakable. That will can manifest itself in certain very definite ways—by abandoning the doctrine of national exclusiveness and accepting every European State as a potential partner in a general settlement; by bringing armaments down to a level sufficient for the essential needs of defence and no more; and by accepting such international machinery for the settlement of disputes as will make the League of Nations a benefit to all and servitude to none.

These things must be stated clearly at this time, at the beginning of a new year. We ourselves have no greater desire than to cooperate fully with others and herein we make no exception. We shall respond fully to the same desire, wherever it manifests itself, and we shall work for the greatest possible solidarity in the belief that, in their hearts, that is what the vast majority of people in every nation ardently desire.

From the speech delivered by Monsieur Blum, French Minister President, at Lyons on January 24th

I now come to the portion of my speech which, I am well aware, is anticipated on all sides with the keenest interest.

According to the Paris press all the newspapers in Europe and in the world have vied with each other in asseverating that on January the 24th, at Lyons, I would deal with the relations

between France and Germany. I will speak on this subject, therefore, since the international press has so decided. If I were now to be silent on the matter that would also be a manner of speaking.

In the first place I would like to discuss before you the meaning of an expression that is frequently used, though not without a certain inadvertence. What does "direct talk" with Germany really mean? We are always having "direct discussions" with Germany through its Ambassador and ours, by our ministers getting into touch with each other when a fortunate chance brings them together. In the course of these discussions we consider that there is no subject that has to be avoided. We have always been and still are always ready to make the most earnest and unreserved efforts not only to deal with the current questions that arise between two neighbouring countries, but also to enter with every frankness into the general problems presented by the political life of the two great states. Direct talks are held, therefore, but I fear that in reality something else is meant when "direct talk" is referred to. "Direct talk" signifies, in the view of people who take special pleasure in the use of this expression, most often "Special settlement". They mean by this that a firm understanding could be arrived at between Germany and France after a discussion in which only the two take part, and with which other powers have no concern. It is obvious that this view is supported by the method represented and applied by Chancellor Hitler. This method favours the conclusion of separate bilateral treaties between one State and every single neighbouring State or State in which it is interested, and which intentionally keeps these other States separate from each other both in the negotiations and in their results.

This method is not advocated or applied by the French Government, and in recalling this fact I do not wish to pronounce a theoretical world judgment. I believe that I am doing justice to the reality when I declare that we do not wish to detach French security from European peace. And as a matter of fact we do not wish this because we simply cannot do it. We are convinced that special obligations towards France would not guarantee security, and this conviction finds expression in the formula of an "indivisible peace" that is so often wrongly understood. —

We cannot continue to be disinterested onlookers in Europe. We are members of the League of Nations, loyal to its principles and its statutes. We have made friendships, to which we adhere absolutely firmly. We have undertaken obligations, which we fulfil loyally to the utmost extent. Our aim is, to repeat the expression of the London Declaration of July, 1936, the complete settlement of the European problems. We have proved that in order to reach such a settlement we were prepared to make the most unreserved and the most unselfish, I might almost say, the most expedient contribution. It is, however, only in the hope of achieving a total settlement or within the scope of such a settlement that we strive for the solution of the German—French problem.

I believe further that this settlement is possible, if all the nations of Europe countenance it with equal goodwill. I believe, however, as Eden also said in the House of Commons on Tuesday, that at the present moment this possibility depends chiefly on Germany, and on this point I wish to speak with every possible candour. At the present time the whole organising talent and the whole power of its national will is being directed by the German Reich to the task of overcoming grave economic difficulties. The idea of a barter business has, therefore, grown spontaneously in many minds, of an arrangement whereby Germany would obtain economic help that it would compensate with a gratifying participation in a peaceable settlement of the European situation. I should not like to take that attitude. I do not believe that we should propose anything to Germany that would resemble bargaining. Our feeling of national dignity is too deeply seated, and we are too firmly determined, if the necessity should arise, to ensure it respect, not on our part to respect the dignity of other nations. We are still less disposed to entertain the idea, which is equally false and dangerous, that the aggravation of Germany's economic difficulties may one day compel that country to seek help and to submit to conditions. We take very good care, finally, not to doubt the will to preserve peace to which Chancellor Hitler has given expression on ceremonious occasions. Should agreements be arrived at one day, they can and may be concluded only in the spirit of confidence and on the basis of equality.

Now that this has been said there is for the future something like an obvious truth, which everybody must recognise. How in the present state of Europe, when for long months past the sensitiveness of the nations has been exposed to violent periodical shocks, and when competitive arming proceeds at a much more rapid pace than before the world war, can anyone imagine an economic agreement independent of a political settlement? What nation would be prepared to collaborate with another, whether by granting credits or by improving its provision of raw material, or by giving facilities

in questions of population and colonisation, or any other help, if it should in any sense fear that the help it renders could one day be turned against itself, that the credits, the raw material, and the undertakings established abroad could serve to add to a power and to increase a military "potential" whose victims it or its friends would become? There is thus a necessary connection, an inseparable association between economic collaboration on the one hand and the organising of peace and the cessation of competitive arming on the other hand. In order to work together one must be able to work in peace.

This connection is just as evident when the question is put from the other side. I am firmly convinced that the excess of armaments in Europe will compel a re-examination of the whole question of armaments. An agreement to restrict and gradually to reduce armaments must of necessity be an essential part of a general settlement of the European problems. The war material industry holds such a position today, however, in the production of the industrial power that it would probably be impossible to ordain a stoppage at a moment's notice without exposing those powers to the danger of serious internal crises. It is perhaps no longer possible to contemplate an international agreement of a political nature concerning disarmament without concluding in connection with it or supplementary to it an economic agreement that would create new possibilities of activity for the industries and their workmen.

By this means the questions of the provision for and of the execution of great European, colonial, and international operations would naturally arise, that is to say, questions of material and technical collaboration, and also questions of credit, or financial co-operation. I concur here with some suggestions in the plan put forward by the International Labour Office at the commencement of the crisis in accord with the Syndicalistic organisations, and I also come back to the ideal that my friends and I presented after the war for the solution of the Reparations problem.

My conclusions are, therefore, a close association of the German—French problem with the whole European problem, and the consequent connection of the economic collaboration with the political settlement and the organisation of peace. I know that they are banal, but I warned you to expect disappointments. I hardly need add that the French Government is prepared today, and will be ready tomorrow to manifest by deeds its fervent desire to restore real security to Europe and to the world, that is to say, the deep inner feeling that the world has again become peaceful, that fears no longer weigh on it, and that it has found again peace in which to work and sleep. Eden said in the speech to which I have frequently referred, and with which I am in all senses fully in accord: "We cannot heal the world with pacts or treaties, and also not with speeches, however lofty and peaceable they may be; there must be a desire for collaboration that is unmistakable."

This desire is present in France in complete unanimity. It is so evident, and has manifested itself so often that nobody in the world thinks of doubting it. When, as we hope, Germany also declares her desire to collaborate we shall be ready to work with her as with all other nations without any reservation and without any lack of candour. We shall allow no one to outdo us in the mutual endeavour, and we can think of nothing more fortunate for Europe than the noble rivalry in the cause of peace that will then ensue. Our standpoint is that what perhaps the country thanks us most for today is our persistent and unswerving endeavour to preserve indivisible peace.

From the speech delivered by Monsieur Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Châteauroux, on January 31st, 1937

At the time when we were endeavouring to prevent the war in Spain from spreading we were making efforts, in spite of the difficulties presenting themselves, which were often of a tragic nature, to carry on the organisation of European peace. Loyal united with the League of Nations as we are, we praised its methods of security, and shall continue to defend the strengthening of those methods. In this we have set a good example. At the last meeting of the Council we reached a settlement of this controversy, from which it was believed that difficulties would arise, that satisfied all concerned. In this matter France and Turkey showed in collaboration with the statesmen then in Geneva the efficacy of the League of Nations.

We feel that we have strengthened general peace and at the same time French security by tightening the bonds that unite us with other peace-loving powers. Our close friendship with England, the stability of our agreements with the Little Entente, with Poland and with the Soviet Union are actual guarantees in our fight against war, while we have furthermore the benefit of the moral support of a number of other nations, in the very first place of the great American democracy, that are united with us in the pursuit of a common ideal.

We do not think of excluding anybody, or of refusing our friendship to anyone whatever. On the contrary, our desire is to

prevent the formation of competing blocks and of coalitions working against one another, whatever may be the ideas and interests they represent and advocate. Our agreements, that are of a strictly defensive nature, and our watchful care for our national defences are merely guarantees and precautionary measures against a sudden tempest. I know that all nations may have the same feeling, and I shall never doubt that it is as sincere in all those cases as is ours.

I prefer, therefore, to hold fast to the positive, human, and fruitful side of the peace organisation, and to help onwards the extension of the efforts of the wide circle of friends, that is still open, to universality. By working for the restoration of international trade and commerce, as we do, by concluding commercial, financial, and customs treaties, by taking part in every exchange of ideas in the international domain, and by submitting all disputes to a court of arbitration the proof can be daily and effectively presented that there is room in the world for all nations possessed of good will, and that recourse to the force of arms is at the same time a miscalculation and a crime. Who among those who hold in their hands the fate of nations has the right to hesitate when he is called upon to choose between the destruction of victors as well as of the vanquished and the benefits of peaceable collaboration?

For this reason I cast no doubts on the sincerity of the solemn declarations that have come to us from beyond the Alps and from the other side of the Rhine. Only yesterday Chancellor Hitler confirmed his desire to maintain peace. The differences of opinion concern, therefore, not the aim but the methods, and the methods must be dealt with, diversified and even antithetical as they so often are. My remarks are not to be taken as a reply to yesterday's speech, for I have not yet had the leisure to devote to it the earnest study and reflection that it deserves, and in foreign politics one must guard against improvisations. I will only formulate a few impressions. In the first place, I am glad to note that Hitler's speech contained no sort of attack on France, and that the Chancellor declared that between the Germans and us there could be no humanly possible matter of dispute. That is our view also, and our wish. But we and the Germans are not alone in the world, and the maintenance of peace is subject to general rules that stretch far over both of us. Among these rules we include, as far as we are concerned, respect for treaties. When the Chancellor recalls former breaches of treaties, and when, on his own initiative, he adds other declarations to this recollection he does not strengthen the confidence that must be placed in signatures. He unquestionably begins a new page when he declares himself to be ready to collaborate loyally in the future, but international collaboration includes negotiations and agreements, which threaten to become very difficult when he declares for Germany in view of her armaments—which are really of a defensive nature—that everybody is the sole judge of what he shall do.

I gladly admit, however, that on the other hand there are passages in the speech which even in view of this question of disarmament are more positive when the Chancellor rightly states that this question must be treated as a whole. This is what we think when we demand the summoning of a general conference. I emphasise in particular the following statement: "Peace is our most valuable possession, Germany will do all that it can to contribute particularly to this work".

As far as we are concerned, we are prepared to support all efforts that help towards a relaxation of tension and towards rapprochement, though we are well aware of the fact that it is not necessary to have the same views from the very outset in order to arrive at an agreement. One condition must be made, however, namely, that such efforts and endeavours are not directed against anybody. In this connection I am thinking of the Soviet Union, and of the fact that I consider it to be arbitrary and dangerous to exclude from the international community a nation of almost 200 million people, a nation that, moreover, does not make the same demands, and that in common with all other nations, needs peace and desires it.

I would like to bring forward still another problem that is at the same time a general and a German—French problem. When we say that the economic restoration of Europe can be effected only in an atmosphere of peace, and that it is dependent on the notification and control of armaments and of their cessation and gradual limitation, Germans are disposed to find offensive allusions in our words. We have, however, always declared with emphasis that our statements are valid for all countries, including our own. We demand from Germany nothing that we do not demand from all, and that we do not demand from ourselves. And when we are now, in declaring that we are ready to collaborate in a more equitable distribution of raw material, anxious that war shall not thereby be promoted, who has the right to feel insulted by such justified and general anxieties? In order that peace shall prevail the war industries must be transferred into peace industries. This adjustment, without which most terrible crises are inevitable, is all the more difficult as armaments have been actively pushed forward at the cost of other production. This difficulty can be

overcome only when the wish and the determination to arm are given up entirely, and when, by means of the re-established exchange of goods, and thanks to the confidence and the security of the economic revival, new marketing possibilities are opened up to the new production. We summon Germany and all other countries to participate in this great task, and in order to accomplish it thoroughly let us drop on both sides susceptibility and mistrust, and deliver the world from the nightmare of the war by freeing ourselves from it. We shall collaborate towards the relaxation of this tension with all the forces at our disposal.

We are convinced that there need not necessarily be war, and that this crime must for ever be proscribed, because it would destroy civilisation for ever. We shall, therefore, in order to avoid war, exhaust all the means of conciliatory procedure. The only limit to our desire for peace is our inflexible determination to defend ourselves if we should be attacked, and to fulfil loyally the obligations that we have undertaken. We offer, therefore, the example of a free and strong nation that, sure of itself and of its friendships, can extend its hand honourably and without fear to everybody.

III. From the Declarations made on the Heroes' Commemoration Day and at the Receptions of the Participators at the Congress in Berlin of the Permanent International Front Fighter Commission

From the speech delivered by General Field-Marshal von Blomberg, Reich War Minister, on Commemoration Day of Heroes 1937 in Berlin, February 21st

In the midst of a mighty peaceable struggle for freedom and of a boisterous work of national re-construction this day which we devote to the memory of our heroes carries our eyes and hearts back again to that greatest of all ordeals, for as such the world war will live in our consciousness and in that of those who come after us. "Wanderer, stay", is what this day calls to us, and this peremptory summons exhorts us to self-communion, searching retrospect, and to venturesome circumspection. From the understanding of the past and of the present, however, there must proceed the fixed determination to shape the future, or otherwise this day will have lost its meaning.

Once again, in recalling the years 1914 to 1918, the depth of the suffering and the greatness of the sacrifice that the world war demanded of our people shakes our whole being. Once again we look on the endless rows of graves of two million German soldiers dispersed over the whole earth and in all seas; once again we feel the profound misery that our mothers, widows, and orphans suffered and still suffer. The sad fate of those disabled in the war also speaks to us in forcible language. As we think of our own dead we think also today with all reverence of the soldiers mourned by the nations who fought with us and against us 20 years ago. "Forget hate!—Prove worthy of our Sacrifice!—Use all the strength at your disposal to prevent a recurrence of the horror!" This is our interpretation of the cry that reaches us from the graves of the world war.

The new Germany has taken up this cry. It has not contented itself with setting up monuments of stone and of metal; it has not only fulfilled the simplest duty imposed by gratitude, in giving a dignified appearance to our soldiers' resting places, and in mitigating and improving the lot of those who were left behind and of those disabled in the war. What appears to me to be much more important is the fact that in these past four years the German people and its leaders have torn down the walls of hatred and of dissension that were previously regarded as being insuperable. In the first place we have removed the barriers in the inner life of the people that were set up by the conflict of the classes and by the arrogance of rank, and we have replaced them with comradeship, with the sense of community, and with National Socialist discipline. The right to work and thus human dignity have been restored to millions of unemployed, and what a moral achievement it is that in a nation of 65 million people no working hour is any longer voluntarily lost! Where in the whole world is there a philanthropic organisation that could compare with the German Winter Relief Work? What country can boast of having given the working classes more of the joy of life and better possibilities for recreation than new Germany has given in the past few years? In what country is more done for the education of a healthy, animated, and robust youth in which we see the assurance of the welfare of the Fatherland? We were indeed great and bold in our peaceable, cultural re-construction, and at the same time we have been studiously careful to respect the vital rights of other nations, for, just as the central point of the Führer's domestic policy is the peaceful comprehension of all the nation's forces, so the leading motive of his foreign policy is the preservation of international peace. The fact should not be lightly estimated abroad that after an unparalleled period of suffering during and after the war, and after an almost endless series of humiliations and oppression, the German people have expressed to all their neighbours their readiness to meet in complete reconciliation. The outside world should also finally understand what importance for the moral

appeasement of the world lies in the fact that Germany has eradicated from her inner life the dictated Treaty of Versailles, that devilish work of hate and of delusion. We stand today in the centre of Europe as a free people, and the freedom of other nations is in no danger from us. All, however, who see in the freedom, in the equality, and in the distinctive life of the nations the basis for international orderliness, will understand also the inexorable defiance hurled by National Socialism at Bolshevism, that menace to the world.

Germany has reverted to the sources of her strength.

The German people know that they can pursue undisturbed their peaceable avocations under the protection of their newly-recovered defensive force. The time of dictates and of threats has gone for ever; we are again master in our own house, and can do in this whatever we wish.

Born of the spirit of National Socialism, the defensive force is the upholder and the herald of the National Socialist view of and conformation of life. Together with the National Socialist Party, to which it feels itself indissolubly bound, it constitutes the backbone and the foundation of the New Reich. It gives to the New Reich the power to assert itself in the midst of the foreign political play of forces, and it watches over the peace of the nation. From the defensive force and from its work the confidence must emanate that pulsates in all the streams of the national life, and that finds its supreme efficacy in the task of educating the German person. For it is thus, and not with guns and bombing squadrons that we wish to operate in the future.

From the speech delivered by General-Colonel Göring, Minister President of Prussia, on the occasion of the official reception in the Reich Air Ministry of February 15, 1937, of the representatives of the Permanent International Front Fighter Commission

Men from all countries are face to face at this Congress who once fought in the most mighty of all wars either side by side as allies or as chivalrous opponents for the ideals of their countries. The fight is at an end, a new path has been opened up. All of us here have been through the terrible inferno of modern material battles. We know that the warriors of the world war are the peers of the heroes of pre-historic times in respect of endurance, of bravery, and of courage. We then realised with fearful consternation what a grievous loss it was for the whole of mankind that the most valuable inheritance of the nations was being destroyed in those most sanguinary front fights.

I believe that the world war was the final test, and that the nations can never again allow themselves to stand up against each other in such a struggle. It was the last warning by fate not to let western civilisation be submerged. Further progress has been made in technics, the equipments for war have gained in force and in destructive power. A new war would increase enormously the terrors of the last one.

For these reasons I believe that there are no better promoters of peace than the old Front Fighters. I am convinced that you, before all others, have the right to demand peace, and to organise it. I award the right to organise the life of the nations in the first place to the men who, for four atrocious years, went through the hell of the world war with weapons in their hands, and I know that the front fighters will be the first to use all their endeavours to ensure that their nations shall retain the blessings of peace.

It is far too often said that the soldiers themselves are the chief representatives of a war party. I believe, comrades, that those people rattle most assiduously with the sabre who have never drawn one. — Those who know nothing of the horrors of war can talk about a "brisk and exhilarating war". We, however, know what a terrible thing the final contention among the nations is.

It is my fervent wish, a wish coming from my heart, that this Congress may contribute towards establishing the groundwork of a real peace of honour and of equality for all parties. You, my comrades, must take the preparatory steps. I am glad that the Congress meets in new Germany, which yearns for peace as fervently as do the other nations, and will maintain it as firmly. I do not believe that it would be possible to hold the Congress in a country whose people were inclined to war, for the front fighters speak everywhere, wherever they happen to meet, not of future wars, but of how peace can be preserved.

General-Colonel Göring concluded with the request to the Front Fighters: Put everything into the background that once divided the nations and us! Remember that history has gone forwards! Discard the sentiments that engendered wrong preconceived ideas, and that develop into gulfs between the nations. **Let us not speak of prestige, not of victors and vanquished, but only of the ideals of the front fighter, namely, of comradeship to the very utmost, of fulfilment of duty to the end, and of readiness to make sacrifices until death! These ideals can be realised at all times, and also in the service of peace.** Find the language of the front fighter that permits you to grasp each other's hands over what is disuniting in politics. Remember that many millions of dead comrades are looking down on us. They will not wish to have died in order that everything shall be repeated; their death is justified only if a new, happier life issues from their graves. These are the wishes, my comrades, that I would like to give you for this Congress.

From the speech by Rudolf Hess, the Führer's Deputy and Reich Minister, welcoming the participants in the First Congress of the Permanent International Front Fighter Commission in Berlin, on February 16, 1937

"I believe that it can be taken as symbolical of the spirit pervading the International Front Fighter Organisation that at the beginning of its existence it is meeting in the capital of the country that for years was regarded by most of you as the main enemy. Perhaps one or another in your home will blame you for travelling here on the grounds that Germany is arming very heavily, for augmenting armaments is hardly compatible with the object of the Front Fighters, which is to work for peace. In reply to this I can only repeat the idea to which I gave expression years ago. I can repeat it in the words spoken by a foreign statesman a few days ago: 'A great Reich which is at the same time a weak Reich is a menace to the stability of the world and a temptation to the aggressor.'

Germany, however, has no wish to menace the stability of the world and to be a temptation to the aggressor. Believe me: a people that has suffered so grievously as the German has through war, and that is led by a government of Front Fighters—at their head the Front Fighter Adolf Hitler—such a people does not arm for the purpose of attacking. Germany also 'throws her strength into the scale of peace'.

We Front Fighters are a band of comrades—for the real Front Fighters entertained from the outset a feeling of comradeship for those who bore the same privations, suffered the same distress, did the same things, and were threatened by the same death in all its terrible forms. The fact that this feeling of comradeship between the opponents themselves, even in the midst of the most awful fight known to history, could not be quite suppressed led many Front Fighters even while the war was going on to hope

that the men who fought in the ranks of all the nations might be called upon to fulfil a great and noble mission on behalf of afflicted humanity. I believe that a way to the fulfilment of this hope has been found in the formation of this International Front Fighter Commission, in which the representatives of the nations stand side by side in full equality and equally esteemed. It can only be hoped that from this beginning, through the work of these men, who have seen and been through the most appalling and the most highly concentrated suffering that ever mankind had to bear, real understanding between the nations will result. May the esteem in which these men hold each other spread more than heretofore among the nations, and may the spirit rise from this extended esteem that will use every effort on all sides to hinder national catastrophes such as it has been our lot to experience."

From the Address by General Field-Marshal von Blomberg, Reich War Minister, on February 21st, 1937

Comrades! When I address you, comrades of the great war, with this title of honour, and bid you welcome in the name of the German defensive force, the meaning of the word comrade demands that we should direct all our thoughts and all our actions to the good qualities and the virtues that have characterised soldierly comradeship in all ages and among all peoples. To be a comrade is to be brave; comradeship calls for confidence; there can be comradeship only between free, honour-loving people and nations that are on a footing of complete equality. Comrades help one another; the very essence of true comradeship consists of submitting in common to the common fate.

Almost two decades have gone by since the world war came to an end. International efforts and endeavours to repair the consequences of that terrible occurrence and to prevent the outbreak of a new war have not been wanting. Most of these endeavours have failed, however, have come to nothing because comradeship was not behind them. Now a new "Internationale", the international corporation of the front fighters, is fighting for the same aim. I believe that this Internationale has on its side the greatest right and the greatest chance of attaining that aim. Who knows war better than you, my comrades? Who has made greater sacrifices on the altar of the mother country than the soldiers of all nations who fell in the war, than the front fighters who carry the wounds on their bodies through life that were inflicted in that war? Who can fight more convincingly for the peace of the world than the soldiers of the last world war?

This is a new kind of pacifism. It is not the outcome of cowardice and lack of dignity, not also of egotism and of malignity. It renders unto Caesar what is Caesar's, but also to God what is due to God. This pacifism pronounces from a full heart in favour of peace, but it also accords to all peoples the right and the duty to defend their country. This pacifism recognises that it is honourable to fight and to suffer for one's country. To esteem one's own honour and one's own rights carries with it, however, recognition of and scrupulous esteem for the honour and the rights of neighbours.

It is the task of the front fighters of all nations to disseminate this idea, and the present Congress serves the same end. That the representatives of 14 nations are met here in Berlin to work with a good will for international understanding and for peace among the nations is a gleam of light on the clouded political horizon. My wish for you, my comrades, is that you may achieve eminent success! You will become acquainted in Germany with a Reich and a people that have borne unending suffering, that are now working with an heroic exertion of strength at their regeneration, and that wish for nothing more ardently and need nothing more urgently than peace for themselves and peace throughout the world. Take this conviction home with you! Become the standard-bearers of a new idealism, of an ideal that is capable of uniting all the nations and of burying all enmity!

WORLD
Fig. 2 JOURNAL OF THE GERMAN ASSOCIATION FOR LEAGUE OF NATIONS QUESTIONS

VÖLKERBUND

THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

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Naval Armaments

The Political Struggle by the Powers for Maritime Predominance

The Collapse of Naval Disarmament

The problem of disarmament was, as is well known, taken up at an early date outside the League of Nations, by the five great naval powers. The most important stages of the negotiations to this end were the Washington Conference, which led to the conclusion of an Agreement on February 6th, 1922, that remained in force until the year 1936; the so-called Admirals' Conference that was summoned by the American President Coolidge in the summer of 1927, and that was without result; the Anglo-French naval negotiations in the summer of the year 1928; the Naval Conference in London in the spring of the year 1930, that resulted in the Treaty of April 22nd, 1930, between England, the United States of America, and Japan; the attempts made by France and Italy in the beginning of the year 1931 to terminate the naval rivalry, which ended with the conclusion of the Agreement of March 1st, 1931, that never came into force; the endeavours made in the Disarmament Conference to reach an agreement, which also failed; the Anglo-German negotiations, which resulted successfully in the conclusion of the Naval Treaty of June 18th, 1935; and finally the Conference that also met in London on December 9th, 1935, and terminated provisionally on March 25th, 1936, with the conclusion of a three-power Treaty between England, the United States, and France.

The Washington Conference 1921/1922

When the world war was concluded all the naval powers among the victor countries felt the desire to reduce naval armaments to the utmost possible extent. The primary reason for this wish was the imperative necessity to reduce expenditure, though the war-weariness of the nations also contributed to it. Finally, also, all the Admiralties felt the need to make a profound study of the experience gained in the war, before laying down any considerable number of new constructions.

The conditions for disarmament were to be created by the dictate of Versailles, whose naval provisions fixed the naval strength of the German Reich at such a small amount that it could practically be ignored in the deliberations of the victor countries concerning their naval armaments. One of the consequences of the Russian Revolution was that the Tsarist navy was rendered incapable of action, so that there remained as naval powers of importance England, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy.

It soon appeared, however, that although they had just won together the war against the Central European powers none of those countries was inclined to renounce the naval force that it considered it had the right to claim on the basis of its political position and of its interests. Two groups were formed, within which rivalries in naval armament questions soon arose, namely, an oceanic group, comprising England, the United States, and Japan, and a Mediterranean group consisting of France and Italy. Much, it is true, was said about disarmament, and a large number of old ships were scrapped by all the navies, about which much was made, but nobody thought seriously of relinquishing demands for its navy in respect of ships of really great fighting force and of most modern construction. For the ships in course of construction the rate of building was again accelerated, and fresh building programmes were drawn up. Naval disarmament was abandoned, and the beginning of a competitive armament was indicated, especially between the three oceanic naval powers, in the building of battle-ships and of aircraft-carriers. England, that had a vital interest in preventing such a competitive armament, succeeded in averting this danger through the medium of the Washington Conference of 1921/22. By abandoning the two-power standard, and by recognising the right of the United States to complete equality, England succeeded in gaining the support of the latter power to her most important wishes. Under the combined pressure of the two Anglo-Saxon powers a Treaty was arrived at that fixed the naval strength of the five naval powers: England, the U.S.A., Japan, France, and Italy, quantitatively in the ratio to each other of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75, and provided for maximum tonnage in the case of battle-ships and aircraft-carriers. From the qualitative point of view maximum tonnage for the individual ship and maximum calibre were fixed for battle-ships, aircraft-carriers, and heavy cruisers. Certain exceptions were specially regulated for each signatory of the Treaty.

In actual figures the British Empire and the United States were allowed to possess **capital ships** with a total tonnage of 525,000 tons each, Japan 315,000 tons, France and Italy 175,000 tons. At the same time the maximum limit for capital ships was fixed

at 35,000 tons, the maximum calibre at 40.6 cm. and the age limit of the ships at twenty years. The building of large warships was to cease for the next ten years.

In addition the tonnage was fixed for the **aircraft-carriers** allowed to the five States, i. e. the British Empire and the United States, 135,000 tons; Japan, 81,000 tons; France and Italy, 60,000 tons. The maximum tonnage of the aircraft-carriers was also limited to 27,000 tons and the maximum calibre to 20.3 cm.

No limitation of the total tonnage was reached in the case of all the other classes of ships. But as regards armoured cruisers, the so-called "Washington cruisers", a maximum tonnage of 10,000 tons was fixed together with a maximum calibre of 20.3 cm. As regards the **light naval forces**, such as small cruisers, torpedo boats, torpedo boat destroyers and submarines, no agreement was concluded in respect of number and total tonnage or the size of the vessels. This obvious lacuna in the Treaty was due of course to the **attitude of France**, who felt she was being treated as a naval power of the second class, and was not prepared at any price to dispense with such an important defensive weapon as the submarine. England proposed the complete abolition of submarines in the light of War experiences, but did not carry her point. France also refused outright to agree to any limitation of the size, armament or tonnage of submarines. England thereupon abandoned her original attitude of willingness to accept limitation of cruisers and destroyers, regarding these types of vessels as specially adapted for defence against submarines and desiring to retain a free hand to continue to build them pending the abolition of the submarine.

That left the Washington Treaty an unfinished torso, though it served to provide valuable starting points for naval disarmament in the shape of provisions with regard to intervals of construction, age-limits and the arming of merchant-ships. It relaxed—for a time at least—the high tension which had prevailed. The idea of Disarmament had in short found a footing.

* * *

When President Harding invited the other powers to Washington he informed them at once that the limitation of naval armaments was bound up with the political problems in the Pacific Ocean and in the Far East. It was clear, therefore, from the outset that one of the aims of the Conference was to arrive at an understanding concerning the principles that should dominate the policy in the Far East. The agreement thus reflected in particular the disquietude produced by the prevailing troubles in China in a world that was uneasy concerning its capital investments in the Far East.

The provisions embodied in Article XIX of the Treaty with regard to naval bases in the Pacific in the case of England, the United States and Japan are important. They stipulated that for the period of the Treaty no changes should be made in the position in regard to defence equipment or resources for the repair and maintenance of naval vessels in the possessions of the three Powers in the Pacific, and in particular prohibited the erection of new fortifications. In the case of England this stipulation applied to Hongkong and the British islands east of the 110th meridian. It did not apply to the bases in the neighbourhood of the Canadian coast or to bases belonging to the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. Singapore, England's chief base on the fringe of the Pacific area, was also not affected by these provisions; and the programme of development of this base was free to continue. In the case of the United States the restriction applied to all the U.S. possessions in the Pacific including the Philippines, Guam and the Aleutian Islands, with the exception of the Hawaii group and the U.S. possessions of the Western coast and Alaska and in the neighbourhood of the Panama Canal Zone. In the case of Japan the restrictions applied to the mandated islands and to the Kuriles, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Coochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores. Bases on the mainland and adjoining islands might continue to be developed.

* * *

The ratio 5:5:3 distributed the burden of power among the three nations in such a manner that each could hold the upper hand in its sphere of influence, without being strong enough to attack one of the two other powers with any prospect of success. Notwithstanding her lower ratio Japan retained the predominance in the Far East, owing to the great distance that

separated her from America and from Europe. The Americans for their part were also, thanks to the great distance, superior in their waters to the English and the Japanese, and for the same reason England was superior to those two countries both in the Mediterranean and in the eastern half of the Atlantic.

Furthermore, England, America, Japan, and France agreed in the so-called **Four Power Pact** to respect reciprocally their rights to the islands in the Pacific, and in case disputes should arise or those rights be menaced by a third power to meet for friendly conference.

In exchange for these important concessions Japan was, it is true, compelled to bind herself in the so-called **Nine Power Treaty** to respect the sovereign rights, the independence, and the integrity of China, and to uphold there the **principle of the open door**.

The fact should not be overlooked finally in connection with these Treaties that the alliance existing between England and Japan since the year 1902 was not renewed.

The Coolidge Conference 1927

In the years that followed, however, it became evident that the Washington Treaty had indeed prevented competitive armament in the battle-ship and aircraft-carrier classes, but that in the categories not limited by Treaty its effect had been a general increase of armaments. Each of the five naval powers drew up more or less extensive building programmes, that augured a very considerable expansion of the cruiser, destroyer, and submarine fleets. The competitive building that had been prevented with the aid of so much care and labour in the case of battle-ships and aircraft-carriers, was soon in full operation in the other classes of ships. This movement was now not restricted to England, America, and Japan, but spread also to France and Italy, whose naval rivalry in the Mediterranean constantly gathered strength.

A commission set up by the League of Nations in the year 1924 in Rome endeavoured vainly to bring about an understanding.

It was Coolidge who succeeded in bringing the United States, England, and Japan to the conference table at Geneva in the year 1927, in the hopes that an arrangement might be arrived at by those powers in regard to armaments in the various classes of the light fighting forces. The endeavour to secure the application of the provisions valid for the heavy fighting forces also to the light fighting forces failed completely. Japan opposed the ratio of power of 5:5:3; America and England could not agree on the cruiser question. England claimed for her widespread and widely ramified maritime interests two classes of cruiser (heavy and light) and a superiority of cruisers over those possessed by the United States. The latter country insisted on equality, however, and rejected two categories of cruisers. England's endeavours were aimed at the recognition of a minimum quota of about 70 cruisers, the number of heavy cruisers of 10,000 tons being limited, while the light cruisers should be subjected to no restrictions of any kind. This proposal was viewed by the United States as being a heavy blow to its interests, its contention being that the situation in the Pacific and in the Far East necessitated the retention of a tonnage as high as possible for its individual cruisers.

The Anglo-French Naval Negotiations in 1928

After it had been proved to be impossible to come to an agreement with the United States, England made every effort to reach an understanding with France.

The Anglo-French naval negotiations in the summer of 1928 were an attempt at an agreement between the two countries for the limitation of the light naval forces.

The views of Great Britain and of France in respect of the limitation of naval armaments had hitherto been diametrically opposed. Great Britain refused to make a close connection between land and sea armaments, while France adopted the principle of the interdependence of armaments and therefore took the view that it was impossible to negotiate separately regarding naval armaments. On the contrary, she considered that armaments formed an organic whole and that negotiations could only be carried on regarding the whole, that is to say, regarding land, air and naval armaments at the same time. Great Britain and France also disagreed as to the method of limiting naval armaments. France took the view that the total amount of tonnage should be fixed for each country, while the distribution of this tonnage among the various categories of ships should be at the discretion of each Power. Great Britain, on the other hand, desired a limitation of the total tonnage of the various categories of vessels. The important point in this connection was that France desired to reserve the greatest possible scope for the development of the light naval forces; this was the very thing that Great Britain wished to prevent since, by fixing the total tonnage for each category, the other naval Powers were prevented from increasing the light naval

forces—an increase which would in the nature of things be of special value to the smaller naval Powers but would be particularly inconvenient for Great Britain and might even endanger the maintenance of her world-wide trade and the connections with the various parts of her Empire. The treaty negotiated between Great Britain and France in the summer of 1928, the text of which was fixed but which did not come into force on account of the sharp resistance of Italy and the United States, was based on an agreement that Great Britain should meet the French in respect of land armaments while France should meet the English in respect of naval armaments, Great Britain agreeing with the wishes of France that the trained reserves and war material should be excluded from the disarmament factors while France gave way to the British view regarding the limitation of naval armaments according to categories of ships. Whereas Great Britain previously agreed with Germany, especially on the question of the trained reserves and the war materials in stock, she was subsequently the main contributing factor to the exclusion of this point from the draft convention of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. The whole was therefore not an agreement for facilitating and preparing for a general limitation of armaments, but **an agreement against disarmament**. It failed on account of its rejection by the Labour Government which came into power in June 1929. The study of the English and French documents and other publications relating to these naval speeches, that were issued in London and in Paris on October 22nd, 1928, is still interesting. It is also a valuable help in judging the methods then employed, and also on later occasions, in the armament negotiations, for it was ultimately these methods that occasioned the breakdown of the negotiations.

The London Naval Conference 1930

The Labour Government then attempted to tackle the question of the limitation of naval armaments and to check the competition in armaments from another angle, i. e. from an agreement with the United States. To ensure this agreement, England declared her willingness to renounce the 70 cruisers requested, and to be satisfied with a minimum number of 50 cruisers. After preparations had been made by Mr. MacDonald's visit to the United States in the autumn of 1929, the Naval Conference convened by the British Government in London at the end of January endeavoured to fill up the gaps left open at Washington in respect of the limitation of naval armaments and thus also to fix definite armament ratios by categories of ships for the light naval forces of the individual naval Powers. The Five-Power Treaty which had been hoped for was however not reached in view of the Franco-Italian difference of opinion in respect of naval parity. On **April 22nd, 1930**, only a **Three-Power Pact** was concluded, which was signed by Great Britain, America, and Japan as Part III of the London Treaty.

The essential feature of the London Agreement was the division of cruisers into two classes—Class A (heavy cruisers) with a maximum tonnage of 10,000 tons and guns of over 15.5, but not over 20.3 cm. calibre, and Class B (light cruisers) with a maximum tonnage of 10,000 tons and guns not exceeding 15.5 cm. calibre. A part of the English claims was thus met; but on the other hand the United States succeeded in asserting their own standpoint in the cruiser question by securing larger numbers and tonnage in the heavy cruiser class. In addition to the arrangement in the cruiser question, the tonnage was fixed in the case of destroyers on the 5:5:3 basis. In the case of submarines there was for the first time a breach in the established ratio, all three Powers recognising the principle of parity. The tonnage of submarines was limited quantitatively. Agelimits were also fixed on the lines laid down at Washington. Furthermore, so-called sliding clauses and special exceptional provisions were adopted, which show, on the one hand, how extraordinarily difficult it was to reach a settlement, and, on the other hand, how small was the satisfaction given — when the matter is viewed as a whole — by that settlement. The validity of the Treaty was made to coincide with that of the Washington Treaty.

* * *

Article 1 of the London Agreement further confirmed the **concession of replacement tonnage for big ships in the case of France and Italy to the extent of 70,000 tons each**. For a considerable period no advantage was taken by either country of this provision with regard to replacement tonnage: but in the last few years building of this tonnage has begun. France considered her "security" seriously endangered by the building of the German armoured ships of 10,000 tons, and proceeded accordingly to lay down two battleships of 26,500 tons each with 33 cm. guns in December 1932 and November 1934 respectively. The first of these ships, the "Dunkerque", was launched on September 15th, 1935, and was completed by about the end of 1936. The second, the "Strasbourg", is not to be completed before the summer of 1938. **Franco-Italian divisions on naval and Mediterranean issues** led Italy at the end of October 1934 to reply

to the French programme of new construction by laying down 2 battleships of 35,000 tons each, the "Vittorio Veneto" and the "Littorio" which come up to the maximum limits laid down in the Washington Treaty in every respect: in particular, they are to carry 9 38.1cm. guns. The latest indications were that France did not propose to leave this increase of Italian sea-power unanswered. The French Law of March 23rd, 1935, authorised the building of other big French ships, the "Jean Bart" and the "Richelieu" this time of 35,000 tons.

The blow to the idea of naval disarmament is thus to be seen not so much in the fact that France decided to construct a capital ship at all as in the type that was decided upon for this ship. In the summer 1932 England had made the valuable proposal at the Geneva Conference that in future capital ships should be reduced to a tonnage of 25,000 and the gun calibre to 30.5 cm. or, with a simultaneous reduction of the limits hitherto set for cruisers, that the tonnage for capital ships should even be limited to 20,000 and the gun calibre to 28 cm. There was thus a definite prospect of reaching a certain measure of disarmament as far as the larger battle ships were concerned. This British proposal was thus brought to naught by the laying down of the French "Dunkerque" with her 26,500 tons and her 33 cm. guns, and this constitutes **the blow which France dealt to the idea of naval disarmament**. France must have known that her decision on the question of principle could not fail to have the most serious effect on the construction plans of her Mediterranean rival.

The Franco-Italian Naval Discussions 1931

Discussions between France and Italy were resumed from time to time in the hope of arriving at an agreement concerning the amount of light naval fighting forces that both countries would concede, but without any success.

Italy demanded complete parity with France, while the latter insisted on a considerable superiority of light naval forces as compared with Italy and thus refused to extend to the light naval forces the parity established in the Washington Treaty in respect of capital ships and aircraft-carriers. After lengthy negotiations through the intermediary of the United Kingdom, it appeared that an agreement had been reached with the **Franco-Italian Treaty of March 1st, 1931**, when France withdrew from the agreement already arrived at. Her obvious intention was to leave in suspense the agreement with Italy and thus to keep the Treaty of London indefinite until the general Disarmament Conference, in order to retain means of bargaining and pressure as against the great Naval Powers in respect of the entire disarmament question. If the Treaty of London had been concluded with Franco and Italy and if the ratio of armaments had thus been fixed between the five great Naval Powers in respect also of the light naval forces, it would have been much easier to settle the problem of naval disarmament at the general Disarmament Conference.

The Disarmament Conference and the Question of Navies 1932/33

No progress whatever was made with the solution of the problem of naval disarmament also in the course of the Disarmament Conference. **Mr. Ramsay MacDonald**, the then Prime Minister, had submitted to the Conference on **March 16th, 1933**, his famous **Draft Disarmament Convention**, the second part of which, in Section II, Clause 2, dealt with naval armaments.

The British **Draft Convention** which, according to the unanimous decision of the representatives of all States, was to be regarded as the basis of the Convention to be concluded, did indeed merely state that the provision of the Washington and London Treaties shall continue to apply to the Contracting Parties. The text of the British plan thus gave these States the possibility of extending their Navies within the limits of those Treaties. On the other hand, after carefully studying the entire chapter, it may be concluded that, not the text, but the **principle** underlying this section aims at a far-reaching **stabilisation of all naval armaments at their present level** for the proposed short transitional period.

The final settlement was postponed till 1935 when a Conference of all Naval Powers was to be held. In view of the stabilisation tendency underlying the chapter on Naval Armaments, there might have been some justification for concluding that the Contracting Parties of Washington and London would also help as far possible to bring about the equilibrium aimed at in the MacDonald draft by adapting their new constructions to the limitation demanded of the other Naval Powers until the conclusion of the Conference proposed for 1935. They would have best contributed to this aim by continuing to refrain from increasing their new constructions beyond their present extent. Hitherto they had deliberately refrained from taking full advantage of the possibilities provided by the Washington and London Treaties, in order that the work of the Disarmament Conference might not be unfavourably influenced by enormous building programmes. The long start gained by the Navies of the five Parties to the negotiations in Washington and London over the navies of the

other Powers had hitherto enabled them and would continue to enable them to exercise such restraint without danger.

This conduct was also in accordance with the provision laid down in Article 23 of the London Treaty which they had concluded and which specially refers to the possibility of a "more general agreement limiting naval armaments to which all would become parties". This could not refer to any other agreement than the Convention to be concluded at the Disarmament Conference.

Only France, by the construction of the battle cruiser "Dunkerque", thus creating a new type of vessel with the maximum fighting power, deliberately departed from this general line which was undoubtedly of the greatest importance for the success of the disarmament negotiations; this gave an **alarm signal** to the experts in all admiralities throughout the world.

The first reading of the **Naval Chapter of the MacDonald draft**, which took place in the General Commission on May 25th and 26th, 1933, clearly showed the **serious differences** existing in respect of naval armaments.

We can hardly be astonished that all the proposals of the five signatory Powers of the Treaty, of Germany and the small naval Powers could not bring about any agreement.

When it became more and more obvious during the long drawn-out negotiations that the Geneva Conference would never be able to carry out its important task of bringing about the speedy and effective disarmament of the heavily-armed States on account of the tactics adopted by the delegations of those States, the Admiralties removed their main interest from Geneva to the **scene of the Naval Disarmament Conference planned for 1935**. It was now of importance rapidly to lay the foundations in order to go to this future Conference "well equipped" in the true sense of the word. And so the race in naval armaments began.

The Naval Conference in London 1934/1936

a) The Preliminary Discussions

The discussions preliminary to this Conference began on June 18th, 1934. Only a few days after the curtain had fallen over the last act of the tragedy of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva the British Government took the initiative in opening up afresh the question of naval armaments. There arrived in London one after the other Roosevelt's special ambassador, Norman Davis, and the American Admiral Standley, a Japanese delegation, Pietri, Minister of Marine, in the company of Monsieur Barthou, the then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and an Italian naval expert.

In the meantime conditions had, at least in the opinion of the three leading participants, undergone a complete change since the year 1930. The view put forward by the American Government was that Japan had thrown over since the year 1931 the system, so finely conceived, of balance of power in the Pacific, and had violated by her campaign of conquest in Manchuria and by penetrating into the interior of Mongolia the obligations into which she entered in 1922 in regard to China and that thus the conditions were no longer valid under which the ratio had hitherto been conceded to her. Japan, on the other hand, contended that in view of the greatness of the tasks that she had undertaken in consequence of the extension of her influence in the Far East the ratio hitherto in force was very far from satisfying her needs. There was undoubtedly a connection between all these matters and the conference of high military and political personages, surrounded with such great secrecy, that was arranged by the British Government in the spring of the year 1934 on the high seas in the neighbourhood of Singapore. The questions discussed concerned no doubt the expansion of that naval base, which is almost as important for the Far East as Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Haifa, Suez, Aden, and others are for the Near East and the Mediterranean.

In the profound depths of this struggle for the trident there blaze the **problems of the space occupied by the Pacific Ocean**, for this is the real matter in dispute, in connection with which the threads of naval strategy and of pure politics intersect each other. The naval stations are strategically as important as whole squadrons of great fighting ships, and the naval balance of power in the Pacific is a problem from which emanate all the tensions that keep those parts of the world in perpetual unrest. Although the solution of the problem has hitherto been postponed by compromises and treaties none of the parties was really contented, and the party who came off worst or felt that he was at a disadvantage always signed with the secret reservation that he would bring forward new wishes when the agreements and treaties expired or were renewed. The treaties could, therefore, never completely banish the forces that were grouped round them.

Japan felt, at any rate, strong enough to take a decided stand, and demanded to be treated generally on terms of complete parity with the Anglo-Saxon powers, and deliverance from the "Fetters of the Washington Treaty". The Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Saito, declared over and over again that public opinion in Japan would no longer tolerate that America should prescribe

to Japan the number of ships the might possess, or that America "should ride about in an elegant Rolls-Royce limousine while assigning a cheap Ford car to Japan". The propelling motive of the Japanese naval policy, namely, to ensure a dominant position on the seas in the Far East, manifested itself clearly enough in the energetic tone of the Japanese programme. This endeavour was furthered also by Japan's demands for an all-round tonnage that would allow each country to construct its navy in accordance with its special needs, to have smaller ships, to abolish aircraft-carriers by means of which air attacks could be carried out across wide expanses of ocean against the thickly-populated country, so extremely sensitive to bombing attacks, and to retain submarines as a defensive weapon.

Washington replied with a brusque "No". Japan, it was pointed out there, had neither two ocean coasts to defend, as America had, nor an empire, as England had, dispersed over the whole globe, and did not need, therefore, such a large number of defensive ships. Japan naturally rejected this view of the matter as being arbitrary, but nevertheless there is something to be said for it from the technical aspect. America and even England can never risk concentrating her whole fleet in the Pacific during a war, each country must in all circumstances distribute its fighting forces in such a manner that attacks in home waters can be ward off. The American argument that a Japanese fleet of equal strength according to treaty provisions would be superior in Chinese-Japanese waters to an American fleet that had crossed the Pacific Ocean, was met with the Japanese retort that the same would apply if the Japanese fleet came across the ocean to the Panama Canal—and in theory the Japanese are undoubtedly in the right. What is overlooked, however, is that Japan has hardly any interest to protect in Central America, whereas America has quite important interests in Eastern Asia, in the form of the Chinese market, to defend.

The central point of the Franco-Italian naval rivalry was the Italian demand for equality. Paris replied to the Italian demand for absolute parity with the strongest continental naval power, namely, France, that that country's extensive over-sea possessions necessitated a distribution of the French fleet, so that absolute parity would render the Italian naval forces superior to the French Mediterranean fleet. France also sees in this situation a menace to possibly necessary transports of troops from her Northern African colonial empire to the home country as a danger to her requirements of food-stuffs and important raw material for war purposes. She is able to supply these needs to a very great extent at home, whereas in case of a conflict Italy is infinitely more dependent on supplies from foreign countries.

Italy has certainly not yet forgotten the expressions with which Hanotaux, the former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Pelletan, the former French Naval Minister, once triumphantly declared: "*Bizerte prend l'Italie à la gorge*", and "*La Corse perce au cœur de l'Italie*".

Opposition continued to exist between London and Washington in regard to the maximum tonnage of battleships and of cruisers. The Americans founded their preference for ships of a large type and with an extensive radius of action on the small number of naval bases in their sphere of influence. The English, on the other hand, wished to force down the tonnage figures, because, owing to their extended sea-routes and their more numerous naval bases, they laid greater weight on the construction of smaller, but faster ships. Between England and France, also, notwithstanding agreement "in principle", there was not unanimity on the question of submarines, the abolition of which England—and also America—continued to advocate. The French Naval Minister, Pietri, had furthermore put forward the principle that: "The French fleet is equalled nowhere qualitatively; what we want is more tonnage, especially in the larger type of war-ship, for a navy without line-of-battle ships is like an army without infantry."

There were thus fundamental points of difference on all sides, which were not mitigated by the fact that the preliminary discussions under French leaderships were introduced by the determination on the part of all the participants concerned to increase their armaments, a determination that was fairly strongly accentuated. The new building programmes were, it is true, in some cases drawn up on the almost shamefaced pretension that the existing treaties left room for new constructions. In reality, however, each party undoubtedly wished to appear at the Conference with the highest possible effective force of ships ready and in building that was exempt from further reduction. **Equality of security** was the slogan flung into the debate by the American delegate, by means of which it was intended to announce that it was not only bare tonnage figures and calibres that were determinative for the fighting value of the fleet, but also the distance from naval bases, etc. Equality of security was not, therefore, intended to mean that the naval strength of each power should be the same as that of another, but that the strength must be graduated in accordance with the greatness of the responsibility devolving on each power when all its interests were taken into account.

The political value of the various forces was thus decisively appraised in the preliminary discussions.

These were broken off in the middle of July, and postponed until October. In the meantime the British Government sent Sir Maurice Hankey, the secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee, and secretary general of the Naval Conference of 1930, on a tour to the Dominions, with instruction to negotiate with their various governments, in connection with London's armament policy, concerning mutual measures of Imperial defence, and especially of naval questions. And at the end of August Japan demonstrated, with a naval parade in the Bay of Tokio, in which 161 vessels of war, totalling 850,000 tons, her determination to become a naval power.

The negotiations with the United States and Japan were resumed in London on October 20th. They were preceded by an official declaration in Tokio on the 16th respecting the instructions given to the Japanese delegation, in which it was stated that Japan intended to give notice of withdrawal from the Washington Treaty, but hoped and wished that this could be replaced by a new agreement. It was also announced that Japan would furthermore claim the right to take the measures necessary for her security and for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. It was stated finally in the Tokio declaration that should the Conference yield no result Japan would consider herself compelled to look to her own self-defence according to her own judgment, though with an absolutely peaceful aim, and animated, as heretofore, by the wish to be on the best terms with the other powers.

Notwithstanding the somewhat optimistic statements by Sir John Simon, the then Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on October 22nd, the opposing views could not be reconciled, and even the well-rounded words with which the negotiations were closed before Christmas could not hide the fact that they had not fulfilled their main purpose.

What was anticipated soon occurred: **On December 29th, 1934, a note issued in Tokio** that Saito, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, handed to the American State Secretary Hull, and that Matsudeira, the Japanese Ambassador in London, handed to the Foreign Office, **denounced the Washington Treaty, and thus also the Treaty of London.**

It was stated in a declaration issued by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the same day that the Japanese Government was as a matter of course ready, even though it had denounced the two treaties, to continue friendly discussions with the other naval powers with the object of concluding a just and appropriate new naval agreement.

The two show-pieces of naval disarmament, the Treaties of Washington and London—which signified, as a matter of fact, not disarmament, but rather a stabilisation of armaments—that had to be held up so often as consolation for the sterility of Geneva in the domain of armaments on land, were thus submerged in the general armament turmoil, and lapsed on December 31st, 1936. The then President Harding of the United States had celebrated the close of the Washington Conference in February, 1922, in a positively dithyrambic speech, and amid universal applause declared: "The obligations solemnly undertaken today mark the beginning of a new and a better era and the progress of mankind... Those among us who are alive ten years hence and longer will probably see the public opinion of the nations strengthened by the experience with this Treaty in the wish to submit to the Divine will instead of occupying itself with war and the means of destruction..." That was spoken still in the spirit of the time immediately after the war, and Wilson, the professorial ideologist, was reflected in those words. The concluding words spoken by the American State Secretary Stimson at the end of the London Conference were nevertheless also animated with very considerable optimism. They were: "We believe that disarmament in itself augments security, and so we hope that the world will attain in times to come in fresh Conferences an ever increasing security by means of ever greater disarmament."

And what has come of all this? A heap of ruins, from which the danger of a gigantic competitive armament arose. The "**struggle for mastery on the seas**", as the English Admiral Lord Beatty once observed, went on with enhanced vehemence.

At the end of the year 1933 there appeared in the annual report published by the Navy Department in Washington the declaration by Naval Secretary Swanson that America could no longer afford to take the lead before the other powers in disarming. There were added the following words, which retain today their full gravity for the attitude assumed later by Germany: "**Our armament weakness in no sense serves the cause of peace. It rather endangers that cause, for an equalised armament is a support for diplomacy, and thus an important factor in the peace policy, whereas excessive weakness becomes an allurement for an aggressive war, and is productive of violations of rights.**"

When Swanson wrote those words the United States were already engaged in carrying out a large building programme that

Large War-ships of the




The English battle-cruiser "Hood"

The largest warship in the world
 In commission since 1920
 Displacement: 46,200 tons
 Engine Power: 151,000 HP
 Speed: 31 seamiles
 Armament: eight 38.1 cm. and
 twelve 14 cm. guns, two 12 cm. and
 four 10.2 cm. anti-aircraft guns,
 four light 4.7 cm. guns and
 19 machine guns, 6 torpedo tubes
 Aircraft on board: 1 fighting and
 1 observation plane
 Crew: 1341
 Length: 262 m.; beam: 32 cm.
 Draught: 9.6 m.
 Armour: up to 305 mm.


The French line-of-battle ship "Bretagne"

Launched: 1913
 Displacement: 22,189 tons
 Speed: 23 knots
 Length: 166 m.; beam: 27 m.
 Draught: 8.9 m.
 Crew: 1130
 Strongest armour: 400 mm.
 Armament: ten 34 cm. guns,
 fourteen 13.8 cm. guns, eight 7.5 cm.
 anti-aircraft, five 4.7 cm. anti-aircraft,
 eight machine guns,
 four 45 cm. torpedo tubes




The English battle-cruiser "Renown"

Launch: 1916 (re-built during and
 after the war)
 Displacement: 32,000 tons
 Speed: 31.5 knots
 Length: 229 m.; beam: 31.1 m.
 Draught: 9.6 m.
 Crew: 1200
 Strongest armour: 279 mm.
 Armament: six 38.1 cm. guns,
 twelve 10.2 cm. guns,
 four 10.2 cm. guns, four 4.7 cm.
 anti-aircraft and 16 machine guns,
 two 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes,
 four aircraft on board



The French battle-cruiser "Dunkerque"

Launch: 1935; Displacement: 26,500ts.
 Engine power: 125,000 HP; Speed:
 30 seamiles; Armament: eight 33 cm.
 and sixteen 13 cm. guns, twelve 10 cm.
 and sixteen 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns,
 40 machine guns;
 6 torpedo tubes, 4 flying boats
 Length: 212 m.; beam: 31.5 m.
 Draught: 8 m.
 Weight of armour: 7000 tons
 Strength of armour: up to 275 mm.
 Crew: 1381
 In its construction the ship greatly
 resembles the English war-ship
 "Nelson". The battle-cruiser
 "Strasbourg", laid down in 1934
 will be of similar dimensions



Leading Maritime Powers

The American line-of-battle ship "West Virginia"

One of the most modern and one of the largest battle-ships of the United States

Launch: 1921

Displacement: 31,000 tons

Speed: 21.1 knots

Strongest armour: 457 mm.

Length: 183 m.; beam: 29.7 m.

Draught: 9.3 m.

Crew: 1407

Armament: eight 40.6 cm., twelve 12.7 cm. guns, eight 12.7 cm. anti-aircraft, 11 machine guns, two 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes, 3 aircraft on board



The American line-of-battle ship "New Mexico"

Launch: 1917

Displacement: 33,000 tons

Engine power: 133,800 HP

Speed: 21 seamiles


Armament: twelve 35.6 cm. and twelve 12.7 cm. guns, eight 12.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns, four light 4.7 cm. guns, 2 machine guns, 3 aircraft on board

Crew: 1565

Length: 190.2 m.; beam: 29.6 m.

Draught: 8.8 m.

Armour: up to 356 mm.



The Japanese line-of-battle ship "Fuso"

Launch: 1914

Displacement: 29,330 tons

Speed: 22.5 knots


Length: 192 m.; beam: 28.7 m.

Draught: 8.7 m.

Crew: 1325

Strongest armour: 305 mm.

Armament: twelve 35.6 cm. guns, sixteen 15.2 cm. guns, eight 12.7 cm. anti-aircraft, 26 machine guns, two 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes, 3 aircraft on board



The Japanese line-of-battle ship "Mutsu"

Launch: 1920

Displacement: 32,720 tons

Engine power: 46,000 HP.

Speed: 26 seamiles


Armament: eight 40.6 cm. and twenty 14 cm. guns, eight 12.7 anti-aircraft guns, 4 machine guns, 8 torpedo tubes, 3 aircraft on board

Crew: 1340

Length: 201 m.; beam: 29 m.

Draught: 9.1 m.

Armour: up to 330 mm.






**The Italian line-of-battle ship
"Andrea Doria"**

Launch: 1913
 Displacement: 21,555 tons
 Engine power: 24,000 HP
 Speed: 21 seamiles
 Armament: thirteen 30.5 cm., sixteen 15.2 cm. and thirteen 7.6 cm. guns, six 7.6 cm. and two 4 cm. anti-aircraft guns, 8 machine guns, 2 torpedo tubes, 1 aircraft on board
 Crew: 1250
 Length: 176 m.; beam: 28 m.
 Draught: 8.6 m.
 Armour: up to 280 mm.

**The English battle ship
"Queen Elizabeth"**

Launch: 1913
 Displacement: 31,100 tons
 Speed: 25 knots
 Length: 195 m.; beam: 31 m.
 Draught: 10 m.
 Crew: 1180
 Strongest armour: 279 mm.
 Armament: eight 38 cm. guns, twelve 15.2 cm. guns, eight 10.2 cm. anti-aircraft, four 4.7 cm. anti-aircraft and 15 to 19 machine guns, two 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes




The Italian heavy cruiser "Trento"

Launch: 1927
 Displacement: 10,000 tons
 Speed: up to 38 knots
 Length: 194 m.; beam: 20.6 m.
 Draught: 5.4 m.
 Crew: 835
 Armament: eight 20.3 cm. guns, sixteen 10 cm. anti-aircraft, two 7.6 cm. anti-aircraft, four 4 cm. anti-aircraft and 8 machine guns, eight 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes, 3 aircraft on board

**The Soviet Russian line-of-battle ship
"Marat" (after re-construction)**

Displacement: 23,606 tons
 Armament: twelve 30.5 cm. guns, sixteen 12 cm. guns, six 7.5 cm. anti-aircraft and 4 machine guns, four 45 cm. torpedo tubes, 2 aircraft on board
 Speed: 24.6 knots
 Crew: 1230



Congress had sanctioned in the summer, and a few weeks later the Vinson-Trammel Bill, with the greatest increase of the navy that had ever been seen, was laid before Parliament.

"An American navy second to none". That was Swanson's demand with which America proceeded to further negotiations.

b) The Results of the Naval Conference held from December 9th, 1935, to March 25th, 1936

Article 23 of the Washington Treaty and Article 23 of the London Agreement both stipulate that the Contracting Parties should meet again for a new Conference on naval armaments in 1935. The Washington Treaty makes this stipulation conditional on the Treaty's denunciation by one of the Contracting Parties is due form before December 31st, 1934. This condition is met by Japan's denunciation.

The prospects of a Conference for the limitation of naval armaments in 1935 were, for obvious reasons, somewhat dim when the year 1935 opened.

To clear up the position in Europe, England took the lead in negotiating with Germany. The negotiations culminated, after Hitler's speech of May 21st, 1935 in the **Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18th, 1935**. There has been a tendency, in drawing attention to the significance of the Agreement in other connections, to overlook the great value which England attached to the Agreement as an element in the efforts to bring about a Naval Conference. The English broadcast by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, on June 19th, the greater part of which was reproduced in No. 134 of this publication, contained numerous references to this aspect of the Agreement.

"In the domain of naval armaments, as far as Great Britain and Germany are concerned, an end has finally been put to competitive arming". Thus wrote Sir Herbert Samuel, formerly British Minister for Home Affairs, in a copyright article at the end of June. Furthermore, Sir Samuel Hoare, First Lord of the Admiralty, declared in the House of Commons on the eleventh of March of this year that he regarded the Treaty as being of very great importance. "I believe" he said, "that there will be no more competitive arming between Germany and England." The Anglo-German Treaty has stayed such competitive arming as clouded the last five or six years before 1914. It is being carried out loyally by both parties. It is certainly a consoling fact that while almost the whole world was thinking of arming further, and conversed about the impossibility of restricting armaments, such an agreement could be arrived at between England and Germany. It was still hoped that this act of Adolf Hitler's, which definitely disposed of the antagonism once existing between England and Germany, might serve as an example for the other naval powers. It has unfortunately not been possible for the latter to come to such an understanding.

The effect of the Agreement on the French on the other hand was at first very different. The French Press indignantly demanded complete freedom of action in the matter of naval disarmament, and made it clear that under the circumstances France would have no particular interest in a Conference to limit naval armaments or even in discussion of the subject. England however continued to press her point. In August conversations in Paris soon showed that the atmosphere had become more favourable. The preparatory conversations with Italy which took place at the same time were equally satisfactory.

England was now in a position to approach the United States and Japan with a view to securing the co-operation of these States in the Conference. Her efforts were in the end successful: but it was not until October 24th that the official invitation was issued to the Signatory Powers of the Washington Treaty.

The general result of the preparatory negotiations and the substance of the invitation to the Conference were made known in a statement made by Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell on October 24th in reply to a question in the House of Commons. The First Lord said that bilateral conversations had taken place between representatives of the Signatory Powers of the Washington and London Agreements to prepare the way for a Naval Conference. England had taken the initiative in arranging for these bilateral discussions, and had that day (October 24th, 1935) addressed communications to the United States, Italy, France and Japan enquiring whether the Governments of those countries were prepared to be represented at a Conference to meet in London on December 2nd. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was also in touch with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions on the subject.

The purpose of the proposed Conference, Sir Bolton continued, would be to secure agreement on as many aspects as possible of the question of naval disarmament with a view to the conclusion of an international agreement to take the place of the two naval treaties expiring at the end of 1936. It was hoped, he added, once agreement between the representatives of the original Signatory Powers was in sight, to extend the scope

of the Conference so as to include representatives of other naval Powers.

The British Government's invitation was accepted by all the States invited. Even Japan agreed to waive the standpoint which she had maintained persistently throughout the year not to take part in a Conference unless parity of her aggregate naval strength with that of England and the United States was recognised beforehand. The holding of the Conference might now therefore be regarded as assured. In the meanwhile further discussions of experts had taken place. December 9th was finally fixed as the date for the opening of the Conference. Special interest attaches to the fact that representatives of the Dominions also took part in the Conference.

* * *

The Conference was opened on December 9th in the Locarno Room of the Foreign Office by Mr. Baldwin, Prime Minister.

When one thinks back to January 30th, 1930, and recalls the brilliant opening meeting in the House of Lords, when the King himself welcomed the numerous representatives of the five Powers that are now participants in this Conference, among them two Prime Ministers and numerous other Ministers, one can hardly imagine a greater contrast between then and today. The participating Powers had in so far adapted themselves to the prevailing atmosphere that—with the exception of the Americans, who had sent Norman Davis as special Ambassador and the deputy State Secretary Philipps—they had contented themselves with being represented by experts, and had entrusted the leadership of the delegations to their ambassadors in London. It is seldom that an international conference was inaugurated with less formalities than was this one. It was placed deliberately on a business footing. The general wish was to keep the outer frame-work as modest as possible, so as to arouse no special hopes and to prepare no disappointments.

Disappointments were all the more to be expected as at the same moment the navies of two of the negotiating powers were strategically drawn up in the Mediterranean, and were ready to strike. The Italian-Abyssinian war and the Mediterranean conflict between England and Italy that arose out of it had the result that Italy adopted an extremely reserved attitude in the Conference, and at a later stage declined altogether to sign the new treaty. Ambassador Grandi announced at the opening sitting that Italy was not inclined to be a party to a naval agreement while England took up an unfriendly attitude towards her, and the League of Nations upheld its sanctions policy. These were, moreover, not the only thunder clouds that gathered over the work of the Conference. A certain tendency towards conciliation that had finally led to an understanding between Washington and London was dissipating, and was being replaced by an almost sullen determination on the part of each country to ensure the fulfilment of its own demands. France, too, that was still under the ban of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, was reluctant to enter into engagements that in her opinion imperilled her security. The Conference was also finally overshadowed by the vastly increased striving on the part of the Soviet Union for power on the sea as well as on land, and by Japan's expansion policy and the change in the disposition of the grouping of the Powers resulting from these two causes. In short, behind the discussions among the naval experts and constructors concerning the tonnage, calibres, and the thickness of armourplating, there were always present the political requirements of the powers in all parts of the world, which, to a certain extent, prescribed the course of events. The only gleam of light in this obscure atmosphere and the only contribution towards understanding and towards peace seemed to be the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

These facts, moreover, were not affected in any way by the speeches delivered at the opening meeting by the representatives of the individual Powers, which, after eulogising the Washington and London Treaties, accentuated the wish and the intention to collaborate in the efforts of the Conference to arrive at an understanding that might lead to a reduction and a limitation of naval armaments. Apart from these assurances, however, very few concrete proposals were brought forward that might have furthered this aim and especially the clearing away of antagonisms.

Mr. Baldwin said: "The position of this country was explained in detail in a statement communicated to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1932, and it remains the same today. Briefly speaking, his Majesty's Governments are prepared today, as they were then, to prolong the principles of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, with such modifications and adjustments as are expedient and necessary on account of altered international circumstances and the needs of individual Powers. They attach the greatest importance to a continuation of limitation in both the quantitative and qualitative field. They would like to see a reduction in the sizes of all the larger types of ships and of the guns which they carry, and they still press for the abolition of the submarine..."

Clearly we shall none of us get exactly what we want, but the essential is that we should agree during this Conference on certain limitations which, while giving each Power such latitude as it may reasonably claim for the fulfilment of its own particular needs, nevertheless relieve the public mind of the threat of a general race in naval armaments...

If it proves impossible to obtain agreement for the abolition of submarines, it is of vital importance to reach an agreement which will prevent their misuse.

Part IV. of the London Naval Treaty laid down rules for the treatment of merchant ships by submarines in time of war. These rules are already in force between the United States, Japan, and the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But I am glad to be able to announce, as a result of the preliminary talks with representatives of other nations, that, once these rules have been incorporated in an instrument which will be distinct from the London Naval Treaty, the French and Italian Governments, who were unable to ratify the London Treaty as a whole, will be in a position definitely to accept such an instrument. We hope that this will be the signal for the acceptance of these rules by all the maritime Powers of the world, and that, by this means, unrestricted submarine warfare may in future be averted...

I am convinced that, if all the countries here represented will be prepared to yield a little of their maximum demands for the sake of the general good, an agreement should be possible between us which will not only permit a reduction to be made in the total tonnages of naval armaments throughout the world, but will also add to the general sense of world security. Our responsibility will be all the greater in that the hope of agreement with the naval Powers not here represented must necessarily depend on the result of our labours."

Mr. Norman Davis, the American representative, read firstly a letter, dated October 5th, 1934, in which President Roosevelt had set out the fundamental attitude of the United States towards the naval question, which was to be, to a certain extent, the guiding line for the American delegation in the preliminary conversations then held. It was stated in that letter: "I ask you, therefore, at the first opportunity to propose to the British and Japanese a substantial proportional reduction in the present naval levels. I suggest a total tonnage reduction of 20 per Cent below existing treaty tonnage. If it is not possible to agree on this percentage, please seek from the British and Japanese a lesser reduction—15 per Cent, or 10 per Cent, or 5 per Cent reduction..."

Only if all else fails you should seek to secure agreement providing for the maintenance and extension of existing treaties over as long a period as possible."

In the course of his own speech Mr. Norman Davis said: "On behalf of my Government I declare emphatically that the United States will not take the initiative in naval competition. We want no naval increase. We want limitation and reduction. Our present building programme, which is essentially one of replacement, is consistent with this desire. For 10 years we ceased naval construction. Under our present plans the strengths allotted to us by the London Treaty as at the end of 1936 will not be attained until 1942."

Monsieur Corbin, the French Ambassador, thereupon stated: "France has never ceased to show herself in favour of seeking a mutual arrangement for the general limitation of all armaments... The French Delegates will, therefore, continue now, as in the past, to co-operate loyally in every discussion of the different aspects of the naval problem..."

In accordance with the wish many times expressed by the French Parliament, they will, however, have to take fully into account the obligations falling upon their country as a result of its imperial responsibilities throughout the world, which cover an exceptionally extended seaboard and involve considerable distances...

In regard to the qualitative position France, as heretofore, advocates the acceptance of drastic limitation, and even a more considerable reduction of the maximum tonnages and gun calibres fixed by treaty.

From the quantitative point of view events have, on the contrary, shown that the problem of the limitation of naval armaments was much more complicated. It arouses legitimate anxiety. Because of the principle of interdependence which France has always upheld, it cannot be studied without raising the general problem of the three categories of armaments. Finally, its solution calls for the maintenance of reciprocal confidence, which is the first condition of general security...

In any case, it is necessary to take into account new factors, which make the present circumstances very different from those which existed when the previous Naval Conferences met and prevent us from binding ourselves except for a short period."

After brief statements had been made by Signor Grandi, the Italian Ambassador, and by the representatives of Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa, **the leader of the Japanese Delegation, Admiral Nagano**, thus specified the attitude of his country: "The object of this Conference, we under-

stand, is to conclude a new comprehensive treaty of naval disarmament with a view to regulating the naval strengths of the Powers concerned from the year 1937. Such a treaty, in the view of the Japanese Government, should be based upon the fundamental idea of setting up, among the great naval Powers of the world, a common limit of naval armaments to be fixed as low as possible, which they shall not be allowed to exceed; simultaneously, offensive forces must be drastically reduced and ample defensive forces provided, so as to bring about a substantial measure of disarmament, thus securing a state of non-menace and non-aggression among the Powers."

During the same evening Admiral Nagano supplemented these declarations in a statement to representatives of the press, in the course of which he said: "We aim at restoring the principles of non-menace and non-aggression among the Great Powers by the reduction, on as extensive a scale as possible, of the burdens raised by the race of armaments. We propose, therefore, as a premise, a common maximum limit of naval armaments among the main maritime Powers, because my Government is absolutely convinced that only the abandonment of the old system of ratios and the recognition of equality in the national defence of each country permits the hope that a just and appropriate treaty will be concluded. This common maximum limit must of course be on the lowest possible level if an effective disarmament is to be achieved.

We demand furthermore the complete abolition or a radical reduction of all ships of an offensive nature, such as aircraft-carriers, ships of the line (battleships) and class A cruisers, in order to avert the possibilities of attack.

In regard to the defensive units, such as the class B cruisers, the torpedo boats and the submarines, we are of the opinion that each nation should be free to organise its defence in a satisfactory manner by maintaining the units that best fulfil these requirements. On that account it is clear that we can never assent to the abolition of submarines."

* * *

In the circumstances described it was not surprising that the material result of the Conference was very inconsiderable. Japan withdrew early from the Conference, namely, on January 15th, 1936, when her proposals were rejected by the other Powers, though two observers remained in London. On February 27th the Italian deputation announced that its Government was not prepared, in the existing circumstances, to place its signature under the Treaty, but the delegation continued to take part in the discussions until the Treaty was signed. **Only the United States of America, England, and France were thus signatories of the Naval Treaty concluded on March 25th, 1936, for six years.**

It was, however, tacitly assumed that Italy also would join the Treaty at a later date. Furthermore, it was understood that the Treaty was to be supplemented by bi-lateral agreements on the part of Germany and Russia with England. The new Treaty differs from former naval treaties in particular in that it contains no quantitative restrictions. On the other hand, it prescribes limits of cost in the various classes of ships the cost of which had been limited hitherto by the Washington and London Treaties. The provisions, finally, are important that require the building programmes to be communicated annually in advance; by this means the possibilities of surprises in naval armaments being sprung are avoided.

The provisions in **Article XIX of the Washington Treaty** relating to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific Ocean were discussed in the early stages of the Conference, but they were undoubtedly not referred to later. The proposal made shortly afterwards by England that the validity of the article should be upheld in the future was not accepted. The restricting provisions of this article thus also become inoperative as from January 1st, 1937. The countries bordering on the Pacific began to manifest, even before the end of the naval treaties, a keen interest in having bases for all eventualities. Japan, for example, had long been suspected by the United States, by Australia, and by New Zealand of fortifying former German islands that she held as mandates. The Japanese authorities have always denied that they had any such intention, but it may certainly be assumed that besides constructing naval bases at points under no restrictions, Japan has made all preparations to materialise at any moment the line of bases across the western Pacific that is already indicated. At any rate, the news circulated by the press at the end of March, 1936, that England was intending to fortify Hongkong has since then been confirmed.

Article XVIII also of the Washington Treaty, that forbids the transfer by the signatories of a war-ship under conditions that enable it to become a war-ship in the fleet of any other power, is now invalid, and will, it may be presumed, render good service to the smaller powers that are already beginning to arm feverishly.

On the other hand, no notice has as yet been given of an intention to terminate either the **Four Power Pact of December**

13th, 1921, that guarantees mutually the possession of islands in the Pacific Ocean, or the **Nine Power Treaty** concerning the maintenance of the open door in China. The importance of the latter Treaty has, however, been considerably impaired by the Japanese advance on Chinese territory, and also by the Japanese claim to have the exclusive right of determination in the Far East, and especially in China.

Sir Samuel Hoare referred, in the sitting of the House of Commons on March 11th, 1937, that has already been mentioned, to the importance of the Treaty of March 25th, 1936, in the following words:

"Lastly, there were the negotiations which led up to the treaty of 1936. The treaty had not yet been ratified by the British Government. He hoped, however, that enough naval Powers would ratify it to enable him to bring it to Parliament and to obtain Parliamentary approval for it. It was very easy to underrate the importance of the 1936 treaty. It was quite true that it failed to make a quantitative restriction. None the less, there were two kinds of race in armaments, one quantitative and the other qualitative, and looking back at past history, it was qualitative restriction that had been the most important. What had led to races in naval armaments in the past had been, in many cases, not so much the building of numbers of ships as the building of new types of ships that had suddenly, almost in a few moments, put out of date the existing fleets and involved all the other naval Powers in huge programmes of new expenditure. A satisfactory part of the 1936 treaty was that it brought about, if it were ratified by the naval Powers, a definite qualitative limitation. He was inclined to think that the more the naval Powers of the world studied it the more they would find that it was a most useful instrument for preventing an unnecessary race in great types and great sizes of ships in the future."

* * *

Although the new Naval Treaty, as far as its material result is concerned, falls considerably short of its two predecessors, it is hardly less important from the political standpoint. Like its two predecessors it exerts an influence, though to a lesser extent, on the building up of the naval force of the greater maritime Powers, and is thus an important factor in the distribution of strength in international politics. The Treaty shows also the change that the political views of the nations have undergone in the armament question. Almost all refuse to have their position in the play of political forces assigned for them by treaty obligations; all wish to retain a free hand. The nations agree merely on certain rules of the game. All have recognised the fact that the political development of the world does not remain stationary, and that each nation must itself determine what measure of armaments is necessary for the defence of its vital interests. The year 1936 thus provided all the maritime Powers with programmes for the building of warships that were very much augmented in comparison with those of previous years, though in view of the still existing obligations the programmes could in most cases be carried into effect only after January 1st, 1937.

* * *

Moreover, all depends of course on the coming into force of the Treaty, which is to take place when the other great naval powers—Italy, Germany, Russia, and especially also Japan—are included in it. The latest news indicate, however, that it is very doubtful if the last-named country will join the Treaty, and the negotiations that England has hitherto conducted with the Soviet Union are hardly likely to facilitate the entry of Germany, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries. Italy has, as a sequel to the Mediterranean Agreement of January 14th, 1937, with England, signed the Treaty.

In reply to a question from the British Government whether Japan would sign the naval treaty the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sato, communicated to Sir Robert Clive, the British Ambassador in Tokio, on March 28th, the **decision of the Japanese Government** concerning its choice of the gun calibre for large battleships. According to this communication "the Japanese Government sees no reason for altering its view as declared in the London Naval Conference, namely, that it cannot accept a qualitative limitation of new ships without a simultaneous quantitative limitation. It regrets, therefore, that it must inform the British Government that it cannot agree to the proposal to restrict the calibre of battleships to 35.6 without a simultaneous quantitative limitation."

It is thus perfectly clear that this attitude on the part of Japan may have consequences whose importance it is difficult to estimate, especially if the Japanese should, for example, not only retain the battleship calibre of 40.6 cm., but also possibly increase the size of their line-of-battleships over 35,000 tons. It is a moot question whether England would then follow the Japanese in this path, and it may be assumed, from Sir Samuel Hoare's latest observations in the matter, that she will not do so for the present,

for according to Sir Samuel Hoare England will not overstep the limits set down in the new naval treaty. The Americans, on the other hand, confront such possibilities of development in a very different manner, and have already intimated that they would set up against the Japanese new constructions ships not only on an equality with them in every respect, but even superior to them. A certain limit is, of course, placed on such new constructions by the dimensions of the Panama Canal, for it was purely on this account that the maximum tonnage was fixed at 35,000 in the former treaties.

If an agreement is not arrived at with Japan in the course of fresh negotiations that will, it may be presumed, be initiated by England, the world may soon be faced with the grotesque fact that a dispute over an increase of 5 cm. in the calibre of ships' guns has been the occasion of renewed competitive armament by the naval powers and of new conflicts.

Before the armaments of the individual Powers are dealt with a brief comparison is set forth underneath between the provisions of the new London Treaty that directly affect the building policy and those of the treaties expiring on December 31st, 1936.

Comparison

between the most important Provisions of the Treaties of Washington and London 1930 and those of the London Treaty of 1936.

Washington and London Treaties of 1930, valid until December 31st 1936	Treaty of London 1936, valid from January 1st 1937 to December 31st 1942
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Limitation of the Total Tonnage and of the Number of Ships of the Separate Classes (Quantitative Limitation)

A. Battleships

When the Treaty provisions have been completely carried out the maximum permitted is:

U. S. A.	525,000 tons
United Kingdom	525,000 "
Japan	315,000 "
France	175,000 "
Italy	175,000 "

Maximum number for:

U. S. A.	15 ships
United Kingdom	15 ships
Japan	9 ships

France and Italy have exclusively the right to deal at will with the proportion of battleship tonnage allotted to them, with the restriction that the qualitative provisions of the Treaty must be observed.

The carrying out of the Treaty provisions was arranged in Washington in such a manner that in the first place a greater number and a higher maximum tonnage could be obtained. England was permitted to start building two ships in 1922, France and Italy were to build each 35,000 tons in 1927 and in 1929. From 1931 all the signatories of the Treaty might begin replacement building systematically and at a specified rate. Old ships were to be scrapped as these new ones were ready, so that the Treaty provisions should be carried out completely by 1942.

In the London Treaty of 1930 U. S. A., England and Japan agreed not to build for replacement between 1931 and 1936, and so many older ships were scrapped by those countries that the numbers fixed as ultimate aim were attained by 1932.

No limitation whatever.

There exists, however, an understanding between U. S. A. and England, though without arrangement by treaty, that the ratio of strength for U. S. A. : England : Japan shall be maintained at 5 : 5 : 3.

Washington and London Treaties of 1930, valid until December 31st 1936

Treaty of London 1936, valid from January 1st 1937 to December 31st 1942

B. Aircraft-carriers

The total tonnage permitted to:	No limitations.
U. S. A. is 135,000	
United Kingdom . . . 135,000	
Japan 81,000	
France 60,000	
Italy 60,000	

C. Cruisers

Maximum tonnage permitted to:	
U. S. A.:	
Cruisers class A, with a gun calibre of more than 15.5 cm.	180,000
Cruisers class B, with a gun calibre of 15.5 cm. or less	143,500
Total	323,500

United Kingdom:	
Cruisers class A . . .	146,800
Cruisers class B . . .	192,200
Total	339,000

Japan:	
Cruisers class A . . .	108,400
Cruisers class B . . .	100,450
Total	208,850

The number of heavy cruisers from this tonnage may not exceed for:

U. S. A.	18
England	15
Japan	12

In this case also there were transition provisions. England, for example, was permitted to retain the four cruisers of the "Hawkins" class, with 19 cm. guns, independently of the stipulated number of 15 heavy cruisers, until 1936.

No limitation.

There exists, however, a tacit agreement between U. S. A. and England that the former will observe the building pause for heavy cruisers and for light cruisers over 8000 tons only as long as England does not increase the number of her cruisers beyond 70.

D. Destroyers

Maximum tonnage permitted to:	No limitation whatever.
U. S. A.	150,000
United Kingdom . . .	150,000
Japan	105,000

Not more than 16% of this tonnage may be used for destroyers over 1500 tons.

10% of the tonnage stipulated for destroyers may be used for B cruisers instead of for destroyers. On the other hand, 10% of the stipulated B cruiser tonnage may be transferred to destroyer tonnage.

E. Submarines

Maximum tonnage permitted to:	No limitation whatever.
U. S. A.	52,700
United Kingdom . . .	52,700
Japan	52,700

Washington and London Treaties of 1930, valid until December 31st 1936

Treaty of London 1936, valid from January 1st 1937 to December 31st 1942

Qualities of the individual Ship of the various Types in Respect of Displacement and Gun Calibre

(Qualitative Limitation)

A. Battleships

Maximum tonnage permitted	35 000
Largest gun calibre permitted	40.6 cm.

Two classes of battleship:

Class A:	
Maximum size . . .	35,000 tons
Maximum size . . .	17,500 tons
Largest gun calibre permitted	35.6 cm.

If one of the signatory powers of the Washington Treaty does not agree to this calibre by April 1st 1937 the largest admissible calibre remains 40.6 cm.

Smallest gun calibre permitted	25.4 cm.
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Classe B:	
Maximum size . . .	8000 tons
Calibre limitations as in Class A.	

Building restriction for the zone between 17,500 and 8000 tons and the minimum calibre of 25.4 cm. to hold good for six years.

B. Aircraft-carriers

Maximum size permitted for new constructions . . .	27,000 tons
Maximum gun calibre permitted for ships of more than 10,000 tons . . .	20.3 cm.
for ships of less than 10,000 tons . . .	15.5 cm.
Maximum size permitted for new constructions . . .	23,000 tons
Maximum gun calibre permitted . . .	15.5 cm.

C. and D. Cruisers and Destroyers

A Cruisers:	
Maximum size permitted	10,000 tons
Maximum gun calibre permitted	20.3 cm.
B Cruisers:	
Maximum size permitted	10,000 tons
Maximum gun calibre permitted	15.2 cm.
Destroyers:	
Maximum size permitted	1850 tons
Maximum gun calibre permitted	13 cm.

The class of **light surface vessels** was created. It comprises surface war vessels with the exception of aircraft-carriers, small war vessels (s. and F.), or auxiliary vessels (s. and G.) with a displacement of between 100 and 10,000 tons carrying no gun with a greater calibre than 20.3 cm.

This class comprises three sub-classes:

Sub - class A: Vessels with a greater gun calibre than 15.5 cm.

Sub - class B: Vessels of more than 3000 tons, with guns whose largest calibre is 15.5 cm.

Sub - class C: Vessels of less than 3000 tons, with guns whose largest calibre is 15.5 cm.

A **building pause of six years** was agreed upon for all vessels belonging to sub-class A, and for vessels in sub-class B whose displacement is over 8000 tons.

Washington and London Treaties of 1930, valid until December 31st 1936

Treaty of London 1936, valid from January 1st 1937 to December 31st 1942

E. Submarines

Maximum size permitted 2000 tons
Maximum gun calibre permitted 13 cm.
Each of the three signatory powers might build three boats.

Maximum size permitted 2000 tons
Maximum gun calibre permitted 13 cm.

F. Small War-craft

No limitation is placed on surface fighting vessels of between 600 and 2000 tons, if

- a) they carry no larger calibre than 15.5 cm.,
- b) they carry not more than four guns with over 7.6 cm. calibre,
- c) they possess no torpedo armament,
- d) their speed does not exceed 20 knots.

Permissible **small war-craft** are surface war-craft, with the exception of auxiliary craft (s. and G.), with a displacement of between 100 and 2000 tons, that

- a) carry no greater calibre than 15.5 cm.,
- b) that have no torpedo armament,
- c) attain a speed of not more than 20 knots.

G. Auxiliary Craft

Surface craft in the navy that are not built as fighting ships and will not be used for fighting purposes, are subjected to no limitations, if

- a) they carry no gun with a calibre exceeding 15.5 cm.,
- b) they carry no more than four guns with a calibre exceeding 7.6 cm.,
- c) they have no torpedo armament,
- d) their speed does not exceed 20 knots,
- e) they are not armour-clad,
- f) they are not built as mine-layers,
- g) they are not equipped for air-craft to be landed on them,
- h) they have not more than one catapult for air-craft in the line of the ship, or one at each side,
- i) they are able, with any means whatever, to put not more than three air-craft in activity at sea.

Admissible **auxiliary craft** are naval surface vessels with displacement over 100 tons that are normally not used as fighting ships, and are not built as such, when

- a) they carry no gun with greater calibre than 15.5 cm.,
- b) they carry not more than eight guns with greater calibre than 7.6 cm.,
- c) they have no torpedo armament,
- d) they are not armour-clad,
- e) their speed does not exceed 28 knots,
- f) they are not primarily equipped to be used by air-craft at sea,
- g) they carry not more than two catapults for air-craft.

H. Small Vessels

Surface fighting ships of the navy with displacement less than 600 tons are subjected to no limitation.

Admissible **small vessels** are surface naval vessels with displacement less than 100 tons. They are subjected to no limitation.

Washington and London Treaties of 1930, valid until December 31st 1936

Treaty of London 1936, valid from January 1st 1937 to December 31st 1942

Age Limits

Vessels of the following types are regarded as being superannuated when the number of years given in the same line with them have elapsed since their completion:

- | | |
|--|--|
| a) Battleships 20 years | a) Battleships 26 years |
| b) Aircraft-carriers 20 " | b) Aircraft-carriers 20 " |
| c) Ships between 3000 and 10,000 tons | c) Light surface vessels of sub-classes A and B |
| I) when laid down before January 1st 1920 16 " | I) when laid down before January 1st 1920 16 " |
| II) when laid down after December 31st 1919 20 " | II) when laid down after December 31st 1919 20 " |
| d) Ships of less than 3000 tons | d) Light surface vessels of sub-class C 16 " |
| I) when laid down before January 1st 1920 12 " | e) Submarines 13 " |
| II) when laid down after December 31st 1919 16 " | |
| e) Submarines 13 " | |

Security Clauses

a) In regard to the number of battleships and of aircraft-carriers and in regard to the qualitative restrictions for cruisers:

If one of the signatory powers considers that altered circumstances compel it to deviate from the provisions set down, a conference on the matter must be summoned.

b) In regard to the other limitations:

If the security of one of the Treaty powers is, in its opinion, impaired by new constructions by a power that did not sign the Treaty, it may increase its total tonnage. The other signatory powers will, however, thereby be entitled on their part to take measures to increase their tonnage to the same extent in the same types of vessel.

Deviation from the regulation is permitted in case of unforeseen entanglement in war, and in the case that powers which did not sign the Treaty build ships immoderately.

Validity

The provisions concerning battleships and aircraft carriers and the qualitative provisions concerning cruisers are valid only for France and Italy. All the provisions are valid for U.S.A., United Kingdom, and Japan.

The Treaty is valid provisionally only for U.S.A., England, and France.

The fastest




The American destroyer "Aylwin"

Launch: 1935/36
 Displacement: 1356 tons
 Engine power: 41,000 HP
 Speed: 36.5 knots
 Range: 6000 seamiles
 Armament: five 12.7 cm. anti-aircraft, four 1 cm. anti-aircraft and 8 machine guns, eight 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes

The French torpedo cruiser "Le Fantasque"

Launch: 1933/34
 Displacement: 2569 tons
 Engine power: 74,000 to 100,000 HP
 Speed: 37 to 45.2 knots
 Range: 2500 seamiles
 Armament:
 five 13.8 cm. guns,
 four 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns,
 nine 55 cm. torpedo tubes
 4 bomb-throwers



The Italian large destroyer "Antonio Pigafetta"

Launch: 1928—30
 Displacement: 1628 tons
 Engine power: 50,000—71,000 HP
 Speed: 38—44 knots
 Armament: six 12 cm. guns,
 four 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft and
 8 machine guns,
 six 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes,
 50 mines on board

The Japanese destroyer of the first class "Amagiri"

Launch: 1929—31
 Displacement: 1700 tons
 Engine power: 40,000—50,000 HP
 Speed: 34 knots
 Range: 4000 seamiles
 Armament: six 12.7 cm. guns,
 4 machine guns,
 nine 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes



The English flotilla-leader "Hardy"

Launch: 1936
 Displacement: 1455 tons
 Speed: 36 knots
 Armament: five 12 cm. guns,
 7 machine guns,
 eight 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes

The French cruiser "Emile Bertin"

Launch: 1933
 Displacement: 5886 tons
 Engine power: 102,000—123,000 HP
 Speed: 34—39.8 knots
 Range: 6000 seamiles
 Armament: nine 15.2 cm. guns,
 four 9 cm. anti-aircraft,
 eight 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft and
 8 machine guns,
 six 55 cm. torpedo tubes,
 2 aircraft and 200 mines on board



Battle Ships in the World

The English flotilla-leader "Codrington"

Launch: 1929
Displacement: 1540 tons
Engine power: 39,000 HP
Speed: 35—38 knots
Range: 5900 seamiles
Armament: five 12 cm. guns,
7 machine guns,
eight 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes



The French heavy cruiser "Gloire"

Launch: 1935
Displacement: 7729 tons
Speed: 32.5 knots
Armament: nine 15.5 cm. guns,
eight 9 cm. and eight 3.7 cm.
anti-aircraft guns, and
8 machine guns



The English destroyer "Hyperion"

Launch: 1936
Displacement: 1350 tons
Engine power: 34,000 HP
Speed: 35.5 knots
Range: 6000 seamiles
Armament: four 12 cm. guns,
7 machine guns,
eight 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes




The Italian light cruiser "Armando Diaz"

Launch: 1932
Displacement: 5008 tons
Speed: 37—40.7 knots
Armament: eight 5.2 cm. guns,
six 10 cm. and eight 3.7 cm.
anti-aircraft, and 8 machine guns,
six 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes,
mines, 2 aircraft on board

The American light cruiser "Marblehead"

Launch: 1923
Displacement: 7050 tons
Engine power: 90,000—105,000 HP
Speed: 34.8 knots
Range: 10,000 seamiles
Armament: eleven 15.2 cm. guns,
four 7.6 cm. anti-aircraft,
two 4.7 cm. anti-aircraft,
four 1 cm. anti-aircraft guns,
six 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes,
3 aircraft on board, and 30 mines



The Armaments of the Individual Maritime Powers

A. List of the Fighting Ships of the leading maritime Powers already in Commission and under Construction at the End of the Year 1936, or sanctioned for this Year

A number of out-of-date ships, that are still included in the navy lists as fighting ships, but which, owing to inadequate fighting value, can no longer fulfil their purpose, and are used only as training and experimental ships or for special purposes, are omitted from the following classification.

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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United Kingdom

(Position on February 1st, 1937)

Battleships

a) Ready

5	31,100	8/38	25	1915/16	
5	29,150	8/38	22	1916/17	
2	32,000	6/38	31.5	1916	
1	42,100	8/38	31	1920	
2	33,500-33,900	9/40.6	23.5	1927	
15	474,750	total			

b) Building

2	35,000	12/35.6	30	beginning 1940	
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Monitors

a) Ready

1	6,400	2/38.1	6.6	1915	
2	7,200	2/38.1	12	1916	
3	20,800	total			

b) Building (none)

Aircraft-Carriers

a) Ready

2	22,500	14/12	31	1917	52 planes
1	22,450	10/14	31	1917	36 "
1	14,450	6/10.2	20	1918	20 "
1	22,600	9/15.2	24	1924	21 "
1	10,850	6/14	25	1924	20 "
6	115,850	total			

b) Building and Sanctioned

1	22,600	5/12.7	30	1938	70 planes
2	23,000	?	30	1939	70 "
3	68,600	total			

Flying-boat Carriers

a) Ready

1	6,900	MG.	11	1914	
1	4,800	4/12	20	1929	9 planes
2	11,700	total			

b) Building (none)

Heavy Cruisers

a) Ready

13	9,730-9,900	8/20.3	31.5-32.2	1928-30	
2	8,250-8,390	6/20.3	32 -32.2	1930/31	
15	143,970	total			

b) Building (none)

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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Light Cruisers

a) Ready

11	4,180-4,290	5/15.2	29	1917-22	
2	4,290	8/10.2	29	1917/18	Anti-aircraft cruiser
8	4,850	6/15.2	29	1918-22	
1	5,100	9/15.2	25.5	1922	
1	6,740	4/12	27.7	1927	Mine cruiser
2	7,550-7,580	7/15.2	33	1926	
4*)	9,770-9,996	7/19	29.5-30.5	1918-25	
8	6,830-7,140	8/15.2	32.5	1933-36	
3	5,200-5,220	6/15.2	32.2	1935/36	
40	231,766	total			

*) Including one training ship for cadets.

b) Building and Sanctioned.

1	5,200	6/15.2	32.2	1937	
10	9,000	12/15.2	32.5	1937/38	
5	5,300		?	1939	
16	127,700	total			

Destroyers

a) Ready

12	900-905	3/10.2	36	1916-22	
40	1,090-1,100	4/10.2	34	1917/18	
10	1,480-1,530	5/12	36-36.5	1918-21	
14	1,120	4/12	34	1919-24	
4	1,120	4/10.2	35	1918	
2	1,140	4/12	35	1920-24	
2	1,170-1,350	4/12	37	1926	
1	1,540	5/12	35	1930	
62	1,337-1,375	4/12	35-35.5	1930-36	
3	1,390-1,400	4/12	35-35.5	1931-33	
4	1,460-1,475	5/12	36	1934-36	
154	190,589	total			

b) Building and Sanctioned

8	1,350	4/12	35.5	1937	
1	1,475	5/12	36	1937	
8	1,650	6/12	36	1938	
16	1,850	7/12	?	1938	
33	55,075	(total)			

Submarines

a) Ready

9	410	1 MG.	13 10.5	1918-20	
9	760-845	1/10.2	17.5 10.5	1919-26	
3	1,311-1,350	1/10.2	15 9	1927	
15	1,475	1/10.2	17.5 9	1929-31	
4	640	1/7.6	13.7 10	1932/33	
3	1,500-1,520	1/10.2	15 8.7	1933-36	Submarine Mine Boats (120 mines)
6	670	1/7.6	13.7 10	1934-36	
3	1,805-1,850	1/10.2	22.5 10	1932-35	
52	53,719	total			

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
b) Building					
2	670	1/7.6	$\frac{13.7}{10}$	1937	
5	1100	?	?	—	
2	1520	1/10.2	$\frac{15}{8.7}$	1937	
3	540	?	?	—	
12	11 500	total			

Small Fighting Ships

Mine-layers	4 (and 1 more building)
Mine-sweepers	24
Gunboats	47 (" 12 " ")
River gunboats	18 (" 1 " ")
Guardboats and Tenders (fishing-boats)	55
Torpedo motorboats	13 (" 6 " ")

Naval Aircraft

7 Fighting Flights with	56 planes
12 Reconnaissance Flights with	89 "
3 Torpedo and Bombing Flights with	36 "
8 Flying-boat flights with	36 flying boats
2 Squadrons of coast torpedo aircraft with.	24 aircraft
Total 241 aircraft	

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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U. S. A.

Battleships

a) Ready

1	26,100	12/30.5	20.9	1912	
11	27,000-33,400	10-12/35.6	19.8-22	1914-21	
3	31,500-32,500	8/40.6	20.6-21.1	1921-23	
15	490,500	total			

b) Building (none)

(2 of 35 000 tons have been sanctioned, however, and will be laid down in the summer 1937.)

Aircraft Carriers

a) Ready

2	33,000	8/20.3	33.9-34.2	1927	135 planes
1	14,500	9/12.7	29.2 30.3	1934	79 "
3	80,500	total			

b) Building

2	19,900	?/12.7	34	1937	108 planes
1	14,500	—	—	1938	
3	34,400	total			

Flyingboat Carriers

a) Ready

1	11,500	4/12.7	14.5	1913	34 planes
1	9,553	2/12.7	15	1921	32 "
2	21,053	total			

b) Building (none)

Heavy Cruisers

a) Ready

17	9,000-10,000	9-10/20.3	32.7	1929-36	
17	159,775	total			

b) Building

2	10,000	?/20.3	—	1937/38	
2	20,000	total			

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
Light Cruisers					
a) Ready					
10	7,050	10-12/15.2	33.7-34.8	1923-25	
10	70,500	total			
b) Building					
7	10,000	15/15.2	32.7	1937	
2	8,550	?/15.2	—	1939	
9	87,100	total			

Destroyers

a) Ready

7	910-1,020	4/10.2	29.5-32	1916/17	
79	1,060-1,090	4/10.2	35	1918-20	
5	1,190	4/12.7	35	1920	
83	1,190	4/10.2	35	1919-22	
8	1,345-1,410	5/12.7	36.5	1934/35	
14	1,500	5/12.7	36.5	1936	
7	1,850	8/12.7	37	1936	
203	241,765	total			

b) Building

26	1,500	?/12.7	36.5	1937/38	
6	1,850	?/12.7	37	1937/38	
12	1,500	—	—	1938/39	
44	68,100	total			

Submarines

a) Ready

28	480-530	1/7.6	$\frac{14}{10}$	1918/19	
37	790-800	1/10.2	$\frac{14}{10}$	1919-24	
1	1,000	1/10.2	$\frac{14.8}{11}$	1922	
6	850	1/10.2	$\frac{15}{11.4}$	1924/25	
3	2,000	1/12.7	$\frac{18}{11}$	1924-26	
3	2,710-2,730	2/15.2	$\frac{15-17}{8}$	1928-30	
1	1,540	1/10.2	$\frac{17}{8}$	1932	
2	1,110-1,120	1/7.6	$\frac{17}{8}$	1933/34	
5	1,290-1,330	1/7.6	$\frac{17}{8}$	1935/36	
86	74,460	total			

b) Building

5	1 330	1/7.6	$\frac{17}{8}$	1937	
12	1 450	—	—	1937/38	
17	24 050	total			

Small Fighting Ships

Mine-layers	14
Mine Sweepers	43
Gunboats	13
Guard and Patrol Vessels	254

Naval Aircraft

6 Fighting Flights with	113 planes
6 Bombing Flights with	98 "
13 Long Distance Reconnaissance Flights with	96 "
11 Reconnaissance Flights with	160 "
1 Torpedo Flight with	18 "
7 Observation Flights with	75 "
Traffic, experimental, and Training Services with	410 "
For Naval Reserve	151 "
Reserve Planes	285 "

Total on July 1st, 1936, 1406 planes

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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Japan

Battleships

a) Ready

3	29,330	8/35.6	26	1913-16	
4	29,330-29,990	12/35.6	22.5-23	1915-18	
2	32,720	8/40.6	26	1920/21	
9	272,070	total			

b) Building (none)

Aircraft-Carriers

a) Ready

1	7,470	4/14	25	1922	26 planes
1	26,000	10/20.3	23	1928	80 "
1	26,000	10/20.3	28.5	1927	60 "
1	7,100	12/12.7	25	1933	40 "
4	66,570	total			

b) Building

2	10,050	12/12.7	30	1937/38	40 planes
2	20,100	total			

Flyingboat Carriers

a) Ready

1	14,050	2/12	12	1920	
1	17,000	2/14	14	1922	
2	31,050	total			

b) Building

3	9,000	—	—	1937/38	
3	27,000	total			

Heavy Cruisers

a) Ready

4	7,100	6/20.3	33	1926/27	
4	10,000	10/20.3	33	1928/29	
4	9,850	10/20.3	33	1930-32	
12	107,800	total			

b) Building (none)

Light Cruisers

a) Ready

2	4,400	8/15.2	26	1912	
2	3,230	4/14	31	1919	
1	2,890	6/14	33	1923	
14	5,100-5,195	7/14	33	1920-25	
3	8,500	15/15.5	33	1935/36	
22	115,755	total			

b) Building

3	8,500	15/15.5	33	1937/38	
3	25,500	total			

Destroyers and Torpedo Boats

a) Ready

I. Destroyers

30	755-820	3/12	31.5	1916-24	
36	1,215-1,315	4/12	34	1920-27	
23	1,700	6/12.7	34	1928-33	
10	1,368	5/12.7	34	1933-36	

II. Torpedo Boats

4	527	3/12	26	1933	
4	595	3/12	28	1936	
107	126,093	total			

b) Building

I. Destroyers

6	1,368	5/12.7	34	1937	
10	1,368	—	35	1937/38	

II. Torpedo Boats

12	595	—	28	1937/38	
28	29,028	total			

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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Submarines

a) Ready

7	735-746	1/7.6	$\frac{16}{10}$	1921-24	
2	1,390	1/12	$\frac{17-19}{9}$	1924/25	
4	655	1/12	$\frac{13}{10}$	1923-27	
17	889-988	1/7.6	$\frac{16-17}{10}$	1920-27	
4	1,142	1/14	$\frac{14}{9.5}$	1927/28	
15	1,635-1,638	1/12*)	$\frac{19}{9-10}$	1927-32	*) 3 Boats 1/10.2 cm.
6	1,400	1/12	$\frac{20}{9}$	1935/36	
7	1,950-1,955	1-2/12.7	$\frac{17}{9}$	1926-36	
2	700	1/7.6	16	1935/36	
64	79,184	total			

b) Building

2	1,400	1/12	$\frac{20}{9}$	1937	
1	1,950	2/12.7	$\frac{17}{9}$	1937	
3	4,750	total			

Small Fighting Ships

Mine-layers 22 (and one more building)
 Mine-sweepers 16
 Gunboats 10
 Guard and patrol vessels 3

Naval Aircraft

33 Flights with about 1000 planes.

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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France

Battleships

a) Ready

1	26,500	8/33	31	1937	
3	22,189	12/30.5	20	1913/14	
3	22,189	8-10/34	23	1915/16	
1	17,597	4-30/5	19	1911	
8	177,231	total			

b) Building

1	26,500	8/33	31	1937/38	
2	35,000	8/38	30	1939-41	
3	96,500	total			

Aircraft-Carriers

a) Ready

1	22,146	8/15.5	21.5	1928	40 planes
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b) Building (none)


Flying-boat Carriers

a) Ready


1	10,000	12/10 anti-aircraft	21.4	1932	26 planes
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b) Building (none)

Gun Towers




33.5 cm. guns of the French line-of-battle ship "Bretagne"




35.6 cm. guns of the American line-of-battle ship "Tennessee"




Battery of medium calibre guns with anti-aircraft gun on the English battleship "Nelson"




Stern 15,5 cm. twin towers of the French cruiser "Duguay-Trouin"



35.6 cm. guns on the Japanese battle-cruiser "Kongo"




40.6 cm. guns of the English warship "Rodney"




Picture of a mo Naval B

1. Attack in clear weather. — 2. Attack in partially cloudy weather. — 3. Att
in chess-board form. — 6. Attack by a torpedo aircraft in a str


I. Aircraft producing fog. — II. Destroyers turning under the protection of a wall
turning as an evading manoeuvre. — V. Defence against aircraft from a battlesh
of a fl





cloudy weather. — 4. Scheme of an attack in group form. — 5. Bomb dropping
g. — 7. Movement of a camouflaged bomb attack on a large scale

— III. Bombers after the start from the aircraft-carrier. — IV. Line-of-battle ships
VI. Bomber. — VII. Full hit. — VIII. A mine-field explodes. — IX. Searchlights
warships



Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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Heavy Cruisers

a) Ready

7	10,000	8/20.3	31-36	1928-34	2 completely un-protected
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7	70,000	total			
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b) Building (none)

Light Cruisers

a) Ready

3	7,249	8/15.5	34	1926/27	
1	4,773	4/13.8	31.6	1931	Mine Cruiser
1	6,496	8/15.5	27.8	1931	Training Cruiser
1	5,886	9/15.2	39.8	1934	Mine Cruiser
3	7,600	9/15.2	32.5-35	1935/36	

9	61,702	total			
3	7,600	9/15.2	32.5	1937	
3	22,800	total			

Destroyers

a) Ready

1	802	3/10	33.4	1924	
12	1,319	4/13	33.5-34.1	1926-28	
6	2,126	5/13	35.5-36.7	1926/27	
14	1,378	4/13	33-36.4	1928-31	
18	2,436-2,441	5/13.8	36-43.3	1929-34	
6	2,569	5/13.8	37-45.2	1935	
1	787	2/10	30	1915	
3	915	4/10	25	1914	
5	608	2/10	34.5	1935/36	

66	114,572	total			
6	1,772	4/13.8	37	1937-39	
2	2,884	8/13.8	38	1927	
7	608	2/10	34.5	1937	

b) Building

15	20,656	total			
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Submarines

a) Ready

1	771	1/7.5	15.8	1914	
2	838-839	2/7.5	10.3	1919-24	
1	464	1/10.5	17	1919	
1	1,041	1/15	10.5	1918	Mine boat
2	744	1/10.5	12.7	1918	
1	842	1/7.5	8	1921	Mine boat
9	974	1/10	14.5	1926/27	
11	548-576	1/10	7.2	1927-30	
6	669	1/7.5	16	1930-36	Mine boats
9	571	1/7.5	10.5	1931-34	
5	565	1/7.5	16	1931-34	
2	558	1/7.5	9	1931/32	
1	2,880	2/20.3	14	1932	
28	1,379	1/10	9	1931-36	
4	597	1/7.5	18	1935/36	

83	78,162	total			
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Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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b) Building

1	803	—	—	1937	
2	1,379	1/10	—	1937	
1	1,100	—	—	1938	
2	597	—	—		
6	5,855	total			

Small Fighting Ships

Mine-layers	2
Mine-sweepers	16 (and 8 more building)
Gunboats	50
Guard and patrol vessels	27
Torpedo motorboats	9

Naval Aircraft

a) On Board:

Aircraft Carrier "Bearn"	40 (Land Planes)
Aeroplane supply-ship	
"Commandant Teste"	26 (Maritime Planes)
Other Vessels	55 (Maritime Planes)

Total . . . 121 Planes

b) Not on Board: 227 (Maritime Planes)

Grand Total . . . 348 Planes

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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Italy**Battleships**

a) Ready

2*)	23,622	10/32	27	1914/15	
2	21,555	13/30.5	22	1915	
4	90,354	total			

*) Only one of these two transformed ships is now ready.

b) Building

2	35,000	9/38.1	30	1938	
2	70,000	total			

Flying-boat Carriers

a) Ready

1	4,960	4/10.2	21.5	1925	20 planes
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b) Building (none)

Heavy Cruisers

a) Ready

10	10,000	8/20.3	32-38*	1929-33**)	
10	97,582	total			

*) In the case of the older ships less (21-22).

**) Three are older (1905-10).

b) Building (none)

Light Cruisers

a) Ready

3	3,182-3,838	7-8/15	21-27.5	1914/15	Formerly German
2	2,755	9/10	27	1914	Formerly Austrian
2	2,900-3,710	6-8/12	22-28.6	1912/13	
4	5,069	8/15.2	37-42	1930/31	
2	5,008	8/15.2	37-40	1930	
2	7,052	8/15.2	37-39.5	1935	
2	7,400	8/15.2	36.5-39	1935/36	

17	about 81,000	total			
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b) Building

2	8,000	10/15.2	35	1937	
2	16,000	total			

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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Destroyers

a) Ready

2	845	3/10.2	32	1915	Formerly German
1	744	3/12	32.5	1916	
1	803	3/10	25	1920	
1	1,528	4/15	33.7	1917	
2	1,383	8/10.2	35	1916/17	
2	1,285-1,407	4/12	36.5	1918-20	
8	862	4/10.2	32-33.5	1919-24	
3	1,528	8/12	33.5-35	1924	
24	935-1,219	4/12	35-38	1925-32	
12	1,628	6/12	38-44	1929-31	
4	1,449	4/12	38	1934	

60	72,771	total			
			b) Building		
4	1,498	4/12	39	1937	
4	5,992	total			

Torpedo Boats

a) Ready

5	542-561	5/10.2	30	1913/14	Formerly Austrian
1	628	7/10.2	31	1916	
4	561-595	2/10	30	1914-17	
2	616	5/12.2	30	1915	
10	616-670	6/10.2	30	1915-17	
12	635	3-4/10.2	32.2-32.6	1917-22	
16	638-652	3/10	34	1935/36	
50	about 32,000	total			

Submarines

a) Ready

8	336-338	1/7.6	10-13 6-10	1918	Submarine Mine Boats
2	779	2/7.6	14 10	1918/19	
18	770-815	1/10.2	16.5-17.5 8-9	1929-31	
2	803	2/10.2	14 8	1931	
5	1,340-1,369	1/12	17.5-18.3 9-10	1928/29	
29	561-664	1/10	14 8.5	1932-36	
6	863-880	1/10	17 8.5	1934/35	
4	1,330-1,371	2/10-12	15.5-17 8.5	1935/36	
74	about 55,000	total			
			b) Building		
10	664	1/10	14 8.5	1937/38	
2	1,109	1/10	16 8.7	1937	
2	656	1/10	—	1938	
14	about 10,000	total			

Small Fighting Ships

Mine-layers *) . **)
 Mine-sweepers 48*)
 Gunboats 24**) (and one more building)
 Guard and Patrol vessels . . . 1
 Torpedo motorboats 44 (and 12 more building)

*) 9 of these 48 mine-sweepers are equipped also as mine-layers.
 **) 7 of these 24 gunboats are equipped also as mine-layers

Naval Aircraft

Aircraft on board (reconnaissance and fighting flights) with 73 planes
 16 Coast reconnaissance flights with 144 "
 5 Coast fighting flights 60 "
 15 Torpedo and bomber flights 135 "
 Total 412 planes

Number	Dis- placement tons	Main Artillery cm.	Speed in sea-miles	Ready	Other Data
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Soviet Russia**Battleships**

a) Ready

3	23,016-23,606	12/30.5	23-24.6	1914	
3	69,878	total			

b) Building (none)

Heavy Cruisers

a) Ready

1	8,030	4/18	30	1931	
			b) Building		
4	—	(20.3) (?)	—	—	
4	—	total			

Light Cruisers

a) Ready

1	5,622	10/13	18	1903	
1	6,338	11/13	23	1904	
2	6,600-6,934	15/13	30	1927/28	
4	25,494	total			

b) Building (none)

Destroyers

a) Ready

5	1,300-1,323	4/10	25-26	1915-25	
10	1,150-1,417	4/10	28-32	1912-28	
2	1,354	5/10	28	1917-27	
2	3,000 (?)	5/13	42 (?)	1936	

19	about 27,845	total			
			b) Building		
6	3,000 (?)	5/13	42	—	
6	18,000	total			

Torpedo Boats

a) Ready

12	310-420	2/7.5	25	1903-07 1935/36	
5	710	3/10	25		
1	750	3/7.5	25		
12	700	2/10	29		
30	17,380	total			

b) Building (?)

Submarines

a) Ready

10	620	1-2/7.5	10-16 8	1916	Baltic and northern Arctic Ocean 71, Black Sea 30, Far East 50 boats
4	330	1/4.7	12 8	1918-23	
1	870	2/7.5	14 9	1918	
15	896	1/10.7	15 8	1930/31	
3	1,039	1/10.2	14 8.5	1933-35	
40	200	—	—	1935/36	
20	500	—	—	—	
10	800	—	—	—	
3	1,000	—	—	—	
45	—	—	—	—	

151	?	total			
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b) Building

(a large number of submarines of various kinds and sizes)

Small Fighting Ships

Mine-layers 16
 Mine-sweepers 20
 Gunboats 16
 Guard and patrol vessels about 40
 Torpedo motorboats " 120

The survey of the navies of the world, which the British Admiralty submits to Parliament each year as a Blue Book and which was published this year on February 27th, gives the following figures of completed warships: United Kingdom 382, U.S.A. 357, Japan 256, France 233, and Italy 309. The survey gives the following figures for vessels under construction: United King-

dom 94, U.S.A. 91, Japan 36, France 38, and Italy 30; in addition, vessels planned for which no building plan has yet been published: U.S.A. 3, Japan 5, and France 26 (including 7 more large submarines).

A comparison with the previous year shows that **the general acceleration in warship construction** which, was at that time noticeable **has further increased.**

B. The Building Policy of the Naval Powers and their Building Proposals for the next few Years

United Kingdom.

Until the Abyssinian crisis England undoubtedly made greater efforts than any of the other leading naval Powers to restrict her naval armament to the minimum extent that, in the opinion of her responsible statesmen, seemed compatible with the tasks of such a great world empire. The Mediterranean conflict showed, however, that England had carried this policy too far, and that an exaggerated economy in expenditure for armaments carried out for numbers of years cannot but have detrimental political consequences for a great Power. The new situation that arose in the Mediterranean, the failure of the League of Nations in the Abyssinian question, and the very meagre outcome of the London Treaty of March, 1936, thus combined to bring about a change in the British naval armament policy. England had, up till the year 1936, taken advantage only in a hesitating manner of the possibilities in respect of the light war-ship classes offered by the treaties for the renovation of the fleets. It is true that the actual tonnage in the light cruiser, destroyer, and submarine classes exceeded very considerably by the end of the year 1936 that fixed for England according to the old treaties, but it included a very high percentage of out-of-date vessels.

In order to remedy this drawback at the earliest possible moment it was decided to accelerate the laying down of a large number of light war vessels. Three supplementary estimates were sanctioned in the year 1936 that provided, among other items, for the additional construction of 1 aircraft-carrier, 2 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, and 4 submarines. In order to raise the number of cruisers and destroyers advantage was taken towards the end of the year of the so-called "Sliding clause" of the London Treaty of 1930, which permits a Power to increase the size of its navy if extraordinary political circumstances justify it in taking such a step. The British Government informed its co-signatories that it intended to retain the 5 cruisers of C class and 40,000 destroyer tonnage that it ought to have scrapped by December 31st, 1936.

The number of the crews of the British navy is to be raised by March 31st, 1937, by 6000 to 7000 to a total of 101,000.

The naval estimates for the year 1936, including those introduced supplementarily, amounted to £81,300,000.—, being an increase of £16,400,000.— over those of the preceding year.

It is already clear that England intends not only to renovate her fleet within the scope of treaties already in force, but also to strengthen it numerically in the light cruiser and destroyer classes. Although the fundamental equality of the English and the United States navies was confirmed after the conclusion of the London Treaty of 1936, in letters exchanged by Eden and Norman Davis, the Americans will probably take no exception to the raising of the number of English cruisers from 50 to 70. The number of 70 cruisers accords with an English demand of long standing, and it may be assumed that the British cruiser fleet will be expanded to this extent in the course of the next few years. On the other hand, it seems to be possible that England will not increase the number of her battle-ships for the present, but will simply renovate those now in existence.

U. S. A.

Congress empowered the Government, by the Vinson-Trammell Bill of 1934, to build up the American fleet to the full extent permitted by the naval treaties. This programme has been systematically carried out, and the following was the situation at the end of the year 1936:

In the classes comprising battle-ships, aircraft-carriers, and cruisers the full number of vessels permitted by the treaties has been constructed or is in building. Only in the case of destroyers and submarines has full advantage not been taken of the amount of tonnage authorised for new constructions, as in both classes there are still in commission very many out-of-date though still serviceable vessels. As their total tonnage still considerably exceeds the limits permitted by treaty, out-of-date destroyers to the extent of 30,000 tons and out-of-date submarines to the extent of 20,000 tons must be withdrawn from service. The destroyer tonnage to be withdrawn from service would have been greater by 59,000 tons if England had not invoked the "Sliding clause" of the London Treaty, and announced that she was

retaining in service beyond December 31st, 1936, out-of-date destroyers with a total of 40,000 tons, and 5 cruisers of C class. This announcement justifies the United States in following the same procedure, and its government has informed England and Japan that it intends to avail itself of this right.

The new constructions contemplated for the year 1937 have already been authorised and laid down, as the budget year 1937 began on July 1st, 1936. They are included in the classification under A., with the exception of two new battle-ships, whose construction might not commence until after January 1st, 1937. The United States had declared that it would for the present build battle-ships only if other naval Powers constructed such vessels. When, therefore, England announced that she would lay down two battle-ships for 1937 the United States followed suit. The ships were to be of 35,000 tons, with a maximum gun calibre in all probability of 40.6 cm., unless Japan had declared by April 1st, 1937, her agreement with the calibre limit of 35.6 cm. In the case of Japan expressing such agreement the latter calibre would come into force. In the meantime, however, Japan has announced that she does not agree to the restriction of gun calibres to 35.6 cm.

In regard to the naval air armaments the number of planes is to be brought up to 1692 by June 30th, 1937. In the year 1942 the number is to be about 1910.

The number of the crews in the whole navy is to be raised by June 30th, 1937, from 93,500 to 100,000, and the naval corps from 16,000 to 17,000 men.

The naval estimates for 1937 amounted to 592 million dollars, corresponding almost exactly with those of the preceding year.

There is no indication at present that the United States intends to increase the actual extent and strength of its fleet as authorised by treaty, unless under compulsion. The two new battle-ships newly laid down merely replace out-of-date vessels.

Japan.

Japan also has availed herself of almost all the tonnage accorded to her by the old naval treaties. When the ships in building are completed there will remain still available only a not out-of-date tonnage in the destroyer class to the amount of about 5500 tons.

On the invoking by England of the "Sliding clause" of Article 16 of the old London Treaty in respect of 40,000 destroyer tonnage, Japan declared that she intended to use the right thus accruing to her to augment her out-of-date tonnage by 28,000 tons in retaining 11,059 tons of out-of-date destroyer tonnage and 15,598 tons of out-of-date submarine tonnage. The reason for this procedure is probably that Japan has not 28,000 tons of out-of-date destroyer tonnage. What Japan proposes to do to counter-balance the longer retention in service by England of the 5 C cruisers has not yet been announced.

Nothing certain is known concerning Japan's further building intentions. It seems to be certain, however, that Japan also will take in hand the construction of large war ships in the year 1937. The statements as to their number vary between two and four, while no exact information concerning the size and the maximum gun calibre of these ships is forthcoming. It may be assumed, however, that the new Japanese battle-ships will not differ essentially in their leading features from those of the other great naval Powers.

It is stated in the press that the view is held in authoritative Japanese naval circles that the Japanese fleet must be enlarged by 200,000 tons by the year 1942, in order that it may be equal to the international situation. The realisation of this programme would, however, necessitate the new construction of from 30,000 to 40,000 tons per annum. The Japanese press points out further that the submarine arm must before all things be strengthened, and according to information proceeding from an English source the Japanese intend to bring the number of their submarines up to 90. For the rest, the chief importance is attached to light cruisers, fast mine-boats, and medium aircraft-carriers. These numerous light fighting craft are to serve mainly to secure the connections with the Asiatic mainland and the waters between the Japanese islands.

France.

France has used the first decade since the Washington Treaty to create for herself an imposing fleet of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. On the other hand, she hesitated for a long time to devote to new constructions the battleship and aircraft-carrier tonnage accorded to her by the said Treaty. Since the year 1932, however, she has been building systematically in the battleship domain. The Navy Minister declared in December, 1936, that France intended to put 5 battleships, each of 35,000 tons, in commission by the year 1943. It seems that no decision has yet been taken in respect of the building of aircraft-carriers, but there can be no doubt that France will lay down vessels of this class also during the next few years.

The new constructions provisionally planned for the year 1937 are:

- 1 light cruiser of 8000 tons,
- 2 destroyers of each 1850 tons,
- 4 destroyers of a newer type, each of 1000 tons,
- 7 submarines,
- some gun-boats and small war-vessels.

The figures show clearly that France intends to apply primarily to the augmentation of her heavy fighting forces the funds voted for her sea power, though without quite neglecting the light armaments.

The expenditure provided for in the navy estimates for 1937 amounts to 4,400,000,000 francs, which is an increase of about 30 per Cent over that of the preceding year.

Italy.

The expansion of the Italian navy was greatly interrupted by the Abyssinian enterprise, but is now being resumed with forceful energy. Up to the present nothing definite has been published concerning the building plans for 1937, but there is no doubt that Italy is determined to maintain a naval force corresponding with her needs. The extent of the new construction undertaken for the expansion of this naval power and the building pace are, it is very probable, greatly influenced by French measures in this domain. Some indication of the extent of the

enlargement of the Italian fleet in the course of the coming year is given by the announcement that the number of the men employed on naval vessels will be raised from 51,800 to 60,000.

The new-construction battleship tonnage accorded to Italy until the end of 1936 by the Washington Treaty was entirely used up in 1934 by the laying down of two battleships of each 35,000 tons. On the other hand, Italy has not, up to the present, built any aircraft-carriers.

Russia

Soviet Russia has re-joined the circle of great naval Powers during the past few years, and has done this in a manner that has almost escaped public attention. Until 1932 the Soviet Union had contented itself with renovating the ships of the Tsarist navy that were still in existence, but in that year it commenced building new ships, and has augmented these activities from year to year. The new constructions comprised destroyers, torpedoboats, and especially submarines. It can be stated without exaggeration that Russia has at her disposal today the strongest submarine fleet in the world! But apart from this Russia's rapid rise to the position of a naval power of importance in the world is amazing.

Orloff, the commander-in-chief of the Russian navy, declared at the meeting of the Moscow Council Congress in 1936 that since the year 1933 the number of Soviet Russian submarines had been increased seven fold, the light war vessels three fold, and the maritime flying-boats five fold. In respect of the naval construction policy he stated:

"The Soviet government intends to complete in the near future a second imposing naval building programme, that comprises ships of all classes and equipped with the finest technical resources."

What ships the Soviet authorities have primarily in mind was revealed during the Anglo-Russian naval treaty negotiations, when the Soviet Union disclosed its intention to build first of all 2 battleships of 35,000 tons each, with 40.6 cm guns, and 7 heavy cruisers of 8000 tons each, with 18 cm guns!

It would be interesting to know within what period Russia proposes to complete this programme, and what will be her following naval construction policy.

Reflections on General Naval Policy in 1936

The Straits Convention of Montreux, of July 21st, 1936

Besides the London Naval Treaty other agreements were arrived at in the year 1936, and other negotiations were conducted that are of importance for the general naval policy of the maritime countries.

In the first place the new Dardanelles Treaty of Montreux may be mentioned, by means of which Turkey recovered the right to arm at will the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The Treaty was concluded with Turkey by Bulgaria, England, France, Greece, Japan, Yugoslavia, Roumania, and the Soviet Union. It is especially important also because it regulates anew the provisions concerning the passage of warships through the Dardanelles.

The fight for the Straits—by which are meant the Dardanelles, i.e. the straits between the Mediterranean and the Sea of Marmara, the Sea of Marmara itself and the Bosphorus, leading from there to the Black Sea—is one of the oldest problems in modern European history. The reciprocal action of geography and politics is nowhere so obvious as in the narrow connecting channel between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The Russian Empire, whose access to the sea was impeded on all sides by great geographical obstacles, after the conquest of Azov by Peter the Great at the end of the 17th century, never lost sight of Byzantium as the key position to the Black Sea, the outlet to the world and a gateway for the invasion of South Russia, and every settlement of the question of the Straits was never more than an armistice in the struggle carried on at times with military and at other times with diplomatic means between Russia and her various rivals in the Mediterranean, **especially between England and Russia**, though France also could have no interest in placing the key to the Dardanelles in Russian hands.

Since the foundation of the British Empire in India and the simultaneous extension of Russian rule to the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea, the freedom of the Straits has been the constant anxiety of British eastern policy. The Straits constantly occupied the central point of the **Eastern Question**, i.e.

the dissolution of the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire into their natural, national component parts, which was favoured by Russia and hindered by England.

The rivalry of the two Great Powers was bound to come to a head as soon as the Black Sea ceased to be a mare clausum, a Turkish inland sea, which it had been since the end of the 15th century. This took place in 1774 when Russia succeeded in gaining the right in the Peace of Kutchuk Kainardji to sail merchant ships under the Russian flag over the Black Sea. The year 1774 is therefore also regarded as the **birth year of the freedom of the Straits for merchant ships**. For the first time the Ottoman key turned in the Dardanelles lock.

From that year the efforts of Russia and of the Tsars were directed towards the conquest of Constantinople, the Byzantium of old, and the Straits, not only in order to realise an old political dream, but also to secure free access to the Mediterranean as an economic necessity, at any rate by the unhindered passage of Russian warships and the closing of the passage to the ships of other nations. This endeavour on the part of Russia, however, was bound to arouse not only the resistance of Turkey, who found her possessions threatened, but also to bring England upon the scene, since she regarded this vast increase in the strength of the Russian Empire, together with the simultaneous rise of a new Great Power in the Mediterranean as a disturbance of European equilibrium and a threat to the sea route to India.

Thus 1798 saw the start of the **great game of the opening and closing of the Straits**. From 1774 to 1923 no fewer than fourteen European treaties were concluded settling the passage of the Straits differently according to the existing constellation of political power, in some of which the English view prevailed that the Straits should be open, while in others a "settlement" was reached in the sense of a restricted freedom according to the importance of the victory won by the Russians in their wars against the Turks and according to the liberty granted to the Russians by the other Great Powers to make the most of a victory. The sufferer in this struggle was always Turkey, the "sick man" on the Bosphorus, who nevertheless for decades obtained sub-

stantial advantages and to some extent remained alive by constantly altering the clauses of his testament.

The last remains of her sovereignty were forfeited by Turkey in the dictated peace of Sèvres in 1919 at the end of the Great War. Nevertheless, the century-old Russian dream regarding the possession of this territory, which was on the point of being realised in the Great War under the Secret Treaty of March 18th 1915, was brought to nought by the collapse of the Empire of the Tsars. And when the brilliant victory of the Turks over the Greeks frustrated England's dream as to at any rate an internationalisation of the Straits with British right of intervention and possibly even a Middle Eastern Empire which would provide the link between the Eastern Mediterranean and India and, after Gibraltar and Suez, would bring the last means of exit from the Mediterranean into her power, England again assumed the role of the guardian of European equilibrium and the Straits acquired even greater importance in view of the experiences of the Great War for which an eloquent testimony was provided by the enormous loss of ships and men at Gallipoli.

In the meantime General Mustafa Kemal, the liberator of Turkey, to whom the nation subsequently gave the name Atatürk, the father of the Turkish people, in two years of violent struggle against internal and external foes, had shattered the cracked piece of Sèvres porcelain. The Ottoman Empire with all the unworthy elements of its decadent period disappeared and, under the leadership of Kemal, a Turkey arose, renewed politically and morally, as a national State restricted to Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. The dictated peace of Sèvres remained what it deserved to remain, a scrap of paper.

On July 24th 1923 it was replaced by the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, which finally put an end to the state of war and reconstructed the foundations of friendly and economic relations between England, France, Italy, Greece, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Japan and Turkey, while an additional agreement, as the last remains of the dictated peace of Sèvres, established a new statute for the freedom of the Straits, which was also signed by Soviet Russia and Bulgaria. It again proclaimed the principle of the freedom of passage and shipping and compelled Turkey, in order to safeguard this position, to demilitarise and disarm the Straits to a depth of 15–20 km. on both banks. The only exception was Constantinople and its immediate surroundings, where Turkey was allowed to maintain a garrison of 12,000 men, an arsenal and a shipping base.

The strength of a fleet belonging to an external State and entering the Black Sea in peace time was limited to three ships of 10,000 tons each and was in no case to exceed the navy of the strongest riparian State. In a war in which Turkey did not take part ships of the belligerents could pass without restriction. Turkey was to be entitled to prevent shipping only if she herself took part in the war and in the case of an enemy fleet. In order to supervise these provisions a Straits Commission was formed consisting of representatives of England, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania and Turkey.

The main Powers, however, realised that the disarming of such an important connecting route was a serious disadvantage even for the reduced territory of Turkey. Her national defence was impaired by this open gap. In order to offer her a certain amount of compensation, England, France, Italy and Japan undertook in Article 18 of the agreement to ensure that certain measures would be taken in a war in which Turkey herself might be implicated. This protection and its execution, however, again depended on corresponding decisions of the League of Nations.

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It is well known that though the Moscow Government signed the Lausanne Treaty and the Straits Convention, it never recognised them; for a better understanding of further events it is necessary to turn back the pages of post-war history fifteen years.

The Lausanne Conference began on November 20th 1922 without the participation of the Soviet Union. It was only in December that M. Chicherin, then Foreign Commissary, contrived to arrange that a representative of Russia should be called in at any rate for questions of vital interest to the Soviet Union, and therefore in particular for the question of the Straits. His participation was, however, restricted to certain points. The Soviet Russians had in numerous declarations renounced all claim to continue the imperialistic policy of Tsarism against Turkey. From the point of view of Moscow the sacrifice of the century-old Russian dreams of the Dardanelles seemed a very small matter. The new authorities in Moscow remembered the words of a diplomat from the time of Peter the Great that the role of Russia in Turkey was very much simpler than was generally assumed: **Russia must be either the greatest enemy or the greatest friend of Turkey.** The world political constellation offered Bolshevik Russia the alter-

native of friendship with Turkey. It was on this basis that the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was concluded in Moscow on March 6th 1921. Turkey waived her Trans-Caucasian conquests, which she was unable to hold, and Moscow gave up the goal of Constantinople, the acquisition of which would never have been possible against the will of the Western Powers. It was the time of the most determined anti-Soviet policy in Paris and London.

In the question of the Straits, Chicherin proved to be more Turkish than the Turks. In a statement on December 4th he said: "There must be lasting guarantees for the maintenance of peace in the Black Sea and in the Near East; that is to say, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus must be permanently closed both in peace and war to warships and aircraft. The Russian Government, and its allies (the Soviet Republics), basing their argument on the fact that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus belong to Turkey, insist on the re-establishment of the full rights of the Turkish people over Turkish territory and waters. They insist further on the fact that the Turkish Government will only be in a position to defend the Straits and the Sea of Marmara if it is entitled to maintain a war fleet and to apply to such defence all the technical accessories of modern warfare. From the economic point of view and from that of defence, such a solution establishes the only possible guarantee for the most vital and elementary interests of Russia and her allies (the Soviet Republics). One need only recall the occupation of Odessa, Nikolaiev, Kherson, Sebastopol, Batum and other ports of the Black Sea by the Allies. It was only the passage of the Allied naval forces through the Straits which enabled the armies of Denekin and Wrangel to be supported in their fight against the Governments of Russia and her allies."

Chicherin did not refrain from giving the true reasons for Moscow's interest in the closing of the Straits. His arguments were in the strongest opposition to those of Lord Curzon, the British representative and President of the Conference, who desired to secure the "freedom of the seas", while it was clear to the Bolshevik Commissary of Foreign Affairs that the British wanted in all eventualities to maintain the necessary freedom of operation in the Near East and against the Soviet power. The Turks, though wishing the Russian representatives to take part in the work of the Conference, were not prepared to insist on this demand when they observed that it could only place them in a worse position as regards the Entente. Curzon came to an agreement over Chicherin's head with the Turkish negotiator Ismed Pasha as to the formula for the opening of the Straits for all merchant ships and Turkish agreement to refrain from fortifying the banks of the Sea of Marmara. It was during this time that Curzon sent his so-called ultimatum to the Soviet Government (May 8th 1923) which almost led to the breaking off of the new relations between London and Moscow. In view of the new dangers which threatened from England, the Soviet Government could do no other than sign the Straits Convention on July 14th 1923. In a statement on July 21st, however, Chicherin said: "The Soviet Government reserves the right in future to raise the question of a modification of the Straits Convention. As a precaution it declares that the Soviet Republics will be compelled to raise the question of its suspension should it be proved in practice that their economic and national defence interests are not sufficiently safeguarded."

For Bolshevik Russia it was no longer a question of obtaining a free passage through the Dardanelles, but of preventing others from entering the Black Sea. In the question of the Straits she occupied a defensive position which was to serve her own security and which she thought would be best safeguarded if war ships were not allowed to pass through the Dardanelles and also if Turkey, with whom she was on friendly terms and who was dependent on her help, guarded the Straits.

France and England again stood on the anti-Russian side at Lausanne as on previous occasions. The old fronts were reconstructed, but their mottos were reversed. Neither London nor Paris was willing to sacrifice such an important route as the Dardanelles for reasons of Russian security. The British interests in the Mediterranean and the French policy of alliances in South-Eastern Europe demanded the opposite of what the Soviet Union required.

* * *

Turkey was obliged for the time being to accept this last restriction of her sovereignty without any prospect of seeing her sovereignty restored in the near future either by a free act or by a new decision of the Guarantor Powers. On the other hand, the Lausanne decisions brought the young Republic up against the most urgent foreign political task: **the revision of the Straits Convention.** To this end Atatürk devoted his entire internal and external policy: in internal policy, by continuing to strengthen the Ottoman Empire which had collapsed in 1919 by means of internal reforms and a consolidation of national sentiment; in foreign policy, by constantly improving the military and international political position of the State. This last objective was

served primarily by the Agreement of Friendship concluded with the Soviet Union in 1921, and further by the development of relations with the Balkan States which ultimately led in 1934 to the conclusion of the Balkan Pact. In so far as the Turkish position became stronger, while the international situation became constantly more confused, the time was bound to approach when Turkey would think it a favourable moment to put forward her claim. The decisive event was the advance upon Abyssinia by Italy, who had always been, either openly or secretly, one of Turkey's opponents in the Mediterranean. The Anglo-Italian opposition in the Mediterranean could not but favour the Turkish plan, and when England approached the other Mediterranean Powers in January in order to bring them into a common front against Italy, Turkey linked up the declaration of her agreement with the announcement of her Dardanelles claim.

When, at the beginning of 1936, the law on the application of financial and economic sanctions against Italy was submitted to the Kamutay—the Turkish National Assembly—for approval, Dr. Aras, the Foreign Minister, gave the reasons for the Turkish attitude in the question of sanctions. On this, as on many previous occasions, he referred to the Turkish demand for the rearmament of the Dardanelles. He again expressed the hope that the "allied and associated Powers" would show comprehension for this need, and gave it to be understood that Turkey would take independent action as soon as any danger arose.

While units of the British home fleet still lay at anchor in Gibraltar and the other British naval bases in the Mediterranean and feverish activity was being displayed for the military strengthening of those bases, while Italian transport ships with dimmed lights and with more and more troops and ammunition were traversing the Suez Canal and the Anglo-Italian difference which had arisen out of the war in Abyssinia was drifting towards a further danger point in which the agreement of mutual assistance between England and the other Mediterranean Powers threatened to involve the latter, the Turkish Government was preparing a fresh surprise for the Signatories of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne.

* * *

In a note handed in on April 11th 1936 in London, Paris, Rome, Tokio, Moscow, Sofia, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Geneva, the Turkish Government demanded by means of negotiations the revision of the Straits Convention of Juli 23rd 1923.

This note is of great interest from various points of view; it puts an end to the illusions of the post-war period and states frankly and not without irony that experience of security guarantees within the framework of the League of Nations and of the collective system of international Powers had been so bad that the Turkish Government preferred henceforward to provide by her own means for her own territory, namely for the Straits and for the former capital Constantinople.

"In 1923, when Turkey agreed at Lausanne to sign the Straits Convention prescribing freedom of transit and demilitarisation, the general situation of Europe, from the political and military point of view, presented an aspect totally different from that of to-day.

Europe was progressing towards disarmament, and the political organisation of Europe was to be based solely on the unchanging principles of law embodied in international engagements. The land, naval and air forces were much less formidable and were showing a tendency towards decrease. At that time, Turkey signed the restrictive clauses of the Straits Convention. She had the assurance given her by Article 18, which added to the guarantee afforded by Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations an undertaking that the signatories and in any case four great Powers conjointly undertook, by all the means decided upon for that purpose, by the Council of the League, the defence of the Straits if threatened.

Since then, the situation in the Black Sea has come to present an aspect of concord which has been reassuring in every respect. Uncertainty has gradually arisen, however, in the Mediterranean; naval conferences have shown a tendency towards re-armament, and the naval shipyards will soon launch upon the seas vessels of a power never previously attained. In the air, the curve of increase has shown a swift upward turn, and continental and insular fortifications are constantly being multiplied.

During this complete change of conditions the only guarantee intended to guard against the total insecurity of the Straits has just disappeared in its turn, and while the Powers most closely concerned are proclaiming the existence of a threat of general conflagration, Turkey finds herself exposed at her most vulnerable point to the worst dangers without any counterpart for this disquieting insecurity.

In response to the urgent demands addressed to her, Turkey accepted the demilitarisation of the Straits, then wholly occupied by foreign forces, after having very fully considered, in the

existing conditions, the value of the minimum guarantees granted to her in order that the demilitarisation of the Straits and of the contiguous zones should not constitute an unjustifiable danger to the military security of Turkey.

To Article 18 of the Convention, which provided a guarantee of security indissolubly bound up with the body of clauses regulating the regime of the Straits, the signatories attached such importance that they solemnly affirmed that the guarantee in question formed an integral part of the clauses regarding demilitarisation and freedom of transit.

This means that without an effective, practical and efficacious assurance, Turkey's sovereignty could not have been diminished over a portion of her territory the security of which is indispensable to that of the country as a whole.

It is also evident that if this guarantee becomes inoperative or uncertain, the equilibrium of the whole Convention is overthrown, to the prejudice of Turkey and to that of European peace.

Political crises have made it clear that the present machinery for collective guarantees is too slow in coming into operation and that a delayed decision is likely in most cases to cause the advantage of international action to be lost. It was for this reason that Turkey in 1923, like many other Powers at the present time, could not be content with the collective guarantee which would be ensured to her by the Covenant on her becoming a member of the League of Nations; that she considered the collective guarantee of all the signatories of the Straits Convention insufficient; and that only the conjoint guarantee of the four great Powers seemed to her calculated to ensure in the conditions then existing the minimum of security indispensable for her territorial integrity.

But, if this minimum itself it weakened or rendered problematical by political and military circumstances entirely different from those which existed when the security was given, the Government of the Republic cannot, without being guilty of serious negligence, expose the whole country to an irreparable coup de main.

The position of the guarantors of the security of the Straits vis-a-vis the League of Nations, the particular circumstances which render doubtful, to say the least, the effective military collaboration of these guarantors to secure the object assigned to them—these factors have upset the general economy of the Convention of 1923.

It cannot be said to-day that the security of the Straits is still ensured by a real guarantee, and Turkey cannot be asked to remain indifferent to the possibility of a dangerous failure to act.

Besides these considerations it should be added that the Straits Convention mentions only a state of peace and a state of war, Turkey being a neutral or a belligerent in the latter case, but does not provide for the contingency of a special or general threat of war or enable Turkey in such a case to provide for her legitimate defence.

It is amply proved to-day, however, that the most delicate stage of danger from without is this very stage of a threat of war in which a state of war may arise unexpectedly and without any formality.

This omission may in itself render the guarantees contemplated ineffective, whatever their value.

From the beginning of its existence the Turkish Republic has followed a policy of peace and understanding, the carrying-out of which in every field has necessarily imposed upon her sacrifices, often heavy sacrifices.



The Turkish Government has shown in the many circumstances which have arisen in the last decade, a spirit of conciliation, of loyalty to her engagements, and of sincere attachment to the cause of peace, which has been appreciated by all the Powers. Turkey is entitled to claim for herself the security which she has always ensured to others.

Circumstances independent of the will of the Lausanne signatories have rendered inoperative clauses which were drawn up in all good faith, and as the issue at stake is the existence of Turkey herself and the security of her whole territory, the Government of the Republic may be led to take before the nation the responsibility incumbent upon it by adopting the measures dictated by the imperative necessity of circumstances.

In view of the above considerations, and rightly holding that the provisions of Article 18 of the Straits Convention relating to a joint guarantee of the four great Powers have become uncertain and inoperative and that they can no longer in practice shield Turkey from an external danger to her territory, the Government of the Republic has the honour to inform the Powers which took part in the negotiations for the conclusion of the Straits Convention that it is prepared to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving in the near future at the conclusion of agreements for regulation of the regime of the Straits under the conditions of security which are indispensable for the

Sub-marines

American submarine escort with a flotilla of submarines on each side



The English submarine cruiser "X 1"

Launch: 1923. Surface displacement: 2425 tons. Speed: 19.5 seamiles. Armament: four 13.2 cm. guns and two machine guns, six 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes. Length: 107 m.; beam: 9.1 m. Draught: 5.3 m. Crew: 129



The Japanese submarine of the first class "J 61"

Launch: 1929
Displacement: 1635 tons
Speed: 19 knots
Armament: one 12 cm. gun,
one machine gun,
six 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes



The French submarine cruiser "Surcouf"

The largest submarine in the world Launch: 1929. Surface displacement: 2880 tons. Speed: 18 seamiles. Armament: two 20.3 cm. guns, two 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns and four machine guns, fourteen 55 cm. torpedo tubes, with 36 torpedos on board. The guns can be submerged, loaded, and pointed. There is a flying-boat on board. Length: 110 m.; beam: 9 m. Draught: 7.2 m. Crew: 150. The vessel can travel about 10,000 seamiles on the surface




The American submarine "Argonaut"

Launch: 1927
Displacement: 2710 tons
Speed: 14.6 knots
Armament: two 15.2 cm. guns, 2 machine guns, four 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes, 60 mines and 1 aircraft on board

The Italian submarine "Ettore-Fieramosca"

Launch: 1929
Displacement: 1340 tons
Speed: 18.3 knots
Armament: one 12 cm. gun, four machine guns, eight 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes and one aircraft on board



Soviet Russian submarine of the Dekabrist class

Launch: 1932
Displacement: 896 tons
Speed: 15 knots
Armament: one 10.2 cm. gun, one 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft gun, eight 53.3 cm. torpedo tubes and 8 mines on board

inviolability of Turkey's territory, and, in the most liberal spirit, for the constant development of commercial navigation between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea."

The note cleverly based its arguments on the Lausanne agreement. It stated that Turkey had only signed that agreement after the Guarantor Powers had guaranteed the joint defence of the Straits. But the new situation in the Mediterranean had created a state of affairs which, "to say the least, rendered doubtful" the effective military collaboration of these guarantors to secure the object assigned to them. The threat to the security of the Straits had, however, upset the general economy of the Convention of 1923.

Though there was no formal connection between the Straits Statute of Lausanne and the new phase of Mediterranean policy, the displacement in the political emphasis of the relations between the Mediterranean Powers brought about by the Abyssinian conflict created a new position which was bound to throw a different light also on that Statute.

The impression caused by the note was in general favourable especially as the Foreign Minister, Dr. Aras, had prepared the Powers concerned.

In doing so he left little doubt that the Conference was faced by a direct alternative: either the fulfilment of Turkey's demands in a new agreement or Turkey's withdrawal from the Lausanne Convention.

If the Conference had refused the demand, the result would presumably have been that Turkey would have seized her rights, declared herself "mistress in her own house", fortified the Straits without the agreement of the Contracting Parties, and autonomously settled the question of the passage of ships.

The endeavour of the Powers to keep the revision of treaties within "legal" limits, therefore, only left them the possibility of complying with Turkey's demands.

Turkey was specially supported by the Soviet Union and favourably judged in France, while England made the best of a bad business.

Italy, as a logical consequence of Mussolini's policy, took no part in the negotiations. She made her participation dependent on the raising of sanctions and of the agreements of mutual assistance to which they had given rise, which had in the meantime been put out of force by France and Greece.

It thus came about that no opposition was raised to the actual Turkish demand for refortification and remilitarisation. If these had been the only questions, the Conference, which began on June 22nd at Montreux, would have lasted at most a few days. But there was again the question of the right of passage.

* * *

In the draft of a new Straits Convention submitted by Turkey on June 22nd, the following demands were made:

Fortification of the Straits, abolition of the Straits Commission, prohibition of passage of foreign vessels in larger units than 14,000 tons and for other purposes than visits of ceremony, the restriction of foreign naval strength present at the same time to 28,000 tons, maximum stay in the Black Sea 15 days, previous notice of one month and prohibition to fly over the Straits. The same passage conditions were to apply to riparian States but were to be extended to include battleships. This meant, in short, that Russia would have in practice freedom of passage, while foreign Powers would be severely restricted, as was pointed out with special satisfaction by the French press (see "Temps" of July 9th).

The price demanded from England was therefore not small, and this at first stiffened the British attitude, finally led to two crises and almost caused the Conference to fail.

A further reason was the Franco-Russian attempt to arrange the new statute in such a way that the alliance between Moscow and Paris would gain. In the very first phase of the negotiations, as a result of the intervention of the Franco-Russian alliance, the discussion went over to the subject of general treaty and alliance policy, in order, when a favourable opportunity occurred, that this hotly contested treaty regarding the Straits Convention, with the danger which it involved for peace, might be declared to be "legitimate", while the free passage in both directions should be guaranteed not only on a decision of the League of Nations, but also in the service of that pact as a "part of the League obligations".

The "Temps", in its final article of July 17th, pointed out with undisguised joy that the new regime placed no obstacle in the way of the normal play of the agreements of mutual assistance concluded with the Soviet Government. The passage was free for merchant ships which in this manner ensured supplies for countries connected by special pacts. The Soviet Union thereby

obtained particularly great satisfaction and any cooperation provided for in the Franco-Russian pact was entirely guaranteed.

England for a time maintained her resistance to this plan. In her opinion it was unreasonable to expect Turkey to carry out the provisions of treaties of which she was not a party, for instance, in the case of the Franco-Russian pact, to allow the fleets of both Powers to pass and then to turn her guns on a pursuing fleet.

* * *

The Anglo-Russian difference was composed by a formula of compromise, in the preparation of which the French representative Paul Boncour took the greatest part. Under the shadow of the Franco-Russian pact of mutual assistance he energetically supported his Russian colleague Litvinov without giving too much offence to the British. M. Boncour's work is in particular Article 19 of the new treaty which deals with the neutrality of Turkey in case of war. In this case foreign warships enjoy the same rights of passage under the same conditions as in time of peace. An exception is made for the ships of the belligerents themselves, to whom the passage is prohibited. This principle, and therefore also the neutrality of Turkey, are however subject to two important restrictions. A right of passage is also to be considered as guaranteed in the case of the exercise of League action. The view was thus accepted that neutrality forms no obstacle to action taken under the League Covenant. But this is not the only reference to the League of Nations. The Straits are also to be opened in order to bring assistance to an attacked State with which Turkey is connected by a "pact of assistance within the framework of the League of Nations". The aim of the second clause is therefore that the fulfilment of provisions of a pact binding Turkey to mutual assistance "within the framework of the League of Nations" also suspends the neutrality of Turkey.

In order therefore that the Franco-Russian pact may have effect in the Black Sea, Turkey would have to accede to a regional pact connecting her with France or with the Soviet Union. This might be done through the connection with Roumania which is allied with Turkey and with France. But Titulescu, who seconded Boncour so energetically at Montreux that he left the Conference in a fit of temper at the British resistance and rushed off to Bukarest, was soon afterwards removed from his office. The Tatarescu-Antonescu Government is less violent in its diplomatic actions. The Turco-Russian alliance of 1921 is also not very suitable as a connecting link, as it was neither concluded within the framework of the League of Nations nor registered with the Secretariat. France would therefore herself prefer to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with Turkey and has already put out feelers in Ankara in this sense. In the meantime Italy, who has not acceded to the treaty and therefore does not consider herself bound by its provisions, has again become more active in the Balkans and endeavoured, after reaching the "Peace in the Adriatic" by means of the Yugoslav-Italian Treaty of Friendship, to conclude a similar treaty with Ankara in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East where she has extraordinarily important economic and political interests to defend.

The reasons for this collapse on the part of England may be due to various considerations; in the first place that she was finally alone in her resistance; in the second place that she was faced by the alternative of either opposing the Russians together with a reconciled Italy or of making the agreement into an instrument of anti-Italian policy. It may also be that she expected that the Turkish Government would presumably not join the Franco-Russian system of pacts and in that case the automatic nature of this system would only come into play after Turkey had at least taken a share in determining who was the "aggressor" in a particular case and thus decided which belligerent Power was entitled to send its ships through the Straits. Lastly, as the Times correspondent wrote from Montreux on July 14th, in the present state of affairs in Europe it is difficult to imagine a war in the Black Sea in which Turkey would remain neutral.

But if Turkey is one of the belligerent Powers or if she feels herself menaced by the danger of war, she can at her discretion open or close the Straits to all foreign warships.

According to the Montreux Convention, in peace time the external States may not send any battleships, aircraft-carriers and submarines into the Black Sea. They may send light surface vessels and auxiliaries of a total not exceeding 30,000 tons and for a maximum period of three weeks into the Black Sea. Under certain conditions the maximum tonnage is raised to 45,000 tons. No one external State may have at the same time more than two-thirds of the total admissible tonnage in the Black Sea.

The right of passage of the Black Sea States is subject in peace time only to the restriction that their aircraft carriers may not pass the Dardanelles at all and that submarines must navigate on the surface and may only pass if they have been

built outside the Black Sea and are proceeding to their ports in the Black Sea for the first time or if they are proceeding to shipyards outside the Black Sea for repairs.

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The Straits Convention of Montreux of July 21th, 1936 thus undoubtedly represents a great success both for Turkish and Russian diplomacy. Russia has obtained for herself the greatest possible freedom of movement in using the Straits and at the same time greatly restricted the possibility of intervention by States not bordering on the Black Sea. Russia's naval and strategical position has thereby been greatly improved. The possibilities which this Convention offers to Russia in case of war strengthens Russian influence in peace time, especially in the Mediterranean, while its aggregate military effect will also be felt in the Baltic and Pacific, particularly when the development of the Russian navy, which has been announced, has become a reality.

Turkey has broken the last fetters of the Treaty of Lausanne. Her position under the new statute is extraordinarily strong and she will no doubt be courted to an increasing extent by the Powers concerned. The State of Atatürk has remained the victor in this, for the present, last fight for the Straits.

The Agreement on the Humanisation of Warfare in respect of Merchant Ships

The Submarine Treaty of November 16th, 1936

A further agreement which England in particular was anxious should be reached is the agreement on the humanisation of warfare in respect of merchant ships in accordance with the provisions of Part IV of the London Naval Agreement of 1930. It was signed on November 6th, 1936 by the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Japan, France and Italy and some time later by Germany and also by Russia.

This agreement has a very stormy previous history, in which the difference in interests and intentions became obvious. At the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 when the submarine was still in its initial stages, Russia put forward the proposal that submarine warfare should be entirely forbidden. A number of States — including Germany and England — agreed provided the provision was universally applied, but France, America and Austria-Hungary caused the proposal to fail. At the second Peace Conference in 1907 the subject was not again referred to. Thus submarines were recognised under international law as an admissible means of warfare and were considered mainly as capable of blockading and defending ports. Their classification as war vessels could not be doubted in accordance with existing rules — war flag, military crew, State property. With the increasing possibility of their use and their increasing seaworthiness the experts began to study in detail the role they would play in warfare in respect of merchant ships. Though it might be doubtful in about 1914 whether the advocates of this role entirely overlooked the results for their own case and were quite clear as to the method of warfare which submarines would be obliged to use, the Great War threw all the desired light on this subject.

The great naval Powers, in particular Great Britain who had the greatest interest in suppressing unrestricted submarine warfare in respect of merchant ships on account of her very extensive maritime trade and her dependence on supplies by sea, repeatedly attempted to bring about a collective prohibition. The first attempt at the Naval Conference in Washington in 1922 failed. The second, made at the London Naval Conference in 1930, obtained the agreement of America and Japan, but France and Italy declined to sign Part IV, Article 22, of the Agreement (and to restrict numerically their submarines and other light forces). Great Britain, therefore, continued to try to obtain the adhesion of these two Powers, and Germany's voluntary statement, in connection with the German-English naval agreement of June 18th 1935, that she would conform to the above-mentioned provisions "without regard to the attitude of other Powers" presumably did much to smooth the path.

The decision of the German Government is entirely in accordance with the principles and suggestions of German policy as expressed in the speech by the Leader and Chancellor on May 21st, 1935. This detailed statement of German peace policy not only expressed the willingness of Germany to enter into reasonable armament agreements, but far-reaching and clearly defined proposals were made for the humanisation of warfare, the prohibition of bombardment and of the use of poison gas, and the abolition of the submarine arm.

When, therefore, the British Government requested Germany to accede on the basis of the protocol signed in London on

November 6th by the naval Powers concerned, Ambassador von Ribbentrop on November 23rd addressed the following note to the British Foreign Secretary on behalf of the German Government:

"In a communication of the 9th inst. the Royal British Ambassador in Berlin transmitted to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs copy of a protocol signed in London on November 6th, 1936, regarding the rules of submarine warfare in accordance with Part IV of the London Agreement of April 22nd, 1930, and expressed the hope on behalf of his Government that the German Government would accede to the rules in question.

These rules are as follows:

'1. In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.

2. In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety.

... For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing weather conditions by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.'

In connection with the German-British naval negotiations, the German Government stated in the summary of the discussions between the German and British naval experts on June 23rd, 1935, that it was prepared to accede to the regulations regarding submarine warfare in Part IV of the London Naval Agreement.

I have accordingly the honour to state on behalf of my Government that the German Government accedes to the above rules and regards them as binding upon itself as from this date."

The view taken by British naval circles as to the effect of this agreement is shown by the following remarks by the "Naval and Military Record" in an article on November 5th, 1936:

"No country in the world has more to gain than England from a prohibition of unrestricted submarine warfare. But can we really believe that any Power fighting for its existence would sacrifice a certain victory, such as Germany expected from unrestricted submarine warfare, on account of a scrap of paper emanating from peace time?

The principal disadvantage of any attempt to humanise warfare lies in the restrictions which such regulations place upon a State which, in opposition to another State, cannot reconcile unrestricted warfare with its honour. Any attempt to reduce the terrors of war by a restriction of the arms used is no longer harmless but will have a disastrous effect on the 'honourable belligerent'."

In connection with this opinion of the Naval and Military Record it must be pointed out that, in accordance with the experience in war, the observance of the provisions of the agreement in practice means that the submarine arm will not be used in warfare in respect of merchant ships, since such warfare would subject the submarines to intolerable risk in accordance with the provisions for surface vessels (arming of merchant vessels, submarine traps etc.).

* * *

The future will have to show whether this agreement will be a test of momentary political agreement rather than a test of humanity. Nevertheless, its conclusion, in view of the tremendous rearmament also at sea, is a small ray of light, and it is only to be hoped that the desire which it expresses for more humane warfare and for the defence of unprotected non-belligerents may find its counterpart in general observance in other branches of warfare, such as bombing and gas attacks from the air and the bombardment of open towns.

The Naval Negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union

Immediately after the London Treaty was signed in 1936 the United Kingdom began her endeavours to conclude supplementary agreements, on the basis of that Treaty, with as many countries as possible that had not taken part in the London negotiations. The United Kingdom attaches such great value to agreements of this kind because she hopes they will prevent any power from deciding suddenly to carry out naval armaments that could not be controlled, and that must necessarily disturb the existing condition of naval armaments in such a manner that one of the parties to the London Treaty would feel compelled to appeal to the "Security clause" of the London Treaty, and repudiate its treaty engagements. This would, of course, involve the collapse of the whole treaty structure erected with so much toil.

Naval



Hawker naval fighting plane flying downwards



Vickers-Armstrong 3.7 cm. calibre machine gun on the bow of the Blackburn-Perth flying boat



The American Bomber "Boeing F4 B-4"

Maximum speed: 330 kilometres per hour
range: 500 kilometres
bomb load: 150 kg.

The Italian long-distance reconnaissance flying boat "Cant 501"

Maximum speed: 260 kilometres per hour
range: 2500 kilometres

The boat has flown from Monfalcone to Berbera, in British Somaliland, a distance of 4966 kilometres, without intermediate landing



Aircraft



The French long-distance reconnaissance flying-boat "Latécoère 582"

Maximum speed: 279 kilometres per hour
range: 1800 kilometres



The Italian flying-boat "Savoia-Marchetti S 55"

Maximum speed: 235 kilometres per hour; range: 2000 kilometres
With an aeroplane of this type Marshal Balbo accomplished his trans-Atlantic flight with a squadron

The English flying-boat Vickers Supermarioat "Stanraer"

Range: 1600 kilometres
armament: 3 machine-guns
Bomb-load: 750 kilogrammes
speed: 265 kilometres




The American long-distance reconnaissance flying-boat "Consolidated P 2 Y-3"

This flying-boat is considered to be superior to those of all other navies. The international record for the absolute longest distance flown over the sea, namely, 5541.3 kilometres, is held by a similar flying-boat made by the same firm




The American Reconnaissance flying-boat "Douglas XP3D-2"
(capacities not available)

The Japanese flying-boat "Hiroshima 90-1"
Maximum speed: 227 kilometres per hour
Range: 1500 kilometres



The English long-distance flying-boat "Short Singapore III"
completely modernised
Maximum speed:
233 kilometres per hour;
range: 1350 kilometres

The French long-distance reconnaissance flying-boat "Loire 70"
Maximum speed: 235 kilometres per hour; Range: 2000 kilometres



England's efforts were naturally directed in the first place towards arriving at a naval armament agreement with Russia, the future naval armaments of that country being the greatest factor of international insecurity in the domain of naval policy. The negotiations culminated in October, 1936, in a **draft treaty** that created extreme surprise throughout the world and occasioned in some cases no little disquietude. In this draft treaty Russia was permitted to commence building immediately 2 battleships of 35,000 tons each, with the maximum gun calibre of the London Treaty (35.6 cm. or 40.6 cm.), and 7 heavy cruisers of 8000 tons each, with 18 cm. guns. This concession ran counter to the provision in the London Treaty suspending the building of heavy cruisers. The provision of the draft treaty is also open to criticism which releases the Soviet Union from the obligation to communicate to its co-signatory its new construction plans for its naval forces in the Far East, especially as it is not stipulated in the draft treaty that ships intended for service in the Far East must be built there. Russia is thus, for example, in the position to carry out in the Baltic, without being subject to any control, new constructions "destined for the Far East", and to leave them there "in trial trip conditions" as long as she chooses, without being called to account for breach of treaty. In these circumstances the later provision that ships of the Far East fleet may not be employed in the Baltic is pure theory.

It remains to be seen if the Anglo-Russian Treaty will be concluded in the form of the published draft. It must arouse apprehension in all the countries immediately interested in Russian naval armament, and it is with those countries in particular that England is negotiating in the hopes of inducing them to join the London Treaty, namely, Germany, the northern countries, Poland, and Turkey. It is easily comprehensible, when the obligations imposed by naval strategy are considered, that these Powers must make their attitude in the negotiations with England dependent mainly on the outcome of the Anglo-Russian Treaty. It is, therefore, conceivably possible that too great compliance on the part of England towards Russia may seriously impair the efficacy of the London Treaty.

The Mediterranean Agreement (Gentlemen's Agreement) between the United Kingdom and Italy of January 2nd, 1937

It was a happy New Year's message which surprised the world on January 2nd, 1937, when in the Victoria room of the Palazzo Chigi in Rome an agreement was signed by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, and the British Ambassador Sir Eric Drummond, which made a break with the past and, though it did not entirely remove, nevertheless mitigated the tension created between the two countries in the Mediterranean by the Abyssinian conflict and subsequently by the Spanish civil war.

The official communiqué of the British and Italian Governments on the conclusion of the Mediterranean Agreement reads as follows:

"The following is the text of the Declaration signed at Rome on January 2nd by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador relating to assurances in respect of the Mediterranean:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government:

"Animated by the desire to contribute increasingly, in the interests of the general cause of peace and security, to the betterment of relations between them and between all the Mediterranean Powers, and resolved to respect the rights and interests of those Powers;

"Recognize that the freedom of entry into, exit from and transit through, the Mediterranean is a vital interest both to the different parts of the British Empire and to Italy, and that these interests are in no way inconsistent with each other;

"Disclaim any desire to modify, or so far as they are concerned, to see modified, the status quo as regards national sovereignty of territory in the Mediterranean area;

"Undertake to respect each other's rights and interests in the said area;

"Agree to use their best endeavours to discourage any activities liable to impair the good relations which it is the object of the present declaration to consolidate.

"This declaration is designed to further the ends of peace and is not directed against any other Power."

* * *

Before this joint declaration, signed on January 2nd, in Rome, was made, two notes were exchanged in Rome by the British Ambassador and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which were worded as follows:

a) Note by the British Ambassador to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

Your Excellency,—The Royal Italian Government may perhaps be aware that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was asked in the House of Commons on December 16 whether he would lay upon the table of the House the precise terms of the guarantee given to his Majesty's Government by the Government of Italy concerning the occupation of the Balearic Islands by Italian subjects.

To this question Mr. Eden replied that the assurances to which reference was made were given verbally. He proceeded to state that his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, acting on instructions, informed the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 12 that "any alteration of the status quo in the Western Mediterranean would be a matter of the closest concern to his Majesty's Government".

M. Eden continued that taking note of this communication, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had assured Mr. Ingram that the Italian Government had not, either before or since the revolution in Spain, engaged in any negotiations with General Franco whereby the status quo in the Western Mediterranean would be altered, nor would they engage in any such negotiations in the future. This assurance, the Secretary of State added, was subsequently reaffirmed spontaneously to the British Naval Attaché in Rome by the Italian Ministry of Marine, and the Italian Ambassador in London had on several occasions given to the Secretary of State similar verbal assurances.

In view of these assurances, his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume that, so far as Italy is concerned, the integrity of the present territories of Spain shall in all circumstances remain intact and unmodified. They would, however, be grateful if your Excellency saw your way formally to confirm the accuracy of this assumption, and I have accordingly the honour to inquire whether your Excellency could supply me with such confirmation.

I avail myself of the opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

* * *

b) Count Ciano to his Majesty's Ambassador:—

Your Excellency,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of to-day's date in which you draw my attention to a question asked in the House of Commons on December 16 last, and the reply given by Mr. Eden, on the subject of the assurances given verbally by the Royal Italian Government concerning the status quo in the Western Mediterranean. You reminded me that in taking note of the communication made by his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on September 12 I assured Mr. Ingram that the Italian Government had not, either before or since the revolution in Spain, engaged in any negotiations with General Franco whereby the status quo in the Western Mediterranean would be altered, nor would they engage in any such negotiations in the future.

I have consequently no difficulty, on behalf of the Royal Italian Government, in confirming the accuracy of his Majesty's Government's assumption—namely, that, so far as Italy is concerned, the integrity of the present territories of Spain shall in all circumstances remain intact and unmodified.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.


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It is obvious that this agreement, which renders possible a reduction of the fighting units in the Mediterranean, is the result of prolonged careful work by the diplomacy of both countries. Its significance becomes clear when one remembers the position in the Mediterranean at the beginning of 1936. Italy was engaged in a by no means easy colonial war, dependent for all her supplies of war material on the sole route of the Suez Canal, economically threatened by the sanctionist measures of half a hundred League States among whom England, in particular, was endeavouring to concentrate all available military and political strength in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, from the home fleet, the Indian and even Australian squadrons to the pacts of assistance with France and countries bordering on the Eastern Mediterranean. Out of fear of an Italian flank attack on the Sudan or from Lybia on Egypt, the military forces in that country were enormously strengthened by the construction of vast military and air camps on the Anglo-Italian frontier. Taken as a whole


Aircraft

Capacities of the Aircraft-carriers here Illustrated.

Name of Ship	Nationality	Launched in the Year	Displacement tons	Length metres	Beam metres	Draught metres	Engine power HP.	Speed sea miles	Crew	Armament	Planes
„Béarn“	France	1920	22,146	182	31	8.7	40,000	21,5	870	8/15.5 cm. guns 14 small anti-aircraft, 12 machine guns and 4 torpedo tubes	40
„Kaga“	Japan	1921	26,900	218	31.3	6.6	91,000	25	1100	10/20.3 cm guns, 12/12 cm. anti-aircraft and 22 machine guns	80
„Lexington“ ..	United States of America	1925	33,000	253	32.3	7.4	180,000	34,2	1900	8/20.3 cm. guns, 12/12.7 cm. anti-aircraft and several small guns and 4 torpedo tubes	135 (90 ready and 45 unmounted)
„Saratoga“	England	1925	33,000	253	32.2	7.4	180,000	34,2	1900	As the above	„
„Furious“	„	1916	22,450	240	27.4	7.4	90,000	31	750	10/14 cm. guns, 3/10.2 cm. anti-aircraft and 56 small guns and machine guns.	36
„Courageous“ .	„	1916	22,500	240	24.7	7.9	90,000	31	750	16/12 cm. guns, and 54 small guns and machine guns.	52



The French Aircraft-carrier „Béarn“




The English Aircraft-carrier „Courageous“

Carriers



The American Aircraft-carriers
"Lexington" and "Saratoga"




The English Aircraft-carrier "Furious"




The Japanese Aircraft-carrier
"Kaga"



Planes on Board the American heavy Cruiser "Minneapolis", that carries eight Planes



Start from the Aircraft-carrier
(the small flag shows the direction of the wind)



Catapult start from a War-ship



Lift-platform of an English Aircraft-carrier

it was a position which seemed to involve even the gravest possibilities.

Mussolini declared on several occasions that in conquering Abyssinia he had no intention whatever of encroaching upon British interests. Again during the war he repeatedly stated that Italy had no political interests in the Sudan or in Palestine and that he regarded Egypt as an independent country. He also gave numerous assurances that Italy would respect British and Egyptian interests on the Tana Lake. After the occupation of Addis Abeba he went even further and stated that Italy now belonged to the satisfied nations and that, consequently, even the smaller Mediterranean countries had nothing to fear. He also stated that British apprehension of the establishment of a black colonial army was unfounded. Again, in the Spanish crisis, Mr. Eden was able to inform the House of Commons on December 16th, 1936, that Mussolini had on various occasions made reassuring statements regarding his Spanish policy and the intentions attributed to him in respect of the Balearic Islands.

On the other hand the Duce naturally made his conditions, of which the raising of sanctions was the most urgent. Immediately after this demand came the cancellation of the agreements of mutual aid and the reduction of British forces in the Mediterranean. Lastly there was the recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia in some form or other in order to secure the vital routes connecting up with the new Empire. At the same time it was clearly to be understood that he was not thinking of reducing the military armament of Italy, as she must be more strongly armed than before precisely on account of the Abyssinian war.

In his great Milan speech on November 1st, 1936, Mussolini again stretched out the hand to England in order to bring about an agreement and to restore Anglo-Italian relations to their natural basis of free recognition of mutual interests in the Mediterranean.

At this time the United Kingdom had already taken the initiative since June for the raising of sanctions. On July 8th she withdrew the home fleet from the Mediterranean and on July 27th recognised the uselessness of further maintaining the agreements of mutual assistance. After the Milan speech she withdrew the Indian Legation guard from Addis Abeba on November 24th and finally, on December 21st, by converting the British Legation into a Consulate General, recognised the Italian possession *de jure* at any rate *de facto*, while a similar step was also taken by the French Government.

The United Kingdom however left no doubt as to the limits to which any agreement could not go. On June 18th Mr. Eden had stated in the House of Commons that the British Government had decided permanently to maintain a stronger defensive force in the Mediterranean than before the beginning of the war. This statement was repeated on July 9th by Sir Samuel Hoare who at the same time expressed the hope that the British Navy which had been in the Mediterranean 300 years would remain a further 300 years. On September 23rd after returning from his tour of inspection in the Mediterranean, which followed upon the journey of King Edward VIII to Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, Sir Samuel Hoare supplemented the above statements by adding that there could be no question of giving up Malta or of renouncing the further development of the naval bases in the Mediterranean. In the Treaty with Egypt of August 26th, 1936, the United Kingdom also took care to provide that she continued to dominate the Suez Canal from a military point of view and that she might take strategic measures towards the Lybian frontier.

The treaty contains nothing on the agreement which was frequently announced in connection with the negotiations, in respect of the demarcation of zones of interest, a limitation of the naval armaments on both sides and the fortification of bases. On the contrary, it is worded in such a way as not to prevent the two States from further developing their positions of strength. Sir Samuel Hoare expressed the British point of view in this direction when he said that Great Britain had learnt from the Abyssinian conflict that her opinion would only be respected by other countries if she could base her determination on actual power.

In this state of affairs it is immediately evident that there could be no question of the agreement restoring the old position, but on the contrary of legalising a new position, without striving for a general settlement of Anglo-Italian relations. In this respect **the agreement will still be subject to some severe tests.** For it is evident that the status quo to which reference is made has fundamentally changed in the Mediterranean. No solution has yet been reached for all the problems which will necessarily arise in practice.

In the meantime, Italy acceded on January 14th to the London Naval Agreement of March 25th, 1936, but has not yet acceded to the highly important new Straits Convention of July 21st, 1936,

by which the other riparian States promoted by treaty the penetration of the Soviets into the Mediterranean. In the Spanish question the final settlement is still lacking, though the agreement makes the impression that the United Kingdom has adopted the Italian standpoint that the erection of a Bolshevik constitution is out of the question. This is however contradicted by a sentence in Mr. Eden's statement in the House of Commons on January 19th: "There is no word, no line, no comma in the Anglo-Italian Declaration which could give any foreign Power a right to intervene in Spain, whatever the complexion of the government in any part of that country."

The Italian standpoint was again laid down in connection with the agreement by the "Giornale d'Italia" in the following words: "The erection of a Communist base in Spain must necessarily cause a displacement of the entire Mediterranean system which consists not only of territorial possession, naval bases and shipping routes, but is also determined by the character and aims of political factors of power which meet in or are firmly fixed in the Mediterranean. In this respect the clear, realistic policy of Italy has no other desire than what every country would do that is anxious to defend its national order and culture."

Mussolini's triumphal journey through Lybia and the speeches which he made on that occasion on the African tasks of Fascist Italy with their echo in the Islam and Arab world again led to a violent press campaign between the two countries and the continuance of questions regarding Abyssinia in the House of Commons. It must be remembered that Abyssinia is still a Member of the League of Nations and it cannot be foreseen when this grotesque situation will come to an end. The rigorous new armament programme with which the British Government surprised not only the British people but also the rest of the world in the middle of February aroused great mistrust especially in Italy where it called forth the determination for further rearmament. The Fascist Grand Council, at a meeting on March 1st, taking the view "that any possibility of a limitation of armaments should be definitely excluded", replied with a programme in five points for the arming of people and economy.

Nevertheless, the agreement was instrumental in overcoming a position which was not without danger and in building a bridge, though a tottering one, between the two States. An acute conflict was overcome, not by regional pacts or pacts of mutual assistance, but by a direct bilateral settlement, in which the United Kingdom again applied her old principle of making the best of it in matters concerning vital interests of her Empire.

Mr. Eden, in the above-mentioned debate in the House of Commons on **the significance of the agreement**, or the Declaration as he still called it, said: "This declaration is neither a treaty nor a pact, but it marks, we hope and believe, the end of a chapter of strained relations. It marks no departure in policy by His Majesty's Government. It neither calls for nor embodies any concession from us, neither, of course, does it involve any modification of any one of our existing friendships. But that this declaration has been of service to an appeasement in the Mediterranean there can be no manner of doubt."

Peace in the Adriatic

A further stage in Italian Mediterranean policy

With a speed and smoothness which must have surprised even those who were informed of the secret diplomatic preliminary negotiations between Rome and Belgrade, the visit of Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, to the capital of Yugoslavia led **on March 25th, 1937**, to the signature, ratification and putting into force of a **Treaty of Friendship between Italy and Yugoslavia**.

"In the conviction that it is in the interest of both countries and of all other countries to secure a new foundation for mutual relations by means of a sincere and permanent friendship and to inaugurate a new era in the political and economic relations of the two countries; in the confidence that the maintenance and consolidation of a lasting peace between Italy and Yugoslavia form an important factor for European peace, the Prince Regent, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia, and His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia have concluded an agreement.

(1) The two countries undertake to respect their common frontiers on land and in the Adriatic, and if either should be the object of an unprovoked aggression by one or more Powers the other will abstain from all action calculated to benefit the aggressor.

(2) In case of international complications, and if the two countries are agreed that their common interests are or may be threatened, they undertake to inform each other of the measures to be taken to safeguard them.

(3) The two countries reaffirm their will not to resort to war in their mutual relations as an instrument of their national policy and to resolve by pacific means all differences and conflicts which may arise between them.

(4) The two countries undertake not to tolerate in their respective territories activities directed against the territorial integrity or existing order of the other, or of a nature calculated to disturb their mutual relations.

(5) In order to give a new impulse to their commercial relations, in harmony with the amicable relations thus established, the two countries agree to intensify and expand the present exchange of goods and services and to investigate the possibilities of closer economic collaboration. A special agreement to this end will be concluded with a minimum of delay.

(6) The two countries agree that nothing in this agreement should be considered as contrary to the international obligations of the two countries, these obligations being public.

(7) This agreement is concluded for a term of five years. If it is not denounced six months before the lapse of this time it will be tacitly prolonged year by year.

(8) The agreement enters into force with the exchange of ratifications which will be made at Belgrade as soon as possible."

By this agreement, **Italian policy has reached a second stage** in its attempts to remove certain tension and discordance in the Mediterranean in so far as they concern Italy. This also is the fruit of a long process of rapprochement which started immediately after the conclusion of the Abyssinian campaign and received its last impulse through Mussolini's Milan speech.

The constant tension in the Adriatic formed part of the unsolved questions the number of which was not reduced but rather increased by the Peace Treaties of 1919. It would lead us too far if we endeavoured here to describe the constant changes in the **eternal struggle between Italy and Yugoslavia for the possession of the Adriatic or at any rate for the greater zone of influence in that sea.** This struggle continued from 1919, when the Italians did not receive the assurances in this area which were given them in the Secret Treaty that led to Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Allies, until March 25th, 1937. After 17 years of differences more or less imminent with danger, of hostilities and misunderstandings which at times assumed threatening shape for the peace of Europe, and after an unsuccessful attempt made on January 27th, 1924, to reach a permanent understanding in the Adriatic Treaty of Rome, the former embittered rivals in the Adriatic have now made a break with the past. The new understanding is not merely an act of political will. It is no artificial construction, for it is based on natural conditions, on the proximity of the two States and on the far-reaching economic and political relations which that involves.

The unified, strengthened and independent Yugoslavia thereby obtains the advantage that the only opponent which may be considered dangerous on her seven frontiers now disappears. On the other hand, as a result of the friendship of Yugoslavia, Italy also obtains substantial advantages firstly through the Adriatic

appeasement which is undoubtedly identical with the strategical security of the east coast of Italy, and secondly through the freedom of movement of supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs from the zone of the Adriatic to the Black Sea.

These advantages will, however, undoubtedly be only fully felt when an Italo-Roumanian and an Italo-Turkish agreement have become realities.

The agreement will also doubtless have a tranquillising effect on the position of Albania, since her political and economic independence is now released from a pressure to which she was hitherto subjected by the rivalry of the two Powers.

One of the facts which has no doubt substantially contributed to the détente between Rome and Belgrade is the fundamental change which has in the meantime taken place in the political constellation round the Adriatic, since Italy's gaze has been more and more turned from the contested Adriatic to the Mediterranean problems.

A further proof has been given of the value and utility of the method of approaching and clearing up sore points by direct methods while excluding any disturbing influences from outside. This outstanding example again makes it clear that direct understanding is alone capable of removing dangerous material of conflict from the world and thus of doing valuable service to universal peace. It is therefore only to be hoped that the fear which the French paper "La République" sees in "the threatened spread of the era of bilateral negotiations like an oil-stain" may continue to be realised. For in particular this orderly method of always acting within the limits of what is possible and attainable should justly find recognition even among the advocates of collective action and the partisans of indivisible peace, since any improvement of relations between States signifies an appeasement and reduction of the total risk. All schemes of collective assurances have hitherto suffered from the defect that they have petered out in an unending dispute as to questions of method or have befogged the debated questions.

In any case **Italy can look back with pride on the military and diplomatic successes of the year 1936 which began in such a fateful manner.**

The occurrences in the year 1936 have shown once more that the naval power of the various countries still plays a dominating rôle in high politics, and this fact has been recognised in the past year by the responsible statesmen of a large number of countries to an extent unequalled for a long time past. The conclusions drawn from the fact of this recognition find expression in the considerable augmentation of the naval armaments of most of the naval Powers. It is, however, fairly obvious that in the case of some countries the limit is overstepped within which a justification for the development of a naval force can be admitted. **The naval armament augmented beyond this limit no longer corresponds with the country's natural requirements, and can serve only pure striving for power.**

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Colonies
and Raw Materials

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Statements by the Leader and Chancellor ADOLF HITLER on the Problem of Colonies and Raw Materials

I. Extracts from the Reichstag Speech of January 30th, 1937

During the last hundred years a number of new nations have been created in Europe which formerly, because of their disunion and weakness, were of only small economic importance and of no political importance at all. Through the establishment of these new States new tensions have naturally arisen. True statesmanship however must face realities and not shirk them. The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The German nation and the German Reich are likewise realities. And for my own fellow-citizens I should like to state that the Polish nation and the Polish State have also become realities. Also in the Balkan nations have reawakened and have built up their own States. The people who belong to those States want to live and they will live. **The unreasonable division of the world into nations that have and nations that have not will not remove or solve that problem, no more than the internal social problems of the nations can be solved through more or less clever phrases.**

For thousands of years the nations asserted their vital claims by the use of power. If in our time some other institution is to take the place of this power for the purpose of regulating relations between the peoples, then it must take account of natural vital claims and act accordingly. If it is **the task of the League of Nations** only to guarantee the existing state of the world and to safeguard it for all time, then we might just as well entrust it with the task of regulating the ebb and flow of the tides or directing the Gulf Stream into a definite course for the future.

But the League of Nations will not be able to do the one or the other. The continuance of its existence will in the long run depend on the extent to which it realises that the necessary reforms which concern international relations must be carefully considered and put into practice.

The German people once built up a colonial Empire without robbing anyone and without violating any treaty. And they did so without any war. That colonial Empire was taken away from us. And the grounds on which it was sought to excuse this act are not tenable.

First: It was said that the natives did not want to belong to Germany. Who asked them if they wished to belong to some other Power? And when were these natives ever asked if they had been contented with the Power that formerly ruled them?

Second: It is stated that the colonies were not administered properly by the Germans.

Now, Germany had these colonies only for a few decades. Great sacrifices were made in building them up and they were in a process of development which would have led to quite different results than in 1914. But anyhow the colonies had been so developed by us that other people considered it worth while to engage in a sanguinary struggle for the purpose of taking them from us.

Third: It is said that they are of no real value.

If that is the case, then they can be of no value to other States also. And so it is difficult to see why they keep them.

Moreover, Germany has never demanded colonies for military purposes, but exclusively for economic purposes. It is obvious that in times of general prosperity the value of certain territories may decrease; but it is just as evident that in times of distress such value increase. To-day Germany lives in a time of difficult struggle for foodstuffs and raw materials. Sufficient imports are conceivable only if there is a continued and lasting increase in our exports. **Therefore, as a matter of course, our demand for colonies for our densely populated country will be put forward again and again.**

II. Extract from the Proclamation to the Party Congress at Nuremberg on September 9th, 1936

National Socialist Germany, with immeasurable efforts within the framework and boundaries of her own country and capacity, has worked and endeavoured to the best of her ability to mitigate the distress and ensure the life of the nation for the future. How simple it is for the statesmen of certain other countries, whose criticisms are nothing but hateful and superficial attacks, to solve the economic problems of their countries, compared with the difficulties encountered by Germany. What need have others to talk of distress when they possess, for instance, fifteen to twenty times as much land per head of the population as we in Germany? What need have they to talk of difficulties when they have at their disposal all the raw materials of the world?

The problems of our national economic subsistence are infinitely difficult.

1. The 136 persons per square kilometer in Germany — even with the greatest effort and the most ingenious utilisation of the existing space — cannot find their entire subsistence from their own soil. What the German peasant has accomplished in these last ten years is unique and unheard of. What the National Socialist State has accomplished in the cultivation of the last heath and moor in Germany is unsurpassable.

Nevertheless, there is still a gap in some spheres of our national subsistence. It is all the more difficult to make good this deficiency by imports from abroad as we are unfortunately lacking in a number of important raw materials in Germany.

2. German economy is therefore compelled to cover the lacking foodstuffs and raw materials by industrial exports, which, especially as the imports of foodstuffs are unavoidable, must take place in any circumstances.

It is, however, regrettable that the rest of the world, thanks to a wanton, unintelligent and even unnecessarily spiteful treatment of these problems, has no comprehension of the essence and immensity of these tasks. For in order to purchase a unit of value of fat for Germany, several units of value of exports must be supplied. But as in matters of food there is not, as some foreign statesmen unfortunately seem to think, any question of evil intentions, but rather of vital tasks, the export must in all circumstances take place as a condition for this import.

It is therefore a sign of a most lamentable lack of reasoning power to reproach for its cheap exports a nation which, in the absence of a proper economic territory of its own, is obliged at all costs to pay with its exports for the foodstuffs which it lacks.

When, therefore, a British politician states that Germany does not require colonies because she is able to purchase her raw materials from abroad, this suggestion is as brilliant as the question of the well-known Bourbon Princess who, when

the mob of revolutionaries were howling for bread, asked with surprise why, if they had no bread, they did not eat cake. If the German nation and the German State had not been bled white for fifteen years and deprived of all their international savings, if they had not lost all their capital abroad, and, above all, if they still possessed their own colonies, we should have found it easier to master these tasks.

The retort that colonies would not be of much use to us is futile. A Government which under the conditions in Germany achieves such undeniable economic results would also be able to administer colonies productively.

German economy, like every sound national economy, aims primarily at utilising as much as possible our own possibilities for the economic subsistence of our people, in order in the second place to take part with its own economy which is in itself sound, in the world economy. As the National Socialist State is under no circumstances prepared to restrict its population but is on the contrary determined to increase this natural fertility of the nation, we are compelled to consider and reflect upon the future results of this development. A substantial increase in the yield of the soil is impossible; a substantial increase in exports in the near future is scarcely possible.

It is therefore the duty of the National Socialist State and its economic administration to consider very carefully what necessary raw materials, fuel, &c. can be produced in Germany herself. The foreign exchange thus saved must in future be used as additional means for providing food and purchasing the materials which can in no circumstances be produced in the country. I now announce this as the **new four-year plan**:

In four years Germany must be entirely independent of foreign countries for all materials which can be in any way produced by German capacity, by our chemical and machinery industry and by our mining industry.

The reconstruction of this great German raw material industry will, after the rearmament, give useful national economic employment to the great numbers who are set free. We hope in this way to be able in many respects to increase further the national production, especially in the internal circulation of our economy, in order that in this manner the receipts from our exports may be reserved primarily for the supply of foodstuffs and for the raw materials which are still lacking.

I have just issued the necessary order for putting this vast German economic plan into operation. It will be carried out with National Socialist energy and efficiency. **Nevertheless, Germany cannot renounce the settlement of her colonial claims. The German nation's right to live is just as great as that of the other nations!**

Germany and the Colonies

In a number of statements by the German Government and by leading statesmen of the Reich—the text of which is reproduced in this number—the Powers have been informed that the present distribution of colonial possessions, in particular Germany's exclusion from the possession of colonies, cannot be regarded as satisfactory. This statement has been sufficient to bring about a worldwide discussion of the "German colonial question". The countries which since the War have administered the German colonial possessions in the form of mandates have naturally taken part in this discussion with particular zeal. This has not always been done "*sine ira et studio*", though views of extreme objectiveness and farsightedness have been expressed in addition to those of an opposite nature. The desire for deliberate misunderstanding—which is represented, for instance, among a certain group of the British Conservatives—is fortunately rare, while in some statements—such as that of the French Minister for the Colonies—a certain lack of knowledge of the problem under discussion is the simple explanation of remarks which are otherwise difficult to understand. On the whole the colonial discussion of the past year has promoted understanding of the German colonial problem in the world. Many questions have been put and answered outside Germany. Many have remained unanswered. It may be useful for the further treatment of the colonial question if some aspects are explained from the German point of view.

I

Sometimes an attempt is made to regard the colonial question purely from an economic point of view. Undoubtedly this facilitates the beginning of a discussion. Sooner or later, however, **purely psychological difficulties arise which have political roots** and which cannot be avoided. We will therefore endeavour to clear up some of these difficulties before dealing with the colonial economic aspect.

The German Reich lost its colonial possessions through the Treaty of Versailles, after an objective examination of colonial rights and needs had been promised in Wilson's fourteen points. The seizure of the German colonies was based on the proved incapacity of Germany to colonise. As against this dual statement of facts, the German nation had the sentiment that its confidence had been abused and its honour violated. The incompatibility of Wilson's statement of the colonial problem with the actual result of the Versailles Peace Conference is obvious from the text and needs no further comment. It is, moreover, not denied by opponents of German colonial rights; as a rule it is merely passed over in silence. The alleged incapacity of the Germans as colonisers is at present no longer taken seriously by those who used it in 1919 to defend the seizure of the German colonial possessions in their own minds and in the minds of their people. We have no doubt that the statesmen who drafted the Versailles Treaty would now be glad if it were forgotten, provided this did not affect the present territorial status quo. This brings us to a psychological problem of great importance. To forget deception and the violation of honour is always easier for the perpetrator than for the one who has been deceived and whose honour has been violated. To assure the latter that the violation of his honour was not seriously meant but only used for purposes of propaganda in order to defend the seizure of his possessions, is perhaps the best way to increase the

"psychological difficulties". Naturally Mr. Amery and Sir Henry Page-Croft in making such statements express a great truth. The representatives of the British Empire, politicians and officers, who—contrary to the provisions of the Congo Act—carried on and concluded colonial warfare in Africa, were quite able, even at that time, to appreciate the colonial achievements of the Germans. The honourable testimony of the English Colonel Meinertshagen may suffice to prove this. But since the War was alleged to be carried on by the western Powers from entirely disinterested motives, a reason had to be found for adding the German colonial possessions in Africa to the already rich British, French, and Belgian colonies. The reason invented was the incapacity of the Germans to colonise. At present the feeling of fairness which exists, especially in England, is endeavouring to remove the misconception which was mainly created and disseminated by the British. Many people are affirming that the German colonies were as well administered as the British. It is even admitted that they were better administered than the colonies of some other States. The Germans understand the friendly intention of such statements; but they do not forget that statements to the contrary (sometimes even by the same persons) helped to expropriate the German colonial empire. For it is still very rare to find any readiness to give up both the argument and the expropriation.

II

We will now consider **the economic aspect**. Are colonies valuable or not? It is sometimes affirmed that colonies are merely an economic burden and play no part in the economy of great modern States. The Leader and Chancellor, in reply to those who express this view, asked why they were not prepared to return the colonies if their administration represented such a great burden and brought no profit. We ask ourselves the question how persons of importance and experience come to take the view which gave the Leader an opportunity to make this fitting reply.

An economic district possesses value not only in itself, but in the connections in which it is placed. A country that is poor in coal will develop its water power sooner than a country plentifully supplied with coal. A country possessing extensive tropical coastal districts will rarely lay out plantations in the inaccessible interior of the country. There are some countries which possess a considerably greater proportion of tropical colonial territories than they can exploit according to their population and economic needs. This statement implies no criticism of the colonial achievements of the countries in question. In order to be objective, we will take an example from a territory to which there is no German claim whatever. The economic prosperity of Java, with its population of 42 millions in an area barely a quarter the size of France proves very much for the colonising capacity of the Dutch. The colonial territories than they can exploit according to their Netherlands possessions proves that the colonising power of a relatively small European country to exploit and administer fully a tropical territory fifty-five times the size of the mother country has hitherto proved insufficient. It is due, not to existing possibilities, but to historical and political development that a square mile of New Guinea is practically valueless as compared with a square mile of Java at its present purchase value. Let us take another example, again from a territory to

which Germany has no claim. If we look in South America for the least developed and most thinly populated territories, apart from deserts and high mountains, we shall find them in the interior of Brazil, i. e. in a country which is only fully developed in the areas near the coast and has as yet no economic need of the forests in the interior; and apart from that, characteristically enough, in the few colonial territories possessed by European Powers in South America. We find here Netherlands Guiana with a population of 1.1 per square kilometre, French Guiana 0.5, and British Guiana 1.3. If these territories were the only tropical countries in the possession of these colonial Powers, they would undoubtedly be developed to a much higher measure of economic capacity. The present position of the Guiana colonies of three European States proves to us that the colonising power and economic interests of these Powers have not been sufficient to promote their entire colonial empire in an equal manner. After the obligation to care for the development of colonial territories and to regard their possession as a sacred trust for the good of the natives has been so frequently stressed, especially by the British, it is not superfluous to refer to the above facts. We should like again to emphasise the fact that in so doing we are by no means questioning the colonising capacity of the nations concerned, but are merely pointing out that the area of their colonies is too great for them to be developed to the same extent as certain territories have been developed. Trinidad, in the immediate vicinity of British Guiana, has a population of 80 per square kilometre. These examples will suffice. They show clearly enough that there are really colonial territories which are more or less worthless—to their present owners.

III

Do the former German colonies belong to this group? They do not come into consideration as territories for the permanent settlement of white races. Neither the Cameroons nor Togoland nor New Guinea have districts suitable for this purpose. In German East Africa, as in the high districts of Kenya, there are certain possibilities of white settlement; but they are comparatively few. It may be assumed as a fact that South West Africa does not offer great possibilities for white settlers. The former German colonies, therefore, need not be taken into consideration as areas of settlement for the white races; this is true of their present owners for two reasons, in the first place because the territories are unsuitable, and in the second place because the western European colonial countries have a lack, and not a surplus, of people willing to become settlers. (The position is different in the case of Japan's share in the former German South Sea possessions. Here there is a desire for and at the same time a suitability for settlement, so that Japan has had considerable success in colonising the small island territory of the Mariannes.)

Consequently, with this Japanese exception, **the value of the former German colonies still remains to be examined merely as producers of raw materials for their present owners.**

As regards mineral raw materials, only the South Sea island Nauru with its rich phosphate deposits has a high value. It is still difficult to foresee whether the recently started gold production of East Africa is capable of development, while the gold production of South West Africa has not fulfilled the hopes formerly placed in it. The diamond production had to be considerably checked. As South Africa has abundance of gold and diamonds, the production of the mandates is not of considerable importance for the British possessions in Africa. It is true that the question arises as to whether there are still undiscovered mineral resources in the mandated territories. This question cannot be answered as the geological exploration has remained in a very backward state. But this fact alone is significant, since it goes to prove how slight is the need for real economic development of the mandated territories on the part of their present owners.

As regards vegetable raw materials, the former German colonies produce primarily palm kernels and palm oil, cocoa, timber, sisal, and tanning materials. Their climate and soil offer similar conditions for such production as the neighbouring possessions of Great Britain, France, and Belgium. A comparison between the quantities produced by the mandated territories and the neighbouring colonies (Gold Coast, Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo, Kenya, and Uganda) is extremely instructive. It appears, for instance, that the export of tanning bark which after 1919 was somewhat higher in the former German East Africa than in Kenya and Uganda, has since declined slightly, while Kenya and Uganda have now reached more than four times the export value of German East Africa. The advance in production from 1933 to 1934 alone is greater for Kenya and Uganda than the annual average for the mandated territory from 1931 to 1935. As regards oil fruits and oil seeds, merely the average annual fluctuation in the constantly increasing export from Nigeria has been greater in the last ten years than the total annual production of Togoland. Here also the increase from 1931 to 1932, and from 1934 to 1935 is greater than the total export from the Cameroons in the same years. The Cameroons and Togoland together attain about one-tenth of the quantity exported from Nigeria. The position is somewhat more favourable in respect of cocoa. Here again the increase in production is considerably greater in the British west coast colonies than in the Cameroons and Togoland. But this is hardly due to the administrations of the mandates, for powerful German private initiative has been developed particularly in respect of cocoa plantations in the West African mandated territories. The position as regards the utilisation of the tropical timber resources is also extremely characteristic. Here also the total annual exports from the Cameroons are at present smaller than the annual fluctuations of French Equatorial Africa. These examples will suffice. It cannot be denied that the total exports of all important products from the mandated territories are of no consequence as compared with the annual fluctuations in the production and export of a single neighbouring colonial territory. This means that the mandated territories are actually of very small importance for their owners; their present economic value is small. It seems natural to inquire into the reasons for this. The conclusion is either that the former German colonies are in an incomparably worse position than the neighbouring colonies of other Powers in respect of soil, climate, and conditions of work, or that their development has been astonishingly neglected by the mandatory Powers. In this connection, South West Africa, which is undoubtedly less favoured by nature, can be partially excluded, but there is no reason whatever to assume that the Cameroons and Togoland are worse colonial territories than the Gold Coast, Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa, and the Belgian Congo. There is no reason to believe that German East Africa has substantially fewer possibilities than Kenya and Uganda, or that the north of New Guinea is less fertile than the south and west. Thus only the second assumption remains, namely **that the mandatory Powers, in view of their wealth in land and their small requirements of additional colonial production, have neglected the mandated territories in comparison with their own colonies.** This fact is not without importance also in view of the constantly emphasised obligation of the mandatory Powers to look after the economic development of the mandated territories and their native populations.

IV

The political public of the colonial Powers includes many persons who have little political and economic imagination. They cannot imagine that an object which is worthless for them may be of value to others. They cannot imagine that countries whose economic development is of no significance for them may be of significance to others. They cannot imagine that production figures which are small for those who

live in abundance may be of importance—even at their present admittedly low level—to those who have no possibility of producing tropical oils and fats, cocoa, sisal, copra, cotton, and tropical wood. In particular, they cannot imagine that the quantity of production can be considerably increased if such increase is necessary.

It is not easy to state potential values and to give reasons for such statements. When it is known to what extent opinions vary, for instance as to the possible density of settlement and economic capacity of Australia or Brazil, caution is necessary in estimating the development in tropical Africa. Nevertheless the comparative figures of neighbouring colonies inevitably lead to the conclusion that actual possibilities would enable the present production to be trebled. At the same time it must again be stressed that from a geological point of view the mandated territories are for the most part *terra incognita*. The few years of German rule before the War were scarcely enough to carry out properly the geographical exploration of the territories. The example of the copper production of Katanga with its revolutionary effect on the copper supply of the world, and the further example of the South African platinum deposits, prove that a number of surprises in respect of mining may still be expected in Africa. Though the present economic value of the mandated territories can be regarded as small for the present owners, their development value must be gauged quite differently.

V

We will now deal with a number of statements which recur frequently and also bear witness to a certain lack of political imagination. They are remarkable for the simplicity of the thought that lies behind them. The question is asked: What is the use of laying out fresh plantations when other countries obtain such a surplus from existing plantations that a considerable portion of the crops must be destroyed? Why further coffee plantations, when Brazil is obliged to burn thousand and thousands of bags of coffee? Why new cotton fields when the United States are compelled by the lack of outlet constantly to restrict the area under cultivation? Why erect expensive plant in order to produce tropical timber when the forests of the northern temperate zone are by no means exhausted? These questions are comprehensible. But the questions that can be asked on the opposite side are sometimes overlooked. Why create new protected industries in the countries of America and the British overseas possessions that are rich in raw materials, when the old European industrial districts are in a position to cover industrial needs? Everybody is aware that the free world economy of before the War has collapsed; but in the colonial discussion it seems sometimes to be assumed that this free world economy still exists or can be re-established at short notice. The fact that a man of great economic experience and wide knowledge of the world, such as Sir Frederick Leith-Ross reverts to the old formula that the countries which are poor in raw materials must purchase their materials from the rich countries merely proves to what extent political feeling may be lacking in some quarters.

The question is often asked as to what States or groups of States bear the blame for the disturbance in world economy. It is a futile question, for all individual measures which are made responsible for this can be traced back directly or indirectly to the Great War. But one fact must be affirmed, namely that the old stronghold of British trade, the inviolability of private property, was destroyed not by Germany but by the Allies under British leadership. Not least, it is the experiences of the War and of the blockade which was continued after the armistice, together with the constantly recurring attempts to use economic dependence in order to exercise political pressure, which have compelled the countries that are poor in raw materials to be especially watchful and to introduce those trade restrictions of which the rich countries

complain. A portion of the special German difficulties can, however, be traced back directly to the end of the War. It is sometimes overlooked what heavy losses in supplies of food and raw materials were suffered by Germany as the result of the cession of territory in Europe.

Sir Samuel Hoare stressed the decisive difference between the haves and the have-nots in the international discussion. This differentiation will only disappear from the field of international politics when settlements have been reached.

Three methods are proposed for settling the existing difference. There are observers in the countries that are rich in raw materials who give the have-nots the kind advice to restrict the increase in population by artificial means, and even, if possible, to reduce their population; a proposal that gives evidence of special Christian love of one's neighbour. There is a second group of opinions to the effect that attempts must be made to improve the possibility of supply of the have-nots out of the surplus territories. In this connection the question of the means of payment is generally overlooked. Loans cannot be more than a temporary makeshift. The increase in the purchase of raw materials by the Great Powers that are lacking in them is only possible under the present structure of possessions in the world, if the Great Powers that are rich in raw materials are willing to accept payment in the form of goods which they can produce on their own soil. There is no readiness to do so, for this would imply a very considerable change in the economic and social structure of the countries that are rich in raw materials. In order to avoid an increase in the economic differences, **only the third way remains open: a change in territorial possessions, in the case of Germany by the return of her colonies.**

Here we must revert to our argument as to the relative value of the colonial territories producing raw materials. We pointed out that the old German colonial territories, with few exceptions, had no considerable economic value for their present owners. It would be incorrect to conclude from this fact that the same territories are as valueless for a country that is poor in raw materials. For countries that are compelled to restrict imports, even small alleviations in their balance of payment are of importance. In asking what value the possibility of importing cocoa, sisal, or tanning materials has for a country whose principal problem is the supply of iron and copper, it is overlooked that every reduction in payments for less valuable raw materials is to the benefit of the supply of more important materials. Moreover such questions are based only on the present position of the colonies. They overlook the possibilities of future development and the exploration of further land. In particular they overlook the fact that a great part of the development of new raw materials is based (apart from the wider uses of coal and lime) on the extraordinarily increased possibility of using and transforming the raw material, wood. The possibilities afforded in this connection by the tropical forests can scarcely be overestimated.

VI

What is the result of all this for the future of the former German colonies if they were to be given back by their present owners? In the first place, the necessity of a greatly increased rate of economic development as compared with the past fifteen years. In this connection, economic, administrative, and financial questions, and not least scientific and medical questions of considerable importance will be raised. While the capacity of the Germans for developing a colonial administration has only been denied in the course of war propaganda, we are not aware that the services of German science in the exploration of the tropics from a geographical, geological, botanical, medical, and anthropological point of view have ever been doubted. The great German explorers of Africa in the nineteenth century—Rohlf, Nachtigal, Schweinfurth—are well known. It is less well known that the geographical exploration

The Lie regarding Colonial guilt

"Finally, the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that the native inhabitants of the German colonies are strongly opposed to being again brought under Germany's sway, and the record of German rule, the traditions of the German Government, and the use to which these colonies were put as bases from which to prey upon the commerce of the world, make it impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to return them to Germany, or to entrust to her the

responsibility for the training and education of their inhabitants."

"Germany's dereliction in the sphere of colonial civilization has been revealed too completely to admit of the Allied and Associated Powers consenting to make a second experiment and of their assuming the responsibility of again abandoning thirteen or fourteen millions of natives to a fate from which the war has delivered them."

From the Note by the Allies on June 16th, 1919

The British Blue Book

The seizure of the German colonies was decided by the Allies mainly on the basis of the statements made in this book.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

REPORT

ON THE

NATIVES OF SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

AND

THEIR TREATMENT BY GERMANY.

Prepared in the Administrator's Office, Windhuk,
South-West Africa, January 1918.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty,
August, 1918.



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... and its Destruction

In the House of Assembly on Thursday afternoon the following resolutions were moved by the Hon. Member Mr. August Stauch, and finally adopted:

„That in the opinion of this House:

(1) that the Bluebook of the Union of South Africa: "Report on the Natives of South-West Africa and Their Treatment by Germany. Prepared in the Administrator's Office, Windhoek, South-West Africa, January 1918. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, August, 1918. London: Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office" having been brought up in war time had the significance of a war-instrument and that the time has come, to put this instrument out of operation and to impound and destroy all copies of this Bluebook, which may be found in the official records and in public libraries of this Territory;

(2) that the Administration be requested to make representations to the Union Government and to the British Government to have this Bluebook expunged from the official records of those Governments;

(3) that the Administration be requested to take into consideration the advisability of making representations to the Union Government and the British Government to impound and destroy all copies of the Bluebook, which may be found in the public libraries in the respective Countries and with the official Booksellers mentioned on the Title-Sheet of the Bluebook, namely: — His Majesty's Stationery Office and E. Ponsonby Ltd., Dublin."

(Original text taken from „The Windhoek Advertiser“ 31st July 1926 No. 687)

..... and the Truth

"It cannot be denied that Germany in many respects transferred her methodical spirit, her orderly qualities and her characteristic discipline to her former colonies and to a great extent promoted the development of the territories now under mandate."

The present French Colonial Minister Moutet, on August 26th 1924 as Rapporteur of the Mandatory Commission of the Inter-Parliamentary Union

(Extract from the proceedings of the XXIIth Inter-Parliamentary Conference at Berne)

"As for Germany's moral unfitness to govern Natives (which did not, of course, figure in the actual treaty) that was of a piece with much else that was said, in speeches and even official correspondence, that belonged to the not wholly dispassionate atmosphere of the time."

The former British Colonial Minister Amery in his reply to the statements by General von Epp on the German standpoint in the colonial question

Opinion on the British Blue Book

"...The untrustworthy and contemptible character of that piece of war propaganda should suffice to condemn it to the dishonourable grave of all such writings of the war period."

General Hertzog, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, on February 28th, 1927

German Technical Schools for Natives in the Former German Colonies.



Printing Works in German East Africa



Carpenter's Shop in the Cameroons



Industrial School: Cabinet Maker's Shop in East Africa



Technical School: Shoemaker's Shop in East Africa

of the German colonies before the War was better organised and made more rapid progress than that of the colonies of neighbouring Great Powers. The achievement of German scientists in transferring the science of forestry to tropical territories is well known. (It is sufficient to refer to the part taken by German advisers in creating a well ordered science of forestry in British India and the Netherlands Indies.) Nothing need be said of the achievements of German tropical medicine. German successes in combating malaria and sleeping sickness speak for themselves.

All nations with colonial possessions have benefited from the achievements of German research workers in this sphere. Since the War, German scientists have worked in this field with all the restrictions arising out of the fact that they have no tropical stations at their disposal. The re-establishment of a German field of work in the tropics for German scientists might have a value going far beyond actual territorial boundaries.

VII

If the justice of the German desire for the re-establishment of a colonial field of work is recognised, and if the necessity for an intensive development of such colonies is realised, the need naturally arises of considering **the native question** with the greatest thoroughness. If the view is adopted that care for the welfare of the natives is an essential part of any colonial development—and this view is at present taken by all the colonial Powers and shared by Germany—a survey of the colonial history of the past four centuries arouses painful feelings. The first centuries of European colonial rule in other parts of the world are filled with revolting and senseless cruelty. Germany, as the youngest of the colonial Powers, is fortunate in having had no share in the unhappy and immoral native policy of those times. She was able to benefit from the collective experience of other Powers and, in acquiring her colonies—with very few exceptions—to avoid the mistakes previously made by other colonial Powers. The natives were, however, not asked whether they wished to belong to the German Empire any more than the natives in the possessions of all other colonial Powers. When the German colonies were transferred to the mandatory Powers, an attempt was made only in very few cases—and after the corresponding influence had been exerted—to obtain the opinion of the natives. So long as the white races exercise colonial care over the black

racés, it will be difficult to attempt to introduce complete self-determination on the part of the natives. Any attempt to prevent the transfer of the mandates on the grounds that the natives have not voted for it, calls into question the basis of all previous colonial Empires.

It is stated in some quarters that, though there is no reason to criticise Germany's native policy before the War, a positive **native policy on the part of National Socialism** is unthinkable. This is due to a misapprehension of the biological views of National Socialism. Germany is at present of the opinion that no greater injustice can be done to a race than to compel it to shape its existence in the mould of a foreign race. New Germany is aware that races are of different kinds and values and that it will be necessary to make clear distinctions between the forms of existence of the black and the white world. Settlements of the native question cannot be found round the conference table. The German nation is observing with sympathy and attention the attempts of other colonial Powers to solve this question. It has thus an opportunity of learning very different methods of treatment. Hitherto we have not seen either ideal or uniform solutions. The natives are treated differently in the Union of South Africa and in the British Protectorates, in Kenya and Uganda, in British West Africa and in French West Africa. In some colonies the barriers between the races have been removed, while in others they have been maintained. The German observer cannot avoid the conviction that the more lasting solutions are to be found in colonies where clearer views are held as to the difference of race. There is no reason to doubt the seriousness and thoroughness of a German examination of the colonial racial question.

There is a last consideration. If we set aside all the reasons hitherto put forward to exclude Germany from colonial possessions, there still remain reasons which are unwillingly expressed. They are not uttered by official Government representatives; only outsiders sometimes express them. They lie within the sphere of what may be called imperial "Realpolitik". They relate to **the political and military dangers** which the German colonies might involve for other possessions. Here again we cannot refrain from a historical reference. Thanks are due not least to Bismarck that, in the period when Africa was divided up, the Congo Act came into being. Anyone who knows the number of German protectorate troops in the year 1914 will realise that Germany had no intention of breaking the Congo Act. What reason is there to believe that Germany would in future militarise her colonial possessions?

A. The Colonial Question as a Political and Legal Problem

An Historical Retrospect in Documents

The Seizure of the German Colonies

The Legal Basis for the Conclusion of Peace:

The Agreement of November 5th, 1918, prior to the Peace

From the Note from State Secretary Lansing to the German Government, on November 5th, 1918

"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 8th 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in the subsequent addresses."

What Wilson promised:

Point 5 of the 14 Points

from the address to Congress on January 8th, 1918

"The only possible programme is:

5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

We have no jealousy of German greatness and there is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, — the new world in which we now live, — instead of a place of mastery."

An authentic interpretation of Point 5

from the Memorandum by Colonel House of October 29th, 1918 (Lyons broadcast)

"The stipulation is that in the case of the German colonies the title is to be determined after the conclusion of the war by 'impartial adjustment' based on certain principles. These are of two kinds:

1. 'Equitable' claims:
2. The interests of the populations concerned.

"What are the 'equitable' claims put forth by Britain and Japan, the two chief heirs of the German colonial empire, that the colonies cannot be returned to Germany? Because she will use them as submarine bases, because she will arm the blacks, because she uses the colonies as bases of intrigue, because she oppresses the natives. What are the 'equitable' claims put forth by Germany? That she needs access to tropical raw materials, that she needs a field for the expansion of her population, that under the principles of peace proposed, conquest gives her enemies no title to her colonies.

"What are the 'interests of the populations'? That they should not be militarized, that exploitation should be conducted on the principle of the open door, and under the strictest regulation as to labor conditions, profits and taxes, that a sanitary régime be maintained, that permanent improvements in the way of roads, etc., be made, that native organization and custom be respected, that the protecting authority be stable and experienced enough to thwart intrigue and corruption, that the protecting power have adequate resources in money and competent administrators to act successfully.

"It would seem as if the principle involved in this proposition is that a colonial power acts not as owner of its colonies, but as trustee for the natives and for the interests of the society of nations, that the terms on which the colonial administration is conducted are a matter of international concern and may legitimately be the subject of international inquiry and that the peace conference may, therefore, write a code of colonial conduct binding upon all colonial powers."

(The full text is given by David Hunter Miller in „My Diary at the Conference of Paris“, Vol. II, pages 69—80.)

"Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered"

The 4 Points of the Address to Congress of February 11th, 1918

The principles to be applied are these:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now for ever discredited, of the balance of power; but that

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and

Fourth, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages.

" not upon the bases of material advantages"

From the speech in Mount Vernon of July 4th, 1918

These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace:

2. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the bases of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the bases of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

"No special or separate interest"

From the speech in New York on September 27th, 1918

1. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

2. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the bases of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

And the Result:

The Versailles Conditions of May 7th, 1919

Art. 119. Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions.

The results of this renunciation, i. e. **the seizure not only of German State property, but also of private movable and immovable property and capital**, are given in detail in Articles 120 to 127, 156 to 158, 246, 257 to 260, 297 and 438.

The Veiling of the Colonial Seizure:

The Mandatory System of the League of Nations

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations

1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order or morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

6. There are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical

contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

8. The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

Article 23

Subject to and in accordance with provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:

a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for, men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations;

b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;

c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;

d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunitions with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;

e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914—1918 shall be borne in mind;

f) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

Germany's Struggle for a Just Colonial Peace

I. Before May 7th, 1919

Dr. Solf, Secretary of State of the German Colonial Office, on August 20th, 1918 in the "Deutsche Gesellschaft" Berlin.

Gentlemen, we have a report to-day of one of the most important statements of British policy, Mr. Balfour's speech in the House of Commons. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs formally announces Great Britain's claim to the annexation of our colonies, and does not hesitate to give moral reasons for this claim. This is necessary in England. For this purpose he deals not only with our colonial methods, but enters widely into questions of high policy, takes a moralising trip through the world and in conclusion proclaims the British creed the object of which is to represent England's right to world domination as self-evident while morally destroying Germany's claim to be a Great Power.

Gentlemen, Balfour's charge against Germany demands a reply. To be silent would be to assume joint responsibility for the defamation of our Fatherland. I will therefore deal with some of the points in Mr. Balfour's speech, in so far as they are contained in the telegraphic summary. . . .

I now come to Mr. Balfour's remarks about the colonies which I quote in extenso:

"We have extended our territory, we have taken Germany's colonies, and I do not think that anyone who has really studied German colonial methods will be surprised when we say that there is a great improvement."

He then proceeds as follows:

"Shall we give back the colonies to Germany and thus enable her to erect submarine bases on all the great commercial routes of the world and place world trade at her disposal? German rule in the colonies would mean tyrannical rule over the natives and the setting up of great black armies in Central Africa."

Gentlemen, in other words, England conquers a country, asserts that she can rule it better than its legal owner and deduces therefrom a claim to its annexation. With such arguments it would be possible to declare a British Monroe doctrine for the world.

I should like to put the following questions:

Does the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs know nothing of the decimation of the coloured population in various African colonies through the action of the Entente, or of the compulsory levies in British East Africa which have been admitted in the House of Commons, or of the enormous armies of labourers and soldiers from British and French colonies? Has he asked his colleague in the British Colonial Office what it means to wage war with natives against natives? Has he any idea of the immeasurable damage to the colonial mission of all civilised nations which must be caused by bringing black men to Europe and using them to fight against white men?

Does Mr. Balfour seriously doubt that the fate of the whole of Africa would have been better, if England had not failed to observe the Congo Act? Has he forgotten that Germany is the only belligerent Power that has expressly included among its war aims the abolition of militarism in Africa?

Is Mr. Balfour at present prepared to make the same promise for Great Britain and definitely to break with French methods and Churchill's plans? Gentlemen, I do not expect a reply to these questions. Mr. Balfour's speech should not merit a statesmanlike explanation. The khaki elections throw their shadow before them. The short history of our colonies shows that we neither desire to carry on, nor have carried on, an aggressive policy either in Africa or in the South Seas. We do not seek for supremacy and predominance, we want an adjustment among the colonial States. We desire a settlement of colonial questions on the principle that colonial possession must correspond to the economic strength of the European nations and their worthiness, as proved by history, to protect the coloured races entrusted to them. Economic capacity alone is not a sufficient title. **To colonise is to carry on missionary work.** The States which endeavoured to act on this principle before the War and which respected humanity even in coloured peoples have acquired the moral right to be colonial Powers.

Germany had acquired this right before the War. The gesture of liberation which makes the annexation of the German colonies plausible as a work of God, is blasphemy. It appears to Mr. Balfour to be quite natural to give moral justification for the robber instinct of British imperialism.

It is so natural to him that he does not notice how ridiculous it is in one breath to stigmatise Germany's effort at general supremacy, and to make a confession of unveiled annexationist policy in Africa and Asia.

Dr. Solf, Secretary of State of the German Colonial Office, in an article in the journal "Das neue Deutschland".

I have defined our colonial programme in public speeches as follows: the recovery of the German protectorates and their development into a strong and economically productive structure, while at the same time preventing the danger which threatens the peace of Europe from the planned militarisation of Africa. This wording indicates the main bases for the continuance of our colonial policy. They are partly of a political character: we must have a share in the domination of territories outside Europe if we are not to glide down to the level of the smaller Powers, and, by means of our own possessions especially in Africa, we must avoid the danger that has been made clear by the present War that future wars might be waged against us with mass armies of a lower race. The reasons which compel us to continue our colonial activity are also of an economic character. It becomes clearer from day to day, even to the most pessimistic, that we must secure an adequate share of the raw materials essential for our economic existence. Our enemies openly threaten a blockade of raw materials. Even if we succeeded in averting this menace on the conclusion of peace, we should be permanently dependent on the grace of foreign Powers without any possibility of obtaining a part of the most necessary raw materials in our own territory. **Consequently, the open door and freedom of trade in overseas countries, in spite of all the value we shall continue to attach to them in future, will not alone suffice.** On the other hand, we are not thinking of cutting off the colonies from foreign trade, just as, in opposition to the French and Portuguese, we have hitherto never known a differential treatment of foreign persons and goods in our protectorates.

In view of my past in respect of colonial policy, in particular my attitude to the treatment of natives and the missions, I do not need to point out that, in addition to cogent political and economic reasons, there are equally cogent and important cultural reasons. There is agreement between ourselves and the enemy camp that the rule set up by civilised nations over wide territories in Africa and the South Seas cannot and may not be withdrawn without inflicting damage on the native population and without their falling back into chaotic conditions. This rightly leads up to the task of maintaining the rule of the advanced races with the object of gradually leading the backward peoples of these territories to a higher stage of intellectual and moral development. It is the right and duty of each of the great civilised States to take part in this task with which civilisation is faced. We do not want to shirk co-operation in this sphere and we cannot tolerate that other States keep us from it out of jealousy or disfavour. Our enemies are well acquainted with the cultural aspect of the colonial problem. It even forms the arsenal from which they are accustomed to take what they consider to be the most effective weapons against the restoration of our colonial empire. Everything that the British rightly brought forward for years in a press campaign against their present allies, the Belgians, and the acts of cruelty with which Leopold of Belgium and his Congo Government were charged, is now transformed and applied to us to an increased extent. How many English, French and even Belgian writers have written variations on the theme that the civilised nations could not take it upon themselves to allow the Germans, who had carried on a brutal policy of extermination and exploitation against the natives, to have a further opportunity of practising

their dreadful colonial methods. These are the writings of the Congo League with a fresh title and a fresh binding. These accusations are as unfounded as they are lacking in originality; their originators, in so far as they know our colonial work, are deliberately disseminating false information. We need not be afraid of comparison with any other colonial State, including Great Britain, and we can energetically repudiate the criticism of our enemies and the conclusions which they draw.

From the point of view of politics, the relationship of the physical forces of the States, and from the point of view of economic policy, the relationship of their needs and economic capacity, must be taken as a basis for the distribution of the colonial territories of the world among the Powers wishing to take part in them; similarly, from the point of view of cultural policy, the cultural capacity of the various States must be taken as a gauge of their right to co-operate in the education and advancement of the native races. It is sufficient to refer to the excessive possessions of France, Portugal, and Belgium in order to show that the present distribution is not in accordance with these standards. We demand that, in the conclusion of peace, there should be a redistribution more in accordance with the above standards, and are convinced that this will lead to an equilibrium in the colonial sphere which will remove future possibilities of conflict and thus serve the cause of the desired world peace.

**Statement by the German Government, on
January 14th, 1919 (WTB).**

In the Entente press, propaganda is being carried on in order to deprive Germany of her colonies. In this connection the Government of the Reich points out that for the future peace both the Allies and Germany have accepted unconditionally Mr. Wilson's proposals for settling the colonial questions. These ensure a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims. The Government of the Reich takes the view **that colonies are indispensable for the German nation.** A peace which would deprive Germany of her colonies would be unjust and would leave behind it permanently a feeling of violence.

**Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Minister
of Foreign Affairs.**

Interview by the Berlin correspondent of
the Chicago Daily News, February 2nd, 1919.

At the present time the die is being cast in Paris regarding the German colonies. Our enemies are engaged in dividing among themselves the German protectorates which they have seized to the detriment of essential interests of the white race. A Reuter's telegram, which is however unconfirmed, even reports that President Wilson has requested the Australian Government to state its legal grounds for the occupation of the German colonies in the South Seas.

Germany cannot admit that her property be disposed of without her consent. She does not recognise any legal grounds for the spoliation committed. She demands her share in the new arrangements for the rule of the white race over the tropical territories and in the distribution of their products.

The fifth of President Wilson's fourteen points states that one of the tasks of world peace is a free, open-minded and impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, in which the interests of the native population must have an equal place with the justified demands of the Government whose legal claim to colonial sovereignty is to be established. During the Paris discussions, if we are correctly informed, the President then expressed the principle that the colonies should be placed under international control. Before accepting the armistice conditions, Germany recognised President Wilson's fourteen points, and the Entente also accepted these points, in particular No. 5, without any restrictions. Germany assumes that the principle of the international control applies to the colonies of all Powers of the European sphere of culture.

It is true that England tried, by means of a calumnious Blue Book, to represent German colonial rule as intolerable; this attempt must fail in view of the testimony given by the first minds of England as to the colonising sins of their own people. We Germans are far from wishing to deny that during the bare generation that Germany has carried on a colonial policy mistakes occurred; we merely affirm that they do not remotely approach the devastations caused by other colonising nations at the beginning of their activity. We can refer to a large number of testimonies from

foreign visitors who, shortly before the outbreak of the War, praised the German administration in the protectorates and held it up as an example.

The German nation has proved its capacity for colonising work in Asia and Africa. In any case, like any other great nation, it has a claim to a share in the products of the tropical zones and in the development of the territories from which they are obtained. In case all the tropical colonies were to be placed under international control, it would demand an adequate territorial share in the administration of the entire tropical colonial areas.

If, as the newspapers report on the Paris negotiations, France, England and Belgium are pursuing the plan of dividing the colonies among themselves, they are departing from the principles on which a League of Nations can be erected in the sense of President Wilson's messages. Quite apart from the breach of the Congo Act, the seizure of the German colonies by the victors would be equivalent to a legitimisation of violence against which the Entente is alleged to have waged war. It is not in the interest of the community of nations that England, as a result of every war in which she takes part, gathers in a rich harvest of colonial possessions, as she has succeeded in doing for two hundred years. It is not in the interest of the community of nations that France should constantly extend her colonial possessions, which she is even now incapable of administering from an economic and demographic point of view, in order to reserve them exclusively for her own financiers by keeping out the other nations. If France acquires the Cameroons and Togoland, so that the French and Belgian Governments together command almost the whole of Central Africa, it will be a bad thing both for the activity of other nations in this rich area of tropical production and for the natives of the territory.

The natural development of Central Africa urgently demands internationalisation. It is not clear why the soil of Africa should be divided up among European Powers who have no other title to it than a conquest which is contrary to international law, while other nations have at least the same interest as themselves in the development of the territories that have been divided up.

The dividing up of the plunder among Germany's enemies would be particularly odious in view of the fact that during the War they acted with particular harshness towards the German missions which had admittedly done very valuable work in raising the level of the natives. Just as Germany readily recognises the services of the French white fathers in East Africa, she must demand that her opponents should do justice to the work of her missions in the east and west of the Continent. Apart from the European belligerents, however, other nations also take part in missionary work in Africa. They must take care that the future of Christian missions and the free co-operation of their members are not jeopardised by a harsh nationalisation of African territory and its division into capitalistic zones of exploitation.

It is not the aim of German colonial policy that all tropical colonies should be placed directly under an international government authority; but we also consider the better solution would be an adequate allocation of the colonial territories to individual nations for administration under their own responsibility. But the administration of the individual States must be under a controlling authority of the League of Nations which opposes to the strong interest of exploitation by the mother country the humanitarian interest of a benevolent treatment of the native population.

**Open Letter from the German Colonial
Association to President Wilson, of April 20th,
1919.**

Before the whole world, we address you the question: From what sources have you obtained your information about the German colonies? Was it from the British Blue Books of July 1916 and August 1918? We reject these as tendentious, and in part false. As you yourself have hitherto been unable to visit the German colonies, there remained the possibility of obtaining reports from unprejudiced experts in America and neutral countries as to conditions in the German colonies. Only persons who know the German colonies from their own thorough observation are entitled to judge our action against the natives. Did you adopt this method of obtaining correct and thorough information? We cannot think so; otherwise your judgment would have been different. But even among our enemies you could and can even now find experts (we may mention among the English Hamilton

German Treatment and Education of Natives

"Contrary to what has been frequently asserted during these past two years, public opinion in Germany as we have already seen in the matter of the putting down of the Herero rebellion in South West Africa has been very much alive to the responsibility of Germany towards her native wards. One has only to read the newspapers and reviews, and to look over booth lists, and to go through parliamentary debates during the past fifteen years, to realize that only in Great Britain among all the European colonizing Powers, has there been manifested as much humanitarianism and idealism as in Germany with regard to the establishment and maintenance of a just and enlightened colonial regime. At this moment it is exceedingly important that this statement be made by one

who cannot be suspected of sympathizing with Germany in the present war or of trying to plead the German cause. The truth is the truth. Only on the truth can the future be built."

The American Herbert Adam Gibbon
in his book "The new Map of Africa", 1916

"The Germans have done real wonders in the sphere of education. . . . The education of the natives was violently interrupted by the Great War. . . . It will take some time before education is again on the level it had reached under the Germans."

The British Governor of Tanganyika on
the successes of German cultural work



School at Wuga (German East Africa)



Geography teaching in the girls' school at Lome (Togoland)



In the Bethel Printing Works at Wuga



Bookbinding



Elementary School in Windhuk.



Secondary School in Windhuk.



Girls' School in South West Africa.



Bodelschwingh School in Lumbwa (German East Africa).

Below: The German Togo-Bund is the society of pro-German Togoland negroes, who regard the Germans as the legitimate owners of the country and agitate for their return.



Right: Native laboratory assistants in the Disease Institute of Daressalam (German East Africa).



and Sir Harry Johnston, among the Americans Roosevelt and Gibbons, among the French Paul Leroy and the correspondent of the «*Dépêche coloniale*»), who have openly expressed their conviction both before and during the War in our favour.

Many official German publications show how carefully our officials enter into the peculiarities of the coloured races, how strictly our judges condemn injustice and cruelty towards natives, how many schools for natives there are in the German colonies, how many millions were spent each year on the health of the natives, how many German doctors—at the head of whom was Robert Koch whom the whole of America has highly honoured—have gone to the colonies in order to investigate, to heal and to combat tropical diseases, to reduce infantile mortality and in short to raise the health and moral level of the natives. What a vast work has been accomplished by the German Christian missions in German (and also in foreign) colonies! But the best proof of our native policy is provided by the course of the war in East Africa. How would it have been possible for our protectorate troops, cut off as they were from Europe, to resist for four years the British, Belgian, and Portuguese troops which were many times their number, if the entire population had not helped them? If we were really the cruel torturers we were made out to be, the natives would certainly have attacked the small scattered troops and taken revenge on their oppressors. Nothing of the kind occurred, but the contrary was the case. Such fidelity cannot be gained by compulsory measures, however, strict; these natives kept faith with us to the end, because we had inspired them with confidence and they were cordially attached to us. Can any colonial Power in the world point to such success for their colonising activity? Certainly not.

In the German mother country also constant interest has been taken in the natives; a society for the protection of natives formed by the undersigned Association counts among its members the best names of German scientists, missionaries and friends of the colonies and has frequently exercised its influence with good effect. We Germans have a right to be proud and are only to be envied for what we have done for the natives of our colonies and for the way they have recompensed us in time of need.

In your speech in Paris on February 14th, Mr. President, you said: "The States will be sought out who have already shown that they are capable of acting conscientiously in this matter and, under their guidance, new light and new hope will be brought to the helpless peoples of the world." Have you convinced yourself, Mr. President, whether this judgment of English, French, Belgians, and Portuguese (for you could only have meant them) is really justified? Who broke the Congo Act, and who brought the war to Africa? Who used their colonies for European purposes? Not we, but those who used coloured soldiers in hundreds of thousands in the struggle against white men and thereby damaged for ever the supremacy of the white race. Who is to blame that in East Africa alone about three quarters of a million natives fell victims to famine and disease? It was not done by us Germans but by those who attacked our colonies. Have you, Mr. President, never heard of the acts of cruelty of the British on the Putumayo, in New Zealand, Tasmania, and Ireland, and of those of the Belgians in the Congo? Do you know how shamelessly Great Britain still exploits the Indian peoples? Do you know that about a million people die there of malaria every year, even now when, thanks to the activity of the Americans in the Panama Canal, we know that this disease is on the whole to be prevented? Have you read the judgments of Indian and Egyptian patriots with regard to the British administration? Are you aware that in Morocco, Senegambia, Northern Rhodesia, and recently in Egypt, bloody risings have broken out among the "helpless peoples" against those who, as you believe, are so pre-eminently called upon to guide these very peoples? Has no word come to your ears of the ill-treatment meted out by the French and applied by their black soldiers to the defenceless German military and civil prisoners? Have you read the publications of the German Colonial Office with their atrocious details? Certainly not. Otherwise you could not conscientiously praise these nations and could not hand over to them the defenceless natives in order to bring them "new light and new hopes".

In point 5 of your message of January 8th, 1918, you solemnly announced to the world your desire for "a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims". Trusting in your word, Germany laid down her arms. Is this trust now to

be betrayed? It must be doubly painful to every German that you in particular, Mr. President, should lend your ear only to our enemies while heaping unjust charges upon us. Ask neutral experts who have become acquainted without prejudice with conditions in the German and foreign colonies from their own experience and who can compare the two. If they, as we confidently expect, give us no worse certificate than the other colonising nations, then we demand that you, as an honourable man, should confess openly to the world: "I was mistaken, I was wrongly informed." Then, when this sole reason for withholding our colonies is removed, we demand that you should, at the eleventh hour, use the enormous influence which is placed in your hands in order that the German nation may not be for ever deprived of the colonies which are a vital necessity to them. We are confident that all your endeavours are aimed at the victory and majesty of right; the first principle of right is that the accused should also be heard. We demand nothing more from you than justice.

Broadcast to the British nation by General von Lettow-Vorbeck, May 1919.

For over four years a devoted group of brave white and black men under my command defended Germany's right to her colonies. We lost the fight but not the right.

I am a simple soldier and cannot talk to you of politics. But the colonies of my fatherland mean more than politics. They now mean life or death for our people. Let no nation be so unreasonable as to think it can be responsible for choking our seventy millions in the centre of Europe. We urgently require for our New Germany a space for our emigrants, settlers, teachers, and missionaries. We demand the return of our African territories in order to be able to feed our people and to obtain certain raw materials for ourselves.

I appeal to the intelligence and justice of the British nation. What would you have felt if you had been threatened with losing your colonies and being choked on your little island? That is how we feel to-day.

We are filled with shame and anger and can hardly believe that this crime is really planned against us. It is a crime that no nation could forget or forgive.

We have thousands of young men as restless and as adventurous as your own. We need our colonies as an outlet for their healthy, peaceful forces. The qualities required by a bold, determined colonist, are precisely those which, if misled, make an unscrupulous criminal or anarchist.

We have worked for many years to build up our few colonies and to develop them to the advantage of white and black. We are young as a colonising Power and have made our mistakes. But in the very last years before the War, you, who were our neighbours in Africa, did not stint your praise for what we had accomplished. In our African house, we kept the door open and all nations were welcome.

It has been said that we treated our natives badly. In this connection we are afraid of no comparison with any other nation. During the terrible last four years our faithful Askaris and black bearers fought for us, worked hard and suffered death, side by side with us to the last. Your own soldiers will tell you what careful treatment your own wounded white and black troops received from us. When our Fatherland collapsed and we were compelled to give up the unequal struggle in Africa, your officers said: "It is natural that you must get back your colonies; England has more than she can look after."

That is a proved truth and a self-evident justice. Must England, with her mighty world empire, envy us our few possessions? The colonies of the German nation cannot be regarded in this new epoch of the world as a military prize of victory or as a political pawn.

I speak in the name of those who fought with me, of the young generations whose sole hope lies in our overseas lands. Englishmen, play a fair game in this great crisis of history.

Restore our property to us and do not let yourselves be led by a short-sighted policy to commit a crime which is at the same time an act of folly.

I do not know whether this appeal and protest will reach your ears. But as I know that it is the cry of a whole nation, I also know that it cannot be suppressed, that it will be written in the book of history and will one day be heard.

General von Lettow-Vorbeck.

II. After May 7th, 1919

The German Reply to the Peace Conditions of May 7th, 1919

Part 1. General Remarks

The settlement of the colonial question is equally contradictory to a peace of justice. For the essence of activity in colonial work does not consist in capitalistic exploitation of a less developed human race, but in raising backward peoples to a higher civilization. This gives the Powers which are advanced in culture a natural claim to take part in colonial work. Germany whose colonial accomplishments cannot be denied, has also this natural claim, which is not recognized by a treaty of peace that deprives Germany of all of her colonies.

10. Colonies

Article 119 of the draft demands that Germany shall renounce all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions. This regulation is in irreconcilable contradiction to point 5 of the Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, in which President Wilson promises a free, sincere and absolutely impartial settlement of all colonial claims. The basis of every impartial settlement is that, before the decision, the parties should be heard and their claims examined. Article 119 at once rejects the German claims without even giving Germany a chance to put them forward.

Germany's claim to her colonies is, first of all, based on the fact that she has acquired them lawfully and has developed them by means of incessant and fruitful toil and at the cost of many sacrifices. Her ownership of them has been acknowledged by all the Powers. Whenever conflicts have arisen with other Powers over particular sections of territory, they have been settled by means of agreements or arbitration.

The possession of her colonies will be even more necessary for Germany in the future than in the past, since, if only on account of her low rate of exchange, she must be able to acquire from her own colonies, as far as possible, the raw materials necessary to her economic life. Her earning capacity having been reduced owing to the result of the war, she also requires the profits accruing from home production.

Moreover, Germany needs her colonies as a market for her industries, in order that she may be able to pay for raw materials with her own manufactures and may have a field of activity for commerce. Germany is looking towards these resources to meet the liabilities imposed upon her in the peace treaty.

Finally, Germany requires colonies in order to have territory where at least a part of her surplus population may settle, the more so as the result of the war increases the necessity for, and reduces the possibility of emigration.

As a great civilized nation the German people have the right and the duty to cooperate in the joint task which devolves upon civilized mankind of exploring the world scientifically and of educating the backward races. In this direction she has achieved great things in her colonies. This assertion, and the claim based upon it, are not affected by the fact that, in the administration of the German colonies, blunders and mistakes have been made such as are to be found in the colonial history of all nations. Germany has a moral claim to the right to continue her successful work.

The interests of the coloured population in these regions are based likewise upon Germany's right to remain in the possession of her colonies. The German administration has abolished the devastating and incessant predatory warfare between the tribes, the high-handedness of the chiefs and witch-doctors, the kidnapping of slaves and the slave-trade, and the accompanying insecurity of life and property. It has brought peace and order to the country, and has created the conditions necessary for the safety of intercourse and commerce. An impartial jurisdiction, taking into consideration the point of view and customs of the natives, offered protection from oppression and exploitation, even by the white man. The opening of the country, by means of roads and railways, to world intercourse and its own trade, and the promotion of the existing culture and the introduction of a new civilization have raised the economic life of the natives to a higher level. The administration endeavoured, at the same time, to protect the na-

tive population by means of far-reaching social provisions, especially by labour legislation and the control of the conclusion of contracts between white men and natives. The scientific investigation and the methodical fighting of human and animal diseases (malaria, smallpox, sleeping-sickness, rinderpest) in which first-rate German experts, like Robert Koch, took an active part, comprehensive sanitary and hygienic measures, and the erection of hospitals have had the most beneficial effects on the life and health of the natives.

A well-organized system of education, including vocational and agricultural schools, provided intellectual and practical education for the natives. The German colonies belonged to the most rapidly and most hopefully developing fields of activity of the Christian missions of both faiths.

From all this it is apparent that Germany has looked after the interests of her natives. She has, in particular, from the outset strictly refrained from militarizing her natives in any way, and she would, therefore, unconditionally agree to an international prohibition of militarization. Germany has hitherto taken a most active part in all international regulation of important colonial questions, such as the abolition of the slave-trade, the suppression of the arms traffic, the liquor traffic and the combating of sleeping-sickness. Even when there was no international obligation, Germany has always—in contradistinction to some other important colonial Powers—adhered to the principle of the open door in her colonies, according the same treatment to foreign subjects as to her own.

Numerous ante-war testimonials of foreign colonial writers of repute, as well as the loyalty of the natives in the German colonies during the war, especially in East Africa, bear witness to the sincerity and the great successes of German colonization.

For the above reasons, the demand of the enemy contained in Articles 119 and 125, that Germany renounce her colonies, is considered unjustified.

Without in any way abandoning or modifying her refusal to renounce her colonies, the following remark is added—with a proviso that it may be supplemented—regarding the conditions under which the cession is demanded:

The demand that all movable and immovable State property in the colonies is to pass into the hands of the mandatory powers without compensation, is unfair and is an unwarranted exception to the principle that Germany shall be credited with the value of the State property in the territories ceded by her. As to the question of debt, the draft of the peace treaty will not allow the ceded colonies or the mandatory powers to take over part of the debt of the Empire and of the Federal States. It ought, accordingly, to be demanded that the State into whose keeping the colonies pass should compensate Germany for all the expenditures which were incurred by the Empire for the benefit of the colonies in question and for their administration, and that the territories to be ceded should continue to be responsible for the liabilities incurred by them.

German private property is to be at the arbitrary disposal of the mandatory States. These may liquidate all property of Germans and of companies controlled by Germans; they may continue the war measures and introduce new measures of the same kind. Moreover, the mandatory States may, according to their own pleasure, drive the Germans from house and home, even if they have been resident there for years or have been born there, and may permanently debar Germans from taking up any activity in the country. Regardless of all principles of international and public laws, this regulation makes the German an outlaw as far as private right and personal liberty of movement are concerned.

The demand that Germany should compensate French subjects for losses suffered before the War, is in contradiction to the armistice agreement and is unfair in other respects as well.

The demand that Germany is blindly to submit, for all time, to the will of her opponents in regard to the subjects treated in the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels is likewise unfair to a degree.

Accordingly, the German Government arrives at the following conclusions in regard to the German protectorates:

1. For the formal treatment of colonial questions, the following proposal is made:

In No. 5 of the fourteen points of President Wilson's address to Congress of January 8th, 1918, an absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial demands is assured. An impartial adjustment implies the hearing of both parties before a decision is arrived at. Such a hearing has not taken place. In the light of that assurance, and particularly in the light of the principle that in the adjustment of colonial claims the interests of the Governments should carry equal weight with those of the population, the proposal is made that the colonial questions be handed over to a special committee.

2. The following proposal applies to the practical adjustment:

The demand contained in Articles 119 et seq. of the draft of peace, concerning Germany's renunciation of her oversea possessions cannot, in the opinion of the German Peace Delegation, be brought into harmony with the stipulations of the armistice, which are based on point 5 of the message of January 8, 1918, to the Congress of the United States. The German Government, on the contrary, considers her claim to the restoration of her colonial possessions just. Germany is ready, however, to administer her colonies according to the principles of the League of Nations—possibly as the mandatory of the latter—if a League of Nations is formed which she can enter at once as a member State, enjoying equal privileges with the other members.

Expert opinion of the Colonial Commission of the German Delegation to the Peace Conference

I. Cession of the German Colonies

A. Contents of the Draft

The conditions of peace require that Germany should renounce her rights and titles in respect of her oversea possessions in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers (Art. 119).

The whole settlement of the future of the German colonies is really nothing other than annexation. In the case of Togoland and the Cameroons, the fact is quite open; indeed, it is only faintly veiled by the interposition of the mandate system. That the system was introduced solely in order to cover the annexation is plain from the fact that it is confined to the German colonies, whereas the general principle on which the system is based would have to be applied to the colonies of other States if it were intended to be seriously carried out. It is also clear that sovereignty over the colonies is to be conferred directly upon the mandatory Powers, and not upon the League of Nations (Art. 257).

B. Principles of the Basis of Peace regarding Colonies

When they concluded the Armistice, the belligerent Powers agreed that the basis of the peace treaty, so far as colonies were concerned, should be an unbiassed, honourable, and absolutely impartial settlement of all colonial claims, governed by the strict observance of the principle that in dealing with all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations affected must carry as much weight as the reasonable demands of the Government whose legal title was to be determined (Point V of the Address to Congress of January 8th, 1918). This clause was obviously designed to lead to a general scrutiny of the existing colonial system; and that was how the German Government construed it. To serve the cause of world peace, and to meet the reformed conception of the nature of colonisation, any fresh settlement of the colonial system had to be dominated by the fundamental idea of a far-reaching internationalisation of colonial territories and a distribution of territory better adapted to the productivity and economic and cultural needs of the colonial Powers. The Allied and Associated Powers seem to have given up any such idea. If the German colonies alone are to be made the subject of this scrutiny, then, on the basis of the Armistice terms, Germany has an indefeasible claim in international law to have the aforesaid Point V scrupulously applied. Accordingly, the decision as to the future of the German colonies must be governed by the interests of their inhabitants and the legitimate claims of Germany. Besides, there can be no question that the old principle of "no annexations" applies equally to colonies.

C. The Conditions compared with the Basis of Peace

1. German Colonial Administration

The cession of the German colonies, demanded in the draft peace treaty, is incompatible with the Basis of Peace.

As regards the interests of their populations, these were fully secured under German administration. The natives are still at a definitely lower stage of human civilisation, and are therefore in need of the protection and guidance of a modern civilised State. The possession of protective powers over backward peoples carries with it the obligation to civilise and develop them. In administering its colonies, the German Government has been guided by this high conception of the true nature of colonisation. It has not itself economically exploited these territories in the sole interest of the mother-country, nor has it allowed anybody else to do so. After many difficulties, such as all colonial Powers have to overcome, had been dealt with, this fundamental principle came to be recognised with increasing clearness during the last decade before the war, and was adopted as the guiding rule for the practical activities of the local administrative authorities; as witness the speeches of responsible German statesmen, the colonial literature of Germany, and the character and results of her colonial administration itself. In the matter of care for the physical and moral welfare of the natives, the German colonial administration was equal to that of the best-governed foreign colonies. The experience it gathered, its insight into the needs of its subjects, and its high sense of responsibility, offer every guarantee of the conscientious treatment and development of the native peoples in the future.

In the German colonies, internal peace, the foundation of all further development, was established and assured. Government and the administration of justice were in the hands of a competent civil service, whose first care was the welfare of the natives. Their organisations, customs, and legal conceptions were to a wide extent preserved and respected. Military occupation was reduced to a minimum; only in the larger African colonies were there bodies of troops, and relatively small, while in none were there naval stations, fortifications to resist enemies from without, or any organisation for militarising the native population. The entire revenue was left in the hands of the colonies, and, in addition, the Reich subsidised them out of its own resources, in order to facilitate their development. No other colonial Power outstripped Germany in the struggle against slavery and the slave-trade, and against the traffic in arms and liquor. The engagement of labour for European undertakings, and the protection of the labourers from exploitation, were dealt with by far-reaching legislation, and were always a subject of special vigilance; forced labour was forbidden. The prevalent social diseases were everywhere successfully combated with all the resources of tropical medicine, and health conditions were steadily improved. Good Government schools and State-aided Christian missions, German and other, worked to raise the moral and intellectual level of the natives, and there were vocational and agricultural schools to spread technical knowledge. Remarkable work was done in opening up the territories by constructing harbours, roads, and railways. The food-supply was assured; the training of the natives to work and the exploitation of the resources of the soil by native cultivation and plantations were progressing excellently. All the colonies were open to all comers; there was complete freedom of trade and absolute equality of treatment for all nations. In all these fields of colonial activity, Germany worked with the utmost zeal and with powerful resources, in the right spirit, towards a clearly-conceived end. The result was to be seen in the rapid economic and cultural expansion of the German colonies, which, in those respects, kept at least abreast of the neighbouring foreign possessions.

The natives themselves were content with the German administration, with few exceptions, the special reasons for which are easy to explain. Risings ceased to occur during the last few years before the War. The attitude adopted by the natives during the War itself is irrefutable evidence of their loyalty and attachment. Whereas in some of the colonies of the enemy Powers, despite the large forces available, extensive risings had to be put down, the native population of the German colonies, apart from purely sporadic incidents, remained completely quiet and readily assisted in the defence of the territories, although they knew that the German Administration was in an extremely precarious position. This is especially true of German East Africa, which could never have defended itself at all but for the

support of the natives. Furthermore, the German Government is convinced, and has evidence, that the great majority of the natives in all the colonies desire the restoration of German rule. Occasional voices may be raised against it; but everybody who knows how prone primitive folk are to give the answer that they think the questioner wishes to hear, and how easily they are influenced, will realise with what caution such statements must be regarded.

Both before and even, to some extent, during the War, a large number of expert opinions, including some from the Allied and Associated Powers, were expressed in recognition of the fine spirit of the German colonial administration, its efficiency in colonisation, and the results of its work up to that time. The negotiations between England and Germany shortly before the War on Central African questions make it clear that at that time the British Government was far from finding fault with Germany's colonial work. If an attempt is now to be made, by producing material of all kinds, to prove that Germany pursued a policy of oppression, exploitation, and maltreatment, not to say extermination, towards the natives of her colonies, and if decisions are to be taken on that basis, then there must first be an impartial investigation of the facts. It is not to be denied that mistakes were made and faults committed, both by individual officials and by the Administration as such; but the great majority of them occurred prior to the latest period of German colonial policy, and can therefore be of no decisive importance. Nor is it possible to judge of the system as a whole from isolated occurrences. Lastly, it is easy enough to point to similar mistakes in the enemy colonies. On the charges brought against its colonial administration, the German Government is prepared to appear before any tribunal or other authority whose impartiality and fitness to judge is assured.

As to the decision about South West Africa, unless the right of self-determination is to be grossly infringed, the wishes of the local white settlers, who have grown up with the country, cannot be overridden. Five sixths of them are German, and it is to their interest that the German connexion should be maintained, because that is the only way for them to preserve their national characteristics. In any case, that is the decision the population will take if it is given the opportunity.

2. The German Claims

a) Legal Title

Germany's claim to her colonies rests primarily on the fact that they were acquired in accordance with international law by treaty with the natives and by agreement with the interested Powers. The greater part of the territory previously belonged to none of the States which form part of the international community. The rest (the East African coastal strips, the Caroline Islands, and the New Cameroons) were acquired by purchase or exchange. In every case possession was taken with much less friction than in other colonies, where protracted wars of conquest took place. Germany's title to her colonies is therefore unassailable, and at least as good as the title of any other country to its oversea possessions. Apart from that, Germany can point to her thirty years of successful colonial work, which gives her a moral right to the return of her colonies. In this connexion, reference may also be made to the achievements of numerous German savants and travellers who were active in the scientific exploration of Africa and the South Sea Islands both before and after the partition of those territories among the colonial States.

b) Economic Necessity

Germany's aim in acquiring her colonies was an economic one. Economic, too, are the considerations that make the preservation of her colonial possessions a matter of life and death, in consequence of the loss of the war and the terrible stringency of the peace-terms.

1. Sources of Raw Materials

Germany is obliged to import food and raw materials, in order to feed and clothe her population and maintain the activity of industry, on which a large part of her people are entirely dependent for employment and food. Tropical and subtropical countries are of increasing importance as sources of supply. Before the War, they accounted for not much less than half Germany's total imports of 11,000,000,000 marks. In the territories controlled by the Allied and Associated Powers, German

trade will in future have to contend with great difficulties, due to the transfers of sovereignty consequent upon the War and the effects of the economic War. This enhances the importance to Germany of her own colonies. True, they have so far provided only a small proportion of her imports; but that is due, not to any lack of capacity on their part, but to the fact that they were only in the early stages of economic development. In the future they may confidently be expected to yield large quantities of products of which Germany is in urgent need: their productive possibilities are assessed very highly by the best authorities. Moreover, to obtain supplies from her own colonies makes Germany's financial position easier, since they and the mother-country form a single monetary unit. Hence the cession of the colonies, which is now demanded, would deprive Germany of a large part of her economic development. It is in the best interests of the Allied and Associated Powers to ensure that Germany's needs in the way of food and raw materials from abroad are met, because on that depend the continuance of German industry and the whole economic life of the country, without which it will be impossible for Germany to meet the financial obligations imposed upon her.

2. Markets

As an industrial country, Germany also needs her colonies as markets for her exports, from which alone she can obtain the means to make the foreign payments involved by her imports of raw materials and the reparations required by the Peace Treaty. As they are progressively opened up and their production increases, the German colonies will acquire a greater capacity to absorb manufactured goods, and in the comparatively near future will become important markets for German industry—the more important because Germany's trade relations with a considerable proportion of her old clientèle have been interrupted by the War.

3. Settlement Territories.

In the future the emigration question will again become important for Germany, because the home country will no longer be able to provide all its inhabitants with food and work. This effect would be exceedingly pronounced if the territorial and economic terms of the Allied and Associated Powers were carried out; but in any event the difficult conditions brought about by the loss of the War would compel many thousands of Germans to seek a living abroad. Access to the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers, to which the areas hitherto generally preferred for emigration belong, will be made difficult, if not impossible, for Germans. On the other hand, Germany's own colonies stand open to them. True, only a comparatively small number of Germans have hitherto gone to live in them; but that will be altered by the pressure of the home country's economic difficulties. Even in the tropical colonies, the highlands, which are suitable for permanent settlement, and in which there is room for plenty of Europeans provided they only expect to make a living, will be largely resorted to. The objections that have been made in the past to white settlement in the tropics will yield to the threat of poverty and hardship in the home country. In this way the colonies can provide a safety-valve against over-population at home.

c) Idealistic Grounds

Apart from her urgent economic necessities, Germany has idealistic grounds for demanding the return of her colonies.

The colonisation of undeveloped countries and the civilisation of their peoples is a task imposed on the whole of civilised humanity. Every civilised nation has an indefeasible claim to take part in it; and Germany makes this claim with the utmost emphasis. The task is such an enormous one that the development of the territories in question would suffer if Germany's cooperation were to cease. To exclude Germany, against her will, from taking her share in colonisation, would be to expel her from the civilised community, and that would be irreconcilable with the highest principles and with the spirit of the basis agreed upon for peace.

Many millions of Germans have the Christian mission to the heathen close at heart, and their interest in it is deeply rooted in their Christian faith. Since Germany acquired colonies of her own, the German missionary movement has assumed greatly increased proportions, and the missionary idea has for the first time become the common possession of German Christendom. Incalculable harm would be done to the life of the Church and to popular religion if the German people were to be deprived of the

possibility of continuing its colonial mission, which has so vastly developed within the last 30 years that at the outbreak of the war a third of all the German Protestant missions, and four fifths of all the Catholic, were working in the German colonies.

There are other important reactions on the home country that make it impossible for the German people to do without colonies of their own. Colonial experience is of the utmost scientific and technical value at home. Comparative philology, comparative law, ethnology, anthropology, and tropical medicine, to name only a few branches of science, have drawn from the colonies data of the greatest benefit to German and to all mankind. They have been responsible for the foundation of scientific institutions of worldwide fame. This is another reason why the loss of her colonies would injure Germany's intellectual life.

Lastly, in the hour of defeat, the German people as a whole needs an ideal goal, something transcending its own narrow frontiers, something to occupy its imagination. From this standpoint, too, the best Germans look upon the possession of colonies as an urgent necessity. Our adversaries themselves can judge whether it is good policy to deprive them of this outlet. They are aware that after the war of 1870-71 Germany not merely refrained from touching the French colonies, but did her utmost to encourage and assist the expansion of France's oversea empire.

It is not Germany's intention to pursue an ambitious militaristic policy in the colonies. Unlike other colonial Powers, she has refrained both from militarising the natives and from setting up other kinds of military establishment. In the future, her army and navy being reduced to insignificance, she will be quite unable to follow any other policy. That apart, she is prepared to offer guarantees making any exploitation of the colonies for military purposes impossible.

3. Conclusion

The German colonies form a comparatively small proportion of the colonial territories in the world. Of all the European colonial Powers engaged in the War, Germany has by far the smallest oversea dominions in proportion to the area and population of the home country. If peace is concluded in accordance with the draft that has been put forward, she will lose even that much, and will then be the only important industrial country in Europe that has no colonies. Their loss would be not only a severe material injury, but an additional serious obstacle to her economic development.

The conditions of peace contain no justification for the confiscation of the colonies. In this connexion, however, it is impossible to ignore the speech in which the President of the United States of America, on February 14th, 1919, introduced the draft of a League of Nations Covenant to the plenary assembly of the delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers. If that speech was correctly reported in the press, he said that Germany had inflicted the most intolerable burdens and injustices on the helpless people of some of her colonies, that she had considered it in her interest to exterminate them rather than to develop them, and that it had been her aim to obtain possession of the natives' land for European use, not to gain their confidence and so raise them to a higher stage of civilisation. This extremely unfavourable judgment of German colonial policy is a disgraceful affront to Germany, and the strongest exception is taken to it. Its only possible explanation is that an erroneous idea was formed from material selected with partiality and torn from its context.

Before so weighty a judgment was reached, morally annihilating Germany as a colonial Power for ever and representing her as unworthy ever to possess colonies again, the accused people ought, on the most elementary principles of justice and in accordance with the agreement that all colonial claims should be adjusted with absolute impartiality, to have been given the opportunity of defending themselves. As this was not thought necessary, the German delegation is obliged to demand the production of the material on which the judgment was based, and the opening of joint negotiations in a commission, in which it can decide its attitude and give a true picture of the principles, aims, and methods of German colonial administration. It assumes as a matter of course that this request will be granted, and is sure that, on impartial investigation, the charge that Germany is unworthy to possess colonies will be shown to be unfounded.

When it accepted President Wilson's message of January 8th, 1918, as a basis for peace, the German Government never doubted

that the colonies would be restored. Supported by the unanimous feeling of the German people, it regards the deliberate confiscation of the German colonies as an arbitrary violation of the basis of peace, to which it cannot subscribe.

II. The Internationalisation of Colonies

The demand for an international system of administration for all non-self-governing colonies is based upon two fundamental ideas: that the development of backward peoples and their lands is the common responsibility of all civilised countries, and that all nations have an equal right to economic and cultural activity in those territories. This demand is continually securing new adherents, but it is still a matter for the future. The first attempts to comply with it are to be found in the General Act of Berlin and Brussels, in the framing and execution of which Germany took a leading part.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, as drafted by the Allied and Associated Powers, lays down the principle (Art. 22) that the wellbeing and development of peoples which are not yet able to stand by themselves is a sacred trust of civilisation, but limits its application (apart from portions of Turkish territory) to the colonies that Germany is required to give up. That limitation in itself makes it plain that the Allied and Associated Powers are not taking the internationalisation of colonies seriously. How far the mandatory Powers are to be placed under any obligation in respect of the administration of the colonies entrusted to them by the League of Nations is a question that has already been touched upon in the introduction. The only general obligation applying to all the colonies of Members of the League (Art. 23, para. b) is the somewhat vague one that native peoples must receive suitable treatment.

Germany is only maintaining the attitude she has hitherto adopted towards this problem, when she says that she is willing to help in building up the international order in the colonies. But she demands on principle that all non-self-governing colonies should be included, and holds it necessary that the areas in respect of which an international settlement is to be reached should be considerably extended, and that more effective provision should be made for enforcing that settlement. The German Government's proposals for the establishment of a League of Nations, which have been submitted to the delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers, contain the outlines of such a settlement. As matters for international regulation they mention not only the slave-trade and the traffic in liquor and in arms and ammunition, but also the protection of natives against forced labour and forced expropriation, and provision for their health, education, and well-being. It is proposed that the arrangements be carried out and superintended by an International Colonial Office and by League of Nations representatives in the colonies themselves. There can be no question but that the German proposals come nearer to the ideal of internationalising colonies than those of the Allied and Associated Powers; yet they do not exceed the bounds of the practicable.

According to the draft Peace Treaty that has been put forward, Germany, since she is not to be a Member of the League of Nations, is to be excluded from assisting to decide about the internationalised colonial territories, and from participating in their administration as a mandatory of the League of Nations. The draft goes even further in the way of ignoring Germany, for it is proposed to reserve to the Allied and Associated Powers the right to make fresh arrangements on the subjects dealt with in the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels (Art. 126). This claim, which, if admitted, would enable the Allied and Associated Powers to exclude Germany, not merely from her position as a Contracting Party to those Acts, but also from the rights therein established for all nations, is in the highest degree unreasonable and unjust.

Finally, on the subject of the German colonies, the conclusions of the German delegation to the Peace Conference are as follows:—

The demand embodied in Articles 119 et seq. of the draft Peace Treaty, that Germany should renounce her oversea possessions, is, in the opinion of the German delegation, irreconcilable with the armistice agreements based on Point V of the Message to the United States Congress dated January 8th, 1918. The German delegation therefore has the honour, making further reference to

the four principles laid down in the Message to the United States Congress dated February 11th, 1918, to propose to the Allied and Associated Governments that the demand for such renunciation be abandoned. Should this proposal on the part of the German delegation meet with objections on grounds that have not yet

been made known, Germany would still regard it as the basis of a just and lasting peace, as far as the colonial question is concerned, if she were allowed to administer her colonies according to the principles and under the supervision of the League of Nations—as the League's mandatory, if it were so desired.

III. The Reply of the Allies

The Justification of the Seizure of the Colonies by the Colonial-Guilt Lie

(Original English text)

Finally, the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that the native inhabitants of the German colonies are strongly opposed to being again brought under Germany's sway, and the record of German rule, the traditions of the German Government and the use to which these colonies were put as bases from which to prey upon the commerce of the world, make it impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to return them to Germany, or to entrust to her the responsibility for the training and education of their inhabitants.

Extract from the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the observations of the German Delegation on the peace conditions.

Part IV.

German Rights and Interests. Outside Germany.

I

In requiring Germany to renounce all her rights and claims to her oversea possessions, the Allied and Associated Powers placed before every other consideration the interests of the native populations advocated by President Wilson in the fifth point of his Fourteen Points mentioned in his Address of the 8th January, 1918. Reference to the evidence from German sources previous to the war of an official as well as of a private character, and to the formal charges made in the Reichstag, especially by MM. Erzberger and Noske, will suffice to throw full light upon the German colonial administration, upon the cruel methods of repression, the arbitrary requisition, and the various forms of forced labour which resulted in the depopulation of vast expanses of territory in German East Africa and the Cameroons, not to mention the tragic fate of the Hereros in South West Africa, which is well known to all.

Germany's dereliction in the sphere of colonial civilisation has been revealed too completely to admit of the Allied and Associated Powers consenting to make a second experiment and of their assuming the responsibility of again abandoning thirteen or fourteen millions of natives to a fate from which the war has delivered them.

Moreover, the Allied and Associated Powers felt themselves compelled to safeguard their own security and the Peace of the world against a military imperialism, which sought to establish bases whence it could pursue a policy of interference and intimidation against the other Powers.

II

The Allied and Associated Powers considered that the loss of her Colonies would not hinder Germany's normal economic development.

The trade of the German Colonies has never represented more than a very small fraction of Germany's total trade: in 1913 one-half of one per cent of her imports and one-half of one per cent of her exports. Of the total volume imported by Germany of such products as cotton, cocoa, rubber, palm kernels, tobacco, jute and copra, only 3 per cent came from her Colonies. It is obvious that the financial, commercial and industrial rehabilitation of Germany must depend on other factors.

For climatic reasons and other natural causes the German Colonies are incapable of accommodating more than a very small proportion of the excess German emigration. The small number of

colonists resident there before the War is conclusive evidence in this respect.

III

The Allied and Associated Powers have drawn up, in the matter of the cession of the German Colonies, the following methods of procedure, which are in conformity with the rules of International Law and Equity:

(a) The Allied and Associated Powers are applying to the German Colonies the general principle in accordance with which the transfer of sovereignty involves the transfer under the same conditions to the State to which the surrender is made of the immovable and movable property of the ceding State.

They see no reason for consenting in the case of the Colonies to any departure from that principle which may have been admitted as an exceptional measure in the case of territory in Europe.

(b) They are of opinion that the Colonies should not bear any portion of the German debt, nor remain under any obligation to refund to Germany the expenses incurred by the Imperial administration of the Protectorate. In fact, they consider that it would be unjust to burden the natives with expenditure which appears to have been incurred in Germany's own interest, and that it would be no less unjust to make this responsibility rest upon the Mandatory Powers, which, in so far as they may be appointed Trustees by the League of Nations, will derive no benefit from such Trusteeship.

IV

The Allied and Associated Powers considered that it would be necessary in the interest of the natives, as well as in that of general peace, to restrict the influence which Germany might seek to exert over her former Colonies and over the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers.

(a) They are obliged for the reasons of security already mentioned to reserve to themselves full liberty of action in determining the conditions on which Germans will be allowed to establish themselves in the territories of the former German Colonies. Moreover, the control to be exercised by the League of Nations will provide all the necessary guarantees.

(b) They require Germany to subscribe to the Conventions which they may conclude for the control of the traffic in Arms and Spirits and for the modification of the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels. They do not think that Germany has any ground to consider herself humiliated or injured because she is required to give her consent in advance to measures accepted by all the great commercial Powers in regard to questions of such great importance to the welfare of the native populations and to the maintenance of civilisation and peace.

V

The Allied and Associated Powers consider that all the possessions and property of the German State in the territory of Kiaochow must be treated on the same footing as State property in all the other German oversea possessions, and be transferred without compensation. In this connection they recall the fact that Kiaochow, which was unjustly torn from China, has been used by Germany as a military base in pursuance of a policy which in its various manifestations has constituted a perpetual menace to the peace of the Far East. In these circumstances they see no reason why Germany should be compensated for the loss of works and establishments and in general for public property which in the

Treatment



"Apart from the regular employment afforded, the natives have been taught discipline and have come to realize what can be achieved by industry. Every labourer is an embryo planter. Large numbers who return to their villages take up cocoa or other cultivation on their own account, thus increasing the general prosperity of the country."

From the official "British Report on the British Sphere of the Cameroons". Parliamentary Papers, May 1922, page 68

Under the supervision of the German Government all measures were taken to ensure the well-being of the workmen in all directions, and, apart from the regular employment offered them, the natives were taught discipline and the realisation of what can be attained by diligence.

Report by the Governor of Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford (1923)

"Togoland was undoubtedly administered by the Germans in first class manner. They did not spare either time or money in developing their large-scale policy. The training of Africans as carpenters, fitters, mechanics, masons, smiths etc., as a glance at the town of Lome shows, was carried out by the Germans in a remarkable manner. The Germans had laid down an extensive first-class system of roads in the entire country."

Newspaper article in "West Africa" of June 23rd 1923, No. 334

"Whoever has studied colonial history at all knows that every nation committed misdeeds against the natives and that no nation is entitled to accuse another in this respect. It would not be possible to prove that Germany ill-treated natives in a higher degree than the other colonizing Powers."

Alcide Ebray in „La paix malpropre“.



"Wherever the German may be, the schoolmaster is abroad. With the missionaries, the colonial Governments have developed education to quite an astonishing extent."

L. Hamilton, in the "United Press" of July 1913

"I am driven to the conclusion that the charges against them are due to suspicions, natural enough in war-time, but without real foundation, and that the statement has been repeated so often upon scanty evidence, that it has come to be accepted as a fact. The great unselfish service of German missions under the British flag calls for an impartial scrutiny of any statement made against them."

Dr. Frank Lenwood, one of the leading officials of the London Missionary Society, in a letter to "The Challenge" of May 10th 1918

"The natives are our protégés and the German Government must for their sake assume the obligation of making the interests of the natives its own. For we do not wish to exterminate the natives, but to preserve them. That is the moral duty which we assumed when we hoisted the German flag in our colonies and in the South Seas."

Dr. Solf in a speech in the Reichstag on March 6th, 1912


"The vigour and strength and system with which Germany, not to mention other European countries, has of late years thrown herself into the work of outside colonisation, has been very marked and notable."

The Canadian Minister of Trade, George Foster, at the meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute in London on January 13th, 1914

"There was no lie we would not believe; no charge of crime which our furious prejudice would not credit. I thought at one time of making a collection of the lies which the French had written against us and we had published against them during the war: it would be a strange memorial of popular falsehood."

The English writer Thackeray in his book "The Four Georges" (3rd chapter)

of Natives



"We find here (in southern Togoland) an enormous number of tiny villages, each ruled by two or three head chiefs of the families forming the village. In order to make good this lack of political unity, the Germans formed districts by uniting a certain number of villages and placing them under the most influential notables of the district. The German administration had conferred absolute power on these paramount chiefs, a practice that is incompatible with the fundamental principles of our political system. We have gradually restricted these excessive privileges, in particular the right to exercise jurisdiction."

From the French Mandatory Report for 1923, page 12

"As a matter of fact, German rule, from the nineties right up to the outbreak of the war, was by no means unpopular in East-Africa. The leading native chiefs were treated as we treat the Indian Rajahs, and the Arabs became so thoroughly reconciled to the German dominion that they became powerful allies of the Germans."

Governor Harry Johnston

"The common impression that we should not find much to learn from the German administration of East Africa is founded on a superficial or out-of-date knowledge of the facts..... Naturally enough, we judged the German system by our own, and in some ways found it wanting; as a nation we have had far greater experience in ruling tropical countries, and we were quick to notice what we considered to be weak points in the German administration; but at the same time we saw much to admire, and the general verdict must, we think, be one of congratulation to our neighbours (p.93)..... On the whole, they have every reason to be proud of what they are doing in their East African Protectorate (p.101)."

Frank H. Melland and Edward H. Cholmeley, in their book "Through the Heart of Africa", London, 1912

"And, first, the annexation of German territory was a distinct breach of the pledge given to our nation and the world at the beginning of the war. On the eve of the outbreak of hostilities we as a people, in common with our Allies, professed that the war was one only against aggression and domination, and the Prime Minister of the day (Asquith) formally repudiated all intent or thought of annexation, as did his leading colleagues latter. That pledge the nation, in a noble mood of moral elation, gladly received and implicitly believed. Yet the struggle had not lasted many months before the Allied Governments were drawing up secret agreements for the appropriation of vast territories in three continents!"

The English historian William Harbutt Dawson



"The Germans had sown thousands of millions in the soil of Africa."

"Dépêche Coloniale" of October 6th 1916

"The Government in German East Africa have taken the part of the native and grant the farmers every possible assistance, and help them to obtain labour, since they are determined not to admit any compulsory measures."

The British Vice-Consul, Douglas Young in his report for 1907/08

"But I was not as well prepared for the corresponding and equally interesting types among the Germans, the planters, the civil officials, the officers who had commanded, or were about to command, white or native troops — men of evident power and energy, seeing whom made it easy to understand why German East Africa has thriven apace. They are first-class men, these English and Germans; both are doing in East Africa a work of worth to the whole world; there is ample room for both, and no possible cause for any but a thoroughly friendly rivalry; and it is earnestly to be wished, in the interest both of them and of outsiders too, that their relations will grow, as they ought to grow, steadily better — and not only in East Africa, but everywhere."

Theodore Roosevelt, in his book: "African Game Trails" (1910)

"Of all the overlords of Africa the German has the cleanest hands and the best prospects. His African invasion was characterized by the most artful diplomacy, but even his bitterest enemy could scarcely declare that he did not play fair."

"I have closely observed the Germans in their intercourse with their half-savage 'protégés' on the West Coast. Administration and government on the black continent are largely a question of temperament, and to all appearances the Germans are less liable to give way to irritation and excitement than other white men. I have studied all the white races engaged in the work of awakening Africa, and I cannot avoid the conviction that the German native will develop himself as highly as all the others, if, indeed, not more highly."

The American traveller E. A. Forbes, in the American journal "Review of Reviews", 1911

hand of this Power have for the most part been used merely as a means of carrying out its policy of aggression.

In so far as concerns the railway and the mines that go with it, referred to in Article 156, para. 2, the Allied and Associated Powers hold that these should be considered as public property. They would, however, be prepared, in the event of Germany adducing proof to the contrary, to apply to such private rights as German nationals may be able to establish in the matter, the general principles laid down in the Conditions of Peace in respect of compensation of this character.

IV. The Colonial-Guilt Lie and its Refutation

The arguments used against Germany in 1919 in order to justify before the public opinion of the world a veiled annexation of the former German colonies are only rarely to be found among the international colonial experts. The lie regarding colonial guilt, i.e. the alleged incapacity of Germany to colonise, as expressed in the covering note of the former Allies of June 16th, 1919, was also officially withdrawn. With the destruction of the British Blue Book in 1926, that is to say, of the document which in 1919 was the strongest weapon in the hands of the Allies in carrying out their colonial annexation, the injustice done to Germany was at the same time refuted.

* * *

In connection with the German claim to colonies and raw materials, anti-German propaganda has endeavoured by means of other arguments to revive the colonial-guilt lie in a more or less veiled form. While this "revival" is to be found in England only in letters to the press, in France on the other hand all the charges against Germany which have long been refuted are disseminated in the press in the most malicious manner. For instance, the French review "Vu" in a special number of April 25th, 1936 uses the crudest methods to combat the German colonial claim. It would have been unnecessary to enter into such statements in the press if the former French Colonial Minister, Paul Renaud, had not written the introduction to this special number. Subsequently in the same review, the present French Colonial Minister, M. Moutet, in an interview made the most superficial reply to the German colonial claim and stated that Germany was now only claiming colonies because the heavy strain of the war industry was removing her basis of subsistence. In a recent number of the "Revue des Deux Mondes", i.e. on May 15th, 1937, the French Senator Frederic Eccard published an article: "Les revendications coloniales allemandes", which endeavours to refute the German claim. The speech by the Leader and Chancellor of January 30th, 1937, is described in this article as bluff. The regaining of the colonies is considered as representing a purely military and strategical interest on the part of Germany, and Eccard ventures to serve up again to the readers of this review every detail of the charges made in 1919 against Germany. It is moreover an interesting feature of this article that it unblushingly takes the secret treaties regarding the distribution of the German colonies as the legal basis in case the League of Nations should ever proceed to redistribute the mandates. That the deputy Archimbaud, who is sufficiently well known for his anti-German sentiments, should sing the same tune is only natural. In reply to Sir Samuel Hoare's speech, all he could find to say in the "Temps" of September 24th, 1935, was the cry: "Let us not allow Germany to take the place on which we are sitting", for "Togoland and the Cameroons are the pearls of the French Colonial Empire". The attacks made by the former Colonial Minister, Sarraut, in "Marianne" of February 17th, 1937, are less comprehensible.

In a period of political détente after the War, even French colonial experts recognised the great colonising work carried out by Germany, especially in the colonies allotted as a

VI

The Allied and Associated Powers are anxious that no misunderstanding should exist with regard to the disposition of the property of German missions in territory belonging to them or of which the government is entrusted to them in accordance with the Treaty. They have, therefore, explicitly stated that the property of these missions will be handed over to boards of trustees appointed by or approved by the Governments and composed of persons holding the faith of the mission whose property is involved.

mandate to France, so that the propaganda to be found in the above examples can only be taken as implying a deliberate attempt to exploit the lack of knowledge of the readers of historical and material facts.

Anyone who continues to use the colonial-guilt lie against Germany must be aware that he is living in a glass house. The provisions of the Versailles Treaty regarding the German colonies are based on the colonial lie. The official documents on which the expropriation was based in the Versailles Treaty, have in the meantime been recognised as forged, untrue and one-sided. The history of German colonisation is at present as clean before the world conscience as that of other colonial nations. There are no unproved facts, no convincing proofs, that could be brought forward in order to leave the slightest stain on the history of German colonising activity and which could place Germany in a worse light than other colonial Powers.

In this connection we reproduce on another page a number of statements and declarations which show convincingly enough German colonial achievement before the War. Germany can only be proud of this work, which was not inferior to that of any other colonial nation.

* * *

The Allies, bound by secret treaties, had made up their minds as far back as 1915 to expropriate the German colonies.

In Townsend's book "The Rise and Fall of the German Empire", we find the following passage in this connection:

"Before proceeding to the detailed terms of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the disposition of the German colonies, let us summarize the situation in regard to these territories as it existed early in 1919, when the Congress was convened. The Allies — France, Great Britain, and Japan — had been occupying and administering all the German colonies, except East Africa, since 1915, and — it must be remembered — possession is nine points of the law. Furthermore, for the perpetuation of that occupation several definite secret treaties and understandings were in existence: in March, 1916, Great Britain and France had signed a Convention dividing Kamerun and Togoland between them; in the secret treaty of London (April 26th, 1915) France and Great Britain had promised to Italy "compensation" if they enlarged their possessions in Africa, meaning thereby additions to the Italian colonies in that continent; and in 1917 Japan had asked Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy to agree to support at the Peace Conference, "the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Germany's right in Shantung and her possessions in the islands north of the Equator". To which Great Britain agreed on condition that the Japanese "would treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the Equator. France agreed on condition that Japan would urge China to break relations with Germany, and Russia and Italy likewise consented.

Furthermore, in addition to all these secret, but none the less definite and binding arrangements, there existed "hopeful expectations" on the part of the British Dominions and Belgium to which the Great Powers were more or less committed. Australia and New Zealand naturally expected to profit from

the part which they had so efficiently played in the capture of the South Sea islands; the Union of South Africa expected to annex German South West Africa, and Belgium had high hopes of a reward for her share in the conquest of German East Africa.

With the foregoing in regard to the German colonial territories before us, we can see that Clause 119 of the Treaty of Versailles merely placed a rubber stamp upon what actually had taken place."

What Townsend shortly describes here was however partly known in 1919.

By occupying the German colonies, or to express it more accurately, by transferring the European war to the colonial territories, the Allies had, in spite of German warning, committed a **breach** of the most important charter of all white colonial nations, the **Congo Act of 1885**. The Allies had to veil all this before world public opinion, for their peoples in the name of justice had entered a war which was not to be a war of conquest. The war against Germany was waged by means of programmes bristling with pacifist phrases. At the moment of "victory" they were obliged to camouflage the imperialism laid down in their treaties and to make the annexation palatable to world conscience by a new propaganda trick. This position gave rise to the purposeful lie regarding the brutality of German colonial methods, and the alleged incapacity of the Germans to carry on the work of colonial education and administration.

* * *

In addition to private propaganda in the press and lectures, the charges were made semi-officially against Germany primarily in two publications: the **defamatory writings of Mr. Evans Lewin**, the librarian of the London Colonial Institute, and the hand books published by Sir George W. Prothero, head of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, in particular **Hand Book No. 114** entitled "German Treatment of Natives". In August 1918 came the official British publication of the so-called **Blue Book**: "The Report on the Natives of South West Africa and their Treatment by Germany." From French official quarters the colonial-guilt lie was disseminated mainly by the publications of the "**Journal Officiel de la République Française**" of November 8th, 1918, and January 5th, 1919.

In Belgium a Grey Book was published in 1919: "**Correspondance Diplomatique et Politique relative à la Guerre en Afrique**", which tried to place the blame on Germany for the fact that the conventional Congo Basin did not, as provided for in the Congo Act, remain outside the hostilities. The exchange of notes carried on in 1914 regarding the neutralisation of the possessions of the belligerents in the Congo basin, however, shows clearly that the Allies attached no importance to the maintenance of the Congo Act, but tried rather to take possession unconditionally of the German colonies. "**Germany is to be beaten wherever she can be reached**" was the refrain in the diplomatic reports on this subject.

Some speeches of that period were directly connected with this literature. They were introduced by a speech by **Mr. Balfour**, British Foreign Minister, on August 19th, 1918, in which he said:

"Will they, for instance, give back to Germany as she is at present the African colonies? Will they really do that? They know well what this would mean. In the first place it would mean providing the Germans with submarine bases on all the great routes of the world, and thus making world trade dependent on the good will of Germany.

In the second place it means the restoration of the tyrannical regime over the African natives. The House is well informed on this point and will be more so when the Blue Book which is at present in preparation and deals with one aspect of this question is published. In the third place

Germany would set out to create a great black army in Central Africa which would...

Mr. Snowden: As France has already done.

Mr. Balfour: Certainly France has already done so, but has France threatened the peace of her neighbours? That is the point. The Germans have not yet realised that nations have a soul and a character."

Lord Robert Cecil, then Minister of Munitions, who subsequently as an apostle of peace and a pacifist came forward in the world of the League of Nations with great ideal speeches, at that time also used similar arguments in the interest of British imperialism. On August 24th, 1918, he said:

"As far as the German colonies are concerned, I cannot agree with Dr. Solf's statements regarding the "moral right" of the Germans to be the protectors of the coloured races. I am of opinion that the German regime proved to be brutal and heartless. The British Government has collected evidence on this point which it will shortly publish. I believe that the world will then share my opinion."

President Wilson also became one of the propagators of the colonial-guilt lie when he made his statement at the Peace Conference on February 14th, 1919, i.e. at a time when, according to the published secret protocols, the fate of the German colonies had already been decided. It is clear from his reasoning that he based his remarks on the British Blue Book.

"One of the many sad discoveries of recent years is that the Great Power which has just been fortunately defeated laid intolerable burdens and injustices upon the helpless people in some of the colonies which it had annexed, so that this Power might be regarded as interested rather in their extermination than in their development and as inspired by the desire of possessing the natives' land for European purposes and not of enjoying their confidence in order to raise mankind in these regions to a higher level."

* * *

During the war, in the course of the years 1917 and 1918, Germany refuted these imputations with every objective means, in particular through the then Secretary of State, Dr. Solf. At the beginning of 1919, the German Colonial Ministry, in a Grey Book, "**The Treatment of the Native Population in the Colonial Possessions of Germany and Great Britain**", replied to half-truths and untruths of the British Blue Book. The result of this was that the British Government refrained from publishing the above-mentioned hand book by Prothero before the Versailles Treaty, although this had originally been their intention. A second German Grey Book, "**German and French Treatment of Natives**", also published by the Colonial Ministry, refuted the French charges.

In these two German replies by the Colonial Ministry, certain cases were frankly discussed in which German mistakes were alleged to have occurred. In this connection certain mistakes and transgressions by German nationals were openly admitted. On the other hand it was proved by the publication of German legislative measures, by showing German methods of jurisdiction in the colonies, by reproducing labour legislation and by explaining the methods of administration and education, that before the War Germany had acted, not only in form but also in practice, in a manner which might serve as an example for other Colonial Powers. In connection with the charges that Germany had carried out a policy of extermination against the natives, robber economy and an imperialist policy for the creation of military bases, **these replies also contain counter-charges**. The history of the colonial methods of England and France is related, and in this connection the German Colonial Ministry used almost exclusively foreign documents, i. e. charges arising out of English and French documents against the colonial methods of their own countries. They were public

investigations and discussions in the parliaments of these countries, charges made in their own press, and reports of journeys made by Englishmen and Frenchmen respectively. These publications still constitute a German "dossier" of the greatest value against any attempt which may be made in future to bring charges against Germany in respect of her former colonial policy.

* * *

At the time of the peace negotiations, therefore, there were German refutations and documents for an objective judgment in accordance with the facts, and these should have opened the eyes of President Wilson, who first learned of the existence of the secret treaties in Paris. The continued claim of Germany to her colonies was made convincingly clear particularly to the United States and their President. A work published at the beginning of 1919 by the official German printing office: "Germany's right to recover her colonies; Irrefutable facts and figures; English and American testimony", in which Dr. Solf developed the German attitude to point 5 of President Wilson's programme, the statement by the German Government of January 14th, 1919, and an interview with the German Foreign Minister, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, by a representative of the *Chicago Daily News* on February 2nd, 1919, were sufficient warning signs to prevent an injustice, to unveil the tendentious lies and to prove that Germany was not behind any other colonial nation in the work of colonial education and administration. But, as Townsend writes in his above mentioned book, "The Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire", "So widespread was this propaganda against Germany's colonial administration, over which it must be remembered the Allies exercised a complete censorship, that the United States was thoroughly infected with it."

* * *

The Paris negotiations of 1919, as they subsequently became known to us from the works of Hunter Miller, the American historian of the Conference, Baker, President Wilson's private secretary, Lansing, President Wilson's Foreign Minister, and Colonel House, President Wilson's confidant and adviser, on the whole took the above mentioned publications, in particular the British Blue Book, as the pretext for the

expropriation of the German colonies. This is made clear from the secret protocol of the Council of Ten of February 23rd, 1919, which Ray Stannard Baker publishes in his work: "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement." He writes as follows:

"But the first principle of successful diplomacy, as of war, is attack—swift and unexpected attack. While President Wilson thought he had succeeded in getting the discussion of colonial claims postponed, he had not counted upon the mercurial Lloyd George. At the afternoon session of January 24th there was a great stir in the outer room of the French Foreign Office, where behind double-locked doors the Council of Ten was sitting.

'At this stage,' reports the secret Minutes, 'the Dominion Prime Ministers entered the room.'

They had come to present their claims for the possession of most of the former German colonies which, as Lloyd George explained, had been captured by Dominion troops.

Mr. Lloyd George made a brief statement showing that the German colonial policy had been a bad one, 'in South West Africa they had deliberately pursued a policy of extermination.'

All he would like to say on behalf of the British Empire as a whole was that he would be very much opposed to the return to Germany of any of those Colonies....

President Wilson said that he thought that all were agreed to oppose the restoration of the German Colonies.

Mr. Orlando, on behalf of Italy, and Baron Makino, on behalf of Japan agreed.

There was no dissentient and this principle was adopted."

In this abrupt manner, all the German colonies were removed from German rule.

* * *

The British Blue Book, the strongest weapon in the hands of the Allies, was estimated at its true value and therefore condemned in the year 1926. The South West African Legislative Assembly, at a meeting on July 29th, 1926, declared it unanimously to be a war instrument, which the time had come to destroy with all copies.

The opinion of General Hertzog, the Prime Minister, regarding this document is clearly stated in the following letter of his Assistant Secretary, which we also publish in the original text:

P. M. 21/3.

Kantoor van de Eerste Minister

Kaapstad, 28 Februarie, 1927.

Die Sekretaris vir Suidwes-Afrika,

Kaapstad.

Met betrekking tot u minute van 23 Februarie, het ek in opdrag van die Eerste Minister om u mee te deel, dat Generaal Hertzog die besluit van die Wetgewende Vergadering betreffende die Blouboek oor die behandeling van Naturelle in Suidwes-Afrika deur Duitsland, in oorweging geneem het, en wens die Eerste Minister die lede van die Wetgewende Vergadering die versekering te gee van die waardering deur hom en sy kollegas in die Regering, van die redes wat hulle gelei het tot die neem van gemelde besluit, as ook van sy bereidwilligheid om hulle soveel moontlik tegemoet te kom in hulle begeerte.

Wat betref nou die versoek om die gemelde Blouboek te doen skrap uit die Offisiële stukke van die Unie Regering, wens die Eerste Minister daarop die aandag te vestig dat dit nooit deel uitgemaak het van die offisiële stukke van die Unie nie.

Vir so ver die verdere versoek om beslag te lê op alle eksemplare van gemelde boek in besit van biblioteke, met die oog op vernietiging, is die Eerste Minister van mening dat, selfs al sou die Regering daar die reg toe hê — wat Sy Edele nie geloof die geval te wees nie — dit 'n stap sou wees waardeur nouliks die gewenste oogmerk bereik sal word.

Die onbetroubaarheid en minderwaardigheid van daardie stuk oorlogspropaganda is, volgens die mening van die Eerste Minister, genoeg om dit te doen tot die oneervolle graf van alle dergelike geskrifte uit die oorlogstydperk.

w. g. W. J. H. Farrell,
Assistent Sekretaris van die Eerste Minister.

P. M. 21/3.

Prime Minister's Office

Capetown, February 28th, 1927.

The Secretary for South-West Africa,

Capetown.

With reference to your minute of February 23rd, I am directed by the Prime Minister to inform you that General Hertzog has given consideration to the resolution of the Legislative Assembly concerning the Blue Book on the Treatment of Natives in South-West Africa by Germany, and that the Prime Minister desires to assure the members of the Legislative Assembly that he and his colleagues in the Government appreciate the motives that led them to pass that resolution, and that he is willing to meet their wishes as far as possible.

In regard to the request that the aforesaid Blue Book should be expunged from the official records of the Union Government, the Prime Minister wishes to point out that it never formed part of the official records of the Union.

As to the further request for the confiscation and destruction of all copies of the said book in the possessions of libraries, the Prime Minister is of opinion that even if the Government had power to take such action — which he does not believe to be the case — it would in no wise conduce to the desired result.

In the Prime Minister's view, the untrustworthy and contemptible character of that piece of war propaganda should suffice to condemn it to the dishonourable grave of all such writings of the war period.

(signed) W. J. H. Farrell,

Assistant Secretary to the Prime Minister.

On January 23rd, 1919, therefore, the fate of the German colonies was already decided. The world learned nothing of this. It was generally thought that one of the colonial territories of vital necessity for Germany would be returned, though possibly merely as a mandate. For Wilson had proposed that, in return for the obligation not to pursue any military or political aims in these colonies, Germany should get back sufficient colonial territory to make her independent of other countries in respect of tropical raw materials and to have at her disposal a territory for emigration. In addition Germany was to be heard before a decision was taken as to the fate of her colonies. This report by the American Press Bureau of May 2nd, 1919, was in accordance with the **statement by the President himself**, in which he strongly **opposed the annexation aspirations** of the other Great Powers:

"The world will say that the Great Powers first divided the defenceless part of the world among themselves, in order then to found a League of Nations. The bare fact will remain that every one of these parts is allotted to one of the Great Powers. I should like to state quite frankly that the world will not accept such a procedure, for it will make the League of Nations impossible and we shall have to return to competition in armaments and the accumulation of debt that it implies and the burden of great armies."

The secret protocol shows, however, that at the decisive moment President Wilson had merely noted that in his opinion all were opposed to the return of the German colonies. On **May 7th, 1919**, therefore, the **peace conditions** were ready, including the agreement regarding the mandatory system, in other words the sharing of the colonial booty under cover of that system. In the **German Government's reply of May 29th**, the lie regarding colonial guilt was refuted in the greatest detail by the statement of accurate facts. But the **ultimatum of the Allies of June 16th** proved that Germany was not faced by a number of Powers who respected international law and truth; the wording of the ultimatum shows the unconcealed hatred of these Powers who did not shrink even from lies in order to draw advantage from an unclean peace and to prevent a country from having access to colonies although it had within a short period acquired uncontested glory in exploration, tropical diseases, the labour education of the natives, and missionary work, especially in Africa.

There were unfortunately men of the first rank who placed themselves in the service of this tendentious lie, and in some cases they were proved to have expressed praise and admiration for German colonial work shortly before the War. Some have since the War taken back what they felt compelled to state in 1919 in the interest of their country. The colonial-guilt lie and the "ramp in idealism", as the *Manchester Guardian* called it, had already fulfilled their purpose.

Before and even after the dictated Peace of Versailles, it was not necessary to refer to German sources in order to ascertain the truth regarding the colonial activity of Germany. Experts of the highest international authority have done this sufficiently. In reply to the colonial lie and its propagators the German nation can bring forward evidence which should silence even the most unscrupulous instigators. We refer to such works as President Roosevelt: "African Game Trails" (1910); Herbert Adam Gibbons: "The New Map of Africa" (1916); Rev. John Harris: "Dawn in Darkest Africa" (1912); E. D. Morel: "Africa and the Peace of Europe" (1917); Ray Stannard Baker: "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement"; Arthur Ponsonby: "Falsehood in Wartime"; Robert Lansing: "The Peace Negotiations" (1921); Sir Charles Elliott: "The East Africa Protectorate" (1901); Vice-Consul Douglas Young in the official "Diplomatic and Consular Reports" 1917/18; the work of the English African explorers R. S. and M. E. Meikle: "After Big Game" and the book of the English colonial officials Melland and Cholmeley "Through the Heart of Africa" (1912). Lastly, the truth about German achievements is to be seen from the

official British reports on the individual colonies, while since the War the same statement has been made on various occasions in the mandatory reports of the League of Nations.

In order to combat and clear up the colonial-guilt lie, the Germans have published comprehensive works. In the first place mention must be made of the book by the last Governor of German East Africa, Dr. Heinrich Schnee: "Die koloniale Schuldfrage" (Munich 1927), which was first published (London 1926) in English under the title: "German Colonization Past and Future", with an introduction by the English historian, William Harbutt Dawson. As far back as 1919 an excellent work was published by the then Governor of Togoland, Hans Georg von Doering, in English: "Colonies and Calumnies", in reply to the work by Sir Hugh Clifford: "German Colonies". At the same time, in reply to the publication of the French "Journal Officiel" mentioned above, there appeared the work by Ajax: "France's Black Militarism". The most important documents on the colonial lie were collected in 1920 by Dr. Hans Poeschel, Government Councillor in the German Colonial Office, in the book "Die Kolonialfrage im Frieden von Versailles" (published by Mittler & Sohn, Berlin). Of other important collections may be mentioned finally Jacob-Schnee: "Kolonialpolitisches Quellenheft (Die deutsche Kolonialfrage 1918 bis 1935 — Buchners Verlag, Bamberg) and Dr. G. Kurt Johannsen and H. H. Kraft: "Germany's Colonial Problem" (Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London), the publications by Dr. Rohrbach, and the continued observation of colonial problems by the German Reviews "Deutsche Kolonialzeitung" and "Koloniale Rundschau".

* * *

It would be serving the cause of international appeasement if this "colonial-guilt lie" were not revived at the moment when the interests at stake for Germany in putting forward her claim to colonial possessions are of greater importance than reasons of prestige or the satisfaction of imperialistic desires. After what has happened, however, Germany has a moral right to reparation. In this connection we need only compare two statements by British statesmen who were responsible for dictating the peace at Versailles in 1919. While Lloyd George stated in a speech of November 10th, 1914: "We swear before God that we have not taken part in any conspiracy. We do not envy Germany her territorial possessions. We do not demand a foot of her colonies", the British Colonial Minister, Walter Long, said on December 13th, 1918: "We have conquered the German colonies in honourable battle, and I hope there is no doubt that we shall keep them." At that moment, there could certainly be no doubt on the subject, since the secret treaties already provided for the distribution of the German colonies, and—as the British weekly, "The Nation", wrote on February 1st, 1919—the mandates for the victors were in reality only a variation of the old "booty" principle.

* * *

Now that the colonial lie on the question of guilt has been withdrawn by its authors, even officially, there is no longer any moral ground for excluding Germany from the administration of colonial territories. There is also no legal ground, since it is proved beyond doubt that the seizure of the German colonies is based on a breach of the treaties by the allied Powers. There is, however, another right for Germany to put forward her claim to colonies and raw materials. No less than the recently deceased Lord Snowden, formerly British Chancellor of the Exchequer, referred to this right on June 12th, 1926, in a letter to the information paper "Spectator" appearing in Berlin, in which he said:

"The Versailles Peace Treaty deprived Germany of all her colonies. This was one of the cases of the worst injustice committed in the Peace Treaty, an injustice that may and must lead to the most serious consequences if amends are not made in time.

There is little danger that under present circumstances a new world war will soon break out in Western Europe. But if the natural aspirations towards expansion of a great commercial nation, such as the German, continue to be artificially suppressed, and if the competitors of Germany on the world market are placed in a position to monopolise vast territories producing enormous quantities of raw materials for industrial purposes, and lastly if Germany is not allowed to find an outlet for her surplus population, this must necessarily result in a dangerous material of conflict which might sooner or later lead to an explosion which would be dangerous for world peace.

That part of the Versailles treaty which deprived Germany of her colonies is not only **an open breach of the promises** made by the Allied Powers during the War, but also **a frankly admitted attempt to suppress Germany's economic revival to the benefit of her rivals in trade.** President Wilson stated in his peace message that, if peace were concluded, he would do everything to convince the German nation that the peace would guarantee their economic existence. Other statesmen of the allied nations made similar statements. But in the spirit of revenge in which the Peace of Versailles was concluded, these promises were regarded as not having been given or were ignored. With a view to justifying the seizure of the colonies, an expensive, and untrue propaganda was carried out throughout the world, the object being to prove that Germany is devoid of any colonising abilities. This allegation is entirely invented. It is true that, at the beginning of German colonial activity, events occurred which cannot be defended. But such abuses happened to every colonising Power at the beginning. After Germany had acquired a certain experience in

colonial work, her colonial administration could be regarded as a model.

Apart from the moral objections raised by the question of depriving Germany of her colonies and overseas possessions, there is the necessity of giving Germany access to large territories containing raw materials and providing her with ways and means of expanding. **It is quite impossible to think that peaceable relations can continue to exist so long as Great Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Italy possess large colonial territories, whilst a nation like Germany is deprived of all possibilities of expansion.** It is by no means in the interest of Great Britain to oppose Germany's claim to colonial mandates.

It is not at all in Great Britain's interest to oppose Germany's claim for colonial mandates. She possesses an Empire that is big enough to satisfy the strongest appetite. It is her duty to develop these territories properly and not to load upon herself new responsibilities by taking over fresh territories. The German claim to colonial mandates must be settled by means of friendly negotiations. The mistakes made in 1919 must be tacitly admitted.

M. Asquith said at the beginning of the War: 'The aim of the Allies in this War is to create secure peace conditions on the basis of the same right for all civilised nations'. That must now become the practical duty of the Allies. **To maintain world peace, all nations must cooperate; that demands a just solution of the colonial problem.** It is of the highest international importance to solve this extraordinarily involved and menacing problem as soon as possible by the application of the spirit of friendship and international understanding."

The Mandatory System of the League of Nations

I. Veiled Annexation

There is no domain of League law in which its unclearness and ambiguity are so pronounced as in the corresponding **clauses of the mandatory system: Article 22 of the League Covenant and the mandate statutes** drawn up by the Mandatories themselves. The establishment of these two sources of law, which moreover owe their origin to a breach of the treaty, has in fact provided for the latent continuation of the mentality of the victorious Powers of 1919 and even of their world war alliance which can hardly be removed so long as the mandatory system lasts. The history and practice of the mandatory system, as may be seen from the League reports, can scarcely be said to have been hitherto anything more than a **struggle for rights of sovereignty between the League and the mandatory Powers**, in which the League, or the Mandates Commission, has in many cases given way step by step, despite all protests and warnings. At the same time, the duality of this system has hindered the sound development of the territories in question and has even been an insurmountable barrier against a just and adequate solution of the colonial question, which has become more and more urgent.

* * *

It is one of the saddest chapters in the history of the League that, at its inception, there was not only a distribution of territory in accordance with the right of war, but also that the League recognised for the mandated territories a system of administration which was contrary to the Covenant.

On searching for proofs of this, there is found to be an "embarras de richesse". As on the British side Lord Lugard has repeatedly written against the German colonial claim and defended the mandatory system, his criticism of the system may be regarded as entirely impartial. In a lecture which he gave before the Dominion and Colonial Department of the **Royal Society of Arts** in London on June 2nd, 1924, and which is to be found in the *Journal of the Royal Society*, Vol. LXXII, No. 3736, Lord Lugard describes in detail the hypocrisy which, with a view to camouflaging an annexation which had already taken place, was a means to an end in 1919. In his lecture he said:

"He (Wilson,) had insisted, moreover, on the principle of 'No Annexations', and indeed (as Mr. Quincy Wright points out in an American journal) **the pre-Armistice agreement of November 5th, 1918, had clearly repudiated annexation**. Yet probably, the majority of the victors, including France, Japan, and the three Dominions were for annexation. Even General Smuts, who claims credit as an advocate of the Mandate principle, did not propose to extend it to the C Mandates. So strong indeed was the demand of the Dominions that they should acquire complete possession of the conquered territories contiguous to their own in S.W. Africa and the Pacific, that in the event it was with difficulty that a form of Mandate was devised, which General Smuts described as 'annexation in all but the name',—and American and Japanese writers have used the same terms.

How were these demands to be reconciled to the theories of 'Self-determination' and 'No Annexations' and to the secret treaties and understandings which had been made in the exigencies of the War, and to pre-Armistice protestations?"

In the course of his lecture, Lord Lugard repeatedly confirmed this annexation in his criticism of the mandatory system.

In speaking of the difference between the mandate and the protectorate, he said:

"The most distinctive feature of the system is the **unqualified right of supervision vested in the League**, which does not, however, interfere with the absolute right of the Mandatory to make and enforce laws, to raise troops, and to raise and spend revenues. It is de facto and de jure, the Government."

In another part of the lecture he said:

"The Mandate System was thus a compromise between conflicting claims, pledges, and ideals, but we have seen that **Annexation—eo nomine—was wholly impossible**."

"The Power which had been principally concerned with the conquest of each Colony, or which had special interests in it by reason of its geographical position or otherwise, was selected as its Mandatory."

Lord Lugard goes on to state then:

"Again, it is difficult to reconcile the terms of the French Mandates in West Africa with the terms of the Covenant. The latter expressly precludes 'the military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of the territory.'"

"These countries would therefore, as Dr. Lewis points out in the 'Law Quarterly', automatically become involved in any war in which the Mandatory may become engaged. Thus the restrictions on the use of troops recruited in Mandate territories for use elsewhere, which is imposed by the Covenant, and was one of the ostensible reasons for depriving Germany of them, does not apply to A Mandates, only partially to the B class, and it seems quite uncertain whether it applies to the C class or not."

In this connection, moreover, the French attitude, when the provision of Article 22, para. 5, were laid down, was extremely significant.

According to Article 22, paragraph 5, militarisation was to be precluded in the German colonies in the interest of the native population. Clémenceau had unreservedly accepted this paragraph 5 on April 28th, 1919. On January 30th it was clear that this clause of the prohibition of militarisation of the German colonies was merely intended to prevent "France from raising great armies of negroes for purposes of aggression." Clémenceau had replied that he was "quite satisfied." A few days after the adoption of the League Covenant, on May 4th, three days before the Treaty was presented to the Germans, "while everything was in great confusion and every effort was being made to get the Treaty printed," Clémenceau, although he was previously "quite satisfied," without consulting his colleagues of the Council of Four or the Members of the League of Nations Commission which had the Covenant in charge, sent instructions to the Drafting Committee, through the French member of it, M. Fromageot, to change the wording of Article 22, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, so that

"the Mandatory might be expressly allowed to raise troops, not only for maintaining internal order, but to fight, if necessary, for the mother country."

But Clémenceau's intention was noticed in time. At a secret meeting of the Council of Ten on May 5th, 1919, the Secretary of the Drafting Committee read the following report:

"The alteration in Article 22 was made under instructions given personally to M. Fromageot by M. Clémenceau, President of the Conference."

This led to excited discussions between Clémenceau, who suddenly demanded negro armies "for the sake of France's

Signs of German Civilisation in

"Let us have the honesty to admit that it would be quite impossible for a case to be presented to an international tribunal against the exercise of German sovereign rights in Africa, on the plea of German ill-treatment of natives. The

presentation of such a case would invite, not only a damaging and unanswerable to quoque, but a citation of much British evidence in praise of German administration in Africa."

E. D. Morel, in the year 1917, in his work „Africa and the peace of Europe“



Government Hospital at Daressalam (German East Africa)



Polyclinic for Natives at Palime (Togoland)



Queen Charlotte Hospital at Lome (Togoland)



Hospital for Natives at Lome (Togoland)



Nachtigal Hospital at Anecho (Togoland)



Hospital for Natives at Anecho (Togoland)

the Former German Colonies

"It is absolutely incontestable that, as regards medical assistance, the Germans in the Cameroons had begun a great work which was already bearing beneficial fruit."

French report on the Cameroons (Rapport au Ministre des Colonies sur l'administration du Cameroun de la Conquête au 1. 7. 1921)



The hospital built in the German period at Duala (Cameroons)



Maternity Home "Elisabethhaus" at Windhuk



Children's Centre in the "Elisabethhaus"



German Veterinary Institute "Gamas" (S. W. A.)



Native Hospital at Duala (Cameroons)

security," and the other parties, in particular Wilson and Lloyd George. Clémenceau said it was very important "to add a few words" in order to enable France to utilise native troops for the defence of French territory. After a long struggle it was decided to reject the "new French wording" and to adopt the old wording of April 28th 1919 which had been agreed to by all.

By a decision of May 6th 1919, the Supreme Council of the League agreed to the distribution. Subsequently the League concluded mandatory agreements with the Mandatory Powers, which again laid down separately and expressly for each mandate the obligations assumed in principle in Article 22. It is, however, characteristic that while all other mandatory agreements include a prohibition of the militarisation of the natives of the German colonies, except for police purposes and the defence of the territory, in accordance with paragraph 5, **the mandatory agreements for the French mandates of Togoland and the Cameroons read as follows in Article 3:**

"It is understood, however, that the troops thus raised (in French Togoland and the Cameroons) may, in the event of a general war, be utilised to repulse an attack, or of defence of territory outside that over which the mandate is administered."

France thus succeeded in getting her own way with the tacit agreement of the League of Nations. The Secretariat of the League appears to have eased its conscience with the statement that "Article 22 of the Covenant would appear to be in contradiction with the above authorisation."

With regard to the **practice of the mandatory administration**, Lord Lugard went on to speak as follows:

"Apart from these apparent divergencies from the strict terms of the Treaty, **the Covenant itself failed to fulfil all the expectations which the pre-Armistice declarations of the Allies had raised.** We have already seen that the United States takes strong exception to the limitation of the pledge of equal commercial opportunity to the Central African Mandates, and there only to members of the League. American writers have denounced this action as selfish appropriation of material benefits, contrary to the spirit and implied obligations of the Treaty, and of a Trustee State, and opposed to the declaration of the Allies that they would derive no material benefits from the Mandates..."

"It seems very regrettable that the principle of equal opportunity was not extended to C Mandates, and, in my personal opinion, it would have been wise, whether Germany joined the League or not, to throw open the door to German commercial enterprise in her former Colonies, where it is to be hoped that she would see a better system of administration under the Mandates than she had adopted in regard to natives. To deny access to direct sources of supply of tropical raw materials and markets, vitally necessary to an industrial nation of sixty million souls, must necessarily engender bitterness and resentment and add to the incentives for a new war."

* * *

It is impossible to describe more accurately the de facto annexation of former German territories and the existing practice of the mandatories, which is in obvious contradiction to the Covenant, than was done by Lord Lugard in 1924.

An annexation had thus taken place and, in order to cover it up, a legal system was constructed on which, in spite of all the learned dissertations, existing international law is unable to give a clear opinion, for the simple reason that it arose out of a breach of the treaty and, as Lugard stated in his lecture, out of a **"distribution of the booty among the victors."** It is scarcely necessary to preface our remarks on the mandatory system with a further general opinion from a competent quarter. The American State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Robert Lansing, who worked with President Wilson

at the Peace Conference, wrote as follows in his book "The Peace Negotiations", published in 1921:

If the colonial possessions of Germany had, under the old practice, been divided among the victorious Powers and been ceded to them directly in full sovereignty, Germany might justly have asked that the value of such territorial cessions be applied on any war indemnities to which the Powers were entitled.

Under the mandatory system Germany lost her territorial assets, which might have greatly reduced her financial debt to the Allies, while the latter obtained the German colonial possessions without the loss of any of their claims for indemnity.

In actual operation the **apparent altruism of the mandatory system** worked in favour of the selfish and material interests of the Powers which accepted the mandates. It should not be a matter of surprise, therefore, that the President found little opposition to the adoption of his theory, or, to be more accurate, of the Smuts theory, on the part of the European statesmen... If the advocates of the system intended to avoid through its operation the appearance of taking enemy territory as the spoils of war, it was a subterfuge which deceived no one.

* * *

After such judgments, it might be superfluous to enter in detail into the moral, legal and practical duality of the mandatory system. It is mainly for the sake of documentary completeness that we summarise below the most important stages of mandatory rule in connection with the altruism of Article 22 of the League Covenant. Moreover, it is not without value to call to mind the recognition by the League of an annexation of about 2,952,000 sq. km. of land with a value of many thousands of million Marks—solely as far as the German colonies were concerned.

The perusal of the proceedings of League meetings at that time inevitably leads to the conviction that, if the responsible representatives of international law at that time did not possess an astonishing degree of cynicism, the definition of League rights as against the rights of the Allies must have been an amusing game for them, consisting as it did in presenting an accomplished robbery subsequently and formally in such a way as to give it a fine outward appearance. They, who themselves belonged to the Allies by their nationality, had the task of giving the world a reason which would **neither invalidate an annexation nor compromise the ideal conception of trusteeship.**

* * *

What was the League doing in 1920, when it received the order from the Allies to proceed in respect of the mandates in the manner decided by a "Supreme Council", not at Geneva, but at Paris, Brussels and Spa? In reply, it may be said that **the League was busy with its papers.** It is an uncontested fact that the League did not use its power of protection over the mandates, that it took no action during the decisive negotiations regarding mandates, in particular the negotiations at Spa, and that it disposed of protests from the natives of the German colonies with the statement that the treaties unfortunately made it impossible to consider their claims.

It was only under the pressure of public opinion and in view of the impending meeting of the Assembly that the Council dealt with mandatory questions at its 8th session in August 1920 and tried to create the mandatory system, at any rate in its outer form.

The recently deceased Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, B. W. von Bülow, in his book "Der Versailler Völkerbund" describes this start in the following words:

"The rapporteur was the representative of Belgium, that is of a country which itself claimed a mandate. It appeared from the beginning that the League was very badly informed of

the actual state of affairs. The rapporteur knew that the Allied and Associated Powers had already decided upon the mandatories in a decision of May 5th, 1919. But this decision did not seem to have been final, for in August 1919 it had been announced that the Allies were 'now' in complete agreement as to the distribution of the mandates. Though he knew nothing of any treaty provision, the territories concerned were in the actual possession of the 'mandatories.' At a time which was not specified, he said, the frontiers of the mandated territories had been fixed by secret treaties between the Allies. In addition, in July and August 1919 a committee of the principal Allied and Associated Powers had sat in order to agree upon the mandatory conditions. This committee had reached unanimous decisions regarding the African colonies and the territories which were to be placed immediately under the administration of the mandatories. Only France had made reservations regarding the recruiting of coloured troops, and Japan regarding the interpretation of Article 22, para. 6.

It appeared from the extremely unclear Belgian report of August 5th, 1920, that the beati possidentes did not regard themselves as mandatories of the League and did not worry about that body in setting up their new rule. In addition, the Council had been unable to establish that (in accordance with Article 22, para. 8) 'the degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory' had been 'previously agreed upon by the Members of the League' (i.e. before January 10th, 1920). According to the Covenant these questions were to be decided by the Council. If the legal position had been otherwise, and if there had been a completed agreement between the enemy allied Powers, the Council could have established this fact since it consisted of seven representatives of Allied and Associated Governments.

Germany had been obliged to cede her possession to the principal Powers. But no blank authority had been given regarding their future fate, but on the contrary Article 22 of the Treaty and of the Covenant must apply to both parties, since the mandatory conditions were not 'previously agreed upon.' But the Council did not act in accordance with this position. It adopted the fiction that a previous agreement existed. It was probably guided by the consideration that the Allies did not intend that the League should lay down provisions for them. **The Council was guided by the will of the principal Powers and not by the provisions of the Covenant**, although it was aware that the Paris Conference had merely been presented with a draft for the so-called A Mandates and that even this had not been approved.

The Council was very well aware **what obligations were placed upon the League by Article 22**, for the rapporteur even enumerated the main points: the choice of the mandatories, the fixing of the frontiers of the mandated territories, the grant of full powers by the League, the fixing of the mandatory conditions, and the appointment of a Mandates Commission to examine the annual reports. Here also it was shown that the Council merely regarded itself as the executive organ of the enemy alliance and desired above all to protect its interests. The Council left the appointment of the mandatories to the Allies, although naturally a State that was to exercise a mandate in the name and on behalf of the **League of Nations** could only be appointed by the League itself. **Undoubtedly the sovereignty over the mandated territories belonged to the League.** This was clear not only from the text of the Covenant, but also from the sense of Article 22. **But the League was never invested with these sovereign rights. The German colonies (according to Article 119 of the Versailles Treaty) had to be ceded to the principal Powers. In order to comply with the Covenant, the principal Powers should have transferred these territories to the League, in order—possibly—to get them back as mandates. The failure to transfer the sovereignty was a breach of the Covenant, according both to its spirit and letter. It could also not be said that the**

sovereignty was transferred tacitly to the League, for the mandatories never received their mandates from the hands of the League. The Council was on the other hand prepared to let the mandatories be appointed by the principal Allied Powers. It merely asked that the names of the Powers concerned and the frontiers of their mandated territories should be communicated to it. Then the League would note these decisions and inform the mandatory of the conditions for the exercise of the mandate. With regard to these conditions, it is true that the Council did not adopt the work of the allied commission of 1919. But it waived the right to draw them up itself and left this to the Allies, together with the definition of 'the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory.' The Council merely reserved a general control over the mandatory administration with the help of the Mandates Commission provided for in Article 22, para. 9, which has to examine the annual reports."

* * *

The voluntary subjection of the Council to the desires of the principal Powers and all the failings and sins of the League Council in the mandatory question are contained in the German Government's note to the League Assembly of November 12th, 1920. (League of Nations Doc. 20/48/106, December 8th, 1920.) It reads as follows:

I

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which determines the fate of the former German colonies, solemnly affirms that the welfare and development of the races inhabiting these colonies is a sacred duty entrusted to civilisation, and that the best method of putting this principle into practical effect is to entrust these races to the protection of nations in an advanced stage of development, who will exercise this protection as mandatories in the name of the League. It follows from the above that the League of Nations has itself assumed the care of and responsibility for the former German Colonies.

Though some particular State, and not the League of Nations, is responsible for the administration of these colonies, the duty of designating such States falls upon the League. Any other construction is incompatible with both the letter and the spirit of the Covenant. The States to be selected are Mandatories of the League and fulfil their task under its orders and in its name. Further, a Mandatory of the League can only be appointed by the League itself. There is no suggestion in the Covenant that the League can leave the task of nominating Mandatories to any other authority.

The Covenant further lays down that the nature of the mandate is to vary according to the special conditions prevailing in the territories in question and to the stage of development reached by their inhabitants. In colonies the mandate is to take the form of a direct administration. In this respect, the Covenant draws a distinction between two classes of colonies for which it contemplates different administrative arrangements. Nevertheless, for both classes it lays down certain identical obligations which are binding upon the Mandatories and from which the latter may not depart. In all cases the Mandatory Power must submit to the League an annual report upon the territories entrusted to it. Further, the extent to which each Mandatory Power shall exercise authority, control or administrative powers is to be the subject of special arrangement. Paragraph 8 of Article 22 explicitly states the authority competent to determine the Mandatory conditions. In the first place, these conditions must be decided by a Convention between the Members of the League. As all the Members of the League only meet in the Assembly, it is obvious that such a Convention can only take the form of a resolution passed by the Assembly. The Council is only called upon to take action if such a resolution is not passed. For this reason the Assembly of the League is now perfectly free to take such action as it may think fit.

As regards the exercise of the control vested in the League, an important task falls on the Permanent Commission of the League which is provided for by the Covenant. As the method of appointment of the Members of this Commission is not provided for by the Covenant, the inference is that it is the Assembly of the League which will have to deal with this question in the first

instance. Further, the responsibility assumed by the League of Nations as a result of the institution of the mandate system implies that the Assembly cannot refrain from taking part in the control of the Mandatory Powers. Therefore the arrangements by which the Council receives the annual reports of the Mandatory Powers and takes the opinion of the Permanent Commission cannot be regarded as incompatible with the intervention of the Assembly.

II

The German Government was surprised to learn by the publication in the Official Journal of the League for September, 1920, of the Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Council, that the latter had received a report regarding the obligations placed on the League by Article 22 of the Covenant, a report which gave a totally different interpretation of the provisions in question.

The report in question endeavours to make out that the appointment of the Mandatory Powers and the delimitation of the territories which are to be placed under mandates is exclusively within the sphere of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; it only leaves to the League, that is to say to the Council, the purely formal duty of notifying the appointments which have been made with regard to this or that State. With this object the report has based itself chiefly on Articles 118 and 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, by the terms of which Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights, titles and privileges whatsoever in or concerning all oversea territories, and by the terms of which she undertakes further to recognise and accept the steps which may be taken by the aforementioned Powers, in agreement, if necessary, with other Powers, with a view to the settlement of the situation arising from this renunciation. These provisions are, nevertheless, not of a kind to justify an interpretation of Article 22 of the Covenant differing from that which has been set forth above. In fact, regarded as a whole, the provisions can only have one meaning, that is that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should hold the colonial possessions, as trustees, till such time as the Mandatories are appointed. It was necessary to make this provisional arrangement because otherwise these possessions would have been abandoned during a period from the coming into force of the Peace Treaty until the appointment of the Mandatories. In this respect the session of the abovementioned possessions to the Principal Powers may be compared to the cession of the territory of Danzig, as provided by Article 100 of the Treaty of Versailles. Besides, the answer given under date June 16th, 1919, to the observations submitted by the German Peace Delegation, regarding the conditions of peace, explicitly confirms the view that the cession of the colonies to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in no way implied the right of these Powers to appoint the Mandatories. In fact, in its remarks concerning Section IV of the Treaty of Versailles, this reply states under heading III in regard to Mandatories that the latter "being constituted stewards by the League of Nations will not derive any profit from such stewardship." That opinion bears out the view expressed in the report already mentioned, according to which the Principal Powers intended, when they drew up the conditions of peace, to retain for themselves the right to appoint the Mandatories. But even supposing that they had such an intention, this would not in the least affect the legal aspect of the matter. For it is an accepted principle, that in interpreting an international treaty no value can be attached to the intentions of one of the contracting parties, except in so far as those intentions have been expressed either explicitly or by implication in the provisions of the treaty. The result is, therefore, that the Principal Allied Powers cannot escape the duty of taking the necessary steps to ensure a result in conformity with the Covenant in respect of the Mandatory system.

As regards the fixing of the conditions of mandates, it is stated in the report already referred to that by "members" in the sense of paragraph 8 of Article 22 are to be understood not the Assembly of the League, but the Signatory Powers of the Peace Treaty, so far as they are Members of the League of Nations. Now there are absolutely no grounds for excluding in this way the Members of the League who were not among the belligerents. Furthermore, the Report declares that a convention drawn up with the aid of all the Signatory Powers would hardly be practicable owing to the immense number of the signatories. It is

for this reason that the Council of the League, who would be competent if there were no such convention, appear to have refrained from undertaking itself the determination of the conditions itself and to have decided to let them be determined by the Principal Powers. The latter would, therefore, confront the Council with a *fait accompli*, so much so that its part in the matter would in fact be limited to notifying the arrangement made to the Mandatories. It is clear that by proceeding in this fashion the Council would be frequently violating the obligation imposed on it in paragraph 8.

Then, again, the Council proposes to convene the Members of the Mandatory Commission, whereas that task, as has already been explained, should fall to the Assembly of the League. The instructions drawn up by the Council for the composition of the Commission provide that each Mandatory Power, in its capacity as a Mandatory, shall be represented by one delegate; and that in addition to these State delegates, a certain number of members shall be appointed from among private individual nationals of other States. It is appropriate to observe that such a system would prejudice the effectiveness of the task allotted to the Commission, seeing that the delegates of the Mandatory Powers would necessarily have to be considered as interested parties, and that the private members would not be able to maintain their opinions with the same authority as the State representatives. The situation would be the same if, as might occur, the Delegate of the State whose mandate is under consideration should find himself precluded from taking part in the voting.

III.

Seen as a whole, the system proposed by the Council of the League amounts to the almost complete elimination of the Assembly, and it reduces the rôle of the Council to a mere formality, and it thus invalidates the control vested in the League. The Mandatory system would therefore become a mere fiction, and we should find ourselves confronted, in fact, with the annexation of the former German colonial possessions, through a distribution carried out by the Principal Powers. The German Government, for its part, would be bound to consider such a solution of the colonial question as a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, of which the Covenant of the League of Nations forms an integral part.

The German Government has not merely a formal, but a very practical, interest in endeavouring to prevent any such violations. Germany has a right to be considered when in due course the final distribution of mandates is undertaken. Therefore, the German Government cannot be indifferent to the question of knowing who is to allot these mandates and what system is to be adopted in deciding the conditions under which they are to be exercised.

For the above reasons the German Government has the honour to request the Assembly of the League of Nations to be good enough to discuss the question of Colonial Mandates, and to see that the steps taken are in conformity both with the letter and the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant. If this appeal should be unsuccessful, the German Government desires, at once, to protest solemnly against this violation of the Covenant, and, as regards the future, reserves its rights concerning this question.

The League Assembly did not adopt any attitude towards this German protest. It is true that the Australian representative proposed on November 23rd, 1920, that it should be discussed by the Plenary Assembly, but he was induced between the meetings to withdraw this proposal. The note, which made a painful impression, was interred by the competent (6th) Committee in a private meeting.

The rapporteur to the first Assembly of the League was Cecil (South Africa), a master in the art of fine phrases. Even he was not able (on December 18th, 1920) to find much to praise, though there was much to blame. The general feeling regarding the previous treatment of the mandates question was unsatisfactory. In particular a complaint was made as to the slight share of the League Assembly in the solution of this problem which was of such importance for the prestige of the League of Nations. The Council had reserved all decisions for itself. The grumbling crowd was

however energetically met by Balfour who justified the Council by stating that it was acting not only according to the text of the Covenant but also according to the spirit of its authors. The Council bore the entire responsibility and it alone had to decide. The same view was also taken by Bourgeois (France). In this connection, Balfour put in a word for the mandatories. He said this was a very difficult experiment. If the League took the view that the mandatories were only to take the responsibility and the trouble, but were not to draw the advantages, this could lead to no good. The man of great ideals, Lord

Robert Cecil, also took the view that the League could not carry on the administration of the mandated territories as a super-State. Finally, however, the Assembly modestly submitted a few wishes to the Council. The most important were that the mandatories of Class A should not strengthen their military forces from the territories entrusted to them and that they should not exploit the territories exclusively "for their own and their friends' advantage." It was also recommended that the mandatory conditions should be published, so that an end might be put to the former system of strictly secret policy.

II. The Distribution of the German Colonies*)

After the "Supreme Council" had determined the Mandatories, and the mandated territories to be transferred to them, on May 7th, 1919, the Council of the League, at its session in Brussels in October 1920, decided to divide the mandates into three categories, as had already been done in the Covenant. The division and distribution of the German colonies within the mandatory system was carried out as follows:

Group B:

German East Africa: Tanganyika Territory (British mandate), with an area of 968,871 sq. km. and a population of 5,063,660.

Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian mandate), with an area of 53,200 sq. km. and a population of 3,293,170.

Cameroons: The larger eastern part of the Cameroons, after deducting the new territory acquired in 1911 which was entirely waived in the Peace Treaty (French mandate), with an area of 429,750 sq. km. and a population of 2,230,201. The smaller western part of the Cameroons (British mandate) with an area of 88,231 sq. km. and a population of 778,700.

Togoland: The larger eastern part of Togoland (French mandate), with an area of 52,000 sq. km. and a population of 762,629. The smaller western part of Togoland (British mandate), with an area of 34,292 sq. km. and a population of 328,077.

Group C:

German South West Africa: South West Africa (mandate of the Union of South Africa), with an area of 834,990 sq. km. and a population of 266,930.

German New Guinea, excluding the islands lying north of the Equator: Australian mandate, with an area of 240,864 sq. km. and a population of 462,177. The island of Nauru is excluded; it is a British, Australian and New Zealand mandate with an area of 21 sq. km. and a population of 2677.

South Sea Islands north of the Equator: Japanese mandate, with an area of 2149 sq. km. and a population of 90,651.

Samoa: New Zealand mandate, with an area of 2934 sq. km. and a population of 53,087.

"There was some unfortunate delay in issuing the Mandates, detrimental to the welfare of the communities concerned... It was not till July, 1922, nearly four years after the Armistice, that the Mandates dealing with the ex-German Colonies were issued. By that time it was six or seven years since the German administration had been ousted in some of them."

It is again Lord Lugard who makes this charge in his lecture. During this time an arbitrary destruction reigned in this territory. At this time the life work of thousands of German families of settlers who had cultivated the desert and

the jungle by the sweat of their brow was destroyed and given over to neglect. **The destruction of German achievements, a sin which, through not openly admitted, had subsequently its repercussions in many forms in mandate reports, is a crowning proof of the small economic need which this new accession of territory represented for the "Mandatories."** For in places where there was really a direct economic interest, the work of destruction was not allowed to celebrate any orgies and had to bow to strict governmental administration. One need only think of the phosphate exploitation on the island of Nauru and the diamond industry in German South West Africa.

For the colonies, the new mandate boundaries also represented a step backwards. Great thoroughfares were artificially separated. Tracts of country which, from the point of view of traffic, had their roots in the Indian Ocean were pressed into the sphere of the Atlantic, and natural boundaries such as those between the former German East Africa and the Congo were abolished, so that colonies which were formerly flourishing were condemned to destruction by the cutting off of their traffic. The division of Togoland and the Cameroons between France and England had also nothing to do with the prosperity of the natives. After the plantations in those territories had become entirely dilapidated and devastated, the mandate reports showed for many years after the War that these former exemplary German colonies could no longer attain the level they had reached under German administration. As far as the former German South West Africa is concerned, the industrial organisation in particular was condemned to destruction because it was in the interest of the Mandatory to use this country as an importing territory.

The lack of confidence in the League of Nations after it had simply recognised everything that the Allies decided, coincided with the much sadder experience that might be called the **second partition of Africa.** Just as the geo-political ignorance had the upper hand in Paris in the partition of Europe, so that nations and economic units were cut in two, Africa was also cut up through no fault of her own and merely because of her helplessness, according to no other right than that of conquest. Just as frontiers were drawn through the peoples of Africa in accordance with the standards of European policy, a determination based mainly on strategical considerations took the form of mandated territories.

In addition all these new boundary stones stand in the deserts and wastes of Africa like monuments of a World War, in which the whites gave the blacks the spectacle of the best way in which respect for white civilisation can be lost. In Article 119 of the Versailles Treaty, a community of nations did not take the German possessions on behalf of an Africa standing under the protection of the whole world, but this article is an emanation of pure striving after power, while Article 22 of the Covenant is the result of a bad conscience.

*) See the map on page 124.

The Powers of the Mandates Commission and their Application in Practice

What decisive action could be taken by a Mandates Commission exercising its right of control under such conditions? Could it annul senseless boundaries? Could it work out the rights of protection which should now be guaranteed to the natives under the protectorate of the League of Nations? Could it fashion the economic development of the mandated territories to the advantage of the natives in such a way as to preclude from the outset a system of privileged rights for the mandatories? Could it take effective action so that other countries might have access to the development of the mandated territories? Could it exercise any effective control whatever?

At the outset of the practice of the mandatory system and its control by a so-called Mandates Commission, there are three decisive limitations of the right of control, which justify a negative reply to each of the above questions. In the first place, the public was excluded from the discussions of the Mandates Commission. In the second place, it was decided that petitions of the natives should not be sent direct to the Mandates Commission. In the third place it was decided that the Mandates Commission could not send any of its representatives to the mandated territories.

The publicity of the discussions might have implied moral and actual support for the Commission. By rejecting the possibility of a direct connection between natives raising protests and the Mandates Commission, inter alia any desires of the natives for the restoration of German rule were entirely suppressed. In view of the fact that the Mandates Commission was only able to follow events and developments in the mandated territories from the only source of information now at its disposal, namely the reports of the mandatory Powers, it only learned of great excesses on the part of the Mandatories from the press when it was already too late, as in the case of the Bondelzwart rising in South West Africa in 1923 and the Syrian rising in 1925.

As against this restricted right of the Mandates Commission, there are also the mandates statutes prepared by the mandatories themselves, which place the Commission in the weakest position precisely in respect of the most important questions. In view of their right of joint administration of mandated territories with neighbouring colonies, the mandatory Powers set themselves the aim of incorporating the territories.

If the Mandates Commission has hitherto during its entire practice played the part of a secretariat rather than a controlling authority, this is mainly due to the complicated procedure of the League of Nations. In order that the work of the Mandates Commission might have no great repercussions, this possibility was prevented from the outset by the League Covenant which provided that mandatory questions do not come directly under the Assembly, but that, according to Article 22, they are only dealt with by the Council. The Mandates Commission comes under the Council, to which it sends the annual reports of the mandatory Powers after it has examined and approved them. Though it afterwards became usual for mandatory questions to be referred to the sixth Committee of the Assembly for discussion, so that the reports were brought to the notice of a wider circle than the Council, important decisions on the mandatory administration were taken by the Council, so that the apparent majority of representatives of non-mandate countries in the Mandates Commission (6 to 4) was much more than counterbalanced by the fact that the mandatory Powers exercised a predominant influence in the Council.

The criticism of the Mandates Commission's work in the present publication will take no detailed account of the economic and social development of the natives. This tragedy of Africa, misery, poverty, the squandering of life, health and prosperity by the entirely inadequate administration of the colonial territories, problems the solution of which demands large-scale action which the colonial and mandatory Powers cannot bring themselves to take, is movingly described not only in writings by private persons but also in investigations by colonial governors and their authorities at home. They prove unequivocally that all colonial Powers have failed to think of the welfare of the natives, and that their administration has aimed rather at serving their own interests.

From this point of view, however, it is of decisive importance to inquire whether, after nearly seventeen years' work, the League, the Council, or the Mandates Commission have fulfilled their high obligations and brought the mandated territories under the League law, or whether the mandated territories have not rather fallen more and more under the rights of sovereignty of the mandatories.

A perusal of the proceedings in the Mandates Commission on the practice of the mandatory Powers shows clearly the method adopted for the administration of the mandated territories. From year to year, the mandatories have succeeded in making the mandated territories more and more an integral part of their colonies. By means of administrative reforms for which reasons of economy are advanced, by means of the principle of indirect rule under which Governors of adjoining territories also administer the mandated territories, by the fusion of the two administrations in respect of Customs, finance, currency and economic policy, and even by postal unions, combinations are made which may be said to undermine more and more the inner uniformity of the mandated territories.

It is impossible in the space available even to give a short description of all these tendencies towards constitutional union. Together with the discussions, claims and protests of the Commission regarding the non-fulfilment of the principle of the "open door", they take up the greatest part of the reports of the Mandates Commission.

An insight into such a discussion may, however, be given in the example of Great Britain's efforts to incorporate the East African mandated territory in the British Empire. Since 1926, plans had been pursued by England, under the motto "Closer Union in East Africa", for fusing the British mandated territory of Tanganyika, which comprises the greatest part of German East Africa, with the adjoining British colonies. In 1927 the British Government sent the Hilton Young Commission to East Africa in order to make inquiries on the spot regarding the proposed fusion. The Commission's report was published at the beginning of 1929 as a parliamentary paper. It was in favour of the union of the mandated territory with the adjoining British colonies of Kenya and Uganda under a Head Commissioner who was subsequently to be replaced permanently by a Governor General. The main reason given in the report for the union was the necessity of a uniform policy in respect of the present position and future development of the natives and their relations with the non-natives. As the Commission's proposals met with strong resistance on the part of a considerable portion of the population of the East African territories concerned and was by no means unanimously approved even in England, the British Government in 1929 sent Sir Samuel Wilson, Permanent Under Secretary of State in the Colonial Office, to East Africa in order to obtain further information on the spot and to negotiate with the parties concerned. His proposals were even more clearly in favour of the political union of the mandated territory with the British neighbouring colonies, though he endeavoured to remove the main stumbling block of the previous proposals by suggesting, in contradistinction to the Hilton Young report, that the native policy of the local legislation should be left to the individual colonial territories. These proposals, however, also met with strong opposition.

A Parliamentary Commission was then formed, consisting of members of the upper and lower houses, which, after taking evidence from witnesses and experts and hearing prominent persons, reported in October 1931; the report was published as a parliamentary document. The Commission's opinion was that "it was not at present the time" to take any far-reaching steps towards a formal union of the three East African territories. The British Government adopted the Commission's opinion. In September 1932 it decided that the political union of the three East African territories was abandoned "because the time for this had not yet come". At the same time, however, it ordered that the Governors of the three territories should regularly meet at conferences to discuss questions of common interest and that close cooperation should take place in individual branches of administration, such as Customs and communications and the scientific experimental institutes.

In June 1933, the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations dealt with the question of Closer Union. It reached the unanimous conclusion that a political or constitutional union between the mandated territory and British colonies would be contrary to the Mandate itself. With reference to the expression used by the British Government in its note of September 2nd, 1932, and by the accredited representative that "the time was not yet ripe" for union, the Mandates Commission in its report expressly stated that "such a union could not take place so long as the Mandate was in force". The Commission's report went on to state

that, without prejudice to full consideration for the provisions of Article 10 of the Mandate, all measures should be avoided which might lead to a de facto establishment of such a Closer Union so long as the Mandate remained in force. Further, as regards the proposed establishment of a Conference of the Governors of the three territories in question as a permanent advisory organ for the cooperation and coordination of the common interests of the territories, the report expressed the opinion that these Conferences should not undertake executive responsibilities which would unduly restrict the necessary autonomy of the mandated territory. This last part of the report, relating to measures which might lead to the de facto establishment of a Closer Union, was not unanimously accepted, but only by a majority, while the minority, consisting of van Rees, Lugard, Merlin and Orts, did not agree to the text because it appeared to cast doubts on the exercise of rights granted to the mandatory Power by Article 10 of the Mandate and because it appeared to imply that the mandatory Power would be capable under any circumstances of taking a decision on petitions, as it had formally promised, not without previous reference to the Permanent Mandates Commission—such as a political and constitutional union of the mandated territory with neighbouring territories. The minority also did not agree to the passage relating to the Conference of Governors, because a purely advisory Conference could not exercise any executive powers or endanger the political individuality of the mandated territory. The minority of four consisted of the representatives of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium.

The report was submitted to the Council on September 28th, 1933, and adopted. In the discussion, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, stated that the difference between the majority and the minority in the Mandates Commission related to fears for the future. The mandatory Power appreciated entirely that the position was governed and controlled by Article 10 of the Mandate. The mandatory Power had done nothing and would do nothing that would represent a breach of that article. In his opinion it would be undesirable to discuss in abstracto problems and solutions which the mandatory Power had not contemplated.

* * *

The development of this particular case shows the purely formal character of the control exercised by the Mandates Commission. For what is to be learned from the treatment of these British strivings? It appears in particular that **there are two legal bases within the mandatory system**: that of Article 22 of the League Covenant and that of the Mandate in question. **Article 10 of the Mandate for East Africa** reads: "The Mandatory shall be entitled to bring the territory into a customs, financial or administrative union or federation with the adjoining territories which are under its own sovereignty or control, provided always that the measures taken for this purpose do not go beyond the provisions of this Mandate." This is the other law of the mandatory system, a law that was not laid down by the organs of the League of Nations, but by a committee of delegates of the Great Powers appointed by the Peace Conference. The Mandate for East Africa was prepared in London and bears the date: London, July 20th, 1922.

After the British assurances, nothing more was said about British aspirations in East Africa, though for a short time, mainly as a result of German protests, it became clearer to the public what the mandatory system really meant in the long run, namely that the League was powerless and had merely to see, in connection with the Mandates Commission, that the outward appearance of Article 22 was, at any rate formally, not too much undermined. In view of this dual law, **the passive attitude of the Mandates Commission** is comprehensible. What can such a Commission do to prevent a political union when its legal basis is opposed by a mandatory statute of which Article 10 is obviously incompatible with Article 22 of the League Covenant. **The unwritten condition of Article 10** lies in the transition from administrative measures to sovereign rights, for which the League law possesses no zone of influence. It is obvious that in practice a customs, financial and administrative union can only be carried out by creating a uniform administration for the territories in question. A financial and administrative union cannot be imagined except as under a common centre. But how can a territory form a separate unit under international law when it is combined with other territories under such a central authority? How is it possible to maintain the

mandated territory as a unit when its finances and administration are combined with those of the British colonies? In the meantime the United Kingdom has gone a step further in its East African aspirations. It has **combined the Tanganyika Territory with Kenya and Uganda in a Postal Union**. In respect of this measure also, the Mandates Commission expressed its misgivings; but it could not decide to place itself in open opposition. We find similar aspirations in **German South West Africa** where the quarters striving for a Great South Africa have for years demanded **the incorporation of the mandated territory as a fifth province**. The so-called "administrative reforms", with which France, in order to "round off" her great colonial empire, is endeavouring to unite Togoland with the neighbouring colony of Dahomey and the Cameroons with French Equatorial Africa, may also be mentioned in this connection. According to these examples, **Belgium** is also trying to amalgamate her mandated territories of Ruanda and Urundi with the Congo Colony. Lastly, **Japan** is also averse to a change in mandatory conditions as she categorically stated after her withdrawal from the League had become legal on March 26th, 1935, and the reason given was that these territories had been promised to her by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers before they were allotted by the League. This attitude is, however, mainly based on strategical considerations, since the mandated islands form a key position for Japanese naval defence.

These examples confirm the misgivings expressed by Germany in her note of November 12th, 1920. The danger of a political union was inherent in the procedure adopted for the treatment of the mandates question from the outset, for the rights of the League were so curtailed that it was only in a position to play the part of a bookkeeper who had merely to enter the decisions regarding the treatment of mandated territories in the "Treaty Series". The opinion of the well-known French professor of international law, **George Scelle**, on the treatment of mandates questions fittingly described this duty of the League of Nations. In his work "L'élaboration du pacte", he wrote: "The manner in which the rights apparently granted to the League of Nations were conjured away by the Great Powers suffices to show that the system adopted in Paris represented a veritable sleight of hand (trompe d'œil)."

* * *

The scope of the mentioned case can only be fully understood in the light of a decision which is to be regarded as a condition for this temptation towards annexation tendencies. We refer to the "clearing up" of the question of property rights in the acquisition and investment of capital in the mandated territories, which the Council dealt with in a resolution of 1924. The theoretical point of departure of this question was the possibility of a change in the mandatory. In this connection, the Swiss Professor Rappard, a member of the Mandates Commission, had drawn attention to three possibilities: 1. change in the trustee by deposition; 2. by voluntary transfer to a third Power; 3. by compulsory withdrawal in case of war.

At that time it was the opinion of all who took part in this discussion that such cases were to be regarded as highly improbable. There could therefore scarcely be any question of deposition, which the Council could only decide in case of continuous unscrupulous administration of the mandate. On the other hand, voluntary withdrawal could not take place without the consent of the Council. Lastly, compulsory withdrawal in case of war was beside the point, since a conqueror would be faced by the entire sanctions machinery of the League of Nations.

The result of this interesting discussion of principle showed, however, that **its cause was the pursuit of very realistic aims by the Mandatories**. They expressed their uneasiness at the possibility of any change in the mandatory administration and demanded that any future injustice in this direction should be checked by creating a sort of "life insurance" for their unselfish and benevolent task. The **League Council**, which was dominated by the mandatory Powers, then adopted, in 1924, the following resolution:


"The Council of the League of Nations:

In view of the discussion of the Permanent Mandates Commission, in the course of its sixth session, on the subjects of loans, advances, and investments of public and private capital in mandated territories, and in view of the earlier discussions and inquiries, and of the statements of the Mandatory Powers on this subject:

German Missionary Activity



The Sign of Daressalam: The German Church



Distribution of the German Catholic Missionary forces in Africa (position in 1933)

"Africa cannot afford to lose the help of the German societies which were established in the various parts of the continent before the War. The German missions in Togoland, in the northern part of the Cameroons, in German South-West Africa and in German East Africa were obviously blessed by God. They made a unique contribution to the evangelisation and civilisation of Africa. Their missionaries were second to none in self-sacrifice and zeal."

Rev. Cornelius H. Patton,
Corresponding Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners
for Foreign Missions at the Africa Conference in November 1917

* * *

The German missionaries were subject during the War to the greatest deprivations and prosecutions; their property and that of their settlements in the German colonies were seized and in part destroyed.

In German East Africa there were before the War 815 schools with 45,970 scholars belonging to the Evangelical Missions and 804 schools of the Catholic Missions with 55,065 scholars (including 284 schools and 14,700 scholars of the three British missionary societies). In German South West Africa, there were 95 schools


of Evangelical Missionary Societies with 5094 scholars, of which 39 schools with 2228 scholars belonged to the Finnish mission. The Catholics had 33 schools with 779 scholars, namely 27 schools of the Hünfeld Oblates and 6 of the Vienna Oblates. In the Cameroons there were 473 schools with 27,529 scholars belonging to the Evangelical Missions and 158 schools with 12,591 scholars belonging to the Catholic Missions. In Togoland, the Catholic Mission had 185 schools with 7539 scholars, and the Evangelical Mission 168 schools with 6218 scholars. In all the German Protectorates in Africa, the two denominations maintained 2731 schools with 160,794 scholars.

Under Article 438 of the Versailles Treaty, the property of the German Missionary Societies was transferred to foreign administrations. It was only in 1925 that German missionaries were allowed to resume the work so abruptly terminated. They are at present refused admission only in French Togoland and Cameroons and in the province of Ruanda which was allotted to Belgium. Wherever German missionaries have been able to resume their work, gratifying progress has been made. This is confirmed by the following tables. The figures relate only to work under German leadership.

The German Catholic Colonial Missions

		Baptized		Main Stations		Priests		Brothers		Sisters		Teachers & Catechists		Schools		School Attendance	
		1914	1935	1914	1935	1914	1935	1914	1935	1914	1935	1914	1935	1914	1935	1914	1935
Togo Mission Cameroons	Lyons Missionaries	17,000	94,389	12	71	47	60	18	12	25	35	228	358	200	211	8,500	14,857
	French Mission of the Holy Ghost and English Mill-Hiller	28,000	362,664	14	113	34	105	36	33	29	56	223	3,581	200	1,186	20,000	38,959
German South-West Africa	German Oblates of the Immaculate Virgin and of St. Francis de Sales	5,028	14,787	20	62	31	47	26	41	30	136	27	207	25	70	728	2,460
	German & Swiss Benedictines of St. Ottilia; German and Swiss Capucines; German & French White Fathers; Italian Consolata Missionaries; Irish & Dutch Mission of the Holy Ghost	62,124	527,165	104	149	224	340	109	188	220	416	1,530	4,819	1,545	3,570	76,000	223,804
New Guinea Mission	Steyl Missionaries	3,684	30,964	17	29	27	47	24	61	45	65	6	300	17	94	1,750	4,783
	German Mission of the Sacred Heart, German Marists; Spanish Jesuits	30,211	97,018	68	112	79	117	79	87	76	215	214	1,093	240	500	8,554	24,604
German- China	Steyl Missionaries	5,617	35,126	4	27	10	43	4	8	21	80	—	332	32	155	256	2,746
		151,664	1,162,113	239	563	452	759	296	430	446	1,003	2,228	10,690	2,259	5,736	115,788	312,213

in the former German Colonies



Distribution of the German Evangelical Missionary Forces in Africa (position in 1933)



The German Catholic Church at Lome (Togoland)

German Evangelical Missions in the Colonies

Districts	Missionary Societies	Baptized Christians		Mission Stations		Missionaries			Native Catechism Teach. 1935
		1913	1935	Main	Access-ory	Ord.	other	Women & Sisters	
Togoland Cameroons	North German Mission ..	7,780	48,491	18	245	5	—	6	521
	Basle Mission	15,112	17,832	10	473	23	2	7	91
	German Baptist Mission ..	3,124	4,138	4	73	6	—	4	73
German South- West Africa	Rhineland Mission	23,375	60,075	22	53	25	1	33	201
	Bethel Mission	2,168	15,102	16	164	10	18	51	339
	Berlin Mission	3,927	15,539	17	564	18	3	24	1,129
German East Africa	Brüdergemeine	1,781	15,410	8	518	7	4	12	395
	Leipzig Evan. Luth. Mission	2,729	26,664	17	134	16	7	20	276
	Neuendettelsau Mission ..	3,637	33,231	16	200	28	14	36	734
New Guinea South Seas Kiaochow	Liebenzell Mission	—	7,680	27	185	34	2	57	274
	East Asia Mission	—	—	2	—	1	3	5	46

The sound ecclesiastical and cultural work of the German Evangelical and Catholic missionaries is impressive evidence against the lie in respect of colonial guilt and striking proof of German colonial capacity

These figures only include work under German leadership. On comparing them with the figures of the Catholic missions differences in missionary principles which affect the statistics should not be lost sight of.



Morning service in the German Evangelical Mission in the Kinga Mountains (German East Africa)



Catholic Mission Station at Morogoro, Uluru Mountains, (German East Africa)

1. declares that obligations assumed by a Mandatory Power in a mandated territory, and rights of every kind regularly acquired under its administration, shall have under all circumstances the same validity as if the Mandatory Power were sovereign:

2. Decides that:

(a) In the event of the cessation of a mandate or of its transfer—however improbable this may be—to a fresh Mandatory Power, the Council, without whose approval no such change can take place, will not give such approval unless it has been assured in advance that the new Government undertaking the administration of the territory will accept responsibility for the fulfilment of the financial obligations regularly assumed by the former Mandatory Power and will engage that all rights regularly acquired under the administration of the latter shall be respected;

(b) Moreover, the Council, when this change has been effected, will continue to use all its influence to ensure the fulfilment of

these obligations, as has already been expressly provided in the mandates for Syria and Lebanon and for Palestine.”

* * *

This resolution is one of the most skilful resolutions of the League of Nations. While ignoring German property rights, it has not only built a solid wall against the possibilities existing under League law of any transfer of mandated territories to other countries, but, with this guarantee of invested capital, it has given the first real stimulus to the aspirations towards fusion which are now widely followed, as we have shown in detail by the above special case of East Africa.

Since this resolution, the main work of the Mandates Commission is the protest of some independent members of the Commission against “administrative reforms”, against the establishment of preferential rights for the Mandatories and against the fusion of these territories with the colonies of the Mandatories.

The Policy of the “Open Door”

In the question of colonies and raw materials a predominant place is given to the so-called policy of the “open door”. In this connection, it is affirmed that the economic and raw material sources are at the disposal of Germany and the other “have-nots.” What are the actual facts?

The principle of the “open door” is based on the **Treaty of St. Germain of September 10th, 1919**, which laid down this principle for the United States, Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Portugal in the so-called Congo Basin (Belgian Congo, parts of French Equatorial Africa and Portuguese West Africa, Ruanda and Urundi, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Nyassaland and Zanzibar, parts of Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland, the northern part of Northern Rhodesia and Angola and a part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan), in amendment of the Berlin Congo Act of February 20th, 1885, and the Brussels Agreement of July 2nd, 1890.

Article 15 of this Treaty, which provided that an examination and possible revision should take place in 10 years, has, like so many other provisions regarding revision, hitherto remained a dead letter.

The Berlin Congo Act of 1885 introduced in the entire Congo Basin freedom of trade, freedom of shipping, neutrality and the abolition of slavery. The “open door” which was thus proclaimed was, as it were, again closed at St. Germain. For the Treaty did not confirm economic “freedom,” but only economic “equality of rights,” and that only among the States represented at St. Germain. It was also stated that the new Treaty could be acceded to by States exercising authority over African territories and other States Members of the League of Nations or signatories of the Congo Act. Germany was excluded and was compelled, according to the unique method of Versailles, to agree in advance to anything that was done in the reconfirmation of the Congo Act. Later, when she became a Member of the League of Nations, no one in Geneva thought of inviting her to accede to the Treaty, in spite of the fact the signatories of St. Germain were to make every effort to obtain the accession of other States. When Lord Plymouth now states that Germany nevertheless tacitly enjoys the same rights from the treaty, this can by no means be regarded as an excuse, much less as a concession. If an examination and possible revision of the Treaty has not taken place up to the present and since 1929, this is certainly not due to the fact that a careful and serious investigation has proved to be superfluous. On the contrary, the treaty was never taken seriously.

What has been done in practice in carrying out this policy? What is the result of the financial, economic and administrative methods dealt with in the previous chapter? Has the policy of the “open door” proved to be one of the great achievements of the League policy, like balsam on open wounds?

As observed in the previous chapter, the discussions in the Mandates Commission have dealt largely with this principle.

But no one can affirm that these discussions have repressed the economic advantage of the mandatories. The principle of the “open door policy” has been maintained or not in every mandated country in accordance with the interests of the mandatory. In making this statement, there can be no intention of belittling the honest endeavours of decided defenders of the “open door policy,” in order to reject in the mass all the valuable suggestions of interest to countries lacking in raw materials, which the Mandates Commission has put forward in the course of the years. In order to obtain a clear opinion as to whether the principle of the “open door” has been maintained for the mandated territories or not, there is unfortunately only one method, i. e. statistics.

An adherent of the view that the Mandates Commission has effectively imposed its will on the mandatory Powers in respect of the application of the principle of the “open door,” the American Benjamin Gerig, in his book “**The Open Door and the Mandates System**” (London, Allen & Unwin, 1929), himself pointed out, for instance, that in the period 1925/27 France was responsible for about 33% to 45% of the import trade into the Cameroons, and that on the other hand British imports into the Cameroons in 1925 exceeded the French. During the same period, 33% to 43% of the exports from the Cameroons went to France. For Togoland Mr. Gerig gives France’s portion as 33% of the imports and 52% of the exports. In Tanganyika in 1926, 62% of the imports came from the mandated Power. Mr. Gerig thinks it can scarcely be prevented that about half the trade of the territory for which the “open door” exists should go to the administering country. As far as the mandated territories are concerned, it must be denied that such a high percentage is compatible with the principle of unselfish administration within the framework of the “open door.” Is there any question of trade with the mandated Power arising out of the sudden discovery of new raw materials which do not exist in its own colonies? Does this proportion of 50%, which is assumed to be inevitable, represent an additional trade which has become a vital necessity? Mr. Gerig himself gives the reply in his book. He has noted a fact which he does not regard as compatible with the principle of the “open door.” In the chapter “**The Open Door in Practice**,” he writes:

“Any country that takes the responsibility and bears the expense of administering colonies, or mandates, will inevitably hope to secure the larger share of the trade of these territories, particularly the import trade. And if there are valuable resources to be exploited it is natural that the nationals of the governing State should be the first to be informed of them. If railroads or bridges are to be built, harbours constructed and public buildings erected, the more lucrative contracts are not likely to go to the nationals of other countries.”

Germany has constantly pointed out this fact to the countries that are rich in raw materials.

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Universität Berlin

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Among the most important questions of foreign policy for all States is that of "collective security" so-called — and with it the problem of alliance, neutrality, and rapprochement, as methods of achieving security — and of the legal forms as well as the significance of the treaties in which the idea of collective security finds expression. German jurists did not participate in the deliberation of the working programme for the International Study Conference on Collective Security in 1934. But for the International Study Conference of London in 1935, the author, who is Professor of International Law and Philosophy of Law at the University of Berlin, worked out a memorandum (which he subsequently expanded into the present book) as a German contribution to the international discussion on this topic. This book, written with scientific thoroughness and dealing comprehensively and in detail with all sides of this difficult complex of questions, is addressed not only to the expert on international law and the science of international relations,

but also to the politician interested in security policy and international law, who is entitled to expect the science of international law to draw clear "theoretical" lines of orientation through the tangle of pact policy and the various efforts to attain international security.

Ainsi qu'on se le rappelle, l'Allemagne n'a pas participé aux réunions destinées à fixer le plan de travail de la Conférence sur la Sécurité Collective qui eut lieu à Paris en 1934. M. Heinrich Rogge, docteur en droit, chargé de cours de Droit des Gens et de Philosophie du Droit à l'Université de Berlin, avait rédigé à l'intention de la Conférence d'études qui se réunit à Londres en 1935 un Mémoire qu'il a pris pour base du présent ouvrage qui peut être considéré comme constituant une contribution allemande aux discussions internationales sur le problème de la sécurité collective.

D'une part, la question de la sécurité collective se range parmi les questions les plus importantes du Droit international public. D'autre part, tous les détails de ce volume de 433 pages, suivies d'un répertoire très pratique, ont été soigneusement contrôlés par l'auteur; ils se trouvent examinés et réunis en un ensemble constituant un exposé du problème de la paix et de ses aspects scientifiques comme on n'en trouve nulle part d'aussi complet.

Par conséquent, l'ouvrage de M. Heinrich Rogge ne peut manquer d'intéresser au plus haut degré, non seulement les experts de Droit international et tout le monde scientifique qui consacre son activité à l'étude des relations internationales et des

sciences politiques dans les différents pays, mais aussi les personnalités politiques s'occupant de la question de la Sécurité et du Droit international, car ils y trouveront des lignes «théoriques» bien clairement tracées qui leur permettront de se retrouver dans le labyrinthe que représentent la politique des pactes et les efforts tentés pour atteindre la Sécurité internationale.

Cet ouvrage a également une grande valeur pour les étudiants, auxquels il montre le rôle important que le Droit international joue dans la politique extérieure.

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Erstmalig wird hier eine Gesamtdarstellung des Friedensproblems und seiner Wissenschaft gegeben, das in seinem ganzen Umfang, in seinen vielfach verschlungenen Fragestellungen behandelt wird. Gegenüber allen pazifistischen Fiktionen und Illusionen zieht sich durch das Werk als Lösung wahrer Friedensbestrebungen die These, daß

der Frieden seinem Kern nach Rechtsproblem ist. Das Friedensproblem wird als die Frage nach dem „Frieden durch Recht“ bestimmt und seine Komplikationen werden unter diesem Gesichtspunkt entwirrt. Dabei wird aber mit aller Deutlichkeit aufgezeigt, daß die Völkerrechtsentwicklung weiterdrängt, daß „das Recht der nationalen Selbstverteidigung“ oder „der internationalen Notwehr“ und die Anerkennung eines „Frieden in Ehren“ zu den Grundfragen und Aufgaben des Völkerrechts und der Friedensbewegung gehören.

Die Entwicklung der letzten zwei Jahre hat den Voraussagen des 1934 erschienenen Buches über die Entwicklung der Sanktionsfrage und des Widerspiels zwischen Bündnispolitik und Neutralitätspolitik recht gegeben, ein Beweis für die Lebensnähe und Anwendbarkeit der darin vorgetragenen Wissenschaft.

Here for the first time the problem of peace, and the science which deals with it, is treated in its entire scope and in all its multifarious intertwined aspects. In contradistinction to all pacifistic fictions and illusions, the solution of true efforts for peace which permeates the work is the thesis that peace is, at the core, a legal problem. The

problem of peace is defined as the question of "peace by law", and its complications are disentangled from this point of view. But it is made eminently clear that the development of international law presses onward, that the "right of national self-defence" or of "international self-defence" and the recognition of a "peace with honour" are among the fundamental questions and

tasks of international law and of the peace movement. Developments of the past two years have vindicated the predictions of the book, which appeared in 1934, regarding the development of the question of sanctions and of the interplay between alliance policy and neutrality policy — a proof of the closeness to reality and the applicability of the science which it expounds.

LOCARNO

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Herausgegeben von
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Dr. Fritz Berber

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Pour la première fois, ce livre contient un exposé d'ensemble du problème de la paix et de ses aspects scientifiques s'étendant aux questions fort complexes qui sont impliquées par ce problème. À toutes les fictions et illusions pacifistes, l'ouvrage oppose la thèse que la solution des efforts entrepris en faveur d'une paix véritable doit découler de cette considération que la paix est, en substance, un problème d'équité. Le problème de la paix est donc défini par la question «la paix par l'équité» et c'est dans cet esprit que sont élucidées les difficultés qui sont venues compliquer ledit problème. Dans cet ordre d'idées, le volume montre clairement l'insistance avec laquelle se poursuit la poussée vers un développement du Droit international; de plus, il montre que le droit, tant national qu'international, de «défense légitime» ainsi que la reconnaissance de la notion de «la paix dans l'honneur» figurent parmi les questions et tâches fondamentales du Droit international et du mouvement en faveur de la paix.

Les événements qui se sont déroulés au cours de ces deux dernières années ont confirmé les pronostics de l'ouvrage — paru en 1934 — au sujet de l'évolution de la question des sanctions et au sujet de la compétition surgie entre la politique d'alliances et la politique de neutralité, ce qui démontre d'une manière convaincante combien les considérations scientifiques de M. Rogge sont proches de la réalité et susceptibles d'application pratique.

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The advantages of the mandatory Powers, like those of the other colonial Powers in their own colonies, are of many kinds and mostly of a very general character. The mere fact that the mandatory Power decides the official language of the country and applies its own legal system offers a great advantage to all members of the mandatory Power, especially the officials. But in addition, all the economic links between the mandated territories and the mandatory Power are much stronger than between them and the other nations. The mandatory Power has the right to appoint the entire staff of officials in its colony or in the mandated territory allotted to it; the costs of this administration, to which only nationals of the mandatory Power are admitted, is borne by the mandated territory. It thus gives the mother country an advantage and relieves it of a burden. The requirements of the administration and of the officials are preferably ordered from the home country, and any possible immigration is in the first place promoted from that country. In view of the close commercial relations, the output will go mainly to the home country or, as in the case of Great Britain, to her dominions and colonies. By means of grants and official loans, the political, economic and cultural influence of the mandatory Power grows, and the mandated territory becomes responsible for the payment of interest. A further advantage is the existence of a sphere of uniform currency in which foreign trade can be carried on without regard to the foreign exchange position.

In addition to these general advantages, there are also special possibilities. These are in the first place all the measures which aim at establishing as wide a monopoly as possible by production and export restrictions in the disposal of certain raw materials, and in the second place they are the measures which, by means of preferential systems, such as export premiums, quotas, railway tariff facilities, preference for national shipping, have an effect on the foreign exchange position of non-colonial countries, on their purchasing power, and therefore also on the demand for raw materials.

In British, American and French inquiries, it is everywhere admitted that the American tariff policy, the high French preferential duties and the preferential system of the Ottawa agreements have exercised a disastrous effect on the development of world trade. It is also admitted that in almost all colonial territories that are not bound by special treaties, the export trade of countries which do not possess colonies has been restricted to the advantage of the mother countries. Lastly, it is also admitted that, in spite of the establishment of the "open door" for the "A" and "B" mandates (in the case of the "C" mandates the Peace Conference considered it necessary for political reasons to exclude this guarantee, while in the case of the "B" mandates the equality of rights was restricted by the arbitrary exceptional provision that it was in the power of the Mandatory to carry out certain public works and services on conditions which it thought fit), and in spite of the Treaty of St. Germain, with the possible exception of a few great public works for which international tenders had to be submitted, the local administration obtains all its requirements from the mother country. In short, in spite of the door which is alleged to be wide open, the governing Powers in practice enjoy commercial facilities, which have also contributed to the position that the substantial sources of raw materials and trade possibilities have not been adequately utilised and that this has been mostly to the detriment of the natives. It may be pointed out in this connection that the agreements concluded at Ottawa in 1932 are valid till 1937.

All this shows that the establishment of the mandatory system, which was to be merely a step towards a new colonial administrative and economic reform, took place solely at the cost of Germany and resulted entirely to the advantage of the trustee. But this fact is also the clearest argument against the attempt to convince Germany that colonies and mandates merely represent a heavy burden, for the loss of which one must be

thankful to providence and to those who are willing to take them.

That it is an uncontested fact that the riches of the mandated territories and their main sources of revenue fall to the mandatory Power is a decisive argument against the entire mandatory system and in favour of its abolition.

The constantly closer combination of administrative and financial practice and the increasing trade of the mandated territories with the sovereign territory of the mandatory Power, particularly in recent years, clearly proves the aim, which is in every way opposed to the theory of the League mandatory system.

How has the economic development progressed since Mr. Gerig's book? The statistics of the mandated territories themselves are sufficient proof. The exports of Great Britain, together with those from Kenya, Uganda and British India, to East Africa amounted in 1931 to 65 % of the total imports of the territory. The imports from the same sources were as follows in subsequent years: 1932, 52.2 %; 1933, 49 %; 1934, 46.3 % and 1935, 48.6 %. The exports from East Africa to these countries were: 1931, 49.2 %; 1932, 64.6 %; 1933, 62.2 %; 1934, 68.2 % and 1935, 68.6 %. As regards South-West Africa, the total imports were £1,261,865 in 1934 and £1,498,732 in 1935. Foreign countries participated in these totals only to the extent of £225,536 in 1934 and £311,549 in 1935. The export figures for South West Africa were: 1934, £1,142,120 and 1935, £2,512,946. The amounts going to foreign countries were: 1934, £301,698 and 1935, £540,039. As regards the Cameroons, the share of France and Great Britain in the imports was: 1930, 51.3 %; 1931, 59.1 %; 1932, 65.9 %; 1933, 60.9 %.

The position is similar for Togoland and to a still greater extent for the South Sea Islands.

Another expert, Leonard Barnes, in a work entitled "The Future of the Colonies" (London, The Hogarth Press, 1936), has given the following interesting figures for 1933:

Share of various States in the foreign trade.

Kenya and Uganda, 1933:

	Import from	Export to
Great Britain	38 %	35 %
Other parts of the Empire	25 %	42 %
Germany	3 %	2 %
Italy	3 %	1 %

Tanganyika Territory, 1933:

Great Britain	29 %	24 %
Other parts of the Empire	19 %	37 %
Germany	10 %	10 %
Italy	—	2 %

Nigeria, 1933:

(incl. Cameroons under British mandate):		
Great Britain	67 %	37 %
Other parts of the Empire	4 %	1.5 %
Germany	8 %	16 %
Italy	0.3 %	4 %

The inquiry of the Royal Institute of International Affairs: Raw Materials and Colonies, arrives at similar figures for 1934.

In 1934 for instance, in spite of the Convention of Algeiras, Morocco obtained 43 % of its goods from France; in spite of the "open door" in the Congo Basin, Nigeria obtained 55 % of its imports from Great Britain, the Belgian Congo 43 % from Belgium, and Kenya-Uganda almost 37 % from Great Britain. Of the imports of French Cameroons, 25.8 % come from France and 39 % from Great Britain; of French Togoland 15.1 % from France and 39 % from Great Britain. The corresponding figures for Germany are 0 %, 4.7 %, 6.5 %, 3.5 %, 7.7 % and 5.9 %.

These figures show what the system of the "open door" really means for colonies and mandated territories. It is quite clear why the system fails to work. But it is no doubt worth while to give the reasons again and to show that the lack of preferential duties and the like in favour of the colonial or

mandatory Power by no means signifies practical equality of rights for all other nations.

We find a deliberate economic policy on the part of the mandatory Powers who, true to their pre-war principles, apply the principle of the "open door" in practice in the manner demanded by their own economic interests. The phraseology of the "open door" is exactly like the pre-war idea of free trade policy; it is nothing more than one of the forms of competition of capitalistic economy in which, after so many unhappy experiences, countries which have been severely tried economically should not place their trust. It was part of the commercial traditions both of England and France never to apply the principle of the "open door" in the manner in which it was applied before the War by Germany. It is one of the merits of the above mentioned book by Mr. Gerig that he has proved this in detail. What was known as free trade before the War was never understood by British statesmen as meaning anything more than "free trade within the British Empire". At the beginning of the discussions in 1919, when England opposed Wilson's unrestricted demand for the "open door policy" for all colonial territories, Wilson was referred to the American policy of preferences. Sir Austen Chamberlain stated at that time, on June 9th, 1919, in skilful diplomatic form: "I am sure that President Wilson's fourteen points are not to be understood to mean that a country has no right or shall no longer have the right to discriminate between its own citizens and others. What he no doubt meant and what I presume he desires is to reduce the extent of the discrimination or to abolish the discrimination with which a certain country acts discriminately against one foreign country as compared with another foreign country. This is quite a different matter."

It will be seen from this, that even after the establishment of Article 22, Great Britain adhered to her old preferential policy. The inclusion of certain mandated territories in the C group is, moreover, the pure expression of such a policy; it has really nothing to do with demographic or cultural questions. France also could not proclaim herself as a representative of the "open door policy". In the past, it is true, she entered into an agreement with Germany granting the latter advantages in Morocco, but in this particular case she had compromised the principle by excluding Germany from the Algeiras Acts of 1906.

Thus, the "open door policy" of the mandatory Powers is also a result of the unsatisfied practice of the mandatory system which goes counter to all promises. It is true that President Wilson's demand that "the Mandatory State or Agency shall in all cases be bound and required to maintain the policy of the Open Door, or equal opportunity for all the signatories of the Covenant, in respect of the use and development of the economic resources of such people or territory" is still to be heard from the camp of the mandatory Powers. It is the reply they make to all countries lacking in raw materials when they say: "What more do you want? The door for obtaining raw materials and economic sources is open to you." But practice shows that this is not so. The fact that the path is closed to Germany in the mandated territories, and especially in the former German colonies, is, however, not solely the result of a selfish economic policy on the part of the mandatory Powers, but is due to political reasons.

The mandatory system has also failed in the accessibility of the sources of raw materials in the mandated territories for non-mandate countries. The result of the Versailles Treaty, the longer it continued, proved more clearly to be a chapter of historical ingratitude and injustice towards Germany.

"Germany was the one Great Power which did not win her colonial empire by conquest.

The Open Door policy was adopted by Germany at a time when she was protesting against the closed doors of other territories and when she was taking the initiative in promoting the Conference of Berlin for equality of treatment in the Congo. Germany took a new parture in Open Door methods by negotiating with England bilateral reciprocal and unlimited Open Door treaties for their respective territories in Middle Africa and in the Pacific. Using these treaties for bargaining purposes she negotiated a series of other reciprocal most-favoured-nation treaties, thus generalizing her Open Door treatment.

There is no evidence from trade statistic, tariff schedules, and informed authorities which leads to the conclusion that the Open Door was not practised. The equal economic opportunity for other countries practised by the German colonial administration from 1885 to 1914 stands as a record of which the German nation may well be proud."

This is the opinion of Mr. Gerig, one of the best of the experts who have observed the "open door policy" of the mandatory Powers in connection with the mandatory system. When German trade, although it enjoyed no preference in the German colonies, ranked first in 1913 with 66% of the imports and 73.8% of the exports, this was a proof that the "open door" was available primarily to the country which pressed forward of its own vital power.

When one thinks in this connection of the meagre result of the first international discussion on the world supply of raw materials, which was carried on at Geneva in March of this year, and of the evasive and unobjective speeches by the representatives of certain countries that are well supplied with raw materials, it is not only regrettable but it is also hopeless ever to expect that such an international political discussion will ever lead to the result which was the cause of this League procedure, i. e. the demand of the poor countries for vital raw materials, the lack of which is the cause of their present crisis.

* * *

The defenders of the mandatory system have argued that the very inaccuracy in the wording of Article 22 of the Covenant in respect of the maintenance of sovereign rights forms the strength of the League, which could at any time prevent political annexation and economic preparations to this end from becoming facts. As no proof was obtainable for this assertion, hopes were held out for the future that some day the Mandates Commission might become an institution which would protect the mandated territories against political and economic imperialistic aspirations with greater power than hitherto as a trustee in the interests of all countries. These future promises sound all very well, but the practice of the mandatory Powers is a different matter. On the contrary, after the experiences of the last fifteen years, it cannot be denied that the mandatory Powers are in many cases deliberately trying to maintain the unclearness of the legal position, in order more easily to attain their real aims.

A system that is so closely connected with the establishment and policy of the League of Nations and is based on such debatable foundations and principles, cannot be improved in the long run by individual well-meaning changes. Judicious economic and colonial experts long ago realised that the entire conception of mandates — "in sin conceived and in remorse begotten", as the first Director of the Mandates Section of the League called them — requires a fundamental revision. Whether this will make much change in the existing conditions is another matter. In order to reach a radical solution, it is not the revision of the mandatory system that is required, but a revision of the entire colonial question.

B. The Colonial Question as a Problem of Economics and Raw Materials

Extract from the Speech delivered by Joachim von Ribbentrop
on the Occasion of the Spring Demonstration of the Commission
for the Economic Policy of the NSDAP., on March 1st, 1937

The World War and Versailles brought about the most tremendous economic upheaval of our time. Germany's foreign trade was destroyed, Central Europe was shut out from the world market, the conventional international laws concerning the protection of private property were disregarded by many countries, neutral trade was stifled. The decision, made at the World Economic Conference of the Allies in Paris in 1916, to continue all these measures against Germany after the conclusion of the War, was largely put into practice in the dictate of Versailles. Versailles brought about the so-called liquidation of German private property, which meant the loss of most of the German capital investments abroad, the exclusion from all the world markets, one-sided privileges by means of one-sided most-favoured-nation clauses to the benefit of the victor states, huge reparation payments in money and kind with no sort of reciprocal terms, the confiscation of the German merchant-fleet, etc. By the erection of artificial customs barriers across century-old economic territories, a state of paralysis if not complete destruction was forcibly brought about in the economic area of Central Europe. These were the immediate results of the World War and of Versailles. In addition there were the indirect results through the development of their own industry and the partial creation of self-sufficing industrial areas by almost all overseas countries, which had formerly provided markets for industrial export from Europe and particularly from Central Europe, that is, Germany.

No country was in a position to avoid the results of this tremendous upheaval. It was obviously much easier for those countries with a large domestic market or a great colonial empire providing vast export possibilities, to adjust themselves to the altered circumstances. France with her colonial empire confined herself to a quota policy, America introduced the policy of high protection to safeguard her great domestic market, and finally, at the Ottawa Conference, England welded her Empire together into an exclusive economic structure by granting customs preferences for the Dominions. In addition the most important economic areas introduced protective tariffs which mainly affected German goods, and reduced German export to these countries more and more.

Germany had not merely to suffer the general results of this world economic dislocation like every other country, but was hit much more hardly. For, in the first place, Germany constitutes a comparatively small and over-populated economic territory, and in the second place she entered the new economic struggle with the enormous handicap of Versailles. I will refer in this connection only to the tremendous reparations debts, which Germany could only pay by means of exports. But the more Germany exported, in the fanatical urge to fulfil what was required of her, the more the great economic units of the world, France, America, and the British Empire, entrenched themselves behind new protective customs barriers. In addition to this, the vast economic unit of Russia, which in the past had been one of the chief of Germany's export markets, was, through Bolshevism, practically excluded from the normal world economic course.

Such was Germany's position after the War, and it is not to be wondered at that Germany, faced with the results of the economic madness of Versailles, had to make tremendous efforts to find her feet once more.

But worse than all these burdens was the moral depression of post-war Germany. The rapid progress of intensification in the nineteenth century had led through the appearance of the insane doctrines of Marxism to a deep and dangerous cleavage

between workers and employers. Bolshevism, coming from the East, exaggerated this division and gradually came to be the greatest menace to the entire structure of European economics and western culture. Especially exposed to danger through the hopeless economic situation of the post-war years, guided by a weak government which had lost touch with the people, caught in a net of capitalistic and liberalistic economic theories, and thus open to the Bolshevik propaganda from Russia, their immediate neighbour, the German people were heading for disaster.

It is the immortal service of our Führer and of the National-Socialist German Workers' Party to have brought about a fundamental change in Germany, in the economic sphere as well. The Führer's principle, that capital must serve economy and economy the people, and not vice versa, became with the National-Socialist assumption of power the guiding principle for the development of the new economic structure of Germany. National-Socialism does away with the hostile tension between workers and employers, and in its place establishes the community of all productive workers in the service of the whole nation. The service of the nation as a whole is allotted to trade and commerce as its significant function, and in united Germany one of the principles of the National-Socialist ideology, "Service before Self", strikes ever deeper roots.

But in this way a solid basis of quiet, of order and safety has been created in Central Europe, on which the German economic system, shattered to its very foundations, could at last be built up once more. The question now arose: how could the German nation, morally united, a community in work, a firm centre of order in a society of states in which class-war, strikes, and class-hatred are rife—how could the German nation give its economic system, crippled through the events since 1914, a sure and lasting foundation, as a guarantee of existence and well-being for the nation?

Experience pointed here first to the method of increasing exports, so that Germany might be in a position to import the foodstuffs and raw materials necessary for domestic consumption and also for purposes of processing and re-export. The method of credit was excluded on principle. The Third Reich did not wish to become the world's debtor. It was sufficiently occupied with the debts contracted by former governments. Import was regulated strictly according to the extent of export. In this way Germany has been able during the last few years not only to adjust her foreign trade balance, but also to make a considerable increase in the volume of trade, and even to pay old debts and interest out of certain surpluses.

But it has been the Führer's constant aim since the assumption of power, in addition to the economic safeguarding of the bare existence of the German people, to raise the general standard of living in Germany and thus to guarantee for his people extended possibilities of cultural activity and cultural exchange. With this aim in view, German economic leaders have during the last years exerted tremendous efforts to increase the German volume of trade with other countries by way of normal goods exchange, and to come to correspondingly liberal agreements with the different countries of the world. The fact that these efforts were only partially successful, as a result of the short-sighted refusal on the part of economically strong countries, and further the recognition that continued propagation of Bolshevism throughout the world might lead to a further decrease in the volume of German foreign trade (as in the case of Spain) have caused the Führer to embark upon entirely new ways.

After renewed unsuccessful attempts to establish comprehensive international trade agreement, the Führer stepped in once more last summer. **The Four-years Plan**, with which you are familiar, was decided upon without more ado. To-day it has already been tackled on an enormous scale, and progresses irresistibly towards its completion. **Thus it was only after it was quite clear that liberal trade agreements with other countries could not be achieved, that the Führer decided upon this step. In other words this plan was virtually forced upon Germany by the other countries.** While at the time of its announcement the Four-years Plan was often laughed at by foreign economists, it seems very strange to us when we read here and there in foreign newspapers, or hear in speeches by foreign politicians, that it will be possible to negotiate with Germany only when she abandons the Four-year Plan. It appears still more strange to us when we hear from other countries that Germany is isolating herself economically, is pursuing a policy of absolute self-sufficiency and desires no more trade relations with other countries. First of all I must point out that, if we are to speak of self-sufficiency, it was the other countries of the world who started this policy, as I have already stated. Roosevelt's economic policy, and above all Ottawa, were purely measures of self-sufficiency, and these were adopted long before the Four-years Plan. **The Four-years Plan is thus merely a natural piece of self-help on Germany's part,** and all the criticisms from abroad can only strengthen us in our opinion that we are on the right way. Perhaps there is really a country in the world which requires certain raw materials as a condition of its existence, and can produce these materials itself, but does not. The leaders of such a country are to be pitied. Germany, at all events, is subject to no such suicidal ideas. Germany has ascertained that she possesses coal, wood, inventive brains and numberless strong, workhardened hands, and is determined to produce herself the raw materials which she cannot import, in order to feed her children better and gradually to raise the standard of living.

Strange as was the first verdict of some foreign countries as to the possibility of carrying out the Four-years Plan, the second conclusions of certain foreign economists seem to me to be equally false; namely, that **the Four-years Plan is a proof of the hostility of German economic policy towards international trade. In my opinion this is a complete and utter fallacy, for these reasons:**

In the first place, I believe that we are far too close neighbours in Europe to-day and far too dependent upon reciprocal exchange of agricultural and industrial products, for any country to be able permanently to cut itself off economically from the others.

But the prerequisite for all reciprocal exchange of goods is the ordered structure of the separate economic areas. If this is not present in one country, it will lead sooner or later to harm for all. As far as Germany is concerned, this prerequisite, namely, **the ordered structure of the German economic area, is to be provided by means of the Four-years Plan,** in that this is to make Germany economically independent of other countries, at least in regard to essential raw materials, and thus provide for German economy its fundamental requirements in raw materials. **Only by this means will the economic foundation be provided upon which Germany can enter into a regular exchange of goods with the rest of the world.**

The capital which in Germany of necessity becomes free through this whole development will automatically flow into the channels of world economy and world trade, and thus bring about a revival.

A prosperous Germany, in quite a different position from that of to-day, will be able to buy more than the minimum of bare necessities from abroad. Thus, in my opinion, **there can be no doubt that the Four-years Plan in its final results will mean anything but self-sufficiency; its execution will rather create the preliminary conditions necessary for Germany's renewed participation in regular world trade and, above and beyond this, German economy, having hereby become independent, will have an enormously beneficial effect on world trade in general in that it will increase the exchange of industrial products between the other great economic units of the world.**

If I have just expressed a few ideas on the effect which, in my opinion, the carrying out of the Four-years Plan will have on world trade, I would now like to turn to the political aspect of the subject; for, as I see it, the economic importance of the Four-years Plan is surpassed by the significance of its political consequences.

In separating the world into victors and vanquished after the War the nations were at the same time divided into the "Haves" and the "Have-nots," as a British statesman put it last year. Now it is very natural and comprehensible if the non-possessing nations regard the possessing nations with discontent, while these in turn regard the others with suspicion.

This discontent and this suspicion, however, can again only be dispelled if the possessing and the non-possessing nations come to an arrangement which, while not raising the latter to the ranks of the wealthy nations of this world, nevertheless offers them a certain compromise.

By the Treaty of Versailles, Germany, once one of the wealthiest countries in the world, has been forced into the ranks of the non-possessing nations. Germany was at the time unwisely deprived of all her assets capable of mobilization, which created an inequality of possession in all spheres, such as could never last, and to which must be ascribed a good part of the unrest in the world to-day.

It is, however, in the interests of all nations to eliminate this unrest in the world and therefore to find a compromise between the possessing and the non-possessing states. And how can it be found?

We are first of all confronted with the practical impossibility of finding compensation for the enormous displacement of values during the post-war period. I take leave to doubt whether those nations which at that time enriched themselves so enormously at Germany's expense, being for the most part very wealthy already, have really benefited thereby. This much is, however, certain, that this redistribution of wealth has had catastrophic results for Germany. A discerning English economist was probably the only person to realise this in 1919 and withdraw from collaboration in the Peace Treaty, because he even then foresaw the terrible results which the execution of this treaty would have on Germany in particular and thus also on world economics in general.

These things cannot be altered now. Nevertheless **an adjustment must be found** because in our enlightened world of newspapers, telephones, telegraphy, wireless, aeroplanes, etc., it is no longer possible for some countries to flow with milk and honey while others have to struggle for their bare existence. **As matters lie, this adjustment can only be found in two fields firstly, by the solution of the problem of the restoration of the former German colonial possessions, and secondly, by means of the German people's own efforts.**

With regard to the question of colonies the Führer declared in his speech of January 30th that: "as a matter of course our demand for colonies for our densely populated country will be put forward again and again." At the same time he utterly refuted the reasons put forward abroad for withholding the former German colonies. If we read over the covering note to the Treaty of Versailles to-day and see that the conversion of the German colonies into mandated territories is expressly accounted for by "the use to which these colonies were put as bases from which to prey upon the commerce of the world" and her inability to administer her colonies, it is quite clear to us with what a morbid psychosis of hate and on what threadbare grounds Germany's colonial possessions were taken from her. I believe that hardly anyone capable of intelligent thought will to-day any longer hold possible the line of argument employed at that time, I further believe that hardly any unintelligent person will suggest that this strange proof of the rough and ready solution that has been found is capable of being brought into line with President Wilson's demand that a "free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" should be found. Yet it was relying on Wilson's promises alone that the German nation at that time laid down its arms.

Germany claims the right to colonial possessions on principle, for this is a right which belongs to every other nation, even to the smallest in the world, and Germany must formally reject every form of argument which seeks to dispute this right with her.

Further more, England, Japan, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal—all possess colonies and, in certain cases, colonial empires which for the most part are far, far greater than their mother countries. Germany with her huge population crowded together in the narrowest space needs colonies more than anyone else. So shall Germany of all nations possess no colonies?

But just as false as were the grounds on which the colonies were taken away from Germany, is the reason which one finds from time to time in the foreign press, namely that Germany would pursue an Imperialistic policy and organize her colonies as strategic bases. Quite apart from the fact that from the military point of view every colony signifies for Germany a lost position in advance, the Naval Agreement concluded between Germany and England is the most striking proof of the falsity of such a contention. Incidentally I may perhaps remind you in this connection of the Führer's declaration that the possession of colonies would lead to no increase in Germany's naval demands.

Now let us turn to the economic side.

Here there are in the main three points which must be continually emphasized anew:

(1) **The question of raw materials**, i. e. the necessity for Germany of the possession of regions in which sources of raw materials may be exploited with her own German currency, and from which raw materials may be bought to supply German industry, likewise with German currency. Granted that all sources of raw materials in the world are open to Germany to-day, but only if paid for in foreign exchange of which we do not possess enough.

(2) **The colonies as a market for manufactured goods and as a field for German enterprise.** In this connection we should emphasize the contracts for public works let out by the colonial administrative authorities, for these are of great importance. In foreign colonies these contracts fall almost exclusively to the industries of the mother country, thus, if there were colonies under German sovereignty, our own industry would naturally receive the lion's share.

(3) **The possibilities of development in the colonies.** It will be possible for the Germany of to-day to develop the colonies much more intensively, and to carry out economic planing on broader lines and based on a longer period of time than was possible under our former liberalistic economic system. There is no doubt that in this way, after a few years of development, a considerably greater percentage of the whole German consumption of raw materials can be supplied from the colonies than was the case before the war, and, what is more, with the aid of German capital alone, that is of German currency.

It would be possible to say a great deal more on this subject of colonies. However, we have not the time to-day. But **I do believe that what has just been said has made it quite clear that a return of the former German colonies is of very great importance**

to Germany and can finally lead to a considerable improvement in Germany's economic situation.

We hope that sound common sense and economic thinking will prove victorious in this matter too and, as soon as possible, find an equitable solution. Such an equitable solution was President Wilson's idea. The present status of the former German colonies as mandates, which leaves open the question of the final sovereignty over them, proves that at that time people could or would not comply with Wilson's demands, but at the same time showed by this temporary solution that they realized that sooner or later this question would have to be finally settled. The growing recognition abroad of the injustice which Germany suffered in the treatment of the colonial question will, it is to be hoped, at last induce the mandatory powers to make of their own free will the generous gesture expected by us, a gesture which would be of the greatest importance for a final clearing of the atmosphere.

I believe that Germany can expect this gesture, for—

In order to take her place again in the ranks of the possessing nations, Germany is prepared voluntarily to take the main burden once more upon her own shoulders in order to satisfy her needs by a renewed, huge expenditure of energy on the part of the German nation. For this is the practical import of the Four-years Plan. It is therefore not admissible that the world on the one hand says that a materially discontented Germany is dangerous, and on the other is not prepared to help Germany and even goes so far as to do a great deal to prevent our being contented. I believe that the world should rejoice that Germany is prepared, with the aid of her own resources and without injuring anyone else, to give her economic system once more the secure basis of raw materials which world trade to-day either can or will not offer it. Yes, I do believe that the outside world must be interested in the success and swift carrying-out of the Four-years Plan almost to the same extent as Germany herself is.

For has there ever in history been a better guarantee of peace and tranquillity than a contented nation which possesses all it wants? In my opinion here lies the importance of our Four-years Plan for foreign policy. In contrast to the privileged nations, Germany finds her way to expansion outside blocked. Therefore she must find her satisfaction in expansion within, through intensification within, and must harness every energy in order to assure the means of existence to her population of 68 millions, living as they do on their small territory and on the poor soil of Northern Europe.

Germany's Colonial Demands

Article published in the American journal "Foreign Affairs", January 1937.

By Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Reich Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank

The American reader will think that the problem of colonial possessions for Germany is no concern of his. For that reason I should like to refer to **two points which are of importance from an American standpoint in the solution of this problem.** First of all, I do not believe that the world economy can enjoy lasting prosperity without Germany's participation. If Germany were isolated, one might say that the world could survive the loss of a market of some seventy million people, that seventy million consumers, more or less, make very little difference to the world at large. But no such isolation of Germany is possible because the whole of Eastern Europe simply cannot dispense with the German market.

The Eastern European countries are predominantly agrarian. For them the German market is a matter of life and death. At the present time Germany receives some 14 percent of the exports of Poland, 16 percent of those of Czechoslovakia, 17 percent of those of Austria, 30 percent of those of Hungary, 49 percent of those of Bulgaria, 20 percent of those of Rumania, 36 percent of those of Yugoslavia, 45 percent of those of Greece and 64 percent of those of Turkey. Consequently, the disappearance of Germany from the world market would have most unwelcome results for the whole of Eastern Europe. Nor is it of much less importance to the Scandinavian countries. No one must forget this importance of Germany, situated as she is in the heart of Europe, with her highly developed population and her high

standard of living. European prosperity cannot be conceived of without German prosperity. And however much America may wish to stand aloof, there is not the slightest doubt that the ebb and flow of European prosperity is important to her.

The second reason why the United States cannot remain indifferent to the German colonial problem is moral. Even though the United States finally refused to ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty, it nevertheless was President Wilson who, by the proclamation of his Fourteen Points, provided the occasion for peace negotiations. Point Five of the Wilson program concerning colonies was one of the points on which Germany relied when she entered into those negotiations. And this, moreover, after the American Government had received from the Allied Powers the assurance, and had conveyed that assurance to Germany, that the Fourteen Points would constitute the basis of peace. **Point Five of the Wilson program reads as follows:**

A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interest of populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

Germany was perfectly ready to submit her colonial claims to the test provided for in Point Five, the more so because **Colonel House**, the President's friend and collaborator, in his well-known Lyons wireless in October 1918, had given the following interpre-



Militarism

When the German colonies were seized, the former Allies found no better pretext in order to make their purely imperialistic aims palatable than to state they merely wanted to protect the natives from Prussian militarism and its methods. The entire falsity of this statement can be clearly proved. The last Governor General of German East Africa, **Dr. Heinrich Schnee**, in his above-mentioned book, gave an accurate description, with figures, of Germany's military position in her former colonies. He writes as follows:

"In the covering note, Germany is charged with have used her colonies 'as a point of departure for raids on the trade of the world'. This statement is entirely untrue. At no time before the War did Germany create institutions or make arrangements in her colonies in order to use them for such purposes. As mentioned above, **the only fortified base in all the German Protectorates was Tsingtow in China.** That the fortifications of this port were created for defensive purposes and not to provide a basis of attack was obvious both from the manner of these fortifications and from the events of the War. All the other German colonies in Africa and the South Seas had not the slightest fortification which was suitable even for defence against an attack by European naval or land forces. There were even no guns. The principal port of the largest German colony, Daressalam, only possessed a few old guns for salutes, fired with very smoky powder, and the same was the case with Duala in the Cameroons. There were no guns whatever in any of the other ports in East Africa, or in any of the other colonies.

Where were the ports in the colonies from which German submarines could have set out, where were the harbour fortifications and strand batteries behind which German warships could have prepared for raids, where were the bases where they could lie in safety and take in coal? Nothing of the kind existed. Nor were there ever any considerable number of warships stationed in the African and South Sea colonies, such as would have been required for such undertakings. In German East Africa there was only one small cruiser, and in the other colonies, if there were any at all, only obsolete small warships were as a rule stationed. When the War broke out, the few small warships in the German colonies in Africa and the South Seas were compelled immediately to leave the ports of the Protectorate which offered them no protection.

And now as regards the alleged militarisation of the German colonies themselves. In the first place the legal provisions regarding the colonial troops and their small effectives show that they had merely to do their service in the colony itself. There were protectorate troops, organised as military troops, only in the three largest colonies of German East Africa, German South West Africa and the Cameroons. Their object is laid down in the **Protectorate Troop Law of July 7th-18th, 1896**, namely that they were used for the maintenance of order and security in the African protectorates. An examination of the figures shows at once that they could not serve any other purpose. **German East Africa**, almost twice the size of Germany and with a population of about $7\frac{3}{4}$ million natives, had protectorate troops numbering 2500 native soldiers with 152 German officers and n.c.o.s, in addition to 108 German sanitation officers and n.c.o.s. In addition there were 2140 native police troops under 4 German officers and 61 n.c.o.s,

for carrying out actual police duties. These troops were armed until after the War started with old sports rifles, single loading rifles, firing with very smoky powder.

The position was similar in the **Cameroons**, except that the protectorate troops and police troops were much smaller than in East Africa. The former amounted to 1550, and the latter to 1255 natives under a corresponding number of German officers and n.c.o.s.

German South West Africa was the only colony with white protectorate troops, amounting altogether to not quite 2000. In addition there were white police numbering 500-600. It is obvious that this small number of troops and police could only be intended for maintaining order in a territory far more than half as large again as Germany, with a not very numerous but difficult native population.

The other German colonies had no protectorate troops at all, but only small police troops, amounting in **Togoland** to 550 natives, in **German New Guinea**, including the widespread island territories, to 830 natives; **Samoa**, lastly, had only a small trained police troop (Fitafita) consisting of about 30 sons of chiefs, who were used for decorative purposes.

The small effectives of the troops existing in the German colonies show without any doubt that they were only used for the maintenance of order in the territory itself. The same result is obtained when these effectives are compared with those of the neighbouring foreign colonial territories. The German protectorate and police troops were entirely within the limits of those customary in British colonies with similar conditions, and were in some cases much lower than the effectives in French and Belgian colonies.

It is absurd to think that Germany would have tried to use these small troops, which in case of war would have been cut off from all supplies from home, for conquest in neighbouring territories.

When the Great War broke out and was extended to the colonies, there were neither sufficient troops nor arms nor ammunition in the German protectorates to put up an effective resistance in the long run to the greatly superior forces that poured in from all sides. The fact that so much was nevertheless achieved and that, in particular, the German East African troops were able to keep the field throughout the War is due, not only to the excellent German leadership and the support given to the coloured troops by the calling-up of German reservists, but mainly to the loyalty of the natives."

The above remarks should have made it sufficiently clear that the charge of militarisation of the German colonies is without foundation. Germany had no colonial army, no coloured troops outside the colonies, no compulsory levy of natives, and no arrangements which would have rendered possible the use of natives for other purposes than the maintenance of order and security in the colony to which they belonged.

That Germany had not more troops in her colonies than were required for internal order is clear from the unquestionable report by **Dr. Solf**, as contained in 1919 in his book: "**Colonial Policy, my Political Testament**" (page 53). He writes on his negotiations with the South African General Botha:



in the Colonies

"Botha then spoke of the natives in South West Africa and of a possible repetition of the rising. When I referred in this connection to a reduction of the protectorate troops which was desired by a section in our parliament, he gave an urgent warning against a reduction of the number of the protectorate troops below 2000, in the interest of the maintenance of order. He was also of opinion that one could never trust natives and should be constantly on the watch."

A further confirmation of the fact that Germany only kept as many troops in the colonies as were necessary to deal with local risings, is to be found in the book by the expert Brigadier General C. P. Fendal: "The East Africa Force 1915 to 1919":

"There was an idea that should war break out between England and Germany there would be no active fighting in Africa.... If was feared that the prestige of the white man would be lowered, and that the progress of civilization in Africa would be put back a hundred years. The prevalence of this idea led to the maintenance, both in British and German East Africa, of only sufficient troops to deal with local risings" (pp. 22—3).

The unpreparedness of Germany for the war in the colonies is also testified by an Englishman. Dr. Norman Leys, the writer of the book: "Kenya", wrote as follows in an article in the "New Leader" of August 24th, 1926:

"A month later (after the outbreak of War) I saw with my own eyes the poor devils of German Askaris use obsolete rifles firing with black powder, from which every cloud of smoke was a welcome target for our men who were armed with modern smokeless rifles. The proof that Germany did not intend war in Africa is as complete as the proof that the mandatory system was a mere cover under which three imperialistic Powers stole entire territories without a shadow of justice."

Proof can also be given from the French side as to the non-militarisation of the German colonies. This was confirmed, inter alia, by the French mandatory report for 1923 for the Cameroons addressed to the League of Nations, which says:

"The Germans had created no fixed organisations in the Cameroons which might be qualified as fortifications or as a military or naval base."

And what about the statement that the so-called "German militarism" had abused the natives under its protection? In connection with the charge of militarisation, merely two fitting proofs may be given. The American Herbert Adam Gibbons wrote as follows in his book "The New Map of Africa", which was published in 1916:

The ability of German officers in Cameroon and East Africa to command the loyalty of these native troops and the cooperation of the inhabitants of these two colonies is a big surprise to France and Great Britain, and disproves the thesis that the natives of the portions of Africa over which Germany ruled were eager to welcome British and French liberators.

Even the *Times*, which can hardly be charged with pro-German sentiments, wrote on December 12th, 1918, when the wave of hatred against Germany was at its height:

It is wrong to think that the natives on the outbreak of war were yearning for freedom.... One element may even prove to be a definite danger, namely the native German soldier whose absolute fidelity is remarkable."

The charge of militarism is a two-edged weapon for those who reproach Germany with it; they should read their own colonial history in order to learn to be silent. The militarism of the great colonial Powers has been so thoroughly described by their own nationals that this literature, if collected, would fill whole libraries. One of the saddest facts was the transportation of black soldiers to the European battlefields during the War. That these coloured troops did not take part in the War out of love for their country, may be sufficiently shown by one example. With regard to the levy of coloured troops during the War, M. Delafosse wrote as follows in the "Dépêche Coloniale et Maritime" on February 16th, 1922:

"Whether we like it or not, we are constrained to admit the fact that recruiting is generally unpopular in our colonies. During and since the war we have certainly succeeded, as a result of persistent efforts, in enlisting large numbers of natives; but in how many cases was the recruit really a volunteer? In certain districts, it is true, there were numbers of young folk who allowed themselves to be enlisted without complaint and even who came and enlisted voluntarily, but the older men looked askance at the matter. Indeed, repeated and strongly emphasized Orders and even forcible measures, were often necessary in order to make up the required contingents, not to speak of the cases in which the recruiting led to disturbances and risings several of which were of a serious nature. It is to be expected that the obligatory service will not be more favourably received by the natives than the volunteer recruiting."

Even the mandated territories have not been spared militarism. It is sufficient to refer to the sensational discussions which took place in the League of Nations, when France succeeded in recruiting natives in the mandated territories not only for police and military service for the internal security of these territories, but also, in using these troops for other territories. The Syrian rising in 1925 in the French mandated territory and the suppression of the Bondelzwarts with air bombs in South West Africa in 1922, moreover, showed sufficiently clearly what methods were used even by Mandatories after the War.

Those who are responsible for the present order of peace should not speak of the militarism of the Germans. In closing this chapter, we may quote the book by Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson, who, as one of the best observers of the Paris negotiations of 1919, had to admit the following facts:

"It was the Prussian idea of force, of military sanctions and military methods that he (Wilson) was seeking to get away from — that had to be got away from before peace could be made. This was a part of the 'old order' that had caused the war; he was there to establish a 'new order'. They had hewn away, with stupendous effort, the head of the Prussian hydra, and here had grown new hydra-heads all over Europe. The old forces were ever here in the Peace Conference, trying to dispatch or at least influence the settlements....."

It was plain that the more vigorous the maintenance of the war feeling, the severer the peace terms could be made."

The dictated Peace of Versailles then gave the proof that the militarists had won the struggle against the political leaders in Paris.

tation of President Wilson's conception: "The stipulation is that in the case of the German colonies the title is to be determined after the conclusion of the War by 'impartial adjustment' based on certain principles. These are of two kinds: 1. 'Equitable' claims. 2. The interests of the populations concerned." Colonel House then referred specifically to Germany, and said: "What are the 'equitable' claims put forth by Germany? That she needs access to tropical raw materials, that she needs a field for the expansion of her population, that under the principles of peace proposed, conquest gives her enemies no title to her colonies."

Just as it is impossible for the Government of Great Britain to ignore, in the face of history, the solemn assurance it gave at the beginning of the World War that it did not wish to annex the German colonies, so it is equally impossible for the American people to ignore the solemn declarations made by their Chief Executive and his collaborator.

It was not the German Government that brought the war into the colonial territories. It was not the German Government that brought the colored peoples into the World War, an act the consequences of which we now see in the widespread unrest prevailing amongst the colored races. The Congo Act of 1885, in which England, France, Belgium and Germany participated, provided that the signatory Powers in case of war would renounce the use of the Congo Basin as a basis for war-like operations. On August 23, 1914, Germany suggested to her opponents that the colonies should be left out of the war. France and England did not follow this suggestion. They not only violated the Congo Act, but brought the war into the German colonies. Germany's entire colonial military power was only some 7,000 men in all the colonies put together. They had no significance other than to act as a police force for the maintenance of law and order. The inhabitants of the colonies were never used for German military purposes, whereas France brought over half a million colored soldiers and put them into the field against Germany. I make these preliminary remarks in order to show clearly that **for Germany the colonial question is not to-day, any more than it was before, a question of Imperialism or Militarism. To this day it is still essentially a question of her economic existence.**

In the golden age before the World War the problem of colonies and raw materials did not have the importance it has to-day. This is as true for Germany as for other countries. Before the War, Germany's world investments were in round figures 12,000 million dollars, the profits of which could be used to buy raw materials all over the world. The markets where raw materials were procured were completely free. Very seldom were the development and distribution of raw materials controlled by cartels, and on the rare occasions when raw materials were cornered the situation was only temporary. Long-term commercial treaties assured the freedom of international trade. All the important countries were on the gold standard, and this provided a sure basis for commercial calculations. Emigration and immigration, between the young countries and the old, was open and was looked on with favor.

All these elementary principles of international trade and intercourse have now disappeared. Strict regulations govern immigration into almost all the countries where formerly immigrants were welcome. The gold standard has been abandoned by nearly every country. Commercial treaties are concluded only for brief periods, and in their place have come quotas and restrictions, to say nothing of constant increases in more effective tariffs. German investments abroad have been taken away without compensation, and the markets where raw materials are to be procured are largely subject to the same restrictions that prevail in other fields of commerce. In recent years we have seen the results of this policy. World trade has fallen to almost one-third of its previous maximum. Credit machinery has ceased to function. Confidence in international payments has been extinguished. Every merchant and investor is chary of investments in foreign countries.

In view of the decline in international commercial relations, the more important countries have fallen into the habit of exploiting more intensively the economic territories at their disposal. Much is said nowadays to the effect that Germany is striving for autarchy. People entirely forget that this autarchy has long since been achieved by such countries as France and Great Britain, not to mention Russia and the United States. Autarchy can be easily achieved—in fact it naturally exists—in an economic region which is supplied with almost all raw materials, provided it enjoys the same monetary system throughout. The

British devaluation would never have had the success which it achieved if Great Britain had not been able to bring the monetary system of the Dominions onto the same basis as her own. France could never have used her colonial empire so successfully if it had not been administered under **the same monetary system as the mother country.**

I should like to quote some figures to indicate the extent to which autarchy has progressed in the British and French Empires. The share of the British Dominions, colonies and protectorates in the imports of Great Britain rose during the last twelve years from about 31 to about 42 percent; and their share in British exports rose from about 41 to about 49 percent. The imports of France from her colonies increased in the last ten years from about 10 to about 26 percent, and her exports to the colonies increased from about 14 to about 32 percent. So vast is the geographical expanse of the United States of America, so enormous its wealth, that it is much less dependent than other countries on an exchange of goods with the outside world. In its natural wealth lies the explanation of the fact that its 125,000,000 people have only a ten percent share of the world's trade, whereas the 45,000,000 people of Great Britain have more than 14 percent. Of course the circumstances are even more favorable in Russia, which is not so developed and contains almost all kinds of raw materials.

As against these great national economic domains stand the countries with large populations but limited territories. Because of their inadequate land resources they are much more dependent than the others upon the international exchange of goods. These two kinds of countries have lately been classified as the **"Haves" and the "Have-nots".**

To their astonishment, statesmen have now become conscious of the fact that the **British Empire** has more than a quarter of the earth's surface at its disposal, and that one-quarter of the world's wheat, one-half of the world's wool and rubber, one-quarter of the world's coal, one-third of the world's copper and almost all the world's nickel is produced within the confines of that Empire. It was recently stated in the House of Lords that of an estimated twenty-five different varieties of essential raw materials, the British Empire was amply supplied in its own territory with no less than eighteen, was supplied to a certain extent in two cases, and was deficient only in five.

Germany, on the contrary, as the same speaker in the House of Lords pointed out, was sufficiently supplied by its own production in only four cases, was more or less adequately supplied in two, and was completely without supplies in nineteen. In Italy and Japan conditions are equally unfavorable. The speaker in the House of Lords appropriately added that, "in these circumstances it was not surprising that there was unrest in Germany, Japan and Italy; it was true that Great Britain was probably the most peace loving country in the world; that was because she had got all that she wanted." What is particularly interesting in this statement is the connection established by the speaker between the control of raw materials and the love of peace. He very rightly recognizes that a nation which is cut off from the essential necessities of life must be a source of unrest in the world.

Now, however, events have unfortunately occurred to make Germany's case very different from that of similarly situated countries like Japan and Italy. Despite the League of Nations and its alleged assurances of peace, Japan has meanwhile decided to help herself and has acquired Manchuria; while Italy, by the conquest of Abyssinia, has expanded the territory which she requires for her life. As a result, Japan and Italy are no longer amongst the unsatisfied nations. They have left the Have-nots and have joined the ranks of the Haves, those nations which are satisfied. **Germany remains the lone unsatisfied large Power. So long, then, as the problem of colonial raw materials is not solved for Germany, so long will she remain a source of unrest despite all her love of peace. It is that love of peace which still permits her to entertain the hope that she can solve the colonial problem peacefully and that she can take her place in the ranks of the Haves.**

In the year 1929, when the extension of ample credit to Germany still concealed her economic situation, and while the international gold standard still flourished, 4,400 million dollars out of the 5,630 million dollars which Germany paid for imports went for food stuffs, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. In the year 1935, the import total had declined to 1,680 million dollars, of which 1,400 million dollars were devoted to food

stuffs, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. The extent to which German production has been throttled is obvious. Of the 1,400 million dollars spent for imports, 600 million were devoted to food stuffs alone, and only 800 million went for raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. Any such quantity of raw materials is far below what Germany normally needs to keep her industries going and maintain the standard of life of her people. The false dawn which foreign credits brought to Germany in 1925—1930 following the institution of the Dawes Plan, made way for cruel reality when this credit inflation ceased and the world economic crisis occurred. **It is either silly or cynical, in the face of such facts, for foreign commentators to declare that Germany can buy raw materials in the world market at will. No, Germany cannot do that because she does not possess the means of paying for them in foreign currencies; and she does not possess the means because foreign countries do not consume enough of her wares.**

In the circumstances, it can hardly be a matter of surprise that Germany should try to increase her ability to produce raw materials in her own country by forced and artificial means. We know very well that even if we succeed in replacing with artificial native products a number of raw materials normally supplied by the world market we can do this only at high cost. **So we ought to reject autarchy on principle, because it will necessarily lead to a lowering of the standard of life of the German people. But we have no choice so long as political conditions do not permit German colonial activity. There will be no peace in Europe until this problem is solved.** No great nation willingly allows its standard of life and culture to be lowered and no great nation accepts the risk that it will go hungry.

I should like to make perfectly clear that autarchy, whether natural or produced artificially, cannot possibly be an ideal. It is opposed to the general principles of civilization. Autarchy means isolation from the rest of the world. A reduction in commercial relations reduces the exchange of products of the intellect; the means of exchange in scientific, artistic and cultural fields are destroyed. A national economy based on the autarchic principle produces mental autarchy. As minds grow narrower there is an increase in the estrangement which has unfortunately existed between the great Powers for many years owing to political factors. Heretofore mankind has progressed only by means of the exchange of intellectual goods; and only by such an exchange can it resume a healthy development.

A considerable school of opinion holds that all that is needed is to restore the international exchange of goods. Germany's share will thus be increased, and she will again be able to purchase raw materials. These are the peoples who are always talking of free trade and the lowering of tariff walls. Everybody agrees with them, but no one has yet succeeded in translating their ideals into reality. The reason for this is very simple. It lies in the fact that a nation's economic strength plays an extraordinarily important part in determining its political situation. **To-day the possession of raw materials has become a political factor, just as the voluntary change of the currency standard has become a political instrument. People think that by withholding or sharing raw materials the political situation of a political opponent or friend can be correspondingly influenced. This theory was sadly exemplified in the famous sanctions agreements of the League of Nations.** It was imagined that by means of an economic boycott the political necessities of life could be denied a country, or deliberately limited. We saw the policy in operation against Italy. The Italian example proves that no nation with any claim to honor and worth will willingly submit to such a policy. For any nation to live at the mercy of another is a complete impossibility. **The spirit which prompts the idea is not that of a League of Nations; it is not the spirit of peace. It is a spirit which drives nations apart and into war.** A great nation that sees itself exposed to such a danger will employ all its powers to avoid it. No friend of peace can ever approve of measures intended to cut off great Powers from the natural treasures of the earth.

A particularly ridiculous charge to which Germany has often to listen in connection with her colonial demands is that colonies in general and her former colonies in particular are valueless, and that it would not do Germany any good if her colonies were returned to her. This immediately prompts the retort: If the colonies are so bad, why do you keep them? It is also misleading to refer to the minor part played by the colonies in Germany's pre-

war foreign trade. I have already pointed out that before the War free trade prevailed on a large scale and that Germany had valuable resources in the form of foreign investments. Consequently, it was not necessary before the War for Germany to develop her colonies with particular energy. It nevertheless is astonishing what Germany did with her colonies before the War without any great effort. They had been in her possession, on the average, for only some twenty-five years, from the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties. But during those twenty-five years Germany did more with her colonies than other countries had done in two hundred and fifty years.

At the outbreak of the World War, that is, after two decades of German administration, the German colonies had ceased to be a burden on the mother country. In fact, the financial balance was so well established that even the colonial railway loans had been paid for by the earnings of the colonies. Only the seven thousand police troops were supported by the mother country. During the fifteen years before the war, the external trade of the German colonies had increased seven-fold. That happened in a time when Germany did not experience a scarcity of raw materials and foreign currency, in a time when world trade had not been interrupted by political and economic mistrust, in a time when the struggles of different currency systems were not being fought out, in a time, therefore, when Germany had no particular need to intensify her trade with her colonies. Today, when there no longer is free trade in the world, when Germany is crushed by foreign debts and harassed by the lack of raw materials and valuta, if her colonies were returned to her she would proceed to develop them with far greater intensity. A large part of the food supplies and raw materials which we now lack could be furnished by them.

Of course there are short-sighted people who declare that if Germany got back her colonies they would compete with the other countries which supply raw materials, to the disadvantage of these latter. This is simply the eternally recurring, short-sighted, unbusinesslike attitude of all those people who are constantly afraid of any new development. It was this attitude which found expression in England in the nineties, when it was said that every Englishman would be the richer if only Germany were crushed.

Even the stupidest person, I believe, would admit, to-day that the English are not richer by one penny because of the World War and the Versailles Treaty. Their trade has dwindled, like that of every other country, and their financial burdens have increased exactly like those of other nations. If Germany could expand economically by acquiring her own basis of raw materials, this could only contribute to the stimulation of world trade in general. It would help to increase consumption, promote prosperity, and raise the standard of life, not only of the German people, but of the entire industrial world. At no time in history did the prosperity of world trade reach such a peak as during the years of peace before the War, when the economic competition of all countries was vigorous. For example, trade between Great Britain and Germany was never so active as at the time before the War when these two countries were engaged in fair industrial competition.

In matters of foreign politics, the American people, despite their youth—or perhaps because of it—have for the most part shown a healthy, human, moral attitude. It is true that, for reasons which are gradually being seen in their true light, the American people joined in the war. But they rightly refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty, because it was an immoral treaty. I know very well, and I wish here to confess it openly, that many things that are happening in Germany to-day are not approved of by a large section of the American people. But may I, just as frankly, ask Americans this question: What would they themselves do, after having lost a war which they fought in the conviction that it was for their existence, if they then were oppressed for twenty long years by an unjust peace imposed by the victors, and on top of that were deprived by their opponents of the necessities of life?

The German people have been the torch-bearers of European culture for thousands of years, have been the model in every field of art, have produced the most creative figures in religion and in science. And this is the nation whose moral standing has been affronted and disparaged by its opponents for two decades! It is inconceivable that such treatment should not produce a profound reaction in the German people. Believe me, my American

friends, when I say that this German people is still the same people that gave the world Luther and Goethe. For this reason it must and will live, for this reason it will continue to fight with all its strength for its place in the world.

Americans must not imagine that they can evade the moral responsibility laid on their shoulders by President Wilson. That this feeling of responsibility still exists in America is shown by the following statement by **Colonel Edward M. House**, the same man from whose Lyons wireless I have already quoted, and who recently wrote in *Liberty* as follows: "Every statesman will admit in private conversation that Germany, Italy and Japan need reservoirs into which to pour their man power and from which to draw those necessities and raw materials which nature denied them. But the great possessing nations—Great Britain, France, the United States and Russia—are unwilling to grant to their less fortunate fellows more than the crumbs that fall from their colonial table. Just as social peace cannot prevail without some adjustment of the capitalistic system, so international peace cannot be preserved without drastic territorial readjustments. Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States must receive Italy, Germany, and Japan on terms adjusted to present world conditions and recognize their insistence upon being given their proper part of the colonial resources of the world. Chaos and catastrophe will be upon us unless those that have among the Powers are willing to share in some way with those that have not."

The attitude towards German colonial needs has been modified a bit. In 1929, when I pointed out at the Young Conference that Germany's demand for colonies raised an essential condition for her economic survival, I was laughed at. But now a British minister, Sir Samuel Hoare, speaking before the League of Nations in September of last year, has come forward in favour of a redistribution of the means of access to the world's raw material resources. The precise propositions and intentions that may lie behind that general formulation have not yet been revealed.

I therefore wish to name **two conditions essential to the solution of Germany's raw material problem.** First, Germany must produce her raw materials on territory under her own management. Second, this colonial territory must form part of her own monetary system. Colonial raw materials cannot be developed without considerable investments. Colonial markets are not of the kind that can live by the personal needs of the native population. Shirts and hats for the negroes and ornaments for their wives do not constitute an adequate market. Colonial territories are developed by the building of railways and roads, by automobile traffic, radio and electric power, by huge plantations, etc. From the moment that the German colonies came under the control of the Mandate Powers, Germany was cut off from the delivery of goods required for such investments. In 1913, for example, Germany's exports to Tanganyika formed 52.6 percent of that area's imports. In 1935 they formed 10.7 percent. The British Mandate Power as a matter of course places its orders in England and not in Germany or elsewhere. That is the reason why Germany needs colonial territories which she herself administers. Since, however, the development of colonies depends upon long term investments, and these investments cannot be made by the native negro population, the German currency system must prevail in the colonial territories, so that the required investments may be made with German credits. These, then, are Germany's two basic demands in the colonial field: that she have territories under German management and included in the German monetary system.

All the other questions involved—sovereignty, army, police, law, the churches, international collaboration—are open to discussion. They can all be solved by means of international co-operation so long as nothing unworthy is imputed against the honor of Germany. The German colonial problem is not a problem of imperialism. It is not a mere problem of prestige. It is simply and solely a problem of economic existence. Precisely for that reason the future of European peace depends upon it.

Extract from Dr. Schacht's Speech at the Centenary Celebrations of the Association for Geography and Statistics at Frankfort o. M., on December 9th, 1936

"It may surprise you that a man like myself connected with finance and economics should take part in the jubilee celebrations of an association dealing exclusively with geography and statistics. But I considered that this might be an opportunity of using dry though irrefutable figures in order to give a picture of the economic position in which Germany is situated from the geographical and demographical point of view. The necessity of such a review arises out of the general conviction that the peaceful development of Europe to a very great extent depends upon whether Germany and the German people can look forward to a secure social and economic development or not.

We are constantly obliged to note to our astonishment that many people abroad, while taking exception to our mental outlook and wishing to consider us as outsiders with whom no discussion is possible, have never taken the trouble to inquire as to the reason for this mental outlook which appears to them to be so foreign. The reason is simply that we are a country which has too large a population on too small a space, and this fact weighs us down like an incubus.

In a recent conversation on this fact with a foreign diplomat in Berlin, this philanthropist gave me the advice that the German people should reduce the number of births. This view, which we meet elsewhere in Anglo-Saxon quarters, is in contradiction with the most primitive principles of the divine world order, and, if we had not had so many bitter experiences, it would be surprising to find such views emanating in particular from a country which in other respects attaches great importance to religious ideas and sentiments. It is only the irony of fate that that same country is one of those that possess possibly the most space and the greatest possibilities of life. I consider the arbitrary restriction of an increase in population as a crime against God and nature so long as the world as a whole offers possibilities of subsistence for the people who live in it. But it is not a fact that the world no

longer possesses such possibilities, though their utilisation is hindered by political conditions in respect of possessions.

As a matter of fact in the last few decades Germany has experienced a decline in the birth rate which was particularly acute in the years after the War. The necessary external influences which the War and its consequences were bound to bring to our nation as to other nations in respect of an increase in population were unavoidable, but the German nation is not prepared to accept arbitrary external pressure which destroys its vital force.

It must be pointed out here that any attempt to cause a shrinkage in a great nation by lasting external pressure must necessarily lead to social distress and disturbance and ultimately to an explosion. The foreign satesmen who attempt to explain the European problem to-day by the motto: "Here democracy, here Fascism" or the like, entirely overlook the fundamental problem. It is not a decisive factor whether the nations eat their fill under democracy or under Fascism. The decisive factor is that they should eat their fill. It is easier to influence the mental outlook of a satisfied nation than a hungry nation. Peace in Europe, and consequently of the whole world, depends upon whether the dense populations of Central Europe obtain for themselves a possibility of living or not."

Dr. Schacht then turned to the rise in the average age of the people, the density of the population and the question whether the nations have properly utilised the space at their disposal, and then showed the extent to which Germany had tried by means of intensive cultivation of the soil, to extract the maximum possible for her subsistence from the reduced area which still remained to her. **Germany had extracted everything possible from her soil at an enormous outlay of capital and labour.** The results of the last three years had proved that the limit attained in 1933 could not be exceeded. The German could not obtain all the food required by the German nation from the existing German soil.

The case was quite different with our European neighbours. If the soil of our neighbours, which was known to be considerably better and more favoured by climate, was cultivated in the way we had been compelled to cultivate ours, the products would be increased in France by a third to a half, in Poland by a half to three-quarters, and in Russia would be doubled or trebled. This calculation leaves out of account the areas which could be but have not been hitherto cultivated and which are still available especially in Poland and Russia.

"I need not go into the serious **lack of materials for Germany's industrial requirements**. Germany is not only dependent on imports of foodstuffs from abroad, but is inadequately supplied with raw materials for her entire industry. We have adequate supplies only of coal, potash, and nitrogen. There is either a restricted supply or a total lack of materials in the case of iron and almost all base metals, petroleum and phosphates, wool, hides, timber, rubber, and cotton. As Germany possesses no supplies or possibilities of production of these materials abroad, she is compelled to purchase all these goods by means of her export trade.

In the report by the Director of the International Labour Conference at Geneva in 1936, the following clear opinion is expressed: 'So long as industrial States can dispose of their goods without restriction abroad, they can purchase the raw materials required by their industry; but if their foreign markets are closed, they can no longer obtain the necessary foreign exchange in order to keep their factories working and to employ their labour.' It can naturally not be expected that an international, though politically bound, organisation should enter into the reasons for these facts and the necessary means of changing them, but I think no one at present will dispute the fact that a country cannot be deprived of all its foreign revenue earning property and all its colonial possessions and in addition be loaded with enormous debts to foreign countries, without bringing such a country's balance of payments to a state of hopeless collapse. But this was done to Germany. The statement by the above mentioned Geneva Labour Conference is, however, of importance, since it rightly points out that, even under normal conditions, if an industrial State is to maintain itself it must have a secure foreign market. This raises a **great problem that endangers the peace of Central Europe** and which must be frankly discussed here.

The fossil free traders who have not yet observed that the world economic position necessarily changes from time to time, continue to state that **all Germany has to do is to sell sufficient goods abroad at cheap prices in order to buy all the raw materials she requires. This view is a foolish one.** Everyone knows that there is not a single civilised country in the world that now subscribes to the principle that goods should be purchased where they are cheapest. This might have been possible when Adam Smith wrote his book on the Wealth of Nations. At present the position is that every Government must first see that its own population has work and is employed. So long as Adam Smith's theory did not conflict with the necessity of providing work, all was well. As soon as industrial development raised the problem of the provision of work, Adam Smith had to be scrapped. It is a fact in economic policy that people must not conform to theories, but theories to people; in other words Adam Smith is beaten by hard facts.

German foreign trade finds itself prevented by the measures of the other Governments from selling its goods to the desired extent in foreign countries. This does not apply only to the present. It will always be a fact that the foreign trade of a country depends not only on the capacity of the country itself but also on the will of the buying markets. Since the War, however, we have learned **what an instrument of power economic policy can be in international conflicts**. I will not on this occasion enter into the moral aspect of all these questions, but the conclusion must be drawn that the maintenance of the freedom of food and raw materials of a great nation is, in the view prevailing among

certain foreign diplomats, to be made dependent on the charity which a few predominant powers can distribute or not at their discretion. It should be clear to any politician that this conclusion cannot be freely accepted by any great, self-conscious nation. If League and other idealists nevertheless still exist who think that the foreign market should in some way be guaranteed to an industrial State provided it promises to conform with certain desires of foreign Powers, the answer must be that, in view of the diversity of the economic and political relations of the countries of the world, there is no reason to attribute evil intentions or even stupidity, in order to show that the execution of such an idea is absurd. Even if all the leading statesmen showed the best will and possessed the greatest intelligence, they could never ensure that the markets of the world would always be kept open for an adequate assimilation of German goods. Economic and demographic conditions, technical and traffic relations and developments in various parts of the world are so completely incalculable that no Power in the world could give a guarantee for the execution of such an alleged ideal.

Before the War Germany had made provision for her future supply of food and raw materials by acquiring her colonies in Africa and Oceania, a territory five times as large as Germany with only about 13 million inhabitants. Mr. Amery, the former Secretary of State for the British Dominions, dealt some months ago with the demand for the return of the German Colonies and stated that a return of the colonies would not help Germany. I will not go to the opposite extreme and state that a satisfactory settlement of the colonial question would at one stroke conjure away all Germany's needs in respect of raw materials. But what the British expert entirely overlooks is that before the War Germany possessed, in addition to her colonies, revenue-earning establishments abroad to a value of 30,000 million gold marks. She possessed a flourishing foreign trade with all accessory branches of industry, such as shipping, insurance, credit institutes etc. The markets of the world were open and for the most part secured by long-term commercial treaties. There were no restrictions on emigration. For all these reasons, Germany could purchase her raw materials on the world market and had no incitement to force the development of her own colonial possessions or to emigrate to them.

But all that has now changed. If the colonies were not now withheld from Germany she would take up the development of supplies of colonial raw materials with the greatest energy by means of German labour and capital and credit in German currency and would obtain infinitely more foodstuffs and raw materials from them than is at present the case under mandatory rule in spite of the development which has taken place. Naturally the development of the colonies will take some time. But it must be pointed out that, with modern technical appliances, development can be brought about much more quickly than was the case previously. Even in the present situation, therefore, the colonies would bring about an immediate alleviation of the German position in respect of raw materials, and the effect would be very rapidly increased in the course of years. Even the present exports of vegetable oils and fats from the German colonies cover about a quarter of our annual requirements of these materials. In respect of timber there would be a possibility of very considerably alleviating the position immediately. These are not merely baseless hopes but actual facts.

To sum up, Germany has insufficient space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly much greater efforts than any other nation to extract from that restricted space what she requires for her living conditions. But, in spite of all these efforts, the space is inadequate. The lack of industrial raw materials is even greater than that of foodstuffs. The existence of the German nation cannot be ensured by any kind of commercial political agreements. The allotment of colonial territory is the real solution of the existing difficulties."

The German Standpoint on the Question of Colonies

By General Ritter von Epp, Reich Governor of Bavaria

"Europäische Revue", September 1936

The German people live in a Territory which is extremely restricted compared to its population, and does not produce the raw materials that have become essential to existence. The Treaty of Versailles deprived Germany of her entire Colonial possessions, as well as of the possibility of acquiring the necessary raw materials with her own currency. In comparison with the colonial possessions of other countries, Germany to-day can only be regarded as occupying a secondary position. Even in 1914 Germany, with colonial areas $5\frac{1}{2}$ times the size of the Mother Country, ranked after many smaller nations. England was already in possession of an empire 105 times larger than Great Britain. Belgium's colonies were 80, Holland's 60, France's 22 times the area of the Homeland.

The fact that Germany was cut off from the possibility of importing necessary raw materials from colonies which she could call her own, has had particularly tragic results, the more tragic indeed because the density of Germany's population (Germany being numerically the biggest European nation after Russia) has made an intensive industrialisation of the country essential in order to feed her people.

Any government which is conscious of its responsibility, must regard it as one of its chief duties to provide its people with food and work. The carrying out of this duty has been made even more difficult than the other countries which possess colonies by the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed an enforced administration on the former German possessions. It should also not be forgotten that the rising standard of living which began to be prevalent in Germany before the War, is to be attributed to the possession and exploiting of colonies.

In order to restore her economic life, Germany is essentially in need of territories which shall, at the same time, produce raw materials and in which her own money shall be legal tender. We are neither willing nor able to accept a position of inferiority compared to other countries. We must be able to make the necessary purchases of raw materials with our own money. For, in consequence of the policy of reparations, we have been subjected to a constantly increasing drain on our reserves of foreign currencies, which makes it difficult for us to buy anything that must be paid for in foreign money. This trend has become even more marked through the attempts of the rest of the world to become self-sufficing, attempts which made it increasingly difficult for Germany to export her wares.

In the most favourable event, Sir Samuel Hoare's proposal for summoning an international conference to deal with the distribution of raw materials could only, even if the proposal was actually carried out, provide Germany with additional territories from which to obtain what she needs; it does not, however, attempt to meet German demands for colonies in which her own currency would be legal tender. Hence, proposals of this kind, however well intentioned they may be, cannot provide the relief which German economic life, labouring as it does under manifold disadvantages, so urgently needs.

Other quarters have attempted to classify various states into "Haves" and "Have-nots," and it is hardly necessary to add that Germany was included among the latter. Certain foreign periodicals have attributed the most incredible intentions to Germany as a "Have-not" country, which was determined to obtain possession of colonies by hook or by crook, and these insinuations have led to widespread unrest. Political suspicion increased considerably, not only in France but in smaller countries such as Belgium and Portugal. In addition, as a result of these repeated statements made in the foreign press about Germany's intention to annex colonies by forcible means, other countries which had hitherto not been active in colonial matters, suddenly began to take an interest in the question.

It cannot be stated too emphatically that Germany would never defy world-wide public opinion by annexing foreign territories. On the contrary, when Germany brings up the question of colonies she is thinking only of her own possessions which the Treaty of Versailles arbitrarily placed under the enforced control of the

League of Nations, for the latter in its turn to hand them over to the present mandatory powers. The German colonial movement aims at nothing more than the removal of this enforced control and the restoration to Germany of the right of free disposal over her own colonial possessions. It follows that no other state will be injured in its territorial status by Germany's demand for her due.

It should not be difficult to meet Germany's colonial demands. The Treaty of Versailles has lost much of its importance as a political guiding principle. It has grown to be a harmful factor in international life because it offends against the very foundations of justice, confidence and authority. The day is bound to come when the wrong done to Germany under paragraph 119 of the Treaty of Versailles will be righted. The "colonial-guilt-lie" which served as a pretext for depriving Germany of her possessions, is already admitted to be the untruth it really is. Important foreign authorities (I need only recall the name of General Hertzog, the South African Premier) have formally withdrawn the charge that Germany is unfit to colonise.

The following juridical arguments which underlie Germany's demand for the return of her colonies have hardly yet been mentioned at all in public controversy abroad. The fact that the Signatory Powers to the Congo Treaty had solemnly undertaken in paragraph 11 not to extend an European war to Central African colonies is in itself proof that to have taken Germany's colonies away from her was an act of grave injustice. This circumstance explains how it was that Dr. Solf, Secretary of State for the Colonies, could telegraph to German East Africa as late as on August 2nd, 1914, that the colonies were not endangered and that the settlers would not be molested. It was not any act of Germany's which ran counter to this paragraph 11 of the Congo Treaty, but, on the contrary, a British cruiser which started hostilities in German East Africa on 5th August. This act of war was contrary to the Treaty stipulations by which the European Powers had undertaken not to drag their colonies into the fray even in the case of war, but rather to guarantee the colonial status quo for the time being.

If this were not sufficient proof of the injustice of depriving Germany of her colonies, yet another reason can be given. Germany only gave her assent to the preliminary treaty of peace officially entered into on November 5th, 1918, because she believed that President Wilson's fourteen points would be maintained and that the note of the American State Secretary, Lansing, of November 5th, 1918, would be the juridical foundation of peace negotiations. Wilson's fifth point provided for a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial solution of all colonial aspirations. This was subsequently nullified by Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, for Germany was forced to renounce all her rights to her overseas possessions.

It is, moreover, impossible to justify the contention that the taking over of the German colonies was a veiled form of annexation to which the country must submit as one of the consequences of having lost the War, for the actual value of these colonies was not taken into consideration when the amount of Reparations was fixed. Consequently, Germany has never ceased to consider that the demand for the return of her former colonial territories is a matter of right.

It is a contradiction in terms to pretend, as has often been done recently, that owing to her racial legislation at home, Germany has proved herself incapable of educating alien races and administering their wealth. Exhaustive studies in the field of biology have enabled Germans to ascertain to their satisfaction that every race possesses its own characteristics differing essentially from those of other races. The point of Germany's racial legislation is precisely to respect and encourage, as well as to assist, the development of these characteristics within her own borders. However, Germany has no intention of interfering with the racial affairs of Native peoples. We are simply anxious to prevent the intrusion of foreign racial elements into our population and this on racial grounds. Those who think this a reason

for denying Germany's capacity to govern Native peoples ought rather to examine the history of many another nation which boasts of its talent for colonising. It will be sufficient to mention the extermination of the inhabitants of the Marquesas Islands and the other Maori populations of the South Seas; or to turn to the disappearance of the Indians in North America and in Canada; or, finally, to remember the concentration camps provided for the Boers until the latter became reconciled to England's interests. In this connection it may be observed that it was not a particularly glorious page in the history of the World War that the Allies should have encouraged black men to destroy white, quite apart from the fact that such a course of action damaged the prestige of Europeans beyond repair in every other continent.

Germany has rightly realised that honour is the sacred possession of a nation, and that no people can tolerate a permanent inroad on its honour. To-day, Germany is considered to be on an equal footing with other nations and, consequently, she claims the right to co-operate in the education of backward peoples on account of **Article 22** of the Covenant.

According to the text of this article those territories which are already subject to the sovereignty of other states are not included in the scheme of cultural development from which Germany cannot be excluded. It follows that we can only fulfil our share of these duties in our own colonies, and not in those belonging to other countries, such as, say, Portugal, Holland, or Belgium. This point of view is the more valid since Germany

cannot prejudice her protest against the injustice done to her, by unjust coveting of other people's possessions.

If the colonial injustice were righted, Germany would be able to absorb in time the rest of her unemployed. Her economic life would receive a stimulus which would ultimately make itself felt internationally. Frozen credits could more easily be made liquid again owing to the renewed flexibility of the German financial market. Economic improvement in its turn would help to ease political tension. It will thus be realised that the solving of the German colonial question **would mean a real contribution towards the recovery of Europe, both commercially and politically**. Even in the territories at present under mandate, their restoration would mean the stable conditions essential to ordered progress. More than that, it should appeal to the white race in its entirety to strengthen its position in dealing with world-wide political problems by the inclusion of Germany.

The sooner Germany's juridical and moral demands for colonial justice are satisfied, the sooner she will contribute her share in upholding European possessions the world over and in fulfilling the obligations they entail. **England is by no means the last country to be interested in the decision as to whether Germany can meet her obligations as an European nation.**

This decision should not be difficult to arrive at so far as the British people are concerned, for the Anglo-German Naval Treaty has proved that, granted good will, the adjustment of the interests of these two great nations is no mere Utopian aspiration.

The Supply of Raw Materials and the Colonies

Extract from a speech by Dr. Rudolf Eicke, Director of the Reichsbank (1936)

I. The Supply of Raw Materials by means of Exports

The supply of raw materials for industry is at present one of the central points of German economic policy. The great extension of the scope of our industry calls for a vast consumption of industrial raw materials. While formerly the public provision of employment claimed the greatest interest, it is now the provision of the material required by our economic policy which involves important tasks. With the change-over from economic measures calling rather for intensive labour and the execution of building programmes to works calling more intensively for materials, the question of raw materials begins to play an increasingly important part among the means of employment.

The lack of a secure and regular supply of raw materials for great industrial nations has for some time been a source of constant anxiety and uncertainty throughout the world. Only few great countries are in a position, in view of their own rich sources of raw materials or of large receipts from foreign capital, to satisfy their demands for raw materials without restriction. Countries with large capital, such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, the Scandinavian States and Switzerland, have at the present time in practice the preference in the purchase of raw materials on account of their good capacity of payment. Many nations, on the other hand, have difficulty in covering even their most essential needs. These countries, which include Germany, Italy and many medium-sized and small States, in view of the difficulties of payment, often obtain only what it has been impossible to dispose of elsewhere.

Germany has no longer at her disposal large surplus amounts of foreign exchange which she can use for the purchase of overseas raw materials beyond the amount obtained from her exports. Before the War, Germany had a flourishing foreign economy of her own in a free world trade. German foreign investments to the amount of approximately 25,000 million Marks brought in 1,000 million Marks in interest per year; German services, in particular shipping and insurance undertakings, produced great profits. These receipts could be used for the great imports of raw materials and colonial products. Germany was deprived by the Versailles Treaty of the greatest part of her foreign investments. **When it is remembered that most of the large European countries at present still possess considerable resources in foreign exchange from their capital investments and services, which they are able to use for purchasing overseas raw materials, the specially difficult**

position of Germany is made clear. There has hitherto been no case in the world, in which an industrial State is able to establish its balance of trade merely by means of the export of industrial products, to purchase raw materials and in addition to pay off its debts.

Germany's present difficulties in obtaining supplies of raw materials are by no means due to the new German economic policy. On the contrary, National Socialism has in this respect succeeded to a poor inheritance. **German industry was greatly shaken economically and financially by the War.** Before the War, Germany, in accordance with the rapid increase in her population and the general extension of the world market, adapted herself so intensively to the international exchange of commodities, that until the outbreak of the War from a quarter to a third of her industrial net production was intended for export, and from three to four millions of the ten million industrial workers were engaged in export trade, while a considerably greater portion were dependent on the import of the foreign raw materials necessary for the internal market. At that time the German economic structure was definitely that of an industrial creditor country with great import requirements of raw materials and a great export surplus of manufactured goods, with a balance of trade which was on the whole passive and of which the deficit was covered by the yield of the growing capital investments abroad. **With the unhappy outcome of the War the economic structure of Germany was greatly changed.** Germany was deprived in the east and west of important territories which were of considerable value as sources of raw materials. The colonies were declared as mandates of individual League Powers and were thus withdrawn from German administration. The extensive German capital abroad was for the most part lost. German economy was to a great extent deprived at the end of the War of gold, foreign exchange and stocks of raw materials.

The economic rise in the post-inflation years was purely due to borrowed money, since foreign credits amounting to over 25,000 million Reichsmarks came to Germany and again set our economic life in motion. By means of these enormous foreign loans, German economy received an influx of foreign exchange, which was partly used as a currency reserve and also served for laying in stocks of raw materials. In so far as the borrowed foreign exchange was not used for paying the high tribute, it

International reputation of

Salvarsan, Germanin, Neostibosan, Fuadin, Plasmoquin, Atebrin — all these are German therapeutic products which have a brilliant place in the forefront of the struggle against tropical diseases. German bacteriologists, with Robert Koch at their head, have played a leading part in the discovery of the infection and transmission agents of malaria, sleeping sickness and relapsing fever. The great part played by German science in international studies of tropical medicine is firmly established and unreservedly admitted. German injections render possible the cure of 95 to 100 per cent of cases of sleeping sickness. The mortality from the sub-tropical disease Kala-azar has been reduced as a result of Neostibosan from 98 to 2 per cent. The terrible disease known as Oriental boil, which is current in Egypt and the countries of the Mediterranean littoral, has been fought with striking success by means of the German drug Fuadin. As a means of combating amoebic dysentery, a dangerous disease extremely common in the tropics and sub-tropics, the Hamburg Tropical Institute evolved the so-called Yatren 105, which every tropical schoolboy (so to say) knows. The incalculable value of these ingenious discoveries, which will always constitute one of

Germany's services to humanity, is apparent in the work of the German laboratories of Bayer (Leverkusen) and others in connection with the campaign against malaria through the production of the synthetic drugs Atebrin and Plasmoquin. With their aid that scourge of the human race, malaria, from which a third of the human race is still at the present time afflicted, is being for the first time effectively held in check.

No one is entitled to belittle the service of German science in this connection. The enthusiastic recognition of the work of German doctors and researchers, and the fact that colonial countries — in spite of imitations — are the first to procure these drugs from Germany, is confirmation of the international reputation of German tropical medicine. The development of the tropical regions of the world has been fundamentally altered by the triumph of German tropical medicine and chemistry. Germany is the author of a revolution in hygiene in tropical countries, which is fraught with blessings. Is it not unfair permanently to exclude the real benefactor from the scene of his benefits?



Prof. Dr. Robert Koch
(From a drawing in the Associated Press)



Institute for Shipping and Tropical Diseases, Hamburg.

German tropical medicine



German doctor engaged on the campaign against malaria



Dr. Otto Fischer, Head of the Tropical Convalescent Home, Tübingen, treating patients in East Africa



Boy suffering from Oriental boil before and after treatment with Fuadin



Child suffering from framboesia before and after treatment with Neosalvarsan



Sleeping sickness patients in the final stage



German Hospital for sleeping sickness patients before the war

returned to foreign countries, when the foreign credits were called off in 1930, for import and other purposes. The international credit machinery became more and more blocked in recent years. Even the use of normal import credits, the so-called documentary credits, became constantly more difficult, especially as the Reichsbank was deprived by the disappearance of its currency reserves of a sufficient fund for manoeuvring these credits. Germany, from being one of the greatest creditor countries in the world, became the principal debtor country, and her purchasing power was affected in a manner which was bound to give rise to difficulties in supplying the vital raw materials and foodstuffs. The raw material troubles of the first post-war years, which we regarded at that time as non-recurring and thought we had overcome for good, recurred with the exhaustion of the foreign sources of credit and the depression in world trade. The raw materials question of to-day is therefore not a new one, but is the raw material problem of yesterday. The definite economic settlement of the War has not proved possible in the last twenty years. National Socialist economic policy, which aims at bringing health to German economy from within, has consequently had a hard struggle from the outset in foreign economy.

This development shows at the same time how extremely important it is, by increasing exports as the principal source of foreign exchange still remaining to Germany for covering her great import requirements, to make the position safe in respect of raw materials and foodstuffs. All the other receipts of foreign exchange are at present of less importance for import purposes. Capital transactions still call for the transfer of considerable amounts of interest to foreign countries, amounting last year to about 250 million Reichsmarks. It is true that the services show a favorable balance in respect of shipping and insurance; but the amount is not considerable and is offset by payments of foreign exchange for other purposes, such as commission, travelling expenses, assistance, the maintenance of official and private agents abroad etc. While foreign countries still state that Germany can export as much as she likes and use the proceeds from such exports in order to purchase raw materials on the world market, the actual attitude of foreign countries is in striking opposition to such statements. German efforts to export are rendered difficult by very many factors over which foreign countries are in a position to exercise a decisive influence. The industrial competitors of Germany are trying by every means to increase their output as much as possible, whatever the effect on Germany. The competition between the various industrial countries, Germany, England, United States, France, Belgium and Japan, has enormously increased in recent years. The devaluation of the currency in a number of countries in practice means nothing more than that export goods are almost given away. In addition to competition by devalued currency and the difficulties caused by quotas and customs duties, there is also open or concealed political pressure. Certain quarters in the world try to make their influence felt everywhere and to create obstacles wherever Germany is taking up the threads, just because they do not like the way Germany is setting her house in order. In addition there is the business lost in Russia and America.

A great obstacle to the development of our foreign trade has also been caused by the great German lack of foreign exchange, which has to a great extent brought our foreign trade into the rigid limits of barter, clearing arrangements and compensation.

Foreign means of payment which can be freely used, the so-called cash foreign exchange, are only received by Germany at present to the extent of barely 20% of her exports. German foreign trade has been enclosed in a strait waistcoat in which it has difficulty in moving. The natural structure of our foreign trade, which consists in paying for overseas raw materials with the considerable traditional surplus of foreign exchange from trade with the European countries, by far our greatest markets, is thereby adversely affected. On the whole, Europe has to provide the foreign exchange required by overseas countries, a fact which is due to the natural position of the overseas markets which supply cheap raw materials and the European markets which require manufactured goods of high quality. In addition, restrictions have been placed on the free initiative of German foreign traders under the pressure of our foreign exchange position, and these restrictions continue to exist despite all efforts towards a more elastic arrangement of clearing and a more reasonable development of compensation transactions. **International trade needs to be freed from the fetters of the present compulsory system**, so that it can again work properly. **The first condition for this, however, is the restoration of peaceful and reasonable political relations in the world.** In the present development of international trade and means of payment, it has only been possible for Germany to maintain and in some cases slightly to extend her export trade by means of the greatest encouragement of exports and great price sacrifices.

If Germany were to devalue her currency, as foreign countries have often proposed, the result would be fresh competition for the lowest price. The other industrial countries which at present oppose the German endeavour to export, would certainly not lay down their arms in face of a devalued German currency. Foreign countries would rather reply to such a measure on the part of Germany by further reductions in price. The great colonial Powers would in the first place continue to reserve their markets for their own industrial products, and would endeavour by every means to defend their position in the other world markets that are secured by treaty. The price dynamics of currency devaluation could contain possibilities of success for German exports only in so far as there are still open doors in the world, but such success could not be obtained in a world economy which is highly independent of price laws and is ruled by duties and quotas. There is therefore no guarantee that German exports can be increased in this manner or that the supply of raw materials can be facilitated.

The foreign trade of the Reich has hitherto been the weakest point in the upward movement of the entire economy.

The main object of exports is at present to obtain the necessary raw materials for internal trade. All other factors, including the employment of the people directly engaged in exports are secondary matters. In case of emergency they could be employed in other industries. But so long as a State, as is the case in Germany, can obtain only a part of its raw materials within its own frontiers, it is dependent on its export trade bringing in at least as much foreign exchange as is necessary for the purchase of the raw materials required for its vital needs.

The governmental regulation of our foreign trade is solely a result of our lack of foreign exchange, which has made it necessary to adapt the import permits to the available foreign exchange in accordance with the New Plan, in order to prevent the occurrence of unsettled new debts and not to allow this cause to endanger the stability of the Reichsmark.

II. Colonies as Sources of Raw Materials

Any investigation into the supply of raw materials for German industry cannot be complete without touching on the colonial question. It sounds very contradictory when the statement is now made in the world that the colonies have no economic value for Germany and that consequently their seizure is not of much importance. The very opposite is the case. In a thickly populated, industrialised country like Germany, industry would be substantially facilitated by colonial possessions. The problem of supplying Germany would be very much simpler, if she could produce in territory under her own sovereignty and with the same currency a considerable part of the principal raw materials required by industry and the substances necessary for daily life, instead of having to purchase them abroad in foreign currency. **The German distress in respect of raw materials and foreign exchange is to a great extent a German colonial distress.**

Germany's desire to regain her colonies is not a frivolous striving for power at the cost of others, but is a result of the thirst for sources of raw materials and a very natural desire on the part of a nation that cannot live permanently in a restricted space.

Apart from Germany there is no Great Power without overseas possessions. The significance of the British world Empire is based mainly on its early colonial policy. The Americans have at great expense laid down rubber plantations in Liberia in order to be able to influence prices on the world market. Japan went to Korea and Manchuria, France took what she could get in North Africa, Italy gained Abyssinia in addition to her old possessions. Everywhere we find the striving to settle one's people on soil which has hitherto belonged to others, in order to produce raw materials with one's own labour and capital and thus to improve the supplies for

the home industry. But while the whole world acts on such principles and in accordance with such views, no comprehension is shown for our endeavours. The constant German demand for the return of the colonies is the best proof of the love of peace of the German Government and the German nation; for in case of war, as the Great War proved, colonies can scarcely be of much use to us.

As is proved by valuable and thorough investigations made by well known colonial experts, the German colonies which are at present under foreign mandate are capable of producing a considerable portion of the German requirements of raw materials, if they are properly exploited. The African colonies are tropical countries five times the size of Germany, inhabited by a native population which has proved by its former achievements that it is capable under guidance by white men of producing considerable quantities of raw materials. The great dependence of Germany on imports of ores and of tropical raw materials, especially oil seeds and fibres could be substantially reduced by the production in the German colonies which was rapidly increasing before the War.

The German requirements of fat can be for the most part covered by the production of oil seeds in the German colonial territories. In the opinion of Geheimrat Schmidt of the Colonial Economic Committee, there is enough suitable land in the Cameroons, Togoland and German East Africa to cover Germany's supply of important fat raw materials, such as palm oil, palm kernels, ground nuts and soya beans. If the South Sea territories, which are important suppliers of products of the cocoanut palm, are included, it would probably be possible to cover almost entirely the requirements of cocoanut oil and copra.

The production of rubber in German East Africa and the Cameroons is possible to an extent that might make Germany independent of supplies from other countries. According to estimates by Geheimrat Schmidt, almost all the present requirements could be covered by the areas available in the Cameroons alone. In addition, the vast forests of the German colonies contain reserves which could supply considerable quantities of rubber at prices which are certainly far below those of artificial rubber.

The German requirements of textile raw materials, such as wool, cotton, hemp, flax and jute, can to a great extent be covered in the former German colonies with their rich possibilities of production. According to the opinion of experts, about 40 % of the German requirements of cotton could be covered by production in the German colonies, which appears to be very promising. The production of sisal hemp already exceeds German needs and represents an important export factor, since the area of cultivation can be greatly extended. Though the great German requirements of wool cannot be covered in the colonies in the near future, there is a possibility of greatly increasing the production by means of suitable hydraulic works for promoting sheep farming. The same applies to the by-products of cattle breeding, i. e. the production of the raw materials of the leather industry, hides and skins.

According to the investigations of Geheimrat Range, the well known Berlin geologist, our old Protectorates justify the highest hopes from the point of view of mining. Much that appeared to be a Utopia before the War, such as the extraction of iron ore in Africa, has already become a reality in other colonial territories. Moreover the production of copper, tin and gold holds prospects for the future. There is no doubt as to the occurrence of light metals and coal. If it were possible to proceed to the mining development of these new countries with greater energy than the present mandatories, valuable mineral resources would undoubtedly be explored.

In addition, the colonies are suited for supplying us with large quantities of timber, especially of the finer kinds, as they did before the War. The guaranteed supply of timber is of importance for all European countries, as the existing supply of European timber for the manufacture of paper and cellulose will possibly only last for another twenty years. If no other raw material of equal value has been found by that time, this may involve great danger for the coniferous forests of the civilised countries. This gives special importance to the rich tropical stocks of timber.

Lastly, the colonies offer rich possibilities for planting cocoa, coffee, tea, bananas and lemons, products which a modern civilised State can now no longer dispense with. Germany's total requirements of cocoa and tea can be covered by our colonies; in the tropical parts of the colonies there is abundance of suitable soil. The planting of coffee in particular, can be greatly increased. German East Africa and the Cameroons already supply good

qualities. The possibility of entirely supplying Germany with southern fruits from our colonial territories is specially worthy of notice. The banana is of special importance; the Cameroons alone offer sufficient possibilities of cultivation to cover our entire previous import requirements of bananas. There are also certain possibilities of planting tobacco.

In view of their climatic conditions and soil, the German colonies thus represent an important basis of raw materials. The fact that these territories were not productive before the War and are even now not very remunerative is due to the colonising work which is still lacking. Before the War Germany had only just begun their exploitation, and the Mandatory Powers have had no economic need to continue this development according to plan. Naturally the exploitation of the natural resources of the colonies can only be carried out gradually; the plant and the plantations must first be created. "Colonising" means in the first place hard work—but work which undoubtedly gives a remunerative yield. After getting back our colonies, it would be possible in a period of about ten years, by intensive work and the investment of considerable capital, to create a raw material territory which would substantially relieve us of imports from abroad.

Even in their present condition the German colonies supply a number of important raw materials which, compared with the German import requirements, amount to over 100 % in the case of hemp, 30 % for cocoa and bananas, 20 % for tropical woods, and over 10 % for oil fruits, oil seeds and coffee.

Exports from the German Colonies¹⁾.

Raw Materials	Total exports from the mandated territories 1934 tons	German net imports 1934 tons
Oil fruits, oil seeds and oils (calculated at their oil value)	98,089	719,469
Southern fruits, all kinds	—	525,918
including bananas	26,429	96,149
Coffee (raw)	15,859	150,741
Cocoa (raw)	35,928	101,381
Flax, hemp etc., all kinds	—	115,199
including sisal hemp	72,510	37,971
Hides and skins, all kinds	5,608	157,119
Wool and other animal hair	992	164,762
Cotton	7,345	337,412
Rubber	2,071	60,232
Phosphates (mineral)	619,859	830,535
Tanning woods etc.	2,151	169,647
Tropical timber	54,533	248,000
Grain (maize, millet, dari etc.)	16,035	388,328
Gold (raw) ounces	322,602	—
Diamonds carat	258,967	—

In 1934, according to Dr. Weigelt's calculations, the German colonies exported raw materials of a total value of 156 million RM. In 1935 these exports rose to 179 millions. They include, however, some very considerable individual items, in particular gold from New Guinea. In some products our former colonies were able to register special successes. German East Africa attained particularly good results with the production of hemp, coffee, cotton and rubber. German South West Africa, on the other hand, might be made an ideal area for cattle and sheep breeding, and therefore for the production of hides, skins and wool. In addition the mineral resources are considerable. The Cameroons have proved specially suitable for the cultivation of cocoa, the production of vegetable fat in the form of palm kernels and palm oil, and fine wood. Togoland and New Guinea are also rich territories for the production of tropical raw materials of all kinds. An energetic administration could obtain further good results from the former German colonial possessions.

A complete survey of the economic value of colonies for the mother country is not yet possible at the present time, and cannot be calculated from the existing statistical figures. In particular, it is impossible to prove exactly their value for the supply of raw materials to the mother country. Estimates have, however, been made by competent experts. The value of the production of raw materials which would accrue to the home country by intensive

¹⁾ From a publication by Dr. Weigelt, member of the Board of the DD. Bank.

exploitation is stated to be about 500 million RM per year, according to conservative estimates of the possibilities of development. Professor Thorbecke even estimates the annual value of production as high as 600 million RM. This amount is equal to about 15 % of our imports last year. If more productive colonies were allotted to us, the amount would naturally be correspondingly higher.

If Germany were at present in possession of her former colonial territory, a natural basis of raw materials could be created there by means of German labour and German capital, for which we are at present obliged, in view of our difficult foreign trade position, to seek a substitute by erecting great equipment in Germany and investing large amounts for artificial manufacture. Naturally the increased utilisation of home sources of raw materials by means of more perfect scientific work and industrial technique may lead to a rise in production and prosperity. But nothing is more natural than to seek to extend technical production which is limited in space to the wider sphere of virgin areas of production. Valuable agricultural products which cannot be grown at all in Germany owing to the poverty of our soil, or can only be grown with an immense outlay of capital and by artificial means, are obtained in the tropics without any appreciable cost. The necessity of colonial activity for Germany thus acquires a constantly increasing importance.

What use is it to us that the English and Americans constantly try to prove in speeches and writings that the raw material markets of the world are plentifully supplied and the further development of colonies is unnecessary, when at the same time Germany is not given the possibility of acquiring sufficient foreign means of payment in order to cover her immense requirements of raw materials abroad? Naturally, the return of her colonial territory will not be able entirely to make up the present lack of raw materials. But the colonies provide rich possibilities for the occupation of German labour and can therefore contribute to secure the economic future of our Fatherland. In relations between the home country and the colonies, a free trade can be developed unhindered by economic and political obstacles. The anxious scheming which at present characterises the exchange of commodities between independent States is of much less importance between colonies and the mother country.

To the same extent as colonies open up new means of supplying raw materials, they also serve to provide new markets for the products of the mother country. Even before the War, German trade with the colonies was rapidly increasing; the turnover was increased five times in a period of ten years. In the last year before the War, the sale of German goods to our African colonies amounted to 141 million Marks. It is true that this amount was very small compared with the total German exports. But, under German administration, the economic development of these territories would have made such progress that they would already have been an important market for German products. If the German colonies were regained, there would have to be immediately great deliveries of means of transport, machinery of all kinds and other investments from Germany to the colonies. Gradually the German colonies, like those of the other European countries, would become a main pillar of the permanent exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods with Germany.

The colonies are also of importance as representing possibilities of settlement for over-populated Germany, which must endeavour to extend its basis of life. The area available in Germany for purposes of settlement is very restricted. There has therefore always been a German emigration to overseas countries. But it is only in German colonies that there is a sure guarantee of the permanent maintenance of the German spirit. The colonial Germans represent a fixed portion of the German nation and take German customs, language, culture, and German institutions to overseas territories. The German colonies can also serve to extend the horizon of the German youth and to enrich many branches of German science by colonial research work.

British colonial experts have recently been endeavouring to contest the value of colonies as settlement territories. The great possibilities of colonial settlement are described by them as an illusion on the grounds that Great Britain herself is not in a position to send her surplus population to her own colonies. In the African colonial territories, it is said, there are great areas which are practically uninhabitable on account of the lack of water, mountainous ground which cannot be cultivated, or the tsetse fly, the carrier of dangerous bacilli. The districts which are inhabitable are said to be already fairly thickly settled by natives

and Germany was scarcely able to accommodate more than 20,000 people in her colonies before the War. On the other hand German experts have ascertained by exhaustive studies that German settlers can do any physical work in the highlands of East Africa without danger to their health and that a denser settlement can be created in South West Africa by means of irrigation work. The difficulties formerly encountered by the settlement of tropical countries on account of the unfavourable climate, the dangers of tropical diseases and the difficult conditions of the soil, have now for the most part disappeared. Medical science and scientific research in the sphere of hygiene and the combating of diseases have given results which enable the white race to work in tropical territories to a much greater extent than was formerly thought possible. The possibilities of colonial industry and colonial settlement have also been extraordinarily extended by the present technical progress. Motor cars and aeroplanes, wireless telegraphy, telephones and broadcasting are the modern means which enable great areas to be opened up to an extent that was formerly unknown. Modern water works and irrigation can open up vast territories.

It is often said that the German colonies have always been run at a loss, that they cost much and brought in nothing. In spite of the expenditure that naturally increases with the exploitation, the receipts from the colonies increased to such an extent that the total grant from the Reich in the last five years before the War barely exceeded 30 million Marks a year. The Protectorate loans on the outbreak of war amounted to about 180 million Marks. If the development had quietly continued, the Protectorates would undoubtedly have been in a position in the near future to cover all the expenditure, including that for national defence, out of their own receipts, and in addition to provide the means for further colonisation. Lastly it should be remembered that the capital investments of German national economy in the Protectorates produced a revenue which increased from year to year. The further large-scale development of the German colonies would no doubt require many thousands of millions of Reichsmarks. But this expenditure would be distributed over a number of decades. In this way a sure basis would be provided for raw materials and for the existence of millions of people, while the same capital investment in Germany, if placed in industry, might one day prove to be a bad investment. It should be quite possible to raise these funds, especially for productive investment and financing in Reichsmarks. That ways and means would be found of obtaining this capital in New Germany is guaranteed by the energetic economic policy of the Government.

The present settlement of the colonial question excludes from colonial work the very people who would be specially suited for carrying out pioneer work in such an economically important territory, a nation of 67 millions who have so conspicuously proved their capacity for colonising. The other Great Powers are absolutely satiated with colonies and in some cases tired of colonies, so that they are incapable of the energy necessary for proper development, while Germany has a surplus of such energy and is increasingly compelled to extend her bases of soil and foodstuffs.

The German nation has been rightly called the "nation without room". Germany can equally well be called the "country without raw materials". Germany, like Italy, attained her national unity and power too late to be able to have any weighty influence in the division of the more valuable territories. It is true that, shortly before the War, by developing an energetic policy by peaceful means, through treaties and the purchase of colonies, Germany at the eleventh hour attained an important position as a colonial Power, which she however again lost in the World War. For our densely populated country with its poverty in raw materials, a freer access to the world's sources of raw materials is a vital necessity. A change in the present position must be all the more easily possible as the present mandatory Powers, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Union of South Africa and Australia, which exercise a kind of guardianship over the German colonies, are in a position to give up the administration of our Protectorates without in any way endangering their own supplies.

Economic points of view at present occupy the front rank. We need work and bread for our people, and we wish to obtain a great part of that bread and work in our colonies. Colonies enable us to extend the living space of Germany and to develop our forces in a national enlarged space of our own, under our own sovereignty and our own administration and with our own

means of production. In view of our foreign exchange position, the most decisive factor for Germany is to be able to produce within her own currency system a considerable portion of the raw materials which she has at present to pay for in foreign currency. **Our economy and our currency policy are concerned in the development of possibilities of obtaining raw materials with German capital and German labour. The extension of the sphere of the German Reichsmark is the most decisive factor.**

At the head of all statements regarding colonies stands the word of the Leader and Chancellor: "We need colonies as much as any Power". In the great peace plan of March 7th, 1936, Adolf Hitler made clear Germany's attitude to the colonial question in the following words: "The Government of the Reich expresses the expectation that, within a reasonable period, by means of friendly negotiations, the question of colonial equality of rights . . . will be cleared up". **Colonial possession has now become a hard German vital necessity.**


* * *

The raw material problem has been more and more discussed in the world in the last few months. Even the recognition that it is a world problem, in which all nations have to cooperate, is a step forward. But it must not be merely a theoretical discussion. The latest events in Africa and the dark clouds which hang over the whole world are the first charge brought against the sins of omission of the past years. **The great possessor countries have the means in their hands to cure the evil from which policy and economy of the whole world are suffering. Let the countries which are poor in raw materials have the door opened in one way or another to a secure and sufficient supply of raw materials and to an adequate extension of the volume of their foreign trade.** The constant growth and the enormous energies of a nation which has a right to its existence, such as the German nation united under Adolf Hitler, are pressing for development and only demand a sufficient living space. The quicker the necessary decisions are taken, the more rapidly will the political sky clear up and the quicker will world trade again reach a sound basis.

The Colonial Powers and their Possessions

According to information supplied by the Governments, as contained in the Armaments

British Empire:	sq. km.	Inhabitants	France:	sq. km.	Inhabitants	Italy:	sq. km.	Inhabitants	Japan:	sq. km.	Inhabitants
Mother country	244,000	46,889,000	Mother country	551,000	41,940,000	Mother country	310,000	43,009,000	Mother country	377,936	68,811,000
Dominions, colonies and protectorates	30,779,150	448,555,305	Colonies	11,200,700	59,600,000	Colonies	2,484,000	2,393,000	Colonies	377,936	68,811,000
Under mandatory rule	2,233,539	8,059,913	Under mandatory rule	648,250	5,649,426	Abyssinia	1,032,000	10,000,000	Under mandatory rule	377,936	68,811,000



The German Colonies as Economic Territories^{*)}

The Economic Development before the War

What efforts did Germany make up to the year 1913 in order to give her colonies a development which still forms the economic basis of these territories?

German colonial economic activity can hardly be said to date back before the beginning of the century. German colonial economic achievement in the short period between that time and the outbreak of the War is all the more remarkable.

The main lines of this development are given below.

The **white population** of the colonies developed as follows: East Africa: 1900, 1131 whites; 1913, 5336 whites; Cameroons: 1900, 528 whites; 1913, 1871 whites; Togoland: 1900, 114 whites; 1913, 368 whites; South West Africa: 1900, 3387 whites; 1913, 14,830 whites; South Seas: 1900, 483 whites; 1913, 1984 whites.

The development of the production of the colonies was as follows:

The following plantation areas were under cultivation in all the colonies together:

1896	11,000 ha.
1904	43,000 ha.
1913	179,000 ha.

The expansion of **cattle breeding** (mainly in South West Africa) is shown by the following figures: In 1910 there were altogether in the German colonies 1047 farms with a stock of 76,787 cattle and 373,352 small animals. In 1913 there were 1331 farms with a stock of 168,977 cattle and 670,514 small animals.

The **capital** in industrial companies working in the German colonies, according to a computation of the Colonial Economic Committee, amounted in 1896 to 62 million Marks, in 1904 to 185 million Marks and in 1912 to 506 million Marks. A first attempt by the German Colonial Office to distribute this capital according to the object of the businesses, was as follows at about the end of 1912:

Capital in Millions of Marks.

10 Banks	11.14
9 Shipping	41.80
7 Railways, Communications, Telegraphs	60.04
47 Mining	111.91
138 Plantations and Cattle-breeding . . .	117.72
109 Mixed businesses, trade and industry	133.48
79 Diamond mining	29.99
399 Companies	506.08

In the case of 20 further companies, the capital was not ascertainable.

In 1913 the **railways** in the German colonies had a total of 4176 kilometers in operation, including 310 km. in the

Cameroons, 327 km. in Togoland, 2104 km. in South West Africa and 1435 km. in East Africa. In addition railway sections amounting to over 300 km. were under construction at the end of 1913.

An examination of the above figures shows in the first place that there were **signs of a rapid upward development**. In view of the fact that such a development took place within ten years, and in a number of cases in a much shorter time, the figures do not indicate the actual development.

A general expression of the economic development of the German colonies may be found in the **increase in their foreign trade and finances**. The following table gives the annual value of imports and exports in millions of Marks.

Foreign Trade of the Colonies

Year	East Africa	Cameroons	Togoland	South West Africa	South Seas	Total
in millions of Marks						
Imports						
1896..	8,66	5,36	1,89	4,89	— ¹⁾	.
1897..	8,94	6,33	1,98	4,89	— ¹⁾	.
1898..	11,85	9,30	2,49	5,87	3,08	32,59
1899..	10,82	11,13	3,28	8,94	3,65	37,82
1900..	12,03	14,25	3,52	6,97	4,37	41,14
1901..	9,51	9,40	4,72	10,08	4,45	38,16
1902..	8,86	13,39	6,21	8,57	5,88	42,91
1903..	11,19	9,64	6,11	7,93	6,95	41,82
1904..	14,34	9,38	6,90	10,06	5,80	46,48
1905..	17,66	13,47	7,76	23,63	8,86	71,88
1906..	25,15	13,31	6,43	68,63	8,38	121,90
1907..	23,81	17,30	6,70	32,40	8,55	88,76
1908..	25,79	16,79	8,51	33,18	7,59	91,86
1909..	33,94	17,72	11,24	34,71	9,80	107,41
1910..	38,66	25,58	10,82	44,34	9,44	128,84
1911..	45,89	29,32	9,62	45,30	12,08	142,21
1912..	50,31	34,24	11,43	32,50	14,20	142,68
1913..	53,33	34,62	10,63	43,42	15,00 ²⁾	157,03
Exports						
1896..	4,12	3,96	1,65	1,25	— ¹⁾	.
1897..	4,94	3,38	0,77	1,25	— ¹⁾	.
1898..	4,33	4,60	1,47	0,92	2,68	14,00
1899..	3,94	4,84	2,58	1,40	2,90	15,66
1900..	4,29	5,89	3,06	0,91	2,83	16,98
1901..	4,62	6,26	3,69	1,24	3,57	19,38
1902..	5,28	6,65	4,19	2,21	3,78	22,11
1903..	7,05	7,57	3,62	3,44	3,88	25,56
1904..	8,95	8,02	3,55	0,30 ²⁾	3,92	24,74
1905..	9,95	9,32	3,96	0,22 ²⁾	4,40	27,85
1906..	11,00	9,95	4,20	0,38 ²⁾	5,64	31,17
1907..	12,50	15,89	5,92	1,62	5,24	41,17
1908..	10,87	12,16	6,89	7,80	8,72	46,44
1909..	13,12	15,45	7,37	22,07	11,35	69,36
1910..	20,81	19,92	7,22	34,69	18,20	100,84
1911..	22,44	21,25	9,32	28,57	16,42	98,00
1912..	31,42	23,34	9,96	39,04	17,13	120,89
1913..	35,55	29,15	9,14	70,30	18,00 ³⁾	162,14

¹⁾ No comparative figures. — ²⁾ Effects of the risings. — ³⁾ Estimated.

*) Cf. the publications by Dr. Warnack: "Die Bedeutung kolonialer Eigenproduktion für die deutsche Volkswirtschaft", 1925, and "Braucht Deutschland eigene Rohstoffquellen", 1929 (published by Mittler & Sohn, Berlin); Ludwig Schoen: "Das koloniale Deutschland" (Verlag Berliner Börsenzeitung), and the Statistical Year Book for the German Reich and "Wirtschaft und Statistik", published by the German Statistical Office, Berlin.

The **total trade** of all the colonies (imports and exports) was as follows:

(in millions of Marks)

1898.....	46,59	1906.....	153,07
1899.....	53,48	1907.....	129,93
1900.....	58,12	1908.....	133,30
1901.....	57,54	1909.....	176,77
1902.....	65,02	1910.....	229,68
1903.....	67,38	1911.....	240,21
1904.....	71,22	1912.....	263,57
1905.....	99,23	1913.....	319,17

According to the trade statistics of the German Empire, the share of the mother country in the foreign trade of the colonies was as follows:

Year	Import from the	Export to the	Total trade of Germany with her colonies
	Colonies		
	in millions of Marks		
1898.....	4,6	11,1	15,7
1899.....	4,8	14,9	19,7
1900.....	6,4	17,6	24,0
1901.....	5,8	15,4	21,2
1902.....	6,9	14,2	21,1
1903.....	7,3	13,2	20,5
1904.....	11,2	25,4	36,6
1905.....	17,6	35,7	53,3
1906.....	20,2	36,9	57,1
1907.....	21,9	33,4	55,3
1908.....	22,7	32,0	54,7
1909.....	29,2	37,6	66,8
1910.....	49,6	45,1	94,7
1911.....	42,8	48,1	90,9
1912.....	52,5	49,1	101,6
1913.....	52,9	54,5	107,4

The total trade of all the German colonies in the last year under report thus amounted to a value of about 319 million Marks, while Germany's trade with her colonies had a value of 107 million Marks. In themselves, these are certainly not very large amounts. But they should be regarded from the point of view that they are in the first place the result of scarcely more than ten years comprehensive economic development work in the proper sense of the word. When regarded in this way they represent a magnificent development. One of the most important facts to be adduced from these figures is, however, the well planned German method of work. The method of capital investment, the building of railways, telegraphs and lines of communication and — as is shown on another page — the cultural and social establishments and buildings, prove that Germany, in planning her colonial work, did not adopt a policy of exploitation and robber cultivation.

In drawing up the balance sheet of German cultural work, the question is raised as to whether the German colonies

represented a "bad business" for Germany. This view is put forward with great glee by interested quarters abroad in the superficial opinion which is still held even at times among experts. The **financial yield from the former German colonies**, however, gives the lie to these statements. In the ordinary budget, the receipts of all German colonies (except Kiaochow) in respect of taxes, customs and other administrative receipts amounted in 1913 to a total of 60.70 million Marks, and the estimates for 1914 up to the outbreak of the War 58.11 million Marks. In addition to these receipts there were in the course of the last ten years growing savings from previous financial years, which amounted in 1902 to only 70,000 Marks, but in 1909 to 3.82 millions and in 1912 to 8.83 millions. The Reich subsidy, which up to 1900 was several times the receipts of the colonies and in 1902 was 16.92 million Marks, i. e. nearly double the actual receipts, became constantly of less importance for the financial administration. In 1912 it amounted to 21 millions, while for 1914 it was estimated at 20.32 millions, i. e. slightly more than a third of the actual revenue. This amount was used for the maintenance of the protectorate troops. All the other expenditure, including the interest on loans, and the financing of railway construction, was covered by the colonies themselves. At the beginning of the year 1914, the German colonies had on the whole entered the period of economic development. Germany had by this time proved that she was as well fitted for colonisation as others.

A comparison between the German African colonies and their neighbouring territories shows that in the latter the economic development, which gradually led to very large yields, was not any quicker in the first period of colonisation than in the German colonies. The lead gained by the foreign territories over the German territories in the absolute amount of their trade, in cases where the external conditions were similar, is mainly due to their earlier start and the deliberate pursuit of economic development. It should not be overlooked that in 1890 Great Britain had 3592 km. of railway in operation in Africa, while Germany had none, and that ten years later the British lines were 7177 km. in length and the German 234. It was only in 1906 that building began on a large scale. The importance of colonial development for Germany had become recognised, and everything that might contribute to this end was carried on with zeal. German science, which placed the results of its research in the service of colonial production and created the means of its development by ridding wide areas of disease, German technical skill which carried on that economic development with the most modern methods, German administration which created the foundations of external order, the German missions which endeavoured to raise the cultural level of the natives, had combined with the result that the heroic age of German colonisation was comparatively soon overcome. The period of economic development on a large scale had started, and the tree was already putting forth shoots — when the War broke out.

The Economic Development after the War and under Mandatory Rule

The economic statistics up to the year 1925 show a **standstill or a decline**. In German East Africa, as a result of the expulsion of the Germans, the German plantations deteriorated. Trade and traffic declined to such an extent that the railway had to close many of its stations. The cultural establishments of the Germans were destroyed. Epidemics and

diseases spread. In 1923 Great Britain had scarcely begun to replace what had been destroyed. According to her own admission, there was a lack of suitable and experienced staff. Winston Churchill, at that time Colonial Secretary, was obliged to state on June 28th 1921 at the British Imperial Conference: "We have endeavoured to equip Tanganyika with a Government not

inferior to the German administration which it had replaced. I am afraid that for a year or two, the state of this territory will compare unfavourably with its progress and prosperity when it was in the hands of our late opponents." In the Cameroons also, the German cultural work was destroyed. The plantations were neglected. The natives left the country as they had either lost their work or had to pay more taxes than before; the introduction of military service was also a cause of emigration. The first action that was found necessary was the introduction or expansion of the French language; the German schools, including the mission schools, were closed. The large-scale German campaign against sleeping sickness was also neglected in the Cameroons by the fact that, for reasons of prestige, the German remedy "Germanin" was no longer used. In Ruanda and Urundi, sleeping sickness had also again made headway. Belgium, which was not even in a position to check this dreadful disease in her own Congo, was naturally not in a position to replace the German measures. Germany, which was said to be "unworthy" to possess colonies, achieved remarkable results for these former German possessions and for Africa as a whole.

In Togoland, the German model colony, there was also a considerable decline in economic activity. The French press was itself obliged to note that the good German organisation had been destroyed, and it was pointed out in the French Chamber (March 18th and 22nd, 1922) that the population under French rule lived in a condition of slavery. In South West Africa the Boer Minister Smuts, it is true, desisted from a general expulsion of the Germans. Nevertheless, the position of the colony became extremely unfavourable on account of the change in the methods of administration. The abandonment of diamond mining severely affected many people. The British native policy entirely collapsed in the Hottentot rising of May 1922, which was directed, not against the whites, but against the new masters, Boers and British. The history of this rising was brought before the Third Assembly of the League of Nations on September 8th, 1922. The imposition of a high tax on dogs caused the natives to refuse payment. Although no blood had been shed at the beginning, the Government entered the field with armed forces, machine-guns, artillery and aircraft, against the natives under the protection of the League of Nations. Their houses were bombarded, and men, women and children were thus killed without discrimination. The natives who were attacked naturally defended themselves, and this led to further heavy losses. It is the irony of fate that this great rising took place in the same territory as the Herero war of 1906, which British propaganda represented as a proof of Germany's incapacity to colonise. In South West Africa also the economic decline was considerable. Without regard to its economic capacity, its production was sacrificed to the advantage of the economy of the Union of South Africa. The Germans were also expelled without consideration from New Guinea and the South Sea Islands. The result was a rapid decline in production. German plantations were handed over to former soldiers, and the conditions prevailing there were condemned even by the Australian press.

Under mandatory rule, therefore, until 1925, in open opposition to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the values created by the Germans were destroyed, and as a result of political measures a standstill or decline in economic activity was brought about which exposed in particular the natives of these countries to severe distress.

The economic development since 1925 is mainly due to the objective work of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations which has gradually made its influence felt. It succeeded in freeing the economic and even the cultural interests of the natives in the mandated territories from the chaos of this first period. The value of the foreign trade of the former German colonies is shown by the following figures:

Foreign Trade of the German Colonies after the War

(in millions of Gold Marks)

I. African Colonies

Year	German East Africa		Cameroons		Togo-land	German South West Africa	Total
	Tangan-yika-Terr.	Ruanda-Urundi	French mandate	British mandate			
1. Imports							
1922	25.79	1.22	11.48	0.97	8.19	21.36	69.01
1923	34.55	1.71	13.87	1.07	8.01	25.53	84.73
1924	38.26	2.00	16.22	0.85	12.04	33.91	103.27
1925	58.07	2.99	25.22	4.60	15.26	44.68	150.82
1926	64.30	1.28	26.11	4.77	13.47	51.03	160.95
1927	74.94	3.52	32.20	6.24	16.60	51.01	184.50
1928	76.35	5.75	33.86	5.93	14.78	58.72	195.39
1929	87.39	6.83	31.83	3.98	16.84	62.68	209.54
1930	81.29	6.74	28.47	3.35	16.64	43.17	179.66
1931	47.50	7.08	17.18	1.98	11.50	32.95	118.19
1932	27.55	2.73	11.98	1.52	10.80	17.76	72.33

2. Exports							
1922	26.82	0.52	8.67	2.59	13.97	23.21	75.77
1923	33.28	1.32	10.78	1.37	6.16	52.41	105.33
1924	49.99	1.85	14.68	2.08	13.41	54.41	136.43
1925	60.99	1.99	22.62	2.57	12.32	54.88	155.36
1926	63.82	1.84	21.12	4.50	10.80	67.01	169.10
1927	70.21	2.29	26.90	6.20	13.55	73.10	192.25
1928	82.75	2.21	26.23	7.89	14.16	67.98	201.21
1929	81.32	1.70	27.99	6.27	13.77	73.12	204.17
1930	59.15	1.68	22.54	5.69	13.71	53.29	156.06
1931	35.99	1.75	13.52	2.94	8.25	29.06	91.51
1932	34.68	1.53	13.71	2.33	4.82	23.11	80.18

II. South Sea Colonies

Year	Bismarck Archipelago etc.	German Micronesia		Samoa	Total
		Japanese mandate	Nauru		
1. Imports					
1922	8.08	3.69	1.46	5.27	18.49
1923	9.91	5.00	1.04	5.23	21.18
1924	9.34	4.36	1.89	5.18	20.76
1925	10.64	6.29	1.28	7.09	25.30
1926	11.65	8.52	2.09	6.64	28.90
1927	13.48	7.60	1.59	6.21	28.88
1928	16.54	9.32	4.84	6.65	37.35
1929	17.62	13.80	1.96	5.86	39.24
1930	17.45	11.87	2.64	5.40	37.35
1931	13.65	12.24	1.50	2.87	30.27
1932	10.03	7.82	1.09	2.03	20.97

2. Exports					
1922	8.61	3.56	5.12	6.80	24.09
1923	12.10	4.78	6.24	5.62	28.73
1924	13.81	6.13	8.16	6.81	34.91
1925	17.00	10.12	6.99	7.77	41.87
1926	22.66	12.40	8.43	6.56	50.04
1927	22.04	16.37	8.93	6.85	54.19
1928	29.98	15.94	7.36	8.59	61.87
1929	23.23	14.80	7.00	5.96	50.99
1930	19.81	22.18	5.19	5.57	52.76
1931	16.94	26.29	3.55	3.39	49.26
1932	14.27	16.50	5.49	2.46	38.72

With a view to the greatest possible statistical accuracy, the same import and export figures are given since 1933 in the currencies of the countries concerned:

Territories	Unit	1933	1934	1935
East Africa				
1. Tanganyika				
Imports	£ 1000	1,947	2,343	2,990
Exports	£ 1000	2,531	2,561	3,354
2. Ruanda-Urundi				
Imports	Mill. Belg. Fr.	27.6	30.6	—
Exports	Mill. Belg. Fr.	15.6	29.4	—
South West Africa				
Imports	1000 S. A. Pds.	1,049	1,262	1,499
Exports	1000 S. A. Pds.	1,365	1,089	2,454
Cameroons				
1. French mandate				
Imports	Mill. Fr. Fr.	75.3	58.7	88.6
Exports	Mill. Fr. Fr.	77.6	72.5	98.0
2. British mandate				
Imports	£ 1000	116	110	185
Exports	£ 1000	168	194	318
Togoland				
1. French mandate				
Imports	Mill. Fr. Fr.	38.1	26.5	31.2
Exports	Mill. Fr. Fr.	27.4	28.1	34.7
2. British mandate				
Exports	£ 1000	96.1	78.1	127.6
New Guinea				
Imports	1000 Austr. Pds.	924.3	948.4	—
Exports	1000 Austr. Pds.	1,766.2	2,340.6	—
Samoa				
Imports	1000 N. Z. Pds.	150.9	92.8	—
Exports	1000 N. Z. Pds.	170.7	126.7	—
Nauru				
Imports	£ 1000	97.7	98.1	157.2
Exports	£ 1000	436.8	470.9	474.4
Marianne, Caroline, Palau, Marshall Islands				
Imports	Millions Yen	9.0	13.0	—
Exports	Millions Yen	18.7	18.4	—

The following tables are of great interest. They give a general view of the economic development in respect of areas under cultivation, stocks of cattle, foreign trade, markets for the supply and sale of goods, and main exports from the former German colonies, according to the position in the year 1935; they also give the maximum position in the various items in previous years. They also show the present German share in imports and exports:

GERMAN EAST AFRICA*)

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum position	Year
Agriculture				
Surface under cultivation				
Maize	1000 ha	.	300.9	1928
Rice	1000 ha	.	53.6	1931
Groundnuts	1000 ha	.	52.6	1930
Coffee	1000 ha	.	47.7	1931
Cattle				
Horned Cattle	1000 ha	.	5,450	1933
Sheep	1000 ha	.	2,346	1933
Goats	1000 ha	.	3,375	1932

*) From "Statist. Jahrbuch", 1936, International Summaries, page 282.

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	Year
Foreign Trade				
Total trade				
Imports ¹⁾	£ 1000	2,990	4,286	1929
Exports ²⁾	£ 1000	3,354	3,949	1929
Import (—) or Export (+) surplus		+ 364	— 337	1929
Important territories of supply				
Germany	£ 1000	317.7	524.7	1929
Great Britain	£ 1000	866.0	1,464.2	1929
Netherlands	£ 1000	44.1	341.3	1929
British India	£ 1000	145.0	529.4	1929
Japan	£ 1000	655.8	255.7	1929
Kenya and Uganda	£ 1000	285.3	195.2	1929
United States	£ 1000	197.7	341.6	1929
Important Sale Markets ³⁾				
Germany	£ 1000	250.0	218.4	1929
Belgium	£ 1000	343.3	1,067.0	1929
Great Britain	£ 1000	710.2	564.4	1929
Netherlands	£ 1000	67.0	141.1	1929
British India	£ 1000	320.0	73.8	1929
Kenya and Uganda	£ 1000	787.1	785.3	1929
U. S. A.	£ 1000	131.1	153.2	1929
German foreign trade with Tanganyika				
Imports from Tanganyika	Mill. RM	3.7	6.3	1929
Exports to Tanganyika.	Mill. RM	2.4	6.5	1929
Main export goods ³⁾				
Rice	tons	5,003	6,394	1933
Rice	£ 1000	66.9	62.4	1933
Coffee	tons	18,886	18,886	1935
Coffee	£ 1000	486.8	486.8	1935
Groundnuts	1000 tons	16.7	19.5	1933
Groundnuts	£ 1000	210.0	166.2	1933
Cotton	tons	10,140	10,140	1935
Cotton	£ 1000	569.5	569.5	1935
Sisal	1000 tons	84.0	84.0	1935
Sisal	£ 1000	1,135	1,135	1935
Copra	tons	4,115	9,470	1928
Copra	£ 1000	38.2	191.2	1928
Rubber (Plantation)	tons	0.0	1,019	1912

¹⁾ General imports.

²⁾ Including re-exports.

³⁾ Export of products of the territory.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA*)

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	Year
Stocks of Cattle				
Horned Cattle	1000	666	725	1932
Sheep, total	1000	2150	2150	1935
incl. caracul	1000	1213	1213	1935
crossbred	1000	814	814	1935
Goats	1000	916	1222	1928
Mining				
Copper ore production ¹⁾	1000 tons	.	15.1	1930
Tin concentrate production ²⁾	tons	.	248	1929
Vanadium concentrate production	tons	.	4676	1931
Diamond production	1000 carat	128.5	1570.0	1912
Diamond sales of the Diamond Companies ³⁾	1000 carat	126.3	1294.7	1912
Diamond sales of the Diamond Companies ³⁾	£ 1000	537	2699	1912

¹⁾ Copper content of the ore mined.

²⁾ Tin content of the ore mined.

³⁾ For 1912: 1913/14.

*) From "Statist. Jahrbuch", 1936, International Summaries, page 283.

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	
Foreign Trade				
Total Trade ⁴⁾				Year
Exports	£ 1000	1,499	3082	1929
Imports.	£ 1000	2,454	3514	1929
Re-exports	£ 1000	58	81	1929
Import (—) or Export (+) surplus	£ 1000	+1015	+ 513	1929
Important suppl. countries ⁴⁾				
Germany	£ 1000	191.7	664.5	1929
Great Britain	£ 1000	69.3	225.3	1929
Union of South Africa	£ 1000	1039.7	1720.6	1929
U. S. A.	£ 1000	38.5	176.6	1929
Important sale markets ⁴⁾				
Germany	£ 1000	326.1	426.4	1929
Belgium	£ 1000	81.4	636.1	1929
France	£ 1000	63.7	110.3	1929
Great Britain	£ 1000	1151.0	1664.9	1929
Union of South Africa	£ 1000	756.7	530.3	1929
German foreign trade with South West Africa				
Imports from South West Africa	Mill. RM	5.2	9.8	1929
Exports to South West Africa	Mill. RM	1.6	9.0	1929
Principal export goods				
Cattle (for slaughter)	1000	87.1	45.9	1925
Cattle (for slaughter)	£ 1000	438.4	103.8	1925
Sheet, goats (for slaugh- ter)	1000	109.2	198.7	1927
Sheep, goats (for slaugh- ter)	£ 1000	109.2	208.6	1927
Caracul skins ⁵⁾	tons	280.4	357.1	1933
Caracul skins ⁵⁾	£ 1000	471.0	447.2	1933
Butter	tons	3010.4	3010.4	1935
Butter	£ 1000	309.9	309.9	1935
Copper ore	1000 tons	4.9	66.7	1929
Copper ore	£ 1000	53.4	703.0	1929
Vanadium ore	tons	3545.3	5268.0	1929
Vanadium ore	£ 1000	132.9	211.0	1929
Diamonds	1000 carat	128.4	1014.2	1912
Diamonds	£ 1000	587.9	1488.8	1912

⁴⁾ Including trade in precious metals. —⁵⁾ Incl. other sheepskins.

CAMEROONS*)

1. French Mandated Territory

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	
Foreign Trade				
Total Trade				Year
Imports	1000 Fr.	88,621	205,727	1928
Exports	1000 Fr.	97,997	159,321	1928
Import (—) or Export (+) surplus.	1000 Fr.	+ 9 376	— 46,406	1928
Important supplying countries				
Germany	1000 Fr.	5,626	27,938	1928
Belgium	1000 Fr.	3,657	11,230	1928
France and colonies . .	1000 Fr.	19,473	64,111	1928
Great Britain	1000 Fr.	24,935	59,455	1928
Netherlands	1000 Fr.	1,686	4,898	1928
U. S. A.	1000 Fr.	10,549	22,349	1928
Important sale markets				
Germany	1000 Fr.	6,047	43,653	1928
Belgium	1000 Fr.	1,306	1,675	1928
France and colonies . .	1000 Fr.	60,770	6,979	1928
Great Britain	1000 Fr.	4,853	26,561	1928
Netherlands	1000 Fr.	16,221	4,086	1928
U. S. A.	1000 Fr.	6,583	4,318	1928
German Foreign Trade with Cameroons				
Imports from Cameroons	Mill. RM	9.1	18.0	1912
Exports to Cameroons.	Mill. RM	1.4	11.4	1912

*) From "Statist. Jahrbuch", 1936, International Summaries, pages 284 and 285.

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	
Principal exports				Year
Bananas ¹⁾	tons	7,730	7,730	1935
Bananas ¹⁾	1000 Fr.	5,281	5,281	1935
Groundnuts	tons	7,725	7,725	1935
Groundnuts	1000 Fr.	6,234	6,234	1935
Coffee	tons	1,369	1,369	1935
Coffee	1000 Fr.	7,518	7,518	1935
Cocoa	tons	23,375	23,375	1935
Cocoa	1000 Fr.	29,901	29,901	1935
Palm kernels	tons	37,022	41,346	1932
Palm kernels	1000 Fr.	20,177	32,666	1932
Palm oil	tons	7,954	8,364	1929
Palm oil	1000 Fr.	7,894	24,292	1929
Building timber	tons	7,013	16,434	1931
Building timber	1000 Fr.	1,591	4,897	1931
Wood, cut	tons	7,206	8,820	1933
Wood, cut	1000 Fr.	3,611	4,658	1933
Mahogany	tons	19,274	23,657	1934
Mahogany	1000 Fr.	4,510	5,432	1934
Ebony	tons	471	940	1932
Ebony	1000 Fr.	253	572	1932

¹⁾ Including banana meal.

2. British Mandated Territory

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	
Foreign Trade				
Total Trade				Year
Imports	£ 1000	185	285	1928
Exports	£ 1000	318	386	1928
Important supplying countries				
Germany	£ 1000	.	89 ¹⁾	1930
Great Britain	£ 1000	.	16 ¹⁾	1930
Netherlands	£ 1000	.	17 ¹⁾	1930
U. S. A.	£ 1000	.	6 ¹⁾	1930
Cameroons under French mandate	£ 1000	.	26 ¹⁾	1930
Important sale markets				
Germany	£ 1000	.	240 ¹⁾	1930
Great Britain	£ 1000	.	9 ¹⁾	1930
Netherlands	£ 1000	.	5 ¹⁾	1930
Cameroons under French mandate	£ 1000	.	21 ¹⁾	1930
Principal export goods				
Bananas, fresh	£ 1000	38,358	38,358	1935
Bananas, dried	£ 1000	752	1,459	1930
Cocoa	£ 1000	4,138	4,634	1934
Palm oil	£ 1000	1,759	1,866	1933
Palm kernels	£ 1000	1,442	1,643	1933
Rubber	£ 1000	609	1,468	1928
Wood, unworked	£ 1000	.	6,665	1933

¹⁾ For 1928 no figures available.

TOGOLAND*)

1. French Mandated Territory

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	
Foreign Trade				
Total Trade				Year
Imports	1000 Fr.	31,208	102,416	1929
Exports	1000 Fr.	34,692	80,131	1929
Import (—) or Export (+) surplus	1000 Fr.	+ 3,484	— 22,285	1929
Important supplying coun- tries				
Germany	1000 Fr.	1,728	.	1929
France and colonies . .	1000 Fr.	3,518	30,698	1929
Great Britain	1000 Fr.	10,556	.	1929
Netherlands	1000 Fr.	1,439	.	1929
U. S. A.	1000 Fr.	3,162	.	1929
Japan	1000 Fr.	2,177	.	1929

*) From "Statist. Jahrbuch", 1936, International Summaries, pages 285 and 286.

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	
Important sale markets				Year
Germany	1000 Fr.	6,635	.	1929
France and colonies . .	1000 Fr.	20,442	45,579	1929
Great Britain	1000 Fr.	1,977	.	1929
Netherlands	1000 Fr.	1,364	.	1929
U. S. A.	1000 Fr.	1,992	.	1929
German trade with Togo- land ¹⁾				
Imports from Togoland	Mill. RM	0,8	6,2	1912
Exports to Togoland .	Mill. RM	0,2	2,7	1912
Principal export goods				
Dried fish	tons	462	1,254	1930
Crabs	1000 Fr.	1,030	4,904	1930
Coffee	tons	117	117	1935
Coffee	1000 Fr.	583	583	1935
Cocoa	tons	11,100	11,100	1935
Cocoa	1000 Fr.	14,430	14,430	1935
Copra	tons	4,367	4,367	1935
Copra	1000 Fr.	3,248	3,248	1935
Palm kernels	tons	13,134	13,134	1935
Palm kernels	1000 Fr.	6,161	6,161	1935
Palm oil	tons	2,055	3,337	1912
Palm oil	1000 Fr.	1,437	1,744	1912
Decorticated cotton . .	tons	1,535	2,045	1929
Decorticated cotton . .	1000 Fr.	5,373	15,382	1929
Decorticated kapok . .	tons	154	232	1930
Decorticated kapok . .	1000 Fr.	617	1,569	1930

¹⁾ For 1935 total French and British mandated territories.

2. British Mandated Territory

Subject	Unit	1934 ¹⁾	Maximum Position	
Foreign Trade				
Exports ²⁾	£ 1000	78,1	210,6	Year
Incl. Cocoa	tons	4,955	5,339	1928
Incl. Cocoa	£ 1000	69,6	200,3	1928
Incl. Cocoa ³⁾	tons	6,386	.	1928
Cotton, raw.	tons	78	115	1928
Cotton, raw.	£	906	2,711	1928
Palm kernels	tons	139	579	1928
Palm kernels	£	567	5,176	1928
Palm oil	tons	.	53	1928
Palm oil	£	.	895	1928
Kola nuts.	tons	15	8	1928
Kola nuts.	£	180	276	1928

¹⁾ Figures for 1935 not yet published.

²⁾ Only exports via French mandated territory.

³⁾ Exports via the Gold Coast.

NEW GUINEA*)

Subject	Unit	1934/35	Maximum Position	
Agriculture				Year
Area of plantations total.	1000 ha	191,5	205,7	1932/33
incl. those capable of cultivation	1000 ha	.	91,6	1932/33
under cultivation	1000 ha	92,1	88,8	1932/33
Coconut plantations				
Total area under cultivation	1000 ha	88,5	88,5	1934/35
incl. area capable of production	1000 ha	69,1	69,1	1934/35
Copra crop	1000 tons	59,0	62,2	1930/31
Cocoa plantations*				
Total area under cultivation	ha	1119	1119	1934/35
incl. area capable of production	ha	522	522	1934/35
Cocoa Crop	tons	83	138	1927/28

*) From "Statist. Jahrbuch", 1936, International Summaries, page 288.

Subject	United	1935	Maximum Position	
Foreign Trade				
Total trade				Year
Imports	£ 1000	948,4	—	1934/35
Exports	£ 1000	2340,6	—	1934/35
Import (—) or export (+) surplus	£ 1000	+ 1392,2	—	1934/35
Important supplying countries				
Germany	£ 1000	47,2	—	1934/35
Great Britain	£ 1000	130,5	—	1934/35
Australian Common-wealth	£ 1000	428,7	—	1934/35
U.S.A.	£ 1000	135,3	—	1935/35
Important sale markets				
Germany	£ 1000	45,9	—	1934/35
France	£ 1000	32,3	—	1934/35
Great Britain	£ 1000	116,2	—	1934/35
Australian Common-wealth	£ 1000	2009,2	—	1934/35
U.S.A.	£ 1000	—	—	1934/35
German foreign trade with German South Sea possessions				
Imports from German South Sea possessions.	Mill. RM	0,5	10,3	1913
Exports to German South Sea possessions	Mill. RM	0,2	2,6	1913
Principal export goods				
Copra	1000 tons	57,2	66,3	1927/28
Copra	£ 1000	361,4	1167,0	1927/28
Gold	1000 oz.	299,8	299,8	1934/35
Gold	£ 1000	1897,2	1897,2	1934/35

SAMOA*)

Subject	Unit	1934	Maximum Position	
Foreign Trade				
Total trade				Year
Imports	£ 1000	92,8	326,6	1928
Exports	£ 1000	126,7	419,5	1928
Import (—) or export (+) surplus	£ 1000	+ 33,9	+ 92,9	1928
Important supplying countries				
Germany	£ 1000	0,6	3,5	1928
Great Britain	£ 1000	14,5	71,3	1928
U.S.A.	£ 1000	8,9	49,6	1928
Australian Common- wealth	£ 1000	20,6	68,4	1928
New Zealand	£ 1000	33,2	96,4	1928
Important sale markets				
Germany	£ 1000	—	26,0	1928
Great Britain	£ 1000	31,3	77,8	1928
Other European coun- tries	£ 1000	38,6	140,9	1928
U.S.A.	£ 1000	8,0	43,6	1928
New Zealand	£ 1000	39,3	19,4	1928
Principal export goods				
Cocoa	tons	1043	974	1934
Cocoa	£ 1000	29,5	69,5	1934
Copra	1000 tons	9,1	16,2	1934
Copra	£ 1000	60,7	319,3	1934
Rubber	tons		169,7	1934
Rubber	£ 1000		17,3	1934
Bananas	1000 boxes	96,2	22,8	1934
Bananas	£ 1000	35,8	11,2	1934

*) From "Statist. Jahrbuch", 1936, International Summaries, pages 287 and 288.

NAURU*)

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	
Foreign Trade				
Total Trade				Year
Imports	£ 1000	157,2	157,2	1935
Exports	£ 1000	474,4	474,7	1935
Exports of Phosphate	1000 tons	488,7	488,7	1935
Exports of Phosphate	£ 1000	474,4	474,4	1935

*) From "Statist. Jahrbuch", 1936, International Summaries, page 288.

Other South Sea Island Possessions*)
(Marianne, Caroline, Palau and Marshall Islands)

Subject	Unit	1935	Maximum Position	
Foreign Trade				
Total Trade				Year
Imports	1000 Yen	12 970	12 970	1934
Exports	1000 Yen	18 424	18 424	1934
Export surplus	1000 Yen	5 454	5 454	1934
Imports from Japan	1000 Yen	12 635	12 635	1934
Exports to Japan	1000 Yen	16 461	16 461	1934
Principal export goods				
Phosphate	tons	60 866	60 866	1934
Phosphate	1000 Yen	1 391	1 391	1934
Sugar	tons	35 909	35 909	1934
Sugar	1000 Yen	10 513	10 513	1934

*) From "Statist. Jahrbuch", 1936, International Summaries, page 288.

The German Colonies as Suppliers of Raw Materials and Purchasers of Manufactured Goods

Before going into the fundamental question as to whether Germany's former colonies offer the possibility of opening up plentiful sources of raw materials, we must first deal with the question as to how far Germany is dependent on foreign countries for her supply of colonial raw materials.

Without wasting many words on this subject we will allow the following four tables to speak for themselves. They are taken from the following publications: Raw Materials and Colonies. The Royal Institute of International Affairs; London. Raw Materials in World Politics, by John de Wilde, in Foreign Politics Reports. Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, New York, No. 13, September 15th, 1936. The Economist, of October 26th, 1935. Report by the League Secretariat for the Negotiations of the Raw Materials Committee of March 1937.

While all the tables, together with the annexed text, make Germany's position clear in respect of raw materials, they endeavour to mitigate this fact by pointing out that even the countries blessed with raw materials do not possess all or even all those which they require; they further point out that the tables also show how little the mandated territories are able to contribute to the relief of this distress. As these arguments are constantly advanced in colonial discussions, it is necessary to consider them in some detail. As regards the first remark Germany can reply without hesitation that she would be glad to have at her disposal the quantities of raw materials which the others allege are so small. In reply to the argument constantly advanced, especially by the English, that Great Britain, which herself suffers from a lack of many raw materials, cannot simply apply to her Dominions with their independent economic policy in order to relieve her distress, it may be pointed out, as is moreover done in the above mentioned inquiries, that in spite of this independence, the close connection of the mother country with the dominions and colonies are naturally of vital importance for the supply of raw materials to Great Britain.

The following observations on the problem of the supply of Germany with foodstuffs and raw materials are taken from a work by Dr. Eicke, "Why Foreign Trade?" published in 1936 by the Verlag für Sozialpolitik, Wirtschaft und Statistik, Berlin SW 68.

"Germany is at present compelled to be extremely economical in the use of foreign exchange and to adopt a cautious import policy. At the same time the development demands the utilisation of all possibilities of domestic production in order to adapt the imports to the reduced yield from exports. The policy of self-supply which Germany is compelled to follow does not aim at

Raw Material Deficiencies of the Leading Industrial States (From an Inquiry by the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs)

	Great Britain and British Colonial Empire ¹⁾	British Empire as a whole	U. S. A. and Dependencies ²⁾	U. S. S. R.	France and Colonies	Germany	Italy and Colonies	Japanese Empire	Belgium and Colonies	Czechoslovakia	Poland
Iron	-	*	*	*	+	+	-	-	-	-	-
Copper	-	*	+	-	+	-	-	*	-	-	-
Lead	-	+	*	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	+
Zinc	-	*	*	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-
Tin	+	+	-	-	+	-	*	-	*	-	-
Bauxite	*	*	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Manganese	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nickel	-	+	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tungsten	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chromium	-	+	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vanadium	*	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Molybdenum	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Antimony	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Magnesite	-	*	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Mercury	-	-	-	*	-	-	+	-	-	*	-
Coal	+	+	+	*	-	+	-	*	-	+	+
Petroleum	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	*
Asbestos	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Graphite	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-
Sulphur or Pyrites	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
Phosphates	*	*	+	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-
Potash	-	-	-	*	+	+	-	-	-	-	+
Platinum	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rubber	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cotton	-	-	+	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wool	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Silk	-	-	-	*	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
Flax	-	-	-	+	*	-	-	-	-	-	*
Jute	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hemp	-	-	-	*	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Manila	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sisal	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vegetable Oils	*	+	+	*	*	-	*	-	*	-	-
Timber	-	*	*	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+

+ Exportable surplus.

* Approximately self-sufficient.

- Partly dependent on outside sources.

— Largely or entirely dependent on outside sources.

(1) i. e. Colonies, protectorates and mandates. Southern Rhodesia is excluded.

(2) Excluding the Philippine Islands.

Geographic distribution of production of Raw materials by John de Wilde in Foreign Politics Reports
(average of 1930 and 1933)


	Coal	Iron Ore	Petroleum	Copper	Lead	Zinc	Tin	Bauxite	Rubber	Cotton	Wool	Sulphur	Wood Pulp	Potash	Natural Phosphate	Nickel	Manganese	Chromite
British Empire (Total).....	22,96	10,56	1,64	19,60	37,89	26,56	43,39	6,50	64,59	17,87	48,63	—	19,88	—	6,33	87,10	34,89	34,85
Great Britain.....	20,56	7,47	—	—	2,17	—	1,61	—	—	—	3,10	—	0,82	—	—	—	—	—
Dominions.....	1,14 ¹	1,22	0,08	12,18	27,20	21,03	7,60	—	—	0,07	42,43	—	19,06	—	—	85,08	2,63	3,22
India.....	1,83	1,21	0,62	—	7,64	4,34	2,82	—	1,00	16,43	2,70	—	—	—	—	2,02	18,03	22,73
Dependencies.....	—	0,66	0,93	7,41	—	1,43	36,36	6,50	63,59	1,30	0,39	—	—	—	2,94	—	14,22	—
Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	1,74 ¹	—	—	—	—	0,08	—	—	—	—	3,39	—	—	—
United States (Total).....	37,14	26,55	62,52	28,34	25,70	32,26	—	17,58	—	51,47	11,92	78,43	24,75	5,20	30,54	—	1,49	—
Dependencies.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Soviet Union.....	5,68	10,98	—	—	0,92	—	—	—	—	—	5,99	—	2,56	—	8,16	—	51,72	19,85
French Empire (Total).....	4,50	31,63	—	—	1,73	1,07	0,90	41,70	1,52	0,19	3,73	—	—	20,68	47,43	9,06	0,49	11,77
France.....	4,50	30,20	—	—	0,69	—	—	—	—	—	1,20	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dependencies.....	—	1,43	—	—	1,04	1,07	0,90	—	1,52	0,17	2,24	—	—	—	1,09	—	0,49	11,77
Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,02	0,28	—	—	—	46,34	—	—	—
Dutch Empire (Total).....	—	—	2,41	—	—	—	17,16	12,87	31,11	0,01	—	0,36	0,56	—	0,92	—	0,52	—
The Netherlands.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	17,16	12,87	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dependencies.....	—	—	2,41	—	—	—	17,16	12,87	—	0,01	—	0,36	—	—	0,92	—	0,52	—
Belgium (Total).....	2,34	—	—	7,46	—	—	1,33	—	—	0,25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dependencies.....	—	—	—	7,46	—	—	1,33	—	—	0,25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Japan (Total).....	4,06	1,30	—	5,74	—	—	1,38	—	—	0,54	—	—	3,95	—	0,86	—	1,54	3,35
Dependencies.....	1,20	1,30	—	—	—	—	1,38	—	—	0,54	—	—	—	—	0,86	—	—	—
Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Italy (Total).....	—	—	—	—	1,67	3,78	—	9,38	—	—	0,74	16,17	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dependencies.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Spain (Total).....	—	2,96	—	3,91	6,45	3,07	—	—	—	—	2,13	0,54	—	3,58	—	—	—	—
Dependencies.....	—	0,42	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Portugal (Total).....	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,48	—	—	0,04	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dependencies.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,04	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Germany.....	11,26	2,99	0,09 ¹	2,24	4,37	8,84	—	—	—	—	0,86	—	11,29	66,34	—	—	—	—
Poland.....	2,84	—	—	—	—	4,68	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,62	3,01	—	—	—	—
Czechoslovakia.....	—	0,96 ¹	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,92	—	—	—	—	—
Total—all dependencies.....	1,65	3,81	3,75	7,46	1,91	2,50	55,75	19,37	96,69	2,46	2,92	0,36	—	—	54,46	9,06	15,19	34,50
Total—all dependencies including India.....	3,48	5,02	4,37	14,88	9,55	6,85	58,57	—	97,70	18,90	5,63	0,36	—	—	54,46	11,09	33,22	41,12
Total—Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	1,74 ¹	—	—	—	—	0,12	0,28	—	—	—	4,25	—	—	—

	Tungsten	Molybdenum	Antimony	Mercury	Asbestos	Flax	Raw Silk	Hemp	Jute	Cotton Seed	Linseed	Hemp Seed	Sesamum	Soya Beans	Copra	Ground Nuts	Palm & Kernel Oil	Olive Oil
British Empire (Total).....	83,24	1,14	0,31	0,11	87,81	—	0,13	—	99,63	20,24	12,80	—	73,92	—	31,92	60,44	51,78	4,41
Great Britain.....	1,57	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dominions.....	4,76	1,14	0,30	0,04 ¹	81,25 ¹	—	—	—	—	0,07	1,91	—	—	—	—	0,16	—	—
India.....	51,38	—	0,01 ¹	—	—	—	0,13	—	99,63	18,63	10,87	—	68,82	—	—	54,14	—	—
Dependencies.....	25,52	—	—	—	1,90 ¹	—	—	—	—	1,45	0,01	—	4,57	—	24,48	5,70	51,78	2,39
Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,09	—	—	0,52	—	7,44	0,45	—	2,02
United States (Total).....	16,13 ²	84,45 ²	2,70 ²	16,38	1,46	—	—	28,63	—	46,72	9,35	—	—	4,76	32,12	6,46	—	—
Dependencies.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,01	—	—	—	—	32,12	0,09	—	—
Soviet Union.....	—	—	—	2,22 ¹	14,78 ¹	75,48	2,36	36,51	—	6,85	20,88	42,72	2,71	1,46	—	—	—	—
French Empire (Total).....	—	3,70 ²	3,43	—	—	2,28	0,32	0,87	0,02	0,22	0,50	0,08	0,62	—	2,13	14,45	14,90	13,69
France.....	—	—	—	—	—	2,28	—	0,67	—	—	0,30	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,85
Dependencies.....	—	3,70 ²	0,51 ²	—	—	—	0,01	—	0,02	0,17	0,20	—	0,44	—	2,04	14,07	9,50	10,68
Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,31	0,20	—	0,05	—	0,08	0,18	—	0,08	0,37	5,40	2,15
Dutch Empire (Total).....	—	6,42	—	—	—	1,11	—	—	—	0,02	—	—	0,52	2,27	29,57	4,01	16,14	—
The Netherlands.....	—	—	—	—	—	1,11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dependencies.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,02	—	—	0,52	—	29,57	4,01	16,14	—
Belgium (Total).....	—	—	—	—	—	2,40	—	—	—	0,26 ¹	0,21	—	0,81	—	—	1,44	13,36	—
Dependencies.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,26 ¹	—	—	0,81	—	—	1,41	13,36	—
Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,03	—	—
Japan (Total).....	—	—	0,78 ²	0,27	0,42	0,51	80,39	5,12	0,33	0,62	—	9,01 ¹	1,74	91,27	0,70	—	—	—
Dependencies.....	—	—	0,10 ²	0,02 ¹	0,10 ²	—	2,58	3,65	0,27	0,62	—	9,01 ¹	1,74	85,77	—	—	—	—
Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,70	—	—	—
Italy (Total).....	—	—	1,68	35,58	0,87	—	—	12,94	—	0,02	0,06	—	—	—	—	—	—	24,75
Dependencies.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,02	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,45
Spain (Total).....	0,88 ²	—	0,20 ²	38,11	—	—	—	0,92	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,40	—	32,56
Dependencies.....	—	—	0,20 ²	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Portugal (Total).....	8,76	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,06	—	—	0,39	—	1,67	1,02	2,27	6,79
Dependencies.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,06	—	—	0,39	—	—	1,02	—	—
Germany.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Poland.....	—	—	—	—	—	5,46	—	2,59	—	—	1,42	4,47	—	—	—	—	—	—
Czechoslovakia.....	1,00 ¹	—	4,13	0,87	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total—all dependencies.....	25,52	8,27	0,81 ²	1,00	0,02 ¹	—	2,91	32,48	0,29	2,56	0,28	4,58	9,31	88,02	100,00	82,60	98,99	17,80
Total—all dependencies including India.....	76,90	—	0,41	—	—	—	3,04	—	99,93	21,19	11,15	4,58	78,13	88,02	100,00	82,76	98,99	17,80
Total—Mandates.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,31	0,20	—	0,14	—	—	0,71	—	8,23	0,85	5,40	4,27

¹) 1930 only. — ²) 1933 only.



Highland at Babanki Tungo (Cameroons)



Dr. Gustav Nachtigal

The Opinion of an Englishman:

From the work by *E. D. Morel*:

Africa and the Peace of Europe

The part which Germans have played in the discovery and scientific exploration of the Dark Continent is admittedly conspicuous: in the matter of scientific exploration, Germany's contribution would probably have been acknowledged, before the war, to have been pre-eminent. Although more than sixty years have elapsed since Barth, crossing the Sahara desert from Tripoli, carried out his protracted and fruitful journeys in the Western Sudan from Timbuctu to Lake Chad, and although many changes have occurred in those regions since that time, the five monumental volumes in which he narrates his experiences remain to-day the standard work upon that part of Africa. He threw a perfect flood of light upon those fascinatingly interesting countries, entering with a minuteness and accuracy of detail into their political, social and economic life which has been of invaluable assistance to the British and French administrators who have come after him and who turn to his printed labours even now as to a text book.

Nachtigal, Schweinfurth and Rohlfs were worthy imitators of Barth's thorough methods. For its knowledge of the ethnology and philology of Africa the world is immeasurably indebted to them and to Reichardt, Koelbe, Schoen and many other of their compatriots. In the priority of geographical discovery in the western part of the continent, Barth and his later coadjutors come second only to Mungo Park, Clapperton and the Lander Brothers, while the former's contribution to our general knowledge of Africa on comparison with the latter's is as an encyclopaedia to a diary.

In the East, Centre and South it was Schweinfurth who discovered the Bar-el-Ghazal and the fluvial system of the Upper-


German Path-Finders

Nile; Krapf, Rebmann and Von der Deken who made known the famous peaks of Kenia and Kilimandjaro; Mohr who discovered the Victoria Falls; Mauch a considerable part of the Zambezi, including the wonderful Zimbabwe ruins; Vogel, Wadai, Schweinfurth and von Wissmann large sections of the Congo basin. These, and other Germans—some of them like Barth and Hornemann under British scientific auspices—were the chief pioneers of British Imperial expansion in Africa, Mauch of Rhodesia, Barth, Overweg and Hornemann of Northern Nigeria.

These feats are cherished national traditions in Germany, just as similar feats are cherished national traditions in Britain, and the notion that Germany—compatibly with a peaceful Europe—can be driven from a Continent which so many of her sons have leavened with their devotion, their intelligence and their blood seems to me to be conceived in ignorance of the deepest wellsprings of the human nature and national sentiment.

Nor must we forget, in considering Germany's historical connection with Africa and the strands of sentiment which have been woven into the national life as a consequence thereof, the outstanding fact that the first great international conference called to deal with the future of the non-colonisable area of Africa was summoned by Bismarck, and held at Berlin.

Passing from sentimental influence to utilitarian issues—if indeed, these can be entirely divorced—Germany's claim to a share in the distribution of African territory is broad-based upon an internal situation created by her population problem and by the national economic necessities arising therefrom. The European statesman who pursues a national policy in disregard of and whose international outlook ignores that problem is closing his eyes to one of the most powerful factors moulding for good or evil, the destinies of the modern world.



Franz Adolf Eduard Lüderitz



Angra Pequena (Lüderitzbucht)

in the Black Continent

The Opinion of a French Colonial:

German Cultural Work in French Colonies

by Jacques Aissa, Dipl. E. P. C. H.

From the "Deutsche Kolonialzeitung" No. 12 of December 1st, 1936

That Germany achieved great things in her overseas possessions is well known in impartial quarters. But the contribution made by German explorers and other colonials in the construction of the French colonial empire is doubtless less well known. As a French colonial of many years standing and a sincere friend of Germany, I think that, in the interest of truth, I should state a few facts regarding these creations of German men and the German spirit. These facts are all the more remarkable as Germans wishing to work in the French colonies have always had difficulties placed in their way. France always regarded them rather as rivals than as co-workers. At the same time, in cases where co-operation has really existed, it has always resulted in the best harmony.

The achievements of the Germans lie in the sphere of geographical, ethnographical and medical research, mission work, practical colonisation and trade. The latter was, however, almost entirely crippled after the War.

Germans have done excellent work, especially in the French colonies in Africa. While the efforts of the great European colonial Powers were directed mainly towards the military and commercial utilisation of Africa, German scientists and missionaries were interested in the natives of these vast territories, quite apart from a commercial utilisation of the country.

The Hildesheim explorer Hornemann who travelled in the Niger basin, and Gottfried Ehrenberg who travelled on the African West Coast, at the beginning of the last century, by means of their research work, helped to prepare for the subsequent penetration of West Africa by the French.

Barth, who was born in Hamburg in 1821, was considered in France as the first authority in the knowledge of North and Central Africa. After a short journey in Morocco, he went through

Algeria to Tunis, which he explored thoroughly. In 1853—1854 he stayed for many months in Timbuctoo, from which he brought rich booty to Europe, after having on this journey thoroughly explored the present French Sudan. The journeys of Overweg, Vogel and von Beurmann also contributed largely to the opening up of Central Africa, although all three lost their lives in Africa and their inheritance was mostly lost.


In particular, Rohlf's, by his adventurous journeys in Morocco, the Sahara and the Chad district, should render possible a valuable insight into the life of the tribes in those districts. His meteorological observations and botanical collections, in particular, contained much information. Nachtigal's contributions in respect of the Sudan were the means of reawakening French interest in that country. The Sudan was shortly afterwards conquered by the French army. The geological work of Lenz regarding great districts in Morocco, the Sudan and Senegambia were of the greatest value to the French in the utilisation of these countries.

In recent times also we often find German scientific expeditions which, by their research work, brought a valuable addition in knowledge also for the French. As examples may be mentioned Theobald Fischer's fundamental geographical studies in Morocco 1907—1908 and the work of Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg in 1910 of French Equatorial Africa. After the War, German exploration was naturally very difficult, but we nevertheless find, inter alia, the well-known anthropologist Prof. Bluntschi in Madagascar in 1931—1932. I would not like to close this list of well-known German explorers without recalling the many extraordinarily valuable expeditions of Prof. Frobenius which have infinitely enriched the knowledge of colonising countries especially in the ethnographic sphere.

In medical research, Germany's share is the greatest. It is true that France has had Pasteur. But Germany produced Robert Koch. As a result of his work the greatest scourges of the tropics have lost their main sting. Apart from the discovery of new methods of treatment for malaria, apart from research in respect of rinderpest and the discovery of the cholera bacillus, the comma bacillus, which is called in France "Koch bacillus" in honour of Koch, he introduced in particular the scientific campaign against



Survey Troop



Georg Schweinfurth

sleeping sickness. His initial work was subsequently crowned by the discovery of the atabrin-plasmochin against malaria and Germanin against sleeping sickness which, like Yatren which was discovered by the Germans against tropical dysentery, were made available for medical treatment by Prof. Dr. Mühlens, the present director of the Hamburg Tropical Institute. Germanin has unfortunately not been used for some time past in the French territories, although it had been the means of excellent cures. The French doctors at present use an imitation of Germanin which is not yet free from objection and which usually results in the blinding of the patients and rarely in their cure. But the French product is nevertheless preferred for more or less political reasons. Thus the population of Central Africa has dropped from four millions in 1911 to two and a half millions. In the German Cameroons at present under French mandate the number of persons affected by the disease has been quadrupled.

Although Germany has at present no colonies, she occupies a predominant position in the campaign against tropical diseases. This is shown by the Hamburg Tropical Institute, created by the world famous Prof. Nocht, and the German Institute for Medical Missions at Tübingen.

German missionaries have also always worked in various French colonies and have faithfully and honestly fulfilled their duties. It is true that there were no evangelical missions even before the War. We also find no German Catholic Congregations; but Germans are active in French and Alsatian societies. For instance we find in these societies before the War a few German missionaries who did excellent work in spite of all difficulties. Several of them distinguished themselves by preparing dictionaries of the native languages, for instance, the Padres Dahin and Fuchs in Equatorial Africa and Michel Schuh in Dahomey and many others.

As regards settlement work, the German settlement "la Stidia" in the Oran district should be mentioned. Here German emigrants from the neighbourhood of Treves were settled at the cost of the French State, as it was desired to settle Algeria as rapidly as possible. This sole great experiment in the settlement of Germans in French overseas territory must be regarded as a complete success, as the settlement has developed a sound prosperity. A number of Swabians also settled in Algeria about the middle of the last century. But all these settlements were gradually penetrated by French influence, so that there can now be no question of local

Germanism, although one often meets descendants of these Germans who remember their origin with pride.

Otherwise, there is no question of an actual settlement of Germans, as the Germans have always been forbidden to stay for any length of time in French territory.

In spite of the comparatively small number of Germans in the French possessions, the Germans have done everything to create regular commercial relations. In this respect Germany has had a particularly hard struggle since the War. While the French look upon the German salesman as a keen competitor (for Germany does not sell inferior goods), the position has been made worse by the agitation generally carried on in France since the War and the anti-German propaganda again stirred up by the emigrants. It is to be hoped that France will soon come to realise this position. For Germany not only sells, but is in particular a purchaser, as she is compelled by her present lack of territories producing raw materials to apply to foreign countries, including the French colonies, in order to obtain the necessary raw materials.

But Germany can only buy when she has the possibility of selling. Although there has been much talk on the subject, France has unfortunately never taken any positive steps to give Germany any economic compensation after the War.

We French colonials do not wish to take part for years in a political game which endangers French overseas possessions in the worst possible manner, merely in order to serve a feeling of hegemony on the part of France. The reputation of the whites in the colonies is seriously endangered. In view of this constant strife on European soil, the native impression as to the superiority of the Europeans is undermined.

The time has come to solve the problem of the colonial crisis. There is only one way to do this, i.e. to restore normal relations and to give back to the Germans what cannot be morally refused them. Only in this way can the French colonies be placed on a sound basis, for the mandated territories in their present form represent severe competition in view of the absence of markets.

Germany is fully worthy of direct colonial activity; otherwise **Marshal Lyautey**, the greatest of all French colonials, would not have uttered the following words regarding the mandatory question: "Instead of taking the colonies from the Germans, they should have been given more." And he was certainly no friend of Germany.



Gerhard Rohlfs



Fishermen on Lake Nyassa

German Marine Exploration in African Waters

Marine exploration has a twofold task. In the first place it endeavours to solve certain practical questions of interest for navigation, overseas trade and high sea fishing. In addition scientific marine exploration, in the constant urge for increased knowledge, tries to solve the many riddles which the sea still holds for man.

Almost all seafaring civilised nations have sent out expeditions to the high seas. German participation in these expeditions in general, and particularly in African waters, ranks very high.

No fewer than eight great expeditions have been sent out from Germany to explore the deep waters of the sea. Each of them has touched on the Southern Atlantic and at any rate came near the African continent, while five of them also explored the African waters of the Indian Ocean. These voyages, which are all known by the names of their ships, were as follows: The voyage of exploration round the world on H.M.S. "Gazelle" 1874—1876, which took place at the same time as the first great British expedition on the "Challenger;" the Plankton expedition in the North Atlantic on the "National" in 1889, which was epoch-making in respect of research of minute forms of life in the ocean; the mainly zoological voyage of exploration in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean on the "Valdivia" 1898-1899; the German South Polar Expedition on the "Gauss" 1901-1903, in which marine research was carried on during the voyage in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean under the guidance of Prof. E. von Drygalski; the voyage of the survey vessel, H.M.S. "Planet" in 1906-1907 in the three oceans of the world; the German Antarctic Expedition of 1910-1911 on the "Deutschland"; the voyage of exploration of the survey vessel H.M.S. "Möwe" in 1911 and 1913 along the African coast, which later fell a victim to the Great War.

The last and, at the same time, the greatest German deep sea expedition, is entirely different in plan and execution from these first seven voyages of exploration, as is shown by the map of the route. This voyage, which is known as the German Atlantic Expedition, was carried out on the survey and research vessel "Meteor" in 1925-1927. While vessels on previous expeditions, in proceeding to their destination, have merely taken samples from

the unknown depths of the world ocean, the "Meteor" for the first time covered an entire ocean, namely the Southern Atlantic, from the southern ice boundary to 20° N. with an equally distributed network of 310 stations. To do this, it was necessary to cross the ocean between Africa and South America fourteen times. Thus the "Meteor" marks an advance in the entire marine exploration to the systematic research of the ocean.

In addition to the results of exploration in respect of the vast spaces of the ocean, there have recently been valuable individual investigations of the African coastal currents. Although the dictated peace of Versailles deprived Germany of her colonies, German science has never ceased to occupy itself with the African zone. Within the last three years alone, the Berlin "Institut für Meereskunde" has investigated three African current zones. The surface movements of the Guinea current which washes the coast of Togoland and, in its offshoots, the coast of the Cameroons, were established together with their annual fluctuations. The deeply extending Agulhas current was followed in its construction and course. A part of its masses of water is brought round the southern point of Africa and flows combined with water from the South Atlantic as the Benguela current along the coast of German South-West Africa and Angola. This Benguela current has recently been investigated. The collection zone of the cold water in front of the coast of South-West Africa, which is considered to be the cause of the desert of Namib, was examined in its inner connection with the Benguela current and the south east trade wind.

Even 25 years ago, Prof. G. Schott, to whom we owe two great collective works on the Atlantic and on the Indian and Pacific Oceans, described the African half of the Southern Atlantic in which at that time there were five German as against three older British expeditions, as the German part of the ocean. With much greater justice at the present time, after the results of the "Meteor" expedition, the whole of the Southern Atlantic could be described as a German sea, if names were decided by the share in scientific research. But the numerous German marine voyages of exploration were not due to imperialistic strivings for power, but were rather an expression of cultural desire of the German nation.

Distribution of the World's Raw Material Production

(published by "The Economist" on October 26th, 1935)

Commodity and Measure	Total World Production	Percentage of World Production falling to					
		British Empire and Egypt	French Empire	Dutch Empire	U.S.A. and Depen- dencies	U. S. S. R.	Rest of World
Cereals, etc.							
Wheat ¹⁾ mill. quintals	1,312	23.4	9.1	0.3	10.9	21.2	35.1
Barley ²⁾ "	379	14.6	10.3	0.3	6.9	17.8	50.1
Maize ¹⁾ "	1,100	5.9	1.4	1.4	55.0	4.3	32.0
Soya bean ¹⁾ '000 quintals	67,870	Nil	Nil	2.7	4.7	1.5	91.1
Vegetable oils ¹⁾ "	13,550	20.6 ⁵⁾	12.4	9.7	Nil	Nil	57.3
Coffee ³⁾ "	24,980	2.1 ⁶⁾	0.9	4.4	1.2	Nil	91.4
Cocoa ³⁾ "	5,800	55.0 ⁶⁾	12.4	0.3	0.2	Nil	32.1
Copra ¹⁾ "	16,260	25.0 ⁷⁾	2.3	34.6	34.9	Nil	3.9
Groundnuts ¹⁾ "	60,700	62.8 ⁶⁾	14.1	3.8	6.8	Nil	12.5
Linseed ²⁾ "	36,000	8.6	0.5	0.1	3.7	21.7	65.4
Textiles, Rubber							
Cotton ⁴⁾ '000 quintals	51,000	24.4	0.2	Nil	49.2	7.1	19.1
Wool ¹⁾ '000 metric tons	1,659	50.9	3.5	0.1	12.3	3.8	29.4
Jute ¹⁾ '000 quintals	14,605	99.5	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	0.5
Rubber ²⁾ '000 metric tons	1,031	58.0 ⁷⁾	1.9	37.2	Nil	—	2.9
Minerals, Metals, etc.							
Coal ²⁾ mill. metric tons	1,100	25.4	4.5	1.2	34.4	8.5	26.0
Lignite ²⁾ "	178	3.7	0.6	0.1	Nil	Nil	95.6
Petroleum ²⁾ "	206	1.8	Nil	2.9	59.8	11.7	23.8
Iron ore ²⁾ "	116	10.0	29.0	0.0	22.1	18.8	20.1
Copper (content) ¹⁾ '000 metric tons	1,050	29.8	Nil	Nil	16.8	3.0	50.4
Nickel (content) ¹⁾ "	45	94.3	Nil	Nil	0.2	2.2	3.3
Tin ore ²⁾ "	122	43.1	1.0	16.4	Nil	Nil	39.5
Lead (content) ¹⁾ "	1,180	44.5	0.7	Nil	21.2	1.1	32.5
Zinc ²⁾ "	1,185	34.8	0.6	Nil	29.8	1.7	33.1
Chrome ore ¹⁾ "	409	33.5	Nil	Nil	0.2	27.5	38.8
Sulphur (content) ¹⁾ "	2,830	4.8	3.0	Nil	3.9	Nil	88.3
Manganese ore ¹⁾ "	1,751	30.4	0.4	0.6	2.2	59.3	7.1
Pyrites ¹⁾ "	6,592	4.1	2.9	Nil	4.4	3.6	85.0
Bauxite ²⁾ "	1,137	3.9	46.5	9.2	14.1	Nil	26.3
Potash ²⁾ "	1,910	0.2	19.8	Nil	6.9	Nil	73.1
Precious Metals							
Gold ¹⁾ '000 kilos	794	64.7	1.0	0.4	10.3	11.1	12.5
Silver ¹⁾ "	5,667	18.5	0.2	0.5	12.8	—	68.0

¹⁾ 1933; ²⁾ 1934; ³⁾ 1933—34; ⁴⁾ 1934—35; ⁵⁾ Production or net exports; ⁶⁾ Production or exports; ⁷⁾ Shipments.

systematically cutting ourselves off from the world market, but is a result of the hard necessity of having to live and work in the present chaotic state of world economy.

German agriculture is at present making the greatest efforts to improve Germany's own supply of agrarian products. The firm determination of ensuring our own supply of foodstuffs, at any rate in case of need, is a part of the political confession of New Germany. According to the National Socialist ideology, a healthy nation must endeavour to obtain its food from its own soil. This view is expressed in the new German agrarian policy which grants every imaginable assistance to agriculture, while demanding that agriculture must do everything to increase German agrarian production to the utmost extent of its power. **Germany is not so favoured by nature in respect of her climate and soil as many other countries.**

By far the most difficult problem of the self-supply of Germany consists in the **supply of fats and fodder**, which are closely connected with each other. Germany is dependent on foreign countries for about 60% of her total supply of fats. Last year, she was obliged to import butter to the value of 87 million RM., and lard, tallow, margarine and other oils and fats to the value of 56 million RM. As regards the **supply of fruit and vegetables**, Germany is also dependent on large imports from abroad. Imports of fruits of all kinds rank first in the German foodstuffs imports; the imports of vegetables are also considerable. In 1935 Germany imported ordinary fruits to the value of 97 million RM., southern fruits 144 million RM., vegetables 43 million RM., and legumes 37 million RM. On the whole Germany only requires small supplies of meat from abroad. In 1935 the imports of meat and meat products amounted to 55 million RM. The supply of eggs and fish

has substantially improved in the last few years. The imports of eggs declined from 128 million RM. in 1932 to 62 million RM. in 1935. **The imports of tobacco, coffee, tea and cocoa are still very high.** Last year Germany imported raw tobacco to the value of 119 million RM., coffee 121 million RM., cocoa 28 million RM., and tea 7 million RM., mostly from overseas. In spite of the German shortage of foreign exchange, which should have called for certain restrictions in the consumption of these commodities, there was scarcely any decline in imports as compared with previous years. The high imports of articles of consumption are no doubt partly due to the fact that we obtain these goods from overseas countries, together with vital raw materials such as wool and cotton, by means of compensation. Here also an important part is played, not only by treaty obligations, but also by considerations of a commercial nature for the needs of other economic systems. On the whole, the supply of the population with the most important food stuffs is at present already guaranteed. The supply is completely covered in the case of grain and the products manufactured therefrom, potatoes, milk and sugar. About 85% of all the foodstuffs consumed in Germany are of German production. This percentage is, however, reduced to about 75% when it is considered that part of the foodstuffs is produced with the help of foreign fodder. In all investigations into the position of the supply of foodstuffs it is observed that consumption has considerably increased in the last few years.

Apart from the supply of foodstuffs, the **German requirements of industrial raw materials** call for considerable imports. Germany's importance as a purchasing country for foreign raw materials is in proportion to her position as a supplying country for industrial manufactured goods. In the last few years, German industry has taken about 20% of the world production of copper, 11% of the wool, 10% of the cotton and 7% of the rubber. It is at present of special importance to ensure the supply of raw materials, since the execution of the great economic programme of the German Government is essentially dependent on the imports of adequate quantities of raw materials. By far the greatest portion of the imports of raw materials is represented by **textile raw materials** of a value of about 700 million RM. per year. Germany imports in the first place wool and cotton and to a smaller extent flax, hemp and jute.

After textiles, the most important German imports of raw materials are **metals and ores**. In 1935, the imports of metals and ores required an amount in foreign exchange equivalent to 431 million RM. The principal metals obtained by Germany from

The Distribution of the Raw Materials of the World

From the Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat of the League of Nations for the discussions of the Raw Materials Committee at Geneva

Product	Percentage of the World Production					
	Great Britain	France	Netherlands	U.S.A.	U.S.S.R.	Rest of the world
Coal	24.7	4.4	1.2	34.0	8.5	27.2
Petroleum	1.5	—	2.9	59.5	11.7	24.4
Iron ore	12.2	28.6	—	20.7	18.4	20.1
Copper	12.2	—	—	15.9	3.4	52.6
Lead	43.0	0.4	—	19.5	2.1	35.0
Zinc	31.8	0.5	—	28.4	2.0	37.3
Tin ore	42.5	1.0	16.8	—	—	39.7
Bauxite	5.2	42.5	7.9	12.6	4.8	27.0
Nickel	85.7	9.0	—	0.2	—	5.1
Sulphur	—	—	0.6	72.1	—	27.3
Rubber	57.9	2.0	37.4	—	—	2.7
Cotton	17.3	—	—	49.0	7.1	26.6
Wool	50.1	3.2	—	12.3	3.7	30.7
Unspun silk	0.1	0.3	—	—	2.3	97.3
Cotton seeds	19.9	—	—	44.5	7.3	28.3
Linseed	13.3	0.2	0.1	5.5	24.3	56.6
Sesame	78.3	1.1	0.4	—	1.1	19.1
Soya beans	—	—	2.7	4.7	1.5	91.1
Copra	29.5	1.9	30.5	34.5	—	3.6
Groundnuts	62.2	14.1	3.8	7.5	—	12.4
Palm oil & Palm kernels	48.4	12.2	22.0	—	—	17.4
Timber	?	—	—	?	?	—
Wood pulp	19.6	1.5	0.6	21.0	1.3	36.0

abroad are copper, lead, tin, zinc, nickel and chromium, while the ores are mainly iron and copper. The German **timber imports** in 1935 amounted to 227 million RM., i. e. double the quantity in 1932. The most important kinds are timber for paper-making and tropical woods of high quality.

Only about half the **requirements of hides and skins** are at present covered by German agricultural production. The imports of these materials which are of such importance for the German leather industry amounted last year to 165 million RM. Hides and skins are a valuable by-product of cattle-breeding. The German production can only be raised by an increase in the stock of cattle, but this is prevented by the difficulties of obtaining fodder and of disposing of the meat. The requirements of particular kinds of hides and skins, especially those used for sole leather, are difficult to cover in Germany. In regard to **mineral supplies**, Germany is also dependent on large imports. Last year the imports of foreign mineral oil amounted to 165 million RM. The other raw materials imported by Germany include a number of products which are of vital importance for German industry, e.g. chemical raw materials, rubber, fats for industrial purposes, etc. For the present completely satisfactory substitutes for these raw materials can only be partly supplied by home production. The necessity for **importing rubber** represents a particularly heavy burden.

In view of the present position of science and technique, there are considerable possibilities of self-supply. Germany is in a position to make herself independent of foreign countries in respect of many products.

All the successes achieved and in prospect in respect of self-supply must not prevent us from promoting foreign trade to the utmost. Though the measures for self-supply are important in the present period of depression in world trade, they must not lead to the isolation of Germany which, as an industrial country and a Great Power, maintains valuable world economic relations. Without world trade there can be no question of maintaining the standard of living of the nations, their culture and — what is specially important — the number of their population and their national energy.

Germany does not desire to be self-sufficing; she attaches importance to having a share in all fruits and products of the soil with which our country is not, or only inadequately, supplied. Germany will, moreover, never be able to be entirely self-sufficing; that is clearer now than ever before, when she is trying to maintain her population and her standard of living by means of her industrial achievement alone. In the present position of German economy which, like that of all industrial countries, is closely connected with world economy, a permanent economic revival cannot in the long run be successful without taking care of world market conditions. For that, the inter-relations between production, population, maintenance of life and foreign trade are too many and too peremptory.

The smooth waging of the labour battle and the fulfilment of other State necessities depend not least on the adequate supply of Germany with raw materials. The problem of raw materials thus links up with the general problem of business prosperity, of which it is a part, and a particularly important part. The leaders of the German economic policy are aware that the question of the supply of raw materials cannot be solved without making Germany's relations with foreign countries more intensive. Dr. Schacht, the President of the Reichsbank, has stated more than once that no nation can permanently close itself to the world market without severe damage. Germany is therefore making the utmost efforts, by straining all her forces, to increase German exports and thus to ensure the country with a supply of the raw materials required for its existence and industry."

* * *

This brings us to the above mentioned **second remark**, that the mandated territories cannot contribute at all or only very slightly to alleviate the German lack of raw materials.

In the previous chapter we have proved by statistics the growth of colonial activity in the German colonies before and after the War. We will now give a **review of the resources of raw materials in the colonies**.

In the first place, there is **cotton**, of which Germany imported 4,779,000 tons with a value of 607 million Marks in 1913. The possibility of cotton growing in the colonies had to

be carefully considered. There could be no question from the outset of overcropping, but it was necessary to examine the natural conditions for a rational cultivation of cotton in the territories concerned and, with the help of all scientific means, to revive any former cultivation which existed or to introduce fresh cultivation. In Africa, Germany carried on pioneer work in this direction, and at a cost of 2 million Marks concluded the experiments in the last years before the War. Cotton cultivation on a large scale was to be started in the colonies suited for the purpose, i. e. Togoland, the Cameroons and East Africa, and the natives were trained and encouraged. In the ten years before the War, the surface under cultivation rose from 1965 ha. to 12,918 ha. and in 1914 704 plantations of a total area of 526,829 ha. had already taken up this important crop. During this period the cotton crop of East Africa increased from 9.29 tons to 2191.91 tons and that of Togoland from 32.11 tons to 503.37 tons with a total value of nearly 3 million Marks. In the last year before the War, it might be said that the experimental stage had been passed and the conditions had been created for a large-scale cotton cultivation.

As regards other colonial fibres such as hemp, flax, jute, sisal, kapok, etc., Germany's imports in 1913 were 1,975,000 tons. Of this quantity East Africa alone supplied 208,000 tons with a value of 10.7 million Marks, although this crop had only been introduced eight years previously. It cannot be pointed out too clearly that the introduction of sisal cultivation is exclusively due to German science and German enterprise. In this manner two-thirds of the German requirements of sisal hemp in 1913 came from East Africa.

The **production of rubber**, of which Germany imported 205,000 tons with a value of 125.9 million Marks in 1913, also developed favourably. The share supplied by the colonies was 14 %, mostly plantation rubber.

As regards the **development of the mineral resources**, it cannot be definitely stated what minerals and what quantities are available for development, as the exploration of all the areas in questions had not been concluded. Nevertheless, the copper production of South West Africa was already considerable in the last few years before the War, and the particularly great increase which took place in 1907 was due to the opening of the Otawi Railway in 1906 and demonstrates in a remarkable manner the importance of means of communications in colonial territories. Germany's imports of raw copper amounted in 1913 to 225,400 tons with a value of 335.3 million Marks. Of this quantity South West Africa supplied 47,345.4 tons with a value of 7,728,700 Marks. In addition, gold, silver, tin, lead and other ores were mined in increasing quantities and bore witness to the richness of the deposits. In addition German South West Africa supplied as from 1910 increasing quantities of marble, and in the year 1913 supplied diamonds to the value of 58.9 million Marks, as against 0.05 millions in 1908.

The **utilisation of tropical wood and tropical tanning materials** could only start after the development of the means of communication which are of much more decisive importance for wood exports than for other colonial products. As regards the supply of fine woods, East Africa and the Cameroons were of primary importance, together with New Guinea. The vast forest regions of these colonies possessed rich supplies of tanning materials. That the German colonies did not export any appreciable quantities of these products was not due to the fact they were unable to produce, but mainly to their insufficient exploration. The natural conditions for their production existed in these colonies just as in the other African territories, in particular British South Africa, and this was one of the factors that caused the German African possessions to be investigated in respect of the possibility of supply.

The raw materials of **fats and oils** were transformed in Germany in 1913 to the extent of 1,785,000 tons. Of this quantity only 50,000 tons were produced in the country. The sum required for the import of the remainder amounted in the last

year before the War to 537.5 million Marks. It is true that the colonies were only able to supply a fraction of this amount, but the increase in this portion during the last twelve years before the War shows what amounts could have been produced. This increase was from 19,000 tons in 1899 to about 80,000 tons in 1913. In this case also the preparations for starting cultivation were difficult and took time and depended on means of communication, since oil fruits and oil raw materials are mass goods and can only be used when it is possible to bring the products, which are themselves of low value, to the coast at small transport cost. For this reason great hopes were placed in the railways in the last few years of German colonial rule. There was, however, no reason to doubt that the measures taken for cultivation, in view of the almost unlimited capacity of the market for vegetable oil products, would have fulfilled the expectations placed in them. The most important factor was the natural conditions which already existed.

In respect also of **colonial goods** the share contributed by the colonies only represents a fraction of the consumption of the mother country. But it must be borne in mind in this connection that these cultivations were all introduced without exception for the first time by Germans, and had to be tried out, frequently at considerable sacrifice and at the cost of mistakes. The production of cocoa products, particularly in the Cameroons, Togoland, East Africa and Samoa, developed very favourably. The exports from all the German colonies together amounted in the last year before the War to 6332 tons.

That the future prospects attached at that time to cocoa growing were by no means exaggerated is proved by a glance at the cocoa development in the British Gold Coast. In the short period of fifteen years, i. e. from 1910 to 1924, the Gold Coast has developed from very small beginnings to the first cocoa country in the world. In 1924, with its production of about 227,000 tons, it already supplied more than half the total world requirements. Coffee growing has continued to increase, especially in East Africa, and the quality has been improved, while experiments in the Cameroons and Togoland offered favourable possibilities for the future.

As regards the capacity of the German colonies to compete with foreign countries as suppliers for home requirements, it may be pointed out in the first place that the **development of tobacco growing** in the colonies was in its initial stages before the outbreak of the War. In the last few years of German colonial work, however, the efforts to encourage tobacco cultivation in East Africa, the Cameroons and South West Africa gave good results. **Banana growing on a large scale** was newly introduced in the Cameroons. On May 9th, 1914, the first German banana steamer was launched, and was intended solely for the transport of bananas from the Cameroons to Hamburg. Large banana plantations had been laid down and the export was to begin in 1914.

As regards **animal raw materials**, the share of the colonies up to the outbreak of War was small. Nevertheless, the efforts made, especially in German South West Africa, registered a certain success. Even at a cautious estimate, the cattle breeding and farming industry in the German colonies gave grounds for the opinion that the further development in the colonies would **supplement German agriculture and produce an additional supply of food for the German people.**

* * *

The results achieved in the former German colonies in the production of raw materials are of special importance for the present review of the position. It has been proved that many particularly important raw materials could be produced. If only the final figures are considered, it must be admitted that they were not high, while the quantity of raw materials exported from the colonies in the last year before the War was still too small to have any appreciable influence on the production of world raw materials and the supply of Germany. The

significance of German colonial economy appears in a totally different light when its development is examined, as there was unquestionably a relatively great increase in a comparatively short time.

It is naturally difficult to determine what the subsequent development would have been, if the War and the resultant expropriation had not destroyed the entire development. There is, however, no reason to underestimate the future possibilities of the territories in question; **a glance at the colonial territories adjoining the German colonies** and possessing on the whole the same geological and climatic conditions, is very informative in this connection.

Reference has already been made to the **British Gold Coast**, which adjoins Togoland, in connection with cocoa production. But in other respects also, the exports from the Gold Coast have enormously increased. The same applies to the **British Colony of Nigeria** which adjoins the Cameroons, and **British East Africa** which is adjacent to German East Africa. On following the trade figures in these territories, it appears that **the development of these colonies has in fact led to very substantial results, which by no means represent the final stage.**

* * *

Though we cannot conclude from the development of those colonies that there would naturally be the same or a similar development in the German colonies, there are nevertheless certain indications in the **reports by the mandatory Powers to the League of Nations**. They show, in spite of all relapses and difficulties, that the seeds sown by German labour in the soil of Africa, in spite of difficult years of depression, have again begun to grow and to show a powerful development. **The seeds sown by years of German colonial work, which began to germinate before the outbreak of War, have borne further fruit in the last few years; but the harvest goes to other nations.**

In **German East Africa** a new period of development only began in 1925. In 1936 Germans were again admitted, and not only returned to their old settlements and plantations, but also took up the exploitation of new land. At present the German element represents 50 % of the productive white population and is again the most important economic factor.

The two great overland railways built under German rule, which bear permanent witness to German science and German labour, must be considered as the great arteries of economic life.

As before the War, sisal production was the main item. After constantly rising, it amounted in 1935 to 84,000 tons i. e. about a third of the total exports. After sisal come the following products: coffee, also with a constantly rising production, amounting to about 19,000 tons, or 14.1 % of the export trade; groundnuts, the production of which declined considerably in 1934, amounting to about 17,000 tons or 6.5 %; cotton, after a heavy drop from 1930 to 1934, with about 10,000 tons, or 16.5 % of the exports; raw gold, after a constant rise, with about 64,000 oz. or 10.8 % of the exports; hides and skins with 4.4 % of the exports. The diamond production, which was still considerable in 1929 and 1930, has entirely ceased. The same fate overtook the production of rubber, which was the most important export in 1912 but which declined considerably after the War. There is a slight increase in tin ore, mica, salt, tanning bark, vegetable oils and fats, while the production of rice is growing in importance.

While cattle breeding in the British mandate among the native population and in European farms is of much less importance on the whole than the products of agriculture and of the cultivation of tropical plants, the extensive cattle breeding carried on by the natives is of decisive importance for the economy of the Belgian territories of **Ruanda and Urundi** which have been incorporated in the Customs union of the Belgian Congo. This is also shown by the increasing exports of hides

and skins (1550 tons in 1935), after which come at a considerable distance small quantities of coffee, cotton, gold and tin concentrates.

In German South West Africa also, the years during and immediately following the War were years of severe crisis, especially as the Versailles Treaty provided the possibility of expelling more than 6000 Germans.

One of the vital elements in German South West Africa is cattle breeding and farming, especially the breeding of caracul and black head Persian sheep introduced by the German Government, as is shown by the rapidly increasing exports of skins (for Astrakhan fur) which rose from about 84,000 skins in 1928 to 514,000 in 1935. The importance of farming and agriculture is shown by the increase in the exports of these products as compared with the total exports, i. e. in 1930 24 % with about £ 605,000; 1931 48 % with about £ 698,000; 1932 75 % with about £ 784,000; 1933 82.1 % with about £ 1,195,000; 1934 82.2 % with about £ 925,000 and 1935 62.8 % with about £ 1,566,000, while the exports of mining products were in 1930 72 % with a value of £ 1,836,000; 1931 40 % with £ 587,000; 1932 18.7 % with £ 195,000; 1933 6.2 % with £ 90,000; 1934 10.6 % with £ 121,000 and 1935 31.7 % with £ 791,000.

Diamond mining which was for many years of decisive importance for South West African economy and which yielded about 2 millions in 1926 and 1927 and about 1½ millions in 1928 and 1929 and then dropped rapidly to its lowest figure of £ 10,000 in 1933, again rose to £ 588,000 in 1934/35 when the Consolidated Diamond Mines Ltd. resumed operations. Copper mining, which ranks second, is exclusively in the hands of the Otawi Mining and Railway Co. which owns the well-known Tsumeb mines. After the production had dropped from 1929 to 1932 from 66,700, 53,700, 36,600 to 21,500 tons with an export value of £ 703,000, £ 425,000, £ 170,000 and £ 42,000, the Company stopped working in July 1932, and has not yet resumed operations. The development of vanadium mining from 1932 to 1934 was no less disastrous; the production, which amounted in 1929 to 5268 tons with a value of £ 211,000, after the decline, again rose in 1935 to 3500 tons with a value of £ 133,000. The production from tin mining has developed favourably.

This decline not only severely affected the workers and employees, but had also an effect on the financial position of the mandated territory, which was already seriously undermined by the difficult conditions in agriculture. Apart from these external difficulties, the mandated territory has been placed at a great disadvantage not only by the Customs and commercial policy of the Union of South Africa, with which it forms a Customs union, but must also bear the costs of the forced settlement of the Boers which is carried out for political reasons in order to weaken the strong German influence.

In the two mandated parts of the Cameroons, the British part of which is joined up with the administration of the British colony of Nigeria, the Germans were ruthlessly expelled after the War, and it was only in 1925 that the German planters were able to reacquire their former possessions in the British part, including in particular the old plantations on the Cameroon mountain.

In the two mandated parts of the Cameroons, the cultivation of the oil palm is of far the greatest importance. The exports of palm kernels in 1935 amounted to about 40,000 tons, i. e. 20.6 %. Nine-tenths of these exports come from the French mandated territory. The exports of palm oil in 1935 amounted to about 8000 tons, of which four-fifths came from the French part. In addition to the cultivation of the oil palm, in the last few years the cultivation of groundnuts and sesame has developed favourably, though to a small extent, especially in the French part (1935: 7725 tons). The cultivation of

cocoa in the French part and bananas in the British part has constantly extended; the cocoa exports from both territories rose from about 13,000 tons in 1929 to 27,500 tons or 30.5 % of the total exports, in 1935, while the banana exports rose from 1100 tons to 46,000 tons. This rapid development is the achievement exclusively of German farmers who now supply 40 % of the German requirements of bananas.

The production and export of rubber show an entirely different picture; in 1913 the exports of rubber represented 50 % of the total, but are now considerably lower.

For the production of useful and fine wood, the forests of the French mandated territory are of primary importance; the exports rose from about 25,800 tons in 1929 to 48,600 tons in 1934 (in the British part from 500 to 5000 tons).

In Togoland also the cultivation of the oil palm ranks first in the French mandated territory, as is evidenced by the constant increase in the exports of palm kernels and palm oil (the figures for 1935 being 13,100 and 2055 tons). The proportion of 42 % of the total exports reached in 1912 has, however, not been again attained. The cultivation of cocoa has made unusually rapid progress, and the total crops and exports, amounting to about 19,000 tons in 1934/35, represent an increase of nearly 50 times compared with the pre-war period (42 % of the total exports). There has been a steady though slow development in the cultivation of the cocoanut palm and in the exports of copra, mainly due to the fact that the plantations laid down by the German administration have in the meantime reached the bearing stage. The British mandated territory is under the administration of the British Gold Coast, and this has not a very favourable effect on the finances.

In New Guinea and the island territories, in which Germany worked hard for ten years to open up and develop completely unknown and inaccessible countries scattered far over the ocean, with a population living for the most part in the stone age, the authority granted by the Versailles Treaty to the mandatory Powers to expropriate the Germans and their possessions was utilised to the full.

While Japan immediately paid amounts up to 70 % of the agreed or fixed value, Australia and New Zealand, like all the other mandatory Powers, referred the expropriated owners to Germany for compensation.

In the plantations of New Guinea the cultivation of cocoanut palms (which were planted before the War but did not enter the bearing stage) ranks easily first, as shown by the increasing yield of cocoanuts (1934/35: 1600 with a value of £ 45,000) and copra, which amounted to about 59,000 tons in 1934/35. The exports of copra, amounting to 57,000 tons with a value of £ 361,000 have been about 60,000 tons since 1928, though the value has decreased by more than half on account of the decline in price (from about £ 13.10.10 in 1929 to £ 6.8.6 per ton in 1934).

As regards mining, the gold production started after the War has constantly gained in importance. No less than nine new workable alluvial gold deposits were prospected in 1934 and 1935 and entirely new primary gold deposits were discovered. Since 1931 the exports of raw gold have risen from 108,647 oz. with a value of about £ 400,000 to about 300,000 oz. with a value of nearly a million Pounds in 1934/35. From May 1921 to June 1935 the total gold exports were about 1,266,000 oz. with a value of £ 5,517,000. The communications between the coast and the mining districts are maintained by several air companies.

As the price of copra fell continuously until 1933/34, the centre of gravity in the total exports was entirely displaced in favour of gold, which accounted for 81 % in 1934/35 (1925/26, 2 %), while copra was only represented by 15 % (1925/26, 92 %).

The German Aspect



Windhuk, the German Town



Bezirksamt Street in Tanga (German East Africa)



German Street Signs in Windhuk



The former German administrative building in Windhuk, now seat of the Mandatory Administration



Bismarck Square in Tanga

of African Towns



Swakopmund (German South-West Africa)

"The native quarter in Daressalam lies immediately behind the town and is a convincing example of the thoroughness of the German system and the seriousness with which the Germans carried on their colonising work. The streets are fine and absolutely clean. For each house there is galvanised iron dustbin with a lid. And this in the middle of Africa. We should have expected rather to find it in an English town in which the health authorities have developed unusual thoroughness."



Daressalam



The two English Africa travellers
R. S. and M. E. Meikle
in their travel book:
"After Big Game".



The port of Lüderitzbucht (South-West Africa)

"As regards internal regulations, the German in Togoland may appear to be despotic when he issues laws in respect of domestic and even of personal cleanliness; a conserve tin thrown away behind the house, a broken jug half full of water — the abode of fever-carrying mosquitos — an uncleaned doorstep or a defective roof, will make the culprit liable to a fine of one Pound. The result is, however, that even the worst grumbler will find pleasure in a walk through Lome."

The Times, January 13th, 1913.



In South-West Africa
German is spoken

A particularly characteristic proof of the common interests of Great Britain and the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand is supplied by the island of Nauru, comprising about 22 sq. km., which, under the dictated Peace of Versailles, became an independent mandated territory; its enormous value lies in its deposits of phosphate which were estimated before the War at about 40 million tons. Their utilisation for the purposes of the British Empire is the exclusive object of the mandatory administration, in opposition to other colonial territories which, in addition to being the home country of the native population, are used for the cultivation of tropical plants and render possible the production of natural products and the extraction of mineral resources.

The exploitation of the enormous phosphate deposits by a British-Australian-New Zealand Condominium, the British Phosphate Commissioners, has assumed an entirely capitalistic form, and the quantities mined have, with certain fluctuations, shown a steady increase, namely from 326,000 tons in 1929 to 488,000 tons in 1935 with a value of £474,000. Except for a very small percentage, these quantities are shipped to Australia and New Zealand. It is quite obvious that such a policy of exploitation which places the Mandatory in the position of a monopoly, is entirely contrary to the meaning of the mandatory idea.

In the island territories of the Carolines, the Mariannes, the Marshall and Palau Islands, the main products are copra and sugar, while there is also a production of phosphates the export of which amounted in 1934 to 60,000 tons. The sugar exports amounted to 35,900 tons with a value of 10½ million yen.

In spite of its small area of only about 2600 sq. km., the mandatory territory of Samoa produces a larger yield for economic work than is generally assumed. In the first place there is the cultivation of cocoa nut palms, cocoa and bananas; the exports are increasing and amounted in 1934 to about £125,000, though the value had declined considerably as compared with previous years (£420,000 in 1928). The production of rubber, which was formerly considerable (the figures for 1927 to 1930 were approximately 160,000, 170,000, 110,000 and 100,000 tons) has entirely ceased since 1932.

* * *

The above account does not claim to describe in detail the economic development of the former German colonies since the existence of the mandatory system. The result is that, after overcoming the war period, and the almost worse post-war period, the productivity of the territories opened up by Germany has again risen and in some respects exceeded that of peace time.

Until the year 1929 there was an increase in the figures of foreign trade, since the imports amounted to 247 million RM. and the exports to 243 million RM., making a total of 490 million RM. for the colonies under foreign mandatory rule, as against 320 millions in 1913. There was thus a rise of 170 millions. This is certainly a notable achievement, but it nevertheless appears in a different light when compared with the growth of foreign trade in the German colonies in the last ten years before the War. From 1903 to 1913, it increased from 66 millions to 318 millions, and the exports alone from 25 millions to 161 millions. From this it may be concluded that, if the colonies had remained in German possession, the development would have been much greater than under mandatory rule. This also applies to the period after 1929, when the general world economic depression naturally affected the mandated territories as much as the other colonial countries and an improvement only took place in 1932.

The various changes in production and export, and the development of certain branches of production which have in some cases not, or only slightly, gone beyond the pre-war position, show that the resources in their own colonies more or less caused the mandatory Powers in the first place to take up only the production that was easiest and in the second place only to promote the production which was insufficient in their own colonies. The binding of the colonies to the mother country, as far as their requirements were concerned, made it necessary, especially in the French mandated territories, as far as possible only to promote such economic and production areas as supplemented the economic system of the mother country, and to check any competitive production. In a number of cases it has also been proved that planting and production, together with the entire economic organisation, were backward because the mandatory Power could not find in its own country sufficient people who were willing to go out as settlers. During the German period, geological investigations were also made in respect of deposits of raw materials. This exploration of the German colonies has scarcely been continued by the mandatory Powers. But the slight research that has been made has shown that the mining and geological development is still in the initial stages. Lastly the comparatively small extension of the system of communications is with few exceptions also due to the fact that the economic interests of the mandatory Powers are of a secondary nature, since their own colonies also in some cases contain wide expanses of virgin soil.

When, in addition to these factors, it is also considered how much was destroyed in the first eight or ten years after 1914, it must be admitted, in view of what has nevertheless been accomplished, that the prophecies of a great future for the German colonial possessions have merely been confirmed. That has been to a great extent recognised and also expressed by the present administrators of the former German possessions. There is for instance a speech in the Chamber by the French Colonial Minister Perrier on December 17th, 1925, in which he opposed the project of handing over the French African mandates to Germany which had been raised in connection with the Locarno negotiations. He said that Togoland and the Cameroons were the colonies from which France's liberation from the economic point of view might come. We have reproduced above the recent statement by the Deputy Archimbaud.

But something else has been proved in the course of the last few years. The economic progress made on former German soil has been obtained by the means which were formerly used by the German administration. The lines which Germany laid down for the development of the country were also considered by the new masters as the most suitable, and wherever German cultural institutions have fallen a prey to destruction, they have had no choice but to build them up again in the same form, though not always with the same value. The Mandatories of the League of Nations have had no other course—after disappointing experiments in new methods—than to return more and more to the German methods of development. The German agricultural schools, research institutes and experimental stations have proved indispensable, the sanitary measures for combating animal diseases and plant diseases were resumed, if at all, on the German model, and the means tried under the German administration for raising productivity have been again applied, as is made constantly clearer by every fresh report by the mandatory Powers. This recognition has also been given officially, for instance by the British Parliamentary Commission which visited German East Africa in the spring of 1925 and recognised the German colonial achievements as exemplary and noted with regret "the regrettable difference between the attitude of the British and the former German colonial authorities towards scientific research in the colonies". In the journal "West Africa" of June 6th, 1925, a prominent British financier, the head of the Bank of British West Africa, after travelling through the Cameroons, writes as

follows in his report: "I must confess that the Germans worked on the plantations with their usual thoroughness, and I wonder what high degree of development would have been reached at present, if the Germans had remained uninterruptedly since 1914." Such remarks, which are not isolated, contain the best justification for German colonising activity as it really was, and the strongest condemnation of the pretences on the basis of which the German colonial possessions were taken away.

* * *

In order to prove the incorrectness of the assertion that the former German colonies are either a "luxury" or a "burden", it is necessary to consider somewhat more closely the dimensions of the economic relations between Germany and her colonies which are now under mandatory rule.

A fairly clear idea of this problem is obtained by comparing the requirements of a mother country in tropical colonial products of a vital kind with the quantities of goods of the same kind that are available for export from her overseas territories, and by drawing from the ratio thus obtained and from the volume of traffic in goods conclusions as to the economic significance of these relative figures.

An investigation of this kind was made by Dr. Weigelt, Director of the DD. Bank, in the "Berliner Tageblatt" of March 3rd, 1935, the result of which is given in the lecture by Herr Eicke, Director of the Reichsbank. This investigation shows that, even according to the position in 1934, the exploitation of the former German colonies would render possible the total supply of German requirements of some of their products, and that considerable quantities would still remain for disposal elsewhere.

This is most evident in the case of sisal hemp and mineral phosphates, in which the annual production is much greater than German import requirements. What advantages could be obtained for German agriculture and the German food supply by using on German soil all these quantities of phosphates, which it is at present impossible to obtain from these former German territories. The position is also very favourable as regards copra, which is not given separately in the table, but which would cover, for instance in 1933, no less than 77 % of the German import requirements. Next to these come bananas and cocoa, which would have covered in 1934 37 % and 35.6 % respectively of the import requirements. The percentage in the case of coffee is 9.4 % and in oils and fats 7.3 %. The great importance which might attach to gold and diamond mining is clearly shown by the table.

The figures in the table naturally do not exhaust the quantities and values of goods coming from the German colonies, and we have already proved in our inquiry that the existing quantities of production can be considerably increased.

The development which we have described and the examples which we have given of the economic progress in respect of similar foreign areas of production show that this possibility is a very real one. It is true that German colonial work could not immediately result in extremely high production figures. Nevertheless, it is wrong to describe what has been attained as an inadequate result of more than thirty years of colonial activity and therefore to dismiss the economic exploitation of the German colonies as a hopeless undertaking. In reality, of these thirty years, it has been possible to apply barely more than ten to the development of the German colonies according to a fixed plan, and in this period the value of their foreign trade increased sixfold and the value of the German trade with the colonies fivefold. The post-war figures of the mandatory reports show, moreover, that, in spite of all obstacles, this development was only the beginning of a rising curve.

But if the production of raw materials in the colonial territories to be developed by Germany could not be raised to such great amounts that, as is quite possible, the territorial distribution of the world production of important raw materials could be decisively changed and new sources of raw materials might come to the fore, there is a much more tangible possibility that German national economy might derive immediate advantage from its own overseas work, i. e. the direct connection between the production of raw materials and the transforming industry, a form of organisation of mixed economic industries which already exists in economic life.

* * *

No one can seriously deny that the possession of colonies would result in a considerable improvement in the German raw material position and a corresponding alleviation of the position in respect of foreign exchange.

For the economic importance of colonial possessions is by no means restricted to the question of raw materials.

Foreign Trade of the former German Colonies

	Importation	Exportation	Total Trade
German East Africa:			
1912 (in Engl. £)	2,463,000	1,538,000	4,001,000
Tanganyika Territory:			
1929 (in Engl. £)	4,286,000	3,949,000	8,235,000
1934 " " "	2,343,000	2,561,000	4,904,000
1935 " " "	2,990,000	3,354,000	6,344,000
Ruanda-Urundi:			
1929 (in Belg. Fr.)	58,500,000	14,600,000	73,100,000
1934 " " "	34,110,000	38,710,000	72,820,000
1935 " " "	30,600,000	29,400,000	60,000,000
German South-West Africa:			
1912 (in Engl. £)	1,591,000	1,911,000	3,502,000
1929 " " "	3,082,000	3,595,000	6,677,000
1935 " " "	1,499,000	2,517,000	4,012,000
Cameroons:			
1912 (in Fr. Fr.)	42,272,000	28,808,000	71,080,000
British Mandated Territory:			
1929 (in Engl. £)	193,000	308,000	501,000
1934 " " "	110,000	194,000	304,000
1935 " " "	185,000	318,000	503,000
French Mandated Territory:			
1929 (in Fr. Fr.)	193,618,000	170,275,000	363,893,000
1934 " " "	58,713,000	72,528,000	131,241,000
1935 " " "	88,621,000	97,997,000	186,618,000
Togoland:			
1912 (in Fr. Fr.)	14,108,000	12,294,000	26,402,000
British Mandated Territory:			
1929 (in Engl. £)	—	191,000	191,100
1934 " " "	—	78,000	78,000
1935 " " "	—	127,000	127,000
French Mandated Territory:			
1929 (in Fr. Fr.)	102,416,000	80,131,000	182,547,000
1934 " " "	26,545,000	28,062,000	54,607,000
1935 " " "	31,208,000	34,692,000	65,000,000
New Guinea:			
1929 (in Austr. £)	782,800	919,400	1,702,200
1933/34 " " "	924,300	1,766,200	2,690,500
1935 " " "	948,400	2,340,600	3,289,000
Samoa:			
1929 (in N. Z. £)	289,000	287,000	576,000
1934 " " "	93,000	127,000	220,000
Nauru Island:			
1935 (in Austr. £)	157,200	474,400	631,600
Japanese Mandated Territory in the South Seas:			
1929 (in Yen)	7,000,000	7,600,000	14,600,000
1933 " " "	9,000,000	18,740,000	27,740,000
1934 " " "	13,000,000	18,424,000	31,424,000

The advantages offered by colonies as a market for the industry of the mother country are particularly striking in a period when preference duties have been introduced in a considerable part of the world. From the point of view both of trade and foreign exchange, there are some widespread misapprehensions which should be cleared up in respect of the results to be expected and the functioning of trade with such German colonial territories.

The value of the total foreign trade amounts to very considerable sums, and it is of great interest to observe the amount of Germany's share in the foreign trade of her colonies under mandatory rule in the course of recent years.

Germany's Imports and Exports from and to the Mandated Territories in Recent Years

Country	¹⁾	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
German East Africa:	T. I.	8.8	6.1	7.3	10.2	9.8	10.6
Tanganyika Territory	E. D. G.	5.6	3.9	7.8	11.8	9.7	8.1
(British Mandate)	E. F. G.	1.5	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.9	1.3
Ruanda-Urundi	I.	6.9	8.5	8.8	5.7	6.7	5.2
(Belgian Mandate)	E.	0.0	0.0	—	—	—	—
South-West Africa:	T. I.	23.2	12.6	10.3	11.5	11.0	13.4
	E. D. G.	11.4	16.1	14.7	21.1	20.2	13.3
	E. F. G.	4.3	2.5	1.5	2.3	2.1	1.8
Cameroons:	T. I.	11.0	8.0	5.9	6.4	7.7	6.3
(French Mandate)	T. E.	38.8	29.8	29.5	21.3	12.6	6.2
Nigeria:	T. I.	10.1	9.0	6.3	8.3	5.0	7.0
(incl. Brit. Mandate	E. D. G.	27.4	25.0	18.3	18.0	12.3	15.1
of Cameroons)	E. F. G.	1.6	1.5	1.2	2.6	1.5	2.0
Togoland:	T. I.	18.9	27.0	22.7	16.7	7.2	5.5
(French Mandate)	T. E.	12.5	11.1	20.4	10.4	21.8	18.7
Gold Coast:	T. I.	11.5	7.9	7.2	8.5	4.8	5.7
(incl. Brit. Mandate	E. H. G.	25.2	18.2	22.0	25.4	19.7	18.0
of Togoland)	E. F. G.	1.3	2.3	3.7	3.8	3.5	6.0
New Guinea:	T. I.	6.2	13.4	3.7	4.0	6.0	4.9
(Austr. Mandate)	T. E.	5.3	4.9	6.3	5.1	2.9	1.9
Nauru Island:	T. I.
(Austr. Mandate)	T. E.
Island territory:	I.	.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
(Japanese Mandate)	E.	.	—	—	—	—	—
Samoa:	T. I.	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.0
(New Zealand Mandate)	T. E.	0.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

¹⁾ In the above table I = Imports; E = Exports; T. I. = Total Imports; T. E. = Total Exports; E. D. G. = Exports of Domestic Goods; E. F. G. = Exports of Foreign Goods; the sign — means no share whatever in the trade in question; the sign . means that the share cannot be ascertained or is not known; 0.0 is inserted when the share in the trade in question cannot be expressed in figures.

A cursory glance at the figures contained in this table shows that Germany has been almost or entirely excluded from trade with certain mandated territories.

In addition, it shows to what extent Germany is compelled to pay to foreign economic systems for necessary or indispensable colonial products from her former colonies, since the value of exports from Germany to the mandated territories is in general insufficient to pay for the imports.

The most important change among countries participating in the trade with East Africa is the far-reaching exclusion of Germany, whose share in imports and exports in 1912 was more than half, while after the War her share in the trade of Tanganyika exceeded 10% only in very few years; in 1935 she supplied 10.6% of the imports of Tanganyika and took 8.1% of the imports. The trade of Great Britain benefited most from the exclusion of Germany. Her share of the imports jumped from 4.9% in 1912 to 42.3% in 1930, and only began to drop in 1931 until it reached 29.0% in 1935, when it was

pressed back by the Japanese export offensive which was particularly successful on the East Coast of Africa. Japan's share of the imports rose from 6.7% in 1930 to 21.9% in 1935. Trade from British India and the Netherlands lost greatly as from 1931, also mainly in favour of Japan (from 17.2% and 8.9% respectively in 1925 to 4.9% and 1.5% respectively in 1935).

The markets of Tanganyika include the British neighbouring colonies of Kenya and Uganda, to which only a very small part of the exports went before the War; they rank first and take on an average over a quarter (1935: 25.6%) of the exports, though the traffic is almost entirely a transit trade. The second place is taken by Great Britain, which raised her share from 10.7% in 1912 to 23.1% in 1935. Belgium is the next most important market (1935: 11.3%); British India ranks fourth with a greatly increased share of the exports (10.4%).

In the imports of Ruanda-Urundi, Belgium, Great Britain, British India and Tanganyika have lost ground in the last ten years (from a total of 73% in 1927 to 35% in 1934), mainly to Japan which supplied only 1.6% of the imports in 1927, but 33.7% in 1934, i.e. almost twice as much as Belgium (18.5%). The United States of America and the Netherlands Indies have also increased their exports to the territory. In 1934, Germany's share of the imports was 6.7%. In 1934, 94% of the exports from Ruanda-Urundi went to Belgium.

The regional changes in the foreign trade of South-West Africa consist almost entirely in the exclusion of Germany by the Union of South Africa and Great Britain. In 1935 almost 50% of the exports went to Great Britain and about 30% to the Union. As regards the supply of goods to South-West Africa, South Africa ranks first—with an average of over 70% since 1931—while Great Britain has in recent years only supplied 4 or 5%. Germany supplied four-fifths of the import goods before the War; in 1925 her share was still 26%, but was reduced by 1935 to 13%. On the other hand Germany has gained ground as a market for South-West Africa in recent years; in 1934 she took about 20% of the exports as against approximately 3% in 1926; in 1935 her share declined to about 13%, mainly as a result of the door to South-West Africa being opened wide to the Union of South Africa and the other British possessions by the Ottawa agreements.

The position was better in the British mandated territory of the Cameroons; Germany's share in the imports in 1935 amounted almost to half, while she took the main part of the exports. In the French mandated territory, France's share of the imports rose rapidly and amounted in 1934 to 35.4%, while her share of the exports was 54.3%. Germany's share (far behind Great Britain and the United States and rapidly falling) amounted to only 7.7% of the imports, while her share of the exports was 18% (second after France, but rapidly declining).

Among the countries supplying the imports of the French mandate of Togoland, Great Britain easily ranks first with 34%, while France (11%) and the United States follow at a considerable distance. Germany's share in the imports is uncommonly small (6.5% in 1935), and this is all the more evident since the cessation of reparation deliveries in previous years (27% in 1931). As a purchaser of Togoland products, Germany accounts for 20% and ranks second after France and her colonies (50 to 60%). The payment of these products which greatly exceed in value the exports to the Cameroons and Togoland naturally represents a burden for the German foreign exchange account. In the British mandated part of Togoland, it is impossible to get a picture of Germany's share in the foreign trade, as the British mandatory reports only give figures regarding trade via the Franco-British mandatory frontier.

In New Guinea the countries belonging to the British Empire have in the last three years supplied far more than

half the total imports, and Australia easily ranks first. Germany's share, which was equivalent to that of the United Kingdom in 1930/31, dropped considerably in 1932/33 and rose slightly in 1934 (5 %). The share of the United States has greatly increased and has almost doubled since 1930/31. The foreign trade of the **Japanese mandatory islands** is carried on almost exclusively with Japan, which is a good customer for the products of the islands and is in a position to supply all their requirements. The most important suppliers and customers of Samoa are New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom. Since the War Germany has supplied practically no goods.

* * *

The above short review of the **commercial relations between Germany and her colonies** again shows clearly and unequivocally what has been proved before, namely that **the principle of the "open door"**, i. e. participation especially in import trade, **has been maintained**, it is true, for the mandatory Powers but **not for Germany**. The figures of trade statistics show that the great colonial empires obtain their raw materials as a matter of course from the colonies, and they also demonstrate how much more easily they find a market for the products of their industry through their influence and the requirements of the administration.

The statement made by **The Economist** on November 16th, 1935, applies not only to England: **"Trade to some extent follows the flag**, even without compulsion. A colony administered and brought up by the English will always give the preference to British goods. Contracts for public works in the colonies will naturally go to the mother country."

* * *

All proposals put forward as a substitute for the transfer, or, more correctly, the re-transfer, of the German colonies under foreign mandate to Germany, do not touch on the **main point of the German raw material problem**. The German lack of raw materials is not caused by the lack of raw materials in the world, or by the refusal of the colonial Powers to sell them, but by the **lack of sufficient foreign means of payment** in order to pay for the raw materials obtained from abroad. "It would be idle and unconstructive merely to state that colonial raw materials are at the free disposal of all who can pay for them, when it is clear on the other hand that certain countries for various reasons do not possess the necessary means of payment. Even within national tariff and currency areas raw materials must naturally be paid for. But purchases outside such areas, unless there is a certain system of barter, must be paid for in foreign currency, which can only be obtained by the export of goods or services, by drawing on foreign credit or by the transfer of gold or securities. So long as there are obstacles to international trade which do not exist for the home trade, it will always be easier to purchase raw materials within one's own currency area, although the importance of this factor can be easily overestimated."

With regard to this **view expressed in the inquiry of the Royal Institute of International Affairs**, we would add that it is not correct to state that it is indifferent whether products come from one's own colonies or from foreign countries, since they must be paid for at the world market price. It is not at all the same, for what the mother country imports from its own colonies is paid for in its own currency. The payment is made by the supply of goods to the colonies, of which the mother country will always deliver a considerable part, supplemented under certain circumstances by receipts from capital investments made by the mother country in the colonies. Everything takes place in the currency of the mother country. There can be no transfer difficulties, since no transfer in foreign currency is required. There is no doubt that Germany's transfer difficulties would be removed to the extent that she could import raw materials from her own colonies. For payment would be made in German currency and would be compensated by the delivery of industrial commodities to the colonies and by services.

The German raw material problem, which finds expression in the foreign exchange account, **cannot be solved except by the supply of raw materials in the German currency sphere**. How is Germany to buy raw materials under the system of the "open door", when she requires foreign exchange for the purpose? And how can the principle of the "open door" make it possible to export German products for an additional value of several hundred million Reichsmarks a year to the tropical raw material territories? As Germany is willing to take up colonial work in tropical territories, she may point out at the same time that by this work the foreign exchange position of the Reich would be alleviated and it would be possible to transfer the foreign debts which must be present be held over. The greater the possibility for Germany to obtain raw materials from the colonies by her own work and her own goods, the greater will be the saving of foreign exchange which will thus be set free for the transfer of the debts. The colonial commercial policy should also be regarded from these wider interests of the States concerned.

When it is stated in reply to this that Germany could adjust the deficit with the colonies in the greater economic possibilities of the mother countries, such as England and France, with which she has a favourable balance of trade, this is poor consolation. For the incapacity of Germany to transfer debts and to establish a proper balance of payments shows that this method of adjustment is inadequate.

In any case, if Germany—as she must do—regards the question of raw materials as a vital question, no one has a right to reject the German demands unless he is prepared to indicate other solutions. Up to the present, however, no opponent of Germany's colonial claims has been able to state or to show how Germany's production of raw materials can be guaranteed except by the future development of her own resources.

Neither the numerous previous attempts nor the Geneva negotiations based on Sir Samuel Hoare's proposal of September 1935 have hitherto shown the faintest sign of a solution, but have intentionally or unintentionally served the purpose of indefinitely postponing such a solution.

The Geneva Raw Materials Negotiations

For the past seventeen years the problem of raw materials and their distribution has been on the agenda of the League Assemblies and Council which have hitherto vainly tried to find a solution. Whenever international commissions have made an inquiry, they have either found before the end of their investigations that the position on the world market has again changed or the deliberations have been broken off because the proposals brought forward have been in many ways defeated by the selfishness of the possessors of such materials. The records were then buried in the archives of the Secretariat.

Fire was first opened by the Italians in March, 1919, during the Peace Conference. A special raw materials committee discussed the matter for a long time without any practical result, and the Supreme Economic Council and other committees were unable in 1919 and 1920 to make any other recommendations than a reduction of customs barriers. On October 25th, 1920, again on Italian initiative, the League of Nations decided to take positive steps. But, as usual, a high-sounding resolution was the result, and the entire question remained in abeyance until the International Economic Conference in the year 1927. The agreement reached on that occasion on November 8th regarding the abolition of prohibitive import and export duties and restrictions, however, never received the necessary number of accessions to bring it into force. An agreement was, however, concluded in 1928. It related to access to the raw materials — hides, skins and bones. In 1929, the question of raw materials was again brought before the Assembly by Italy, but again without success. The extent of the failure of the 1933 Conference for which such elaborate preparations were made is still within the memory of all.

Italy then decided to solve the question on her own account by the conquest of Abyssinia. This then led to the famous proposal which Sir Samuel Hoare made on September 11th, 1935, during the Sixteenth Assembly of the League of Nations and which was again taken up a year later, on September 25th, 1936, at the Seventeenth Assembly by his successor Mr. Eden and described as ripe for discussion. On October 10th it was decided to create a Committee and the Council of the League was instructed to appoint and convene it. This took place on March 8th, 1937. The members taking part were representatives of Great Britain, Japan, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, the United States, South Africa, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Belgium.

A basis for the discussion had been prepared by the Secretariat in a memorandum which, after a short historical account of the previous action of the League, gave lists of raw materials of essential and secondary importance and a list of the percentage of production of the colonial Powers, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and also of the United States and the U. S. S. R. This list clearly shows the **poverty of Germany in raw materials**. Lastly, the memorandum gave an **analysis of the proposals and suggestions** contained in public statements and investigations since 1935.

1. The surest and most effective remedy for the dangerous position brought about by inequality in the distribution of, and access to, raw materials would be a revival of commercial exchanges through the abolition of the obstacles at present placed in the way of the international circulation of goods.

2. The establishment of an effective Open Door régime in all colonial territories.

3. The transformation of the colonies into mandated territories or the transfer of colonial administration to an international authority.

4. The international organisation of the distribution of the world's raw materials with control over such materials.

5. The conclusion of international agreements under which the distribution of raw materials would be secured through reciprocal exchanges of goods or services or the conclusion of general international agreements under which all countries would enjoy equality of treatment in all markets — or at least in all colonial markets — as regards both the sale of their own goods and the purchase of local goods.

6. The general adoption of the practice of certain cartels to admit consumers' representatives to a seat on the controlling body.

7. The formation of chartered companies to organise and develop colonial territories administered by other States; the creation of an International Bank for carrying out large-scale financial plans in order to guarantee to certain States free access to raw materials; the formation of a Mines and Forest Trust administered by the League of Nations, with the twofold object of guaranteeing joint control and free circulation of raw materials, and also their conservation.

This memorandum had a curious fate. Some delegates thought it dealt with the question onesidedly, i. e. too favourably for the countries which complained of the irregular and unjust distribution of raw materials. It was therefore regarded not as a basis but merely as information for the negotiations. No copies were given to the press and M. Avenol, the Secretary General, moreover stated in his opening speech that it did not reproduce the view of the Secretariat, which had "no view to express". Lastly the public were excluded from the discussions and the press was consoled by communiqués which were to keep them informed of the proceedings. In order not to commit the Governments, it was decided from the outset that the members of the Committee were acting merely on their own behalf (*à titre privé*) in order, it was said, that they might express their opinions "in complete freedom". All the speakers then introduced their remarks by stating that they would not speak on behalf of their Governments and would not represent their countries.

We have reported on page 103 how the **British representative, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross**, complied with the request for a free exchange of views.

* * *

It is worth while to study this speech. The wording is admirable, though more for English ears than for a international body, not to speak of those who are poor in raw materials. We will not contest Sir Frederick's opinion that the world production of raw materials is sufficient for actual requirements; he no doubt wishes to imply that speculation played no small part in the rise in prices of raw materials. But the question at Geneva is — or at any rate should be — not whether the world produces too much or too little raw material, but whether the sources of raw materials in the world are reasonably distributed.

When Sir Frederick goes on to add that the British Government is prepared to increase certain raw materials in certain of its colonies, even if they were required by foreign consumers, this statement has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. But it is more to the point when he adds that the British Government cannot go beyond this.

For the subject under discussions is: In what manner can industrial countries which have difficulty in working and are short of foreign exchange and raw materials have access, without special expenditure of foreign exchange, to the raw materials which they require in order to give

employment to their workers and contribute to the general prosperity of the world? To this there is only one reply: colonies. Sir Frederick is clever enough to admit that the supply of raw materials from one's own colonies offers certain advantages; otherwise he would lay himself open too easily to the question as to why, in that case, England is so interested in maintaining her own colonies and mandates. But he adds that in some cases Great Britain pays higher prices for certain raw materials from the colonies than on the world market. Obviously he is thinking exclusively of Pounds Sterling. If England did not count on the excess prices (in Pounds) paid to the colonies being indirectly of political and economic advantage to the Empire, London would certainly not pay these excess prices. Why should not the countries which are short of raw materials and which are referred to, with a mixture of condescension and pride, as the "have-nots", also use such arguments? For them, for instance for Germany, under present circumstances the account is paid not in Pounds, but for instance in Reichsmarks and foreign exchange—foreign exchange which is to a great extent lacking because the imports of German goods are prevented.

Against this argument, the principle of the open door has again been put forward; but Leith-Ross only recognises this idea very conditionally—and we also think it scarcely offers real guarantees—and demands "counter-services" from the purchasers of raw materials; he then proceeds to attack the import restrictions and the policy of certain countries that are short of raw materials. Germany was not expressly mentioned in this connection, nor was any other country, but everyone at Geneva observed that these remarks were aimed at Germany. As if she did not concentrate her imports so laboriously in particular in order to be able to pay properly for the necessary imports of raw materials.

It is not quite clear why Sir Frederick, at the end of his speech, found it necessary to enter into the question of artificial raw materials. That Germany was again meant is clear from the fact that the speaker used the expression "Ersatzstoffe" which, since the desperate exertions of the War, has been included in the dictionary of the nations with a distinct German flavour. For Germany, in view of the achievements of German science and technique, these artificial raw materials long ago became national materials with good qualities for exchange against old materials and with new qualities of economic and technical progress. These remarks by the British expert were, however, somewhat imprudent. For England in particular produces synthetic fuel on a great scale (some 100,000 tons) and cellulose wool (10% of the world production), not to speak of artificial silk. England ranks third in the world as a producer of artificial press materials to the United States and Germany. England goes in a good deal for "Ersatz". This fact leads to the question as to why Sir Frederick calls these synthetic materials a greater burden on the national economy than the purchase of natural products: because in these arguments he is constantly thinking in Pounds Sterling.

For if England really pays more than the world market price for her colonial products, it is logical that Germany should at any cost promote her artificial materials; for she calculates in Reichsmarks. The meaning of the German colonial claim is to be able to operate in Reichsmarks, since Germany cannot find a sufficient guarantee in a foreign exchange agreement corresponding to her capacity in manufactured goods.

The British press regarded Sir Frederick's speech as a definitive refusal of the German colonial claim. The speaker endeavoured, however, very skilfully to avoid the real subject, i. e. again to evade any real decisions.

That the representative of South Africa should agree with his British colleague is entirely natural.

The only clear statement was made by the representative of Japan, who threw into the scale the weight of a popula-

tion of a hundred millions crowded into a very narrow space. Japan demands the suppression of all attempts to form raw material monopolies, freedom of emigration for the nationals of all countries to territories that are still undeveloped, and freedom of trade which should not be separated from the question of the distribution of raw materials.

The Polish representative also raised the demographic problem of the 34 million inhabitants of Poland with its annual increase of 450,000. He attached special importance to the consideration of financial and currency questions and the question of colonial raw materials.

It was reserved for Mr. Rosenblum, the representative of the Soviet Union, to make a definite attack on the countries which "though they have no money to pay their debts, have money to build guns in order to unleash the next war". Russia's only interest is the organisation of peace. It is a very great and a very rich country that does not claim any territory in other countries, does not demand the exploitation of foreign territories and asks for no special advantages in the access to raw materials. It has of course everything, voilà tout.

After a number of other speeches had been made (the French representative had not put in an appearance), the Chairman of the Committee noted that the Committee was agreed that all questions relating to a redistribution or a transfer of colonial territories were not within its competence. On March 12th, the discussion was concluded with the appointment of three sub-committees, one for the collection of statistics on the production, imports and geographical distribution of industrial and food raw materials, and the other two for examining complaints and difficulties arising out of the supply, purchase and payment of raw materials.

The Committee had, however, the courage to state that, in view of its restricted terms of reference, it could not say whether it was in a position to make suitable proposals for solving the question.

Germany and Italy did not take part in the discussions. They were continued in June.

It can hardly be said that the start was very promising.

* * *

What hopes and expectations may be coupled with the work of the League of Nations in connection with the problem of raw materials? Prof. Dr. Ludwig von Mises gives the following reply to this question in the June number, Vol. III, No. 1, of the "New Commonwealth Quarterly," London, Constable & Co.:

In the political sphere the League of Nations has completely failed in its present form of organisation. There is no point in deceiving oneself in this matter or, for the sake of misplaced courtesy, hesitating to speak the truth against the persons responsible. The League Secretariat, it is true, continues to work, the statesmen still come to Geneva for meetings of the Assembly, the Council and Committees, but the great political negotiations are carried on at the side. The League of Nations deals with questions which, however important they may be, in themselves, are of minor importance compared with the main task allotted to it. The Secretariat publishes interesting statistical records, which could, however, be prepared equally well by an international organisation of statistical offices.

But now the League is again faced with a task which is in line with its duty of ensuring the peace of the world. Leading statesmen have publicly mentioned abuses which cause them to describe the present political order of the world as unsatisfactory. They have described the "unequal distribution" of raw materials as a serious disadvantage for their people. While affirming their love of peace, they have stated that there is nothing they desire more than that their complaint may be settled in a peaceful manner. These statements have made a deep impression on the public opinion of the whole world. In the face of such a state of affairs, the League of Nations must

South Sea



The Phosphate Island Nauru


The Nauru Mandate

"Whether it was desirable that the Mandate should be conferred upon the States which owned the monopoly, and whether periodical transfer of administrative responsibility, is in strict accord with the spirit of the Covenant are perhaps, open to question."

From the lecture delivered by Lord Lugard to the Dominion and Colonial Department of the Royal Society of Arts in London on June, 2nd, 1924. See Journal of the Royal Society, Vol. LXXII, No. 3737.

"A journey through the mandated territory of New Guinea leaves a terrible picture of the desolation of a land that was once so flourishing. Great amounts will be necessary to bring everything to the level attained by the Germans."

Sydney Daily Telegraph, of December 12th, 1921



Workers' hospital in Stephansort



Pre-war native school at Malifa (Samoa)



Plantation with storehouse in New Guinea



German officials' houses in Namanula

Islands

"The plantations on Samoa are in a bad condition, and if no steps are taken some of our finest plantations will be lost. It is now obvious what a great mistake it was to expel all the German inhabitants."

Daily Mail 1921, in a report from Brisbane

"The German planters were deprived of their property and driven out with refined cruelty. The plantations were handed over to returned soldiers who were lacking in all experience."

In Stead's Review of Reviews,
Melbourne, July 27th, 1921



View of Apia (Samoa)



Business street in Rabaul

"No better proof of the thoroughness of German colonising methods can be given than the settlement of Rabaul, the seat of the Government and the capital of German New Guinea. German New Guinea has undoubtedly a great future. It had the best possible start in the German spirit of enterprise, German capacity for development and general commercial thoroughness. If Australia continues this energetic policy, German New Guinea must become one of the most flourishing islands of all the groups of islands in the Pacific."

Thos. J. McMahon in the Far Eastern Review,
June 1921



Pharmacy, Native Polyclinic and Womens' Hospital in Rabaul

"The hygienic measures of the German Government in Rabaul and elsewhere are being continued by the new authorities. They are characteristic of the 'thoroughness' for which the Germans and especially German science are justly famous. The two German doctors in Rabaul, both men of great knowledge, look after not only the European hospital but also a comfortable and well equipped native hospital outside the town on the road to Herbertshöhe. They are also responsible for the other natives living near Rabaul and visit the various centres to carry out small-pox vaccination, medical attendance and

supervision. The conditions created by the Germans in Herbertshöhe and Friedrich-Wilhelms-Hafen are similar though on a smaller scale, and one of my pleasantest memories is the interesting morning I spent in visiting the native hospital at Herbertshöhe under the friendly guidance of the amiable and capable German doctor who was proud to show everything that was done for the health and well-being of his patients."

E. S. Burnell, in his book "Australia versus Germany"
Chapter XV, published in London 1915 (George Allen
and Unwin Ltd.)

not keep silent. If it did so, then it would really be wiser to do without the League altogether.

It was, moreover, quite indicated that the League should take up the problem of raw materials. It is, however, another question whether the method chosen for its treatment was the best.

The League of Nations must not be a debating club or a statistical seminary. It must not regard it as its duty to compile data from the available statistical information regarding raw materials, to present them in print and then to discuss them. It is natural that the Secretariat must prepare for the discussions of the Committees by providing all available materials. But that has nothing to do with the actual work that has to be done.

What is necessary is a **discussion for and against** the complaints raised. This discussion should take place in the full light of publicity. No word spoken about these matters in the League of Nations should be concealed from the world. A properly organised press service should see that the discussions are known everywhere by the press and broadcasting. It is quite incomprehensible why the press representatives are kept out of the meetings of the Committees. What secrets are there in this sphere, which should not be made public?

It is not only representatives of the Governments who should be allowed to speak before and in the Committee. Of more importance than the Government representatives, whose freedom of action is hindered by their diplomatic task, are the free experts who should be brought in without regard to their nationality.

In general, the importance of the question of personality should not be under-estimated. The League work should not result merely in the production of a further mass of League documents which will be buried in archives and libraries. It must move the world; it must be effective. But it can only do this by the strength of the personalities who find expression in it.

It cannot be denied that such a procedure would make a break with the former diplomatic and bureaucratic tradition of the League. But the League of Nations was not intended by its creators to be an official department or a fortress of diplomatic sophistry or unwieldy treatment of business. It was intended to replace the antiquated methods of secret diplomacy by a procedure more in accordance with democratic demands.

That it has not fulfilled these expectations is one of the reasons for its failure. It is an intolerable position that there is more interest to-day in everything except what goes on in the spacious rooms of the Palais des Nations, and that scant attention is paid to the utterances in the meetings of the League of Nations. All States are arming feverishly, all statesmen are on the move in order to secure for their country the best possible position in the new war that threatens. The League of Nations can only do one thing: it must openly discuss the materials of conflict. It must show them to the world in their true form, and must raise the question: how is it possible that a war can do any good?

The League of Nations must not be content to be an official department which regards it as its most important duty to give as little offence as possible to the Governments of the fifty or more Member States. It must endeavour to become a moral instance which is taken seriously by the world. Its committees, which have more freedom than the Assembly and Council, which consist of official Government representatives, must be a sort of world parliament. Here the differences must not be hushed up by fine speeches; here the struggle between the nations must be openly settled in spirit with the greatest passion and with the full use of all available arguments. It must not be regarded as the duty of the committees to puzzle out draft international agreements which either mean so little that it is useless to ratify them or that they never get as far as ratification. Under present circumstances the League of Nations has the sole possibility of exercising a moral effect by furnishing information. Only narrow-minded bureaucrats will regard the moral successes that could be accomplished as less important than the accurate drafting of documents which only come to the knowledge of bureaucrats and diplomats.

The importance of what is taking place in the Raw Materials Committee of the League of Nations should not, therefore, be under-estimated. Here the League of Nations has an opportunity—perhaps for the last time—of playing a decisive part in world policy. Here the League may show whether it is in a position to take part in the appeasement of the world. The reform of the League cannot start with a change in the provisions of the Covenant. Deeds, not paragraphs, are decisive. As an office at the side of a thousand other offices, as a debating forum at the side of a thousand other debating societies, as a publisher of writings at the side of a thousand other publishers, it is truly superfluous.

C. The British Standpoint on the Colonial and Raw Material Question

I. The raising of the problem by Sir Samuel Hoare at Geneva

Extract from the Speech by Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Secretary, at the Sixteenth Session of the League Assembly on September 11th, 1935

It is not enough to insist collectively that war shall not occur or that war, if it occurs, shall be brought to an end. Something must also be done to remove the causes from which war is apt to arise. Some other means than the recourse to arms must be found for adjusting the natural play of international forces. I do not underrate the delicacy of the task. Not every demand for change deserves to be listened to. Too often the artificial excitement of national feeling is made the excuse for the repudiation of an obligation or for a threat of force. **Yet the world is not static, and changes will from time to time have to be made. The Covenant itself admits this possibility.** But such changes will have to be made when they are really necessary and when the time is ripe, and not before; they will have to come about by consent and not by dictation, by agreement and not by unilateral action, by peaceful means and not by war or threat of war. The members of the League must address themselves to this as well as to other aspects of security if the rule of law in international affairs is to be established and confirmed.

I have now tried to describe the aims of the League and the conditions in which the League is actually working. I have tried to describe once again the British attitude towards the League.

I have spoken in particular of the sincerity of our ideals. The sincerity springs, I admit, from enlightened self-interest, but it springs also from an enlightened interest in what we believe to be best for all. Let me illustrate what I mean by enlightened self-interest, and I will choose as my illustration a question that is exercising the minds of many people and many Governments.

I will take as an example the problem of the world's economic resources and the possibility of making better use of them in the future. Abundant supplies of raw materials appear to give peculiar advantage to the countries possessing them. It is easy to exaggerate the decisive character of such an advantage, for there are countries which, having little or no natural abundance, have yet made themselves prosperous and powerful by industry and trade. Yet the fact remains that some countries, either in their native soil or in their colonial territories, do possess what appear to be preponderant advantages; and that others, less favoured, view the situation with anxiety. Especially as regards colonial raw materials, it is not unnatural that such a state of

affairs should give rise to fear lest exclusive monopolies be set up at the expense of those countries that do not possess colonial empires. It is clear that in the view of many this is a real problem. And we should be foolish to ignore it. It may be that it is exaggerated. It may be also that it is exploited for other purposes. None the less as the question is causing discontent and anxiety the wise course is to investigate it, to see what the proposals are for dealing with it, to see what is the real scope of the trouble, and if the trouble is substantial to try to remove it.

The view of his Majesty's Government is that the problem is economic rather than political and territorial. It is the fear of monopoly—of the withholding of essential colonial raw materials that is causing alarm. It is the desire for a guarantee that the distribution of raw materials will not be unfairly impeded that is stimulating the demand for further inquiry. So far as his Majesty's Government is concerned, I feel sure that we should be ready to take our share in an investigation of these matters.

The Government that I represent will, I know, be prepared to take their share in any collective attempt to deal in a fair and effective way with a problem that is certainly troubling many people at present and may trouble them even more in the future. Obviously, however, such an inquiry needs calm and dispassionate consideration, and calm and dispassionate consideration is impossible in an atmosphere of war and threatenings of war.

Extract from Mr. Eden's maiden speech in the House of Commons, February 24th, 1936

I must make it clear that his Majesty's Government have in no way withdrawn from the proposal of my right hon. friend the member for Chelsea (Sir Samuel Hoare) on this subject. They are perfectly willing at any time to enter into an examination of this subject, and they think that such an examination could usefully be held at Geneva. The appropriate moment, however, for such an examination must clearly depend on many factors, including the attitude of other Powers towards the proposals. **Useful though we believe such an examination would be, I think that the House would be mistaken if it were to imagine that from a pursuit of it we should discover some magic touchstone for all our ills.** Clearly it is not so. The international situation is much more complex than that, but this problem may be an element in our difficulties, and therefore I repeat that his Majesty's Government are willing at any time to enter into an examination in an attempt to remove it.

II. Extracts from the Parliamentary Debates

House of Commons May 3rd, 1935

Sir John Simon.—Apart from the objection that the Covenant was in Herr Hitler's view tied up with the treaty of Versailles, this further objection was very strongly insisted on. Japan, it was said, had left the League and yet she still had the administration of a former German colony. If Germany was to be regarded as not fit to administer any colony where was the equality? And to that, as he and Mr. Eden pointed out, we surely had a good answer which reasonable men should consider. **The distribution of mandates was not a question for any individual member of the League. The distribution of mandates was a question for the League itself.**

Sir A. Chamberlain.—No; certainly not.

Sir J. Simon agreed that it was not originally.

Sir A. Chamberlain.—Surely this is very important. If my right hon. friend's words stood unqualified as he has spoken them, it would give rise to a wholly false impression and indicate a new

departure on the part of the Government. **The mandates were allotted by the Powers at Versailles. The territories mandated were placed under the guardianship of the League. It has never been held or pretended that it was within the power of the League to transfer a mandate from one country to another.**

Sir J. Simon said that he was very much obliged. He did not think, although he was sorry that he should have stated his point not quite accurately, that he conveyed any false impression, for his right hon. friend and himself made it perfectly plain that the transfer of mandates was not a discussable question; and they left the German Chancellor under no misapprehension as to their position in the matter. He was led to make an inaccurate observation—he was glad to be corrected—because it appeared to him that this view that Germany was in a position of inferiority in this matter was a contention which, having regard to the structure of which we wanted Germany to form part, surely could not be maintained.

House of Commons, December 12th, 1935

Colonel Wedgwood asked the Prime Minister whether he could give an assurance that neither Tanganyika nor any other British colony would be transferred from British sovereignty, save with the consent of all classes, creeds, and races, within the territory primarily affected.

Mr. Baldwin.—The right hon. gentleman can hardly expect me to give such a categorical assurance in reply to such a purely hypothetical question. I can, however, assure the right hon. member that no British territory and no territory under British protection or mandate would be transferred from British sovereignty or authority without the fullest regard being had to the interests of all sections of the population in the territory concerned.

Colonel Wedgwood.—Does that apply to the Protectorates of South Africa?

Mr. Baldwin.—I think the answer is entirely comprehensive.

House of Commons, February 6th, 1936

Mr. Lansbury called attention to the question of peace and of the need for a new world conference to consider the supply of raw materials and the provision of markets; and moved:

That this house affirms its profound belief in the futility of war, views with grave concern the world-wide preparations for war, and is of opinion that, through the League of Nations, his Majesty's Government should make an immediate effort for the summoning of a new international conference to deal with the economic factors which are responsible, such as the necessity for access to raw materials and to markets and for the migration of peoples, with a view to arriving at an international agreement which will remove from the nations the incentive to pile up armaments and establish the peace of the world on a sure foundation.

Dr. Salter seconded the motion. He said that we were witnessing to-day in Europe and Asia events and movements among people similar to those which in the past had altered the destiny of the world. The fundamental cause and the urge which had produced those movements were operating to-day. Was there any actual justice in the claims of Japan, Italy, and Germany that they were unable to live because they could not get either food or raw material, while other nations had a super-abundance? He found from Sir Thomas Holland's book on the mineral sanction that out of a long and formidable list of commodities absolutely necessary for the full life of the modern State there were 25 essentials, none of which could be dispensed with. In the possession of these first prerequisites of modern life the British Empire had a predominating and overwhelming position. Out of the 25 essentials the Empire had adequate supplies in the case of 18, some supplies in the case of two, and none at all in the case of five. Japan had adequate supplies of three only of these essentials, some supplies of five, and of 17 none at all. Germany had adequate supplies of four, some of two, and of 19 none at all. Italy had adequate supplies of four and of 21 none at all.

If those facts were even approximately correct it meant that there was a group of nations that might legitimately describe themselves as the "have-nots" of the world. It could not be expected in these times that virile, enterprising, and spirited nations like those were likely to sit down quietly and accept the situation, to be restricted in self-development, and to be deprived of the actual necessities of modern civilized life, while many of their people were actually semi-starving.

We had to ask why it was that we possessed a sufficiency of these things. There could be only one answer, and that was, of course, because we were first in the field in seizing, often with brutal violence, territories that were delectable and exploitable. It was only human nature that the "have-nots" should endeavour to obtain some of the possessions of the "haves", and that the "have-nots" would combine among themselves to get some of these necessities of modern life.

A new war was certain unless there was a radical change in the economic policy of the Western nations, and particularly Great Britain. There must be a voluntary reorganization of the world. Coupled with that there must be some agreement as to the restoration, or partial restoration, of the free movement of populations which existed 30 or 40 years ago. Our present policy was, "What we have we hold". In view of the world's needs that seemed to him to be a policy of selfish greed. He believed that there was no necessity for such a clash as he had referred to, but he felt

sure that time was pressing and a settlement could not be postponed indefinitely.

Mr. Lloyd George did not believe they would have peace in the world until they reconsidered mandates. Belgium with a population of 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 had got the best part of German East Africa. She had got the whole of the Congo. Portugal, with a small population, had got millions of square miles. Holland was in the same position.

Sir A. Chamberlain said that those were not mandated territories.

Mr. Lloyd George said that those countries had got tropical territory, and here they had got Germany with none and Italy with practically none. He did not believe they would make peace in the world until they met all the nations in a friendly spirit and said that the British Empire was prepared to reconsider the question of the mandates. He would plead with the Government first of all to consider whether the time had not come—and whether it ought not to be soon—when all the nations of the earth should be summoned together.

Mr. Amery said that surely Mr. Lloyd George knew that unless there was some measure of agreement as to what they meant to do at a conference before it was summoned it was doomed to futility. They saw the futility of the international conference of 1933. What hope was there, if they convened a conference to-day, of any of the powers concerned coming to the conference prepared to surrender any of their territory? What was the good of summoning a conference like that? Germany had a colonial Empire before the War, and it only played a very small part in her economic life. It only took a minute handful of settlers. Having lost it in a war which she herself provoked, why should she have a prior claim?

Referring to the mandated territories, he said that the essence of the mandate was our obligation and trust to the peoples concerned in those territories. Would it be better fulfilled by handing them over to Germany or any other Power that wished for a larger economic field? Why could not the countries faced with the economic difficulties enter into some economical arrangements with the great markets of Central Europe for mutual trade and mutual preference and thus follow among European countries the good example which the nations of the British Empire set to the world at Ottawa?

Sir H. Page Croft said that any Government that gave the impression that this country had become so weak-kneed as to offer to give back the mandated territories, or even all the Colonies, to the Mandate of the League of Nations would be kicked from power by an infuriated people. To talk about satisfying Germany's population and economic needs by handing over part of East Africa was no solution of the problem, for he did not believe that in the next 10 years the whole of tropical and semi-tropical Africa could absorb more than 100,000 white settlers. He did not think it was wise to tell this country or the world that these problems could be solved by any idea that the raw materials of the British Empire were going to be made more accessible. Let them consider that if they liked but do not let them raise false hopes. Nor was there any mandated territory where the British Empire was at present allowed to exercise its influence—except Palestine—where there was any hope of another country being able to solve its economic or population problems. Was it suggested that Palestine should be handed over to Germany? Nor did he think it was wise to consider for one moment the handing over, without their consent, of native populations at present under British rule to a foreign flag or any combination of flags. He believed that if a poll was taken of the natives in any country under the British flag they would express an almost unanimous desire to remain under the rule of the gracious Sovereign who have given them freedom, liberty, and justice such as they had never had before.

Viscount Cranborne. Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.—The third proposition in the motion was that, through the League of Nations, his Majesty's Government should make an immediate effort for the summoning of a new international conference to deal with economic factors. So far as the general aim was concerned the Government had no quarrel with the wording of the motion. But these question were not easy; they were exceedingly complex.

Could any of us say that the time was quite ripe for a new world economic conference? We had one in 1933, and that conference was not a success. It was a failure because the world was not

ready for it. Could we honestly say that it was prepared for it at this moment—"immediately", in the words of the motion? He did not think so. If there was any failure it would not only be unfortunate, it would be disastrous. The time for the next step to be taken could not be fixed here and now this evening, it must depend on circumstances.

The Government were not shirking this issue. They all wished to arrive at international agreement which would remove from the nations the incentive to pile up armaments and establish the peace of the world on a sure foundation.

House of Commons, February 12th, 1936

Sir H. Page Croft asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he would give an assurance that his Majesty's Government had not considered, and was not considering, the handing over of any of the British Colonies, either under mandate or otherwise, to a foreign Power, and that they were not prepared to make British Colonies the subject of barter in any world conference.

Mr. Mander also had a question on the same subject.

Mr. Thomas.—No, Sir, his Majesty's Government has not considered, and is not considering, the handing over of any of the British Colonies or territories held under mandate.

Mr. Sandys.—Does the right hon. gentleman's statement refer equally to British Protectorates?

Mr. Thomas.—My answer covers the whole question of Colonies, Mandated Territories, and Protectorates.

House of Lords, March 25th, 1936

Lord Arnold called attention to the problem of Dominion and Colonial raw materials and also to the need, in view of the effects of the Ottawa Conference Agreements, for a return to freer trade in the fiscal arrangements of the British Empire, particularly having regard to the claims for economic expansion of Germany, Japan, and Italy.

The noble lord said that the British Empire owned about one-quarter of the world's wheat, one-half of the world's wool, more than half of the world's rubber, one-quarter of the world's coal, nearly one-third of the world's copper, about 94 per cent. of the world's nickel, and so on.

In these circumstances, it was not surprising that there was unrest in Germany, Japan, and Italy. It was true that Great Britain was probably the most peace-loving country in the world; that was because she had got all that she wanted. The central difficulty of the three nations was the same; they wanted freer access to markets abroad for the sale of their manufactured goods.

The question arose whether the problem of raw materials, vital as it was, was at the root of the trouble. The three dissatisfied nations had no difficulty in obtaining what they wanted of British Empire raw materials if they could pay for them. That meant if they could have bigger exports. Owing to tariffs and so forth it had become increasingly difficult for the three dissatisfied nations to sell sufficient goods abroad.

The system of preferences within the British Empire should be done away with, and the British Empire should go back to the policy of throwing its markets open on equal terms with its own nationals to all the countries of the world. Such a policy would do a great deal to remove from the minds of Germany, Japan, and Italy a sense of exclusion and grievance. The Ottawa Agreements had greatly increased the preferences for British goods entering the Dominions and Colonies.

It was said by supporters of the Ottawa policy that trade between Great Britain and the Dominions and Colonies had increased since 1932. Of course, it had increased, but the increase of Imperial trade had been achieved at the cost of foreign trade. But in general the increase in Imperial trade had been disappointing, and the policy had made for discord rather than harmony in the Empire. The dissatisfied foreign Powers saw the trade in which they might have had a share being diverted from them by the Ottawa policy, and if we were in their position we should feel as they felt. The British Government should not only urge that the Ottawa policy be reserved, and it would have the help of the Canadian Government. The adoption of the policy of reversal by Great Britain and the British Empire would be a real contribution to the alleviation of a serious, not to say menacing, situation.

Lord Lugard said that he did not share Lord Arnold's views on free trade in so far as the British Empire and the British Dominions in their own home markets were concerned, but he

strongly supported the noble lord's appeal for a reversal to the policy of the open door in the non-self governing Colonies and protectorates. The trouble appeared to lie in the alleged difficulty in selling in the local markets. Germany had dissipated her credits in the foreign exchange markets by unprecedented expenditure on armaments. Italy and Japan had similarly been engaged in heavy war expenditure. Thus it was not surprising that there was little left for ordinary commercial expenditure.

The problem before them was how they could share the advantages enjoyed by the British Empire without compromising their pledges to the inhabitants, black and white. In British West Africa and Somaliland practically prohibitive quotas had been established against certain Japanese imports. Germany's contention was that she was unable to obtain the raw materials she required because she could not sell her goods in the local markets and thus obtain local currencies.

It seemed reasonable that the vendor of imported goods should purchase produce of the country into which the imports went, and that a proviso of this kind would not in any way contravene the principle of equal opportunity. To remove effectively any suspicion of monopoly and to share as far as possible the economic advantages the policy adopted should be on the lines of equal commercial opportunity as imposed by the African mandates.

Lord Redesdale said that he was one of those who considered it high time that some arrangement should be made whereby Germany should have some of her colonial territory restored to her. We harboured no hatred towards Germany; where such hatred existed it was bred of fear. Why should we take any part in the desire which apparently existed in Europe at the present time for the encirclement of Germany? For some reason which he had never been able to understand, we appeared to have taken our instructions in these matters from abroad. The general treatment of Germany did not appear to him to bear the stamp of British. Why could we not say to the other Powers that if they wanted to go on nagging at Germany they must do it alone?

There had been a tremendous amount of anti-Nazi propaganda going on in this country, some of it of a very doubtful character, and all of it bore the appearance of importation.

Whatever might be said against certain details of this administration, it was certain that Herr Hitler saved Germany from going Red, and for this, if for nothing else, he deserved the deepest gratitude not only of Germany or of Europe, but of the whole civilized world. In three years he had raised the people of Germany from absolute, black despair and restored to them their self-respect. Could anyone doubt his sincerity or his desire, expressed over and over again, to live in peace with his neighbours? He wanted to see this country take some step on its own account with reference to the restoration of colonial territory to Germany.

International conferences were too much like an auction. At such conferences Germany would certainly have to ask for more and take less than she deserved. Why could not we do something generous and big, and so create the sort of understanding which should exist, between two great nations?

Lord Noel Buxton said that the significance of Sir Samuel Hoare's utterance at Geneva last September had not been fully grasped by the public. None of them could have foretold that the Colonial question would then be raised, and anyone not in the highest authority who had raised it would have aroused strong resentment at doing so. Sir Samuel Hoare had forced the question into the front rank, and since he had done so he had repeated his case and led to a flood of debate on the subject and consequently to quite a revolution in public thought.

Why did Sir Samuel Hoare spring this surprise on the world? It could hardly have been his mere sense of the degree of injustice. Some more urgent cause must be sought for this surprising fact. Sir Samuel Hoare must have seen, as many men saw in the Colonial situation, elements of great danger and apparently the necessity not to defer its discussion any longer.

It was dangerous to let the situation drift. Even before the war the desire for colonies on grounds of prestige was keenly felt, and it was undoubtedly one of the causes of unrest that led to the war. Something more than return to freer trade was required, because it was part of the case of the dissatisfied Powers that they had no assurance of a continuance of access to the markets of the British Empire, and the best security of that kind would be extension of the mandate system. Such extension to the tropical colonies

now in our possession would secure the open door that was the main genuine need of the dissatisfied Powers.

Acceptance by us of the mandate system for British colonies in Africa need not be regarded as a derogation of dignity, because we had always boasted that we were trustees of those lands for the natives and for the rest of the world. We must be ready to revise many of the ideas which we had long held.

The **Earl of Plymouth, Under-Secretary for the Colonies**, said that it was definitely the policy of the Government to do what they could to lower the barriers which were hindering world trade, and to do anything in reason to try to increase the flow of international trade throughout the world. The policy of the Government, however, must take into account the fact that the conditions in which the theory of free trade could be converted into practice did not exist at present. It was unthinkable that we should now adopt a policy of free trade unilaterally, or even that we should take any steps which would considerably lower the protective duties which we had to adopt as a result of the policy of other countries.

The **Ottawa Agreements** were not an intensification of protection, but rather a modification in the direction of freer trade over a very wide area. He did not agree that the abrogation of the Ottawa Agreements would result in freer trade. In the great majority of the African colonies, the position was controlled by certain treaties by which this country was bound. In all these territories Germany and Italy enjoyed exactly the same economic opportunity as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and there was no discrimination whatever.

The economic policy of the Dominions was, of course, a matter for the Dominion Governments. He could see no reason why, if the Ottawa Agreements were abrogated, those Empire countries which lost their preference would be likely to reduce their general tariff to non-Empire countries. The view of the Government definitely was that the Ottawa Agreements were not a step away from free trade, but a distinct step towards it, over a very large field—freer trade within the Empire.

The Government had hoped that a further step would be taken at the World Economic Conference in 1933. Unfortunately, their hopes were not fulfilled, but the Government were still anxious that the next step should be taken as soon as there was a reasonable prospect of success. It seemed to be somewhat doubtful whether at present there was such a prospect.

In his speech in the House of Commons last Friday, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs mentioned a proposal that a world conference should be held to consider, among other questions, the economic relations between the different nations. Clearly, that could not be brought about with any prospect of success unless the other Powers were willing and ready to come in and discuss those questions. His Majesty's Government were only too willing to cooperate with other nations to see what was possible to bring about a more satisfactory economic state of affairs throughout the world, but it was not possible for them, in the present circumstances, to take any unilateral action in regard to the matter which would have any useful result.

He did not think that Germany, Italy, and Japan would be satisfied by a return to freer trade. What they wanted was not equal trade, but, to all intents and purposes, exclusive opportunities over certain defined areas. Of the restrictions which had been placed on the trade of Germany and Italy it was fair to say that the majority were the result of their own deliberate policy. It had nothing to do with the Ottawa Agreements, nor anything else that this country had done or could do in the future.

The main difficulty facing these countries was that of obtaining foreign currency in sufficient quantities to cover their requirements of raw material. Germany, and Japan, and Italy could have all the raw materials they wanted from our Colonies on the same terms as our own friends—they should be prepared to pay for them. The fundamental necessity was to solve the difficulties of exchange and currency throughout the world, and that could not be done by abrogation of the Ottawa Agreements or by any action we could take by ourselves at the present moment.

It was unthinkable that we could withdraw the Ottawa Agreements; they did not stand in the way of freer world trade. The Government were ready to discuss way and means to that end when other countries showed any disposition to do so. The Government were prepared at the same time to discuss the availability of raw materials.

House of Commons, April 7th, 1936

Mr. Sandys asked the Prime Minister whether the declaration made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on February 12th, to the effect that his Majesty's Government had not considered and were not considering the handing over of British mandated territories to any other Power still represented the policy of his Majesty's Government.

Mr. Baldwin.—There has been no change in the attitude of his Majesty's Government in this matter.

Mr. Sandys.—In view of the existing anxiety, can the right hon. gentleman give us an assurance that this will continue to be the policy of the Government?

Mr. Baldwin.—I have answered the question on the paper; I have nothing more to say.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd asked if the right hon. gentlemen's attention had been called to a statement in the Press concerning a speech reported to have been made by the Under-Secretary (Lord Stanley) showing quite another point of view.

Mr. Baldwin said he saw many statements in the Press. He noticed one in the Daily Mail this morning, but the one he had just made was authoritative.

Mr. Churchill.—There was one more evil consequence which had arisen out of the policy which the Government had pursued. Sir S. Hoare, in his memorable speech at Geneva, made a declaration about raw materials which, though carefully guarded, did in fact bring up the whole colonial question. **Where did we stand on the question of the return of the mandated colonies to Germany? The House ought to know.** What were the principles by which the Government would be guiding in dealing with this matter in the future? The statements of Ministers were very conflicting. The Colonial Secretary made what seemed to him and many of his friends a very satisfactory statement in the context, in which it was uttered. But the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs was reported in the Press as having said, that on this matter he had an open mind. The late Minister without Portfolio (Lord E. Percy) in a speech said, that we must alter our conceptions of the British Empire and be prepared to make considerable concessions.

What did all that mean? What was the conviction of his Majesty's Government? Had they an open mind upon the future? Were they waiting to see who pushed the hardest? He asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to give them a plain answer. Did he, or did he not, accept the view put forward the other day by Sir A. Chamberlain that there should be no question of handing over even mandated territories to Germany while race persecution was rife in that country?

Was it not a fact, also, that we could not in any case hand over these territories to Germany but only to the League of Nations, which alone could decide upon their future destiny? The Government must have a view, and they were bound to declare it to us.

We did not want to have another muddle about our colonies—similar to that into which we had been led about Abyssinia. We did not want to excite all sorts of hopes, and in this case arouse all kinds of appetites, and then, when it came to this issue, refuse point-blank to do anything effective. He hoped that they would be told that Sir A. Chamberlain rightly interpreted the view of the Government on this question.

Mr. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, said:—In the first place, let me point out that there is a clear distinction between colonies and mandated territories. So far as I know no one has ever asked or suggested that the British Empire should give up any of its colonies, and I need hardly say that if such a demand were made, it could not possibly be entertained for a moment. **Mandated territories are not colonies.**

I think perhaps there is some confusion as to the way in which these mandated territories were allocated in the first instance and as to the manner in which it would be possible to alter the present arrangement. The mandated territories—the territories formerly belonging to enemy Powers—were allocated to the principal allied and associated Powers who voluntarily undertook a mandate from the League. By one of the articles of the Covenant they are bound to render a report from time to time to the League as to their administration of these mandated territories.

So far as I have been able to make out, it was not contemplated at the time that these mandates were allocated that there ever

would be any change in these mandates. There is no provision made for the transfer of a mandated territory from the original mandatory Power to any other Power. **I believe it may be taken that in order to effect a transfer, there will be at least required the assent of the mandatory Power, the Power to whom the territory was to be transferred, and finally the assent of the Council of the League of Nations.**

The position of the Government of this country on this subject has already been made clear by the Colonial Secretary in answer to a question, when he said:

His Majesty's Government have not considered and are not considering the handing over of any of the British Colonies or Territories held under mandate.

As to what might happen in the future I think it would be unreasonable to ask me to attempt to pledge, even if I could do so, the action of future Governments, but I will say this, at any rate, the mandates are not held by this country alone. I cannot conceive that any Government would even discuss the question of the transfer of its own mandates quite irrespective of what was to happen to the mandates held by other countries. I would say in addition that we do recognize that we have definite obligations to the people who inhabit these territories and that we would not think of surrendering those obligations or handing those territories over to any other Power, even for the sake of obtaining that general peaceful settlement which all of us so much desire unless we were satisfied that the interests of all sections of the populations inhabiting those territories were fully safeguarded.

House of Commons, April 27th, 1936

Mr. A. Williams asked the Prime Minister whether, in order to prevent the development of an agitation inimical to the interests of peace, he would make a declaration that his Majesty's Government would not at any time consent to a transfer of the mandated territories.

Mr. Baldwin.—As there may be some misapprehension as to the conditions under which mandates are held and the circumstances in which their transfer could take place, I should like to make a short statement on the subject.

The mandated territories were allocated at the end of the War by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The mandatories thus chosen accepted mandates from the League of Nations and undertook the specific obligations contained in Article 22 of the League Covenant and in the mandates themselves. These include the primary obligation to promote to the utmost the moral and material welfare and social progress of the inhabitants of the territories themselves.

There are no provisions, either in the Covenant or in the peace treaties or in the mandates relating to the transfer of a mandate from one Power to another Power, and no such transfer has ever been made. **I am advised that before any such transfer could be effected it would be necessary that the consent, at any rate, of the present Mandatory Power and the Power to whom the territory was to be transferred, and also the unanimous consent of the League Council, should be secured.**

I hope that what I have said will make it clear to hon. members that the question of the transfer of a mandate is one which, were it to be contemplated, would require the most careful consideration and which would be subjected to a procedure of a very elaborate nature. It is not a matter which could in any circumstances be the subject of a sudden and hasty decision.

As regards the policy of his Majesty's Government, I repeat once more in the most categorical terms that we have not considered and are not considering the transfer of any mandated territories to any other Power. I think that a great deal of the apprehension which hon. members claim exists on this subject must be due to a belief that his Majesty's Government have already been considering such a possibility, notwithstanding the denials which have been given, and that the House might at some stage be faced with a decision on the subject. This apprehension is unfounded. Hon. members may rest assured that his Majesty's Government have no intention whatever of raising the question themselves and that, in the event of any question arising regarding the future status of mandated territories, they would not commit themselves to any settlement of the problems at issue without giving the fullest opportunity for discussion in the House.

Mr. Thorne asked whether the inhabitants of mandated territories had any voice in the matter.

Mr. Baldwin said a completely reassuring reply had been given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies of that point. It was obvious that if a question of transfer ever did arise that would be a primary consideration.

Mr. Thurtle.—Is it not a fact that when the mandates were originally given to the Powers concerned the people in the respective territories were not consulted at all?

Mr. Baldwin.—I do not think that anybody was consulted at that time.

Miss Wilkinson.—May we take it that there is nothing in that reply which would preclude this country from taking part in any international conference called for the rearrangement of mandated territories if such was felt necessary for the maintenance of world peace?

Mr. Baldwin.—I would rather not enter at this moment into any very hypothetical questions.

House of Commons, July 9th, 1936

Mr. de Rothschild.—There was another question which was occupying the public mind at present, and that was the future of the mandated territories. He hoped that the Government through the Secretary for the Colonies was keeping in touch with the views of the natives on the important matter of the administration of the mandates and of the claims which had been put forward for the return of certain mandated territories to other Powers. The German claims had not been officially formulated as yet, but there was no doubt that they had been formulated already by Herr Hitler and some of his Ministers, and there could be no doubt that in some form or another they would shortly be put forward in a manner which would require the consideration of the Colonial Office.

If this question were considered apart from the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants it would be contrary to our duty as a mandatory Power and contrary to the system under which the mandates had been set up. We could not divest ourselves at will of the mandate clauses of the Treaty. There was only one case as yet where we had surrendered a mandate, and that was the case of Iraq. Native interests must, of course, be paramount both in regard to questions of present administration of the mandates and any question of transfer or return of mandated territories to another Power.

He could not imagine that natives would care to exchange British for Nazi rule, or that they would care to be ruled by German governors who would share Herr Hitler's view that the black man should always be subordinated to the white man. That theory was absolutely contrary to the mandatory system, which aimed at bringing native peoples gradually to share in their own government. He hoped that the Colonial Secretary would inform himself about native feeling in this matter, and would bring his influence to bear in those circles which would barter these mandates in order to buy off some foreign Power which threatened European peace. It would, however, be to the advantage of the native peoples if the technical branches of the mandate administration were opened to men of non-British nationality, so as to admit non-British doctors, architects, and bacteriologists.

Our colonial policy might well have justified some of the claims for colonies which were advanced on economic grounds. Since Ottawa we had sought deliberately to make colonial markets into a preserve for British trade, and this policy hampered other nations in the purchase of raw material. Had the fiscal policy of Ottawa been to the advantage of the Colonies themselves? The interest of the Colonies was to produce and sell as much as they could, and Great Britain could not supply a market for the whole of colonial produce. **The effect of the restriction had been a reduction of the standard of life of the natives.**

A result of the restrictions was that other nations were making themselves as independent as they could of colonial raw materials. They were manufacturing synthetic products, huge vested interests in these were springing up, and the demand for the produce of the Colonies was being reduced. The Colonies had everything to gain from the most free trade possible. It was suggested recently that the Government should take steps to denounce the Congo Basin Treaty. He hoped that no such departure was contemplated.

Earl Winterton said that it was quite incorrect to say that Germany was deprived of raw material by the fiscal policy of the British Empire. She could get all she wanted. He agreed that there should be the fullest consultation with the inhabitants

German Plantations

"Germany was well on the way towards making Togoland a model colony."

Bonnecarrère,
French State Commissioner in Togoland (1920)

"We have endeavoured to equip Tanganyika with a government not inferior to the German administration which it had replaced . . . I am afraid that for a year or two the state of this Tanganyika Territory will compare unfavourably with its progress and prosperity when it was in the hands of our late opponents."

The British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill,
at the British Imperial Conference on July 22nd, 1921



Coffee Plantation at Usambara (German East Africa)



Tea Plantation of the Kibwele Company in Mufindi
(German East Africa. German post-war settlement)



Caracul sheep herd
at the house dam of the
Voigtland Farm
(South West Africa)



Coffee preparation plant of the Coffee Plantation „Kifumbu“
near Moshi (East Africa)



Coffee selection tables with separate electric drive
(Coffee Plantation „Kifumbu“)

and Farms

"The mere fact that propaganda is still going on in Germany makes it absolutely incumbent upon us to give that vast territory which in area is larger than Nigeria, and contains a population just over 4,000,000 at least as good and complete an administration as was given by the Germans in that country before the War."

Mr. Ormsby-Gore, British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, on July 25th, 1923, in the House of Commons; Official Report, Parliamentary Debates, p. 509



Dwelling of a German planter in the Cameroons

"As a whole they are (German plantations) wonderful examples of industry, based on solid scientific knowledge."

From the official British Report on the British Sphere of the Cameroons; Parliamentary Papers, May 1922, page 12




Administrative and residential building of a plantation in Bibundi at the foot of the Cameroon mountain



Coffee Plantation in the mountain landscape of Nkongsamba (Cameroons)



German Kapok Plantation in the Kiroka Valley (German East Africa)



Cocoa seed beds of the German Togo Company in Tafie

Dépêche Coloniale of Oktober 6th, 1916:

„Through the prosperity of Togoland, the Cameroons, East Africa, and even the small German territories in the Pacific, finally also Kiaochow, the Germans were near to occupying the highest rank among the Colonial Powers. They had sown thousands of millions in the African soil.“



German Sisal Plantation
in German East Africa



German Sisal Plantation
in German East Africa

Seat of administration
of the West African
Plantation Co. Victoria,
W. A.P. V. (Cameroons)



German Coconut Plantation
in German East Africa



Transport Equipment through
a Banana Plantation in the
Cameroons belonging to the
African Fruit Co., Hamburg



L'Economiste Français, August 4th, 1923:

„The work of our predecessors must be neither belittled nor over-praised. On the credit side must be placed the methodical study of all the possibilities of the country and the endeavour to use them for the requirements of the fatherland, and also a well thought out organisation in which every cog wheel was in its prescribed place and produced the maximum achievement, and in addition far-sightedness and the ambition to do great things.



Fruit and Vegetable plantation at Tschensema in Westuluguru



Wood reafforested in the German period in the Bunduki basin (Westuluguru, East Africa)



German Farm in Usambara near Wuga (German East Africa)

Coffee and Tea Plantation in German East Africa

German Farm in Swakoptal (South West Africa)



of mandated territories not only before discussing surrendering a mandate but even altering the terms of a mandate.

Mr. D. O. Evans said that he regarded the open-door policy not so much from the point of view of free trade and protection as from that of the relations between this country and other Powers. It was no use shutting our eyes to the fact that foreign countries which were highly industrialized, like Germany, recognized this powerful weapon of restriction of exports from the Colonies to foreign countries which the British Government had in their hands and might at any time use against these countries. The power was there to restrict the export of raw materials and to impose prohibitive tariffs, and the Germans and others knew it and it had an important psychological affect on their minds. This was a matter of grave importance in view of the unsettled state of the world to-day.

Mr. M. Jones.—Our function became one of trusteeship and must be characterized by a genuine endeavour to assist the indigenous people of these areas to equip themselves for the ultimate task of self-government. **It was inconsistent with the concept of trusteeship to administer the estate for the primary benefit of ourselves or our own kin and colour who might happen to reside in these areas.**

The policy of the open door should be our main objective as between our administration of these areas and countries outside the Empire. One of our first tasks was to give these people ample opportunities to educate themselves for the task before them. **The British Government were rather open to the charge, generally speaking, throughout our Colonies of neglecting the provision of educational facilities.** The amount of money we spent on education of the natives was comparatively small, and it was not true to argue that these people would not respond to the provision of educational facilities.

House of Commons, July 16th, 1936

Captain McEwen asked the Prime Minister whether his Majesty's Government in their consultations with the South African Minister of Defence, during his recent visit to this country, officially discussed the question of Germany's claim to territories in Africa; and whether they gave him any reason to believe that the putting forward of such claims would be sympathetically entertained by his Majesty's Government.

Mr. Baldwin.—My answer to the latter part of the question, is in the negative.

House of Commons, July 28th, 1936

Mr. Eden.—Many questions have been addressed to the Government on their attitude in respect of the transference of territories at present held by them under mandates. A subject which has of late grown up, as it were, alongside this question is whether any arrangements are necessary or desirable for giving foreign countries freer access to such raw materials as are produced in the mandated territories and in the Colonies.

This is a matter which has frequently been raised in debate by hon. members in all parts of the House, and the Government fully realize its importance. They are alive to the interest which is displayed in many quarters in these matters, and are fully prepared, and will be glad, to discuss the subject at some international conference under the auspices of the League of Nations. At such a conference they would, for their part, be entirely ready to discuss such problems as wider guarantees for access to Colonial raw materials and obstacles in the path of such access. The approach to this matter might well be made, in our view, at the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly in September.

Having expressed that view, which I hope will command general acceptance, I return to the question of whether an actual transfer of territory held by them under mandate is contemplated by the Government. Let me make it clear that this question is one which affects, of course, all mandatory Powers, the United Kingdom, the Dominions Governments, and foreign Governments.

The Government have not had any consultation with them upon it, but so far as his Majesty's Government are concerned, **the question of any transfer of mandated territories would inevitably raise grave difficulties, moral, political, and legal, of which his Majesty's Government, must frankly say that they have been unable to find any solution.** His Majesty's Government, therefore, hope, with so many other international questions still unsolved, but with new opportunity of advance towards their settlement having been

afforded during the last few days, there will in no quarter be the desire at this time to introduce further cause of serious differences between the nations.

House of Commons, August 1st, 1936

Mr. Amery.—Many hon. members had been mystified and alarmed by answers given in the House, by the evasive character of the replies given, and by the underlying assumption, that the Government might be inclined to yield to the German demand for territory which many years ago was hers. **There was no difference between the position of a Mandated territory and a Protectorate.** There was nothing in the mandates that gave any member of the League except the member controlling the territory, and least of all Germany, who was not even a member of the League, any say in the disposition of these territories. **We were there by indefeasible right, and for all time.**

Mr. Price.—What Mr. Amery said about the relative legal position of Crown Colonies and Mandated Territories seemed to have rather a one-way mind. He did not seem to realize how important was the role of the League in the mandatory system. We received the territories of the Tanganyika and German South-West Africa from the League to administer on behalf of the League.

Mr. Amery.—We did not receive them from the League but from the other Allied and Associated Powers to which Germany surrendered.

Mr. Sandys said that there was nothing in the constitution of the League or in the mandatory code which gave to the League any power to interfere with the disposition of the mandated territories. The Government should make a declaration that the transfer of mandates was not a discussable question. There was anxiety throughout the Empire about this matter.

Viscount Cranborne said that Mr. Amery and other hon. gentlemen, who had spoken of the question of the mandates, had put forward very important considerations which, of course, we must all bear in mind. But, while recognizing that, he hoped they would understand if he did not add anything to what had already been said. The Foreign Secretary made a statement on this subject in the debate last Monday, and, what was more, he made it perfectly clear in the speech in which he wound up the debate that it had been a most carefully considered statement by the Government. The right hon. gentleman then said that he could not possibly amplify it, and certainly it would be improper in view of that for the Under-Secretary to try to do so. He (Lord Cranborne) would only say that he would recommend Mr. Amery, Mr. Sandys, an other to read the Foreign Secretary's last words, in which he said, "I would only ask hon. members to read it carefully, and then I think they will appreciate that that statement is as definite as the Government could possibly make it in existing circumstances".

Mr. Sandys.—All we are asking is, that the Government should make their statement to-day as clear as the statements which they were able to make in years gone by. I cannot accept the suggestion by the Foreign Secretary that it is impossible for the Government to make this statement. What we want is to know if any change has taken place. If the position has changed, then, at any rate, we shall know that our fears are justified. We cannot accept that a direct, clear answer has been given which an ordinary person can understand.

House of Commons, December 18th, 1936

Mr. Mander asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether, in view of the continued German campaign for the return of her former colonies, he would make it clear beyond misunderstanding that the satisfaction of legitimate German claims, in so far as Great Britain is concerned could not be satisfied on that basis in view of our obligations as trustees for the native races in these territories?

Mr. Eden.—I would refer the hon. member to the statement which I made on this subject 27th July, to which I have nothing to add.

House of Commons, February 4th, 1937

Mr. Mander asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he would state what action the Government proposed to take with reference to the German demand for colonies, as reiterated in Herr Hitler's speech on Saturday: and whether he would make it clear

that this matter, whether dealt with by extension of the mandate system or otherwise, could only be considered as part of a general settlement, in which Germany would return to the League of Nations and cooperate in the collective system and that the paramount consideration, in any event, must be welfare of the natives.

Mr. Eden.—I would refer the hon. member to the answer which I gave him on December 18th last, to which I have nothing to add.

House of Commons, February 16th, 1937

Mr. V. Adams asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, to dispel ill-founded German expectancy, he would state in unmistakable terms that his Majesty's Government could not contemplate the cession to Nazi Germany of any territory whatsoever under British political control.

Viscount Cranborne.—As has been previously stated, his Majesty's Government have not considered and are not considering such a transfer.

Mr. V. Adams.—Have discussions, in fact, been proceeded?

Viscount Cranborne.—It is inherent in my answer that no discussions are proceeding.

Commander Locker-Lampson asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he could now announce the result of the negotiations between his representative and Herr von Ribbentrop; and whether he would undertake, that no return of colonies or offer of oversea commercial opportunities were made without debate in the House.

Viscount Cranborne.—As regards the first part of the question, my hon. and gallant friend is under a misapprehension. The recent conversation between the Lord Privy Seal and the German Ambassador was in no sense a negotiation but merely an exchange of views on a number of topics of interest to the two Governments, such as takes place in the ordinary course of events from time to time. As regards the second part, I would refer my hon. and gallant friend to the concluding words of the reply given by the Prime Minister to Mr. H. G. Williams on April 27th last.

House of Lords, February 17th, 1937

Lord Noel-Buxton moved:—

That this House, realizing the dangers that may arise in applying to Colonial possessions a policy which excludes other States from participation on equal terms in the advantages of Colonial development and trade, calls upon his Majesty's Government to consult with the Governments of the Dominions and of other Colonial Powers with a view to the application of the mandate system in suitable cases to British and other Colonies, and to the revision of the Convention of St. Germain (1919) in accordance with the fifteenth Article of that Convention, in such a way as to extend its operation.

The noble lord said that a Government which believed in the League of Nations must find many points of agreement with the motion. The policy of extended mandation was part of the attempt to secure peace, and without it the attempt was not complete. If we kept the Colonies as a close preserve we were heading for war, and if there were no other grounds for extended mandation this was a common-sense ground for it.

It was true that the German claim at the moment was the claim for the return of her Colonies, but the need of markets was an important part of the German claim. Herr von Ribbentrop, speaking in London two months ago, dwelt on what he called a reasonable solution, meaning wider markets. The dissatisfied Powers said that they could not buy as freely as they wished, and the satisfied Powers replied that markets were open, but the dissatisfied Powers had a reason for their inability to buy in the fact that they could not sell freely and get currency with which to buy. They could not solve the German economic crisis by Colonial changes alone, but Colonial trade was a large factor in the German situation. It was not enough to say that Germany had only herself to blame and must get herself out of the mess.

Good will was an essential factor in preserving peace, but good will was tempered by economic injustice, and to monopolize trade conflicted with modern ideas. To impose duties and preferences on Colonial trade for the benefit of the governing State, and to treat Colonies as private possessions, conflicted with a true sense of international order. The policy of mandation offered an advantage to the unsatisfied Powers while it did not represent a special concession to Germany, since it affected the world. He was not proposing any change in the mandate system nor unilateral action, and he was not proposing to transfer any territory.

Africa was the main colonial field, a field of unlimited development in the future. German industry and science were needed in Africa. Germany should be brought back into the African colonial system. Her real need would be largely met by extending mandation and extending the Congo Conventional basin.

Lord Lugard moved:—

To leave out the words "the mandate system in suitable cases to British and other Colonies, and" and to insert the following words: "this policy, and if need be."

The noble lord said that the effect of the amendment would be to eliminate the proposal to place certain Colonies under a mandate system while supporting the principle of equal participation in economic advantages. The words which he suggested should be omitted would not only be ineffective but positively harmful to the cause they all had at heart. Recent events had taught us that in giving a lead we should have some reasonable hope of finding a follower. Germany would appreciate the right of commercial equality.

If the proposed consultation with other Powers about the adoption of the open door should prove unfruitful, it would still be open to his Majesty's Government to give a lead by adopting it as the British policy.

The sovereignty of a Colonial Power over its Colonies was to some extent impaired if its administrative acts were placed under international supervision. He did not think that the British people were prepared to surrender their sovereignty over their Colonies, and he felt certain that France and other Colonial Powers were not willing to do so. It was essential that there should be a clear understanding of the meaning of the term "equal commercial opportunities." The term would denote every kind of advantage and facility enjoyed by the nationals of the sovereign States, but it would necessarily exclude such rights as were essential for administrative purposes. There would be a necessity for an arbitral authority, under the auspices of the League, to investigate any complaints of infringement, and this might be entrusted to the Mandates Commission or to some smaller body. The adoption of such a régime should be a real benefit to countries like Germany and Poland, which needed access to raw materials, and it was not asking more than could reasonably be asked of the Colonial Powers. The placing of Colonies under mandate was not in any way essential to the main object of the motion, and he hoped that Lord Noel-Buxton would accept the amendment.

Lord Arnold said that the Ottawa Agreements, which were a clear violation of the principle of equal trading, had aroused great anxiety among the "have-not" Powers particularly Germany, Italy, and Japan. British statesmen had many virtues but they did not excel in the virtue of seeing things from the point of view of other nations. It was not surprising that Germany, Italy, and Japan looked with jealous eyes upon the British Empire and demanded trade facilities. If the motion or the amendment were adopted, the psychological effect on international relations, principally with regard to Germany, would be enormous, and the material loss to Great Britain, if the motion were carried out to the fullest possible extent, would be quite small.

The Marquess of Crewe said that at the back of the whole of this discussion was the German claim for consideration in the matter of oversea possessions. The complete stripping of Germany of her colonial empire by the Treaty of Versailles was a political blunder. It did not follow that it would be possible to restore those possessions to Germany. Had those who were responsible for the treaty thought less of revenge and more of the future of the world it would not have been done. While there could not be anything like a general redistribution it was surely possible that some advance could be made on the economic side in giving to Germany what she evidently had not got—an equal chance of obtaining the primary products of which she stood in need.

The farther the system of the open door could be extended, the better it would be. There were some who would prefer that a system of mutual preferences on the lines of the Ottawa Agreements should be adopted, but in any agreement of that kind there existed the seed of future discontent. The manner in which the British Empire was regarded by foreign countries had been dangerously modified by the adoption of the protective system by this country. When all ports were open and all goods were free, the fact that we possessed by far the largest part of the Colonial Empire, if not applauded, was at any rate condoned. If the Government could assure the House that there was good hope of

getting the Dominions and the Colonial Powers to discuss the extension of the mandate system, with a prospect of success, he would be well content to support the motion. Failing that assurance, the amendment seemed to offer a good way out.

The Earl of Plymouth, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said that any proposal actually to abandon full sovereignty in favour of a mandatory status must evidently present many difficulties in territories which were British territory and whose inhabitants were his Majesty's subjects.

He had the privilege of visiting the West African territories some two years ago, and could bear testimony to the fervent devotion of the inhabitants of those territories to the Crown and the Empire. Any proposal to alter their national status in any way would be very strongly resented. His Majesty's Government would expect great difficulty in inducing the Dominion and foreign Governments to accept the proposals made in the motion. He could not say whether these objections would be the same as those of his Majesty's Government. In any case his Majesty's Government could not even invite other Governments to consider such proposals unless they were themselves convinced that they would be both useful and practicable at the present time.

He assumed that Lord Noel-Buxton's intentions were to demonstrate beyond all question that the Government fully accepted the doctrine of trusteeship as applied to Colonial Dependencies as well as mandated territories and to assist certain foreign countries to expand their trade and so obtain larger quantities of the raw materials they needed. The Government were fully in sympathy with and shared the noble lord's ideals, but they differed from him in their estimate of the value of the proposals he had put forward for attaining those ideals.

The doctrine of trusteeship in regard to colonial dependencies was essentially a British doctrine, and it was not necessary for the Government to take further steps to prove their devotion to this ideal. The position of this country in this matter was fully understood by the Colonial Empire and even by the least advanced native peoples. There were not more cordial messages to his Majesty on his accession than the messages of loyalty and devotion which came from every part of the Colonial Empire.

If the open-door policy were imposed upon the Colonial Empire it would be impossible for all time to give full fiscal autonomy to any Colonial Dependency, and this would be the gravest obstacle to the evolution of self-governing institutions. The proposal was one not only for the complete reorganization of the Colonies, but also for the complete reorganization of the machinery at Geneva for supervising the operation of the mandate.

The principles on which this country governed the Colonial Empire were those of trusteeship, and these proposals must ultimately be judged by whether they would be advantageous to the inhabitants of the Colonies or not. The Government were in full accord with the noble lord's desire to see an increase in international trade. If the policy of the open door in Colonial territories would merely result in such an increase there would undoubtedly be something to be said for it. There were, unfortunately, many reasons why it would be unlikely to do anything of the sort, and it would in present circumstances have some very unfavourable results in certain territories in which it was introduced.

The open-door policy was a permanent restraint imposed from outside upon the Government of the territory concerned. The privilege of giving preference gave a territory the advantage of being able to secure preference in return. The right of discrimination was one which no country desired to use if it could avoid it. The power to discriminate was, however, the only weapon to secure its possession against widespread discrimination obtaining in other countries. While he agreed that the mandatory system had not been an embarrassment to the mandatory Powers, it was clear that it did not necessarily operate to the advantage of the population of the mandated territory in all commercial matters. Under the terms of the existing mandates, the discrimination clause theoretically applied only to members of the League. Consequently, if the system were extended to-morrow to all colonial empires, there was no guarantee that, if the preferential system were abolished, it would not be replaced by another tariff system which would discriminate against Germany, Japan, and other countries which were not members of the League.

It was clear that the abolition of preferences in the colonial empires would not, by itself, do much to solve the payment difficulties experienced by many Powers at the present day, and in particular by Germany. These difficulties were real, but they were

caused essentially by very different considerations from those of trade facilities with colonial territories, and they involved currency questions of great complexity. The question of difficulties of payments would fall within the scope of the Committee on raw materials which was about to meet at Geneva.

It was quite clear that whatever views the noble lord might have regarding the advantage accruing to Germany if his proposals were adopted, the German Government themselves had no illusions on this score. It was clear enough from the public pronouncements of German statesmen and the German Press that there was in Germany no particular desire to see the principle of "equal access" extended throughout the world. What they might be assumed to want on the economic side was some arrangement by which some colonial territory might be included within the German currency area, and, in present circumstances, within the area of the German exchange restrictions. In face of these restrictions the "open door" would become entirely meaningless. For these reasons alone it was difficult to believe either that Lord Noel-Buxton's proposals would be very desirable in themselves, or that they would result in any appreciable lessening of political tension in the world as a whole.

It was quite wrong to suppose that Germany was unable to export goods to the British Colonial Empire. The latest complete figures available were those for 1935, but he thought it would be found that the figures for 1936 were more favourable to Germany than those of the previous year. In 1935, according to the Colonial Blue-books, goods imported from Germany were valued at about £5,600,000 and goods exported to Germany were valued at about £6,400,000. After allowing for the fact that the former figures were c.i.f. and the latter f.o.b., it would be safe to conclude that Germany's unfavourable balance of trade with the Colonial Empire in 1935 did not exceed more than about £1,250,000 to £1,500,000, if, indeed, so large a figure. That was not in any case a very serious figure, but it had to be read in conjunction with the figures relating to the balance of trade between the United Kingdom and Germany.

In 1934 Germany exported goods to the value of £30,600,000 to the United Kingdom, while the United Kingdom domestic exports to Germany were only £14,000,000. In 1935 the figures were £30,000,000 and nearly £19,000,000. In 1936 the figures were nearly £33,000,000 and nearly £19,000,000. It was fair to say that the United Kingdom had nothing to be ashamed of regarding her commercial policy towards Germany, and indeed she was the principal source of Germany's supplies on free exchange for the purchase of raw materials which she required.

In the figures relating to the trade between Germany and individual Colonial Dependencies there could not be found any close relation between the balance of trade and the existence of Imperial preference. The largest individual Colonial export to Germany was cocoa from the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Trinidad to a total value of a little less than £1,400,000. Only just behind came copper from Northern Rhodesia to a value of a little short of £1,150,000, which must be taken with copper pyrites from Cyprus valued at about £50,000. Other large items were palm kernels from Nigeria and Sierra Leone valued at about £900,000, rubber from Ceylon and Malaya valued at about £750,000. No other items were anything like so large, but there were quite substantial quantities of groundnuts, copra, cotton, sisal, and other raw materials. There could therefore be no question that, in spite of the difficulties alleged to exist, the Colonial Empire was a very important customer of Germany and a very important supplier to her of raw materials of all sorts.

It was clear both that Germany was doing a very considerable trade with the British Empire and that she would not be likely to benefit very greatly from any abolition of Imperial preference, or indeed, from any modification of the colonial quota system, though it was true that her powerful barter system of foreign trade might in those circumstances enable her exports to make some progress as compared with those from the United Kingdom.

Turning to the question of the revision of the Convention of St. Germain, the noble lord said that he took the proposal to mean that other territories, over and above those in the Congo Basin, should be placed under a similar regime to that imposed by the Convention of St. Germain, which implied absolutely complete freedom of trade. This was a point which was, however, not one which commended itself to his Majesty's Government. While the gradual freeing of trade was the goal of their policy, his Majesty's Government would not in fact be in favour of such violent

uprooting of established connexions and possible diversion of the course of trade as would be caused by the immediate application of the principle of complete freedom of trade in all colonial territories.

If, on the other hand, Lord Noel-Buxton merely wished to "bring Germany back into the circle of participants in colonial economic opportunity by inviting her to rejoin the "Consortium of Congo Basin Powers", then his desire was to a large extent irrelevant. Germany was, and always had been, except for the immediate post-war period, treated within the Congo Basin as if she were a party to the Convention of St. Germain. There could therefore be no grievances on her part in that particular respect.

I have said enough (Lord Plymouth continued) to show that on several points we are in agreement with Lord Noel-Buxton. We can see that there would be considerable advantage if a joint and general declaration were made by the colonial Powers expressing their willingness to be guided in the administration of their colonial territories by the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Though this would be unlikely, in the view of his Majesty's Government, to do much of itself to lessen existing tensions, it might still have a certain value, if it formed part of a general political settlement. But for the reasons which I have given his Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to accept either the noble lord's motion or the amendment moved by Lord Lugard.

They believe that a more fruitful line of approach to the solution of the economic difficulties to which the noble lord has referred is to be sought in the deliberations of the Committee on Raw Materials, which will shortly be meeting in Geneva.

Lord Strabolgi said that the Opposition were disappointed that there was nothing constructive in Lord Plymouth's speech except a reference to a Committee meeting in Geneva which the principal complainant refused to attend.

House of Commons, February 19th, 1937

Mr. Garro-Jones said he found himself frankly in opposition to some of his hon. friends. **Mr. Mander repeatedly pestered the Government to give a pledge that in no circumstances would they restore to Germany colonies that were taken from her. He believed that to be a dangerous and untenable attitude. If we were to put ourselves in the position of Germany to-day, with the Polish Corridor, with her minorities and her lack of colonies and economic opportunities—when Great Britain were in Germany's place she would never accept permanent peace until there had been some rectification of that position.**

Mr. Mander said he wished to make his position clear. He agreed that so long as we and other countries retained individual colonies Germany had a legitimate claim; but he would get over that by a development of the Mandates system, placing all colonies under the international control of the League.

M. Garro-Jones said against this policy he had no complaint, but that had not been the burden of Mr. Mander's appeals to the Government that in no circumstances should Germany's Colonies be returned to her.

Mr. McGovern.—Is the hon. member in favour of giving Colonies back to Germany?

Mr. Garro-Jones said that he was in favour of bringing the question before a tribunal of equity and if, as part of a general pacification, Germany was prepared to enter into disarmament on a basis of justice all round and a complete measure of dis-

armament, he would give to Germany such measures of territorial and economic adjustment as an international tribunal of equity might decide upon. If we were going into such a tribunal with our minds made up that in no circumstances would we give this or that nations any concessions then there would be no permanent pacification in the world. We must remove these causes of war, whatever they were. Without that we must go on arming and in the end it would mean a conflagration. He was glad to have had the opportunity of stating this point of view, even though it might cause offence in some quarters.

House of Commons, March 2nd, 1937

Mr. Bellenger said that if the Government were prepared to give a lead with a policy which would have one end only—namely, that of peace, he would support the Government. And he would support a policy of rearmament if that rearmament was to take its place in the collective system of security which was the only safe measure for peace. The Government's foreign policy was a collection of bits and pieces not forming one cohesive whole or complete picture. What was the use of denying Germany her colonies, the demand for which was not made under the Hitler or Nazi regime, but which came from the whole nation. It was impossible for Britain to say that she would for ever deny Germany access to some of those colonies of which we had stripped her.

Sooner or later some of the mandated territories would go back to Germany.

Mr. Emrys-Evans. The surrender of colonies to Germany would be an act of strategic madness, apart from being a political error.

Mr. Grenfell. There were people who said that Germany was unjustly treated after the War. He would say she was stupidly treated, but they had to remember the feelings of all peoples who had stood on their own defence.

What was the reply to the German demand for the return of her colonies, and he would ask if that was all the Germans wanted? If a bargain was struck and Germany was given any or all of her colonies, would she promise not to cause further disturbance to her neighbours? Would Germany give guarantees? What was the British Government prepared to do? After all they could not look forward to these international difficulties with equanimity. What was his Majesty's Government prepared to offer? The step they should take was to invite all the nations to join in a world peace convention now, without waiting, and before war might come upon us like a thief in the night.

Mr. Eden.—The hon. gentleman put to me just now a very fair question on the subject of colonies. I had not intended to mention this subject, but since the question has been asked I think it is desirable that I should answer it, lest there should be any misunderstanding anywhere. A few days ago a question was put by the hon. member for Leeds, W. (Mr. V. Adams), to this effect: Whether to dispel ill-founded German expectancy, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will state in unmistakable terms that his Majesty's Government could not contemplate the cession to Germany of any territory whatsoever under British control. My noble friend (Viscount Cranborne) answered: "As has been previously stated, his Majesty's Government have not considered, and are not considering, such a transfer." That statement of my noble friend remains the policy of his Majesty's Government, and I have nothing whatever to add to that reply.

III. From the Declaration of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross before the Committee for the Study of the Problems of Raw Materials — Geneva, March 8th, 1937

(According to a Communiqué by the Secretariat)

Sir Frederick Leith-Ross said that, in accordance with the Chairman's request, he was ready to open the discussion by giving his own views on the subject. He thought that the memorandum distributed by the Secretariat was interesting and gave a reasonable account of the opinions that had been expressed during recent years on the problem of raw materials. He thought that the memorandum was valuable as information, but should not be regarded as a basis of discussion. He thought that the first thing to do was to define what the Committee meant by raw materials.

In this connection, he pointed out that the list of such materials given in the Secretariat's memorandum was perhaps too restricted. Perhaps the memorandum drew too much attention to colonial raw materials. That was perhaps why foodstuffs had been neglected in the list. He thought that they should be inserted, for they were more important than industrial raw materials. They were not only more indispensable than the others, for no country could do without them, whereas it could more or less do without industrial raw materials, but further, if a country had to purchase foodstuffs

The Opening up of the

At the end of 1913 there were altogether 4176 km. of railways in operation in the former German colonies, including 310 km. in the Cameroons, 327 km. in Togoland, 2104 km. in South West Africa and 1435 km. in East Africa. In addition 300 km. were under construction at that time.



Stores for railway
construction material
at the Windhuk
Station (1906)



The German Tanganyika railway between the Indian Ocean
and the Belgian Congo



Railway Line Luderitzbucht—Aus



Otjihavera Railway
Station with 30 m bridge
(German
South West Africa)

Former German Colonies

According to a reliable calculation of the German Colonial Office, at the end of 1912, 399 business firms with a capital of 506.08 mill. gold Marks were taking part in the economic development of the German colonies. They included 10 banks, 9 shipping companies, 7 railway, traffic and telegraph companies, 47 mining companies, 138 plantations, 109 mixed business (trade and industry), 79 diamond mining companies.



Wire rope railway in Usambara (German East Africa)



Graf-Zech Bridge in the Kame Gorge (Togoland)



Railway Bridge (159,60 m span) near Sanaga (Cameroons)



Railway Bridge near Osona (German South West Africa)

abroad, it would have less money for buying materials necessary for its industry. Sir Frederick thought that they should begin by making a list including, not only foodstuffs, but also materials necessary for the maintenance of animals and likewise industrial raw materials. On the other hand, they should make a statistical investigation of the various materials on the list, especially as regards: (1) world production, world consumption and price movements during recent years; (2) the production and consumption, imports and exports of each of the chief countries concerned and for each of the raw materials.

They must also consider what raw materials were really essential and could not be replaced by substitutes. Also what should be regarded as a single country; and in this respect the position of the British Empire was somewhat peculiar, seeing that the United Kingdom Government had no power over the economic policy of the Dominions. The speaker referred to a study made by the Institute of International Relations showing that no country was completely self-sufficing. **He thought the question could not be settled by any transfer of territory, even if it were decided to transfer whole continents.**

He observed that they had to meet two other apprehensions expressed by certain countries: on the one hand, certain countries feared that they would not be able to obtain sufficient quantities of certain raw materials and, on the other, they were anxious as to their general situation in respect of their imports of raw materials. He considered that each case must be taken separately, for each country and raw material. They must determine whether each raw material was really difficult to obtain and whether certain countries really had difficulties in procuring it. Perhaps special sub-Committees must be set up for each of the materials in question; on these sub-Committees the chief importing and exporting countries would be represented. But generally speaking production of raw materials was at present sufficient for almost all real requirements. But if difficulties were put forward on that subject, they might be considered. As certain of these cases might concern products of certain British colonial dependencies,

it might be well for him to give the view current in his own country. **The United Kingdom Government was always ready to encourage the production within its colonial dependencies of raw materials desired by consumers not only in the British Empire, but even elsewhere. But it would evidently be difficult for his Government to go further.** He referred to the statement made in certain publications to the effect that it would always be an advantage for a country that consumed a raw material to find that product in one of its colonies. He did not deny that there was some truth in this; but he pointed out that, in certain cases in Great Britain, a higher price was paid for colonial produce than the price on the world market. Further, for the opening up of the colonies, large investments of capital had been necessary. If the mother country received certain advantages in exchange, these were rarely obtained without reciprocity.

As regards the policy of the open door which was recommended for all colonies, such a policy might in certain cases be harmful to the development of the colonies and even to the welfare of the natives. He did not think moreover that such a policy could be applied in regard to all countries without reciprocity. Amongst the countries that desired the adoption of the policy of the open door in other States, some themselves practised a policy of restricting the circulation of goods and endeavoured to maintain an artificial level for their currency. The policy of the open door in the colonies must not be considered independently of economic policy in the mother countries.

If certain countries had difficulties in securing certain raw materials, it must also be considered whether this was not due to their own economic and monetary policy, whether it was not owing to an excess of quotas or an unsuitable financial policy that they had placed themselves in an inferior position. Finally, he observed that the production of artificial substitutes involved a heavier burden on national economy than the purchase of natural products, and that the inevitable result was a lowering in the standard of life of the people.

IV. Resolutions, Memoranda and Petitions

The Colonial Problem at the Conference of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Association at Margate October 1st, 1936

Mr. Sandys, moved:—

That this conference urges his Majesty's Government, in order to dispel grave anxieties within the Empire and dangerous hopes abroad, to give an assurance that the declaration made by the then Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, to the German Chancellor in Berlin in March, 1935, to the effect that the cession of any British Mandated Territory was not a discussable question, still represents the unaltered attitude of his Majesty's Government.

The Germans based their demand for colonies, Mr. Sandys said, on the grounds of economic necessity, need for an outlet for their surplus population, need for access to raw materials, and, lastly, currency difficulties. They were certainly not going to find an outlet for their surplus population in semi-tropical African territories. Before the War all the German colonies put together only managed to absorb 20,000 white people. The climatic conditions in those territories were not suitable for large white populations.

With regard to Germany's second argument—the need for access to raw materials—one would think, by the way Germans talked, that we were guilty of cornering colonial produce. The fact was we were at our wits' end to find somebody to buy it. There was no tariff or any other form of discrimination against Germany. She had exactly the same facilities for buying raw materials as we had ourselves.

It might be thought from German speeches that they could not obtain the necessary British currency with which to buy raw materials from the Mandated Territories. That was a myth, like the other arguments. Official figures showed that Germany had a favourable balance of trade. Last year in Tanganyika alone she had a credit balance of £67,000. Far from having currency difficulties, she was actually taking British currency out of the Mandated Territories and spending it elsewhere.

From the economic standpoint the loss to us of the transfer of these territories to Germany would be as insignificant as the gain

to Germany. But from the military and strategic standpoint the danger to us would be immeasurable.

One consideration, which overrode all others, was the interests and the welfare of the inhabitants for whom we had accepted guardianship. Every successive British Government, including the present National Government, had repeatedly given assurances both to the British settlers and to the natives that the protection of the British flag would never be withdrawn. There could be no question of going back on our word.

An amendment was moved by **Captain E. C. Cobb** to leave out all the words after "conference" and insert:—

Recognizes the fact that the mandates allocated to this country were accepted from the League of Nations and cannot be transferred except by the unanimous consent of the League Council as well as the present Mandatory Power. It accepts the clear declaration of the Prime Minister that his Majesty's Government have no intention of raising the question themselves and that, in the event of any question arising regarding the future status of Mandated Territories, they would not commit themselves to any settlement of the problems at issue without giving the fullest opportunity for discussion in the House of Commons.

He said nothing created a more unhelpful attitude than a blank refusal to listen to what the other side had to say. It would be most unfortunate if they were to give the impression that they wished the Government to refuse to listen in any circumstances at any future time. He hoped the conference would agree that the Prime Minister's declaration was sufficiently real and reassuring to justify the delegates in accepting the amendment.

Sir S. Hoare said there had been two very clear statements made on this very difficult question. The first was made by the Prime Minister last April, and the second by the Foreign Secretary at the end of July. The Prime Minister, on April 27th, first of all made clear in the House of Commons the legal position as to

Mandates. He made it clear that the Mandates were originally mandated by the Allied and Associated Powers, and, secondly, that the Mandatories accepted the Mandates from the League of Nations with special obligations under Article 22, and particularly with special obligations for the moral and material welfare of the inhabitants of the territories.

Thirdly, there was in the Covenant no provision at all for the transfer of those Mandates. Fourthly, supposing there was a provision of that kind, even so it would be necessary that the Council of the League, including the Mandatory Power, should be unanimous. Fifthly, the Government had not considered the question of any transfer, either, themselves or with the Dominions; and they had no intention of raising it. Sixthly, the Government had given the definite understanding that they would enter into no commitments without the fullest discussion in the House of Commons.

Since April there had been another statement, equally considered and equally approved by the whole Government, made by the Foreign Secretary at the end of the Session, on July 27th.

That statement supplemented and brought up to date the declaration made by Sir John Simon to the German Chancellor in Berlin in March, 1935.

It was precisely because the situation had developed since March, 1935, that his Majesty's Government felt it necessary to make a further statement on this subject at the end of the last session. In the present delicate international situation, Sir Samuel Hoare continued, he hoped that he would not be expected to elaborate or to add to that statement. The Government were as fully aware as anyone in that hall of the difficulties and the objections to the transfer of Mandates. The passing of the resolution, therefore, could not make them any more cautious than they were already.

On a show of hands the amendment was defeated, and the resolution carried by a large majority.

An Investigation by the Labour Party

An advisory committee of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party has made a study of the Colonial problem, which was published in September 1936 as a pamphlet with the title, "The Demand for Colonial Territories and Equality of Economic Opportunity".

In the first place the pamphlet examines the claims of the "dissatisfied Powers" under the headings of prestige, strategy, and economic considerations, and says that although the first two play some part in the aspirations of dissatisfied Powers towards empire, it is economic beliefs and objects which are the most advertised causes of the desire for the possession or control of colonial territories.

The economic advantages attributed to colonial possessions are:—(1) that they ensure access to raw materials and foodstuffs and that a great Power without colonies cannot hope to make itself industrially self-sufficient; (2) that they afford markets for the products of industry and that the monopoly of colonial territory by a few Powers shuts out others from colonial markets; (3) that they provide a closed field for the export of capital and the exploitation of concessions; (4) that they are of great economic and social advantage to the "upper" classes in Imperialist countries because they provide lucrative and attractive administrative and military jobs and (5) that they are a necessary outlet for surplus population.

Each of these contentions is examined and the committee's conclusions are summarized as follows:—

- (1) Colonies are of some but not of great economic importance.
- (2) The non-possession of them is only really injurious in so far as discriminatory practices are adopted by the "possessors".
- (3) The abolition of discrimination rather than the exchange of territories should consequently be our aim from this point of view.
- (4) This abolition of preferential and discriminating practices will not remedy the dissatisfied Powers' principal economic troubles; the real remedy of those troubles is in their own hands.
- (5) Nevertheless the removal of discrimination, both for its modest economic and its general moral importance, should most emphatically be undertaken.
- (6) Such return to multilateral trade as is possible in present circumstances is desirable not only on general grounds but also because of the great dependence of certain of the so-called dissatisfied Powers upon a multilateral system.

The report suggests that the most effective part which the British Empire could play in averting the threats to world peace

implied in the present strangulation of international trade would be (a) by re-establishing the principle of the "Open Door" and equality of trading opportunity in all the dependencies, and (b) by freeing ourselves from the Ottawa Agreements and working towards the formation of a low tariff group open to all countries on equal terms, subject to the requirements of planned international trade through import and export boards.

The first of these proposals would best be linked up with the mandate system, and the second would have the advantage of avoiding the difficulties which have arisen in connexion with the "Most-favoured-nation" clause, since it would not permit any country to benefit unilaterally from the lowering of barriers within the low tariff group. All countries wishing to benefit would have to give as well as take.

"Such a scheme would, it is true, call (the report continues) for the abandonment not only of the Ottawa Agreements but of the whole principle of Imperial preference. But . . . that from the standpoint of world needs Imperial preference is an anti-social principle, of doubtful advantage even to its supposed beneficiaries, and calculated gravely to prejudice any peaceful solution of the problems now confronting the dissatisfied Powers. . . . A distinction must, however, be made between such agreements and barter agreements made by Colonies themselves, primarily in their own interest, which may in some circumstances be justified by trading conditions."

It is suggested that **guarantees for the uninterrupted supply of raw materials should be given in the form of an international convention.** It is held that little or nothing can be done to meet the demands of dissatisfied Powers with regard to population by means of colonial territories, and that international action should be directed to bringing together idle men, idle land, and idle capital and to transferring people from overcrowded countries to other countries capable of absorbing them and finally to improve world trade.

As to the administration of colonial territories, the report opposes transfers of sovereignty and says:—

"It should never be forgotten that the colonial populations have not only a claim but actually a paramount claim to consideration in any revisional scheme which may vitally affect the conditions of their social development, and that therefore Britain should only be a party to such a scheme if it carries their full and spontaneous consent."

Transfers of territory under present conditions should therefore be resisted, but if it were proposed to transfer what is now colonial territory under mandate to one of the dissatisfied Powers (which would then be answerable to the League of Nations), or similarly to transfer existing mandates as part of a general settlement including disarmament, collective security, and the return of the dissatisfied Powers to a real League, and if the consent of the population were obtained, then the changes should be considered.

"It might perhaps be argued (the report says) that, so long as observance of the terms of a mandate is secured, it matters little, even to the subject peoples concerned, by what country the mandate is administered. But changing the nationality of the mandatory Power may mean changing also the official language of the mandated territory (with all the consequential upheavals in the system of education), changing the wonted principles of administration and the currency, and changing the type of native policy. Such changes might well put back the clock of advance for the indigenous population for a generation."

After discussing rather tentatively the possibility of the administration of colonial territories by an international authority under the League of Nations, the report advocates an **extension of the mandate system.** In the main the territories which should be brought under mandates are those of tropical Africa. The mandates would roughly correspond to the present B class mandates, the key provisions of which are that the well-being of the native peoples should be treated as a primary trust, that the "Open Door" should prevail for members of the League; that there should be no fortifications or military or naval bases; no military training of the natives except for police purposes and the defence of the territory, and that there should be an annual examination of the Permanent Mandates Commission. The report points out that the question of islands and other pieces of territory held specifically for their strategic value (Gibraltar, for example) is not raised by the claims of dissatisfied Powers for colonies.

"The colonial settlement contemplated," it is stated, **"is part and parcel of an international system based upon a real League and real collective security. . . .** In offering to bring her African tropical colonies under the mandate system, provided that such a League system of collective security is accepted and established, Britain should take steps to see that other Imperial Powers were invited to deal with their colonies on similar lines. Even if that invitation were not immediately and universally accepted, Britain should declare that it accepted the mandatory system in principle for all colonies inhabited mainly by peoples of primitive culture and would accept the scrutiny of the Mandates Commission in such cases, if it could be arranged. The offer should also be conditional on an **extensive reform of the mandate system** being carried into effect at the same time."

Some of the suggested reforms of the mandate system are that members of the Mandates Commission should undertake periodic tours of inspection in the mandated territories; that aggrieved parties in the territories should have a right to appear before the Commission; that there should be equality of opportunity for the nationals of all League members to enter the public services of mandated areas; and that mandates should be held in trust from the League and, in the event of a mandatory leaving the League, the mandate should revert to the League.

The report also suggests that an international conference might first discuss the questions of raw materials, access to markets, and migration, leaving the questions of territorial change and the mandate system until later.

The Petition of the "Four Hundred"

A **"National Memorial on Peace and Economic Cooperation,"** conveying a demand for a British initiative in favour of economic appeasement as offering a way of escape from the threat of war, has been addressed to the Prime Minister on February 8th, 1937 by nearly **400 representative persons drawn from many sections of the public life of the country.** The signatories include 35 lord mayors and mayors of the larger cities and towns; 13 Bishops of the Church of England and the leading ministers of other denominations; 35 professors and principals of universities and university colleges; 40 headmasters and headmistresses of public schools; the chairmen or secretaries of 17 national trade unions; and nearly 100 representative business and professional men, writers, publicists, artists, and others.

"There is an increasing public awareness (the memorial states) of the essential link between economic and political appeasement. Much of the tension underlying the general expansion of armaments and the drift towards war has its foundation in economic and industrial conditions, and especially in the breakdown of normal trading relations between the peoples of the world. The general economic crisis has led to a feverish search for economic self-sufficiency—'born in want and fear, and in turn begetting them'—which finds its counterpart in the rapid growth of national armaments and the development of a psychology of conflict which, unchanged, must sooner or later result in war.

"In these circumstances it would seem that there can be no political stability and no agreement to stop the competition in armaments without some substantial movement towards the mitigation of the distress arising out of economic and industrial circumstances. We believe indeed that measures of reconstruction altogether new in scope and magnitude—aiming at the solution of economic problems—offer the best, if not the sole, remaining hope of escape from the gathering threat of war. The moment is both urgent and opportune. The recent agreement, following the devaluation of the French franc, for a stabilization of exchanges between France, the United States, and Great Britain, has given an indication of, and opened the way to, democratic leadership for constructive ends. The victory of President Roosevelt and of his policy in regard to economic relations has underlined the encouragement afforded by United States' participation in the currency agreement—the first important breach in the political and economic isolation which has characterized American policy since the abortive World Conference of 1933.

"The significance for economic cooperation and world peace of the currency agreement must, however, depend on the measure of the freer exchange in real wealth in the shape of goods and services across the frontiers of nations which it secures. Can these wider advantages be achieved unless Britain, as the greatest of all the trading Powers, is prepared to take the lead? For our part we

are confident that in the interests of world peace, in the interests of world economic advance, and in our own interests as a great international trading country, we ought to make an immediate declaration of the part we are prepared to play in a new and determined effort to achieve these ends.

"As far as contemporary economic difficulties are concerned, the remedy is to be found, we believe, along lines of general economic policy rather than in any administrative changes affecting the undeveloped areas of the world. At the same time, we are confident that a decision of the colonial Powers to accept in respect of all their dependent territories, not immediately ready for self-government, the international obligations imposed by a strengthened mandate system, would provide a guarantee of a non-discriminating and cooperative economic policy and, in replacing a purely nationalist control of such areas, would contribute towards a right solution of the colonial problem.

"We suggest, therefore, that at an early opportunity your Government should announce in a communication to all countries, Great Britain's intention:—

(a) to do all in its power to expedite the proposed investigation under the League of Nations into the question of access to raw materials and to take such action as is necessary to carry out the conclusions reached;

(b) to undertake a revision of the Ottawa Agreements, such revision having as its minimum objective the creation of a low-tariff group which all other countries would be invited to join on a reciprocal basis;

(c) to seek simultaneously with any group of nations outside the British Empire, an agreement—which would cover not less than one-third of world trade, including that of the Empire—for the removal of quotas and the lowering of tariffs by a substantial percentage of their present amount;

(d) to return to a policy of the Open Door for trade in all dependent territories under its control;

(e) to present and advocate to other colonial Powers concrete proposals for the general application of a strengthened mandate system under the League of Nations, to all dependent territories not immediately ripe for self-government.

"We commend these proposals to your most urgent consideration and venture to express the belief that the vigorous promotion of them by your Government would enlist the enthusiastic approval of responsible opinion throughout the country."

The Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, on May 22nd, 1937, received a deputation representative of the 400 signatories to the national memorial on the subject of "Peace and economic cooperation" and handed them a statement in reply to the national memorial, which he had had prepared. The statement pointed out that the Government fully shared the view of the signatories of the memorial that the cause of world peace would be promoted by the freer exchange of goods and services across the frontiers of nations. The question of what steps could usefully be taken to promote this policy of the development of international trade was one to which the Government attached the greatest importance. The main obstacle was the existence of the present systems of quota restrictions on industrial goods and exchange controls. It was clear that action in these matters had to be taken by other Governments, since there were no exchange controls in the United Kingdom and the only quota restriction on industrial goods was the flexible duty-quota control of imports of iron and steel which formed part of an industrial agreement with the chief supplying countries. All that the British Government could do was to take every opportunity to urge such action upon the Governments concerned. In this sphere the initiative did not rest with this Government.

As regards tariffs, those which existed had been imposed to prevent the increase of unemployment and to protect the standard of living in this country. In fact, they had not prevented the development of trade. Although when they were first introduced it was essential to rectify the balance of payments by a substantial reduction of imports, since 1933 imports into this country had considerably increased. This would undoubtedly provide a stimulus to international trade generally. The Peace Council suggested that the Government should seek agreement with other nations with a view to creating a low tariff group. Proposals of this kind had frequently been put forward, but in the view of the Government they were open to two fundamental objections. In the first place, the creation of a low tariff group would involve discrimination against non-participating countries and might lead to retaliation

and tariff wars. It would involve the disappearance of the general application of most-favoured-nation treatment, to which the Government attached special importance. The political friction which would be created by reprisals and tariff wars was obvious. In the second place, experience went to show that practical results were not likely to be achieved, except by bilateral negotiations. But the Government did not reject the idea of multilateral negotiations, if it could be shown that the time was opportune. The difficulty was that the circumstances of each country differed so widely that multilateral negotiations were in practice likely to lead to a breakdown.

The policy which the Government had followed in recent years had been to negotiate bilateral agreements, both with British and with foreign countries. These agreements had resulted in the mutual lowering of barriers to trade; moreover, the benefits of the agreed concessions—and this was an important point—had been extended to other countries generally in virtue of the most favoured nation clauses of treaties. The Government had no doubt that their adoption of this policy had greatly contributed to the development of international trade in recent years. There was still much to be done to promote the further development of international trade; but, from the nature of the case, further initiatives in this direction fell to be taken by the countries which had developed their protective systems to a degree greater than we had, particularly by means of quota restrictions on industrial goods and exchange controls.

As regards the League of Nations inquiry into access to raw materials, his Majesty's Government initiated this proposal, they consistently pressed for the inquiry to be expedited, and, in fact, it opened on March 8th. They would give careful and sympathetic consideration to the conclusions of the inquiry.

There remained for consideration the proposals that his Majesty's Government should "return to a policy of the open door for trade in all dependent territories under its control" and they should "present and advocate to other colonial Powers concrete proposals for the general application of a strengthened mandate system under the League of Nations to all dependent territories not immediately ripe for self-government." Both these proposals had been carefully considered by his Majesty's Government in the

United Kingdom, who regarded them as being open to objection. Full and immediate imposition of an open door would impair the authority of Colonial Legislatures and impede their progress towards self-government by limiting their authority in fiscal matters. Further, it would seriously weaken the right of the Colonial Empire to claim preference in the United Kingdom and other Empire countries which, in the absence of equivalent opportunities in other metropolitan markets, was essential to its economic well-being. Conversely, it would prevent the Colonial Empire from taking action in its own economic defence against discrimination by other countries; and, finally, it would, in present circumstances, tend to favour the trade of countries with an exceptionally low level of labour costs, to the disadvantage of the trade of other countries with higher labour standards. The question of economic policy in Colonial areas could not be divorced from the question of economic policy between metropolitan countries, and in present circumstances his Majesty's Government saw no justification for reserving the policy of Imperial preference, which had contributed greatly to the prosperity of the Colonial Empire.

The application of a mandates system to the British Colonial Empire would not be welcomed by the inhabitants of the Dependencies themselves, who were proud of their status as British subjects and would resent being placed in a different category from other members of the British Empire. Moreover, the authority both of Parliament and of the local legislatures over the Colonial Dependencies would to some extent be prejudiced. Finally, so extended a scheme would perforce necessitate the abandonment of the present machinery of a permanent Mandates Commission composed of distinguished experts, and its replacement by a kind of international Colonial Office.

On the other hand, his Majesty's Government would see considerable advantage in a joint and general declaration by the Colonial Powers expressing their willingness to be guided in the administration of their colonial territories by the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League. His Majesty's Government did not disguise from themselves the fact that such a declaration could have only a limited effect in lessening existing tensions; but they considered that it might usefully form part of a general settlement.

V. Important Statements by Private Persons

Letters to The Times

Lord Lugard's Articles in The Times

In his articles, Lord Lugard first replies to the critics who state that Great Britain quite naturally desires peace and the maintenance of the status quo, since she has everything and more than she needs, vast half-empty dominions in the temperate zones, and colonies in all parts of the tropics. The belief that Great Britain possessed vast and empty lands capable of colonisation in the Dominions was incorrect, since the British Parliament had no influence on the immigration policy of the Dominions (including South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) or on the foreign territories and mandates under British control.

He then replies to the statement that the present position of Great Britain in Africa is the result of a "policy of robbery". It was an historical fact that, at the time of the partition of Africa, the British Government adopted a negative attitude towards the acquisition of fresh territory. All opportunities and even requests that Great Britain should assume control over various territories were ignored both in West and East Africa. Decisions of the Cabinet to give up territories such as Uganda and Nyassaland which were already occupied only failed to be carried out on account of the violent resistance of the British people. It was only when the original policy of "peaceful penetration" with a minimum of interference in institutions of the natives failed on account of their maintenance of slavery that the Government went over to "actual occupation" and then to "indirect rule", in which, however, the institutions of the natives were as far as possible protected.

Even during the War, Great Britain declared that she had no intention of acquiring further territory. But when, at the end of the War, the question arose as to what should be done with the former German colonies, and it was decided to place them under mandatory rule, Great Britain felt obliged to claim such mandates.

The tremendous sacrifices of life and money required by the conquest of East Africa are much too little known; with the development of the aeroplane and submarine, the question as to which Power should control these territories became of vital importance for the position in the Indian Ocean and in the neighbouring African territories. It could therefore not be affirmed that the "Peace Conference was dominated by British desire for gain".

In reply to the proposals that the "satisfied" nations should give up some of their possessions to the "hungry" nations, Lord Lugard quotes a remark by the Prince of Wales that "**British subjects are not for sale**". The cession of Jubaland to Italy may find its excuse in the fact that it was the fulfilment of a promise given in the war, which was a war of life or death for England. Moreover this cession did not become generally known among the British public.

Extracts from Lord Lugard's Article in the "Times"

Many proposals have been made as to the share which Great Britain should accept should any sacrifice be demanded in view of the general agreement. The Labour Party desires "the international control of sources of supply of raw materials and the extension of the mandate system for colonial territories." This policy of placing all British Colonies under mandates deserves careful and respectful consideration, the more so since it is supported by the high authority of Sir Arthur Salter, who suggests the enactment of an **international convention enforcing distribution of all raw materials on equal terms in peace or war except to any State declared to be an aggressor**. It is argued that "this would not mean that we hand over our Colonies to other people," but unless the mandates

were assigned to the dissatisfied countries the change would be of little interest to them.

The proposal to transfer British mandates—or even, as others have proposed, some of our Colonies and Protectorates—to a foreign flag, treating the inhabitants as mere chattels, is surely unthinkable since it would involve the breach of pledges repeated by successive Secretaries of State. It would be heart-breaking to the men on the spot to see their work frustrated by the adoption of new policies. The only condition which could be urged as a possible justification for the transfer of a mandate would be the willing consent—or at least the complete indifference—of the large majority of the population, ascertained by full and impartial inquiry by the League, with compensation to non-natives who had sunk capital in the country if their interests were prejudiced. I am sure that the reply to such a proposal in the British Mandated Territories would be an emphatic desire for no change.

Others have suggested that instead of handing over the Colonies, to a foreign flag the Colonial Power should agree to place some of them under the mandate system. We have seen that so far as Great Britain is concerned the principles of that system are already applicable to British Colonies. Such a gesture would not be held by Germany or Italy to be of any particular value to them unless they held the mandate. This would differ little from the proposal already discussed.

A third and more plausible proposal is that some or all of the territories under European control in Africa should be placed under a "Collective Mandate" administered by the League. It can hardly be meant by this rather vague term that a condominium of Power should jointly control a particular colony, for the "native policies" of the different Colonial Powers vary greatly and no device could be more sure of generating friction. It may be assumed therefore that the suggestion is that the League itself should take the place of a national mandatory, and assume "the direct government", primarily with the object of ensuring "economic opportunities to the whole world." Assuming for the moment that such a scheme were practicable so far as the League is concerned—and I hold it to be impracticable—its advocates could only hope that the dissatisfied nations would be appeased if they have a dominant voice in the collective control. In point of fact, the officer appointed as Governor would dictate the policy, and his nation, presumably Germany or Italy, would become de facto mandatory. From the point of view of the African inhabitants, the "collective" would differ little from the individual mandate.

But consider the position as it would affect the League. Each of the Colonial Powers has a Colonial Office of trained and experienced officials dealing from day to day with the many problems of administration. The final decisions rest with a Minister for the Colonies on behalf of the metropolitan Government. The League has no such machinery—and putting aside any question of cost there would be difficulty in creating a board of qualified men of different nationalities who could work together and reside permanently or meet constantly at Geneva or elsewhere. In whom would the final authority be vested to decide in questions on which opinion was divided; and to control the autocratic powers of the Governor?

The nearest approach that the League has made is the Permanent Mandates Commission. But the function of that body is confined to seeing that the terms of the mandate are being carried out. It is purely advisory to the Council and exercises no direct control. It disclaims any authority to advise regarding administration for which the mandatory alone is responsible. It has gained experience in the past 13 years, but as having myself been a member ever since the mandates were issued, I consider that it would be most unsuited to exercise administrative functions. Incidentally, the present Commission is quite fully occupied with the supervision of 12 separate mandates.

Clearly in these circumstances the Governor on the spot would have to be entrusted with very wide powers. Ex hypothesi he would not be selected from the "surfeited" Powers, and since the object is to propitiate the "Have-nots," preference would probably be given to a German or Italian.

The ultimate result of the "collective mandate" would probably be to create several Nazi and Fascist autocracies in Central Africa.

But if Great Britain cannot consider the transfer of mandates or Colonies, what can she offer if it is agreed that some sacrifice is needed to meet new conditions and preserve the peace of the world? I submit the following suggestion. Provided the other Colonial Powers are prepared to bear their share in the collective

effort—not necessarily by adopting the same method—Great Britain should fulfil the promise to accept her share by reverting once more to her traditional policy of the "Open Door" in the African territories over which she has control. The departure from this policy in 1932, admittedly in the interest of British trade, has afforded some pretext for the complaint of monopolies.

To afford the guarantee which Sir Samuel Hoare said was demanded for the effective application of this policy I would further suggest that the Mandates Commission should be entrusted with the task of seeing that the "commercial equality" clause was strictly enforced. For this task it is exceptionally well qualified, for, as the rapporteur of the Assembly Committee observed, "there is hardly a session at which the question has not been raised." This would not impose too heavy a burden, since its role would be limited to receiving memorials or petitions from anyone who had grounds for considering that the pledge was being infringed.

This proposal would of course involve some adjustment of the Ottawa Agreements. The proposal to revert in Africa to the principle of "the Open Door"—which used to be our justification for our world-wide Colonies—does not, of course, apply to the policy which the United Kingdom of the Dominions may see fit to adopt for themselves to protect their trade in a tariff-ridden world.

I do not underrate the ideal of Empire reciprocity, and it is only in so far as trade with Colonies—especially Africa—is concerned that I suggest "the Open Door." Most Dominions have little trade with Africa, and the collective adoption of equality of commercial opportunity by other nations would more than recompense them—and the United Kingdom—for the loss of preference in those markets. The withdrawal of the demand for preference in them would moreover do away with the feeling by the natives that their interests were being sacrificed for the benefit of British merchants, as in the case of the Indian cotton duties, and the attempt after the War to restrict the export of oil-palm products to Empire markets.

Sir Samuel Hoare insisted that each Colonial Power should bear its share in the collective action adopted. If any such Power should prefer that its share in the collective sacrifice should take any other form than the adoption of the "Open Door" in its Colonies—for instance, a territorial adjustment—it would, of course, make its own proposal.

While I am convinced that foreign Powers would emphatically decline to place their colonies under mandate, I have gained the impression, from conversations and other indications, that some Colonial Powers in Africa not having made such pledges as have the British, would not lay the same stress on the consent of the Natives to a change of the mandatory and would prefer to surrender a mandate provided they received adequate compensation for foregoing their rights. If they are right in thinking that the inhabitants would be indifferent to the change and if the present mandatory preferred to surrender its mandate rather than to adopt the "economic equality" regime in all its colonies, the two methods in combination might perhaps provide an effective solution.

To the Editor of the Times

Germany's psychological desire for colonies is intensified by the insulting manner in which she was deprived of them. Far from being unfit to colonize, those who enjoy first-hand knowledge of German colonial methods know that these were excellent and in no way inferior to our own. I was General Smuts's Intelligence Officer during a long period of the Great War and was often struck by the excellence of their administration, which was reflected by two remarkable facts. Large areas of German East Africa were depleted of troops during the campaign with no resultant native rising. We had native trouble. Also, desertion from the German native army was less than that which disgraced certain of our coloured units in Kenya. And, finally, it is by no means certain that if the natives of Tanganyika were asked to-day whether they wished us to remain or the Germans to return they would favour us.

The second point is economic. Raw material from any non-German colony is quite useless to Germany, for she cannot pay for it except in sterling, which she has not got. To repeat the fallacy that Germany can get all the raw material she wishes from our colonies displays lamentable ignorance. Germany must be able to pay in marks for her raw material.

Lastly, let us drop the hypocritical doctrine that we cannot hand over Colonies without consulting the wishes of the inhabi-

tants. Have we ever asked a single native if he wishes to be ruled by us? Did we consult the wishes of any German native in 1919?

Our present inexplicable inaction in this matter must be fatal. **The history of Anglo-German relations during the past four years has been the story of lost opportunities.** Must this policy of suspicion and this atmosphere of Versailles prevail for ever?

R. Meinertzhagen.

Sir,—Mr. Adams, endorsing in your issue of September 12th your leading article on "The German Claim to Colonies" asks:—

(1) **Can the new Germany succeed, where the old failed, in producing raw materials?**

One reply is that Germany did not hold them long enough to develop them, but, had she maintained from 1914 onwards the very modest standard of progress set by us in adjoining areas, **her African colonies would by now be furnishing her with twice as large a proportion of her imports as is provided for us by all our African colonies.** To quote pre-War percentages in this connexion is, to use his own phraseology in reference to those with whom he differs, "nonsense". The domestic achievements of the National-Socialist Party in the economic development of Germany in the last four years vitiate comparisons with her pre-War tempo.

(2) He then inquires **whether the Nazi State would be a worthy trustee of native races.**

My submission is that no State in Europe is better able or more likely to play a worthy part. Their early record was creditable, and as good as that of any other Power; all Powers have made and doubtless, are still making, grave mistakes. We ourselves have had riots in Zanzibar, trouble in Rhodesia, serious complaints from Nyassaland; the French and Spaniards have had long struggles in Morocco; the history of Belgian and Portuguese possessions includes some dreadful episodes. **It ill befits any of us to pronounce judgment on Germany as an administrator.** Can anyone seriously claim that the present distribution of African trusteeships between Portugal and Belgium, France and Spain, the Union of South Africa and ourselves must be permanent even at the cost of excluding the largest Power in Europe?

Let us frankly recognize that the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which deprived Germany of all her oversea possessions must be reconsidered. The problem of Africa will soon be so difficult as to demand the co-operation of every European Power. To exclude Germany is to dam and to embark a torrent in its upper reaches, thus imperilling fertile lands below.

A great Scandinavian writer said to me recently:—

The world will respect Britain if she lets others enter some of the lands she has so recently taken under her charge; the world will not forgive her if she risks a European war in order to keep what she asserts to be of so little value.

I have reached the conclusion that the peace of Europe for the next few decades may well turn, for psychological rather than economic reasons, not upon a rearrangement of the frontiers of Eastern Europe, but upon our attitude towards the colonial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

The retention of former German colonies and the maintenance of the status quo in Africa do not, in my judgment, constitute one of those "just causes" for which the present generation in this country are prepared, or should be asked, to fight. If a clash must come, and I utterly deny that it need come, let us be on surer ground than this.

Your obedient servant

Arnold Wilson.

To the Editor of the Times

Sir,—I do not doubt that most of the letters which appear from time to time in your columns criticizing the proposal to return colonies to Germany are written with **genuine conviction.** That, however, is **not enough.** Knowledge of the actual facts is **more important.** Will you allow me, therefore, to state briefly certain considerations which no controversialist of just judgment and good will would wish to ignore when discussing this question, so profoundly important for the future relationships of the two countries directly concerned and for the peace of Europe.

(1) The German colonial movement dates from the seventeenth century, when the Great Elector of Brandenburg obtained colonies in West Africa. From that time forward it was kept alive by Prussian kings, German political economists, and a large band of intrepid explorers of the first rank who added greatly to the knowledge of North, South, East, and West Africa, as well as of the dark regions of Australia and the South American Continent.

(2) Before Bismarck in 1880 took steps to obtain colonies he was careful to satisfy himself that British rights and claims would not be invaded. On this subject readers may be referred to an easily obtained publication entitled "German Colonization", which was written by me at the request of the Foreign Office for use at the Peace Conference and which had the formal imprimatur of the Colonial Office. **Not one of Germany's colonies was acquired by war or conquest, no rights of other Powers were violated, and some of the territories were formally confirmed to her by treaties to which Great Britain was a party.**

(3) Many and generous tributes of praise and admiration were paid before the war to Germany's colonial work, not only by men of the highest standing like Cecil Rhodes, Sir Harry Johnston, Theodore Roosevelt, and Sir J. S. Keltie, but by Foreign Office Reports. In the early years mistakes were made, excesses committed, and in one case a rebellion was quelled by drastic measures. But was it different with any other Colonial Power, and was the suppression of the Hereros of South West Africa by the Germans harsher than the suppression of the Matabele and Mashonas? What, also, of the Belgian "Congo atrocities" and Portugal's cruel slavery record?

(4) **Long before 1914 the administration of the German colonies left little to be desired in efficiency or the humane treatment of the natives.** On the eve of the war our Government was about to transfer to Germany certain British colonial territory. Are we to believe that it regarded the Germans as unfit to colonize? The fine work done by German doctors and administrators in the combating of tropical disease and the relief of its victims alone discredited any such idea.

(5) One of your correspondents recently wrote that Germany would "militarize the natives". **Germany never militarized her black subjects; only France has done this.** (See Brigadier-General Fendall's book "The East African Force, 1915-19" (pp. 22-33). What has that correspondent to say about the fact that in giving France the mandate over a German colony her allies empowered her to militarize the natives? Marshal Foch boasted that his country would have a million colonial soldiers ready for the next European war.

(6) On the question of Germany's need of colonies as outlets for population and as sources of raw materials for industry, &c., **I will only say that denials from subjects of an Empire which owns and controls over a quarter of the globe are not likely to impress the landless nations, and that so to argue is singularly impolitic.**

(7) It has been objected that having once received their mandates the Powers now in possession cannot renounce them. Yet Great Britain has renounced the mandate over Iraq and France is about to do the same in relation to Syria.

(8) It has also been said that it is "unthinkable" that British subjects should be handed over to another Government. Yet in 1919 Great Britain and her Allies did not regard it as unthinkable to hand over arbitrarily millions of Germans to foreign Governments. **Is the honour of one country superior to that of another?** Of course reciprocal conditions of transfer would have to be negotiated.

(9) Germany's offer of October 5th, 1918, to surrender on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points and his other peace utterances was solemnly accepted by all the allied Powers. The fifth Point stipulated that there should be "free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustments of all colonial claims", and that "the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined" should be considered equally with "the interests of the populations concerned", while another of the pledges given to Germany was that the peace should "not contravene her legitimate economic aspirations". Nevertheless, **Germany's rights and title were never once considered.**

The longing for a peaceful Europe is universal, yet so long as the material provisions of the treaties of peace remain unmodified we shall seek peace in vain.

Yours faithfully,

W. H. Dawson.

It would be an aid to clear thinking, and, perhaps, to an ultimate settlement of the question, if sympathizers with German aspirations would realize that there can be no general "return" of the former German Colonies in Africa. There are obvious reasons, for which no British Government will abandon Tanganyika, and the same may be said of the Union Government as regards South-West Africa.

In respect of the matter in question there is no special virtue in the former possessions of Germany. If ever any cession of territory is made to Germany it will be in the interests of peace and as a contribution to a general settlement, and not in recognition of past errors or to right a wrong. Also, may I suggest that it serves no purpose to persist in telling the Germans that colonies are of no use or advantage to the owners. One is reminded of the rich man assuring his poor neighbour that wealth brings only troubles in its train. The Germans remain unconvinced. Moreover, in this matter the Germans are largely actuated by psychological motives, as to which no argument is possible.

In these circumstances, and since you have opened your columns to a discussion of the subject, it may clear the air if we give the matter a practical aspect and consider how African territory can be ceded with the least inconvenience to the owners and with the best prospect of satisfying the natural, if not legitimate, wishes of Germany. A reference to the map of Africa shows that in the mid-western portion of the continent possessions of the four great African landlords follow one another in this order: British, French, Belgian, and Portuguese. I suggest, for consideration, that Britain should cede to Germany a section of Western Nigeria, with access to the sea, and to include the mandated zone which forms the frontier of the Colony; to this France would add a portion of the adjoining territory of the Cameroons of equal extent and value; south of this, Belgium would cede her share in the form of a section of the Congo, and to this would be added an equal Portuguese contribution from Angola, with access, presumably, to the mouth of the Congo. Germany would thus become the owner of two colonies, richer and more varied, if not more extensive, than her former possessions. She ought to be satisfied.

The above very tentative proposal may illustrate at once the ease and the difficulty of the problem. The ease, because if only the necessary sacrifice were consented to by the four Powers, I believe that their delegates could agree on details in as many days. But the difficulty will lie in the principle involved. Those of us who have served the State know the altruism of which British Governments are capable, and their ever-present readiness to make graceful concessions. But this spirit is less prevalent among the Governments of foreign nations. I anticipate that it would be very difficult to obtain the required agreement. Hoc opus, hic labor. But I would not say that it cannot be done if England were to give a strong lead.

I have no wish to appear an advocate of the scheme outlined above. There may be better methods of redistribution. My purpose is to put the question in the light of a concrete proposition which accords with the wise words of Sir Arnold Wilson, when he spoke, in a recent letter to you, of a "general settlement in which all must play a part and to which all must contribute."

If any cession is made, I hope that it may be in a sufficiently liberal spirit to achieve its purpose and in full sovereignty; also,

that all non-German European residents and traders in the ceded territories who do not wish to come under German rule may be bought out and compensated at the expense of Germany.

Claud Russell.

I have recently returned from a mission to certain Empire countries, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and in all these I have found the belief that there must be some solution of this issue not beyond the wit of men and statesmen to devise, and that it would be folly to risk another European War on account of not dealing with it. I am realist in politics, and do not believe in shelving a live issue because it is difficult to find a solution. If we do not face up to this issue now I have no doubt in my own mind that it would produce very serious repercussions in the future, and that generations to come will rightly blame us for our lack of foresight and prevision.

This is a question, however, which concerns not only our own nation but all the colony-owning nations. I submit, on the other hand, that it does not directly concern nations who are not colony-owning, and therefore I should be sorry to see such an international commission appointed as is recommended by Lord Allen of Hurtwood. On analysis it would be found that the colony-owning nations are:—Great Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Spain, the United States, and Japan. These countries between them should with good will be able to satisfy Germany's aspirations, Germany on her part making a contribution to the general pacification of the world and being reasonable, even if disappointed, if she does not receive back all her ex-colonial territories.

Personally I have never felt any strong reason against the return to Germany of Togoland, or of the Cameroons, and I believe, if European peace were at stake, New Zealand would not feel very strongly about the return of German New Guinea. Japan might even be persuaded to hand back some of the islands in the Pacific which she received under mandate.

So far as Holland is concerned she neither lost nor won anything during the last War in her comfortable position as a neutral country protected by the Allies on both sides. She has huge undeveloped areas in Dutch New Guinea—adjacent to German New Guinea—peopled by tribes still living in the Stone Age and regarding all white men as belonging to the same nationality and race. There, and perhaps elsewhere, she might be able to help. Portugal likewise has large areas of very sparsely developed territories whose inhabitants need not suffer by change of master-ship. Portugal could also help if so minded.

I do not wish to pursue this further, but I am satisfied that the time is now insistently ripe for seriously investigating this subject, in the first place, I venture to suggest, through a committee of experts set up by the colony-owning nations.

Lord Elibank.

From a Discussion between Sir Evelyn Wrench and Sir George Maxwell

Sir Evelyn Wrench wrote a letter to the Times in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, in which he expressed the view that the only satisfactory basis for European rule in tropical Africa in future was a trusteeship on mandatory principles, if there were not to be a conflict between the nations possessing colonies and those not possessing them. The British Empire should play a leading role in the realisation of this aim.

These proposals brought a reply from Sir G. Maxwell who asked Sir Evelyn Wrench a number of questions to which the latter replied.

Question.—Why should Great Britain set an example?

Answer.—Because Great Britain has a great task of moral leadership in the world. Journeying through a dozen countries this autumn I was convinced that it would have been much better for Europe and ourselves, if Great Britain had some years back given the lead Sir Samuel Hoare gave at Geneva in September.

Question.—Is there any hope of it being followed by Italy, whose "colony hunger" is the motive for the present war?

Answer.—So long as the nations share the views of the eighteenth century on economic nationalism, they will no doubt refuse to carry on a forward policy. I have made my proposals with the definite object of formulating a colonial policy which will remove the needs of the nations that do not possess colonial territories

and are not in a position to obtain raw materials. If France or Great Britain, as the two greatest colonial Powers, merely try to "keep out the foreigners", they will make the conflict between the "haves" and the "have-nots" among the nations unavoidable.

Question.—Is there any hope that France will follow, under whose colonial principles and methods the inhabitants of a French colony are taught to regard themselves as worthy Frenchmen?

Answer.—An Englishman is getting upon dangerous ground when he attempts to prophesy as to political tendencies in France. This much I will prophesy—that when the French African possessions acquire in the future the status of "Brown Dominions" the policy of sending native troops for service overseas will cease.

Question.—Who would gain by this handing over? So far as the raw products, industries, and import and export trade of any British Crown Colony are concerned, has a British subject a penny-worth of advantage over a non-British person?

Answer.—Sir George Maxwell is taking me very far afield. If world unity is our goal, everything that makes its attainment more difficult is to be deplored. For this reason I consider the high tariff in the United States one of the causes of the world's present economic plight. If the colony-owning countries agreed to govern them on the mandate principle, I consider the whole world would benefit, because one of the chief causes of friction among nations would be removed. Ever since the War there has been a

The Fate of a Small German Industrial Town in South West Africa

An Example of Industrial Development: The Tsumeb Mine

The discovery of copper lying on the surface in German South West Africa between Otavi and Tsumeb led in 1892 to the formation of the South West African Company Ltd., which worked with German and English capital. In the same year the German Government granted extensive land and mining rights to the Company in the north-east of the Protectorate. The exploration of these areas showed the existence of a workable copper vein to a depth of 20 metres and furthermore, in the Otavi valley, in addition to copper, also lead and silver. In view of these facts the Otavi-Minen- und Eisenbahngesellschaft was formed in 1910 with considerable participation of the main German banks. As the name of the Company implies, part of the business consisted in railway construction. Thus the Otavi line came into existence, with a length of 567 km., which was put into operation in 1906 and connected up with the port of Swakopmund. The railway also opened up a farming district which in course of time became constantly more flourishing.

At Tsumeb copper deposits at a lower level were subsequently discovered. Shortly afterwards, in 1907, the extraction of these deposits was started. The yield of the ore was 13 % copper, 28 % lead and 280 gr. silver per ton. As rich iron deposits had been found in the immediate vicinity

of the line at Kalkfeld, the mine was enabled to smelt the ore at Tsumeb itself, and this represented an advantage for the entire territory in respect of labour and profits.

In the course of the years the small Tsumeb became a flourishing centre. The mining plant, with shafts, smelting furnaces, workshops and ore dumps grew and expanded. Streets were laid out, schools and two churches were built, trade and traffic increased with the growing numbers of workers.

The mine employed 3000 natives and 250 Europeans. Even in 1930, 184,000 tons of ore were still mined.

On account of the slump in copper prices on the world market, the works were closed in 1931 as unremunerative. At present, all the works at Tsumeb are at a standstill. The lower levels of the mine, at a depth of 490 metres, are for the most part under water; the German school has had to close its doors; most houses in the town are abandoned. Most of the German workmen have found occupation in the Union of South Africa at the newly founded iron works near Pretoria. The many thousands of natives have returned


to their tribes. No price drop in the world could have caused this flourishing industrial life in the midst of Africa to cease, if the creators of the works had remained the protectors. The mines of Tsumeb were allowed to fall into neglect, not because the ore deposits are exhausted, but because the world has a surplus of copper.

Whereas in the works and dwellings of a prim industrial town created

by the German spirit of enterprise, nature is carrying on its work of destruction, Germany is not in a position to cover her requirements of copper, because she cannot either exchange goods or purchase in her own currency.



The Tsumeb Mine



Hauling Plant of the Tsumeb Mine

growing number of preferences in the British Empire and the process has been hastened by Ottawa. Sir George is no doubt familiar with the Colonial Office publications No. 83, 1933, and No. 97, 1934. British imports enjoy a very definite preference in a number of Colonial territories, especially in those not bound by the Congo Basin Convention.

General von Epp's case examined by the Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery, M. P.

The case for Germany's reacquiring the Colonies which she lost in the Great War is stated by General von Epp with such evident sincerity and conviction that it obviously deserves careful examination. If that examination shows that the case is one based on a profound misapprehension of the facts, both economic and juridical, and that the solution demanded by General von Epp is an impossible one, that does not mean that there is no German case to be dealt with and no solution for it to be discovered, still less does it imply an attitude of mere negative hostility to all German aspirations.

Let us examine the actual facts past and present. Before the War the whole of the German colonies together took 0.6 per cent., or 1/180th part of Germany's exports, and supplied her with 0.5 per cent., or 1/200th part of her imports. The average annual emigration from Germany to German colonies, in the ten years before the War, was about forty, say 1/600th of her total emigration. By 1914 the total German population of those colonies, including 3,000 military and police, was barely 20,000.

General von Epp is equally under a misapprehension when he thinks that by the loss of her territorial sovereignty she has been "cut off" from importing raw materials from her former colonies. The greater part of them, viz. Tanganyika, Cameroons and Togoland are, in virtue of the mandatory undertakings of their present possessors, precluded from pursuing any policy of trade discrimination, at any rate as regards members of the League of Nations. Germany has continued to benefit by this provision even though she has thrown over the League. She is not only as free to buy, but as free to sell, in those territories, and the adjoining territories, as those who directly administer them. In the three years 1933-35 she bought £1,080,561 of products from East Africa. But she could have bought more if she had wanted—so far at any rate as East Africa was concerned—for she sold to East Africa during the same period £1,429,415 worth. Taking Tanganyika alone, her favourable trade balance with it for 1934-35 was £67,628. In the British Cameroons, 42.5 of their import trade and 79.8 of their export trade in 1934 was done with Germany. Where is the "cutting off" of Germany's access to raw materials in that instance? Her former colonies in South-West Africa and in the Pacific have, it is true, come within the South African, Australian or New Zealand fiscal systems. But Germany does a large trade, both import and export, with these Dominions, all three of which would gladly sell more to her if she were in a position to import.

General von Epp, in this connection, lays great stress upon the importance of markets in which German currency would be legal tender, in which Germans could buy necessary raw materials with their "own money." There is something in this argument, though not nearly as much as he suggests. Unless those colonies were to be taken out of the free trade zone and included in a strict preferential system, or unless German currency were depreciated to an extent that would be equivalent to a substantial tariff against the non-German world, the mere fact that the currency was German would not lead to those colonies buying from or selling to Germany if other competitors could sell more cheaply or offer a better price for their products. Identity of currency is a convenience which, so far as it goes, facilitates trade intercourse. But in the main, the power of purchase, whether of raw materials, or of anything else, is created by the establishment of foreign credits through sale of one's own products either directly or to some third country. One can, of course, buy the products of one's colonial territories, as of one's home territory, with paper money, regardless of the balance of trade, but only at the cost of a depreciation of the currency whose final reaction may far outweigh any advantage secured.

In any case the question of the economic value of colonies has assumed, in German eyes, a wholly disproportionate importance. There is, after all, no evidence that the ownership of colonies is an indispensable condition of prosperity. It is clear that, in the main, the prosperity, or the reserve, of the various European countries

Question.—Does Sir Evelyn believe that, on its merits, the plan should be adopted, even if the other European countries reject it?

Answer.—Yes, I do believe that Great Britain should declare to the world that she will govern those of her Colonial dependencies not yet fit for self-government on the mandate principle. Sooner or later other nations would have to follow suit.

to-day is due far more to their respective financial and monetary policies at home than to their possession or non-possession of a colonial empire.

The problem, indeed, so far as there is one, is not primarily a colonial one, if by colonies are meant territories directly dependent on and controlled by the governing power. All the world's colonies, in that sense, added together are only responsible for a very small fraction, not more than 10 per cent., of the world's production of essential raw materials. It is quite true that they produce nearly all the world's rubber and palm oil; slightly more than half the world's tin and phosphates, and about a quarter of the world's supply of copper, ground nuts and sisal. Apart from these materials I have mentioned, the overwhelming bulk of the world's supply of raw materials comes from the U.S.A., from Russia, from the British Dominions, from British India, from Central and South America, in other words, from self-governing states.

The real trouble then, such as it is, is one dependent upon the policy of these self-governing states, and the fact is that most of these self-governing states have, in increasing measure, for the last 50 years, been determined to develop their own secondary industries as well as their primary ones. They are steadily setting up tariffs and fostering their own manufactures to the detriment of the exporters from the old industrial countries, and unconsciously making it more difficult for those countries to secure the raw materials they need. Any remedy then, to be effective, must be one which deals not merely with colonies, but with the whole problem of access to raw materials. That means dealing with sovereign states, not by negotiation with a few colony-owning principals but by direct negotiation with a number of free negotiators. There can be no question of imposing any particular policy upon all these countries; still less can there be any question of the redistribution of their territories.

But before dealing with the possibility of a solution to this, the economic aspect of the problem, I must first dispose of the juridical and historical contentions which form the other half of the case advanced by General von Epp.

The assumption here is that the German Colonies were temporarily impounded by the League of Nations which handed them over to the Mandatory Powers as tenants at will, but that their real ownership is still in some sense vested in Germany. For this assumption there is no foundation whatever in the facts. Germany ceded her colonial territories, as completely and irrevocably as she ceded Alsace-Lorraine or the former German territories which are now part of Poland. She ceded them by Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, not to the League but to the principal Allied and Associated Powers. These Powers proceeded to divide these territories between themselves by mutual agreement. With that division the League had nothing whatever to do. Whether the division was final and absolute, as common sense would suggest, or whether there still exists some sort of unsubstantial ghost of ultimate sovereignty in the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as some ingenious lawyers have suggested, there is at any rate no question that, so far as territorial sovereignty is concerned, neither the League nor Germany have any juridical standing in the matter.

How then did the League come into the picture? It came in because the Allied Powers were concerned to make clear to President Wilson and to the world that were not taking over these territories for the sake of exploitation, but for their own security, and intended to administer them in the interests of the inhabitants and on principles of non-discrimination in trade. In order to give to that intention a more formal and explicit sanction they agreed to embody it in documents specifically setting out their undertakings, to submit these documents to the League, as representing the international conscience, for its approval, and to make to the League an annual report as to the fulfilment of these undertakings. The Mandates have nothing to do with the ownership

or possible disposal of the territories concerned. They constitute, on the one side, a solemn undertaking by the Power in possession of the territory, and on the other the formal blessing of the League upon that Power's good intentions. A violation of the undertaking would give the League cause for complaint, as would the infraction of any other treaty registered with the League.

That is the juridical position. But General von Epp has an alternative line of argument on moral grounds. What happened should not have happened: (a) because earlier treaties had provided for the permanent neutrality in peace and war of the so-called Congo Basin area; (b) because one of President Wilson's Fourteen Points stipulated for a "free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" with special regard to the interests of the Natives; (c) because of the "colonial-guilt lie." As regards point (a) that could at best only affect Cameroons and Tanganyika. In any case the question of "who began the War" in the colonial sphere is one on which there is much to be said on both sides.

As for point (b) the Allies, including President Wilson, no doubt, in this respect as in others, gave to the Fourteen Points an interpretation not entirely in accordance with that which Germany hoped they might give to them. They decided that on consideration of all claims Germany was not entitled to retain any of her colonies. The main reason—and I think I can speak with the authority of one who helped to prepare the British case—was **strategical**. Neither this country, nor the Dominions, nor our Allies, wished to be exposed again to the menace of a restlessly ambitious neighbour in what we wished to be essentially un militarised areas.

In their endorsement of this resolution the Allies were not uninfluenced by the fact that the German Colonies were in no sense, economic, social or historical, an integral or deeply-rooted part of Germany's national life.

As for Germany's moral unfitness to govern Natives (which did not, of course, figure in the actual treaty) that was of a piece with much else that was said, in speeches and even official correspondence, that belonged to the not wholly dispassionate atmosphere of the time. But it was essentially incidental, and added nothing to the real reasons for the Allied decision.

The arguments on our side for not surrendering those one-time German Colonies which are in the possession of the United Kingdom or of the Dominions are, to say the least of it, as strong as they were in 1919. The strategical reasons have certainly not lost weight in the interval. With Italy established as a formidable military and air power in Abyssinia the re-establishment of Germany—now allied with Japan—across our line of communications by land, air and sea in that part of the world would gravely imperil the position in South Africa, in East Africa and in the whole Indian Ocean. After all, General von Epp's own demand for a colonial empire sufficient to enable Germany to buy her raw materials with her own money would never be satisfied without an empire far larger than any she ever possessed or than we ourselves "possess" to-day.

Moreover, in the years that have passed, these territories have become fully absorbed into the administrative framework of the British Empire. The exact status of a mandated territory makes no difference to the fact that a whole generation of the native inhabitants has grown up under British rule, that in accordance with our principles and our pledges under the mandates, we have accustomed them to our ideas of justice, made them feel that they are being governed for their own sake and not merely in our interest, have trained them in the rudiments of self-government. We have no more right to hand them over the counter as small change in a political deal than we have to hand over any other population that is under British rule and content to remain there.

What applies to the Natives applies also to our own people, who on the strength of repeated official assurances as to the permanence of our occupation have settled in these territories or invested their money in them.

If territorial redistribution is ruled out, what is the solution?

Many speakers and writers have suggested that it lies in the direction of extending the area of universal free trade and getting rid of economic nationalism in all its forms. I believe that to be an idle hope. The forces in favour of economic organisation on national lines, of securing the maximum development of the resources of any particular state, of maintaining certain standards of living for its workers, is far too strong to be reversed to-day.

We cannot restore the nineteenth century in the middle of the twentieth century. No self-governing state is going to adopt the policy of free trade to-day, or even to favour a policy of equal treatment of all nations as against a policy of specific advantages secured from specific nations by definite trade agreements.

In any case, so far as the colonial sphere is concerned, there is very little room for expansion of the policy of equal trade which is already in force over most of tropical Africa and in the Dutch East Indies. If we take our own colonies, most of those outside Africa have some measure of self-government in fiscal matters, and wherever they have such freedom, as for instance in the case of the West Indies and Canada, they have negotiated preference on their own terms. Indeed, most of the preference which now exists in the British colonial empire, is preference gained by the colonies concerned as the result of negotiations, or arises from their free recognition of the advantage which it is to them to be under a preferential system. Indeed I doubt if, in the long run, you can justify the forcible imposition of free trade upon any subject territory.

Lastly, I would say that such a system of universal enforced equal treatment is not even in the interests of those who are most vocal about their present difficulties. **It is not Germany or Italy who are going to gain in the long run from the open door in Africa, but Japan, China, and India.** In the world to-day what is wanted by the nations is not promiscuous free trade but assured and stable trade based on mutual reciprocity and on economic co-operation between nations who are in a position to supplement each other's deficiencies. It is on these lines that we shall find the solution: it is on these lines, after all, that the nations of the British Empire have, since Ottawa, been developing co-operation among themselves.

I see no reason myself why the industrial nations of Western Europe should not follow our Ottawa example and establish a system of mutual preference between those that have colonies capable of producing far more than their mother countries can absorb, and those which have large markets and no colonies. Belgium and Holland could well come to an arrangement with their great hinterland in Germany and Central Europe. And such a scheme could also bring in those less developed countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe which in economic structure correspond to some of our dominions just as the countries in the West and North-West of Europe correspond to ourselves. We would thus get a system, corresponding to the system established in Ottawa, with opportunities for almost unlimited development.

Such a scheme would not, any more than the Ottawa scheme, be exclusive and preclude trade outside its confines. But it would secure a wide area of balanced trade—the best equivalent of that trade "with our own money" that General von Epp postulates—as the flywheel of Germany's economic life. That Germany's colony-owning partners in such a scheme should also give special facilities to German contracts and German colonists or planters would only be a natural corollary, once the fear of German territorial designs was removed.

There is, however, one obstacle in the way of such a solution as I have indicated. That is the Most Favoured Nation Clause in most of the commercial treaties of this and other countries, as well as the Free Trade restrictions under the Mandates or under the Treaty of St. Germain. If we were to waive our rights under those treaties in respect of any arrangements for mutual preference entered into by the nations of Continental Europe west of Russia, including their colonies, we should give a lead which it would be difficult for the United States or any other extra-European Power not to follow or, indeed, submit to. We shall be making some sacrifice of trade, no doubt; but the sacrifice would be compensated, to some extent at least, by a corresponding greater freedom to ourselves to make special arrangements with countries like Egypt and Iraq, possibly even the Argentine and the Scandinavian countries, free of most favoured nation obligations. In any case it would involve none of those political and moral difficulties which rule out the surrender of territories, and still more of peoples, now under the British flag.

To the Editor of the Times

Sir,— May I put before the readers of the Times certain impressions of the present international situation derived from discussions with people interested in international affairs during a visit to Canada and United States from which I have just returned?

Many of those most inclined to support the collective system in international affairs are alarmed at the present tendency to make the League an instrument for waging war—police war—by economic or military means, in order to maintain the status quo, a tendency emphasized by its apparent inability to make itself an instrument for peace by dealing vigorously and successfully with the causes of aggression.

In the view of many thoughtful people on the other side of the Atlantic the major cause of the present rise in armaments, the present wars in Abyssinia and the Far East, and the threatened conflict in Europe is not territorial frontiers, but the economic suffocation of certain nations possessed of inadequate natural resources and markets within the territories in which their currency runs, through international restrictions on the movement of trade, capital, and population.

The most significant phenomenon is that in all these countries the younger generation are being prepared to break their bonds, if necessary at the cost of war, if no other way of providing for their future can be found. **Unless the collective system can grapple with this aspect of the prevention of war at least as vigorously as it is attempting to deal with aggression itself the League will eventually become no more than one-half of a new Balance of Power in which the other half will be the so-called suffocated Powers.** It is the feeling that a second intervention in an European war, so long as Europe is divided into 26 watertight economic compartments, is no more likely to result in a lasting peace than was the intervention in 1917 that in part at any rate accounts for the recent drive towards neutrality in the United States.

If the present deadlock is to be resolved it can only be by exploring thoroughly the avenue opened in Sir Samuel Hoare's speech of September 10th last in which he proposed a joint investigation into the problem of giving access to the "suffocated" Powers to the raw materials and markets of the rest of the world. The only real way out is to prove to Mussolini and the Italian people as well as to Hitler and Dr. Schacht and the German people that there is a way in which Italy and Germany can make sure of a steadily rising standard of living for their own people which is more certain than the costly, calamitous, and probably ineffectual method of attempting territorial or colonial expansion by means of war. A solution which by removing the barriers which now prevent world development and world trade began to solve the problem of unemployment in these countries would ensue to the benefit of the rest of the world as well.

The root of the problem does not lie in territorial or colonial exchanges. The urgent need is to make it possible for the so-called suffocated countries to buy foodstuffs and raw materials with their own currencies or by exporting in exchange their own manufactured products in quantities sufficient to make an immediate impression on their domestic unemployment and under conditions which promise a steadily rising standard of living at home in the future. How that is to be done is a matter for scientific economists to advise and for statesmen to propose to their peoples. In this aspect of international peacemaking—the aspect which alone promises a general reduction in tension and armament expansion—we are far more likely to enlist the co-operation of the New World than in action which has in it the direct risk of war.

Lothian.

VI. An Enquiry by the Royal Institute of International Affairs: "Raw Materials and Colonies"

(Chatham House, St. James' Square, London, SW. 1)

The enquiry starts with the claims of Germany, Italy and Japan, and from this standpoint treats the unsatisfactory territorial distribution of colonies as a factor of the current unrest, and the economic need for raw materials as the principal cause of the German demand for colonies. At the outset of the enquiry we find a Table which shows the extent to which the individual countries are reduced to import commodities from overseas to satisfy their demand for raw materials. Four signs are used in the Table viz. a plus (+) sign for commodities of which the country in question has an export surplus, an asterisk (*) for commodities in respect of which the country is virtually dependent on others, a minus (—) sign for raw materials in the case of which there is a partial demand for import from other countries, and a double minus (—) sign for materials which have to be imported to a large extent or wholly from other countries.

A brief glance is sufficient to show where the dividing line runs as between the countries with abundance of raw materials and the "Have nots." The plus signs and the asterisks predominate in the case of the British Empire, the United States and Russia; and the French colonial empire is also adequately situated in the matter of raw materials supply. The only important raw material which England lacks is oil; and a prudent and far-sighted policy in the matter of oil supply has served to place the extensive oil-fields of Iran and Iraq under British control. The United States lack only rubber. The same is true of Russia. The French have neither coal, rubber, oil nor cotton. But these gaps in the supply of the countries mentioned are nothing to the gaps in the supply of the three countries Japan, Italy and Germany; and, of these three "Have nots," Germany is by far the worst off, in as much as the only raw materials of which she has an abundance are coal and potash, while all the other raw materials on the list are

shown in her case with a minus sign. There are 6 commodities, in the case of which she is dependent in part, and 26 in the case of which she is wholly dependent, on imports from abroad.

Under these circumstances it is not calculated to have a conciliatory effect to point out that no country and no political unit is wholly autonomous.

Another table which gives a comparative survey of the colonial production of the world is made the basis for the conclusion that very little importance attaches to the mandated territories as sources of raw materials. It follows, so the argument goes, that the return of the former German territories cannot do anything for the restoration of German prosperity. **The problem, it is said, cannot really be solved by transfers of territory, unless "it were decided to transfer whole continents." The only possibility of improvement lies in the direction of greater freedom of trade.**

What the position in regard to the freedom of trade thus predicated really is as the result of restrictions, direct and indirect, and the establishment of 11,000 km. of new tariff and Customs boundaries since the War, will be shown in detail below.

The enquiry concludes as follows:

"For the economic side of the claim for colonies must be viewed in its proper relation to the psychological aspect. The fact must be faced that the claim exists, based on a lack of certainty of continued access to sources of supply, which, combined with motives of prestige and strategy, creates a desire for possession. If the colonial Powers decide to ignore this claim, they would appear to lay themselves open to trouble. Adjustment in the matter of access to colonial resources is a step towards easing their situation, but it is instilling a false hope to argue that the whole solution lies that way."

D. The official attitude of France and Belgium

The French attitude has already been outlined in various utterances of French politicians such as Archimbeau (Chairman of the Colonial Committee of the Chamber of Deputies) and former French Ministers like Sarraut and Perrier. To these may be added one or two further utterances, for instance:

"The return or sale of colonies would be a particularly painful experience for any European organiser. As I have said in my published writings, the handing over of a colony in return for political advantages, the handing over (that is to say) of a society of human beings, would be exactly similar to a deal in goods or negro slaves..... My desire is for the institution of European co-operation — in which Germany would assume the place belonging to her as a great nation — for the vast task of opening up the Black Continent. But such co-operation would have to be subject to conditions which left untouched the principle of present sovereignty. My view is that Africa, black Africa, should be a meeting-ground, a place of mutual understanding and combination of those interests which in Europe at the present time are arrayed against one another in the fatal clash of economic nationalisms, with every prospect of bringing Europe in the end to her ruin, if she is not careful. Europe calls for reconstruction, if she is to stand up to that Asiatic menace to the dangers of which I have long since drawn attention; and such reconstruction, as I see the position, can only take place in Africa."

The above is the attitude of the former Premier and Minister for the Colonies, **Sarraut**. Side by side with it, take the following declaration of the former Colonial Minister, **Paul Reynaud**. Writing in the *Echo de Paris* he said:

"It is necessary to destroy the illusions which are widely held as to the benefits an African colony can bring to a European country. Let us tell Germany we are ready to rebuild the continent of Europe now threatened with disaster at the hands of Asia as a result of the historic hatreds by which it is torn in two. But such reconstruction cannot issue from a struggle for hegemony in Europe; for in any such struggle it would be the most highly developed and most fragile nations that would receive the fatal wounds."

The present Minister for the Colonies, **Moutet**, wrote as follows in the *Paris Soir* of December 28th, 1936:

"My opinion is that the possibility of a return of the former German colonies simply does not arise. France exercises her mandate within the framework of the League of Nations, and will not surrender it. Our colonial policy, as I see it, is a long-sighted policy, which is what it was supposed under the terms of the mandate to be. Who anyway has any cause for complaint under the present circumstances? The mandate is a charge; and such advantages as we derive therefrom are not privileges. The economic system of the mandated territories is the system of the Open Door, and all nations, provided they are members of the League of Nations, are entitled — so far as economic benefits are concerned — to develop the country, to send in their goods and to acquire raw materials. The notable development which is the fruit of our colonial labours is seen at a glance on the spot or in the statistics of the territories concerned. It is sufficient to compare the present position with that which we found when we first assumed our mandate. It is a joke to talk of peoples who are constricted finding an outlet for their superfluous population in these regions. No Europeans can work in such climates except in a few directing posts. We cannot contemplate any change in our colonial policy for a variety of reasons, the chief of which is to be found in the wishes of the native populations..... I want cooperation with Germany in the economic field, if Germany is prepared to cooperate for peaceful ends. Germany will always find a willing

ear if she is prepared openly and frankly to seek general agreement. But the initiative rests with her — not with us."

The above utterances were sufficiently remarkable. Still more so an interview which Moutet gave on February 10th, 1937, to the periodical *Vu*. He there argued that the German desire for colonial possessions with a view to settlement was invalidated by the fact that only 80,000 Frenchmen had settled in Tunis up to the present, and another 80,000 in Morocco. Considering the exiguous population of France, the argument can hardly be said to be convincing; but the further point which the Minister proceeded to make that even the United States with the largest production of automobiles in the world do not command a supply of the raw rubber which they require for their cars, and that France has no oil, is so poor an answer to the economic and monetary arguments on the colonial issue as to suggest inevitably ignorance, wilful or otherwise, of economic considerations.

The Premier, **Blum**, in his Lyons speech of January 24th made the well-known suggestion that the concession of economic or colonial advantages to Germany should take the form of a trade deal. He went on to say that the connection between the particular problem of colonies and the general problems of peace was pregnant and inevitable. "Under present conditions in Europe, where competition in armaments is proceeding at an even faster rate than it did before the war, how are economic agreements to be negotiated independently of political settlements? Where is the country which would be prepared to cooperate with another country by giving it credits, by improving its supply of raw materials, by facilitating its emigration or colonisation activities, or by any other measures, so long as the possibility persists of even so much as an apprehension on the part of the former country that the assistance which it lends to the other may one day be turned against itself, and that the credits, the raw materials, the oversea enterprises and the rest may be used to strengthen a striking power and a military potential of which its friends or itself may find themselves the victims? There is a necessary, an inevitable, connection between economic cooperation on the one hand and the organisation of peace and the arrest of armaments competition on the other."

The attitude of Belgium again has been similarly made clear by a number of official utterances to the effect that there is no colonial question, so far as Belgium is concerned. The Congo is regarded as an integral part of Belgium, and any menace to its independence (it is intimated) will be resisted by the latter with every means in her power, including military means. It is however noticeable these utterances only refer to the Congo: they never include the mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi. The instructions issued by the Foreign Ministers Hymans, Vandervelde and van Zeeland to the Belgian Ministers in foreign capitals on May 19th, 1927, June 20th, 1928, and May 31st, 1935, are explicit in this sense. Answering Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons on February 5th, 1936, the Belgian Premier van Zeeland spoke to the same effect in the Senate on February 25th; and the Foreign Minister Spaak said the same thing to the foreign Press correspondents on July 20th.

Vanderveldes remark's contained the following passage:

"The mandates question must be treated as a separate question, which can be settled only by the unanimous agreement of the interested Powers. Belgium is one of those Powers. But Belgium is not prepared for one moment to do what others are not prepared to do. If sacrifices are to be made in this connection, let them be in proportion to the shares of each of the parties concerned."

German Industrial




Factory in Lüderitzbucht




Electricity Works in Lüderitzbucht



German Diamond Works Kolmanskop




Krupp Sisal Preparation Machine




The German Diesel Motor for driving the German Corona Fibre Stripping Machine


Undertakings



Modern Diamond Washing Works



German Electricity Works in the midst of the jungle (Cameroons)



Palm Oil Press. West African Plantation Company Victoria



Cocoa Preparation Room of the W. A. P. V. in the Cameroons

E. Reflections on the British Point of View

This British attitude, which we have intentionally given at considerable length, and in which we have reproduced in particular the views of those colonial exports who reject the German standpoint, such as Lord Lugard, the former Governor of Nigeria and for many years a member of the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva, and Mr. Amery, the former Colonial Secretary, compels us to devote particular attention to their arguments, in so far as they have not been already refuted in the introductory article and in the German statements.

Even on a superficial perusal, it is obvious that the views expressed, with few exceptions, even when their attitude to the German claims is sympathetic, agree on one point, i. e. **the more or less open refusal to return the former German colonies.** The reason given for this is no longer the lie regarding colonial guilt, but, apart from the right of war by which Germany lost her colonies, the mandatory obligations of Great Britain, her trusteeship and her anxiety for the welfare of the natives who cannot be treated as merchandise and subjected to a barter transaction. It is astonishing how certain people overlook the previous history of this distribution of colonies at Versailles where, according to a tardy statement by Mr. Baldwin, "no one was asked his opinion", in particular the natives who were simply the object of the worst kind of barter transaction. This sudden solicitude, especially in Conservative quarters, is all the more grotesque as they admit in the same breath that **strategical reasons** are now, as they were then, the **decisive factor**, for taking away the German colonies at that time and for refusing to return them at present. No mention is made as to how in reality this trusteeship was and is still to some extent exercised.

In view of the great emphasis placed on this lofty and very English conviction that the colonies and mandates are administered in trust, the sincerity of which is probably not doubted by the majority of the British nation, there is a constantly increasing danger that the entire question will become one of the **prestige of the British Empire** and will be removed from its natural connections into a pseudo-moral sphere.

This is the reason for the more or less disguised hints of the German peril, the enigma of the German character and the mysterious dynamics of the German nation. These are slogans which generally have an undertone of reprobation and cause those who adopt a positive attitude to think that a transfer of colonies or mandates must be subject to the condition that Germany should again return to the circle of League Powers, should accede to the system of collective security and, lastly, should agree to disarmament.

Quite apart from the fact that these quarters should be aware for what reasons Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, looks with suspicion on the system of collective security and was compelled to go over from complete disarmament to rearmament, the other arguments entirely overlook the **compulsory nature of the German position and the decisive conclusion to which it leads, i. e. the same right as other colonial nations both to possess colonies and to have a share in the distribution of the raw materials of the world.**

At the same time the Germans must counteract the idea that the fulfilment of the last mentioned claim, with its notion of "have-nots", might remove the legal claim to the former. Without wishing to doubt the right of other "have-nots" to similar claims, it must be pointed out that **Germany, in claiming the return of her colonies, either in the form of mandates or possessions, is not appealing to the pity of the possessing Powers, but to the right which was betrayed in 1919 and was constantly delayed after Germany's admission to the League of Nations.** Lastly it is necessary to meet arguments which,

with a view to refusing the German claims, are based on former statements by the Leader and Chancellor and on quotations from his book "*Mein Kampf*", and some even on the colonial period of Bismarck, which also expressed a negative attitude. In this connection it is not pleasant to remember similar changes in British views as to the significance of colonial possessions and to recollect the time when the British were much less enthusiastic about colonies than at present. For instance, Disraeli, the great conservative statesman, who subsequently became the high priest of British imperialism, said in 1852 that "the wretched colonies are a millstone round our neck", while in 1865 a Committee of the House of Commons decided that all future extensions of territory should be rejected as inadvisable. Lord Lugard also openly admitted these facts. Such arguments are therefore very foolish.

Since the German view that colonies are a part of complete equality of rights was clearly expressed for the first time in the discussions which Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden had with the Leader and Chancellor in March 1935, it may fortunately be concluded from the discussion which has since continued that, in view of the fact that there is on the one side a mass of mostly undigested possessions in all parts of the world and on the other side a number of active nations lacking in raw materials, all clear-thinking people cannot close their eyes to the necessity of a solution and must consider that the present exclusion of a great and over-populated nation from the sources of raw materials is unjust and contrary to reason. The raising of the German claim to colonies has, however, made British public opinion think much more about this subject and—apart from the Tories of the extreme right—there are now few Englishmen who deny that a solution satisfactory to Germany must be sought in the colonial problem, and the principal difference is the method to be adopted.

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We have shown in the **economic part of our inquiry** how far Germany can cover her overseas requirements of raw materials with the commodities that can be produced in her old colonies. It is therefore not a fact that from the economic point of view the colonial question is of so little importance that it is not worth while discussing. The astonishing argument that the possession of colonies represents a burden rather than a gain and that to some extent the nations are happier if they are discharged of this burden is strong evidence of the decided possessive instinct of the colonial countries; it is like the anger of the rich man when a poor man approaches his loaded table and asks for a little food. It makes a grotesque impression when Sir Robert Horne goes so far as to state that England belongs to the "unsatisfied" nations.

It is perhaps not right to dispute as to whether it is possible to own a third or "only" a quarter of the surface of the globe. But it is certainly wrong to prove that Germany's foreign trade with her colonies before the War scarcely amounted to 0.5% of her total trade. It is a matter of extreme surprise as to why those who now refer Germany to the "quantité négligeable" of that half per cent consider it essential and valuable enough to use this modest amount in order to round off their quarter of the surface of the globe.

We do not go to the other extreme and assert that a satisfactory settlement of the colonial question could entirely or at one stroke conjure away all Germany's troubles in respect of raw materials. The financial and transitional difficulties which would have to be overcome in order to develop the former German Protectorates so that we might be able to carry on a flourishing trade to the advantage of both parties (in a German sovereign territory and in German currency) are well known to us, especially as the territories have not the fertility of the British or Netherlands colonial possessions. But it is entirely

overlooked by those who take the above view that it is now 1937 and not 1913. At that time the German Protectorates were in the initial stage of their development, and only four-tenths of the colonial exports went to the mother country which was well supplied from all sources; the remainder was exported to other countries. At the present time Germany would proceed to the economic development of her colonies with much greater enthusiasm than any other country and even than Germany before the War when she had no export and foreign exchange difficulties, no raw material problem, no currency dumping, no reparation devastations, no customs and quota barriers and similar dragon's teeth of the war and post-war period.

The raw material famine in Germany would provide a guarantee for the rapid development of the colonies returned to her. The possibility of obtaining tropical products in her own currency would be of enormous importance for a country like Germany and the question of intensive development and cultivation would assume a totally different aspect and importance than is at present the case. That the interests of the natives would not be affected, but would on the contrary be promoted, has been proved by the recognised administrative and educational methods of German colonial work in the last few years the outbreak of war.

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Instead of a return of colonies or even a transfer of colonial mandates, there is now a fairly general tendency to transfer the entire problem to the sphere of commercial treaties or international agreements by the free distribution of raw materials and the abolition of existing restrictions and preferences, and to overlook the central problem, i.e. the importance of colonies as a basis of raw materials and an export market.

The meaning of the famous proposal made by Sir Samuel Hoare at the September session of the League Assembly in 1935 was "to ensure the participation of all nations in the products of the world". The object of the committee on raw materials at Geneva which arose out of that proposal is to take collective action to remove the fear entertained by countries without colonies in respect of raw material monopolies. In view of the self-satisfied examples of calculations and the theoretical inquiries with which this **colonial substitute** is discussed, it must be pointed out that they are not based on that thoroughness which is on the whole required by the wide recognition given to the scope of the German colonial and raw material problem. It is true that the multiplicity of these proposals shows that there is an attempt to substitute something better for the present position which is recognised as unsatisfactory, in need of change and therefore not without danger. There is agreement on this fact, though not on the ways and means to be adopted. Apart from the few proposals in favour of the cession of colonial territories on grounds of the observance of the idea of revision, or the proposals made by labour or liberal quarters in favour of a collective administration, a collective mandate or a kind of condominium for all colonies under the auspices of the League of Nations, there are **two proposals** which stand out from the mass and which are examined, discussed and criticised with all their variations and with all their pros and cons: the **extension of the policy of the open door**, and the **extension of the mandatory system**.

We would refer to the special chapter which we have devoted to the policy of the "open door" and its application.

The facts that are there noted and the criticisms to which they give rise suffice to show that it is wrong to try to solve the problem by the free distribution of raw materials and the removal of the existing restrictions. The "open door" alone is insufficient, in the future distribution of raw materials, to free Germany by means of various treaties from her present position as a step-child in the distribution of the raw materials of the world. For in future, as at present, a treaty guarantee of permanent access to raw materials and

of colonial equality of rights will not for various reasons prevent the mother countries from creating for themselves a preferential position, in particular as sources of supply for the needs of the colonial territories.

The only one who is not impressed by the idea that, if Germany is not given her colonies she should at any rate be granted the principle of the "open door" is **Mr. Amery**. In his view this principle and the entire idea of most favoured nation treatment merely act as fetters. "In the interest of the obligations assumed by Great Britain", however, he is not in favour of returning the colonies, although he regards them as practically worthless from an economic point of view. But, he says, the European Powers west of Russia with their colonies could obtain a wonderful economic development from all the undeveloped land in the temperate and tropical zones if they could only decide to follow the **example of Ottawa** and adopt the method of mutual preferential duties and systematic cooperation. No country, he adds, would have more to offer and to gain than Germany. If any clauses in the mandates and other treaties hindered the extension of this system of preferential duties, they must be removed. And the "satisfied" countries, presumably France, Holland, Belgium and Portugal, would no doubt grant the Germans all advantages in their colonies, once they were freed from the fear of the German expansionist impulse. **The Columbus egg**. Mr. Amery's suggestions are too indefinite to give rise to the suspicion that they are merely a consolation, fine words instead of raw materials, or even merely a trick to extricate England from these wretched debates on colonies and raw materials. But if Mr. Amery has a really constructive proposal, we would request him to state more definitely and in greater detail his views as to this method of overcoming the German raw material distress and the difficulties in respect of exports and foreign exchange.

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The position is similar with the other proposal made principally by Lord Noel Buxton, Charles Roden Buxton, Sir John Harris, Sir Arthur Salter, Prof. Bentwich, Mr. Barnes and people belonging to the Labour Party, who, with a view to creating a framework in which the Germans can develop their physical forces and mental capacity in Africa and obtain economic advantages, suggest an **extension of the mandatory system**. The criticism of the mandatory system has shown that all colonial nations take the view that a nation which requires colonies can only attend to them politically, economically and culturally in the widest sense, if it bears full responsibility for its own administration. As we have seen, this view has not lapsed on account of the fact that it was for the time being forgotten at Versailles when it was a case of taking away the German colonies.

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Lastly, the repeated declarations of responsible representatives of the British Government form an interesting aspect of the **British attitude**. They show that the **British Government** is endeavouring not to take up an immutable attitude either for or against the German problem of colonies and raw materials. In this respect the statements of the former Prime Minister, Lord Baldwin, and his present successor Mr. Neville Chamberlain, are of importance since, in spite of certain attenuations, they give an **objective judgment of the possibility not only of economic, but also of political changes in the present position**.

And this is ultimately the important point.

The Problem, not of the Economic Aspect, but of Revision

The colonial problem is not only a question of raw materials or of attempts at economic solutions. The question of the settlement of colonists is also not decisive, although it cannot be simply disposed of by the well-known pre-war formulae

which show no comprehension for the tremendous urge to work of a nation with special colonising gifts.

In the chapter on "the colonial-guilt lie and its refutation," we have already given the legal and moral reasons for the justice of the German colonial claim. In subsequent parts of our inquiry, we have explained the economic and political arguments in favour of German colonial possessions. But also Germany's position within the framework of European culture and among the nations of the world, her obligations in respect of the great tasks of humanity in connection with the development and utilisation of the tropics for the special benefit of the natives, for the selfare of Germany and therefore also for the world, call for overseas activity on her part. For a nation of the strength, structure, culture, and colonial past of the German nation, if it is to maintain itself, colonial activity is not a whim or a passtime, but a necessity. Germany has the same right to this activity in her own colonies as France with her small population or Great Britain with her wealth of territory. The significance of a colonial empire for them may be imperialistic in character; New Germany, with her policy based on National Socialist ideology, does not pursue either a policy of prestige or imperialistic aims.

We may add a few remarks on the racial problem, which is undoubtedly one of the most important in Africa. In the various discussions on the German colonial claim, this problem is often raised in order to prove that the subjection of natives to German rule is precluded on account of the attitude of National Socialism to foreign races. The German racial policy, it is said, is not suitable for taking over the care of natives and is contrary to the colonial idea, since it excludes all feelings of humanity towards the coloured races and would therefore lead to serious conflicts with the native populations. It is therefore claimed that National Socialist Germany offers no guarantee for a just guardianship over primitive peoples, such as is to be found in the feeling of responsibility of the democratic western colonial Powers.

It may be observed in passing, in the first place, that these Powers had enough time and opportunity for nearly fifteen years to allow democratic Germany to take part in this responsibility.

With regard to the question itself, however, the above insinuations show complete ignorance of the essence of National Socialism and its policy, the racial idea of which would do greater justice to the needs of the natives than the "democratic" administrative methods of some western colonial Powers. France, for instance, endeavours to solve the racial problem in her colonies by a policy of power on the principle of the military solidarity of all parts of her possessions, i. e. by the militarisation of the natives, and by administrative and cultural methods in the assimilation and association of the natives of her colonies with the French of the mother country by a mixture of blood, in short in forming a French nation and empire that is uniform politically, culturally, and racially with the object of promoting the imperialistic idea. It need not be specially pointed out that this is not compatible with the idea of the mandate.

Even before the War, the German colonial and native policy was based on the idea of promoting the development of the natives to a special independence, which was to be prevented from being drawn into European entanglements by means of the principle of military neutrality. It aimed at developing the natives according to their own inclinations and views, at maintaining their own culture to the exclusion as far as possible of the influences of modern civilisation which might be harmful to the natives.

A colonial administration and a native policy on the basis of the National Socialist racial idea would place still more stress on such aspirations.

The Leader and Chancellor, in his great Reichstag speech of January 30th, 1934, clearly expressed the idea of the National Socialist racial policy:

"The National Socialist racial idea and the racial know-

ledge on which it is based do not lead to a less regard or a depreciation of other nations, but rather to the realisation of the tasks to be faced in the proper maintenance and continuation of the life of our own people. It therefore necessarily leads to a natural respect for the life and substance of other nations. It thus releases actions of foreign policy from all attempts to subject foreigners in order to be able to rule them, or even to incorporate them as a pure mass in one's own people."

The consequence to be drawn is that every race existing in the world has its own characteristics which are destroyed by mixture with other races. The maintenance of the race and therefore also of its culture is the main task of the coloniser; it must prevent native culture which has arisen through particular circumstances from being depreciated or destroyed and leading to the destruction of the inner life of the natives. This task in no way excludes a higher education, or the teaching of modern science, which, however, if they are not ultimately to lead to a spiritual and cultural homelessness of the natives and are to fulfil their real purpose which is to maintain the natural life of the natives, their tribal peculiarities and train natives to lead their own people, must be cleansed of all appearances of a poor average.

The subjection of natives under a National Socialist administration would do more to realise the ideals put forward by well known African experts as the aim of colonising work than has hitherto been done by the colonial policy of the other Powers.

* * *

It is to misjudge the position entirely, at any rate as far as Germany is concerned, to endeavour to divert the German claims into a discussion of raw materials and economic questions and to dismiss them by talk of a better distribution of raw materials and commercial and political concessions to nations which do not possess colonies.

Apart from the fact that all these proposals, as we have seen, do not attain the desired object, but that the only solution is production and sale in sovereign territory with one's own currency, they make no contribution towards colonial revision.

What is meant by this is expressed by the **Manchester Guardian of February 8th, 1937:**

"But the so-called 'colonial question' is not one but two. There is the immediate question, which is largely one of political expediency, of what to do with Germany; and there is the long-term question, which is far more important, of what to do with colonial empires. By distributing Germany's colonies as League mandates at the end of the war the Allied and Associated Powers took one step forward and one step back. The mandatory system itself was a tremendous advance in colonial theory; it marked the beginning of a totally new conception of empire. But it also helped to conceal the fact that two or three Great Powers, all of them hardened imperialists, were grabbing the colonies of another Great Power as the reward of victory. As a result we are not quite certain to-day whether we have gone forward or back. If all that happened was that Britain and France added to their vast possessions at the expense of Germany, then Germany has a good case for demanding them back again; but if Britain and France really abandoned the old tradition of national possession, then it is high time we proved our sincerity by advancing still farther.

Unless, therefore, the French and British Governments begin at once to consider what they can do to extend the mandate principle to all their colonies, to revoke all economic restrictions, and, better still, to offer the mandated territories for international administration, it will be extremely difficult to resist Germany's demands. At present neither the French nor the British Government is in any position to use moral arguments. There is no such thing as a "right" to colonies, but, if we use that outworn language, Germany has as much right as Britain. Both are Great Powers, both are industrial nations, both have big guns and a feeling of superiority to the dark

s. If colonies are good for us they are good for Germany; they are bad for Germany they are bad for us. There is no room for moral arguments here. But the conclusion is not that we should return Germany's former colonies to her, for that would merely perpetuate an unjust system. On the contrary, the conclusion is that unless we are prepared to surrender our own colonial privileges to the general good we shall not have a single argument with which to resist Germany's demands."

is still more clearly expressed in a leading article in the Swiss "Appenzeller Zeitung" of December 23rd, 1936, which expresses the commonsense view in a refreshing, clear and unequivocal fashion:

is exactly a year since we wrote an article in these pages on the colonial problem. It was entitled: "The Great Powers can solve the Colonial Problem." They have not yet done it; but they have still time and opportunity to do so. As Italy is concerned, she has cleared up the question for herself. In this connection we will not enter into the question in which she has done so or the effects. If we leave aside the young (in fact too young) aspirations of Italy, there still remains the German Reich.

We do not need to defend ourselves against the suspicion of indiscriminately representing demands for fresh German colonies. We understand such demands as an emanation of the Italian temperament, as a reaction to a period of political confusion. We do not hesitate to oppose them in our own country, in which we regard them as dangerous for the realisation of a European agreement; but we also do not hesitate to support them where we find them justified and reasonable from a higher point of view. This is the case with the desire of the Reich to have colonies.

is a question for discussion whether the German method of proceeding is correct. It may even be doubted whether a demographic policy which is defensible which lives above its circumstances and which endeavours to solve the problem of a "nation without space" by increasing the numbers of the nation with every means before the required space is available and thus, without themselves admit, accumulating explosive material. In our opinion, it cannot be denied that a Power of the size and quality of Germany and a nation of the size and quality of the German nation are entitled to demand a part of what other nations have profited by for many years, or that Germany is capable of fulfilling the duties connected with the possession of colonies.

There are two aspects to the question, a political and a moral aspect. But from whatever angle the question is regarded, the conclusion is the same. Germany lost the war. It has never before in the history of the world that a State overtaken by such a fate was rewarded. If Germany had won, she would have been given nothing away to her enemies. The loser has always to make sacrifices for his loss. Complaints about such a fate are comprehensible, but it is fate. It has always taken time to compensate for the loss, and it must take time in this case. It is in the natural course of events that the loser must pay the piper, just as it is in the natural course of events that a debt can only be remitted by the creditors. Consequently in view of German desires, it is not important what is demanded. But it is important what reason demands. And a reasonable demand must not be refused on the grounds that it is contrary to the desire of the person making the demand. Germans need colonies. They need them just as much as nations who already possess colonies. Thanks to their sense of civilisation and their standard of civilisation, they are entitled to administer colonies. From a purely moral point of view that is a legitimate reason for demanding colonies. Not that the colonial possessions were lost in the War, but that they appear to be necessary and justified in peacetime. The conclusion is the same when the question is regarded from the political aspect. The Germans are mad after colonies. It is fatal to await the moment when, in full cons-

ciousness of their power, they will choose their own means of attaining their object. It is been recognised in wide circles, not only in neutral countries, that Germany also requires a raw material basis of her own. Is it proposed to wait until Germany's desire develops into an ultimatum to the Powers? Is it proposed to let matters go so far that reason can no longer be the guiding principle and prestige must become the driving force of the political decision in the colonial question? As we have said, the solution must be dictated by reason and must therefore be voluntary. If it is compulsory it will no longer be reasonable, and like all compulsion, will leave its sting in the policy of the future. But what is more obvious for the policy of democratic States—such as the present colonial Powers are—than to act in what they regard as a reasonable manner voluntarily and in accordance with what they consider right? They should not wait until the explosion, of which Herr Schacht recently gave a warning, has occurred; they should not wait until the other party has his heel upon their neck; but they should do what they consider right in good time and of their own free will. Free will and independent action do not denote weakness but strength; they do not arise out of pressure or fear; they are to the honour of the person acting on them and they give him moral credit, both for the present and even more for the future. No one knows whether he will not require credit in the future. And after all, is not the moral soundness of some importance? The deficit of States, and in particular of Great Powers can hardly be wiped out morally. The thing of ultimate importance is to do what is right. This importance is nowhere so great as in politics. It is right that a nation of nearly 70 millions requires a possibility of obtaining its own supplies. It is right that such possibilities exist to a wide extent in the world. It is right that other Powers make the greatest use of these possibilities. Lastly, it is right that Germany's participation in these possibilities does not need in any way to restrict that of the other Powers. The conclusion is evident. Let it be drawn while there is still time and while it can be drawn voluntarily. The example of Italy should have been a sufficient warning. Colonies should be ceded to Germany, so that she may not take the same path as Italy. If the readiness to do so exists, suitable objects of concession will be easily found."

* * *

If it is stated that Germany has her eye on the colonial possessions of any particular country and attempts are thus made to bring the small colonial countries into a dispute in respect of a colonial revision which does not concern them, the object of such statements can only be to cause trouble.

In answer to this, we must repeat the unequivocal statement by Adolf Hitler on January 30th that Germany has no colonial claims against countries which have not taken any of her colonies.

Lastly, it is a double-edged argument when the press of the other colonial Powers, in defending the refusal to give up even a foot of their colonial possessions, speak of the "indisputable rights" of the colonial repartition of Versailles. Germany also possesses such rights which, if the entire question were to be opened up, would presumably prove to be much more indisputable. It would soon be seen that, as Colonel House expressed it on December 6th, 1935, in the Daily Mail, the colonial Powers would have to give up the idea that "he that hath, to him shall be given, and he that hath not, from him shall be taken away even that which he hath."

That the German nation will not waive these rights was made clear on September 10th, 1936, and January 30th, 1937, by the Leader and Chancellor, when he said:

The right of the German nation to live is just as great as the rights of other nations.

The demand for colonies in our thickly populated country is a matter of course and will constantly be raised.

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THE PEACE DEMONSTRATION IN BERLIN

Mussolini's Visit to Germany

"The Berlin meeting has resulted in an understanding between the two countries on definite problems some of which are particularly important at the present time. But this understanding, which was fixed in special instruments and duly signed, this vertical line between Berlin and Rome, is not a dividing line but rather an axis around which all European States who are inspired by a desire for co-operation and peace may work together."

With these words, uttered by Mussolini on November 1st, 1936 on the Cathedral Square at Milan, the Head of the Italian Government coined the famous expression, the "Berlin-Rome axis", which has since then not disappeared from the European discussion.

Before this speech by Mussolini there had been the meeting between himself and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. Between June 1934 and October 1936 there had been mutual visits of leading statesmen of the two countries and, lastly, at the end of October 1936 the visit of the Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano to Berlin and Berchtesgaden.

Revolutionary events which made a deep impression on European and world policy had in the mean time taken place, as a result of the foreign policy carried on by Germany and Italy which endeavoured to guarantee peace in new ways after the ruts of Geneva and Versailles had proved to be no longer feasible. Versailles divided the world into victors and vanquished, haves and have-nots, and Geneva endeavoured as far as possible to perpetuate this division. Italy, which belonged to the "victor States" and had received far-reaching promises from the other Allies did not find the fulfilment of her desires and claims in the dictated Peace of Versailles and saw the future of her constantly increasing population blocked. She therefore looked after herself. After years of internal reconstruction and armament of the entire nation, Mussolini recreated the Roman Empire and incorporated Abyssinia against the will of the whole world. In this connection Germany gave him from the outset the support of her strictest neutrality and was the first Power to recognise the Empire of Ethiopia, thus making a breach in the ban which

weighed so heavily on the relations of Italy with the sanctionist States and opening up the path for a settlement of the Abyssinian crisis. Germany was obliged in her struggle against Versailles and Geneva to secure her equality of rights. She restored her military sovereignty together with her sovereignty over the demilitarised Rhineland, and the other articles of the Versailles Treaty entailing discrimination against Germany were also removed. Thus the two States, though for different reasons, had to a considerable extent a common foreign policy after the War, especially as Mussolini was the only one of the statesmen of the former Allies to see through the disastrous policy of Versailles and constantly raised a warning voice against the madness of that policy.

This common line was, it is true, sometimes broken by differences of opinion regarding central European questions, but it always proved possible to come back to the great common points of view and lastly even to find complete agreement on the Austrian problem.

It is particularly in the Austrian question that entire success was reached by Adolf Hitler's new method of tackling and dealing with problems direct. All the prophecies of foreign countries that the German-Italian discussions might lead to any result except agreement in the Austrian question proved to be erroneous. Count Ciano's visit to Adolf Hitler in October 1936 here again proved the harmony and parallelism of the German-Italian press. While Germany acts on the basis of the agreement of June 11th, 1936, Italy bases herself on the Rome protocols, without the two lines bisecting or becoming entangled. This does not exclude cooperation. "The Austrian question", wrote the "Giornale d'Italia" on October 26th, 1936, "in which foreign countries look forward to a division between Italy and Germany, has been definitely cleared up."

* * *

The result of the discussions in the last few days of October 1936 was not laid down in secret treaties or other mysterious agreements, but was entered in a protocol, on the contents of which Count Ciano gave detailed information to the Munich press. His statements clearly showed

the extent of the German-Italian agreement and its general constructive character. All important present-day questions were included in the sphere of examination, and that not only in the sense of mutual interests, but with a view to preparing the way for practical, just and pacific cooperation of all European nations. In the thicket of confusion in which the European situation was placed, a clearing was made from which it was possible to make a further advance and also to place the relations with other Powers on a sounder basis. "In the tempestuous sea to which the European continent may be compared, an island was created, a strong indestructible bulwark of solidarity against world Bolchevism" (*Messaggero*) and its object was "to defend the great civilisatory institutions of Europe" (Count Ciano).

No pact or agreement was concluded, no new exclusive block of Powers was created, that any State or group of States could regard as directed against themselves. Not even the Soviet Union could take this view, for the political, economic and social attempts at disintegration of the Bolchevist Third International are to be guarded against while obviously maintaining the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of the Soviet Union, and the campaign is to be conducted on an ideological basis against an ideology which threatens western civilisation.

There was no question of creating a new system of alliances, but of well prepared contact by diplomatic means between two European Great Powers which, in view of a network of many-sided pacts and dangerous military alliances, desired to lay down the principles of future cooperation. The two countries are united by common fundamental views on the principles and conditions of a sound and secure European communal life in which no wrong turnings are taken and the germs of disease and danger are not disseminated.

In view of the fact that the life of the nations is governed not by abstract and arbitrarily interpreted formulae but by realities and concrete developments, the Berlin-Rome axis represents a new core, a new point of crystallisation for intelligent and calm cooperation in Europe.

The "*Frankfurter Zeitung*" wrote at the time:

"It will however depend entirely on the extent of honest European opinion, that is to say the honest opinion of the other States in respect of equality of rights, as to whether the European character and the European aim which determine our attitude remain pure and altruistic and are put into practice as we should wish. It will mean that France and England do not (as in the past) understand "Europe" quite differently from ourselves. The prison of Versailles is indeed broken open, but the paragraphs of Versailles concealed a policy and a sentiment of which too much still remains. It is important that the idea of "Europe" which is still very vague should be given firm points of crystallisation by means of friendships based on solid interests, but it is equally important that the sources of all centripetal forces should be stopped."

These sources have unfortunately not been stopped, and of the various points of the review carried out at that time between the Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano, the German Foreign Minister Baron von Neurath and the Führer and Chancellor, no progress has been made in the replacement of the Locarno agreement by a new western pact, in the position in the Danube

basin where there are still remains of the plans of Tardieu—and Hodza—, in the League of Nations problem, or in the Spanish question. The main reason for this is that, while appealing to false collectivity which camouflages egoistic plans and intentions under high sounding words, the creation of stable conditions is said to require the cooperation of the Soviet Union which proves by word and deed that it is on the contrary interested in disturbing international peace and in deliberately causing unrest and contention among the civilised nations.

On the contrary, in spite of the calm and objective and even favourable reports of Count Ciano's journey and its results, constant flank attacks were very soon made from the east and from the west against the axis; these were met by Mussolini in an interview granted to the "*Völkische Beobachter*" on January 17th, 1937, in which he said: "The establishment of the Berlin-Rome axis represents the beginning of a process of European consolidation. Attempts have been made to throw doubts upon the new Italo-German block. I have put an end to these attempts." In his Palermo speech on August 20th he again said: "One does not come to Rome by ignoring or going against Berlin, and one does not come to Berlin by ignoring or going against Rome. Between the two States there is effective solidarity. In order to make the political scope of this important statement quite clear, the "*Giornale d'Italia*" mentioned as one of the three conditions for any cooperation with Italy "the acceptance of the Rome-Berlin axis as a fundamental element for the agreement and cooperation of the nations of Europe."

* * *

As a result of these preliminary events in Italo-German relations, it was natural that the announcement of Mussolini's visit should be received with tense expectation throughout the world. Moreover—apart from a short visit to Switzerland in connection with the signature of the Locarno agreement—this is the first foreign journey undertaken by the Head of the Italian Government since the historical march on Rome. This fact alone was sufficient to stress the cordial political relations existing between Germany and Italy, which were now to become personally and ideologically deeper by the closer connection of the Duce with the German people. While the political side of the relations between the two States were settled in the protocols of October 1936, on this occasion in Munich and Berlin the main stress was laid on the human, popular and ideological side of the mutual relations. These were in a certain measure subjected to a plebiscite of the 115 million members of the two nations. In addition to the millions who cheered the Duce on his journey from Rome to Munich and from Munich to Berlin; in addition to the millions who acclaimed him enthusiastically in the streets and squares of Munich and Berlin; in addition to the millions who took part in the vast historical demonstration on the May Field in Berlin, there were millions in Germany and Italy who listened in to this meeting of the nations at which—just as nearly two thousand five hundred years ago the last delegates of Sparta on the market place of Athens directly addressed the members of a foreign State—for the first time the head of a foreign State stood at the side

of the German Führer and spoke face to face with the German people.

It was a symbolic act when the Olympic bell, which a year ago opened the peaceful rivalry between the flower of the nations, rang in the historical moment on the May Field with the Olympic greeting: I call the youth of the world. This was also the undertone of the two speeches which Hitler and Mussolini sent out beyond the 115 millions of their own people to the outer world, in the conviction that the young people in particular will be the first to understand the aims and ideas which are in the minds of the two leaders of their nations and to which they gave rousing expression. We call the peace of the world! This was the note which rose to heaven and re-echoed through the world at the night demonstration lit up by the Olympic flame.

On the May Field met two movements, two Empires, two nations and two "dictators", whose one and only aim extends far beyond their sphere of power: joint work for peace, for the building up of a young, new Europe, to which the Berlin-Rome axis as the bearing element must provide a real equilibrium.

The Berlin-Rome axis is not a dividing wall! This was the title of an article written by Count Ciano in a special number of the "Illustrazione Italiana" which appeared in the middle of September in connection with the Duce's journey to Germany. He wrote as follows:

"No one can see in our policy any intention of creating dangerous and menacing divisions. On more than one occasion it has been proved that the policy of Fascist Italy and that of National Socialist Germany follow two parallel lines. This was particularly clear in the case of the western pact, in the question of the security of Belgium, in the Austrian policy and more generally in the Danube basin, in the anti-Bolshevist attitude, in the matter of Spain and more particularly in the question of non-intervention, the territorial integrity of Spain and the recognition of the national Government of General Franco; these are all questions that have affected international activity in Europe in recent months. We have not formed a block. The Rome-Berlin axis is inspired by a true and profound feeling of cooperation between all nations, and there is nothing secret or mysterious about it. On the contrary, the practice of recent months has shown that the parallel policy of the two great authoritarian States of Europe is an extraordinarily useful factor of security and peace, a sign post to guide all the forces which desire to protect civilisation from the Bolshevist danger and to carry on fruitful and durable work of reconstruction."

"In short", wrote Dr. Goebbels in the same number, "the German and Italian nations are bound together by their common attitude towards the same European peace tasks, the same belief in hardy living, the same determination not to evade the solution of present international questions but to master them in the interest of a new European order."

On September 25th the semi-official "Giornale d'Italia" enumerated the four essential elements on which the two leaders wished their solidarity to be founded in the service of European peace:

1. that Fascism and National Socialism should find complete understanding and due respect as ideologies and State

systems among other nations, upon whom, however, they in no way desire to impose their movement;

2. that Germany and Italy should on every occasion and in all problems be granted a political, technical and, above all, moral equality of rights as against the other Great Powers in Europe;

3. that there should be greater comprehension and more respect for the vital rights and development of all nations, in other words that international justice should be exercised not only in words but also in deeds;

4. that, as a result of a growing feeling of European solidarity, all nations should regain that minimum of self-respect which qualifies them for joint defence against the forces of subversion and for an understanding of common dangers.

The director of the "Giornale d'Italia" pointed out in conclusion that these four points give "a realistic picture of the Rome-Berlin axis".

* * *

It would lessen their effect if we tried to deal specially with the significance of the toasts of the 27th and the speeches of the 28th September. They were spoken by the leaders to their peoples; they were clear and unequivocal and therefore much more comprehensible than the statements usually made at diplomatic and political meetings which are open to various interpretations.

Dr. Virginio Gayda, the director of the "Giornale d'Italia", gave the following summary of the results of the visit on September 30th in the "B.Z. am Mittag":

"The demonstration of the peoples on the May Field was the greatest plebiscite of New Europe. This plebiscite speaks to the peoples of this continent and, we hope, also to their Governments. For this grandiose demonstration of national forces concerned a mass of 115 million people dwelling in the centre of Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean."

"These 115 million people" Gayda continues, "have in particular three important characteristics in common: the revolutionary spirit, the will to solidarity and armed power. In addition, the two nations have the powerful figures of their two great leaders, who embody in their persons the unity of their peoples."

"The plebiscite brought confirmation of the complete agreement between the policy of Adolf Hitler and that of Benito Mussolini. This agreement exists especially in respect of the following important points:

1. The National Socialist and the Fascist regimes are of one mind not only in respect of their ideology, but also of their practical policy;

2. Germany and Italy are animated by the determination to maintain this solidarity with every means in respect of every international problem. For this purpose they will reject all political and diplomatic attempts to engage in the childish game of playing off Germany against Italy or Italy against Germany;

3. The plebiscite has given proud confirmation of the international right and also of the international responsibility of the two Governments and of the two nations;

4. The plebiscite was a demonstration of the realistic wish for peace of Germany and Italy. This wish for peace can only be realised by a far-reaching understanding of definite international problems. But understanding means international justice. Such justice cannot, however, be realised by doctrinary systems and treaties which generalise international questions ;

5. The plebiscite was a demonstration of the open, uncompromising fight against Bolshevism, the declared enemy of world peace."

Mussolini himself drew up the historical balance sheet of the meeting in the few sentences of his telegram of thanks sent to the Führer on September 30th on leaving German soil and in the speech which he made after his solemn entry into Rome to the hundreds of thousands gathered on the Piazza Venezia :

"These days have sealed the spiritual solidarity which binds National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, the firmness and concord of their principles and the indissolubility of their friendship . . .

The Italo-German friendship, confirmed in the policy of the Rome-Berlin axis, has today entered the hearts of the two nations and will remain there. The aims of this friendship are the close solidarity of the two revolutions, the re-birth of Europe and a peace between the nations that are worthy of the name."

* * *

The Berlin days are past. It may be noted with satisfaction that opinion in foreign countries, apart from Communist, Socialist and Left Radical circles, has been objective and in part favourable. The former either endeavour to construe the absence of official communiqués as implying some mysterious intentions on the part of the two "dictators" or to maintain that Mussolini returned "with empty hands". The Duce's visit to the Krupp works is adduced as a proof of the intentions in question. "This is ridiculous", writes the "Flämische Standard", "If War Ministers and high officers from countries friendly with France visit the Maginot Line and the Schneider-Creuzot works in France, if high officers and even Ministers in France inspect the Soviet Russian military arrangements and arms factories and the military experts of these two Powers

then meet at the airports and arms factories of Czechoslovakia, this is naturally done solely in the interest of peace."

The second argument shows the astonishing shortsightedness of the judgment of politicians and journalists who cannot imagine meetings of statesmen without business transactions. They regard success or failure as on a par with profit or loss in selling merchandise. They cannot imagine that, without written understandings or agreements, events such as those which occurred in Berlin in their frankness, good will and freedom from artificial legal formulæ possess an exemplary general value and exercise a beneficial and calming influence which makes its effect felt both spiritually and materially.

What Mussolini and Adolf Hitler attained in Berlin is a close and firm friendship between the two countries and a comradeship between their peoples, animated by honesty and sincerity in the pursuit of a great aim, namely, in the interest of the peace of Europe to erect a bulwark against the forms of degeneracy and the destructive tendencies of a Bolshevist rule of violence.

In these aims the two "dictators" stand far above the democratic dictatorship of Versailles which poisoned the post-war period and the injustice of which still forms the greatest obstacle for genuine and sincere collective cooperation.

The "Temps", the "Times", "Daily Telegraph", "Daily Mail", "Morning Post" and other papers did not say anything new when they pointed out that the Berlin-Rome axis was firmly and strongly built and was a reality, that its importance should not be under-estimated and that it had to be taken into account, and when they went on to say that these two Powers had not concluded an alliance the rigidity of which prevented cooperation with other Powers but that there were great possibilities for such cooperation because the desire for peace announced in Berlin was seriously meant. It is only to be hoped that these admissions will lead the way from the sterile policy of recent years and enable constructive power to commence a new era in European policy and a new formation of European history which may lead to a better future for the Continent ; in this respect September 28th, 1937 represents an important milestone and a fresh stage.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S SPEECH

On October 6th, 1937 President Roosevelt made a speech on the occasion of the inauguration of a bridge in Chicago, in which he dealt with the constant anxiety which the general political position caused among all peace-loving peoples and nations. In view of the present world position he considers that the foundations of civilisation are gravely threatened and also believes the United States of America to be in danger since armaments offer no security and authority no help. He spoke particularly against aerial warfare, the bombing of open towns and submarine piracy in the Mediterranean and then called upon the peace-loving nations to make a common effort to revive the laws and principles of peace.

In a second part of the speech, he spoke against the political and economic unrest in the world and gave a picture of the political situation as he saw it. He concluded with the statement that positive efforts must be made to maintain peace. America therefore took an active part in the search for peace.

* * *

We are accustomed to American censure and it is not the first time that President Roosevelt has held up a mirror to the old world in which its faults are shown up all the darker in proportion as a brighter light is thrown upon American merits. The celebrations of the armistice day generally provide

a good background for this. In the past twelve months the Pan-American Conference of Buenos Aires and the 150th jubilee of the American Constitution have provided suitable opportunities. On these occasions the refrain is always the same. Roosevelt says of European States that they proclaimed war as a means of attaining their national aims, that for this purpose they piled up armaments, that out of these dark intentions arose the system of autarchy, and that, since their economic activity was built up exclusively on the boom in armaments, there was nothing for them to do but to go to war if their economy was not to collapse like a house of cards.

When a statesman of the importance of Roosevelt makes speeches pointing out that the world position has become considerably worse, and when the effect of these speeches with their accusations against other nations obviously extends beyond the limits of his own country, he must be aware of the necessity of not only looking at outer signs but of getting to the bottom of matters and finding out the causes of the defects.

What European statesman would not be glad to speak in the name of the only Great Power within a radius of several thousand miles, possessing uncontested predominance on a continent the coasts of which are guarded by two oceans from a great part of the cares and dangers which have become the daily portion of European nations? The political and economic conditions existing in America are infinitely simpler than in other continents. The United States have not inherited historical experiences with the consequent tension of various kinds, and the clash of languages and nationalities such as exist in Europe; they have never played a decisive part; lastly, in view of the vast and almost inexhaustible territories and the sources of raw materials which cover all their requirements, the problem of over-population and self-supply has never attained any importance since the time when America became a politically independent factor.

This is no doubt also the reason why America often misunderstands and misinterprets events which occur in other parts of the world. In particular they apparently do not understand the extent of the injustice and its effect on the people suffering from it in Europe. In his opening speech in Buenos Aires, President Roosevelt rightly pointed out that a great deal of the distraction of Europe is due to the consequences of Versailles which were not desired—but were also not prevented—by his predecessor President Wilson. He said he was glad that he had not to stand before a Conference such as that in Paris which began by dividing up the spoils and finished by moving national groups like pawns from one State to another.

After President Roosevelt's own Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, had spoken strongly against Versailles only a few months ago, the South African Prime Minister, General Hertzog, on September 28th, 1937 at the Pretoria City Hall denounced the Treaty of Versailles as the cause of the present international distrust and the race in armaments. The war psychology of 1919, he asserted, persisted so strongly that in nearly every event of international importance in which victor confronted vanquished there was proof of its presence. The victors of 1919 could not rid themselves of the delusion that the victory of 1919 gave them a kind of sacred right in 1937—and in the future—to demand obedient submission from the vanquished to the terms of the treaty. The natural result was that the vanquished persisted in the same inexorable resistance and stubborn opposition with which they were inspired in 1919. It was quite

clear that unless there was a fundamental change in this mentality of European leaders the next European war would be the child of the Treaty of Versailles.

It cannot therefore be taken amiss in the New World if everyone, especially in Germany, still remembers the initiative taken at the end of the War by the then President of the United States in the sense of a reform and new order in international relations in accordance with the principles of right and morality. The weight of power thrown by the United States into the scale did, it is true, succeed in bringing the World War as such to an end. But the authority of the President was insufficient to secure acceptance to any extent of the principles of peace which he had proclaimed. For it can be confidently stated that post-War conditions—especially in respect of freedom, self-determination and satisfaction—have become much worse than ever before.

* * *

When at the present time a President of the United States again raises his voice in order to some extent to influence the conditions of the world and therefore also of Europe, there is some justice for the expectation that he will take up the threads where they were dropped by President Wilson. It is accordingly not enough to note that conditions are unsound and dangerous. But it is also necessary to make a sincere diagnosis of the causes of the present unrest and dissatisfaction. It is only then that useful proposals can be logically made to remedy and improve the conditions.

In his last speech Roosevelt avoided going into details—at any rate as far as Europe was concerned. He spoke in general terms of the "sanctity of treaties" without for his part making a distinction between treaties which are in accordance with international morality and those that are not. But there are some nations in Europe which have a rich but bitter experience in this direction.

We will again quote from General Hertzog, the Prime Minister of South Africa, in the reply which he gave to the appeal of the American Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, of July 16th, 1937. In this appeal Mr. Hull laid down the foundations of American foreign policy—renunciation of the application of force and intervention, sanctity of treaties, the necessity for a peaceful revision of obsolete treaties, the removal of obstacles to trade, the limitation of armaments, the renunciation of alliances—and transmitted it to the American representatives abroad with a request that the various foreign governments should give their views.

General Hertzog said in his reply that he could not help thinking that, if the Union was in the position of a State fighting against an injustice imposed upon it and perpetuated by an agreement concluded at the point of the bayonet, such an agreement would have little claim to any measure of sanctity. It would certainly have no claim to sanctity at all if it were concluded in a manner violating the ordinary customs of war or the laws of international conscience. Before it could be said that such an agreement was in accordance with the principle of the sanctity of treaties, equitable measures should in his opinion first be taken to clear it of all exaggerations. In other words, before the principle of the sanctity of treaties was applied to an agreement, a State which had suffered injustice should first have the right to examine the treaty conditions.

"We have" wrote the "Times" on August 4th, "heard and seen much in recent years of one-sided repudiation of treaty clauses; but may not unilateral denunciation have been a

consequence of unilateral imposition ? . . . There has been failure to realise that, if the Kellogg Pact " (the failure of which Roosevelt especially regrets in his speech) " insists on eliminating war as the instrument of change which it has always been, then some other method must be found. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so political nature abhors the status quo . "

President Roosevelt went on to speak of rearmament and the growing expenditure on armaments, of countries that are aggressive and others who only use their armaments for defence, again without giving any satisfactory characteristics distinguishing them. He forgot to mention that the competition in armaments, with its extremely serious consequences, is due to the fact that certain States felt they could not give up the overwhelming military supremacy which they gained after the collapse of Germany.

If Germany was finally compelled to rearm, the reason was the same as that given by England, France and even America in justification of their armaments programmes ; it was reduced by Mussolini and also by the French Minister for War, M. Daladier—the former on June 11th at Cattaneo in Sicily and the latter on the conclusion of the great manoeuvres at Alençon on September 17th—to the simple formula : A nation that will not bear its own arms will end up by bearing those of others One does not seek the friendship of the weak but of the strong . President Roosevelt's statement that the reinforcement of armaments is intended to abolish those injustices with the sword is undoubtedly incorrect. The Leader of the country which suffered the greatest injustice from the Versailles Treaty has stated often enough and without reservation that he knows of no problem which could not be settled by peaceful means.

When Roosevelt went on to speak in particular against aerial warfare, the bombardment of open towns and submarine warfare, it may be pointed out that it was Germany during the Disarmament Conference and her Leader and Chancellor after its break-down who constantly demanded the prohibition or abolition of these methods of warfare and arms, and that no account was taken of these demands by the other Great Powers.

President Roosevelt avoided going into the menace to all States and nations constituted by Bolshevism and also into the constantly repeated attempts of the Soviet Union in the Spanish conflict at the decisive moment to torpedo any possibility of a détente. The Soviet Union's great purchases of armaments for the equipment of the Red Navy, as shown by the licence reports of the State Department, however, constitute an obstacle to this attitude.

Roosevelt again expressed the view that the peace, freedom and security of 90 % of the population of the world are threatened by the remaining 10 % who disregard the principles of

international law. These 90 % should find ways and means of asserting their will. The moral conscience of the world, he said, must recognise to the full the importance of removing injustices and pay attention to justified claims.

These remarks cause the Polish newspaper " Express Poranny " to point out that not only 90 % of the population of the world is peaceful and 10 % aggressive, but that also about 90 % of all raw materials are in the hands of the satisfied nations and the remaining 10 % in the hands of the hungry nations, which however form a much greater number than the satisfied. Two-thirds of the surface of the globe is in the hands of nine colonial States, while five States alone—Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Holland—produce 80 % of all the iron and cotton, 75 % of the coal and oil, 95 % of the rubber, 50 % of the copper and nearly 90 % of the gold. It is not enough, says the paper, to complain of the aggressiveness of certain nations and to regard certain State constitutions as a danger. These are to a great extent also the result of the disproportion in the distribution of resources. Democracy, political and economic liberalism, it continues, form the constitution of the rich nations, but cannot be afforded by the poor. The origin of the wars in Africa and the Far East was overpopulation or the lack of raw materials of one or the other country.

When, lastly, President Roosevelt holds up the constitution and State form of the United States, i.e. democracy as a whole, as a shining example for other countries, it may be pointed out in reply that the peoples and nations create out of their own means the State form best suited to their character and tasks, and none of them can claim that their own is the original and ideal standard for all. We have indeed learned to know that democracy which, under the threat of violence and hunger, at Versailles imposed upon us a dictated Peace, in which the last word was not spoken by reason and justice, but we have seen nothing of its blessings. It was with democracies that the German people concluded the preliminary peace of November 5th, 1918, and those democracies had the opportunity in Paris of reconstructing with a greater measure of justice the world which collapsed in the War. They failed so completely that America withdrew in spite of the fact that the first signature under the preliminary peace and under the Treaty of Versailles was that of an American President. And Roosevelt himself has on various occasions refused the admission of the United States into the crown of democratic world order, the League of Nations.

When the President of the United States thus considers that salvation lies in the union of the peaceful nations and the intimidation of the evil nations, such a proposal has only a practical meaning if it is first made clear what is meant by good and evil. The criteria which he has hitherto put forward are however insufficient for such a distinction.

APHORISMS ON «DISARMAMENT»

Through British Rearmament to Disarmament and to Peace

British Declarations

In our special number of February 2nd 1937 "Europe in Arms", we described in detail the course of British rearmament policy. Since that time there has been no change in the tendency of that policy, but on the contrary its fundamental tone has been strengthened by the support of the Labour Party which was granted by an overwhelming majority. "There is more joy over one sinner repented than over ninety-nine just men", cried Chamberlain with deliberate irony. In a world that is arming, Great Britain cannot remain unarmed, especially as this rearmament serves not only and primarily British security, but in addition the strengthening of the League of Nations, the development of collective security, and the disarmament which is still hoped for; it is therefore in the interest of peace. Lord Snell characterised this tendency in the debate in the House of Lords on March 3rd with the words: "We regard other people's armaments as dangerous, and our own as harmless, necessary furnishings in the temple of peace".

There can be no halt, said Mr. Chamberlain on October 8th at Scarborough, until Europe has returned to sanity. When does Mr. Chamberlain consider this position has been reached. Can Europe return to sanity at all in this armour plate (for Mr. Chamberlain surely does not regard it as remedy) and in that case what will happen to these armaments of a strength and extent never before attained or attempted in British history?

THE BRITISH REARMAMENT PLAN OF FEBRUARY 17TH, 1937 (WHITE PAPER CMD 5374) BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, justified new rearmament plan, on February 17th, 1937:

"It is absolutely essential for us to equip ourselves at home and along the lines of communication with the newest methods of repelling attack. We must provide forces which are capable of being dispatched wherever they may be wanted. We cannot afford to allow our fighting forces to go into field to meet others better armed than themselves.

The White Paper shows where and how the cost is going to be incurred and while it does not provide details of cost, though this, of course will in due time be provided in the Estimates laid before the House, it does for the first time make an effort in public to estimate the order of the total expenditure on defence which we have to contemplate during the next five years. Even this figure of £1,500,000,000 cannot be regarded as final for certain. If circumstances should change and allow us to slow down or reduce our programme, all the better; we shall be thankful enough to do it. On the other hand, as conditions have changed to our disadvantage since we first contemplate this programme they may change again, and it may be that in the end we shall find that even £1,500,000,000 has not represented the total amount that this country has been compelled to spend in this respect.

Our programme is not directed against any particular Power or group of Powers, but it is the duty of the Government to put before the House a programme which they consider necessary for our safety and the fulfilment of our obligations.

Everybody knows that the British Empire stands for peace, and that it never will use its forces for aggressive purposes. On the contrary it will exert all its influence to preserve peace not only for itself but for others as well. We know from our own experience that our influence waxes and wanes in proportion to our strength. The strength that we are now rapidly gaining from day to day and from week to week is in itself a steady

factor in international affairs, and probably the greatest bulwark for peace that exists in the world to-day. Holding these views, convinced as we are that this great programme is essential for our own safety and the major factor in the safety of other nations it would be impossible for us to shrink from meeting it.

No one, least of all the Chancellor of the Exchequer, can see this growing accumulation of burdens without a feeling of disgust and shame that civilization is trying to break its own back instead of trying to settle its differences by give and take, and turning its energy to the pursuits which might bring prosperity and contentment to all. For the time being at least we can do nothing but set our teeth and go forward with measures which we cannot afford to lay aside. Peace, political appeasement, disarmament are not attainable by any one Power alone, but whenever and wherever we can find others who share our views, we shall rejoice in their company to seek to find a more fruitful, a saner, and a worthier solution."

Sir Samuel Hoare, First Lord of the Admiralty, justified the Naval Estimates (£105,000,000) on March 11th, 1937:

"The House is being asked to vote £105,000,000 for a new construction programme of 80 new ships. Following immediately on last year's programme, the demand means that at the end of this year we shall have under construction no less than 148 new ships of war. From one point of view that is a very big programme: from another point of view, however, it is a reasonable programme. Its very size is evidence not of any now policy, but of the fact that for one reason or another over a long period of years we have failed to make the normal replacements. The result is that we have to telescope a programme into two or three years that in the ordinary course would have taken a decade or more."

Sir P. Sass of Under-Secretary of State for Air justified the Air Estimates (£82,500,000) on March 15th, 1937:

"It is my duty this afternoon to introduce the largest Air Estimates which have ever been presented to this House. The net Estimate of £82,500,000, compares with an average figure of some £18,000,000 asked for by the Ministry in pre-expansion years. It shows an increase of nearly £32,000,000 on the total of the Estimates of 1936.

The magnitude of this figure gives rise to mingled feelings of disappointment and relief. All must regret the necessity to expend so vast a sum on military preparation. Yet all must feel relief that proper steps are being taken to safeguard our own country against attack and to fulfil our international obligations. In previous years I have been careful to point out that our expansion in no way meant that we had abandoned our hope of securing an air pact and a general stabilization of air armaments. Neither have we abandoned that hope to-day. On the contrary, we regard its realization as a matter of paramount importance. We shall seize instantly every opportunity to achieve it. Until such opportunity offers, however, we have no choice but to proceed with our plans.

A British Air Force strong, ready, and well equipped, is one of the greatest contributions which this country can make to the peace of the world."

Mr. Duff Cooper, Secretary of State for War, justified the Army Estimates (£90,000,000) on March 16th, 1937:

He said that when he introduced the Army Estimates last year he had pointed out that it was extremely fortunate that at the time of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute no similar emergency had occurred in any part of the Empire or the world.

He said that if such an emergency had occurred it would have taxed our military resources to the breaking point.

It was as fortuitous as it was fortunate that the emergency in Palestine arose a few months after the Italo-Abyssinian dispute had been liquidated so far as this country was concerned.

He mentioned these facts to emphasize the pressing need of retaining in England a force of a certain size which might be required, when and where they could not say and against whom they could not say, a force sufficiently strong and well equipped to be dispatched at a moment's notice to meet any adversary in any part of the world. It might be questioned whether, seeing how different were the obligations that our Army might be called upon to fulfil, it was wise to maintain only one Army for so many and diverse purposes; and whether the same force could possibly be equally well adapted to fight against tribesmen on the mountains of Asia and against a modern mechanized force on the plains of Europe. That was a very pertinent and far-reaching inquiry, and it was impossible to reply in the affirmative that one force was equally well adapted to meet these two contingencies.

But this country was limited by material considerations. We were limited in the amount of military equipment which we could possibly maintain. Whether it would be possible to divide that equipment into two parts, maintaining one for Imperial service and another for short service at home, with the possibility of taking part in a European war should such a war occur and should it be decided that we should take any part on land at all—that was an inquiry which he assured the House was being closely considered by the War Office.

After 15 years of continuous reduction in every branch of the Army they were attempting in three years to bring the Army up to the point which it would have reached if those 15 years had been devoted to continuous expenditure and development.

Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer at Edinburgh, March 5th, 1937:

"In 1933 the Defence Estimates were £109,000,000. Last year they were £158,000,000 and Supplementary Estimates brought the figure up to £188,000,000. This year there is an addition of £278,000,000. He proceeded:

Paradoxical as it may seem, certain that the process of rearmament is a necessary preliminary to the possibility of a general disarmament."

Sir John Simon, Home Secretary, speaking at a National Government demonstration of Plymouth, March 20th, 1937 said:

Britain remained firmly devoted to the cause of peace and to the promotion of those better international relations which was the purpose for which the League of Nations was founded. But at the present moment, out of the seven most powerful States in the world, three—namely, the U.S.A., Japan and Germany were outside the League altogether, while Italy, a fourth among the seven great Powers was acutely critical of the League. These things must have a profound effect upon the League ideal of collective security, viewed not as an ideal but as a going concern. There were some people who were tempted to refuse to face these facts, and they repeated this phrase "collective security" almost as though it was a charm or an incantation with the mysterious property of guaranteeing this country from all possible danger. But the safety of this country could not depend on a phrase, and in the world as they found it, their defence policy was the necessary means by which Britain could discharge her responsibilities and fulfil her international obligations. A stronger Britain was not a threat of war but a contribution to world peace.

**The British Rearmament in the Empire
Conference at London (May 15th-June 15th, 1937)
(Extract from the "Times" of June 16th, 1937)**

The discussions about the Empire Defence began with a review of the events which led up to the adoption by his Majesty's

Government in the United Kingdom of their rearmament programme, and of defence problems generally. The members of the Conference noted with deep concern that since the session of 1930 international tension had increased in a marked degree, and that there had been a large and rapid increase in the armaments of all the principal Powers. They were impressed by the world-wide effect of these increased armaments on the international situation and on the financial and economic position of the nations concerned, and while their respective Parliaments had already recognized the necessity for taking measures to put their defences in order, they thought it of the highest importance that negotiations for the limitation of armaments should be reopened whenever there was a reasonable prospect of success. They recognized with regret that, notwithstanding the measure of success in the limitation of armaments attained by the countries concerned in the London Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments of March 25th, 1936, and in the Anglo-German Agreement of June 18th, 1935, international conditions were not at the moment favourable to further progress in the direction of disarmament. At the same time, however, they acclaimed the efforts now being made to extend naval limitation to other countries.

The statements made to the Conference by the Delegation of the United Kingdom concerning the rearmament programme of the United Kingdom reported the further developments in the organization of the Committee of Imperial Defence, notably in improving the arrangements for joint planning between the three Defence Services and for the mobilization of industry.

Attention was also drawn to the important progress made in recent years in the standardization by the Governments concerned of the training and equipment of the Defence Forces in different parts of the Empire, as well as in uniformity of administrative practice in defence matters. Reference was made to the increasing importance of the industrial side of defence owing to the progress of technical development in armaments, and emphasis was placed on the advantages attending cooperation in the production and supply of munitions and raw materials as well as of food and feeding stuffs to meet the several requirements of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India, and the Colonial Empire.

The discussion was continued by the Delegations representing the Dominions and India. The Conference was informed of the developments in the Canadian Defence Forces from 1926 to the present time. After considerable reductions in 1931 increased appropriations had recently been made for the Defence Services of the Dominion. The strength of the Canadian Naval and Air Forces had been increased, the Militia had been completely reorganized, and a policy of modernization and mechanization of equipment had been adopted. The industrial aspect of defence preparations had received close attention and a Committee of the Cabinet had been appointed to maintain active supervision of defence problems.

The defence organization of the Commonwealth of Australia next received consideration. The great importance from the Australian point of view on the Singapore base was noticed. The Conference was informed of the large increases in the defence votes in Australia under a Three Years' Programme commenced in 1934, and that a new Four Years' Programme overlapping the last year of the other Programme had been put in hand.

As affecting the whole field of defence, great importance was attached by the Australian Delegation to the development of cooperation in defence matters between the several parts of the British Commonwealth.

The Conference was informed that his Majesty's Government in New Zealand also attached the greatest importance to close co-operation in defence matters. The Government were anxious to make sure that expenditure on the three Services was properly balanced and laid out so as best to enable the New

Zealand forces to act in the most efficient way possible not only in the local defence of their country but also in Commonwealth defence in cooperation with the forces of other countries of the Commonwealth. In this connexion great importance was attached to the Singapore base.

With regard to the Union of South Africa, it was recalled that matters of principle had been discussed and agreed between the Union Minister for Defence, Mr. Pirow, and United Kingdom Ministers during the visit of Mr. Pirow to London in 1936. South African expenditure on defence had recently been greatly increased, being in the last year nearly three times as much as in 1932-33.

The Conference was informed that the Defence Forces of India are designed primarily to meet a possible attack on the North West Frontier and to cope with the ever-present problem of dealing with the tribesmen in that region, in addition to maintaining internal law and order. It was recognized that the Army in India is fully equipped for these purposes and constitutes a force which is as well prepared as any other to take the field if the occasion arises.

The Conference took note of the measures, recently adopted by the various countries represented at the Conference, often at a heavy cost, and recognized that the increased programmes of armaments were no more than sufficient for the defence of their territories and trade and the fulfilment of such obligations as each might have assumed.

The Conference recognized the vital importance of measures to safeguard maritime communications, including routes and waterways essential to defence and trade, and to provide naval bases and facilities for repairs and fuelling of ships. The Conference accordingly was glad to be informed that steps have been taken with these ends in view and in particular that substantial progress has been made towards the completion of the naval base at Singapore and its defences, with the aid of the generous financial assistance received from various parts of the Empire.

The Conference heard with satisfaction of the important steps taken by his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the maintenance of a Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength to afford adequate protection against attack by the strongest air force which may be at any time within striking distance of the shores of the United Kingdom. In this connexion the Conference took note of the extensive preparations that are being made by his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the spheres of both active and passive defence against air invasion.

The Conference also recorded the progress made by the several Governments in creating and maintaining an adequate chain of air bases and refuelling stations along the lines of communications between the different parts of the Empire.

The Conference noted with satisfaction that in accordance with recommendations of previous Conferences a common system of organization and training and the use of uniform manuals, patterns of arms, equipment, and stores had been adopted, as far as practicable, for the naval, military, and air forces of their several countries. Each of them would thus be enabled to ensure more effectively its own security and, if it so desired, to cooperate with other countries of the Commonwealth with the least possible delay. The interchange of individual officers of the naval, military, and air forces of the countries was recognized as conducing to the dissemination of the experience acquired by the officers concerned under the widely different conditions existing in various parts of the Empire. Defence Councils or Committees have been established in the Dominions.

The Conference gave careful attention to the question of munitions and supplies. At the same time the Conference recognized that it is the sole responsibility of the several Parliaments of the British Commonwealth to decide the nature and scope of their own defence policy.

Bishop's Plea for Arms

The Bishop of Winchester, Dr. Cyril Garbett pleaded for rearmament in the interests of liberty and peace in a presidential address to the Winchester Diocesan Conference on September 28th.

He said that it was now clear that the League of Nations could neither prevent nor stop a war if a great Power had decided to wage it. He saw no advantage in trying to revise its constitution, and the League must be content with a much more modest rôle than that for which it was intended.

Dr. Garbett added: "In view, therefore, of the danger of the international situation and the proved inability of the League to prevent war, rearmament becomes inevitable. History gives many instances of nations losing their liberty though they have fought bravely for it, but as far as I know there is no record of a nation preserving its liberty though it refused to defend it."

"I wish that our pacifist critics would recognise that those of us who support rearmament hate war and long for peace as genuinely and zealously as they do. We differ from them because we hold that a defenceless peace-loving nation with vast possessions is a direct incentive to war. Unilateral disarmament is dangerous in the world which is armed to the teeth."

"But rearmament will not only safeguard our own freedom, it will help us to make what may well prove a vital contribution to the peace of the world."

From the speech by Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister at the Conservative Party Congress at Scarborough. (October 7th-8th, 1937):

"Till the world recovers some of its sanity, there can be no halt in the process of rearming this country. On that point there is practically only one opinion now, since the chairman of the Labour Party Conference, in the sole passage of his rumbustious speech which has attracted any attention outside, declared that this country must be powerfully armed. (Mr. Chamberlain here alluded to the Labour Party Congress held at the same time at Bournemouth, whose rearmament resolution was accepted with 2,169,000 votes against 262,000, after the Trade Union Congress held at Norwich in its vote on September 10th pronounced for rearmament with 3,544,000 against 262,000 voices.) I must say, frankly, that progress is not yet as fast as I should like, or as it soon will be. I am glad to say that this preparatory stage is now practically completed and that production has begun in earnest. All three services are sharing in the general activity. No military problem, great or small, will be overlooked, and that though our army will not compare in size with the huge conscript armies of the Continent, it will, when fully equipped, be thoroughly adapted to the task it has to fulfil.

As for the Navy, the aggregate tonnage now being built or already sanctioned by Parliament for the British Navy exceeds half a million tons, while the naval personnel is being extended at rate never attempted before in time of peace.

It is perhaps the condition of the Air Force which has been the subject of the greatest amount of attention, and some anxiety has been expressed about the pace at which it is expanding. Powerful machines unsurpassed in design and equipment are now steadily coming forward from the manufacturers. The volume of supply will very soon be greatly augmented. You have heard of the shadow factories. Where 12 months ago was nothing but bare ground, aeroplane shops have sprung up. The result of all this, and of the ready response to the call for men, which shows no sign of diminishing, can be seen in the fact that in the space of the last two years the strength of our home-based force has been nearly trebled, an expansion at a rate and on a scale never attempted before.

Documents

I. MUSSOLINI'S VISIT TO GERMANY AND THE BERLIN-ROME AXIS

THE DEMONSTRATION ON THE MAY FIELD IN BERLIN ON SEPTEMBER 28TH, 1937

Adolf Hitler's speech

Men and women! We are witnesses of an historical event such as has never before taken place in this form and to this extent.

Over a million people have gathered here for a demonstration in which 115 million members of two nations are taking part with warm sympathy, and which is followed with more or less interest by hundreds of millions of people in the rest of the world.

Our first emotion at this moment is the great joy at seeing in our midst one of those lonely men of the times who are not tried by history, but who themselves make history.

In the second place we feel that this demonstration is not one of the meetings which constantly take place elsewhere but that it represents a confession of common ideals and common interests. A confession expressed by two men and heard by a million, but awaited and approved with warm hearts by 115 millions. Thus, this evening is not a meeting of peoples, but a demonstration of peoples.

The deepest significance of this demonstration of peoples is the sincere desire to guarantee to our countries that peace which is not the reward of a cowardly abdication, but the result of a responsible securing of our national, intellectual and physical welfare, and of our cultural substance and values. Thereby we believe we can best serve those interests which are not only the interests of our two nations but should be those of the whole of Europe.

If we are able to hold this demonstration today, we thereby take stock of the changes in the period that lies behind us. No nation can desire peace more than Germany, but no nation has learned to know better than ourselves the terrible results of weak confidence. For behind us — before the entry into power of National Socialism — lies a period of fifteen years which were a series of oppressions, blackmail, the refusal of equal rights and therefore of unspeakable moral and material distress.

The ideals of liberalism and democracy in our country did not save the German nation from the most dreadful violations imaginable in history. National Socialism had therefore to erect a new and more effective ideal, in order to restore to our people those general rights of humanity which had been refused them for fifteen years. During this period of bitter trial, I must today state before the German people and the whole world, Italy and, in particular, Fascist Italy took no part in the humiliation of our people. During those years she showed understanding for the claims of a great nation to equal rights, for her bare living and, not least, for her national honour.

It filled us, therefore, with sincere satisfaction that an hour came in which we could remember that and, I believe, have remembered.

Out of the similar nature of the Fascist and National-Socialist revolutions there is arising to-day not only a community of views but of action. But this is fortunate at a time and in a world in which the tendencies of destruction and deformation are everywhere evident.

Fascist Italy through the genius and work of one creative man has become a new Empire.

You, Benito Mussolini, will in the last few days have seen with your own eyes the facts of the National Socialist State.

Germany, in her national attitude and her military strength, has again become a Great Power. The power of these two States

today forms the strongest guarantee of the safeguarding of Europe which still possesses a sense of its cultural mission and is not prepared to fall a prey to destructive elements.

For all you who are gathered here or are listening in the world must recognise that two independent national regimes have found the way to each other and have met at the same time as the ideas of the democratic Marxist international can show everywhere nothing but demonstrations of hatred and therefore of discord.

Every attempt to divide such a unity of peoples by playing off one against the other, by casting suspicions or alleging untrue aims, will fail before the wish of the 115,000,000 taking part in this demonstration, as also, in particular, before the wills of the two men who stand before you and speak to you here.

Benito Mussolini's speech

Comrades! The visit that I am paying to Germany and her Leader, and the speech that I am holding before you, represent an important point in the life of our two nations and also in my own. The demonstrations with which I have been received have deeply moved me.

My visit should not be measured by the same standard as the usual diplomatic-political visits. The fact that I have come to Germany to-day does not mean that I shall be travelling somewhere else to-morrow.

I have come not merely as head of the Italian Government but above all in my capacity as the head of a national revolution, which thereby wishes to give a proof of its close connexion with your revolution. The course of both revolutions may have been different; but the goal they have wished to reach and have reached is the same: the unity and greatness of the nation.

Fascism and National Socialism are both expressions of that similarity in historical events in the life of our nations who have reached unity in the same century and by the same event.

There are no secret intentions hidden behind my visit to Germany. Nothing will be planned here to divide a Europe which is already divided enough. The solemn confirmation of the fact and stability of the Rome-Berlin axis is not directed against other States. We National-Socialists and Fascists want peace, and we shall be always ready to work for peace, a real, fruitful peace which does not silently ignore, but solves the questions arising from the life of the peoples.

To the whole world, which is asking tensely what the result of this meeting will be, war or peace, the Führer and I can answer with a loud voice: Peace.

Just as Fascism has for fifteen years given Italy outwardly and spiritually a new countenance, your revolution has given Germany a new countenance: new, even if it is formed, as in Italy, according to the loftiest and most imperishable traditions which are compatible with the necessities of modern life. I desired to see for myself this countenance of New Germany. And, on seeing it, I am now more than ever convinced that this New Germany—in her strength, her justified pride and her desire for peace—is a basic element of European life.

I believe that the reason for much misunderstanding and distrust between the nations is that those responsible are not aware of the new reality which is arising. The life of the nations, like that of individuals, is not something that is fixed once for all, but

is subject to a constant process of change. It is a mistake which may prove fatal to judge a nation on the basis of figures and descriptions or of writings of twenty or fifty years ago. This mistake is often committed against Italy. If the national revolutions of Germany and Italy were better known, many prejudices would disappear and many points of conflict would lose their justification.

We have many elements of our ideology in common. Not only have National Socialism and Fascism everywhere the same enemies who serve the same master—the third International—but they have many conceptions of life and history in common. Both believe in will as the determining power in the life of the nations and as the driving force of their history, and therefore reject the teachings of so-called historical materialism and its political and philosophical by-products.

Both glorify work, in its innumerable forms, as the sign of human nobility. Both are based on the young people, whom we train to discipline, courage, resistance, love of the fatherland and contempt for easy living.

The resurrected Roman Empire is the work of this new spirit with which Italy is inspired. The German rebirth is also the work of a spiritual force, of faith in an idea, in which at first only one man believed—then a crowd of heroes and martyrs, then a minority, and lastly an entire nation.

Germany and Italy follow the same goal in the sphere of economic autarchy. Without economic independence the political independence of a nation is doubtful, and a nation of great military power may become the victim of an economic blockade.

We experienced this danger in all its directness when 52 nations assembled at Geneva decided upon criminal economic sanctions against Italy. Those sanctions were carried out with extreme rigour, but did not attain their object and even gave Fascist Italy an opportunity of proving her powers of resistance to the world.

In spite of all inducements Germany did not take part in the sanctions. We shall never forget that.

That is the point at which, for the first time, the existence of a necessary cooperation between National-Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy appeared. What the world now knows as the Rome-Berlin axis arose in the autumn of 1935, and has worked in the last two years for the ever stronger rapprochement of our two peoples to each other, as for the growing political strengthening of the peace of Europe.

Fascism has its ethics, to which it intends to remain true, and these ethics are identical with my own morals: to speak clearly and openly and when one has a friend to march with him to the end.

All arguments which our oponents bring to bear are invalid; neither in Germany nor in Italy is there a dictatorship, but there are forces and organisations which serve the people. No Government, in no part of the world, has the approval of the people to the same extent as the Governments of Germany and Italy. The greatest and richest democracies in the world today are the German and Italian.

In other countries, under cover of the "inviolable rights of mankind", policy is governed by the forces of money, of capital, of secret societies and of political groups in strife with one another. In Germany and Italy there can be no question whatever of private forces influencing the policy of the State.

This community of ideas in Germany and Italy has found expression in the struggle against Bolshevism, the modern form of the darkest Byzantine arbitrary force, that unbelievable exploitation of the credulity of the lower classes, that government of famine, bloodshed and slavery. Since the War, Fascism has fought with the utmost energy against this form of human degeneration which lives on lies; it has fought with words and with arms. For

when words are insufficient and when threatening circumstances demand, arms must be taken up.

We have acted in this way in Spain, where thousands of Italian Fascist volunteers have fallen to save European culture, that culture which may still experience a rebirth if it turns its back upon the false, lying gods of Geneva and Moscow and turns towards the luminous truths of our revolution.

Comrades, I have nearly finished. We and you make no propaganda in the ordinary sense of the word outside our own frontiers in order to obtain adherents. We believe that truth itself possesses enough power to penetrate everywhere and that it will ultimately be victorious. The Europe of tomorrow will be Fascist by the logical force of circumstances and not by our propaganda. It is twenty years since your great Führer shouted to the masses the rousing cry which was to become the war cry of the entire German people:

Germany, awake!

Germany has awakened. The Third Reich is there.

I know not whether and when Europe will awake, as was said at the Party Rally at Nuremberg, for secret, but to us well enough known, forces are at work to turn a civil war into a world conflagration. What is important is that our two great nations—who in human beings make the immense mass of 115,000,000—stand together in a single, unshatterable determination. The proof of that is to-day's gigantic demonstration.

THE TOASTS AT THE RECEPTION IN THE REICHSKANZLEI ON SEPTEMBER 27TH, 1937

Adolf Hitler.

Your Excellency!

As Leader and Chancellor of the German nation I have the great honour and joy to be able to welcome Your Excellency most cordially to the capital of the Reich.

The German nation with me in this festive hour greets in you the genius that created Fascist Italy, the founder of a new Empire.

On your journey through Germany your Excellency will have appreciated from the great enthusiasm with which you were received by all classes of the German nation that your visit meant more to us than a merely diplomatic event and a purely conventional meeting.

At a time in which the world is full of tensions and alarming confusions, in which the most dangerous elements attempt to attack and destroy the civilization of Europe, Germany and Italy have found themselves in sincere friendship and common political cooperation.

This cooperation rests not only on the same indestructible will to live and assert themselves, but, in addition, on related political ideals which we are convinced are a basis of the internal strength and firmness of our States. These common fundamental political principles constitute a tie binding our peoples, and there operates in the same direction the fact that in the real vital interests of Italy and Germany there are no factors separating them, but only factors of a complementary or unifying nature. The conversations which have taken place between your Excellency and myself in the last few days have confirmed this anew.

We believe that the safeguarding of peace and of the most precious flowers of European civilization are not to be attained by the creation of a bloc directed against other European States. We are, on the contrary, convinced that through our common work we serve best not only the interests of our two countries but in addition the objective of a general international understanding, which lies close to our hearts.

It this spirit Germany and Italy will examine and deal side by side with the political tasks, so as to oppose every attempt to separate the two nations or even to play one off against the other.

I raise my glass and drink to the health of the King of Italy, Emperor of Ethiopia, your exalted Sovereign, as well as to the personal well-being of your Excellency and to the greatness and prosperity of the Fascist Italian nation.

Benito Mussolini.

Your Excellency!

The cordial words of greeting which Your Excellency was so kind as to address to me have deeply touched me.

Since I have been on German soil I have felt everywhere around me the spiritual atmosphere of a great, friendly people, of brown-shirted Germany, the Germany of Adolf Hitler.

I greet in the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich the warrior who has restored to the German nation the consciousness of its greatness. I greet in him the re-creator of the nation with which Fascist Italy is allied by so many ties of spirit and of work.

The Fascist revolution and the National-Socialist revolution were and are creative revolutions. Germany and Italy have created on their soil great works of culture and progress. New and not less great works will rise in the future.

During my stay in Germany I have seen and admired such works of culture and progress. I saw and admired the will to live and create which inspires the German people; their manliness, their will, their faith. The German-Italian solidarity is a living and active solidarity. It is not a result of political calculations or diplomatic subtleties but the expression and result of national homogeneity and common interests.

It is not and does not aspire to be an exclusive bloc distrustfully and fearfully shutting out the rest of the world. Italy and Germany are ready to collaborate with all other nations of good will. What they demand is respect and understanding for their needs, their necessities, and their legitimate claims. As the sole condition for their friendship they demand only that no attempt is made to disturb the bases of our glorious European culture.

The conversations which I have had with your Excellency in the last few days have strengthened our friendship and made it impervious to every attempt to disturb and divide from whatever side it may come.

When I return to Italy I shall take with me the memory of your powerful troops, of your popular demonstrations, of the spiritual and technical reconstruction which the German people has accomplished under your leadership; the recollection of your power of achievement, and of the reception you have prepared for me, for which I am most deeply grateful to you. But, above all, I take with me the certain consciousness of our fast friendship.

I raise my glass to the health of the Führer and Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, to the prosperity and greatness of National-Socialist Germany.

Mussolini's thanks to the Führer.

On leaving German soil, the Duce addressed the following telegram to the Führer from Kufstein:

"In memory of the unforgettable days which I have spent with you and in the midst of your splendid people, in gratitude for the reception which I was given by you and the German nation, with a heart full of the drama of vigour, work, and faith which your land proudly shows in its powerful re-birth, my thoughts go out to your Excellency once more as I cross the German frontier.

These days have sealed the spiritual solidarity which binds National-Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, the firmness and harmony of their purposes, and the indissolubility of their friendship. They have deepened and revived my admiration for your work and my friendship for your person.

Accept with the renewed expression of my gratitude my most sincere and heartiest wishes for you and your great country. In expectation of greeting you in Italy.

Mussolini."

THE ERECTION OF THE "BERLIN-ROME AXIS"

The Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, paid his first foreign visit from October 21st to 25th, 1936 to the friendly German Reich. From October 21st to 23rd he was the guest of the German Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath in Berlin. On the 24th he was received by the Führer at Berchtesgaden. On the 25th Count Ciano returned to Rome. The result of his conversations led through the following announcements to the recognition of the Italian Empire of Ethiopia and to the erection of the so-called "Berlin-Rome axis".

German Official Announcement of October 24th, 1936

The Royal Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, was today received by the Führer and Chancellor. In the conversation the Führer and Chancellor informed the representative of the Fascist Government that the Government of the Reich had decided upon the formal recognition of the Italian Empire of Ethiopia. The Italian Foreign Minister stated that the Fascist Government noted this communication with satisfaction and fully appreciated its significance.

German Official Final Communiqué of October 25th, 1936 regarding the Political Discussion with the Italian Foreign Minister

In the course of the visit of the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, in Germany, in his conversation with the Führer and Chancellor and in various conversations with leading German men, the outstanding political, economic and social questions of importance were discussed, in particular those of immediate concern to the two countries.

The conversations took place in an atmosphere of friendly cordiality. To the satisfaction of both parties it was observed that their views were in agreement and that the two Governments intended to direct their common activity towards the promotion of general peace and reconstruction. The two Governments have decided to keep in touch with each other in order to carry out these aims.

Statements by Count Ciano regarding his Negotiations in Berlin and Berchtesgaden

On October 25th the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, received the press representatives in Munich and made the following statements:

"In the last few days I have had a thorough exchange of views in Berchtesgaden with the Führer and in Berlin with Baron von Neurath regarding the general political situation. This exchange of views has shown still more clearly the firm intention of our two Governments to direct our common effort towards the general work of peace and reconstruction. These common endeavours have their firm foundations not only in the interests of both countries, but also in the lofty task which Germany and Italy fulfil in the defence of the great civilisatory institutions of Europe.

This framework includes the examination which we have concluded of the negotiations now pending for the replacement of the Locarno agreement. As you are aware, both the German and the Italian Governments have already replied to the British memorandum, and both Governments stressed their clear determination to cooperate in reinforcing the foundations of security such as may arise out of a guarantee pact for western Europe.

We also examined with Baron von Neurath various aspects of the League of Nations problem. Our two Governments will remain, as in the past, in close and friendly touch with each other.

As far as the Danube basin is concerned, I can state that our examination of the position, which we have carried out in the light of the Rome protocol and the German-Austrian agreement of July 11th, enables us to our mutual satisfaction to note the practical and positive advantages for Austria which

the policy of the two countries has already demonstrated. The two Governments will deal with the problems concerning the Danube basin in a spirit of friendly cooperation.

We also discussed the position of Spain and it was agreed that the national Government of General Franco is supported by the firm determination of the Spanish nation in the greatest part of the territory where it has succeeded in restoring order and civil discipline as opposed to the anarchic conditions which had reigned there. At the same time we reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention in Spanish affairs and again confirmed the maintenance of the international obligations entered into in this respect. It is unnecessary to add that we were of one opinion that Germany and Italy have no other desire than that Spain—in her absolute national and colonial integrity—should soon again resume the position in the life of the nations which is her due.

In the face of the serious dangers which menace the social structure of Europe, the Führer, Baron von Neurath and myself have renewed the firm determination of the Italian and German nations to defend with all their power the sacred inheritance of European civilisation in the great institutions based on the family and the nation which forms its foundation.

In this spirit Baron von Neurath and I decided to intensify the cultural relations between Germany and Italy, and immediately after my return to Rome we shall begin discussions for the conclusion of an agreement for cultural exchanges between the two countries.

As announced yesterday, the Führer has decided to recognise the Italian Empire of Ethiopia. I do not need to tell you with what satisfaction I received this decision. In this connection we regulated the Italo-German economic relations in regard to Ethiopia, and the various outstanding questions will be settled to the mutual satisfaction of the two countries.

All these points were laid down in the protocol drawn up on the conclusion of our discussions.

I am returning to Italy with a feeling of sincere admiration for everything that I have been able to see in Germany. These feelings refer primarily to the Führer to whom I have transmitted the greetings of the Duce and of Fascist Italy. I did not yet know Germany, although, as you can well imagine, I have followed almost daily during these years the National Socialist movement and your brilliant national revival under the intelligent and creative guidance of the Führer. What I have seen has made a keen and direct impression upon me, and the contact with your statesmen, the institutions that I visited, the demonstrations that I attended serve to complete in my mind the great picture of National Socialist Germany to which I express my deepest and sincerest good wishes.

The cordial contact between our two Governments will be continued, and our cooperation in the general work of peace and reconstruction of Europe will be carried on in Rome as in Berlin in the same spirit and with the same determination as it has been begun in these days."

The Statements on Foreign Policy

in Mussolini's Speech at Palermo on August 20th, 1937

After the conclusion of the manœuvres in Sicily, the Head of the Italian Government made a speech at Palermo on August 20th, 1937; its importance in respect of foreign politics lay on the one hand in the readiness which he expressed to reach an agreement with England and on the other hand in the reaffirmation of German-Italian solidarity.

"You have seen with your own eyes the organisation of Italian land, sea and air forces. It would be only in a fit of insanity that anyone could conceive the idea of penetrating into your country. Here no one will ever land—not a single soldier. Now listen to the following announcement: the present day begins for our soil one of the happiest epochs of the four

thousand years' existence of Sicily. This epoch is connected with a historical fact, the foundation of the second Roman Empire. The energies of the State will in future be concentrated upon you even more than in the past, as Sicily is the geographical centre of the Empire. When I decided to hold the great manœuvres in Sicily, fears and exaggerated and inappropriate objections arose. All this is now past. The entire world must in future be convinced that Fascist Italy is determined to carry on a positive policy of peace.

In accordance with these principles, we are endeavouring to improve relations especially with the States which have common frontiers with our country. Our relations with Yugoslavia have undoubtedly improved since March until the present time. Our relations with Austria and Hungary are based on the Rome protocols which have proved their effectiveness in the height of the economic depression. I do not need to point out that our relations with Switzerland are more than friendly.

Among the countries with which we have common frontiers, there is lastly France. If we take a long view of these relations as a whole we arrive at the conclusion that there is no ground for any drama. Relations would certainly be better if in France authoritative circles were not idolators before the idols of Geneva, and if there were not also other currents which for the last 15 years have awaited with a tenacity worthy of a better cause the collapse of the Fascist régime.

If from land frontiers we now pass to maritime and colonial frontiers, we meet Great Britain. I have said we meet—and I beg those who are preparing to translate and to traduce this speech not to confound a meeting with a collision. When I turn to reflect upon our relations with London during the last two years I am led to conclude that at bottom there has been a great misunderstanding. Opinion has lagged behind. There exists a superficial and picturesque knowledge of Italy, of that picturesqueness which I detest. This young, resolute, mighty Italy is not yet known.

Thanks to the January agreement, there was a clearing of the atmosphere. Then came unfortunate events to which it is unnecessary to refer at this moment. Now again there is a fresh clearing of the horizon. In the foreground is the question of the common colonial frontiers. I think it is possible to arrive at a lasting and firm resolution between the "route" and the "life" of two nations. Thus Italy is prepared to give her collaboration on all those problems which interest the political life of Europe. But she will now bring certain realities into the reckoning. The first of these realities is the Empire. It has been said that we desire recognition by the League of Nations. Nothing of the sort. We do not ask the officials at Geneva to register a birth. We do think, however, that the time has come to register a death. For the last 18 months there has been a dead man in history. Bury him in the name of public health. We cannot be suspected of excessive tenderness towards the League, but we cannot make any further distinction between those who have recognized the Empire and those who have not recognized it.

Another reality of which account must be taken is that which is now commonly known as the Rome-Berlin axis. One does not reach Rome by ignoring or going against Berlin and one does not reach Berlin by ignoring or going against Rome. You understand me when I say there is an active solidarity between the two régimes. Let it be said in the most categorical manner that we will not tolerate in the Mediterranean Bolshevism or anything of a similar nature. Whenever these disturbances created by a people absolutely foreign to the Mediterranean have been warded off, I shall be pleased to issue an appeal for peace to all those countries which are bathed by that sea where three continents have brought together three civilisations. Should this appeal not be heard, we are perfectly calm, because Fascist Italy contains such forces, spiritual and material, that she can face and mould to herself any destiny."

II. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND THE MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM

In view of the attempt by an unknown submarine to torpedo the British cruiser "Havoc" exercising control in the Mediterranean under the agreement for non-intervention in the Spanish civil war—though the bloodshed on the torpedoed German cruiser "Deutschland" exercising the same duty and the attack immediately afterwards on the cruiser "Leipzig" had not sufficed to bring about measures against piracy in the Mediterranean—the British and French Governments decided to convene a Conference in order to find ways and means of safeguarding shipping in the Mediterranean. In spite of the unfortunate experience of the greatly prized collective cooperation gained through the treatment of attacks on Italian and German ships, the Anglo-French proposal was favourably received in Germany and Italy. Berlin and Rome again gave proof of their desire to do useful work for European peace which was endangered by the Spanish civil war. At the time of the invitation, however, came the two notes of the Soviet Government worded in a manner that was deliberately provocative for the Italian Government and accusing Italian submarines—without a shadow of proof—of attacks on two Russian steamers in the Mediterranean and demanding compensation from the Italian Government and the punishment of the guilty parties. Furthermore the Soviet Union wished to make this accusation against Italy a subject of discussion at the proposed conference and thus to remove it from the purely technical aspect of its work into the political sphere. Soviet diplomacy thus continued the sabotage in favour of Valencia which it had carried on from the outset of the London non-intervention committee and which it always applied when any possibility of an agreement of the other Great Powers appeared on the clouded political horizon of Spanish events and useful work was to be carried out for preventing the spread of the conflict and the maintenance of European peace.

When, therefore, on September 6th an invitation was sent to the States bordering on the Mediterranean and Black Sea and to Germany to take part in the Conference at Nyon, Berlin and Rome rejected it and proposed that the entire question should be settled by the Non-Intervention Committee in London which had, indeed, been set up for this purpose. The Conference then met without the two Powers on September 10th at Nyon. Italy, in a note of September 14th, protested against the result which was contrary to her interests in the Mediterranean; the United Kingdom and France took account of this protest by proposing a new Conference of naval experts in order to bring Italy into the Nyon Arrangement. This Arrangement, which gave Italy a right of control only in the Tyrrhenian Sea, had left open the question of the subsequent inclusion of Italy in the control of the Mediterranean. This Conference took place from September 27th to 30th in Paris and led to an agreement between the three Powers, the effect of which, however, still depends on the agreement of the other signatory Powers of Nyon. In the meantime, however, France, in the conversation on September 22nd at Geneva between the French Foreign Minister Delbos and the Italian delegate to the League, Bova-Scoppa, of which much was made in the French press, endeavoured to bring up the entire Spanish problem at a new Conference of Three, with a view to reaching a settlement of the questions of volunteers and of the "status quo" in the Mediterranean. After some hesitation, the United Kingdom supported France to the extent that the two Powers took a common step in this direction through their representatives in Rome during the absence of Mussolini and Count Ciano. The objects aimed at by the conversation at Geneva and the step in Rome were then laid down in the Anglo-French note of October 2nd, the proposals of which were however answered in the negative by the Rome note of October 9th.

THE NYON ARRANGEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 14th, 1937. Communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, President of the Mediterranean Conference of Nyon.

Geneva, September 21st, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

As President of the Mediterranean Conference of Nyon, I have the honour to forward to you herewith the text of the Arrangements signed, on the invitation of the French and United Kingdom Governments, on September 14th and 17th, by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Egypt, France, Greece, Roumania, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia.

I should be obliged if you would be good enough to communicate the text of these documents to the Members of the Council.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) Yvon Delbos.

The Text of the Arrangement.

Whereas arising out of the Spanish conflict attacks have been repeatedly committed in the Mediterranean by submarines against merchant ships not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish parties; and

Whereas these attacks are violations of the rules of international law referred to in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22nd, 1930 with regard to the sinking of merchant ships and constitute acts contrary to the most elementary dictates of humanity, which should be justly treated as acts of piracy; and

Whereas without in any way admitting the right of either party to the conflict in Spain to exercise belligerent rights or to interfere with merchant ships on the high seas even if the laws of warfare at sea are observed and without prejudice to the right of any participating Power to take such action as may be proper to protect its merchant shipping from any kind of interference on the high seas or to the possibility of further collective measures being agreed upon subsequently, it is necessary in the first place to agree upon certain special collective measures against piratical acts by submarines:

In view thereof the undersigned, being authorised to this effect by their respective Governments, have met in conference at Nyon between the 9th and the 14th September 1937, and have agreed upon the following provisions which shall enter immediately into force:

I. The Participating Powers will instruct their naval forces to take the action indicated in paragraphs II and III below with a view to the protection of all merchant ships not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish parties.

II. Any submarine which attacks such a ship in a manner contrary to the rules of international law referred to in the International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments signed in London on April 22nd, 1930, and confirmed in the Protocol signed in London on November 6th, 1936, shall be counter-attacked and, if possible, destroyed.

III. The instruction mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall extend to any submarine encountered in the vicinity of a position where a ship not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish parties has recently been attacked in violation of the rules referred to in the preceding paragraph in circumstances which give valid grounds for the belief that the submarine was guilty of the attack.

IV. In order to facilitate the putting into force of the above arrangements in a practical manner, the participating Powers have agreed upon the following arrangements:

1. In the western Mediterranean and in the Malta Channel, with the exception of the Tyrrhenian Sea, which may form the

subject of special arrangements, the British and French fleets will operate both on the high seas and in the territorial waters of the Participating Powers, in accordance with the division of the area agreed upon between the two Governments.

2. In the eastern Mediterranean,

(a) Each of the Participating Powers will operate in its own territorial waters ;

(b) On the high seas, with the exception of the Adriatic Sea, the British and French fleets will operate up to the entrance to the Dardanelles, in those areas where there is reason to apprehend danger to shipping in accordance with the division of the area agreed upon between the two Governments. The other Participating Governments possessing a sea border on the Mediterranean, undertake, within the limit of their resources, to furnish these fleets any assistance that may be asked for ; in particular, they will permit them to take action in their territorial waters and to use such of their ports as they shall indicate.

3. It is further understood that the limits of the zones referred to in sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 above, and their allocation shall be subject at any time to revision by the Participating Powers in order to take account of any change in the situation.

V. The Participating Powers agree that, in order to simplify the operation of the above-mentioned measures, they will for their part restrict the use of their submarines in the Mediterranean in the following manner :

(a) Except as stated in (b) and (c) below, no submarine will be sent to sea within the Mediterranean.

(b) Submarines may proceed on passage after notification of the other Participating Powers, provided that they proceed on the surface and are accompanied by a surface ship.

(c) Each Participating Power reserves for purposes of exercises certain areas defined in Annex I hereto in which its submarines are exempt from the restrictions mentioned in (a) or (b).

The Participating Powers further undertake not to allow the presence in their respective territorial waters of any foreign submarines except in case of urgent distress, or where the conditions prescribed in sub-paragraph (b) above are fulfilled.

VI. The Participating Powers also agree that, in order to simplify the problem involved in carrying out the measures above described, they may severally advise their merchant shipping to follow certain main routes in the Mediterranean agreed upon between them and defined in Annex II hereto.

VII. Nothing in the present agreement restricts the right of any Participating Power to send its surface vessels to any part of the Mediterranean.

VIII. Nothing in the present agreement in any way prejudices existing international engagements which have been registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

IX. If any of the Participating Powers notifies its intention of withdrawing from the present arrangement, the notification will take effect after the expiry of thirty days and any of the other Participating Powers may withdraw on the same date if it communicates its intention to this effect before that date.

Done at Nyon this fourteenth day of September nineteen hundred and thirty seven, in a single copy, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, and which will be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

Agreement supplementary to the Nyon Arrangement. of September 17th, 1937.

Whereas under the Arrangement signed at Nyon on the 14th September, 1937, whereby certain collective measures were agreed upon relating to piratical acts by submarines in the Mediterranean, the Participating Powers reserved the possibility of taking further collective measures ; and

Whereas it is now considered expedient that such measures should be taken against similar acts by surface vessels and aircraft ;

In view thereof, the undersigned, being authorised to this effect by their respective Governments, have met in conference at Geneva on the seventeenth day of September and have agreed upon the following provisions which shall enter immediately into force :

I. The present Agreement is supplementary to the Nyon Arrangement and shall be regarded as an integral part thereof.

II. The present Agreement applies to any attack by a surface vessel or an aircraft upon any merchant vessel in the Mediterranean not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish parties, when such attack is accompanied by a violation of the humanitarian principles embodied in the rules of international law with regard to warfare at sea, which are referred to in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22nd, 1930, and confirmed in the Protocol signed in London on November 6th, 1936.

III. Any surface war vessel, engaged in the protection of merchant shipping in conformity with the Nyon Arrangement, which witnesses an attack of the kind referred to in the preceding paragraph shall :

(a) If the attack is committed by an aircraft, open fire on the aircraft ;

(b) If the attack is committed by a surface vessel, intervene to resist it within the limits of its powers, summoning assistance if such is available and necessary.

In territorial waters each of the Participating Powers concerned will give instructions as to the action to be taken by its own war vessels in the spirit of the present Agreement.

Done at Geneva this seventeenth day of September 1937, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which will be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

Text of the Anglo-French Note to Italy of October 2nd, 1937.

The Governments of France and the United Kingdom have noted with pleasure that, as a result of the conversations which have taken place in Paris between their naval experts and those of the Italian Government, it is now possible to contemplate the modification of the arrangement signed at Nyon on September 14th in such a manner as to secure the participation of Italy in the measures agreed upon for rendering the arrangement effective.

Favourable conditions are thus created to enable the three Governments to examine, in a spirit of perfect frankness, the situation arising from the prolongation of the Spanish conflict.

The two Governments have, moreover, noted with satisfaction the assurances given by his Excellency Count Ciano to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Rome that there was no present intention of permitting the despatch of further volunteers to Spain.

They have also taken note of the declaration made to Monsieur Delbos by the Italian Delegate at Geneva, that Italy had no intention of making the smallest change in the territorial status of Spain ; that she had no designs upon the Balearic Islands, and that the integrity of the continental and insular territory of Spain would be strictly respected.

For their part the two Governments willingly renew the same assurances to the Italian Government. They further desire to declare that in accordance with what is the very essence of the non-intervention agreements, they consider themselves bound to respect the political independence of Spain.

The Governments of France and the United Kingdom earnestly desire that the civil strife in Spain shall cease to be a cause of international unrest and suspicion and that, in that part of Europe, conditions shall develop which shall permit of progress being made elsewhere towards general appeasement.

But they are convinced that no considerable improvement in the situation is possible until further measures have been carried out to make the policy of non-intervention effective by the withdrawal of the non-Spanish nationals who are now taking part in the struggle.

So long as large numbers of foreigners continue to assist both sides, the risk of grave international disturbances will be present, and will inevitably tend to increase until at least a substantial number are withdrawn.

The London Committee has, of course, been already apprised of this programme, but the difficulties it has come up against have practically paralysed its action, and it appears that a previous agreement between the three Powers is necessary to overcome these obstacles.

The view of the two Governments is that the elaboration of such an agreement should form one of the essential elements of the frank and cordial conversations to which they invite the Italian Government.

Moreover, greatly as the French and United Kingdom Governments desire to maintain the obligations which they have undertaken resulting from the international agreements respecting the supply of arms and men to Spain, they cannot conceal from themselves the difficulty of preserving these conditions unless some such steps are taken to make the policy of non-intervention really effective.

With this end in view, the French and United Kingdom Governments have the honour to invite the Italian Government to join with them in conversations with the object, if possible, of reaching an agreement on measures to carry this policy into effect.

In their view, such an agreement would not only make an important contribution to the improvement of the political situation, but once such a withdrawal has been effected the question of the recognition on certain conditions of belligerent rights to the two parties should be capable of solution.

It is the earnest desire of the two Governments that these conversations, to which they attach the utmost importance, should be held at the earliest possible moment.

The Italian Reply of October 9th, 1937

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs have the honour to refer to the communication of his Britannic Majesty's Embassy dated the 2nd instant.

The Fascist Government willingly take note of the assurances furnished by the British Government regarding the political independence of Spain. For themselves they do not need to recall the assurances furnished on repeated occasions, in the most solemn fashion regarding the political independence and consequently the territorial integrity of Spain, its mainland, its islands and its colonies.

The Fascist Government fully share the hope expressed by the British Government that the internal struggles of Spain may cease to be a cause of suspicion and friction between the other nations and that the situation may evolve in such a manner that, in other fields also, progress may be realised towards a general *détente*.

They are ready, with every possible good-will, to examine, as they have always done in the past, all means which may be thought suitable to render effective the policy of non-intervention.

Among the elements constituting this policy the British Government lay particular emphasis upon the question of the volunteers and their withdrawal.

Nevertheless, in order to indicate clearly the individual political positions and the responsibilities deriving from them,

and not for any untimely emphasis of polemic, it is opportune to recall how it was actually Italy, together with Germany, who was the first to draw attention to the question of volunteers, and to insist that their despatch should be forbidden, and subsequently that provisions should be taken for their withdrawal.

The Italian Government claim for themselves and for the German Government the merit of the initiative directed towards the consideration of this question as one of the indispensable elements of any policy of non-intervention.

In so far as they themselves are concerned, they recall the explicit declaration made to the French Ambassador by the Italian Foreign Minister so long ago as August 1936, the declarations obtained in the "note verbale" of January 7th last addressed to the Embassies of Great Britain and France, that of January 25th last, addressed only to the Embassy of Great Britain, and finally the repeated declaration made by the Italian Representative on the Committee of Non-Intervention in London on the occasion of the last discussion of this question.

The Fascist Government have the honour to confirm that so far as concerns the whole question of non-intervention, in its various aspects and elements, they maintain the same order of ideas as that which emerges from all the above mentioned declarations.

In their communication of the 2nd instant, the British Government suggest that conversations should be initiated between the three Governments of France, England and Italy for the purpose of reaching, if possible, agreement on measures designed to ensure the application of the policy of non-intervention.

The British Government suggest such a procedure with the intention of obviating the difficulties which have occurred at the London Committee.

The Fascist Government appreciate, in all its value, the British suggestion, but doubt whether the difficulties in question can be overcome by way of ingenuities or device of procedure and, above all, by that proposed.

They draw the attention of the British Government to the fact that the matter under discussion does not regard some states alone; but on the contrary directly interests other states besides France, Great Britain and Italy.

Further, the fact should not be overlooked that without the adherence of Burgos and Valencia any decision on the question would fail to lead to practical results. All the more so when one remembers the attitude of the representative of Valencia who, by his specious pretext, excluded in his speech in Geneva any possibility of the evacuation of the volunteers enrolled in the armed forces of his Government.

The proposed discussion, in the absence of the other states, would lack the elements indispensable for reaching an agreement. It is the conviction of the Fascist Government that the adoption of procedures—even if only preliminary—outside the London Committee and its organs would, in the present situation, result, not only in not diminishing, but in increasing, the possibility of misunderstandings and complications, and in retarding instead of hastening the attainment of the general agreement, an agreement which the Fascist Government regard as supremely necessary.

The Fascist Government are therefore of the opinion that the question of non-intervention should continue to be dealt with at the London Committee.

The Fascist Government have finally the honour to state that they will not participate in conversations meetings or conferences to which the German Government have not been formally invited and in which they do not participate.

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BELGIUM'S FIGHT FOR HER INDEPENDENCE

The German-Belgian Exchange of Notes of October 13th, 1937.

A New German Contribution to European Peace.

It is exactly a year since King Leopold of Belgium, in his sensational speech of October 14th, 1936 in the Belgian Council of Ministers, announced the introduction of a new Belgian policy which aimed at releasing Belgium from the undertakings and obligations arising out of and assumed after the war and at returning—if not to pre-war neutrality—at any rate to a kind of "voluntary neutrality". The German-Belgian exchange of notes of October 13th, 1937 represents a great step towards the realisation of this aim.

From the German point of view this exchange of notes is a further stage on the path of development which was taken by the step of March 7th, 1936 with the denunciation of the Locarno Agreement and the restoration of territorial sovereignty over the demilitarised Rhine zone. At the time, we reported on the negotiations which followed this step in Nos. 161/165 of this Journal. They ended for the time being by the declaration of the remaining Locarno Powers, United Kingdom, Italy, France and Belgium, in Paragraph III of the Memorandum of March 20th, 1936 :

"that nothing that has happened before or since the said breach of the Treaty of Locarno can be considered as having freed the Signatories of that Treaty from any of their obligations or guarantees and that the latter subsist in their entirety.

They undertake forthwith to instruct their General Staffs to enter into contact with a view to arranging the technical conditions in which the obligations which are binding upon them should be carried out in case of unprovoked aggression."

On April 1st the British Government—Italy having in the meantime again withdrawn—addressed a note to the French and Belgian Governments in which that declaration was reaffirmed and a guarantee agreement was thus concluded between these three Powers, which was to be a sort of intermediate stage until the conclusion of a substitute for Locarno by a new Western Pact proposed in the German memorandum of March 7th or, if this failed, it was to be a definite settlement between the three Powers. It subsequently appeared that there were very considerable difficulties in the way of the desired rapid conclusion of a new western Pact mainly on account of the French demand that it should be linked up with the Paris-Moscow Eastern Pact plans.

Baldwin's famous phrase about the "British Rhine frontier" also acquired a new and deep significance not only for Germany but also for Belgium when, in the General Staff conversations which took place in April 1936 on the basis of the British guarantee, the British General Staff demanded as a recompense

that they should have in certain cases the right to use the Belgian airforce arrangements and the air intelligence service established on the Belgian-German frontier. A completely new factor was England's intention, in case of a warlike conflict with one of the signatories of the Western Pact, to obtain the active military assistance of the other parties to the treaty, and to become not only a guarantor with obligations as in the Locarno Agreement, but also a guaranteed Power with counter-claims; this was, however, entirely opposed to the intention of Belgium to take part in a new western Pact as a guaranteed, but not as a guaranteeing Power.

Finally the exchange of notes led to no result on account of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict and the Spanish crisis. This position caused the Belgian question to come up in the autumn of 1936.

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The foreign and military policy of Belgium in the past 17 years has been conditioned mainly by the following considerations.

When the neutrality of Belgium was brought to an end under Article 31 of the Versailles Treaty, and replaced by the new situation which that Article established, in 1919, Belgium became a member of the League, but without making any of the reservations made by Switzerland. In the following year Belgium concluded a Military Convention with France on September 7th, 1920, which in itself constituted a violation of Articles 20 and 21 of the Covenant of the League. In further violation of Article 18 of the Covenant the Convention was never registered with the Secretariat of the League. Its contents accordingly remained secret; but its existence was made public by the registration and publication of the accompanying Notes of September 10th and 15th, 1920. In 1921 Belgium further concluded a defensive alliance with England, and was a party in 1925 to the Locarno Treaties, under which she became, not merely a guaranteed Power, but a Power guaranteeing the "status quo" in Western Europe. As a consequence she was forced into a one-sided adherence to France and the French rearmament policy, which was shortly patent to the world in the shape of a joint programme of development of the Armies and fortress systems of the two countries. On the Northern and Eastern frontiers of Belgium there has recently been erected a dense series of fortifications which are meaningless unless regarded as a continuation of the Maginot line. On the Western frontier, i. e. on the side exposed to France, Belgium remained without defences; and the whole

of her defence forces were at the same time organised on lines which ran parallel to those of French military policy. It was this development that gave rise to an internal opposition which gathered strength at every moment. The Flemish section of the population, was increasingly opposed to the effortless subordination to France. The first recognition of the existence of this feeling was the declaration by the Minister M. Hymans on March 4th, 1931. It did not amount to much. It was not till three years later that a statement was made by the Count de Brocqueville on March 6th, 1934, which made a lasting impression on us on account of its sharp condemnation of the Versailles system. In the meantime speeches and articles in the Flemish Press multiplied their attacks on the one-sided connection of Belgium with France and their demand for the denunciation of the Secret Agreement of September 7th, 1920.

In connection with the proposal submitted to the Belgian Chamber at the beginning of February 1936 to extend the period of military service a Flemish resolution was introduced on February 20th for the denunciation of the Franco-Belgian Secret Agreement. In the discussion of the Flemish motion in the plenary meeting of the Chamber on March 11th the Flemish deputies argued that Belgium, like certain of the Balkan States, was reduced to nothing more than a section of the French military block. The Belgian defences were directed simply and solely against a single neighbour. The Premier van Zeeland thereupon announced that the Military Convention with France had been terminated only a few days before—on March 6th—and replaced by a new Agreement which only provided for permanent contact between the General Staffs. The Premier's statement was not calculated to allay the anxiety in the country. The Flemish Nationalists and the Fleming members of the Catholic Party contended that the new Agreement with France was no improvement in so far as the independence of Belgium was concerned. In Parliament and in the country they argued for the return to an independent policy of voluntary neutrality. After the new Elections of May 1936, which strengthened the ranks of the Flemings and brought the Rexists for the first time into Parliament, the new Foreign Minister of the van Zeeland Cabinet, M. Spaak, at a reception of the Press on July 20th declared in favour of a policy of neutrality. A storm of indignation in the Francophil Press was the sequel: but a semi-official announcement was made shortly, afterwards notwithstanding to the effect that in any new Locarno Treaty Belgium would decline to accept the position of guarantor of any foreign country's frontiers, and that her efforts would be directed solely towards the negotiation of a guarantee of her own frontiers.

In his Speech to the Council of Ministers on October 14th, 1936 the King of the Belgians himself referred to the need for a reshaping of Belgian foreign and military policy in the light of internal and external political developments.⁽¹⁾

What weighty grounds were there in the field of foreign politics to induce the King of the Belgians to make these startling public statements with regard to Belgium's desire for a foreign policy of her own—statements, be it noted, which gave the death-blow to the spirit, if not to the actual letter, of the Agreements with France? The answer is to be found in the Note sent from Brussels on October 23rd, 1936 to the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay in reply to enquiries from London as to the Belgian attitude in regard to the proposed Five Power Conference for the conclusion of a Western Pact. The following are the comments of the Brussels Correspondent of The Times on the contents of the Note (The "Times", October 23rd, 1936):

"The Note makes it clear that the Belgian Government, like the British Government, view with dismay the recent tendency

towards the formation of rigid and antagonistic blocs in Europe and that they are determined to hold themselves aloof from it. In the circumstances of 1936 the obligations assumed under the original Locarno Pact are too heavy to be borne by a State of Belgium's size and military strength. Article 1 of the Locarno Pact, by implication, placed Belgium on terms of equality with the Great Powers, and under it Belgium has the same responsibility as the other Powers for the maintenance of German and French territorial integrity. Though the assumption of this obligation was much criticised by the Flemings at the time, it was generally felt that it could be safely shouldered. Germany was largely disarmed, the Rhineland was demilitarised, and the League looked like becoming a nucleus of a dependable system of collective security. Moreover it was felt that the new treaty had made a vital contribution to the maintenance of Belgian security.

"In 1936, the Note explains, everything is different. German rearmament, precipitated by the Barthou Note of April 17th, 1934, has culminated in a remilitarisation of the Rhineland and has completely altered Belgium's position in relation to Germany. The collapse of collective security in the face of Italy's war against Abyssinia has so weakened the League that it is now felt to be almost useless as an instrument for the maintenance of peace. Finally, the development of the French system of alliances, with the aim of counterbalancing Germany's growing military strength, tends to divide Europe into precisely two such antagonistic pro-French and pro-German groups as it was the aim of Locarno to dissolve.

"Against this background the Belgian Note goes on to argue that in the light of recent events Belgium can best contribute towards Western security, if the national defences are so strengthened as to offer the maximum deterrent to any aggressor, and if at the same time Belgium holds aloof from all systems and thereby does not provide a potential aggressor with the excuse that she forms part of a hostile ring."

The Note reveals in the first place the one-sided interpretation hitherto given by France and Belgium to the Locarno Pact, inasmuch as they persisted, in spite of the English and Italian guarantees, in their policy of a military alliance and General Staff conversations. It is easy to read between the lines—as some of the comments in the English, French and Belgian Press did not fail to do—that the new French policy of alliance with the U.S.S.R. was the primary reason for Belgium's reconsideration of her position. The Belgian public and the Belgian Government rightly felt that the Franco-Russian Pact had introduced an incalculable element of danger into the political system of Europe. When, after the initial rift in the shape of the revision of the Franco-Belgian Military Alliance on March 6th, Belgium decided definitively to abandon the system of assimilated Franco-Belgian policy which she had practised for the last fifteen years, and to free herself completely from the commitments it entailed, her decision was due in the last analysis to nothing else than the feverish French mania for the conclusion of Pacts with dangerous, automatically operating obligations.

The speech of the King of the Belgians was the prelude to a lively exchange of views between London and Paris as to the significance of the new policy of neutrality which it proclaimed. The anxieties to which it gave rise in the minds of the French and English Cabinets, were (as the Press comments showed) in connection with the idea of collective security, the one-sided Belgian obligations to the Western Powers on the land and in the air, the arrangements between the different General Staffs, the problem of policy in relation to the League of Nations, the right to march through Belgium, and so on and so on.

The Belgian Foreign Minister further made it clear that Belgium would adhere to the Locarno Treaty and the Agreements of April 1st, 1936 pending the conclusion of a new Western Pact

⁽¹⁾ The text of M. Spaak's speech and that of the King of the Belgians will be found in No. 171-175 of this publication, page 30.

between the former Locarno Powers. The Foreign Minister's announcement was indicative of the Belgian inclination—to which subsequent interpretations of the King's speech and the General Staff arrangements which followed also gave expression—not to strain Belgian relations with France and England too far. The Belgian declaration of neutrality applied therefore only to future negotiations: the former agreements should remain in force for the present.

In his speech on foreign policy in the Chamber on October 28th, 1936 the Foreign Minister (M. Spaak) stated that Belgium would still be ready in the future to take part in any reasonable form of collective action within the limits of conditions clearly defined. Belgium was anxious to fulfil her obligations; but the obligations must be laid down in plain and exact terms, explicitly circumscribed in such a manner as to admit of no misunderstanding. Belgium intended to pursue a purely Belgian foreign policy, having regard to her geographical position, her traditions and her capacities. There was no question of a reversion to the pre-war neutrality, since Belgium meant to remain a member of the League. The Foreign Minister then referred to the system of collective security. It was perhaps the ideal system of ensuring the maintenance of Peace, but only if organised on comprehensive and effective lines; and it could not be said to be so organised at the present time. Belgian foreign policy would therefore be based on the maintenance of complete independence. Its object would be to make it perfectly plain to each of her neighbours that Belgium did not propose to allow her territory to be used either for the transit of troops or as a strategic base. Such a policy postulated a strong Belgium. The military and the political issues were consequently inseparable.

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After these statements by the King of the Belgians and his Foreign Minister, which presumably also found expression in the two Belgian Western Pact notes of October 25th, 1936 and February 12th, 1937 (the latter being immediately after the offer of guarantee to Belgium made by Adolf Hitler in his Reichstag speech of January 30th), a violent press campaign started in France by which the British attitude was also influenced and King Albert was caused personally to seek in London comprehension for the views and desires expressed in his speech, while immediately before his journey on March 20th a memorandum by the French Government endeavoured to create a feeling against those views.

The negotiations lasted four entire weeks before an agreement was finally reached on April 24th, 1937. The text shows in the first place quite clearly that Belgium is relieved of her previous obligations of guarantee under the Locarno Agreement and under the agreement between the remaining Locarno Powers of March 19th, 1936, while the guarantees assumed by France and the United Kingdom towards Belgium are maintained. This admission was certainly not easy for the two Western Powers who were accustomed to regard the country of the Scheldt and Meuse as a fixed factor in all common military considerations. They not only took time to reach their decision, but presumably weighed every possibility of keeping Belgium in this system. All the more praise is due to the determination of Belgium to carry out her policy of complete independence. The pressure exercised on her is no doubt the reason why she accepted the two conditions (a) that she must have strong armaments in order to support and defend her frontiers, (b) that she must remain in the League of Nations. But Belgium was no more thinking of scrapping her armaments than she was of leaving the League of Nations. From the point of view of Paris and London, therefore, there are doubtless other reasons behind these two conditions. This was soon shown quite openly by French and British comments. The question relates to Article 16 of the League Covenant, with which it is proposed to argue at the proper moment, since its provisions "do not preclude

the use of Belgian territory for the passage of troops for purposes of defence or as a basis of operation for the air arm in a League war". In this connection it was also hoped that a "contact" of the General Staffs might be maintained, especially as there is not a word in the declaration on the subject of the agreement of March 6th, 1937 concluded in lieu of the alliance of September 7th, 1920. It is then anticipated that Belgian public opinion will be subsequently more mindful of the "true interests" of the country. It is true that these obligations, the participation in sanctions and the grant of the right of transit, are open to various interpretations and have in practice already been variously interpreted. It is also known that, as far as Switzerland is concerned, participation in military sanctions and the grant of the right of transit have from the outset been waived. It is also known that, on the conclusion of the Locarno agreement, Germany rejected undertakings arising out of the sanctions article and the right of transit on account of her special geographical position and her military and political situation at that time. Holland has also stated on several occasions that she reserves for herself entire freedom of action in this respect. In view of the trend of Belgian policy it cannot be assumed that there is any intention of using League obligations as a path towards new General Staff discussions and of thus returning in any form to those one-sided undertakings which Brussels has for months so strenuously tried to escape.

In his speech in the Chamber on April 29th, 1937, the Foreign Minister, M. Spaak, gave an interpretation of the Franco-British declaration of guarantee of April 24th, outlined the standpoint of the Belgian Government and referred to some points in special detail. The aim of Belgium was especially to be able to carry out a policy of independence which would enable her to take up arms only in her self-defence. In pursuit of this policy, the period of military agreements with other countries was closed. Belgium would therefore not take part in further General Staff discussions. She would carry out her obligations as a Member of the League of Nations, but retained the right—here he referred to the Netherlands and to the various possibilities of interpreting Article 16—to make the right of transit dependent on her own consent and not to let it be imposed upon her. M. Spaak thus rejected a decision of the League as implying an absolute obligation to allow the passage of troops and reserved the right of decision. He laid stress on the "recommendation" in Article 16. The right of passage is, of course, much less risky for States situated on the outskirts, and on the other hand weighs with all its dangers on those situated in the centre. Belgium will therefore find it very hard to give her consent, especially as it is in most cases very hard to distinguish between an offensive and a defensive war. For she desires—neither in the west nor still less in the east—no longer to be even a subject, not to speak of an unconsulted object, and rejects the exaggeration of the collective security policy, of the "unclear ideology" of which M. Spaak's statements sound like an obituary notice.

As late as the middle of August the "Temps" took the view that a neutralisation of Belgium would form a barrier preventing France from assisting her eastern allies in case of unprovoked aggression and that the return of Belgium to such a policy destroys the entire defensive system of France and her allies which is approved by England—in other and clearer words that France will still try, whatever formulae may be used, to regard Belgium as a territory of deployment and military operations; this fact may have strengthened the desire in Brussels ultimately to clear up the situation on the basis of the offer made by Adolf Hitler on January 30th. The diplomatic negotiations on this subject then led on October 13th, 1937 to the German-Belgian exchange of notes—in the same form as the Franco-British declaration—the origin and purpose of which were commented on the same day by two official communications published at Berlin and Brussels.

It is an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, said the Foreign Minister, M. Spaak, in speaking to press representatives of the new German declaration of guarantee. At a time when diplomacy is moving in a circle, the German step merits all the more international consideration and appreciation.

While it awakened great satisfaction in Brussels—apart from a few Marxist and Chauvinistic papers under French influence—and was warmly approved in Rome—from which a similar offer was made to Belgium on March 18th, 1937—the well known chorus of cynics in Paris immediately pointed out a whole series of “unclear points” and, as usual under such circumstances, disseminated misinterpretations and incriminations against Germany. It would indeed have been remarkable if the German-Belgian agreement had been everywhere accepted in the spirit in which it was concluded and without the usual intrigues. The “Temps”, however, in a lengthy and somewhat involved article full of small pinpricks, of October 14th, was nevertheless compelled to admit that the German declaration constituted an important political action for the reinforcement of peace in Western Europe and represented a valuable step forward. In London, certain newspapers prefer to be silent when they have reason to recognise German achievements. The Times alone was an exception and wrote on the “German Pledge” as follows on October 14th:

“Belgium has now been given almost all that King Leopold asked for her exactly a year ago. In April of this year the British and French Governments duly released Belgium from the guarantees which she had freely given, and declared that they would respect Belgian integrity themselves and would still defend it against all aggression. At the same time, in April, the hope was widely expressed that Germany would give a similar guarantee. That guarantee has now been made in the most explicit manner possible... There can be no doubt that the German declaration is a step in the right direction. Every move which brings appeasement in even a small area is to be welcomed; and already the German move has lessened the tension almost continuous during the past few years between Belgium and Germany. Taken at its best, the declaration brings a new element of security into north-western Europe, and it will be approved by all who believe that peace must be sought by instalments. The relief of tension anywhere must be a contribution to that process. An assurance has been given which is of importance not only to Belgium but to Britain and France. Belgium has certainly every reason to be well satisfied with the whole declaration; she feels her position to be strengthened. And the people of this country, pledged to defend Belgium, have also reason to welcome a declaration which balances the British at almost every point.”

It appears to us that Baldwin's remark about the “British Rhine frontier” has lost its meaning: England can now calmly relegate the Belgian “section of the Front” to a back seat. Not only because Belgium no longer wishes to be a ground of deployment or transit for England, but because the security of England has also been considerably increased by the Belgian guarantee, and her “fear” that a Great Power might control the opposite coast of the Channel has been removed by the declaration of October 13th.

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On October 20th and 21st the German-Belgian exchange of notes was the subject of two interpellations in the Belgian Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The debate again showed that the German declaration was almost unanimously welcomed and approved. M. Spaak, whose statements were greeted with loud applause, again stressed the importance of the declaration, and in reply to a question regarding Belgian counter-obligations said that Belgium had assumed none. Belgium had had nothing to refuse

to Germany, as Germany had demanded nothing. The German reservations were, moreover, quite justified.

Interesting statements were made by Count Carton de Wiart, a Catholic deputy, who said:

“We have noted with satisfaction the declaration made on October 13th and can congratulate ourselves upon it. It forms the third wind of a triptych, to which one or more wings may still be added... Moreover, until the League of Nations has placed on Article 16 of the Covenant the interpretation demanded by the Scandinavian countries in their note of August 20th, 1936, we know by the statements made here that Belgium will never tolerate a passage of troops through her territory which is not the result of her own independent and sovereign decision.

As regards indivisible peace, we regard this expression as a catchword open to many misunderstandings. If the meaning of international solidarity is not to be misconstrued, it is dangerous and false to assert that every war must draw us into its machinery. On the contrary, we will oppose every ideological undertaking that might bring us into conflicts if our interests are not directly concerned.

It is not that we are indifferent to universal peace. On the contrary we regard the declaration of October 13th as a really important element of appeasement.”

Lastly, the former War Minister, Dèveze, published an article in “Le Soir” in reply to certain criticisms of the German declaration. He said:

“It is said to be a further scrap of paper in the over-full archives of our diplomacy. This remark would be justified if there was any question of our disarmament, or of the suspension or even slowing down of the complete execution of our national defence as decided upon.”

Dèveze went on to prove that the German text contained no ambiguities and required no interpretation. As regards those who suspect Germany because she made no reference to the League of Nations—of which she is not a Member—and who take the German reservation regarding the application of Article 16 by Belgium as a pretext for asking the Government whether they intended to break with the League or with collective security, Dèveze answered:

“Let us simply establish the fact that the declaration does not and cannot make any change in the legal question of Belgium. If Belgium is ever asked to apply Article 16, she will act according to her own counsel. She now knows without any doubt what would be the unavoidable result of her decision. Is there anything new in this? Certainly not. For it is foolish to imagine for a moment that a State will allow the passage of belligerents without the full intention of taking part in the war.”

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No entangling alliances! That is the formula which expresses Belgian foreign policy since King Leopold's speech. On October 13th it was supported by an unshakable corner-stone which at the same time served to support European peace. From this a bridge could easily be built to the Western Pact. In his speech in the Reichstag on January 30th the Führer and Chancellor made the further statement that there could be no further “imaginable point of dispute”, between France and Germany.

The 13th of October, moreover, again confirmed the correctness of the principles of German foreign policy which he laid down in his Reichstag speech of May 17th, 1933 and which he has frequently stressed since that time, i.e. understanding on the basis of unconditional equality of rights, mutual respect for the vital conditions of the nations, settlement of outstanding questions not by the fallacy of collective security but within the limits of what is possible by the direct method between one State and another. For this is the only way to remove hindrances and to build up not only for the benefit of those directly concerned but also for the community.

The Work of the League of Nations

THE AUTUMN SESSION OF 1937

From September 13th to October 6th, 1937, the League of Nations held its Eighteenth Ordinary Assembly, which was opened by M. Negrin, the representative of Red Spain, as President of the simultaneous session of the Council and then presided over by the elected President, the Aga Khan, delegate of India. In accordance with the existing rules, three days before the Assembly met, i.e. on September 10th, the Council began its 98th session, which, after three non-permanent Members — Belgium, Iran and Peru — had been elected on September 29th, according to the rules of rotation, continued to sit in its 99th session at the same time as the Assembly.

This year's Assembly was not terminated during this session, but was adjourned at the request of the Eastern Asia Committee, and the President was empowered to convene the Assembly at any time, should this be demanded by the position in the Far East.

The main items on the agenda of these discussions were the conflict in the Far East, which in view of the unclear conditions of right and power is not regarded in any quarter as a state of war existing after a declaration of war, and the civil war in Spain.

The first question was dealt with by the Council and the Assembly, and by the Eastern Asia Committee (Committee of Twenty-Three) set up as far back as 1933. This Committee prepared two reports on the present position, which are mentioned in the text of the resolution subsequently drawn up by a smaller Sub-Committee of Thirteen and adopted by the Assembly. The Sino-Japanese conflict, as dealt with by the League of Nations, was divided up into three different groups of questions. The first to come up for discussion was the bombing of open towns, and a resolution was adopted containing a moral condemnation of such bombing on humanitarian grounds. In the second place, the Council, after discussion in the Financial Committee, granted a credit of two millions for the existing regular budget grants for material assistance to China with a view to organising the campaign against epidemics. Lastly, the conflict as a whole was discussed in respect of the military operations and treaty conditions, on the basis of China's appeal to Articles 10, 11 and 17 and in connection with the discussion in the Assembly and subsequently in the Political Committee (the so-called Sixth Committee) on the Secretary General's report. The really decisive discussions, however, for the drafting of the text of the resolution took place in a number of meetings of the Committee of Twenty-Three, which were for the most part secret.

By the unanimous adoption of a resolution on October 6th with two abstentions, Siam and Poland (the text of which is reproduced in this number under "Documents"), the treatment of the Far Eastern conflict by the League was for the time being concluded. By the reference in the resolution to the preparation of a meeting of the parties to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, it was to be assumed that the real political decisions in this matter would be taken outside the League.

With regard to the discussion on the Spanish civil war, the League was faced in particular by the five demands put forward in the Assembly by M. Negrin, President of the Valencia Government; special mention may be made of the demand for the establishment of aggression on Spain by Germany and Italy, and the demand for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from National Spanish territory. The Spanish question also fell into three sections, although one of them did not directly concern the League. The first was

the discussion in the Assembly and Sixth Committee, the only possible result and meaning of which was that, under the leadership of Soviet Russia, the real representative of Red Spain at Geneva, the Valencia representatives and certain Popular Front Governments created a well used platform in order to level offences and suspicions against "Fascism" and "Dictatorships", i.e. against Germany and Italy, so that these "negotiations" brought the League down to the level of the demagogic atmosphere of political meetings. In the second place, there were the Nyon negotiations on defence against submarine attacks on non-Spanish vessels in the Mediterranean, on which occasion Soviet Russia again did her best to sabotage the proceedings. Lastly in the Committee of Twenty-Three, the question of volunteers and the continuance of the London Non-Intervention Committee were discussed in detail with a view to preparing a resolution.

On October 2nd the Assembly rejected the draft resolution on Spain by two votes (Albania and Portugal) with 14 abstentions.

The League of Nations cannot register any rise in prestige as a result of these two debates. It was compelled to leave the settlement of these, the most important items on its agenda, to other international bodies, namely, the Spanish question to the London Non-Intervention Committee which has in the meantime again resumed its discussions, and the Far Eastern conflict to a conference of the parties to the Washington Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 which is to meet on November 4th at Brussels. These results might at first sight be interpreted as a proof of wise restraint, especially as in both cases the proposals to establish aggression failed. That this is not the case is eloquently shown by the circumstances which accompanied these "negotiations".

The text of the resolution on the Spanish question which was put to the vote in the Assembly was the result of a one-sided judgment of the events in Spain and contained expressions which obviously took account of the instincts of hatred on the part of the Soviet front in the League and gave satisfaction to these quarters. That the resolution was not accepted was not of decisive importance, for before this a vote was taken on the supplementary proposals of Hungary and Austria. The acceptance of these proposals would have implied in particular that the League of Nations shared the view that contingents of foreign volunteers in armed group formations were also fighting on the Red Spanish front; by rejecting them the League States, including France and the United Kingdom who state that they are endeavouring outside the League to assuage the international crisis created by the Spanish civil war, adopted the view of Red Spain and thus gave moral support to the violent speeches made on every possible occasion at the Assembly against Germany and Italy by the representatives of Valencia, Negrin and del Vayo, and their superior officer Litvinov. The dangerous flank attacks made by the Soviet representatives at various secret night meetings and the extent to which they succeeded in taking England and France by surprise are openly shown in the passage where the draft resolution goes over to threats and states that the end of the non-intervention policy must be considered "à bref délai" unless the non-Spanish fighters are to be immediately withdrawn.

The failure to establish the aggressor in the resolution on the Sino-Japanese conflict also does not give the conviction that it is a case of that restraint which is usually

the sign of the master. Whatever interpretation may be placed on this failure, one consideration is of greater importance than any other: even League States are no longer convinced of the effectiveness of applying Article 16 and putting the sanctions machine into operation. Interest in sanctions can at the present time only be felt by States which regard a new World War as a way out of their own "impasse". In the case of China, however, there are Members of the League whose interests in the Far East are so important that they cannot afford a definite breach with Japan. A sanctions war against Japan would have merely brought such countries a fresh source of trouble, i.e. a free hand for Soviet Russia in Asia. In this discussion too Soviet Russia played the part of "protector of the principles of the Covenant" while torpedoing those principles in a neighbouring Committee room. In these negotiations, the League States also adopted reports and a resolution in which the influence of Litvinov can be traced.

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These discussions on questions of high politics, in view of their results, do not show that the League of Nations has any practical political value for the settlement of important conflicts; on the other hand the purely theoretical discussions at this Assembly have not restored the lost confidence in the League. For instance, the discussions on the problem of raw materials, on disarmament and on the question of universality strengthen the view that the League of Nations in its present form is an institution which was originally started by the creation of a new international law based on the law of the victors and that it proceeded from this to weave a further network of treaties the main aim of which was to strengthen those articles which safeguarded the advantages and possessions acquired, and that the present tactical position to a great extent consists in regarding as a disturber of the peace anyone who tries to remedy obvious mistakes and dangers in the system erected in 1919 and to find new ways for definitely liquidating the Great War.

The problem of raw materials at this year's Assembly apparently called for the special attention of the League. An outer sign of this was that one day the delegates and journalists were to be seen moving busily about the corridors of the Secretariat with two fine purple booklets which were said to contain the last word on the problem of raw materials. They were the final report of the Raw Materials Committee of the League and its supplement, the memorandum by Professor Ivar Högbom on the development of world production of raw materials. It is sufficient in the present short summary to note that the Committee's report refers to the financial difficulties of certain industrial countries which are obliged to develop their production under pressure of a growing population, though they lack certain essential raw materials. In this connection the question is raised as to how far the difficulties of such countries are a result of their financial, economic and armaments policy. The report points out that these difficulties would be less, if the countries used their resources for productive purposes and that, on the other hand, the movement of capital to these countries would be more favourable if serious obstacles were not constituted by the fear that the loaned capital might be used for anything but pacific purposes. Another conclusion—which the press regarded as a surprising result—is the one relating to the comparatively small importance of colonial raw materials in the total raw materials of the world. "A calculation, which necessarily can only be a rough one, seems to indicate that, including production both for domestic consumption and for export, the total present production of all commercially important raw materials in all colonial territories is no more than about 3 % of world production". The report also examines the complaints and difficulties experienced with regard to the supply of raw materials and their acquisition and payment. It considers that the only general

and permanent solution of the problem of commercial access to raw materials is to be found in a restoration of international exchanges on the widest basis. According to the report, the difficulties of supplying certain raw materials, though increased by the heavy expenditure on armaments, also applies to countries possessing sufficient supplies of foreign exchange. But it continues, if countries which do not dispose of a large amount of foreign exchange use it for raw materials primarily for purposes of armaments, they may well have difficulty in obtaining the raw materials required for normal purposes. The Committee points out that these difficulties would immediately be alleviated if a political settlement were forthcoming which would permit countries to reduce their present armament expenditure.

During the discussion in the Second Committee, these conclusions met with the approval of most delegates. In the Assembly itself the problem of raw materials was also repeatedly interpreted in this sense. In particular the British Foreign Secretary based himself on this report. In view of the statement that the production of raw materials in the colonies only amounted to 3 % of world production, Mr. Eden drew the conclusion that the problem of raw materials was not primarily or even essentially a colonial problem.

This League discussion showed that raw materials are at the present time in the real sense of the word latent war material. This conclusion can without exaggeration be carried still further, for the comments of the international press on this subject has sufficiently exploited the view that the demand for raw materials involves a danger of war and that those who are so violently demanding raw materials are disturbing the peace.

Since the War, what reasons have not already been put forward as a danger to world peace? At one time it was the demand that the highly armed victor States should disarm, at another time it was the demand for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, later it was the desire for the revision of the League Covenant, and at present it is the demand for raw materials by the countries which lack them.

The question arises as to what is the use to the countries lacking in raw materials of the activity of the League as a statistical seminary, if the facts are overlooked and no concrete proposals can be made. When the final report of the Raw Materials Committee speaks of the fear which can only be removed by political appeasement—an argument that is not new although Mr. Eden again took it up—the fear of war, the roots of which are found to be the international economic crisis, should justly include the question of countries which experience a fear of poverty and therefore also of social political distress. It sounds very significant when representatives of colonial Empires state that the problem of raw materials is not a colonial problem. In reply to this it must be said that countries lacking in raw materials would in any case draw very much more from colonies than countries which are rich in colonies, and even for the latter the lack of three percent of the total world production of raw materials would presumably cause considerable embarrassment. On the other hand, the final report of the Raw Materials Committee pointed out the dilemma which exists between lack of raw materials and poverty in foreign exchange. The only solution for this is regarded primarily as political appeasement. Is this not a path that the League has often taken before, and does it not merely imply putting the cart before the horse? The entanglement of the disarmament problem by the same method has shown clearly enough where it leads. First security, then disarmament! That was the catchword at the time. With regard to the problem of raw materials, the catchword is now: first disarmament, then economic prosperity. Here again, the question must be put: is not the economic distress of the nations the cause of their fear, as a result of which misunderstandings lead to political tension and armaments develop in a vicious circle? The discussion on the problem of raw materials showed, among other things, that some representatives take this view. But agreement in theoretical views is far removed at Geneva

from the bridging of great existing interests, and the fact that the problem of raw materials is at present being dealt with by the League of Nations provides no certainty that it is not so much a question of finding a way out as possibly of taking the wind out of the sails of the demand for colonies.

This Assembly of the League even had a discussion on disarmament. We will revert in greater detail to the "development" of this work.

The Third Committee, which was revived by last year's Assembly, seemed at first as if it would have to be content with somewhat cavalier treatment, as it was not originally intended to convene it. Finally two meetings were accorded for this subject, as there are still League delegates who regard the execution of Article 8 as one of the most important tasks of the League.

It was like a fairy tale of olden times when, on a sunny afternoon the delegates entering the committee room included so many of the old warriors of the fight for disarmament and rearmament in the deceased General Commission—Aghnides, Boncour, Bourquin, Komarnicki, Lange, Politis, Rütgers, Sandler—names representing programmes and names with which draft disarmament plans are connected.

In the view of the Chairman of the Bureau, M. Politis, the Disarmament Conference is not dead, as superficial persons declare. Whether the Disarmament Conference is dead or not is at bottom a political question. The possible future candidate for the presidential chair of this Conference (should it ever be reopened), M. Politis, pointed this out in the same speech with refreshing sincerity for the benefit of those who have lost all faith in a just settlement of this question within the framework of the League of Nations. In view of the sense of dizziness which M. Politis felt at the present expenditure on armaments, he said: "Certain States imagine that they can withdraw from international legality in order to carry out their intentions". Everyone is aware that M. Politis was not thinking of the Barthou note of April 17th, 1934, nor of the £180,000,000 which the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden mentioned in the Assembly a few days earlier for his country, nor even of the £1,500,000,000 which, according to a previous statement by Mr. Eden, the British taxpayer must now pay because M. Barthou did not accept the British, Italian and German offers. We know what M. Politis, Greek Minister in Paris and Professor at the Sorbonne, was thinking of in referring to "certain States".

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Just as in the problem of raw materials and the question of disarmament no advance was made beyond purely theoretical discussions, just as in these two problems there were no signs of courageous decisions in the sphere of practical politics and attempt were made in some quarters to turn them into political questions, there was no advance in the treatment of a group of questions for which the League had set up a special committee in view of the complete failure of sanctions. We refer to the question of the reform of the League, or—as the word "reform" approaches too closely to the word "revision" to which such objection is taken at Geneva—the question of the application of the principles of the Covenant; the committee in question was the Committee of Twenty-Eight which the optimists had originally and wrongly described as the "Committee for the Reform of the League of Nations".

The Committee was faced by a mass of reports: a report on regional pacts of mutual assistance—Rapporteur, Paul-Boncour (France); a report on Article 10 of the Covenant—Rapporteur, Nasrollah Entezam (Iran); a report on Article 11 of the Covenant—Rapporteur, Undén (Sweden); a report on Article 16 of the Covenant—Rapporteur, Rutgers (Netherlands); a report on regional or continental organisation of the League of Nations—Rapporteur, Boris Stein (Soviet Union); a report on the coordination of the League Covenant with the Pact of Paris and the Argentine Pact—Rapporteur, Pardo (Argentina), and two

reports on the participation of all States in the League of Nations and on the cooperation of the League with Non-Member States—Rapporteur, Lord Cranborne (United Kingdom).

None of these reports were really discussed at the session of the Committee of Twenty-Eight during the Assembly. On the other hand, during this period the Committee engaged in what may be termed a remarkable discussion. It will be remembered that last year Chile proposed that the League of Nations should examine the question of its cooperation with Non-Members. The Assembly stated at the time that it was still too early to consider this proposal. Chile brought the same proposal before this year's Assembly, together with a second proposal on the universality of the League. On the other hand, this year the Argentine proposed that the League should decide that, in case of war or the danger of war, it would immediately take steps to get into touch with States non-Members of the League. The remarkable feature of the discussion was not so much the acceptance by the Assembly as the determination with which Chile and the Argentine, supported by the vast majority of the South American Members of the League, expressed themselves on these fundamental questions in the Assembly and the Committee of Twenty-Eight. On the other hand, it was equally remarkable to observe the determined opposition of certain Members, under the leadership of Soviet Russia, to these proposals. We have already referred briefly to similar tendencies in other questions, but more violent expression was given in this case to the interest taken by certain Members of the League in preventing the cooperation of the League with non-Member States. Apart from the lip service which even these States render to universality or to the widest possible cooperation, it was possible to draw the conclusion from more than one speech in this discussion that they were really only anxious to impose their own dictatorship on the League. It was only necessary to follow the echo of this discussion in the international left-wing press which indulged in recriminations against the Chilean delegate—who, it was stated, was thinking of Germany—in order to realise the demagogical methods with which for instance, Soviet Russia succeeded in turning upside down the principles of the League Covenant. The proceedings in the Committee also showed that, to some extent in a concealed manner but also in some ways quite openly, the discussion on the universality of the League, under the leadership of the Soviets, was converted into a discussion for combating and excluding Germany and Italy. Litvinov's tactics of obstruction in this case failed of their object. But that is not a matter of essential importance. Here also, in connection with a question in which the dissension between the States Members is constantly growing, the Soviet Union carried on its destructive work with the object of creating a front within the League. The "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" of September 27th, wrote: "The opponents of the Chilean plan, who would have been glad to make the League a happy hunting-ground of the adherents of the ideology of the Popular Front, did everything they could under the leadership of the inevitable M. Litvinov to prevent an objective discussion of M. Edward's proposals. When the noiseless method of 'procedure', the difficulties of which are used to stifle inconvenient suggestions, proved in this case not to be sufficiently effective, recourse was even had to personal incriminations against the Chilean delegate."

The only "abstention" in the vote on the Chilean resolution was Soviet Russia. There is no lack of irony in these proceedings, when one remembers the remark made by Litvinov in the speech preceding the vote. He recalled the abstentions and negative votes on the Spanish resolution two days earlier. Those who abstain or give negative votes are in the Soviet view enemies of the League if they do not support M. Litvinov's proposals. In the case of the Spanish resolution this charge referred for instance to the following countries: the Union of South Africa, the Argentine, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, Cuba, Hungary,

Irish Free State, Panama, Peru, Switzerland, Uruguay and Venezuela. These countries include some who have undoubtedly done the League greater service than the new Member, Soviet Russia, who only discovered her League soul, or rather the possibilities of propaganda offered by the Geneva platform, in 1934. These countries include some whose love and pity for unhappy Spain is certainly more sincere than the objects pursued by Moscow with its policy of intervention in the Spanish civil war.

The opposition of the medium and smaller States showed on this occasion that the Soviet Union—which undoubtedly stood behind the attacks of the Valencia representatives, Negrin and Del Vayo—cannot always misuse the platform of the League for its propaganda. Many of them have for a long time been tired of merely endorsing the compromises strung together by the Great Powers and their satellites behind closed doors. The rejection of the re-election of Red Spain in the Council, which was decided on September 20th by 29 out of 52 States, may in any case be regarded as a defeat for the influence of Moscow.

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What general comments may be made on this League Assembly of 1937? In drawing up a sort of balance-sheet, certain tendencies and facts arise which may be rightly called a crisis of the League. Among these may be mentioned in particular the stubborn attempt of certain Members to lead the League into steps the political effect of which would cause still further political tension in the international relations of the peoples. Then again, the urgent demand of a number of Members of the League, in particular the Latin American States, for the cooperation of the League with non-Member States might be regarded as a movement within the League which is no longer purely theoretical in character but has reached a phase in which these Members are determined to reconsider their further cooperation with the League, if cooperation with non-Member States remains merely on paper. On the other hand, in the discussions a tendency opposed to "universality" was expressed more or less sharply and with more or less propaganda to the effect that all international negotiations and treaties outside the League might in the view of certain Members of the League lead to a new World War. The obstructionist tactics of the Soviet representatives and their satellites must be regarded not so much as a tendency as a fact, and their object is no other than to hinder that cooperation. Lastly it must be regarded as a crisis of the League of Nations that at present as in the past the solution of important political conflicts by the League must be subordinated to the solutions arrived at by the other international organs outside the League.

As regards the League crisis, the French Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, does not believe in it. In his view it is a peace crisis. But in saying this, does he not confirm the League crisis? Is it not being recognised that the will for peace of states which for various reasons decline cooperation with the League is as sincere and decisive as that of the Members of the League? The League of Nations is not required to provide ideal solutions. For this, in all the political conflicts with which it has had to deal, the vital interests of the Members are too much at stake. But it is this consideration of political realities by the Members of the League that should prevent them from calumniating or causing others to calumniate other nations and other governments which do not possess membership of the League. It proves nothing when certain States, solely on the basis of their membership, have for years begun their speeches with the words: "Chacun de vous connaît bien l'attachement de mon gouvernement à la cause de la paix." and have then gone on to speak of the "pays belliqueux" or to reduce the League to a party and to endeavour to play off the idea of democracy against the idea of dictatorship. Germany can make the same claim to her attachment to the cause of peace, with this difference that she not only affirms it in speeches but

has also proved by deeds so that tranquillity and a reduction of tension have been introduced in the endangered parts of Europe. In five short years the policy of the Führer has created conditions serving the cause of general peace with Poland, Austria, Belgium and in the sphere of naval armaments, such as have not been achieved by the League in fifteen years and have not, it is true, been attempted by the requisite means and methods.

When in the present year, at the instance of a part of the international press, the word is sent out like a blast of trumpets with innumerable echoes through the marble halls of the new League building: outside the Covenant there is only war!—it is overlooked that the League itself is a child of war and that its parents, as victors, once created conditions which did not show the same conscientiousness in dealing with the right of self-determination of the nations as is shown today in appealing to the sanctity of treaties and to the maintenance of certain principles of the Covenant such as Articles 10 and 11 one of which guarantees the inviolability of the territorial "status quo" laid down in the Paris Treaties while the other, in anticipation of the future, makes a revision of these treaties almost impossible. These articles 10 and 11 were also the subject of special reports. But any expectation of special progress in this direction was doomed to disappointment. A glance at these reports is sufficient to demonstrate clearly the vast difference in conception between the words "reform of the League" and "application of the principles of the Covenant". When one also remembers the interpretation placed by another report on Article 16, and by a further report on regional pacts of mutual assistance, it will be realised that international cooperation has entirely lost its meaning for some States if it is assumed in theory that the slag of the Versailles Treaty will some day be removed from the League Covenant. Some Members, in particular New Zealand and Chile, at this year's Assembly moreover strongly urged the necessity of a separation of the Covenant from the Versailles Treaty. A special Legal Committee was even appointed immediately after the beginning of the discussion in connection with this object. The Legal Committee issued a report on this question during the Assembly. We will revert later to this report which in view of its conclusions may be termed a masterpiece of subterfuge and of evasion of the main question by means of all the arts of legal sophistry. But we may already express our concurrence with the view of the Roumanian delegate M. Pella who, though certainly no adherent of such separation, observed in the discussion on this report that it was very unfortunate to speak of the work of the Legal Committee as if it referred to a separation of the League Covenant from the Peace Treaties—and Professor Pella, as an expert on international law, should know what he is talking about.

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The aggregate result of the XVIIIth Assembly of the League of Nations is resolutions which left everybody dissatisfied, draft resolutions which would have been dangerous, a bunch of reports some of which express hopes and expectations which would make one wish to cry: it is too good to be true; further reports which do not give the conviction that the League of Nations desires to give up its old ways. The cooperation of the nations is still to be kept in the fetters of 1919, when it was desired by means of insane frontier demarcations and provisions to stipulate exactly which way each nation must go. This way should necessarily lead to a new and freer movement of the nations who were suppressed and crippled at that time. At present we are living in the midst of those struggles for freedom which, in contradistinction to the principles and ideas preached at that time, are now described by the former peace-makers as attempts to disturb the peace. The League of Nations has also placed its forum at the disposal of this dangerous tendency. This is in

contradiction with its achievements which in this year again have scarcely amounted to more than the ignoring of actual causes and connections and a further evasion of concrete conclusions which can no longer be shelved.

The League of Nations stands like a mirage in the sight of mankind. At certain times it rises in a current of hopes which are generally found to be bitter disappointments after the meetings have been held. Reports are shot up like fireworks in

dazzling colours as if to penetrate the night that surrounds the relations of the peoples, in order again to disappear in the night as rapidly as they arose. For these reports contain none of the sacrifices which must be made by the States organised at Geneva on the altar of peace, if the League is to fulfil its meaning and object of promoting the cooperation of the nations and of safeguarding international peace in order that justice may rule.

PALAIS DES NATIONS

The Headquarters of the League

Its almost startling whiteness rises amid the dark tree-tops of the famous Ariana Park, a gift of Gustave Revilliod to his native city, the greater part of which the latter proceeded on September 25th, 1928 to turn over to the League. A year later, on September 7th, 1929, a stormy, showery autumn day, the foundation stone was laid, the ceremony lasting only a few brief minutes. On September 6th, 1933 the company assembled to celebrate its inauguration. A long train of high officials of the League, representatives of the States Members of the League and of the world Press, and notables of the city of Geneva proceeded slowly like a funeral cortège through the still unfinished building. Even in the inauguration speeches echoes of doubt and anxiety made themselves heard. For down below in the old "Crystal Palace" the struggle of the Disarmament Conference was raging, and in the world outside the competition between the already armed Powers was busy digging the grave of one of the noblest ideals of the League of Nations and the international Peace movement. The young dreams which it was still possible to dream, when Briand and Stresemann wielded the silver hammer at the laying of the foundation stone in 1929, had now dissolved into thin air. Still the work went on; and in February 1936 the Secretariat began to move into its new premises. In September the Council was able for the first time to meet in the new "Palace"; and in September of the present year, the vast Assembly Hall, though not quite completed, was ready for the session of the Assembly.

On September 25th, the Aga Khan, the President of this year's Assembly, gave a reception for the opening of the Assembly Building—a magnificent celebration from the Arabian Nights. There was a concert and dance, and lavish buffets laden with pyramids of the choicest food, with batteries of two thousand bottles of the best champagne. "Le congrès s'amuse". The Spaniards and Chinese excused themselves. The thunder of the guns on the Manzanares and the Yantsekiang, the rattle of machine-guns and the din of bursting shells, it is true, were hardly in harmony with this representative demonstration, which it might have been better to avoid—at any rate in these surroundings and to this extent.

The old temporary premises on the banks of the Lake are a thing of the past. The new mammoth erection on the Ariana heights looks down contemptuously on its petty predecessor. The latter, in view of the glut of hotel accommodation already prevailing in Geneva, is not to revert, as had originally been intended, to its former functions of a hotel, but is to provide quarters for the offices and conferences of international associations.

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So there it stands, the *Palais des Nations*, the Palace of the Peoples, approached from the town by the new and splendidly laid out Avenue de la Paix. An artificial mountain of ferro-concrete, 400,000 cubic metres of it, covering an area of 18,000 square metres of ground. Circumference 2 kilometres : frontages

of 400 metres each. Facing of stone, with rows of windows, the effect of which in successive layers of stories is designed for the view from a distance. The impression from a distance was presumably felt by the architect to be more important than the impression at close quarters, which is that rather of the big cold offices of some huge commercial concern. It is not till we come to the central building with its vast dimensions (76 by 55 metres and a height of 35 metres), the tastefully laid-out gardens of which form a harmonious whole with the rare old trees of the Ariana Park, that the sober design springs into life. It stands back in crescent shape, carried on ten broad, tall columns. Here is the "Cour d'honneur". A powerful open staircase leads up to the "Salle principale", from which there is a superb view to right and left across the Lake of Geneva in the foreground to the Alps of Savoy in the background with Mont Blanc towering in impressive splendour in the far distance. The view extends as one mounts the many steps or numerous lifts to the restaurant on the breezy heights of the roof.

Designs were submitted by 370 architects, from whom five were ultimately selected to carry out the work. For "five" read "one". The magic formula, well tried in political connections in Geneva, found an application this time in the sphere of art. A compromise was concluded, and the plans of the French architect Nenot, which had been awarded the first prize, were adopted with the inclusion of other ideas from the designs of the other prize-winners.

Perhaps the biggest architectural effort of the present age, the realisation in symbolic form of the world peace conception of Immanuel Kant and the dreams and desires of Humanity, it might have been an achievement to kindle the imagination. But that was not to be. The combined efforts of so much talent could produce results which technically were of the first order; but the architectural achievement was purely academic. Once again it was made plain that it is the Spirit which creates its own Form, and not the Form the Spirit. This League of Nations of bargains and ingenious "formulae", when expressed—at a cost of over 30 millions of gold Swiss francs—in steel and concrete, could not be other than it is, a monster model of correctness, a marvel of technique but not of art. Its dimensions, as those who built and those who inhabit it are in the habit of announcing—not without a certain satisfaction, are almost exactly those of the Chateau de Versailles. The magnificence of the latter (between which and the "ad hoc" premises which house the present League of Nations there is really no comparison) is the expression of the unbridled imaginings and lust of aggrandisement of the Roi Soleil. Is the precedent ominous? The future alone can show. Are the Powers who have rough-hewn the League to suit their own desires and interests, and in the process have erected this colosseum on a foundation of crumbling soil, still capable of learning from past mistakes? If they are, the new Palace of the Peoples may yet develop that magic power which is needed, if a new spirit is to be called into being in the relations of the peoples. If they are not, the

Palace can have no other destiny than to become a museum of lost hopes, a standing memorial of frustrated aspirations.

* * *

A museum? Every day this summer hundreds of passing travellers and holiday-makers have made their way to the white palace, paid their half-franc, and been conducted by huissiers in blue uniform, highly conscious of their own importance, through this labyrinth of the peoples. Confusing as the ways of the League are the ways that lead through its palace. Hundreds and hundreds without end of uniform doors on five stories hide the 450 offices of the Secretariat. Here is the "Salle des pas perdus". Here the various Committee Rooms. And, finally, the Holy of Holies of the League, the Assembly Hall with its special building forming the centre of the entire construction. It rises on an almost square plan (42 by 44 metres) to a height of 20 metres and has 1541 seats without including those on the platform and the accommodation for the verbatim reporters. The ground floor has 240 seats for delegates. On three sides there are galleries for the secretaries and experts of the delegates with 276 seats, above these the "diplomatic box" with 179 seats, the press gallery with 438 seats, and finally above these the public gallery with 408 seats. The hall makes a serious and solid impression which it is to be hoped will not be spoiled by the four vast pictures with various symbolic representations of peace which are still to be presented by the French Government. The Council Chamber is furnished and decorated on wall and ceiling (like the neighbouring Committee and other rooms) by the different States Members, and affords an interesting insight into their decorative art. The walls and ceiling of the Council Chamber are covered with colossal allegorical pictures by the Spanish painter Sert. The motives are taken from the history of Mankind. Three of them represent Progress and the blessings of technical Science, the liberation of Man from feudal service and slavery, and the successful combating of plagues and diseases. Two other pictures show conquerors and conquered. The conquerors are portrayed bowed by the sacrifices of lives which the victory has cost them. The conquered are shown collapsing under the burdens which defeat has brought, and thinking of retaliation. The motive of the last of the five pictures is "Pourquoi pas?" It represents two huge guns on which a woman holds up a child in her arms, while on each side the combatants and their wives and mothers run to meet one another with joy and relief in their faces. The beginnings of a new age are indicated in the colossal fresco, which shows five giant male figures representing the five continents who hold out their hands to one another in collaboration.

"Pourquoi pas?" Why not? Why not the liberation of mankind from that greatest of all scourges, War? A mute question—not least for those who gather every year time after time beneath these pictures, for those in whose power it lay to make this act of liberation, had they honestly and sincerely desired so to do.

Filled with the earnest thoughts which a visit to the Council Chamber cannot fail to awaken, the visitor is conducted to the Film Room. He is shown a landscape of innumerable war graves, such as are scattered over the whole world as memorials of the last war. This is the introduction to the League film. An invisible voice at the same time recites the preamble to the Covenant of the League. He is then shown the Secretary General, M. Avenol, and other high officials of the League, with pictures to illustrate the daily work of the Secretariat and the different Sections.

The idea is not merely to show the visitor the technical resources of the League, but also the achievements of the Sections which deal with problems of international law, minorities, mandates, disarmament, finance, economics, intellectual co-operation, communications and transit, health, the trade in dangerous drugs, traffic in women and children and the like.

All these Sections of the Secretariat, with the corresponding standing Committees of the League, have come into being in connection with the functions imposed on the League by Articles 23, 24 and 25. But the exercise of these functions does not place the League in a position of itself to solve any of the economic, social, humanitarian or cultural problems concerned. The importance of these Sections and Committees should not under these circumstances be overrated. The work they do is mainly preparatory in character, involving no obligations for anyone. They advise the Council and Assembly of the League, and place the requisite documentary material at their disposal. This applies to all except the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference, the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Minorities Section whose function it is to supervise and enforce the execution of obligations incurred by States Members of the League under the Covenant—in which task unfortunately, as experience shows, they have not had much success. It is just these three organisations which have least to show in the way of satisfactory results. All prospects of disarmament have definitively collapsed: the Mandates Commission has long since failed in its task; and, in spite of the Minorities Section, there are more human beings groaning under the yoke of foreign rule in this age of the League than has been the case for centuries. As for the other functions of the Sections and Committees, a great many of them were already being exercised by international bodies, i.e. by offices set up by international conventions, before the League was established; and many of these international bodies were able to show quicker results, wherever there was a common desire for such on the part of the individual Governments concerned.

The scepticism with which the visitor views the pictures thrown on the screen reaches the point of repugnance, when the Head of the Political Section is shown unfolding with particular deliberation a bundle of documents labelled "Disarmament", "Japan and China", "Italy and Abyssinia", "Bolivia and Paraguay" with other political issues on which the League was found wanting.

The last picture shown on the screen is that of the sympathetic Belgian Premier, van Zeeland, who pleads for the League and the cause of international co-operation.

One last look at the mighty Library building, to the erection of which Rockefeller contributed 2,000,000 dollars. That ends the personally conducted tour.

Dazzled with the glare of the sunshine reflected from the white walls, the visitors leave the Palace. Some seem thoughtful: others laugh and make a noise as they go. They do not worry. They are delighted to be able to get their impressions fixed in the form of snapshots or picture postcards of the League.

It will not be long before they have forgotten the "Pourquoi pas?" of the painter Sert; and the impressions of the film will be over even sooner. In the pleasant surroundings of Geneva the picture of the graves will also soon vanish like a vision in the distance, and with it the memory of that voice which reminded them of the ideals of the League still awaiting fulfilment.

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"Pourquoi pas?" Why are these ideals further from fulfilment today than they were at the time when the cry for them rose to heaven from tortured human hearts, from blood-stained battlefields, in the passionate prayers of millions of the living and as a last legacy of innumerable dead?

To that question neither the stone walls of the Palace nor the film of the League have any answer to give. The answer is to be found in the files and documents which slumber in the archives of the League—dumb witnesses, but all the more incorruptible for that, of the League's tragedy as also of the reply to the further question as to how it came about.

Documents

I. BELGIUM'S FIGHT FOR HER INDEPENDENCE

The Exchange of Notes of March 6th, 1936 regarding the Amendment of the Belgo-French Military Convention of September 7th, 1930.

Identical Notes of March 6th, 1936 exchanged between the Belgian Prime Minister, M. van Zeeland, and the French Ambassador in Brussels, M. Laroche.

Brussels, March 6th, 1936.

Monsieur le Ministre (Monsieur l'Ambassadeur),

By the Notes exchanged on September 10th and 15th, 1920 between the Premier and Foreign Minister of France on the one hand and the Premier of Belgium on the other hand, the Government of the French Republic and the Government of His Majesty the King of the Belgians gave their consent to the Military Convention signed on September 7th, 1920. The 1920 Agreement had the object, according to the notes exchanged between the two Governments and registered at Geneva, of reinforcing the guarantees of peace and security arising out of the League Covenant. It ensured the technical conditions for military cooperation between France and Belgium in case of unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany.

In 1925 an agreement was concluded at Locarno which provides the guarantees agreed upon in 1920 in a more complete and unequivocal manner. This agreement was concluded by the President of the Republic (His Majesty the King of the Belgians) and adopted by the Chambers.

This agreement represents one of the essential elements of the international status of Belgium, and the obligations which it lays down, together with those of the League Covenant are the only obligations of guarantee and assistance binding France and Belgium.

It need not be stated that both Governments are more than ever determined to remain faithful to these undertakings.

In military matters the 1920 Agreement, in addition to general provisions regarding contact between the two General Staffs, contained special provisions regarding the left bank of the Rhine.

Recognising that certain parts of this agreement are obsolete, the two Governments have realised the necessity of retaining only the part which is still of value, namely their mutual agreement. At the present time they attach importance to maintaining the contact between the General Staffs in order to carry out the undertakings contained in the Rhineland Pact of Locarno, and also in order to study the technical conditions for carrying out these undertakings.

It is understood that such contact cannot lead to any undertaking of a political nature nor any obligation with regard to the organisation of national defence for either of the interested parties.

I have the honour to confirm to Your Excellency the agreement of the French (Belgian) Government with the above provisions.

I have the honour etc.

(Signed) LAROCHE
(VAN ZEELAND)

**The Anglo-French Declaration of Guarantee
of April 24th, 1937,**

In accordance with instructions received from their respective Governments, his Majesty's Ambassador and the French Ambassador have the honour to make the following communication to the Belgian Government :

(1) The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the French Republic have not failed during the last few months to give their full attention to the desire of the Belgian Government to have the international rights and obligations of Belgium clarified in certain respects where this is rendered necessary by her geographical position and by the delays which may still occur before the negotiation and conclusion of the general act intended to replace the Treaty of Locarno.

(2) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic, being anxious to give full expression to their sympathy with this desire of the Belgian Government, have agreed to make the following declaration :

(3) The said Governments have taken note of the views which the Belgian Government has itself expressed concerning the interests of Belgium, and more particularly :

(1) the determination expressed publicly and on more than one occasion by the Belgian Government : (a) to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any aggression or invasion, and to prevent Belgium territory from being used, for purposes of aggression against another State, as a passage or as a base of operations by land, by sea, or in the air ; (b) to organize the defence of Belgium in an efficient manner for this purpose ;

(2) the renewed assurance of the fidelity of Belgium to the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the obligations which it involves for Members of the League.

(4) In consequence, taking into account the determination and assurance mentioned above, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic declare that they consider Belgium to be now released from all obligations towards them resulting from either the Treaty of Locarno or the arrangements drawn up in London on March 19th, 1936, and that they maintain in respect of Belgium the undertakings of assistance which they entered into towards her under the above-mentioned instruments.

(5) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic agree that the release of Belgium from her obligations, as provided for in paragraph 4 above, in no way affects the existing undertakings between the United Kingdom and France.

The Belgian Foreign Minister's Reply of April 24th, 1937.

The Government of His Majesty the King has taken note with great satisfaction of the declaration made to it this day by the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French Republic, for which it expresses its cordial thanks.

Extract from the Speech by M. Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, in the Belgian Chamber, on April 29th, 1937.

In his great speech in the Chamber on April 29th, 1937 the Foreign Minister, M. Spaak, again referred to the reasons which had caused Belgium in future to carry on an exclusively and purely Belgian policy. He then replied to the charge that, in so doing, Belgium was adopting an egoistic attitude and was lacking in loyalty to the principles of collective security and mutual assistance.

"But", he continued, "in order to understand each other, if we wish to penetrate to the truth of ideas, we must first overcome the obstacles created by mere words.

If collective security is an idea that implies that all States, whatever their importance, strength, traditions and geographical position, must take up the same attitude and subscribe to the same undertakings, if it means that the policy of Belgium must be identical with that of France, England or Germany, then I state that collective security is a mere vaporous ideology which will never lead to anything because it is profoundly contrary to realities and possibilities. But, if collective security means that, for the common well-being of all peoples and the organisation and maintenance of peace, each State must make the maximum effort, within its means, to fulfil its mission, then I agree with this, and I add that this is the position of Belgium; for the important matter is not the obligations undertaken but the obligations that are kept. And I again repeat that Belgium, by organising her national defence, by making a great military effort, by defending herself against any attack which may be directed against her and by taking upon herself the fearful dangers involved in this determination, is giving to Europe everything that Europe can legitimately demand of her.

This is the way in which England, France and Belgium have settled the obligations of the past among themselves.

I will now turn to the future.

The efforts made for months past will be continued. The Franco-British declaration leaves no doubt on this point. Precisely because the negotiations for preparing a Western Pact may still last a long time, an immediate solution of certain problems has been sought and found.

In these negotiations Belgium will play her part. The Government is well aware that its task will only be really finished when formulae have been found to which Germany can subscribe.

I have already stated what importance I attach to the last declaration of the German Chancellor; it was proof of a spirit which must be approved and it displayed possibilities which I would by no means abandon. The difficulties are not insuperable. The spirit in which they are approached is an essential factor of success or failure. The state of Europe is better to-day than six months ago, and the Franco-British declaration is a fresh element of appeasement.

The will for peace of most of the European statesmen is beyond doubt. It is necessary to have confidence.

We have reached the first stage. I am advancing with complete optimism to the next.

This completes the comments which I desired to make to the Chamber on the Franco-British declaration."

Turning to Article 16 and the question of General Staff discussions, M. Spaak continued:

"There are however two other problems which have not been touched upon in this declaration, about which I would like to say a few words, for I know they are occupying the attention of public opinion in Belgium and the rest of Europe. They are the interpretation of Article 16 of the League Covenant and the question of agreements among General Staffs.

My statement regarding Article 16 will be brief; for I am of opinion that it is for the Assembly of the League at Geneva to interpret the text officially. But in view of the present dis-

cussion, the Chamber will no doubt understand that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has no opinion or, if he has one, that he refuses to state it.

I therefore hope that what I have to say will help to clear up a problem which would ultimately be made even more confused and insoluble by exaggerated caution or exaggerated ingenuity. In this I am only following the example of the honourable Foreign Minister of the Netherlands who has just made important statements in the Netherlands parliament which call for our entire attention.

The most important and delicate point in Article 16 appears to be the penultimate paragraph which deals with the right of transit:

'The Members of the League agree... that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.'

When and how does such an obligation come into force?

It is very unusual and, I must confess, even somewhat alarming that such an important text, the application of which may have such serious consequences, is still left to the individual interpretation of each Member.

As far as the Belgian Government is concerned, the possible right of transit through the territory of our country is dependent on two essential conditions. The first is that the right to march through Belgium can in no case be imposed without her consent. The second is that such consent can only be given in connection with the carrying out of a common action.

It seems to me that these two conditions cannot be seriously contested.

The first condition is the only interpretation that is compatible with our complete sovereignty and also with our constitutional law.

I think it is superfluous to emphasise this fact, for it is quite clear.

The second condition, namely the existence of a common action, is derived from the text itself.

I certainly do not go so far as to state that common action requires the effective participation of all Members of the League, but it does require at any rate the participation of our neighbours.

These are the essential principles that I shall put forward at Geneva as soon as the question is raised.

As far as agreements between General Staffs are concerned, my answer will be clear. The Franco-British declaration of April 24th closes for us the period that may be called the period of military agreements, and I am glad of this.

On this point, however, a statement is necessary.

I am glad, not because these agreements were bad, but because, in spite of realities and in spite of the assurances repeated ten or twenty times by my predecessors, they were an element of confusion and distrust for us and for Europe.

Some of us regarded them as a proof of our dependence on one of our great neighbours. Others regarded them as an essential element of our national defence. Both these ideas were wrong.

Now that these military agreements no longer exist, I solemnly repeat that they were not political in character, that they did not affect the complete independence of our country, and that the spirit in which they were concluded remained the spirit in which they were applied.

But what is the position now?

The merit of the Franco-British declaration, as I have already said and again repeat, is that it sets matters right.

At the present time there is for us only one reason for a possible war: national defence.

This justifies me in stating that the military problems with which the responsible authorities are dealing are now freed from all superfluous complications, with which they were burdened by our former guarantees.

This simplified problem is now only a technical problem.

Our foreign policy now coincides exactly with our military possibilities.

It is for us to solve this technical problem in complete independence and freedom; we have not and shall not put up with the slightest hindrance or limitation in this respect.

We again assume the solemn undertaking to do everything that can be done within these limits for our national defence."

The German-Belgian Exchange of Notes of October 13th, 1937.

On October 13th the following Notes were exchanged in the Foreign Office in Berlin between the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron von Neurath, and the Belgian Minister, Viscount Jacques Davignon:

The German Government have taken cognizance with special interest of the public declarations made by the Belgian Government with regard to the clarification of the international position of Belgium. They on their side have repeatedly given expression, especially through the declaration of the German Reich Chancellor in his speech of January 30th, 1937, to their attitude in this connexion. On the other hand the German Government have made a note of the declaration of the British and French Governments of April 24th, 1937.

As the conclusion of a Treaty designed to replace the Pact of Locarno can still take a considerable time, and in the desire to strengthen the peaceful efforts of the two countries, the German Government regard it as appropriate to define now, in precise terms, their position towards Belgium. To this end they make the following declarations:

"(1) The German Government have taken official notice of the attitude to which the Belgian Government, on their own authority have given expression—namely:

- (a) That they propose to follow, in full exercise of their own sovereignty, a policy of independence; and
- (b) That they are resolved to defend the frontiers of Belgium against every attack and every invasion, with all their forces, to prevent Belgian territory being used for an attack against any other country, either as a *Durchmarschland* (passage-way for military forces) or as a base of operations by land, sea, or air, and to this end to organize the defence of Belgium in effective fashion.

"(2) The German Government hold that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western Powers. They confirm their decision that in no circumstances, will they impair this inviolability and integrity, and that they will at all times respect Belgian territory, except, of course, in the event of Belgium's taking part in a military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved.

"The German Government, like the British and French Governments, are prepared to give support to Belgium in the event of her being subjected to an attack or an invasion."

I have the honour, etc.,

Baron von Neurath.

Belgian reply

The Belgian Note stated:

The Royal Government have taken official notice with the greatest satisfaction of the Declaration which has been made to them to-day by the Reich Government. They express to the Reich Government their warm thanks for it.

The Official Comment in Berlin.

The following statement is made by the competent authority on the above exchange of notes:

The object of the German note is to clear up the German standpoint in respect of the international position of Belgium, so long as a new Western Pact has not been concluded. In the Rhineland Pact of Locarno the international position of Belgium was regulated in such a manner as to guarantee the integrity of her territory, while she was at the same time, like England and Italy, in the case of a German-French conflict to take the side of one or other belligerents. Since the withdrawal of Germany from the system of the Rhineland Pact and since the inauguration of diplomatic negotiations on the conclusion of a new Western Pact, the Belgian Government, as pointed out publicly in various declarations, has taken the view that the special position of Belgium requires that the guarantee of her integrity should no longer be dependent upon her assuming corresponding guarantee obligations. In pursuance of this view, the Belgian Government has succeeded in prevailing upon France and England who in their relation to each other and in relation to Belgium still regard the old Rhineland Pact as binding until the proposed new Western Pact is concluded, to waive all the obligations assumed by Belgium in the Rhineland Pact. It will be remembered that this was done in an officially published exchange of notes of April 24th of the present year.

The Reich Government has from the outset shown the greatest sympathy for the desire expressed by the Belgian Government to pursue a policy of independence. In particular, the Führer and Chancellor made a statement in this sense in his Reichstag speech of January 30th last, to the effect that Germany was prepared to recognise and guarantee the inviolability of Belgium. As it cannot at present be foreseen when the negotiations on a new Western Pact, in which the question of Belgium's international position would also have to be settled, can be brought to a conclusion, the Reich Government has thought fit to put into effect and to define Germany's readiness as expressed by the Führer and Chancellor in a formal diplomatic document to the Belgian Government.

The Declaration of the Reich Government is based on the fact that the Belgian Government, by their own free decision, have proclaimed their intention of following, in full exercise of their sovereignty, a policy of independence, and of preventing with all their forces the use of Belgian territory as a base of operations by an attacking State. On the principle that the inviolability and integrity of Belgian territory are common interests for the Western Powers, the Reich Government in their declaration agree in no circumstances to impair this inviolability and integrity and at all times to respect Belgian territory.

*Only one condition is attached to this obligation, and it explains itself. Germany's freedom of action vis-à-vis Belgium will be restored if Belgium should join Germany's opponents in a war in which Germany is engaged. That would apply, naturally, not only if Belgium fought on the side of Germany's opponents, but if the Belgian Government—perhaps on the ground of Belgium's membership of the League of Nations—should find themselves ready to place Belgian territory at the disposal of the hostile forces as a *Durchmarschland* or as a basis of operations. In addition, in accordance with the announcement of the Führer and Chancellor, the Reich Government has linked up with its obligation to respect the inviolability and integrity of Belgium the assurance of granting Belgium assistance at her request should she be the object of attack or invasion.*

In this Declaration, the Reich Government have taken account so clearly and unambiguously of the standpoint of the Belgian Government that no room remains for doubts of any kind. Belgium has the complete certainty that so long as she refrains from cooperation in any military action directed against Germany, she remains immune from any military action on Germany's part, and that, in the case of her being attacked from any other side, she can rely on the full support of Germany.

The Reich Government may claim that, with this great, disinterested step, they have achieved a substantial new contribution to

the securing of the peace of Europe. They believe themselves justified also in expecting that this step will have a favourable influence upon the development of good neighbourly relations between Germany and Belgium.

Text of the Official Statement in Brussels on October 13th, 1937.

The German Government has just handed to the Belgian Minister in Berlin, Viscount Davignon, a declaration in which it declares its determination to respect for all time the inviolability and integrity of Belgium.

This declaration is on the lines of the words uttered by Chancellor Hitler in his speech last January, when the German Government expressed its readiness at any time to recognise Belgian State territory as inviolable.

The Belgian Government, in thanking the German Government for the intentions thus notified expressed its willingness at the time to enter into negotiations with Germany and the other signatories of the Locarno Agreement in order to put these intention into effect.

Some months ago, the French and British Governments, in view of the time which will elapse until the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Locarno Agreement, decided to define their position in respect of Belgium.

As the German Government also realised that a certain time would elapse until a new security part for Western Europe was reached, it has for its part also thought fit to define its attitude towards our country, pending the preparation of the general treaty to be negotiated.

Germany promises to respect Belgian territory at all times, with the exception, naturally, of an armed conflict involving the Reich in which our country takes military action against Germany. The definitions of "military action" are clear. They refer to the case in which armed Belgian forces fight against Germany and naturally also to the case in which Belgium places her territory at the disposal of foreign forces whether as a territory of passage or a basis of operations.

If Belgium acts in this sense, Germany is naturally no longer bound by the obligation which she has assumed.

The German declaration, following upon the Franco-British declaration of April 24th, 1937, enables us to note the agreement of the three western Powers in respect of the attitude adopted by Belgium.

The fact that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium is regarded as of common interest to the three western Powers confirms the historical mission of Belgium and strengthens her international position.

Belgium is glad of the comprehension shown by the neighbouring States. The Belgian Government has expressed its keen satisfaction to the Reich Government. It regards the German declaration as an important contribution to the strengthening of peace and as a factor promoting the good relations between the two countries.

It need not be stressed that the Belgian Government, in taking note of the German Government's declaration and appreciating the spirit in which it is made, has not lost sight of its obligations as a Member of the League of Nations.

II. DOCUMENTS OF THE LEAGUE ASSEMBLY

I. THE ATTITUDE OF THE LEAGUE TO THE CHINESE CONFLICT.

(a) Text of the Resolution regarding bombing of open towns from the air by the Japanese air forces.

The Advisory Committee set up by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933, which again met in pursuance of the Council's decision of September 16th, 1937 in order to discuss the conflict which had again broken out in China, on September 27th, adopted the following resolution which was unanimously passed by the Assembly on September 28th:

"The Advisory Committee,

Taking into urgent consideration the question of the aerial bombardment by Japanese aircraft of open towns in China,

Expresses its profound distress at the loss of life caused to innocent civilians, including great numbers of women and children, as a result of such bombardments, and

Declares that no excuse can be made for such acts which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the world, and solemnly condemns them."

(b) Extract from the Reports of the Advisory Committee on Far Eastern Questions, and the Resolution of the Assembly.

After the drafting of the above resolution on the bombing of open towns in China, the Advisory Committee appointed a Sub-Committee consisting of 13 States, in which the United States of America were also represented. The task of this Sub-Committee was to examine the position created by the Sino-Japanese conflict in the Far East, to discuss the relevant questions and to submit to the Committee such proposals as it thought fit. The Sub-Committee submitted two reports which were published in League Documents A. 78, 1937 VII and A. 80 1937 VII.

Of the first report we reproduce merely the introduction and the conclusion, which are worded as follows:

The Sub-Committee has not attempted to deal with the historical and underlying causes of the conflict in the Far East. It has not, for instance, thought it necessary to revert to the Manchuria affair, which is dealt with in the report adopted by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933. Nor has it attempted to describe in detail the development of events either in the sphere of military action or in that of negotiation and policy. The accounts issued by the two parties in regard to these are contradictory, and on the basis of the material available it would be impossible to do so, especially in view of the fact that Japan, which, since March 28th, 1935, is no longer a Member of the League, did not agree to send a representative to sit on the Committee.

In any case, a detailed study is unnecessary. At the beginning of July 1937, there was no indication from either side that there was anything in their relations which could not be settled amicably. All that the Committee has to do is to describe and assess the events which led from a state of peaceful relations to a situation where large armies are in conflict.

It has, accordingly, been possible—in the time available to trace the main development of events—to examine the treaty obligations of the parties to the conflict and to draw conclusions which are set out at the end of this report.

(Then follows an account of these events since July 1937.)

Conclusions.

It is clear that the two countries take very different views as to the underlying grounds of the dispute and as to the incident which led to the first outbreak of hostilities.

It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in military control

of large areas, including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the coast of China to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

After examination of the facts laid before it, the Committee is bound to take the view that the military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly co-operation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that it can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defence, and that it is in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6th, 1922, and under the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928.

Second Report of the Sub-Committee.

1. In the report which the Sub-Committee has already submitted to the Advisory Committee, the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan have been examined. That report shows that the action taken by Japan is a breach of Japan's treaty obligations and cannot be justified.

2. The establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments and the maintenance of respect of treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples one with another are matters of vital interest to all nations.

3. The present situation in China is a matter of concern not only to the two States in conflict but, to a greater or lesser degree, to all States. Many Powers are already directly affected in the lives of their nationals and in their material interests. But even more important than this is the interest which all States must feel in the restoration and maintenance of peace. This, indeed, is the fundamental purpose for which the League exists. It has thus the duty as well as the right to attempt to bring about a speedy restoration of peace in the Far East, in accordance with existing obligations under the Covenant and the treaties.

4. The Sub-Committee has considered in the first place the obligations which the Covenant places in such circumstances upon Members of the League.

5. The Advisory Committee has been set up under the wide terms of Article 3 (3) of the Covenant, which authorises the Assembly to deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

6. This Article places no limit upon the action of the Assembly, and Article 11 which, *inter alia*, has been invoked by China provides that "the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".

7. The Sub-Committee has examined the situation with a view to determining what action would be "wise and effectual".

8. It cannot be admitted that the present conflict in the Far East, which has been shown to involve an infringement of Japan's treaty obligations, is one which can as of right only be settled by direct methods between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. On the contrary, the whole situation must be taken into the fullest consideration and in particular any appropriate means by which peace may be re-established, in conformity with the principles of the Covenant and of international law and with the provisions of existing treaties, must be examined.

9. The Sub-Committee is convinced that even at this stage of the conflict, before examining other possibilities, further efforts must be made to secure the restoration of peace by agreement.

10. In attempting a settlement, by negotiation, of the present conflict, the League cannot lose sight of the fact that one party is not a member of the League and has, in relation to the work of the Advisory Committee, explicitly declined to co-operate in political matters with the League.

11. The Sub-Committee notes that under the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington, the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed, *inter alia*, to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and that all contracting Powers, including China, agreed that, whenever a situation should arise which involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable the discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the Powers concerned. It appears, therefore, to the Sub-Committee that the first step which the Assembly should take, in the name of the League, would be to invite those Members of the League who are parties to the Nine-Power Treaty to initiate such consultation at the earliest practicable moment. The Sub-Committee would suggest that these Members should meet forthwith to decide upon the best and quickest means of giving effect to this invitation. The Sub-Committee would further express the hope that the States concerned will be able to associate with their work other States which have special interests in the Far East to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement.

12. The States thus engaged in consultation may at any stage consider it desirable to make proposals through the medium of the Advisory Committee to the Assembly. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Assembly should not close its session and should declare the League's willingness to consider co-operation to the maximum extent practicable in any such proposals. The Advisory Committee should in any case hold a further meeting (whether at Geneva or elsewhere) within a period of one month.

13. Pending the results of the action proposed, the Advisory Committee should invite the Assembly to express its moral support for China and to recommend that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China.

(c) The League's Resolution on the Chinese Conflict.

"The Assembly:

"Adopts as its own the reports submitted to it by its Advisory Committee on the subject of the conflict between China and Japan;

"Approves the proposals contained in the second of the said reports (document A.80.1937.VII) and requests its President to take the necessary action with regard to the proposed meeting of the Members of the League which are Parties to the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922;

"Expresses its moral support for China, and recommends that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China;

"Decides to adjourn its present session and to authorise the President to summon a further meeting if the Advisory Committee so requests."

II. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

(a) The Text of the Rejected Spanish Resolution.

(League Document A. 70. 1937. VIII of October 1st, 1937).

(This draft resolution submitted by the Sixth Committee on October 2nd did not obtain the requisite unanimity and was rejected by two adverse votes and 14 abstentions, with 32 votes in favour of it.)

The Assembly:

(1) Associating itself with the Council in recalling that it is

the duty of every State to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other States—a duty which, for Members of the League of Nations, has been recognised by the Covenant ;

(2) Affirms that every State is under an obligation to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of another State ;

(3) Recalls the special undertakings entered into by the European Governments, and the London Non-Intervention Committee which, in the intention of the countries to whose initiative it owes its origin, was set up for the purpose of restricting the Spanish conflict and thereby safeguarding peace in the rest of the world ;

(4) Regrets that not merely has the London Non-Intervention Committee failed, despite the efforts of the majority of its Members, of which the Assembly expresses its appreciation, to secure the withdrawal of non-Spanish combatants taking part in the struggle in Spain, but that it must to-day be recognised that there are veritable foreign army corps on Spanish soil, which represent foreign intervention in Spanish affairs ;

(5) Observes that the Council in its resolution of May 29th last justly described this withdrawal as “the most effective remedy for a situation, the great gravity of which, from the standpoint of the general peace, it feels bound to emphasise, and the most certain means of ensuring the full application of the policy of non-intervention” ;

(6) Sincerely trusts that the diplomatic action recently initiated by certain Powers will be successful in securing the immediate and complete withdrawal of the non-Spanish combatants taking part in the struggle in Spain ;

(7) Appeals to the Governments, which must all be animated by the desire to see peace maintained in Europe, to undertake a new and earnest effort in this direction ;

And notes that, if such a result cannot be obtained in the near future, the Members of the League which are parties to the non-intervention agreement will consider ending the policy of non-intervention ;

(8) Requests the Council, in view of the provisions of Article 11 of the Covenant of the League, to follow attentively the development of the situation in Spain and to seize any opportunity that may arise for seeking a basis for a pacific solution of the conflict.

(b) Supplementary Proposal to the above Draft Resolution
(Extract from Document A. 74. 1937.)

submitted by the Austrian and Hungarian delegations, rejected by the Assembly on October 2nd by 31 adverse votes against 3 votes in favour of it and 14 abstentions.

On behalf of the Austrian and Hungarian delegations, we have the honour to propose the following amendments to the Draft Resolution submitted by the Sixth Committee to the Assembly, relating to the situation in Spain and connected questions.

1. In paragraph 4 insert the words “on both sides” before the words “on Spanish soil”.

2. Replace the words “army corps” by “armed forces” ;

3. In the 2nd sub-paragraph of paragraph 7, replace the term “the Members” by “certain Members” ;

4. In the same sub-paragraph, replace the words “will consider” by “might consider” ;

**III. RESOLUTIONS ON COOPERATION
OF THE LEAGUE WITH NON-MEMBERS**

(a) Resolution on the basis of the Chilean proposals.

The Assembly,

In consideration of the Chilean Delegation's proposal ;

Appreciating the fact that it has been inspired by the desire to strengthen the authority of the League of Nations ;

In consideration of the opinion expressed by the Special Committee appointed to study the application of the principles of the Covenant ;

Whereas it would be eminently desirable for the League of Nations to associate the greatest possible number of States with the application of the principles on which it is based ;

Whereas, being anxious to neglect nothing which would promote such a development of international co-operation, the Special Committee would be glad to know the observations and suggestions which the non-member States and the States that have announced their withdrawal from the League might think fit to make in order to assist it in its studies ;

Requests the Council to examine the conditions in which such information should be obtained as and when opportunity offers, in order to be placed at the said Committee's disposal.

(b) Resolution on the basis of the Argentine proposals.

“Whereas the covenants of a universal tendency aiming at the pacific settlement of international disputes, by which the States Members and non-members of the League of Nations are mutually bound, such as the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed in Paris on August 27th, 1928, and the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, signed at Rio de Janeiro on October 10th, 1933, on the initiative of the Argentine Republic, are designed, like the League Covenant, and in accordance with Article 21 thereof, to ensure the maintenance of peace ;

“And whereas the Inter-American Conference for the Consolidation of Peace which met at Buenos Aires on December 1st, 1936, on the initiative of President Roosevelt, was actuated by the desire to supplement and strengthen the League's efforts to prevent war ;

“The Assembly declares that :

“In the event of war, or a threat of war, the League of Nations, while not delaying for that purpose its own action in virtue of the Covenant, shall take suitable steps and shall establish such contacts as may appear to be necessary to associate in its efforts for the maintenance of peace those States which are not members of the League, but are mutually bound by the above-mentioned covenants, the common aim of which is to maintain peace.”

**IV. RESOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY ON THE
QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT**

“The Assembly,

“Considering it desirable that a first step should be taken towards the conclusion of a general convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments, and that accordingly use should be made of the work done by the Disarmament Conference :

“1. Recommends, in pursuance of the resolution of the Bureau dated May 31st, 1937, the conclusion of an international convention on the publicity of national defence expenditure and the working of an organ of supervision and co-ordination ;

“2. Recommends the Members of the League, each in so far as it is concerned and to the extent that this has not already been done, to examine the possibility of adopting internal measures with a view to the effective supervision of the manufacture of and trade in arms, ammunition and implements of war, on the basis of the work done by the Special Committee of the Disarmament Conference ;

“And asks Governments to inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of the action taken on this recommendation ;

“3. Requests the Secretary-General to communicate the present resolution to the States not members of the League of Nations.”

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GERMANY'S CLAIM TO COLONIES

The Present Position of the International Discussion on Colonial Questions¹

Adolf Hitler on the German Colonial claim

"... Moreover in our economic life there is only one question which has for years continued to give us the greatest trouble: it is the difficulty of our food supply. The German scope is too small, without being supplemented by colonies, to guarantee an undisturbed, certain and permanent nourishment of our people. No other nation can show greater achievements in this sphere than ourselves... In the long run it is an intolerable thought to be dependent from year to year on the accident of a good or bad harvest. The claim to colonial possessions belonging to the Reich is therefore based on our economic distress, and the attitude of the other Powers to this claim is simply incomprehensible. Germany had neither deprived these Powers of her colonies nor stolen them. In a world that is at present dripping with moral phrases, it is well to take this fact into consideration... We have a harder struggle to carry on than others. 137 persons per square kilometre are more difficult to feed than 11 or 12..."

(From the Proclamation of the Führer and Chancellor at the Nuremberg Party Congress on September 7th, 1937.)

* * *

"When we now state that our scope is too small and that we must therefore absolutely supplement it by colonies, then some wiseacre goes about and says: What do you need with colonies? Colonies would be of no use to you. You can buy what you want. Of course we are clever enough to buy if we have money. They should not have plundered us for fifteen years, then we should have been able to buy."

There are rich people who say: wealth is a burden, which is very heavy to carry. Let no one yearn for wealth, lest this burden should be placed upon him. One would think that if wealth is such a heavy burden, those who possess it should be glad to give some of it away. But they will not do so. There are also foreign statesmen who say that colonies are a heavy burden, but they do not want to give up any part of that burden. They say colonies have no value. But they do not want under any circumstances to give back these "valueless" colonies to their rightful owners. When I speak of rightful owners, I do so only at a time and in a world that is full of the ideals of League morality and modesty; it was according to these ideals that we Germans formerly acquired our colonies, though we lost them according to other principles which

should be most severely condemned from the standpoint of League morality."

(From Adolph Hitler's speech at the Harvest Thanksgiving Festival on the Bückeberg on October 3rd, 1937.)

* * *

Since Adolf Hitler's statements on colonial policy in the two proclamations at the Nuremberg Party Congress on September 9th, 1936 and September 7th, 1937, in his Reichstag speech on January 30th, 1937 and in his speech at the Harvest Thanksgiving Festival on the Bückeberg on October 3rd, 1937; since the numerous statements of a similar tenour by Dr. Goebels and other responsible statesmen, it is no longer a secret for the world that the demand for colonial equality of rights will not die down and will be advanced by the Reich with the greatest emphasis. Frankness and sincerity have always been the guiding principles of National Socialist foreign policy, and the Government of the Reich therefore makes no secret of its view that the treatment of the colonial question in 1919 in Paris and Versailles constituted a breach of President Wilson's peace programme and that the German colonial claim is therefore morally, legally and economically well founded in every respect.

Mussolini's Appeal

On October 28th, 1937 a fresh appeal, and at the same time a fresh warning, was sent from Rome to the colonial Powers.

Benito Mussolini took advantage of the State festival of Fascist Italy, the anniversary of the day, fifteen years ago, when the blackshirts marched on Rome, to tell the statesmen and diplomats and the peoples of Europe of the conditions which are to create the basis of a juster and better European order of peace which is desired by Italy and Germany: the elimination of Bolshevism from European politics, the revision of certain clauses of the Paris Treaties, and the repairing of the colonial injustice done to Germany.

"What is the watchword for the celebration of the 16th year of the Fascist era? The watchword lies in the simple word: Peace."

(¹) See the Special Number of this Journal, No. 192-206 "Colonies and Raw Materials."

In order that this word may again become permanent and fertile, it is necessary to eliminate Communism from Europe, beginning with Spain. It is necessary to revise some of the crying and absurd clauses of the "peace treaties". A great nation like the German must regain that place to which it is entitled and which it possessed in the African sun. Lastly, it is necessary that Italy should be left in peace, because she has created her Empire with her own means and without touching a single square yard of foreign Empires."

After the Berlin toasts of Hitler and Mussolini and the remarkable speeches on the Berlin May Field, no particular gift of imagination was required in order to realise that Italy shows unlimited comprehension for the German colonial problem. It was Mussolini himself who made the cooperation of Germany and Italy with other nations dependent on the conditions that they should show respect and comprehension for their requirements and justified demands. These words contained a clear recognition of the justice of the German colonial claim. It was further strengthened by the utterances of the Duce on the May Field when he pointed out the identity of the aims of Germany and Italy in the sphere of economic autarchy and proclaimed the principle—which is also adopted by Germany—that without economic independence a nation can have no political independence.

It is not the first time that the head of the Italian Government has raised his voice in favour of a revision of the treaties of 1919. With the same stubbornness with which, since the conclusion of these treaties, France in particular has opposed every possibility of voluntarily admitting even the slightest change in that disastrous mistake, Mussolini has from the beginning of his government shown true foresight and proclaimed the principle that the oppression and disqualification of a nation like the German is incompatible with the striving for genuine peace in Europe. Recognising this fact,—whether in connection with reparations, disarmament or the Saar problem—Italian policy, unlike that of France, has logically represented the standpoint of justice and equity and the necessity for an early revision of "peace treaties" concluded in the triumph of victory. The necessity for a decrease in European tension was already realised in Italy at a time when her relations with Germany were not yet based on feelings of cordial fellowship as is the case at the present time when that fellowship has been erected not least on the struggle which the two countries, as young nations, and therefore as "have-nots", have to wage for equality of rights with the older satisfied nations, especially as regards the distribution of colonial possessions. Though Italy, according to a statement by Mussolini, now belongs to the "satisfied" nations, she nevertheless does not stand in this question on the other side of the barricade erected against Germany. Her struggle for the recognition and maintenance of what she has gained still shows that the other colonial Powers cannot yet stomach the role of possessor to which Italy has risen by founding a colonial empire.

* * *

The echo of Mussolini's appeal in England gave rise in the first place to a doubtless inspired article in the "Daily Telegraph" of October 29th:

"It is not very consonant with diplomatic usage for the leader of one State to make himself the spokesman of another, well able to speak for itself... It may not be irrelevant to remark, first, that Italy was a party to these "absurd clauses" and, secondly, that the questions raised are not such as can be conveniently or profitably discussed on the public platform, even by those whose motto is Peace. If the claim to colonies is to be amicably adjusted, it must be only by discussion or negotiation between the parties concerned, and the uninvited intrusion of an "amicus curiae" is more likely to keep the parties apart than to bring them together.

Again if this question of the German Colonies is to be raised it must be at a suitable moment, which the present international situation does not afford. The British nation is very ready to be on good terms with Germany, and is willing to discuss in a friendly way any grievances that hinder good relations. But in this matter of Colonies it would not unreasonably expect two preliminary conditions to be fulfilled—first, a precise statement of what would satisfy the grievance; and next, an assurance that any settlement reached would result in a genuine appeasement, and would not be an advance base for further claims. Apparently much is to be asked of this country. The least that could be required in return would be a real and assured contribution to the guarantees of the world's peace."

Heavy guns were brought up by Mr. Eden on November 1st in the House of Commons:

"The question was whether the Foreign Secretary, in view of Signor Mussolini's speech would inquire from the Italian Government which parts of Italy's African possessions they were prepared to offer to Germany..."

The House would no doubt have observed that during recent days the country that had itself, as an outcome of the Great War, gained very considerable accessions of territory in Europe, and had also received certain territorial concessions in Africa from countries which were her allies, was now championing the claims of Germany to African possessions. While I do not desire, to add anything at this moment about these claims so far as they concern Germany and ourselves, I must now declare plainly that we do not admit the right of any Government to call upon us for a contribution when there is no evidence to show that that Government is prepared to make any contribution on its own behalf...

We are ready enough to make our contribution to the peace of the world. We are ready enough to discuss the difficulties at issue with those concerned, but we are not prepared to stand and deliver at anyone's command. Such methods will never have any response here, such order will never be obeyed by the British public."

It is a pity that such opinions were never expressed from the platform of the British parliament by responsible British statesmen when such methods and orders were for fifteen years after the conclusion of peace constantly showered upon the German nation.

In France, Mussolini's initiative also had its effect, and the reaction varied from arrogant and provocative attacks on the head of the Italian Government to a certain comprehension for the necessity of a solution, which was however immediately made dependent on a prompt return of services by Germany in the general political sphere. It is indignantly pointed out that Mussolini has no right and no cause to support Germany so openly in the colonial question.

The Italian press was quick to give a reply to London and Paris. The "Giornale d'Italia" wrote on October 31st:

"... It is time that the whole of France should realise once for all that the time has gone for ever when it was possible to dispute Italy's right to do what she thinks fit without let or hindrance. It is also time for France to realise that, whether she likes it or not, Fascist Italy claims for herself the same right of free speech regarding European and world questions as is exercised so abundantly by the States or heads of Governments on both sides of the Ocean in order to judge international events with incredible arrogance and to constitute themselves arbitrators, distributing praise and blame according to whether the nations and their governments belong to their own clique or independently protect their national interests.

It is grotesque to state that the Duce is not entitled to raise the colonial problem. The Duce spoke in the name of the Great Power, Italy, which signed the Treaty of Versailles, out of which the problem of the German colonies arose. It is a European, and not a French or British, problem. The fact that a former régime signed the

Versailles Treaty can in no way prevent the Fascist Government from proposing a revision. The Duce defended the German colonial demand with all the greater right as Italy has clean hands.

As against the paper Peace Treaties, the idea of justice is constantly gaining ground in reawakened Europe, and the conviction is being gained that a peace must not be based on new alliances and covenants but on an actual equilibrium and on the interest of each State to maintain it on account of the advantage which is derived from it. It was with a view to such a peace that Mussolini confirmed Germany's right and appealed to Europe's sense of responsibility before it is too late. The peace which Fascist Italy offers is not an armistice, but a permanent construction on a sound foundation, the erection of which, however, calls for magnanimity and not petty egoism."

An Italian official reply to Mr. Eden's speech was given on November 3rd by the "Informazione Diplomatica":

"While Great Britain and France divided Germany's great colonial empire between themselves, Italy merely received insignificant compensation, namely 91,000 square kilometres of "very doubtful value" in Jubaland from Great Britain, and 115,000 square kilometres of "authentic sand" from France. The British Foreign Office is the last authority that has the right to express itself in this matter, and Mr. Eden's arguments are therefore valueless. Italy can express her disinterested opinion of Germany's just colonial claim in complete frankness because she has herself demanded nothing from Germany."

The "Popolo di Roma" asks: "Must Italy first give back the wretched strips of desert transferred to her, before she has the right to state that on the day when Germany was deprived of her colonies the greatest injustice was committed?"

The "Tribuna" reminds England and France, in view of their attachment to the League of Nations, of the fact that the German colonies are still under mandate and are therefore still awaiting a final decision, so that they belong neither to Great Britain nor France nor Belgium. It is also possible to refer them to Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Covenant which they prize so highly, under which any Member of the League—and Italy is still a member—has the right to draw attention to any circumstance which threatens to disturb peace or the good understanding between the nations. "Is it thought that joint complicity has been purchased by a few ridiculous frontier revisions between the Italian colonies and those of England and France?"

The British Colonial Discussion

We reproduce below a number of letters to the Editor of "The Times," which show that on the other side of the Channel the view is constantly gaining ground that the German colonial claim can no longer be dismissed by a mere wave of the hand or by the old moralising objections. But this nevertheless took place on October 7th at the Conservative Party Congress at Scarborough, when Sir Henry Page Croft gave the grossest reply hitherto recorded to the German arguments. It is not worth while to go into his statements in detail. But in order merely to characterise the arguments which he still uses, it is sufficient to point out that he does not hesitate to refer to the notorious Blue Book of the South African Union, which provided the Paris Conference with the "documentary basis" for the assertion regarding Germany's colonial incapacity and therefore also for the seizure of the German colonies. It was however unanimously judged on July 29th, 1926 by the South African House of Assembly to be a "war instrument" and it was stated by the South African Prime Minister, General Hertzog on January 28th, 1927 that "the untrustworthy and contemptible character of that piece

of war propaganda should suffice to condemn it to the dishonourable grave of all such writings of the war period." It cannot be assumed that all this is unknown to Sir Henry. But the astonishing thing is that on the basis of his babbling, the entire Congress unanimously adopted the following resolution which he proposed:

"This conference has noted with grave concern proposals emanating from certain Liberal and from Socialist circles for the dismemberment of the Empire by the surrender of sovereignty in the British Colonies to some international body, and records its emphatic opinion that any proposal of this character would be a callous disregard of the rights of property, both national and individual, a treacherous betrayal of all inhabitants of those Colonies, and disastrous to the welfare of our countrymen, whether engaged in the factories of Great Britain or in production oversea. This conference further calls upon the Conservative Party to resist these subversive proposals and to make the integrity and unity of the Empire under the Crown one of its foremost articles of faith."

The "Manchester Guardian" of October 8th, in an article entitled "A Tory Triumph" sharply criticised this resolution, in the following words:

"Yesterday's debate showed that Sir Henry Page Croft has won a victory. Last year at Margate there were still some wise Conservatives who refuse to accept the principle of what we have, we hold. Yesterday there were no such reservations. It is a sad conclusion. At a time when no statesman dare make an important speech without admitting the need for peaceful change and the satisfaction of legitimate grievances the Conservative party can think of no better policy than what we have we hold. Yet Germany has a legitimate grievance. It is not a moral grievance, it is not even an economic grievance, but it is a political grievance. So long as Britain and France regard their colonial empires as private property and the loot of wars Germany may be forgiven for wanting her share."

It is an astonishing resolution, and South African statesmen such as General Hertzog, the Minister of Defence Pirow and the High Commissioner Te Water must have shaken their heads over it.

Mr. Pirow, on the same date, October 7th, repeated his previous statements in a speech at Wartburg (Natal) before a large number of German settlers and spoke in favour of a decent and just solution of the colonial problem in the interest of close cooperation with equal rights between Germany, South Africa and the British Empire.

He was preceded in this path by the South African High Commissioner in London, Mr. Te Water during a holiday journey in Canada, who spoke at Montreal on September 15th in favour of the investigation of the colonial problem and the return of the German colonies by means of an international conference, which, he thought, could find a solution which would be acceptable both to Germany and to the mandatory Powers. This statement raised a good deal of dust in England and in the dominions, so that Mr. Te Water was compelled to make a corresponding correction, in which he said: "So far as the colonial question is concerned, it is my personal opinion, which I have had for a long time, that the nations cannot long hesitate to examine Germany's standpoint in this matter in a spirit of reason and moderation. In my personal opinion, South Africa will be prepared to take part in such a Conference."

Lord Sankey, the former Lord Chancellor, and Lord Samuel, the former leader of the Liberal Party, were apparently not satisfied with the treatment of the colonial question at Scarborough.

Lord Sankey, in a speech in the Guildhall on October 28th, advocated the return of a part of the German colonies. It was impossible to condemn a great nation to hard labour for

life. Though a hard peace had been dictated, it was unwise to allow anger to continue to burn. A time of revision and resettlement must come. For it was a great mistake to regard any nation as an enemy for decades. The enemy of today might be the friend of to-morrow. It was undeniable that peace was seriously endangered when a nation with limited space had constantly before its eyes the prospect of other nations possessing huge territories which were not colonised.

Lord Samuel stated in a speech at Oxford on October 29th that "the true spirit of Liberalism must require us to take a positive action". Justice must be done between the nations irrespective of their domestic régime. To say that because Great Britain disapproved of the domestic régimes in these countries she could not consider any claim, whether legitimate or not, was the way to make war inevitable in the long run. If when Germany was unarmed it was found necessary to consider her claims, and then when Germany was armed it was found weak and dangerous to consider those claims, this would create a dilemma from which there was no escape. Great Britain should not get into the position that nothing was done without force. In conclusion, Lord Samuel said: "Let us have wisdom and statesmanship, even at the cost of some sacrifice, and adopt an attitude of justice to safeguard peace."

* * *

In this connection, and as a reply to the Scarborough resolution, the proceedings at the British Empire Migration Conference, which held its third annual assembly from October 11th to 13th in the Guildhall, was of interest. Its object was to discuss the troubles and difficulties in respect of population questions which had not received sufficient attention at the Last Imperial Conference, and to propose suitable measures. For the joint measures of Imperial defence decided upon at the Imperial Conference are of little use in the long run if the people are lacking who can alone make any security living and effective.

Lord Bledisloe, formerly Governor-General of New Zealand, therefore very rightly remarked that the British Empire, in view of its shortage of men, could not logically and equitably defend or justify its claim to possess a quarter of the surface of the globe including most of the habitable regions as a permanent and exclusive possession.

"The overcrowded, ambitious countries of the world," he said, "conscious of their virility, their stifled enterprise, and their need of expansion, inevitably represent our British race as owning all the earth's most habitable empty spaces and not utilising them."

They not unnaturally stigmatise us as "dogs in the manger"—an expression which does not conduce to world peace. Either we must "go in and possess the land" which our forefathers acquired for the British Crown or sooner or later combined pressure from foreign nations will operate effectively and impair the territorial integrity of the British Empire."

Lord Horne, formerly Chancellor of the Exchequer, expressed himself in similar terms. He said that in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland there were 468 people to the square mile. In Australia the comparative figure was two to the square mile, in Canada three, South Africa 10, and New Zealand 15. When every qualification of those figures was taken into account the fact remained that there were great areas, rich in resources, which to-day were left untitled and idle because the population was not there to develop them. This situation was a source of weakness and potential danger to the Empire. Lack of population raised a grave question as to the security of some of our Dominions. In the world to-day there were many envious eyes cast upon these unoccupied territories and to those whose claims for colonies were being

loudly asserted these undeveloped lands seemed to afford a moral justification for their claim.

Lastly Lord Mansfield said that "throughout the world there were nations and races which recognized no law save that of force. Some of them had undoubtedly justifiable claims to be allowed to expand somewhere. They were very much overcrowded, although some of those which complained most were no more overcrowded than we were ourselves. If we were to leave our far-flung territories practically denuded of inhabitants it would be difficult to resist, ethically, the claim that we should make available to other land-hungry nations some of those territories which we were unable or unwilling to use, and very difficult indeed to protect if and when another nation considered the moment opportune to try to acquire them for herself."

The figures mentioned at the Conference show clearly the vast space for human settlement in Canada, Australia and New Zealand alone. They also prove how hopeless the prospect of a natural increase of population must remain under the present state of population of Great Britain and the Dominions. They further make it clear that the artificial increase in population, the compensation for the "human deficit" by immigration from England can no longer take place, after the former flood of emigrants from that country has long been at a low ebb. Lastly, the representatives of the Dominions stated during the proceedings quite openly that the British immigrants are lacking in the pioneer spirit which, as Colonel Clegg of Australia pointed out, is present in a high degree among the German settlers and farmers.

Space without people, People without space! While other over-populated countries are carrying on a severe struggle for existence, because they are not granted the possession of sources of raw materials and empty spaces, a world empire is crying in vain for people. For what has been said here of the Dominions applies equally to the Colonies.

* * *

The letters to "The Times" are mainly directed against the arguments constantly used by the former Colonial Secretary Mr. Amery, Sir Henry Page Croft, M.P., and other politicians and Members of Parliament as a basis for their abrupt rejection of the German colonial claims. These letters show, it is true, that there are still many prejudices and false views in England regarding the seriousness of and the reasons for the German claim. Even in the case of people who are honestly trying to open up paths between England and Germany a certain opportunist policy makes itself felt, and they are not aware that the acceptance of such proposals would come close to that dangerous era of advance performances which always proved a disappointment to Germany and with which the policy of Adolf Hitler has definitely broken. There are also discussions and proposals which—though certainly with no evil or ulterior intention—show a tendency to evade the German claim by endeavouring to solve the colonial problem by means of a careful system of paragraphs and to formulate conditions, hypotheses and clauses which amount to an intolerable limitation of the German claim to equality of rights and, in spite of good will, to a solution which is unjust from the political and economic point of view. A return of the colonies to Germany would be no real return, if, as is proposed in many quarters, it were to take place within an extended mandatory system or with the participation of Germany in an international African bureau or African Federal Council. In all these proposals which have, moreover, little prospect of realisation, the problem of German equality of rights with the other colonial Powers is not solved.

The same applies to the leading article in the "Times" of October 28th—the day when Mussolini advocated the German colonial claim—in which the various opinions expressed in the letters are to some extent summarised to form the paper's own attitude. This article also, like many of the letters, deserves attention not so much on account of the proposals which it contains, but on account of the truths which it openly expresses. Moreover it shows a sense of political actuality, but gives no ground for illusions or exaggerated optimism. This is shown by the fact that the refusal to return German East Africa (Tanganyika) is a clear proof that in practice the German and British standpoints regarding this former German colony are still very far removed from each other. Further the article seeks salvation in a compromise which looks for a middle path between complete restoration and complete rejection. But even this medium solution is to be made dependent upon the debate regarding the German colonial claim being included in a general framework, which it is apparent from previous discussions means that in this framework the return to the League, the armaments problem, the Western Pact and presumably also the Eastern Pact are also to be settled. Lastly, the object of this medium solution is the turning of the German claim into a "field of activity or development" which, in other words, means that England does not think of giving up anything.

It is illogical to fear that the failure to settle with Germany will lead to war and the collapse of civilisation and, in complete contradiction of this fear, to state elsewhere that a colonial settlement cannot restore peace. Lastly, it is to evade responsibility and to take too slight a view of the German discussion to state, as the "Times" does, that Britain is not the only party to this discussion with Germany, that other States also administer German colonial possessions and, in short, to put on the "mask of the League of Nations" and to hint at mandatory policy and competent organs. England, or the British Empire, was the leading Power in Paris and Versailles, and at her special request received the lion's share of the former German colonies. England was mainly responsible for the injustice done and is at the present time mainly competent to make it good and to bring Germany back to the full extent of her territory into colonial work. If Great Britain is firmly resolved to do this, there will undoubtedly be little hindrance or difficulty on the part of the League of Nations.

That there is moreover no great fear was shown by the debate in the House of Commons on July 21st, 1937, in which the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, did not absolutely reject the idea of a revision of mandates.

"The Mandate in the minds of some people had become a sort of Bible every word of which was inspired. That was hopeless. The whole essence of the League of Nations was that treaties and international obligations when they were shown to be obsolete by the facts of the case, could and should be revised. Half the troubles to-day in the world was that the essence and spirit of the League were not being fully carried out in many matters."

It is true that this debate related to Palestine, and that England has every interest in the revision of that mandate. But what is good for the goose!...

As regards the desire expressed by "The Times" that the colonial debate should be withdrawn from publicity and placed in the hands of diplomacy, it should be pointed out that, as far as Germany is concerned, the colonial problem is a matter for the entire nation and should therefore be treated before and by the entire nation. If only the diplomatic channel had been used up to the present and the German colonial claim had not been brought to the notice of world public opinion and hammered in with loud speakers, the echo which is now to be heard everywhere would presumably be missing. This is proved by the years

1919 to 1933 in which the beneficiaries of the distribution of the colonial booty did not think for a moment of granting to "democratic" Germany, which bowed to all their desires and demands, the slightest concessions to compensate the German nation for the injustice which it had suffered.

Capax imperii! Capable of forming an Empire, says the "Times" in referring to Germany. In making this statement, the London newspaper has once for all cleared away the Versailles colonial guilt lie. But that alone is not enough. The injustice done as a result of that lie must also be removed by deeds. The peace of Europe and the advantage of all demands that the "ramp of ideals" which stood godfather to the Versailles "colonial order" should return to a real order built up on actual rights and actual equality of status.

If Germany again becomes the African Power that she was formerly, she will also be prepared to cooperate with the other colonial Powers in the African problem in the interest of the civilisatory development and economic welfare of the natives in the same spirit of community which animated the Congo Act of 1885 concluded under her leadership.

French Colonial Discussion

In France a fundamental discussion of the colonial problem has hitherto been avoided on the ground that it is a question of secondary importance, the settlement of which primarily concerns England. The various Paris Governments have, it is true, stated that they were prepared to discuss the question, but only within a general settlement of all the other outstanding problems. For instance Léon Blum, when he was Prime Minister, expressed himself in this sense in his Lyons speech, and the same view was expressed by the present Prime Minister M. Chautemps and also by the Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, in his last speech at Lille. The basic idea was always that Germany should not use an increased supply of raw materials for promoting her armaments and thus be enabled to forge weapons again France herself or against her allies in Central Europe etc. During this year's discussions in the League Assembly on the problem of raw materials the French delegate Mr. Faure who used the same argument, was given the correct reply by the Norwegian delegate, who pointed out that the raw materials used for armaments purposes represented only an extremely small proportion and the problem of raw materials was to be regarded as independent of the question of armaments. The idea that Germany might need raw materials also for pacific purposes, in particular for her food supply, scarcely seems to enter the minds of French politicians, or that the National Socialist State is acquainted with possibilities of acquiring raw materials and of settlement quite different from those known to pre-War Germany and the Germany of Weimar. The French colonial debate relates naturally mainly to the Cameroons and Togoland, the return of which is rejected on the grounds that it would mean the "ruin of French Equatorial Africa".

The Cameroons, it is said, belong to France on the basis of a proper military conquest, and the League of Nations can only claim a right of control over this colony but not a right of ownership, quite apart from the moral claim to possession which France has acquired by her twenty years' civilising work and her investments. Lastly, the establishment of an "ambitious neighbour" in the midst of the French African possessions would constitute a danger to peace. In an official publication, "L'Oeuvre de la France au Cameroun" by Pierre Chauleur, to which Governor-General Reliquet himself has written the foreword,

we also find that France's right of possession to the Cameroons is based on the fact that, on the outbreak of War, Germany was still engaged on the "inventory" of her colony and, in particular, had scarcely penetrated into the hinterland to which the French had, moreover, a prior claim on account of previous reconnaissance expeditions.

All these arguments naturally overlook the fact that France has a gigantic colonial empire with an area of 11,200,000 square kilometres and a population of 60 millions, and that, in spite of possessing part of this territory for three hundred years, has been unable up to the present time to exploit it economically or to appease it politically.

That the French view, as expressed in the above statements, is untenable has for a long time past been proved from French sources. We observe in the well documented and very thorough work by Gilbert Maroger, "*La question des matières premières et les revendications coloniales*" (Paris 1937) a few remarks by French experts, some of whom advocated a juster solution of the colonial question immediately after the War. These statements have, however, remained isolated, but there are still a number of representatives both of the Right and of the Left who assume and give expression to a friendlier attitude, although the subject is usually distorted in their statements, so that economic concessions are to take the place of political concessions which are alleged to be impossible.¹

It would take too much time to enter into the economic, political and legal arguments. But one fact must be stressed in conclusion. Any concessions which the others are prepared to grant to Germany in the economic field can never equal the advantages lying in the political return of the colonies. If France and England, with their enormous colonial possessions, were able to reach an agreement after Fashoda, why should the trifling German claim to these possessions stand in the way of a similar agreement or even endanger the territorial security of these countries?

* * *

The German colonial claim must therefore find its fulfilment—and the sooner the better. Not only because it is impossible to exclude a nation of 70 millions with the cultural, economic and civilisatory qualities of the Germans from the colonial mission of Europe, but also because the just solution of the colonial problem is a matter of life and honour for the German nation. The claim is incontestable both from the German point of view and also from that of the best interests of Europe, for its fulfilment constitutes an essential condition for the political and economic appeasement of Europe and the world.

LETTERS TO "THE TIMES"

Sir,—Within the last few days the colonial question has been raised once more by two authoritative voices—Herr Hitler at Nuremberg and Mr. Te Water's at Montreal. Speaking as a citizen of a country which, like the United Kingdom, is at present administering part of the former German colonial empire under an international Mandate, the High Commissioner for South Africa in London has just pleaded, in Canada, for a speedy examination, at a conference table, of Germany's point of view.

In the hope that Mr. Te Water's initiative may be followed up, we venture to make the following suggestions regarding the conditions necessary for a satisfactory settlement, and the possibility of reconciling these conditions with each other. The first condition is that the natives of the non-self-governing territories (both those which are and those which are not at present under Mandate) should not be sacrificed in any way for the sake of improving the relations between European Powers. The second condition is that, both in the administration of non-self-governing territories and in the matter of access to such legitimate sources of supply and markets as these territories may offer, the European Powers should be placed upon a footing of approximate equality with one another.

The second of these conditions obviously calls for a revision of the colonial chapter of the Versailles Treaty; while the first of them forbids any relapse into an unrestricted exercise of sovereignty on the part of any European Power in any non-self-governing territory that is at present being held in trust and administered under an international Mandate. Both conditions can, we suggest, be satisfied simultaneously if the European Powers can bring themselves to agree upon three measures.

The first of these measures is that some, at least, of the former German colonies shall be handed back to Germany, to be administered by her, not under the pre-War régime, but under the existing Mandates. At the same time, those European Powers which possess Crown Colonies should consent to place at least an equivalent portion of those Crown Colonies under the same Mandatory régime. Thus, Germany will not find herself the only Power that is being asked to administer under a Mandate colonial territories over which she has once exercised unrestricted sovereign powers. In the third place, all non-self-governing territories ought to be thrown open to the trade of all nations on equal terms—as the Mandated Territories are to-day, and as our British Crown Colonies and Protectorates were until yesterday.

On such lines as these we see the possibility of a colonial settlement which might prove equally favourable to the well-being of the native peoples and to the peace and prosperity of Europe.

Yours faithfully,

Vernon Bartlett, Gilbert Murray,
Noel-Buxton, Arnold J. Toynbee.

("Times", October 7th, 1937.)

Sir,—Almost exactly a year ago I suggested in your columns the case for a return to Germany of some of her former colonies as part of a general settlement to which all (including Germany)

⁽¹⁾ See the Special Number of this Journal, No. 192-206 "Colonies and Raw Materials", p. 121.

must contribute and in which all must play a part. I urged that any rendition of mandated territories should be voluntary, from strength, and not from weakness. Mr. Te Water and Mr. Pirow have in the past year made it clear that there are those in South Africa who have an open mind upon the subject.

The policy pursued by Germany in the past 12 months has not smoothed the path of negotiations on these lines, nor have our declarations at Geneva pointed the way to common ground. Lord Noel-Buxton and his associates would extend the mandatory system, which suffers from inherent and ineradicable defects. Mr. Amery, on the other hand, stands for the *status quo* in Africa, at all costs, claiming that any change in sovereignty would mean sacrificing "the native populations who are happy under British rule" and would also be strategically dangerous. Judging from recent disturbances in Mauritius, Trinidad, Zanzibar, and Mombasa, and recent reports from various parts of East and South Africa, he perhaps overstates the Arcadian contentment of Africans and overrates our ability to deal wisely with the immense territories in our hands. He certainly underestimates the danger to international relations of a flat *non possumus* on the part of the beneficiaries of the colonial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles to any claim for a restoration of Germany's former colonies, and it is noteworthy that the Government have never committed themselves to such an attitude.

Were a conflict to arise on this issue we could not rely upon armed assistance in any quarter: apart from this, all that I hear and read indicates that the problem of Africa will in the next decade become so difficult of solution and so dangerous as to demand the active co-operation of all European Powers if disaster is to be avoided.

What is now required is not an extension of the mandatory system, but the establishment, independently of the League, of an International Bureau of African Powers, maintained, equipped, and staffed by all States exercising jurisdiction in Africa, all of whom would be members.

Such a body would start without unhappy associations. It would not restrict but could influence the exercise of sovereignty. It would not forbid trade preferences, but would devise many adaptations of those that exist. It would help all States to learn from each other: it would be acceptable to Africans, and to all States who may at any time enjoy sovereign rights in Africa. There are several international organisations, which are outside the League, and they are efficient. Let us try what we can do on these lines before placing fresh responsibilities on a moribund Mandates Commission and let us realize that if we refuse to negotiate any territorial changes by agreement we are making war, somewhere, some day, inevitable.

Your obedient servant,

Arnold Wilson.

("Times", October 11th, 1937.)

Sir,—Mr. Amery should not assume that those who differ from him about German colonies are entertaining "amiable delusions." The world situation is so critical that it deserves examination in a less provocative and a more practical manner. Mr. Amery believes that a perfidious Germany is influenced only by insatiable ambition. Now, Sir, what have been Germany's declared ambitions in the international sphere? How far do they indicate any abnormal behaviour?

First, Germany took steps to obtain security. This included rearmament, reoccupation of her own frontier territory in the Rhineland, and an *entente* with other Powers to counter-balance the overwhelming forces of the armed nations which encircle her in military alliances. But she only did this after her requests

for security based on equality had been repeatedly refused. Was this so unnatural?

Secondly, she has demanded colonies. She has done this partly on economic grounds which are about as sound or unsound as some of our economic policies. But her real claim is based on status.

Germany demands that she shall not be put in a lower category than Holland, Belgium, Portugal, not to mention France, Italy, and ourselves. Mr. Amery opposes the return of any of her colonies partly because he believes this would be unpalatable to the natives. But, if native wishes are to decide the ownership or suzerainty of their territory, he cannot limit this principle to the ex-German colonies. He must apply it to the Congo, Morocco, possibly even to some of the lands over which we exercise jurisdiction. Whether they are all contented or discontented not even Mr. Amery knows.

Lastly, Mr. Amery believes that Germany alone of all nations does not honour her pledges. Here he is on more dangerous ground as he will realize when he studies all the actions of the Allies since the Armistice. Their record is not blameless.

I do not put forward any concrete proposal at this moment beyond this. Let not Mr. Amery and others bolt any door unnecessarily. Nor commit themselves irretrievably against making some concession on colonies either direct to Germany or indirectly, as suggested by some of your recent correspondents. At some moment, such a concession might make all the difference to the success or failure of a settlement.

Mr. Amery is right in believing that a settlement of the colonial question may perhaps not bring contentment and confidence in Europe. But he would be doubly right were he to realize that unless and until there is some adjustment of the colonial issue there can be no confidence or any sense of security in Europe, nay, there must be an ever running sore liable at any moment to burst.

Yours truly,

Lord Astor.

("Times", October 13th, 1937.)

Sir,—Mr. Amery's letter refuses any appeal to reason, and asserts that because we are good colonizers, and because the cession of some territories might be dangerous, therefore no accommodation must ever be made with those who desire colonial expansion or prestige.

What we have gained we keep, and we take no risks. In other words we say, "If you think you ought to have colonies you must take them by force because you will never get them by reason." This attitude is simple, obvious, in a sense easy. And if we are armed to the teeth we might make it good. But an England which so speaks loses its moral position in the world. Future generations will blame us. It is a psychological question, not simply one of cheap raw materials. Germany might well say "Why are we the only Great Power without colonies?"

And to say "No" to Germany's natural desire for colonies is wrong for us who are saturated with colonies.

I am, &c.,

Walter Carey,

Bishop.

("Times", October 13th, 1937.)

Sir,—Will you allow me space to write to you in general support of the recent letter of Lord Noel-Buxton and others favouring a colonial settlement with Germany, and to urge the

need of making up our minds as quickly as possible what we (Great Britain) are prepared to do in this matter?

I believe that half the troubles that now beset Europe arise from procrastination when the first symptoms appeared. Some of them could have been settled fairly easily if we had aimed at once at a moderate solution and made a more determined effort to reach some definite result. And anybody who now follows German propaganda must know that the demand for colonial territory is likely to become ever more clamant and insistent. Moreover, those of us who are not blinded by chauvinism have to recognize that Germany can make out a fairly substantial *prima facie* case. It is founded on the declared intention of the Allies in 1919 to make "an absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims", on Germany's proved ability in colonial administration, on her large and increasing population, on her inability to buy raw materials in her own currency, and on her position as the only Great Power of Western Europe which has no oversea possessions—whereas much smaller States like Portugal, Belgium, and Holland have considerable empires.

There is the further argument that British statesmen—members of the present Government—have quite frequently spoken in favour of "peaceful change" and against the notion that the world is for ever to be encased in the form moulded in 1919. The Kellogg Pact, moreover, implies change by other means than war, unless its framers supposed that the world was going to remain in *statu quo* for ever! And when they speak of peaceful change our statesmen surely cannot mean that only other countries are to make sacrifices, while Great Britain—owning more territory than any other—makes none. Let us not lay ourselves open to the charge of humbug. In the last resort there is only one way in which peaceful changes can be effected—concessions by the possessing countries to the unpossessing.

Are we prepared to set the example of peaceful change? If we are, the sooner we say what we think might be done the better.

Are we or are we not ready to accept Germany as a partner in Africa? I believe we should be, with certain proper precautions and negotiated conditions and on the basis of sensible internationalism in Africa and in Europe. But if we are not ready let us say so and make it clear to the Reich Government that the continuance of the officially conducted agitation for colonies will be regarded as an unfriendly act and can only make good relations between our two countries impossible.

I know many Conservatives (not M.P.s.) who feel like myself that an agreed settlement between ourselves and Germany is the primary need of international politics and that such an agreement would immensely facilitate the solution of every other problem.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

A. L. Kennedy.

("Times", October 14th, 1937.)

Sir,—To many of us there seems only one method that offers any hope of solving the most difficult problem of Germany's claim to colonies. That method has not yet been made sufficiently clear in the valuable correspondence you have permitted in your columns.

It is surely a mistake to lay stress upon the fact that colonies have little or no economic value for either trade or migration, if—having made such an assertion—Britain still retains her own colonies. That merely adds fuel to the fire of provocation. It is the emotion of prestige which makes Germany wish to get, and

other nations to keep, a colonial Empire. It is a mistake to remind the new Germany that in 1914 the old Germany had considerable colonial possessions and yet went to war. That merely raises bitter controversies as to the causes of the Great War.

It is a mistake that colony-owning countries should reserve to themselves the right of deciding whether the interests of native populations require the transfer or retention of colonies.

It is a mistake to lay emphasis upon the strategic as distinct from the economic value of the African colonies, for that only intensifies Germany's determination to regain equal rights with other first-class Powers.

But equally is it a mistake to propose, as an isolated concession to Germany, the reconsideration of the colonial problem either in terms of mandates or of sovereign ownership. That method of making isolated concessions may only feed ambition and gives no guarantee against further indefinite demands.

Surely the wise procedure is to desist from these dialectical exchanges, and to say: "This problem of colonies can only be helpfully considered on one condition, namely, that such consideration is part of an all-round peace settlement." What detailed form a new colonial arrangement—if any—may take cannot now be discussed as an isolated subject. The only point worth making clear at this stage is that it must be part of a general settlement. To leave Germany in any doubt on this matter is a profound error.

The Treaty of Versailles may have been just or unjust (it was probably no worse than the treaty victorious Germany would have imposed upon the Allies). None the less, it was a general settlement, and it included the subject of colonies. Consequently, if this exceedingly difficult problem is now to be reopened, it must again be part of an all-round settlement. As such, it must include Germany's membership of a league of nations and be guaranteed by her acceptance, and by our own, of the limitation and international supervision of armaments on the basis of equality of status.

On that understanding, and probably on no other, can this delicate subject be reopened with any prospect of carrying the support of British public opinion or of guaranteeing both to Germany and to ourselves some hope of an assured peace.

But to state this essential condition only serves to underline the urgent necessity of a new effort being made to ascertain whether we are willing to offer, and Germany to accept, a proposal for such negotiations. If some means to this end be not found, and found speedily, the claim to colonies will—like Reparations before it—become a festering sore in the body politic of Europe.

Yours, &c.,

Lord Allen of Hurtwood.

("Times", October 16th, 1937.)

Sir,—“Mein Kampf” was written chiefly in 1924, when Herr Hitler was in prison and when the whole German race had been more embittered by the disastrous French invasion of the Ruhr than by the War itself. Sir Malcolm Robertson rejects every offer of cooperation or peace made since then by Herr Hitler and wishes us to assume that his outlook has not altered with time and experience. Sir Malcolm further invites us to stereotype our own War mentality and learn nothing from the Allies' post-War experiences and mistakes. Perpetual hymns of hate settle nothing.

His policy would repeat our errors over reparations and over the disarmament proposals of 1932. He would play the game of those Powers which tried to wreck Locarno; which have cons-

istently impeded any *rapprochement* between Germany and England; which do not desire a spirit of harmony between Germany and France. Sir Malcolm's policy would compel us to mass most of our forces at home and so leave us too weak to cope effectively with the wide problems of Empire in the Mediterranean, Palestine, and the Far East.

Sir Malcolm Robertson's line must inevitably lead either to war or to diplomatic humiliation.

Why not at long last try the healing alternative? Why not try to remedy what is remediable? To-day we are strong enough to review the question of colonies without accusation of weakness. We can still count on powerful influences of answering good will. We can still negotiate with War veterans. Later we might have to deal with an entire nation which had no experience of the horrors of war. The currents of calamity might then be too strong for us all.

History shows that, on the whole, nations, like individuals, react to the treatment accorded them and that generosity and justice bring their reward.

Yours truly,

Lord Astor.

("Times", October 18th, 1937.)

Sir,—Mr. L. S. Amery writes:

The only ex-German colony held by the United Kingdom is Tanganyika. Does Lord Astor seriously suggest that we, or South Africa, can afford to contemplate the strategical risks involved in re-establishing Germany in this key position?

In those few words there shines the whole spirit of that elder statesmanship which leaves so many of us uncertain whether to laugh or to cry. A statesmanship which can still think of the final catastrophe of another European war in terms of key positions and strategical risks is a matter for tears, but the tears can only turn into hysterical laughter when we are told what the key position is. We shall get no general settlement in Europe if we start every argument with the major premiss that the "security" of the least part of the Empire is not to be "threatened". One has been told again and again by British statesmen that the British Empire is the greatest guarantee of peace in the world; that peace is the desire of every Englishman; that it is the other fellow who is so damnably aggressive; no doubt they believe this sincerely. But it should still be possible for them to understand how the British Empire appears to the "other fellow". Not only do we own, as it were, property all over the world, but we insist that there shall be an "all-red route" to that property; and on no account must the all-red route be "threatened".

Now, Sir, it is not understandable that the sacro-sanctity of the Empire, and of every line, visible or invisible, connecting up the Empire does not seem to the foreigner to be the clue to the world's happiness? We who announced a little while ago that we would not risk "one single ship" for the greatest ideal of the age, the ideal of collective security, have since announced that we will fight "to the last man" in the defence of any "British interest". Wherever the foreigner looks, he sees a British interest, wherever he moves, he is reminded that in one step he will be endangering a British interest.

There would be more hope, then, of what Lord Allen calls an "all-round peace settlement" if we began by realizing that to the rest of the world the British Empire is not a guarantee of peace but a guarantee of trouble; and will continue so to be until for our present motto, "What we have we hold", we substitute the more gracious one, "*Noblesse oblige*". It would also be an advantage if just occasionally we could discard that hypocrisy which, to the foreigner, is so infuriatingly

characteristic of England. We announce complacently that we have done all we can for peace: we offered to disarm; we set the example . . . and so on. Of course we want peace. What dictator, once in power, what tyrant, what plutocrat ever wanted civil war? But at least let him avoid the hypocrisy, when civil war comes, of saying that it wasn't his fault, he didn't want it.

Above all, Sir, let us remember, when we talk of strategic risks and key positions, that the tragedy of the next world war will not lie in the result of it but in the happening of it. Compared with the war itself, victory or defeat will be a triviality. To endanger, in however small a degree, the chance of a peace settlement by an intransigent insistence on the key positions in the ensuing war would be criminal folly. To endanger it for a key position in the middle of Africa—O God! O Tanganyika!—there is nothing left to say.

Yours, &c.,

A. A. Milne.

("Times", October 21st, 1937.)

Sir,—I hope this question will be solved but by a careful statesmanlike investigation of the whole question of Powers and their right to colonies and their share of colonies. I see, of course, that each Power is saying, "Germany ought to have colonies, but not our little lot".

As I shall write no more, may I put the following questions:

(1) Is it fair that Germany alone of the Great Powers should have no colonies? Yes or no.

(2) If it is not fair then isn't it better to deal with the situation by forethought and conference now, rather than wait for some crisis involving war?

(3) Is it always necessary to be so suspicious of Herr Hitler? He has broken agreements, but so should I have, for they were unjust and repressive. But all my instincts tell me that if Herr Hitler pledged the Reich to certain agreements—e.g., not to raise a black army in Tanganyika—he would keep his word. For peace you must have trust.

I am, &c.,

Walter Carey, Bishop.

("Times", October 21st, 1937.)

Sir,—Will you allow me to associate myself wholeheartedly with the views expressed by Lord Astor, Dr. Carey, Mr. Rees Jeffreys, Sir Arnold Wilson, and Captain A. L. Kennedy on Mr. Amery's attitude in bolting the door against any suggestion of our making a concession to Germany in the matter of the return of any part of her colonies? In "The Times" of May 4th, last the late Mr. Molteno gave a striking list of the successive offers made by Germany in her efforts to secure equality of status—16 years after the War—all of which except one had been either rejected or ignored by the Allies. Later, while failing to carry out part of their undertaking, they seemed, and still seem, determined to keep Germany down to the level of the smallest and most unimportant European State, and to forget the pledge given by them in 1919 to make "an absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims," a point to which Captain Kennedy draws attention in the letter published in your issue of October 14th. In the light of that declaration and of the other circumstances upon which that adjustment was based it is difficult to understand the *non possumus* attitude adopted by Mr. Amery, which apparently aims at imposing on Germany till the crack of doom the stigma of being unfit for any colonial possessions.

Is not this attitude bound to produce in the long run an exasperation which might ultimately produce disastrous consequences ?

In view of the attitude hitherto adopted towards Germany's claim to a return of at least some part of her colonies, an attitude so strongly supported by Mr. Amery, Germany must inevitably wonder what has become of the old English tradition of fair play, especially towards a beaten enemy, who has surely been severely punished and has given pledges of non-aggression towards France, Belgium, and Holland. It is surely clear, by the way, that these pledges would undoubtedly have been given last year had Germany been invited to a renewed Locarno Conference instead of being kept outside the schoolroom door as a naughty boy. The Germans will contrast their present treatment with that given to France by the victorious Allies at the Congress of Vienna. They will see, too, that while we are urged on no account to return any part of their colonies to them we cannot even maintain the white population of a vast part of our Empire.

The truly appalling position revealed in the letter of Sir Hal Colebatch, Agent-General for Western Australia, in your issue of October 12th, following upon statistical data with regard to population per square mile in different parts of our Empire, should surely give pause to those who seem determined, *coûte que coûte*, to keep every inch of our territories, including the 2,500,000 square miles with a population of 93,000,000 which we have acquired by the Treaty of Versailles, although a large proportion of our younger manhood have apparently become permeated, as Sir Hal Colebatch says, with an "idleness tending towards permanent degeneration," which is hardly the stuff to produce the right kind of colonist! The late Mr. Fleetwood Chidell had already drawn attention to the danger to our very existence as a Colonial Empire which is involved in such circumstances in his book "Australia, White or Yellow" (1926). Fortunately it would seem that we are now, very late in the day, about to consider what measures, if any, can be devised to prevent the crumbling away of our colonial possessions, not by attack from without but by a process of inanition.

The fact is, Sir, that, as I ventured to suggest in my letter of September 29th, the time has come—is, indeed, long overdue—for us to accept the offer of friendly discussion with a great people which was beaten in the Great War, and which, even under the terms of a dictated peace, has hardly had a fair deal. Germany is, moreover, undoubtedly anxious for a real understanding with Great Britain, the fundamental basis of which should be, in her opinion, the establishment of Germany's status among the European Powers, great and small—a status which is definitely and scornfully challenged by the refusal even to discuss the question of her colonial claims.

But, above all, if we are to act on the lines indicated by your correspondents, let us be prompt and frank in the matter. Captain Kennedy is absolutely right in saying that half the troubles that now beset Europe arise from procrastination . . . some of them could have been settled fairly easily if we had arrived at once at a moderate solution and made a more determined effort to reach some definite result.

I look for the time when some great man will say to England : We must initiate a conference to ascertain if we can satisfy Germany's reasonable claims, established on the basis of prestige and status, while we safeguard the Empire and the world for generations to come.

In such a conference Mr. Amery's great gifts as a statesman and administrator would render incalculable service, not merely to Britain, but to Europe and indeed to the world. I venture, then to suggest to him, with great respect, that he should add to his rich equipment a little of that very English quality of magnanimity to which I referred in my letter of September 29th, and to which the Prime Minister has just alluded in saying that it is not in the temperament of our people to bear malice, and

that we have the shortest memory for quarrels of any nation in the world. There is no body of British citizens which has given a nobler example of magnanimity than the British Legion, the vast majority of whom are full of friendly feelings towards the gallant enemy whom they met in the field, and I feel sure that they would look upon the bolting of the door to Germany's colonial claims as an act not in consonance with wisdom, justice, and our national character.

You obedient servant,

George Shee.

("Times", October 23rd, 1937.)

Sir,—Since 1918 you have allowed me so often to state from different standpoints Germany's claim to colonies that I dare not ask for permission to repeat arguments which must be familiar to every reader who systematically follows this lamentable controversy. May I, however, answer several objections to the reinstatement of Germany as a colonial power which have lately been advanced in your columns ?

Your correspondent, Sir Malcolm Robertson, points to the fact that in "Mein Kampf," written many years ago, when Hitler was an unknown and irresponsible private person, the need for colonies is denied. But why should it be strange that, when in office he recognized the strength of national opinion on this question, he changed his attitude ? After all, Bismarck reacted to the colonial movement in precisely the same way. I ask your correspondent what he would think if a German writer were to deny our need of colonial empire because of the fact that in the middle of last century Disraeli was willing to abandon what he called the "wretched colonies", and that a little later both the Privy Council (in a petition to the Queen) and a Committee of the House of Commons declared strongly against any further addition to the Empire. (Since then we have acquired many millions of square miles of territory, inasmuch that the Empire now comprises nearly a quarter of the whole globe.)

Again, with no justification whatever, it has been suggested that Germany could not be relied on to observe treaties. Let us be English and fair, and acknowledge that if Germany has violated the Treaty of Versailles it was because the Allied Powers had set the example—first by refusing to implement the articles providing for revision where existing stipulations were dangerous to international harmony, and then by refusing to adopt the measures of disarmament to which they were pledged both by verbal assurances given to the German delegation and by the treaty itself. If the invasion of Belgium be advanced as a reason for distrusting Germany, though it is arguable that Belgium had herself abandoned a neutral attitude, shall it not be remembered that it was not the German but the British Government which refused to honour the article of the Congo Treaty of 1885 which stipulated that in the event of war between European Powers the Congo Basin should be regarded as neutral territory and be kept out of hostilities ?

As to the un-English fears of Germany as a colonial neighbour, I will only recall—particularly for the encouragement of the member for Birmingham—the manly and generous words spoken by Joseph Chamberlain in 1885, when, in certain political circles, the same faint-hearted spirit prevailed.

If it be necessary (he said), as I think it may be, to review our foreign and colonial policy in the light of recent events, let us face the altered circumstances of the problem in the spirit of full-grown men, and not with the pettish outcry of frightened children.

To those who have not Chamberlain's faith and courage, I would say, in conclusion, that the best way of conserving the Empire is to discourage distrust and envy of it and to increase the number of its friends.

Yours faithfully,

W. H. Dawson.

("Times", October 22nd, 1937.)

Sir,—It is astonishing that Mr. Amery, an ex-Cabinet Minister, and a travelled man, cannot see Mr. A.A. Milne's point of view, which is that the sight of the great British possessions—increased since the War—makes others jealous, and that our protestations that we desire peace seem to them hypocritical.

Again, our protestations that we cannot hand over because of our love for the natives do not ring true in the ears of others. They know, if we do not, that in a British Dominion a few hundred miles south of Tanganyika a policy of steady repression has been pursued for a dozen years. In South Africa the colour-bar Act, the masters and servants Act, the white labour policy, the land policy, the suppression of the native franchise, are all indications of a steady determination to keep the native down. This policy has made tens of thousands of natives lose any hope of progressing.

What right have we then to talk as if we were the only people who knew how to treat natives?

Personally I should like to support strongly the suggestion that Germany and ourselves should hold our non-self-governing colonies under mandates, a policy good for the natives—good for peace, and so good for ourselves and the world in general.

Yours truly,

Arthur Southampton.

("Times", October 26th, 1937.)

Sir,—The letters published in your columns show that most of your correspondents fall into one of two groups. One group feel that it is worth taking risks for peace rather than to head for another world war. They wish to recognize frankly that Germany must have full equality among the great Powers of the world. They see a chance of a peace pact covering most of Europe and the whole of the Dominions, and wish to seize this large half loaf as a worthwhile instalment towards the re-establishment of confidence.

The other group feel that they can never satisfy Germany's ambitions. Some were anti-German before Hitler's advent. They seem unable to bury the hatchet and are more concerned with renewing the past War than in avoiding a future one.

Now, Sir, the attitude of this second group translated into policy may well involve the suicide of the British Commonwealth.

Such a policy may compel us at some moment to choose between a diplomatic retreat with dangerous loss of prestige or else war on some issue for which the Dominions may not fight; a war that must shatter all the main combatants. Such an attitude on our part must inevitably lead to competitive preparations for war during which troubles probably would be fomented for the British Commonwealth in the Far East, in the Mediterranean, in the Arab world—in the Moslem world—in India.

All this I foresee as the almost inevitable result of an anti-German policy by Britain, of a refusal to make any concession to German demands for equality of status as regards Colonies and of continuance of encircling military alliances, which impose a sense of insecurity on Germany until she can form counter-alliances. Moreover, such a result would serve the strategy of Communism, which desires to see non-Communist countries at war in the belief that revolution must follow.

What has Herr Hitler offered since "Mein Kampf" was written?

(1) Pacts of non-aggression with "neighbour States".

(2) Equality of status as regards Colonies.

(3) A German Navy 35 per cent. of the British Navy.

(4) For five years an air arm equal to 50 per cent. of the French air arm or 30 per cent. of the combined forces of Germany's neighbours, whichever be the less, followed after 10 years by air parity with the principal air Powers.

(5) Return to the League on terms.

Point 4 is no longer open because of M. Barthou's rejection and of the subsequent French Soviet alliance.

Point 5 would probably necessitate amendments of the Covenant to separate it from the Peace Treaties and to make the League more of a consultative than a coercive body. The unwillingness of the Dominions and of the British public to commit themselves automatically to war, economic or military, on relatively minor issue, such as a self-determination plebiscite in Austria or redress of the Sudetan Deutsche grievances, makes such a revision a prime British interest as well as a peace interest.

As to Point 3. If we continue refusing offers of settlement and adopt, a policy of permanent antagonism, may not the naval pact be terminated and murderous naval competition follow?

This brings me to Point 2.

Many of your correspondents have put forward interesting suggestions. I purposely refrain from making any proposal. Prerequisites of successful negotiation necessitate the barring of as few solutions as possible and the preliminary confidential private exploration of all alternatives.

What else is there?

Black African armies? If they are to be prohibited to Germany, should not this prohibition apply also to others with African colonies? Mussolini has accepted this principle.

Central Europe? Some of the countries in Central Europe have recently shown a disposition to follow the example of Belgium, Switzerland, and Scandinavia and to consider their prospects of preserving territorial integrity and political independence as greater if they are neutral than if they form part of an anti-German military *bloc* even if this be labelled collective security.

French security? Surely France must be more secure if she relies on a German non-aggression pact coupled with a whole-hearted British guarantee of help in case of unprovoked aggression than if she depends on her existing provocative military alliances (of diminishing military value) and a British entente inevitably more half hearted and less cordial and binding because of France's provocative alliances.

Risks to Britain? Of course there are risks associated with this policy. But these risks for peace are less dangerous than the competition in armaments and search for military allies, the growing tension with Germany, and the increasing anti-British activities in the Near East, &c. We cannot deal effectively with any of the vital British problems in these regions so long as we are obliged to keep our main fighting strength near home because we have not reached a settlement with Germany.

Yours truly,

Lord Astor.

("Times", October 27th, 1937.)

Sir,—To those of us who hold that Germany should not be deprived of colonies, the correspondence in your columns has afforded a valuable opportunity for understanding the motives which inspire opposition to their return. We can see that repugnance to a German colonial empire is based upon premises which, if true, would be impressive, but which are in fact illusory. They appear to be as follows :

- (1) That Germany is inevitably hostile to England.
- (2) That Germany is determined upon aggression in Europe, and it is useless to make colonial concessions in the hope of inducing her to keep the peace.
- (3) That Germany can be defied.
- (4) That Germany was rightly deprived of her colonies by the fortune of war.
- (5) That the interest of the natives would be injured by their transfer to German rule, and that this consideration must be paramount.
- (6) That, whether the deprivation of Germany's colonies was right or wrong, the needs of Imperial strategy compel us to retain possession of Tanganyika.

Those who may claim to belong to that middle body of opinion referred to in your leading article of October 28th can see an answer to these arguments, somewhat on the following lines :

- (1) The assumption that one Great Power is to be permanently an enemy is an impossible basis of foreign policy.
- (2) If it were certain that Germany intended to expand eastward in Europe by war (an expansion which would ultimately involve us all) and could by no means be deflected from this purpose, then it would be reasonable to make no concessions to her, but to occupy the remaining years or months of peace in preparations for her defeat. But, failing such certainty, it is incumbent upon us not to increase the incentive to the Germans to embark upon such a disastrous course. If they are made to feel that they can get no consideration for their claims from their brother nations of Western Europe, then the bitterness of despair may well turn their thoughts towards carving out a new destiny to the Eastward.
- (3) Those who assume a peaceful future while Germany nurses a grievance, deeply felt, are living in a fools' paradise. It was presumably such an outlook which inspired France, prior to 1933, when an incapacity for long views led her to assume a permanently helpless Germany.
- (4) If there are some to whom the deprivation of Germany's colonies appeared to be morally justified, there are few to-day who, on the moral score, can contemplate calmly the breach of the promise conveyed in the fifth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points—"an absolutely impartial investigation of all colonial claims."

(5) Consideration for the interests of the natives is the most creditable of the motives expressed ; but it should not be forgotten, in a large view of the tremendous problem of native welfare in Africa, that Germany has a real contribution to make to the fund of talent in science and organization that Africa so urgently requires. And it is idle to deny that the system of mandation does offer a powerful factor tending towards native welfare. Moreover, the greatest injury that could befall the natives of Africa would be war, which the denial of colonies to Germany might well produce.

(6) Those who oppose the restoration of colonies to Germany on the ground of strategy in the Indian Ocean have not reflected that, while the German Government has no ground for requesting the return of any but its former possessions, it would be in the German interest to "do a deal"; indeed, German ambition looks rather to West Africa than to East. Sir Claud Russell, in your issue of February 3rd, suggested a way in which a new distribution of territory might be made, satisfying Germany in the West.

Transfer of territory would, of course, involve difficult problems of vested interest and established tradition ; but sacrifices of some kind are inevitable in the cause of peace.

Yours, &c.,

Noel-Buxton.

("Times", November 2nd, 1937.)

Extract from the leading article in the "Manchester Guardian" of November 1st, 1937 :

It has for some time been obvious that no general settlement will be possible in international and European affairs which does not include a solution of "the colonial question". The motive force behind the Nazi regime in Germany is provided by national grievances. One by one these grievances have been removed either by time or by the action of the German Government. There still remain, however, two grievances outstanding : the existence outside the boundaries of the Reich of several million Germans and the loss of all her colonies. If one or both of these grievances could be assuaged it would deprive National Socialism of much of its sting. It must be admitted moreover, that up to a point Germany has a strong case. It is not an economic case, or at least it would not be if Britain and France abandoned restrictive tariffs in their own empires. (It is worth pointing out that so far Germany has made no response to Mr. Eden's offer to negotiate on colonial preferences.) It is not really a moral case, for one cannot admit that any Power has a moral right to rule over other peoples. But as things are she has a political right of a sort. Germany was certainly given to understand before she signed the Armistice that her colonies would not be taken away ; yet in spite of this they were taken away, and the excuse offered, that Germany was incapable of colonial administration, was a specious one. In truth they were taken away because Germany had lost the war, and the fact must be a perpetual encouragement to her to try and win another one. It is true, of course, that her colonies do not now belong to Britain, France, and Belgium but to the League, and that the mandatory system is a great advance in colonial theory. Alone, however, it is not enough. Just as it was useless to disarm Germany if the Allies refused to disarm, so it was useless to make Germany's colonies League mandates if the other empires remained a species of private property.

The true solution is not to go back to what was before but to go on still farther. The ideal, as has repeatedly been urged in these columns, is direct administration of all colonies by the League of Nations, but that, we may admit, is a long step. One might fall short of this and yet go forward. Germany might, if necessary be offered territory in Africa to hold under a mandate to the League as part of a general settlement and on condition that she returned to the League. With the exception of a small band of Tory die-hards, whose bark is much worse than their bite, public opinion in this country would be willing to accept some such settlement, and one hopes that the Government itself is not determined against it.

Extract from the leading article in the "Times" of October 28th, 1937 :

Nothing but good can come of the correspondence which has poured into these columns during the last three weeks on the thorny question of the German claim to colonies. It is an urgent claim, and it is an integral part of the larger problem of the future peace of the world. For various obvious reasons it cannot for the moment be discussed between Governments in the calm surroundings which are necessary to a settlement.

All the more reason, therefore, why the conclusions which are forming themselves in England, among those who have some claim to speak on the subject from different points of view, should be exposed and canvassed in public against the day when they can be tested officially. Their letters have already covered most of the ground. They have dealt with the broad political issue raised by the German claim and with the practical difficulties of meeting it in certain specific cases. They have propounded a number of novel solutions of the whole problem of European colonization—a wide extension of the mandatory system, for instance, or the establishment (particularly for parts of Africa) of an international bureau of the Powers concerned. They have argued the right of the native populations to be consulted on any change of administration and have touched on the menace of black armies. The discussion has wisely been kept to the point at issue. There has been no attempt to confuse it by importing any sentiment of dislike. It has revealed a very general desire for a peaceful settlement with Germany, in the direction where this country can contribute to it most, emerging midway between those who would tolerate no change at all and those who are prepared to restore the former German colonies wholesale as a hopeful gesture of good will.

It is safe to say that the best and the bulk of British opinion stands on neither of these extreme positions. There is certainly no support in this country for the view that the peace of the world would be assured by a mere reversal of the colonial settlement of Versailles. Nor indeed is such a step within our competence. The responsibility for the mandates over the former German colonies has never been a British interest only. No doubt the largest share of them was entrusted to the British Empire—by no means always to its material advantage: but a number of these are a matter of deep concern to the people of the self-governing Dominions, some of whose spokesmen show an ingenuous disposition to abandon any mandate but their own; and in a lesser degree there are other countries involved. No simple solution therefore is possible even if it were desirable. But there is equally no support in this country for the crude belief that the Versailles settlement must persist for all time in every detail, and without the revision for which its own clauses provide. In the matter of colonial administration we are all entitled to be proud of the long and glorious record of the British Empire; but it is rightly held sheer hypocrisy to pretend that no other European race is fit to be entrusted with it. More particularly in Africa, where the destinies of the native races present one of the supreme problems of the future, there is a strong case (as more than one correspondent has urged) for enlisting the cooperation of all the best European experience in its solution. That does not mean the retrocession of Tanganyika—which presents unanswerable difficulties, administrative, economic, and strategical—nor does it necessarily mean the extension of the present mandatory system to all the African native territories. But it does mean a genuine attempt to find

for Germany some acceptable field for development. The recognition that she was *capax imperii* would be all the more satisfactory if such a field could be opened to her by the common action of three or four of the great colonizing Powers with contiguous African territories.

The truth is that British public opinion is probably far ahead of the Government in its conviction that a clear understanding with Germany would have consequences more profound and more conducive to a stable peace than any other single object of our foreign policy. There is little sympathy here with the view, which has sometimes seemed to prevail on the Continent, that the proper way to treat Germany is to ring her about with vigilant allied States, sometimes masquerading as the League of Nations, like trained elephants round a tiger in the jungle, to prevent her expansion in any direction beyond the limits imposed twenty years ago. She has broken those limits here and there already and every article of statesmanship suggests that a halt should be called to a process which must otherwise lead inevitably to war and to the downfall of civilization in the West. Let us at least be clear at what point a stand should be made, and let us make a supreme effort, so far as Great Britain is concerned, to do what is possible for appeasement before that point is reached. The German appetite for expansion is not to be satisfied by an isolated gesture. The recovery of her former colonies may not even be what Germany most desires. But her other known desires are not directly a British interest; for the moment at all events the colonial issue takes first place in her list of grievances; and there is assuredly no case for refusing to discuss it, as part of a general settlement, in a frank and friendly spirit.

The point that the discussion must envisage a general settlement is vital; but there are two conditions to be satisfied before it can begin. In the first place it will be stultified from the outset if there is any disposition to conduct it by a shouting-match. Is it conceivable that any British Minister, confronted with a public demand through the German megaphone for this or that colonial concession, could possibly make an affirmative reply through a similar instrument? Is it conceivable that British opinion would support him if he were to attempt it, or that there could be any other outcome than a final banging of the door? Here, even more than elsewhere, it is essential to get away from the long-range challenges of politicians and back to normal diplomatic methods. And, in the second place, there must be an end of the Spanish trouble before it is possible to face any other problem in a tolerable atmosphere. That open sore—the growth in turn of imported Bolshevik and Fascist intervention—most effectually prevents all progress so long as it is running. But Germany has prudently refused to become involved in it to any serious extent by comparison with some other nations; and this country is not involved at all except as a mediator. There is no reason whatever why Spain should prove a permanent stumbling-block in the way to better relations between them.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE DISCUSSION ON GERMANY'S DEMAND FOR COLONIES

Our Standpoint under International Law

Text of the Speech by General Ritter von Epp in the Colonial Law Committee of the Academy of German Law in Munich, on October 29th, 1937

The Führer has on various occasions—the first time after the restoration of German military sovereignty in his Reichstag speech of March 7th, 1936 and later at every suitable opportunity in his speeches—given the Powers clearly to understand that Germany cannot waive the settlement of her colonial claim.

What has been the reaction to this German claim in foreign countries? The "German colonial question" has become the subject of lively international discussion. In particular the countries which exploit German colonial property in the form of mandates have given careful attention to all the utterances of the Führer and his collaborators regarding the necessity for Germany to regain her colonies. They do not, however, meet the clear arguments put forward, but advance every possible reason on the other side, although, it is true, there are some people who are definitely in favour of the solution of this question which is of such vital importance for our people.

What does Germany want? According to the logical utterances of the Führer, her demand comprises the definite liquidation of a political status which has arisen and the removal of the economic difficulties of our people of which this is the essential cause. When did this political and economic position arise? It owes its origin to the political and legal monstrosity of Versailles: the mandatory system. Its consequences are making themselves more and more felt in Germany's economic position which is conditioned by the absence of the necessary economic outlet and of vital resources.

The accuracy of this short description of the core of the German colonial question is also shown by the fact that the most stubborn opponents of the reinstatement of Germany as a colonial Power endeavour by their comments to conceal or contest this position, while making strenuous efforts to ignore the situation created by the spiritual work of Versailles.

The tactics of the adversaries therefore aim at finding reasons for the incontestable German economic distress which would from the outset preclude a return of German colonial possessions. This is apparent in the assertion which is made in many forms: Germany's economic distress is not connected with the colonial question; it cannot be removed by the return of the colonies; there is merely a raw materials question which arises internationally and the settlement of which must be left to the League of Nations.

Thus the revision of the Versailles Treaty has been allowed to disappear from the debate. Presumably the justified claim to the return of territory has thus been put out of sight. In accordance with long practice the way has thus apparently been found for evading the troublesome German claim without a direct negative. But these tactics are useless, for all these fine reasons come up against the following unchangeable realities:

(1) Germany's economic question cannot be separated from her colonial question. It is impossible to separate the raw materials question, the question of outlets and the colonial question, or to make any other division of the problems, according to the historical development which determines the present economic position in general and in particular after Versailles.

(2) Germany's severe struggle for foodstuffs and for industrial raw materials is to a very great extent due to the seizure of her colonies, that is to say of her overseas economic possibilities.

(3) The German nation which, since the seizure of the colonies by the manipulations of Versailles, has protested against this reduction of its economic outlet, has reached the conviction in the course of the development of the last twenty years, and especially since the assumption of power by National Socialism, that it must again obtain possession of its colonial property. This conviction is at present held by the entire German nation. This conviction cannot be changed by any tactics of the other side.

* * *

When at the end of last century Germany acquired overseas possessions by peaceful and legal means and thus became the last Great Power to enter the ranks of the colonial Powers, this was done not least in order to be prepared in future for a development which arose out of the rapid industrialisation and the unprecedented growth of the population and the corresponding reduction in outlet to which this gave rise. Germany introduced into her colonies the basis of orderly development and of a suitable reservoir of supplementary forces. The primary meaning and object of all the colonial activity of the colonising Powers was to create such forces in their own colonial possessions. Though before the war international economic interests were so intertwined that the belief in a further peaceful development of world policy and the belief in the firmness and security of capital investments abroad formed the fundamental condition of the economic structure, the colonial Powers and other countries that were indirectly concerned concluded a treaty to guarantee their colonial territories in Africa—the natural outlet reservoir of Europe—against all possibilities of a war.

On February 26th, 1885 this treaty, the so-called Congo Act, was concluded. Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the United States of America, Italy, Portugal and a number of other States concluded a treaty with the preamble: "Wishing to regulate in a proper spirit of mutual agreement the most favourable conditions for the development of trade and civilisation in certain districts of Africa, and of ensuring to all nations the advantages of free navigation on the two principal African rivers which flow into the Atlantic Ocean; being desirous on the other hand of preventing misunderstandings and disputes which might be caused in future by the taking possession of fresh territory on the coasts of Africa, and being concerned at the same time with means for increasing the moral and material well-being of the native populations, have resolved..." In Article 11, the contracting Powers undertake, in case a Power exercising sovereignty or protectorate rights in the conventional Congo Basin is involved in war, to use their good offices in order that the possessions of that Power in the conventional Congo Basin may be declared neutral. Such possessions declared as neutral shall be subject for the duration of the war to the laws of neutrality and shall be regarded as if they did not belong to a belligerent State. It could not be more clearly expressed that all war should be excluded from these territories of the conventional Congo Basin, which was far greater than the geographical

basin. The conventional Congo Basin comprises the whole of German East Africa, about a third of the Cameroons, the whole of British East Africa, Uganda-Nyassaland, a small part of North Rhodesia, about half of French Equatorial Africa and the whole of the Belgian Congo.

The preventive measures for maintaining the natural overseas outlets of Europe taken as a result of the far-seeing spirit shown at that time—especially by the American representative, Mr. Kasson, who referred on December 10th, 1884 to the first conflicts of the Europeans in America—were destroyed by the Great War. The Congo Act was ignored by the opponents of Germany and the war was carried over into the colonies.

Here also, as in all the other cases, the clear breach of a treaty was excused by the corresponding document, the Belgian Grey Book¹ in spite of the obvious foundation for Germany's belief in the security of her colonies by treaty.

The injustice of the attack on our colonies was also sanctioned at Versailles by the taking away of the remaining German possessions in the world.

* * *

The War deprived Germany of 12,000 million Dollars of foreign investments. Belief in the safety of private property invested abroad was removed by the entrance of very many States into the War against Germany for the purpose of taking possession of German private property merely by writing out a declaration of war.

These results of the War were recorded at Versailles in the following paragraph: The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right "to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interests belonging at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty to German nationals, or companies controlled by them, within their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including territories ceded to them by the present Treaty."²

According to similar paragraphs, Germany's colonies came under compulsory administration and the enjoyment of them was entirely removed from the German owners. To crown everything, the dictated Peace which sanctioned the most glaring injustice created an institution the express purpose of which still consists in supervising the further maintenance of the injustices sanctioned, namely the League of Nations.

To the natural results of the disturbance of the world economic system was added the beginning of an economic epoch which is characterised by increased egoism, i.e. monopolies and protectionism. The owners and producers of certain raw materials and foodstuffs combined in the service of egoistic interests and converted the exchange of goods from a means of attaining mutual advantages into an instrument which enabled them to exploit the distress of foreign purchasers exclusively for their own benefit.

By means of the Versailles Treaty and its supervisory institute, the League of Nations, incredible injustice was codified as a guiding principle. The situation created at Versailles determined the line of economic development, i.e. the violent removal of outlets, an unbearable burden of reparations and the most highly developed position of monopoly. The entire weight of these effects was exercised against Germany

whom the victors characterised in contradistinction to themselves with the name of "Have-not".

* * *

The colonial empires of the European nations were founded in order to prevent the results of a development which divides the world into "Haves" and "Have-nots", i.e. those who are one-sidedly favoured and those who are one-sidedly deprived of their rights. Though the politicians before the war were not fully conscious of their actions, they nevertheless displayed a certain far-sighted magnanimity and showed by the Congo Act that the solution of a European question in respect of outlet and raw materials which would at some time become urgent would be found in Africa on account of its favourable position in proximity to Europe. The Congo Act is the first example of a far-sighted "clearing of the ground" in Africa, the natural reserve outlet of Europe. This fact found expression, even in the atmosphere of triumph which existed in 1919, in the so-called Lyons broadcast of October 29th, 1918. At the instance of Colonel House, one of President Wilson's advisers, American delegates prepared an expert opinion in which the question of the "justified German colonial claims" was expressed as follows: "Germany requires access to tropical raw materials. She needs a field for the expansion of her population. Under the principles of peace proposed, conquest gives her enemies no title to her colonies."

President Wilson spoke in the same sense on December 4th, 1917 in the American congress, when he said that "the War must not end with an act of vengeance of any kind, and no nation or people must be deprived of possessions or punished". On February 11th, 1918, he added in the same Congress that "there shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages." This was also the sense of Point 5 of President Wilson's fourteen points, which provided for the much talked of "free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims". Germany had accepted this point along with the others in her note of October 3rd, 1918 and her adversaries had also agreed to it after President Wilson's point 5, which so deeply affected Germany's fate, had been explained and commented on by Colonel House.

As against this standpoint there were the undisguised annexationist demands of Great Britain, who was bound by the London Secret Treaty of April 25th, 1915 on the basis of which Italy entered the War, and by the Secret Treaty of February 1917 with Japan in respect of the presumable division of the German colonial territories. It was also opposed by the Prime Ministers of the British Dominions, the representatives of France and naturally also of the other countries. Differences of opinion arose between the protagonists of the secret treaties and the peacemaker President Wilson, as is shown by the secret protocol of the Council of Ten of January 24th, 1919. President Wilson said:

"The world would say that the Great Powers first portioned out the helpless parts of the world, and then formed a League of Nations. The crude fact would be that each of these parts of the world had been assigned to one of the Great Powers.

I wish to point out, in all frankness, that the world would not accept such action; it would make the League of Nations impossible, and they would have to return to the system of competitive armaments with accumulating debts and the burden of Great Armies."

* * *

(¹) Correspondance diplomatique et politique relative à la guerre en Afrique. Rapports du Haut Commandement. Violation des lois de la guerre par l'ennemi. Ministère des Colonies, Bruxelles et Paris, 1919.

(²) Art. 297 of the Versailles Peace Conditions of May 7th, 1919.

In order, however, to obtain possession of the German colonial territories, the mandatory system was invented, a new

version of the former concealed British annexationist methods.¹

Just as England when occupying Egypt in 1882 called herself the "mandatory of Europe",² this mandatory system of Versailles was based on the lie regarding atrocities which had proved so serviceable in the War, though in this case the reference was to German colonial incapacity. Thus Germany's colonies were not annexed, but came under the administration of the Powers, just as had been previously arranged in the various secret treaties. Only Italy was cheated of the guarantee contained in her secret agreement.

With regard to the true character of the mandatory system it is of interest at the present time to recall the statements made by President Wilson's Secretary of State Robert Lansing³ in 1921: "It may appear surprising that the Great Powers so readily gave their support to the new method of obtaining an apparently limited control over the conquered territories, and did not seek to obtain complete sovereignty over them. It is not necessary to look very far for a sufficient and very practical reason. If the colonial possessions of Germany had, under the old practice, been divided among the victorious Powers and been ceded to them directly in full sovereignty, Germany might justly have asked that the value of such territorial cessions be applied on any war indemnities to which the Powers were entitled. On the other hand, the League of Nations in the distribution of mandates would presumably do so in the interests of the inhabitants of the colonies and the mandates would be accepted by the Powers as a duty and not to obtain new possessions. Thus under the mandatory system Germany lost her territorial assets, which might have greatly reduced her financial debt to the Allies, while the latter obtained the German colonial possessions without the loss of any of their claims for indemnity. In actual operation the apparent altruism of the mandatory system worked in favour of the selfish and material interests of the Powers which accepted the mandates."

What is a mandate? The New Oxford Dictionary of 1933 defines a "mandate" as "a commission issued by the League of Nations authorising a selected power to administer, control and develop a territory for a specified purpose". I will not go into the discussions which have taken place regard the idea of mandates. I have quoted a definition to which even well-known Englishmen refer.⁴

* * *

The primary condition for the mandatory administration of the German colonies was the colonial guilt lie in the notes of the Allies of July 16th, 1919, namely: "The Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that the native inhabitants of the German colonies are strongly opposed to being again brought under Germany's way, and the record of German rule, the traditions of the German Government, and the use to which these colonies were put as bases from which to prey upon the commerce of the world, make it impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to return them to Germany, or to entrust to her the responsibility for the training and education of their inhabitants." These statements were based on the British Blue Book⁵ with regard to which the South West African House of Assembly decided on July 29th, 1926 that it had "the

(1) Campbell-Lee, *The Mandate for Mesopotamia and the Principle of Trusteeship in English Law*, a Lecture, London 1921: "It was the spirit of English trusteeship that set free the peoples of Canada, of Australia and of New Zealand." "... The mandatory principle of trusteeship for backward peoples is actually embodied in the South Africa Act 1909."

(2) According to Meurer, "Die Grundlagen des Versailler Friedens und der Völkerbund", Würzburg 1920, p. 120, England in occupying Egypt in 1882 called herself the "mandatory of Europe".

(3) See Robert Lansing: "The Peace Negotiations, 1921, p. 157.

(4) See correspondence between Viscount Rothermere and H. Williams in the Daily Mail of May 27th, 1937 and June 11th, 1937.

significance of a war-instrument and that the time has come to put this instrument out of operation."

General Hertzog, South African Prime Minister, said on January 28th, 1927: "The untrustworthy and contemptible character of that piece of war propaganda should suffice to condemn it to the dishonourable grave of all such writings of the war period."

As regards the content of the colonial guilt lie, the present French Colonial Minister Marius Moutet said on August 26th, 1924 as Rapporteur of the Mandatory Committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Union at Berne: "It cannot be denied that Germany in many respects transferred her methodical spirit, her orderly qualities and her characteristic discipline to her former colonies and to a great extent promoted the development of the territories now under mandate."

The former British Colonial Minister, Mr. L. S. Amery, one of the stubborn opponents of the return of the colonies to Germany, said in reply to my statement of the German standpoint in the colonial question: "As for Germany's moral unfitness to govern natives, that was of a piece with much else that was said, in speeches and even official correspondence, that belonged to the not wholly dispassionate atmosphere of the time."⁶

The last mentioned statement finds a parallel in Mr. Lansing's words regarding Mr. Wilson and the idea of mandates⁷: "His high-mindedness and loftiness of thought blinded him to the sordidness of purpose which appears to have induced the general acquiescence in his desired system of mandates." Is that perhaps the reason why Mr. Amery and the considerable number of his followers are endeavouring after the event to turn the mandate into an annexation, or merely to create a basis on which, after the reason for the mandatory administration has disappeared, Germany's claim for the removal of the mandatory system can be carried «ad absurdum» and her colonial possessions further exploited? This is the reason that explains why Mr. Amery merely refers to Article 119 of the Versailles Treaty as a proof of his assertion of the definite cession of the German colonies. The League of Nations, which otherwise seldom fails in theoretical matters must now therefore again make way for the Allied and Associated Powers—according to Mr. Amery's argument—for according to him the "League of Nations had nothing whatever to do" with the distribution of the German colonial possessions.

In so far as the German standpoint can at all enter into a discussion regarding the Treaty of Versailles after the solemn declarations of the Führer and Chancellor in the Reichstag on January 30th, 1937 and at the Party Congress in 1937, the question must be asked: "Why should there be mandates at all, why Article 22 of the League Covenant which should in any case form a whole with Article 119?" The fact that Germany under Article 119 of the Versailles "Diktat" had to give up her colonies in favour of the Principal Powers does not transfer sovereignty to these Powers any more than the similar wording in respect of Danzig⁸ and Memel⁹.

* * *

Germany formally and legally establishes the fact that the foundations for the compulsory abandonment of colonial possessions have disappeared and there is therefore no legal ground for a continuance of mandates. All attempts to bring to life the stillbirth of Versailles by means of tactical manoeuvres fail in view of the natural inadequacy of these methods.

(5) Report on the Natives of South West Africa and their Treatment by Germany. Prepared in the Administrator's Office, Windhuk, South West Africa, January 1918. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, August 1918. London, Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office.

(6) "Journal of the Royal African Society", January 1937.

(7) Lansing, *ibid*, p. 160. (8) Act. 100. (9) Act. 99.

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THE THREE-POWER AGREEMENT AGAINST COMMUNISM

The Pact between Germany, Japan and Italy of November 6th, 1937

A Measure against the Bolshevik World Danger and in favour of Political, Economic and Social World Peace

On her Eastern frontier France has erected gigantic impenetrable fortifications consisting of a wall of steel and concrete one kilometre deep—the Maginot Line. At the expense of further thousands of millions, this line is being extended to the Mediterranean and along the Belgian frontier to the Channel by the so-called Daladier Line. After its completion, France's territorial frontier will be protected by the most tightly closed and strongest fortification system of all times which, it is constantly affirmed, is only intended to serve her own security and to protect her against warlike attacks and the attempts at invasion by enemies. If, for a moment, the undoubted importance of these mighty frontier fortifications as a point of departure and base for active military operations is left out of account, it must be admitted that France's possibilities of defence against any kind of military action provide a maximum of security. The same applies more or less to most of the other European States, and this calculation would be quite correct if these States were able to adapt their defensive measures merely to military opponents and were not threatened by a much greater and more dangerous, because invisible, enemy, for whom no armies or fortifications, however strong and well equipped, provide an obstacle, namely, world Bolshevism and the subversive activity of the Communist International.

In the act of penetrating through Germany to Western Europe, Bolshevism was caught and hurled back at the decisive moment by National Socialism. Here an Adolf Hitler Line was erected as a dam against the Bolshevik flood, and it guarantees that the road to the west through Germany remains for ever closed to the disintegrating effect of the Comintern. Since the Party Congress last year, when the great alarm was given, the active dispute with world Bolshevism has become a subject of world discussion on which a searching light has been thrown by the events in Spain. Thereby the world has recognised more and more the danger that would be involved for every other country if the "red bacillus" were to be established beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

The world revolution carried on by the Communist International assumes practical shape in the propaganda for popular fronts with a view to creeping into a position of power from

which it can strive after its aims under official forms. It has recourse to sanguinary revolts when it considers the circumstances suitable. It unchains and promotes civil war for the destruction and annihilation of a nation, as witness the terrible proof given in Spain.

We do not need to describe in detail the whole history of the preparations made by the Communist International to an ever increasing extent during the past twenty years with the object of inciting and unchaining world revolution. The men of the Comintern have in fact stated often enough in recent years that they are advancing towards their aim methodically and with cold calculation. They have even given a list of the victims which they are prepared to make one by one and have established an order of priority of nations that are more or less ripe for Bolshevik attack. The Seventh Comintern Congress of 1936 was in this respect an undisguised declaration of war on the other States of the world according to Lenin's principle: the practical task of Communist policy is to take advantage of the hostility of bourgeois States to each other and to set the capitalists against each other; we Communists must play off one against another. In 1936 Spain was regarded as the next and ripest victim and its Bolshevisation was prepared and carried out on a large scale. Russian policy at the Conferences in Nyon, London and Brussels has clearly proved that the principle of Communist policy set up by Lenin has in no way disappeared from Russian foreign policy under the rule of Stalin.

But the Comintern does not restrict its activity to Europe, but stirs up trouble in North and South America, incites the black nations of Africa and rummages among the dock workers of India and Australia and in the over-populated large cities of China. We also remember that Marshal Tukhachevsky said it was a self-evident right of Bolshevism to encompass the whole world by direct action on all neighbouring countries, the Red Army being given the part of "shock brigade of the world proletariat". The fact that he has in the meantime himself become a victim of this world danger does not make it any less a danger. Nations who are wide awake and conscious of their responsibility, however, do not wait for this "direct action" or until they are encompassed by the strangling arms of the Communist International.

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After Germany, therefore, another Great Power adjacent to the country of origin of the Comintern soon recognised this world danger and carried on a successful struggle against its subversive work, namely Japan. It counteracted with a strong hand the destructive activity of the Comintern agents and radically crushed all Bolshevik undermining work.

What was therefore more natural than that these two Powers should come together for common defensive measures and erect a new bulwark or anti-communist wall in the form of the Berlin Agreement of November 25th, 1936.

An agreement of this kind is by no means a novelty in history. It has no other significance than the international treaties which have been repeatedly concluded in order to avert dangers threatening the community, such as the agreements to prevent the spread of cholera and plague. Germany and Japan, two leading Great Powers in the West and in the Far East, both situated in the centre of the spheres in which the Comintern is constantly trying to exercise its activity, will take joint measures of "political hygiene" in order to prevent the dissemination of the "red bacillus" and to protect the world from the danger of infection.

A third bulwark has now been added, on November 6th, 1937, to this anti-communist wall by the accession of Italy to the German-Japanese agreement. Mussolini also, since he came into power, has shown iron determination in pushing back the Bolshevik wave that threatened to flood Italy. It is a logical consequence of this repeated challenge to Bolshevism, for instance in his Milan speech of November 1st, 1936 and recently in his appeal on the occasion of the sixteenth anniversary of the march on Rome on October 28th, that the Italian Government, after reaching an agreement with the German Government during Count Ciano's visit to Germany as to the necessity of combating Bolshevism, should now formally accede to the German-Japanese agreement as an original signatory.

The significance of the protocol of November 6th does not ultimately lie in the fact that it is made quite clear to the world that at any rate three Great Powers comprising 200 million people are not prepared to make compacts with Communism as such or to allow the primary necessity of the defensive struggle against Bolshevism to recede into the background on account of political considerations. The organisation of the revolution is opposed by the organisation for maintaining and safeguarding peace, and the planned attacks of the Moscow central authority is met by planned defence. This defence can only count on success if it is organised in practical cooperation between the Governments. The Agreement is therefore open to any other State desiring to accede to it. Against the Bolshevik pressure there is now the impregnable wall of nationalist defence; in the South of Europe Fascism keeps guard and the Communist expansion in the Far East is checked by the land of the rising sun.

That part of the world which still regards the Moscow International as a harmless society club will now have to reckon with this great and powerful line of defence. It is a part of the world that is constantly diminishing, while the States that are alive to the danger of the Bolshevik threat and are determined to oppose it are constantly increasing in number. For it is now an undisputed fact, and one that no longer needs to be explained in detail, that the emissaries of Moscow are carrying on their dangerous work in all continents. For England too, for the British Empire, its dominions, colonies, protectorates and mandates there is a Bolshevik problem, and the "Bolchévisme Colonial" and its repression is a source of great trouble for the Paris authorities in the French colonial empire.

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It is natural that the foundation and tendency of the German-Japanese agreement have remained the same. It is well known that they are in no way directed against a State or nation, but are intended solely as a defence against the menace of a subversive movement which has nothing in common with evolution but rather aims at the destruction of the material and ideal values of all nations. The agreement is therefore by no means directed against the Soviet Union as a State, but only relates to the Moscow of the Comintern with which—as has so often been affirmed—official Moscow, the State which calls itself the Soviet Union—has nothing whatever to do. Has not the Soviet Government frequently undertaken—we need only recall the promises given in London and Washington—to renounce all Communist propaganda, and then, when the "value" of these promises became clear, declared with a polite shrug of the shoulders that it has unfortunately no means of influencing the Comintern and accordingly cannot assume any responsibility for its actions. If, therefore, Moscow is really running "on a single rail", it cannot feel itself "threatened". After the first rumours were heard of a German-Japanese understanding, the Soviet Ambassador in Tokio, Yureneff, asked the Foreign Minister Arita for an explanation; the latter replied: "If the Soviet Government desires to cultivate close friendly relations with the Japanese Government, there is nothing in the way of this, and the latter will do everything to attain this object. This is in no way incompatible with the Japanese Government's fight against Communism and its central bureau, the Comintern, for the latter has nothing in common with the Moscow Government." The Tass Agency, which published this report, did not record what the Ambassador replied. He could, of course, only have replied that in fact the Japanese Government's view was correct. That this is unfortunately not a fact was shown by the Moscow reaction, which took the form of a protest by Boris Stein, the Soviet Ambassador in Rome, to Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, on November 8th. This reaction was sufficient to reveal the double-faced Janus of Moscow. On November 9th, 1937, the "Petit Journal" and other French newspapers rightly pointed out that Soviet Russia had admitted by this step that its internal régime was identical with the Third International. When it now declared that a treaty directed solely against the Comintern was an unfriendly act, it was undoubtedly on dangerous ground and was thus justifying the ideological crusades directed against it.

This "crusading spirit" of the agreement is specially emphasised in France and it is at the same time pointed out that it is impossible to share in it. In the same breath, however, it is compared with the western democratic front, the special characteristic of which is that it does not hesitate to include the Soviet Union in its ranks and to represent it as a protagonist of democratic ideals. The fact that strategical speculations play a decisive part in this respect makes this attitude perhaps more comprehensible but not more pardonable. The record in this respect was taken by the "Prager Presse", which wrote on November 9th: "The position created by the treaty would not be a happy one, if the proportion of power were not such that the treaty or, more correctly, the alliance of the three totalitarian Great Powers, cannot represent a serious threat to democratic States."

The British Empire, France, the United States and Soviet Russia, together with the smaller States belonging to this bloc, possess practically all the raw materials of the world; they have all the capital, absolute mastery of the seas and excellent armies. As these Powers are absolutely peace-loving, they are doing everything to maintain peace, and as they are aware of their military, financial and economic supremacy, they do not require to pursue a policy of prestige."

This jubilant statement by the Prague newspaper is not so very remarkable in view of the articles published in the rest of the Czechoslovak press on November 7th to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, in which the political, cultural and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union is glorified and a more fruitful development of that cooperation than hitherto is desired. Naturally all these newspapers do not realise that the crisis through which Europe is passing does not originate in the misunderstanding or misinterpretation of a crusading idea imputed to Germany, but is due to two very obvious causes which are closely connected, namely the alliance of France and Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union which is bent on world revolution, and the Bolshevik programme which is painted with bloody letters on the Spanish sky. On the contrary, as in the case of the German-Japanese agreement of 1936, all kinds of fantastic combinations have been imputed to the present additional protocol. Not only has it been represented as a political alliance with secret political and military clauses, a camouflage of imperialistic intentions and aims, but it is even declared to be directed quite definitely not so much against Russia as against England, France and America. Those who have learned to think only in terms of military alliances and secret treaties directed against third parties have difficulty in imagining a "triple alliance" in which nations which are closely connected in their views on life and history have come together in order to safeguard the order and soundness of the life of their States and peoples from Communist contagion.

They therefore take no interest whatever in the methods by which Russia is governed, so long as Russia keeps her "political form of life" for herself and does not try to export it by cunning or violence.

It is therefore extremely surprising that foreigners should try to shift the Three Power Agreement, which is solely intended to defend culture and civilisation, into the international sphere, by asserting that the accession of Italy implies the end of the idea of an agreement with England. The latest development in Anglo-Italian relations on the contrary shows that the anti-Communist pact extended in Rome does not lie in the plane of international policy as such. Participation in this pact, which is in no way intended to be exclusive, can therefore never mean that there is any desire to form a bloc going beyond anti-Bolshevik solidarity or that the international relations of the par-

ticipants with the rest of the civilised world are to be in any way changed or affected.

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If any event could still further stress the necessity and opportuneness of the Rome signature of the Anti-Comintern Protocol, it was the manner in which the 20th anniversary of the Communist revolution was celebrated on November 7th in the place where Bolshevism reigns. To take a particularly gross symptom, special interest in this connection attaches to the Moscow broadcast which, in a message to the citizens of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, very frankly and as a matter of course "congratulated all nations of the world on the great festival of the whole of mankind." At present, it said in so many words, the Soviet Union stood before the eyes of the world, the safeguard of freedom, the bulwark of peace, the fortress of culture, the most powerful and the happiest State throughout the world. The proclamation of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist International, which was addressed through the same transmitter to the "proletarians of all countries and the nations of the whole world", was even more pointed. It reveals in plain terms the expansionist aims of Bolshevism which consist in uniting the international proletariat of the entire globe in an insoluble connection with the nations of the Soviet State. "Long live the victory of the proletarian world revolution" are the closing words of the proclamation of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

It is only to be hoped that these broadcasts were also really heard abroad, and in the first place by those who for one reason or another, and with one incrimination or another, thought fit to attack the German-Japanese-Italian agreement. For all countries are ultimately affected by the above proclamations, and the critics together with their countries form no exception. The blood-stained balance-sheet of this jubilee of terror, the crying contrast between Bolshevik promises and Bolshevik performances should open the eyes even of those who still sympathise openly or secretly with Bolshevism or think they should include it in their political calculations.

It is therefore only to be hoped that the Three Power Agreement of November 6th, 1937 will in future find the appreciation to which it is entitled as an instrument for the creation and maintenance of political unity and social peace between the nations and as a protection of their culture against the subversive machinations of the Communist International.

The World in Arms

Under this heading our Journal will in future from time to time publish short summaries of the armaments position in the world, divided up into countries, on the basis of official data and reliable press communications, just as we have given such information in past years in the course of current articles.

In our Special Number 176/185 of February 2nd, 1937, we gave the

position of European armaments as it existed at the end of 1936. In continuation thereof and in order to complete the documentary material, we give particulars in the present number for the first few months of the present year; this information has already become known through the press, but is not out of date because it relates to armaments measures taken for the most part in respect of the budget year 1937/38.

Australia

Increased expenditure on Australian national defence. The national defence budget for 1937/38 (from July 1st, 1937) submitted to the Australian Federal Parliament on August 27th amounts to £11,531,000. This "record figure in peacetime" is divided up as follows: Army £3,264,000; Navy £3,616,000; Air Force £2,672,000; Munitions £1,039,000; Civil Aviation £940,000. As Mr. Casey, the Federal Treasurer, pointed out in introducing the new budget, the expenditure on armaments was nearly £3,500,000 higher than for 1936/37, when a considerable increase had been made over the previous year. The further increase proved Australia's determination to contribute an adequate

amount for the defence of the British Empire. The expenditure was possible because Australia was experiencing the highest level of material prosperity in its history. The extent of the increase in expenditure is apparent on comparing it with 1932-33, when only slightly more than £3,000,000 was expended on defence. The increase is therefore fourfold in five years. Of the total amount of the new defence budget, £2,500,000 is raised by loans in London and allocated to the payment of corresponding British supplies. The plans include the following: the extension of munitions and other arms factories, an increase in the strength of the Navy, the rearming of the coast fortifications, an increase in the air force in four years to 17 squadrons

with 204 planes, the creation of new air bases at Sydney, Darwin, Brisbane, Cardwell (North Queensland), New Guinea and one of the islands in the Pacific. Mr. Curtin, leader of the Federal Labour Opposition, in the debate on the result of the London Imperial Conference, even demanded the creation of 50 fighter-bomber squadrons at a cost of £15,000,000 giving double the strength of Japan's seaborne aircraft. ("Times", No. 47773, and 47775, Aug. 26 and 28; "Daily Telegraph", No. 25662, Aug. 28th, 1937.)

Denmark

Improvement of Danish national defence. The Government submitted to the Folketing on February 4th two laws on the strengthening of the army and navy. The annual expenditure, which has hitherto amounted to about 26 million kr. for the army and 13.75 million kr. for the navy (making 39.75 million together), is to be increased under the Government proposal to 26.38 and 14.385 millions (making 40.765,000 kr. together). In addition, it is proposed to expend a total of 20 million kr. during the next five or six years for modernising national defence, this amount to be divided equally between the army and navy. The law on compulsory service is maintained, but the number of annual conscripts and the training period are somewhat reduced. On the other hand, the possibility of voluntary admission to the forces is extended. In the army, the mechanisation of the artillery is to be accelerated and the entire technical equipment is to be improved. In the course of the next six years the additions to the navy include 5 torpedo boats and submarines.

The object of the proposals, as pointed out by the Defence Minister Andersen, when introducing the budget in parliament, is to provide the best possible safeguard for Danish neutrality in case of a European war. ("Times", No. 47605, Feb. 2nd "Berlingske Aftenavis", Feb. 4th, 1937.)

Danish Naval Budget 1937/38. According to the "Temps" No. 27,650, May 22nd, 1937, the Danish defence budget for 1937/38 (from April 1st, 1937) amounts to 41.3 million kr. (as compared with 39.5 million kr. for the previous financial year 1936/37). On this amount 14,385,000 kr. (as against 13.5 millions in the previous year) is allocated to the ordinary naval budget. In addition the extraordinary expenditure for the navy amounts to 1.5 million kr. for new vessels, 0.3 million kr. for material and for the coast artillery, and 0.6 millions for fisheries, so that the total amount available for the navy in the new financial year will be 16,785,000 kr. According to the draft law on the strengthening of the army and navy submitted to the Folketing on February 4th, the new constructions in the next six years will be: 3 submarines, 3 torpedo boats, 1 mine layer, 3 mine sweepers, 3 rapid boats, 1 supervision ship and 1 survey ship; a further submarine is to be begun during this period.

United Kingdom

British Defence Loan and Five-Year Plan. On February 18th the House of Commons adopted by 329 votes to 145 a resolution announced on February 11th by Mr. Neville Chamberlain on behalf of the Government, empowering the Treasury during the five years from April 1st, 1937 to March 31st, 1942 to raise loans to an amount of £400,000,000 for armaments purposes.

In explanation of the resolution, the Government published a White Paper on February 16th contraining particulars of a vast armaments programme extending over the above five years at a total cost of about £1,500,000,000. This amount includes the normal annual budgets of the three arms and the additional loans for the period from April 1st, 1937 to March 31st, 1942. In the general explanation given as an introduction to the new programme, reference is made to the statements in the White Paper of March 3rd, 1936, the essential features of which remain unchanged, and it is pointed out that

recent years have witnessed an immense elaboration of the mechanical equipment of fighting services in many countries and that modern forces must be provided with arms and defences more formidable and costly than any conceived a generation ago. The growth in the destructive powers of air forces compels the adoption of a whole system of new measures, necessarily involving heavy cost, for air defence at home and overseas. The modernization of the defence of strategic points in various parts of the British Empire, states the White Paper, is a formidable item in the cost of the new defence programme. The White Paper states that the loan of £400,000,000 represents a maximum. Parliament will, it explains, still retain control over defence expenditure through the requisite approval of defence budgets. The defence programme will remain flexible in accordance with the future development of the position and may be curtailed or spread over a longer period. Taking the programme as it stands today, the White Paper adds, it would be imprudent to contemplate a total expenditure on defence during the next five years of much less than £1,500,000,000. (In No. 1 of this Journal, of October 1st, 1937, we gave extracts from the debate in the House of Commons on the British defence programme.)

Detailed statements of the White Paper on the Five-Year Armaments Plan:

1. Navy

Heavy expenditure must be incurred over the next few years in order to bring the Navy up to the necessary strength. A series of heavy building programmes will be carried out. The construction programme for 1937/38 will include three further capital ships, so that in the first half year of 1937, five capital ships in all will be laid down, including the two which had been begun on January 1st. The total building costs of all new constructions to be started in the next financial year are considerably higher than those of the ships of the last building programme, which will require £50,000,000 as against an average cost of less than £12,000,000 for the years 1931-1934. Further heavy expenditure will also be incurred for the necessary modernisation of older capital ships and cruisers. The same applies to improved anti-aircraft defence, and to the acquisition of a sufficient quantity of ammunition, fuel and other stores. The personnel of the Navy must also be considerably increased and the naval establishments on land must also be extended. The Fleet Air Arm is also being substantially increased. The number of its first-line aeroplanes is to be increased in proportion to the progress in the building of new aircraft carriers, from the present number of 217 to 450 (according to the "Daily Telegraph" No. 25,418 of February 17th, 1937, to 500).

The British Navy Estimates for 1937/38. The Navy Estimates for the year from April 1st, 1937 to March 31st, 1938, which were published in the "Times", No. 47,624 of March 4th, 1937, together with the statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty, amount to £105,065,000, i. e. £23,775,000 more than the estimates for the previous year plus the two supplementary estimates (69.93 + 10.30 + 1.06, making together £81,290,000). The increase from the one year to the other is thus 29.24 %. Since 1932, the Navy Estimates (in round millions) have been: 50.2; 53.6; 56.6; 64.9; 81.3; 105.1; the annual expenditure has thus been more than doubled in the last five years. Of the new estimates, £27,000,000 will be provided from the Defence Loan of £400,000,000. The budget is based on the policy laid down in the White Papers of March 3rd, 1936 and February 16th, 1937. The largest increase, namely, according to the First Lord's statement, £14,000,000, is required by the New Construction Fund amounting in all to £28,000,000, partly on account of the fundamental acceleration of the rate of building, and partly because the considerable increase in the number of annual new constructions begun with the previous year's building programme now has its full effect in the shape of complete annual contributions. A further part of the increase,

i. e. £9,000,000, is for the increased cost of placing in commission and maintaining the Fleet, including the modernization of capital ships, increase in personnel and the making good of deficiencies in stores and material reserves. **Personnel:** The estimated strength of the personnel of the Fleet is increased by nearly 11,000 to a total of 112,000 officers and men. (At the end of 1913 the number was 144,419.) **New construction:** The new construction programme provides for: 3 battleships (King George V type, i.e. of 35,000 tons with 35.6 cm. guns), 2 aircraft carriers of 23,000 tons, 7 cruisers (5 of 8000 and 2 of 5,300 tons), 16 destroyers (improved "Javelin" class, of 1650 tons, according to the "Daily Telegraph" No. 25,511 of March 4th, 1937), 7 submarines (Patrol type of 1,100 tons), 3 escort vessels, 4 minesweepers, 3 patrol vessels; in addition, 1 destroyer depot ship and 1 submarine depot ship, 1 surveying ship, 2 large river gunboats, 2 special service vessels, 10 motor torpedo boats of 15 tons, 16 boom defence vessels, 2 tugs; total 80 vessels. In the construction of new ships, the qualitative limitations of the London Naval Treaty of March 25th, 1936, which are now alone applicable, have been taken into consideration.

£4,200,000 are provided for the Fleet Air Arm as against approximately £3,600,000 in the previous year, i.e. an increase of £600,000, which is to be devoted mainly to the acquisition of new aircraft material.

In the "Daily Telegraph" No. 25,511 of March 4th, 1937 the Naval Correspondent of the paper calculates that in the year 1937, including the 1937/38 building programme, a total of 148 new British vessels will be under construction, i.e. 5 battleships, 21 cruisers, 5 aircraft carriers, 49 destroyers, 19 submarines, 3 depot ships, 24 sloops, 2 surveying ships, 3 gunboats, 17 motor torpedo boats. The new submarines will bring the total number of submarines up to 70.

British Naval Rearmament. Mr. Hector E. Bywater learns from naval quarters that next year's building plan, i.e. 1938/39 will include three more battleships, so that the total number of new vessels of this class, including the one laid down since January 1st, 1937, will be eight. In all, ten new battleships of 35,000 tons are to be placed in commission by 1942, so that Great Britain will then have a total of 25 battleships, including the existing 5 capital ships all of which will by that time have been modernised. ("Daily Telegraph", No. 25,598 of June 15th, 1937.)

2. Army

Of the four new infantry battalions described in the White Paper of March 3rd, 1936 as necessary for the overseas garrisons, two are to be set up in the near future according to the present plan. A further reinforcement is supplied by two new tank battalions, one of them in the near future, and certain auxiliary troops. The greatest part of the increased cost in the Army Estimates is required by equipment: the modernization of the field artillery, infantry and all other arms, the accelerated execution of mechanisation and motorisation and the supply of war stores of all kinds, in particular ammunition reserves. The territorial army will have a more modern arms equipment.

The British Army Estimates 1937/38. The Army Estimates for the year April 1st, 1937 to March 31st, 1938, published in the "Times" of March 5th, 1937 together with the memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, amount to £82,170,000 net (of which £19,050,000 is borne by the new Defence Loan), i.e. £26,290,000 more than the last estimates plus the supplementary estimate of July 6th, 1936 (49.28+6.60, making a total of £55,880,000). Within one year, therefore, there has been an increase of more than 47 %. Of the new estimates £73,720,000 is for the effective services and £8,450,000 for the non-effective service (half-pay and pensions). Since 1932 the Army Estimates (including supplementary estimates, in round millions) have been: 36.5; 38; 39.6; 44.9; 55.9; 82.2. Next year's estimates therefore are £45,700,000 higher than those of 1932, in other words, an increase of 125 % in five years. The Me-

morandum of the Secretary of State for War points out that, in the comparison with the previous year, two factors must be taken into consideration. 1. In 1936 £551,800 was included in Army Estimates for arms factories. Army expenditure for this purpose (£7,950,000) in 1937 appeared in the special Royal Ordinance Factories Estimate relating to the three arms, which (according to the "Daily Telegraph" No. 25,512 of March 5th, 1937) amounts to a total of £16,160,000 (including £7,950,000 borne by the Defence Loan), i.e. £10,180,000 for 14 new factories more than in the preceding year (£5,980,000). 2. In the previous year some £2,800,000 was included in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian dispute and does not recur in the present year. These amounts under 1 and 2, making together about £3,350,000, are to the benefit of the increased armament of the army in 1937, so that the amounts really available for this purpose are: £26,290,000 in the actual Army Estimates, £7,950,000 representing the Army's share in the Royal Ordinance Factories Estimate, and the above £3,350,000, making a total of £37,590,000 or nearly as much as the entire Army Estimates in 1933. The increase in the new Army Estimates is due to the armaments measures described in detail in the White Papers of March 3rd, 1936 and February 16th, 1937. Most of the increased costs are caused by the increase in warlike stores of all kinds, especially ammunition. For this purpose the gross estimate is £30,330,000, as against £12,360,000 in the previous year and (according to the "Daily Telegraph" of March 5th, 1937) an average of £2,500,000 in the years 1928 to 1934. **Effectives:** The strength of the Regular Army inclusive of British troops overseas (without the air forces and the troops in India and Burma) is to be raised by 10,500 to 168,900, in order to be able to set up the new battalions etc. and to make the other changes in organisation which have already been announced. Including the British troops in India (about 57,500) the future strength of the Regular Army (without the air arm) is to be about 226,400. At the beginning of the financial year it will be below this by 980 officers and 20,200 other ranks; in addition the number of men leaving the Colours during the year will be approximately 27,000. The recruits required will therefore be about 47,200, a number which will be very difficult to reach in spite of the proposed new provisions (increased pay, better accommodation etc.). **Reserves.** (a) The strength of the Army Reserve on April 1st, 1937 will be about 121,900, and at the end of the financial year about 131,500. Section A of the Army Reserve, which is required to meet peace-time emergencies is to be raised from 3,000 to 6,000. (b) The strength of the technical Supplementary Reserve will be about 21,130. In the last ten months only 400 officers and 1,620 recruits were obtained for this reserve. (c) The Infantry Section introduced in September 1936 to provide for the completion of mobilization of units of Infantry of the Line for the first few months after mobilization has so far made little progress. From September 1936 to January 1937, only 1792 recruits were obtained. It is hoped that in the course of 1937 a total of 4,460 volunteers will be obtained. The attainment of the proposed future strength of 17,000 is therefore still far distant. The strength of the Territorial Army on January 1st, 1937, was 7,870 officers and 133,283 other ranks, making a total of 141,153 (exclusive of Permanent Staff), as compared with 128,321 in the previous year, i.e. 12,832 more. The future number is to be 184,321, i.e. a further number of about 43,000. The annual camps were attended by 123,524 men.

The military correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph", Major-General Temperley, points out in No. 25,512 of March 5th, 1937 that the new Army Estimates are the highest for sixteen years. The "Times" of the same date states in its leading article that the estimate comes as a surprise because the increase is greater than that of the Navy Estimates (£26,290,000 as against £23,780,000). It points out that the estimate for 1937 is nearly double that of 1935.

3. Air Force

As the White Paper repeatedly points out, the reinforcement of the striking power of this arm is a matter of supreme importance for England, because the island kingdom has become to an increasing extent vulnerable to air attacks on account of the rapid increase in aircraft and the perfection of this weapon. The programme of the Royal Air Force comprises the following points: the construction of numerous new aerodromes, the creation of more than 75 new flying schools and training centres at home and overseas, an increase in the number of squadrons and aircraft, improvement of types, further considerable increases in personnel, which has already been raised from 31,000 in 1934 to 50,000 last year. Preparation of special stores of equipment, bombs and ammunition and of fuel reserves, erection of additional State aircraft factories ("shadow" factories) for the mass production of aircraft material in wartime.

In addition, the new arms programme provides for a general rise in the "war potential" of all parts of the defence forces, i.e. an extension of all armaments industrial plant, improvement in the possibilities of converting it for war material in case of mobilisation and the accumulation of supplies of raw materials. Lastly the air defence is to be substantially developed. Two divisions of the Territorial Army have already been reorganised for this purpose, and further transformations are intended.

The Britain Air Estimates 1937/38. The Air Estimates published in the "Times" No. 47,626 of March 6th, 1937, together with the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Air, for the year April 1st, 1937 to March 31st, 1938, amount to a net sum of £82,500,000, i.e. £31,800,000 more than the estimates for the preceding year plus the supplementary estimate of July 6th, 1936 (39.0 + 11.7, making a total of £50,700,000). The increase therefore amounts to 62.72 % in one year. The estimates for the Air Force since 1932 have been (in round millions): 17.4; 17.4; 17.6; 27.6; 50.7; 82.5; the annual expenditure has accordingly been increased five-fold in the last five years. Of the net amount of the new estimate, £82,018,000 is for the effective service and £482,000 for the non-effective service (half-pay and pensions). The sum of £82,500,000 includes £26,000,000 borne by the £400,000,000 Defence Loan. The total expenditure for aviation (military and civil) in 1937/38, including appropriations from other estimates (inter alia £4,200,000 from the Fleet Air Arm Grant as against about £3,600,000 in the previous year), is estimated at the gross amount of £88,590,000, i.e. £32,880,000 more than in the previous year when £43,490,000 plus £12,220,000 for the supplementary estimate of July was voted, making a total of £55,710,000. Civil aviation receives in the new estimates a gross amount of approximately £2,500,000 as against £908,000 in the previous year. **Reinforcement of the Royal Air Force:** According to the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Air, the estimates are based on the air armaments programme of May 22nd, 1935 which is still to be completed (1500 first-line aircraft by the end of March 1937), the extended programme of March 3rd, 1930 (1750 first-line aircraft by the end of March 1939) and the White Paper of February 16th, 1937. Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister of Defence, stated in the House of Commons on March 22nd ("Times", No. 47,640 of March 23rd, 1937) that up to date 102 home squadrons had been formed, to which would be added one more in April making a total of 103; of these the whole of the regular squadrons were at full strength in pilots and mechanics and ten were under strength in aircraft. According to the statement by the Secretary of State for Air, Lord Swinton, in his memorandum on the air estimates, the number would be increased during the summer to 124 home squadrons (including 20 non-effective squadrons of the Auxiliary Air Force) with a first-line strength of 1500 aircraft. These 124 squadrons would be gradually increased in size to give the necessary total first-line strength of 1750 aircraft. The overseas air force (which was to be 415 aircraft in 37 squadrons by the end of

March 1939) amounted to 20 squadrons after one new squadron had been formed in the previous year. The Fleet Air Arm (at present 217 aircraft in 20 squadrons) is to be raised next year by 61 to 278 aircraft for aircraft carriers and catapult ships. The ultimate strength of all front-line aircraft at home, overseas and in the Navy will therefore be about 1750 + 415 + 450, making a total of 2615, while at the present time, according to the "Times" of March 6th, 1937, only 1610 first-line aircraft are available. In the Auxiliary Air Force 10 special units are to be created for operating a balloon barrage in connection with the defence scheme for the London area. **Personnel:** In the estimates of July last year the numbers were increased to 55,000 officers and men and are to be raised in the present year to 70,000 (exclusive of India); three years ago the number was only 31,000. In order to train the newly organised air reserve, it is hoped next year to obtain 800 volunteers from civil occupations. They are to practise 15 days a year, and are also to be trained in the evenings and at week-ends. For technical equipment, in particular aircraft material and warlike stores, a net amount of £43,500,000 is provided in the new estimates as against £26,500,000 in the previous year. According to the Memorandum, next year's amount is more than six times as high as the corresponding figure for 1934. The aircraft industry, without auxiliary industries, occupies 63,000 persons. The extension of works, buildings, aerodromes etc. requires next year £18,000,000, i.e. £8,650,000 more than last year; it also includes the extension of "shadow" factories. The existing 65 aerodrome sites in the home country are to be increased by 15 to 80. Overseas seven new sites are to be provided.

The "Morning Post" No. 51,384 of March 6th, 1937 points out in its leading article that in 1913/14, the total expenditure was £49,000,000 for the Navy and £23,000,000 for the Army, making a total of £72,000,000 and that the cost of the Air Force alone, which is estimated at £82,500,000 for 1937/38 is higher than the total British defence expenditure in the last year before the War. The "Daily Telegraph" No. 25,521 of March 16th, 1937 stresses the remark made by Sir Philip Sassoon, Under-Secretary for Air, in introducing the new estimate in the house of Commons that it is the greatest air estimate ever laid before Parliament and that such a vast increase in a single branch of national defence in such a short time, amounting practically to the trebling of the air force, is unexampled in the history of the country.

France

French Expenditure on Armaments for 1938. The estimates for 1938 submitted to the Chamber on September 9th, according to the "Temps" No. 27781 of October 1st, 1937, show a total expenditure on the ordinary estimates of 52,179 millions francs (as against 48,168 millions francs for 1937). Of this amount 10,898 millions francs are provided for the three Defence Ministries as against 9,610 millions in the current financial year, so that the increase in ordinary expenditure on defence is approximately 1,300 million francs. The draft law states that this increase in expenditure is to a great extent due to the rise in prices of food, clothing, fuel etc. and also to the increase in personnel, especially in the air force and navy. The extraordinary estimates, raised by loan, for carrying out the programme of rearmament and work (Compte des investissements en capital), amounting to a total of 13,630 millions francs, provides 11,260 millions francs for armaments alone, i.e. about 1,760 million higher than the 1937 estimates in which the extraordinary expenditure on armaments amounted to only 9,502 millions. The total expenditure on armaments for 1938 is therefore estimated at 10,898 + 11,260 = 22,158 millions francs, i.e. more than 3,000 millions higher than in 1937, and that only for the three actual defence estimates, without considering the national defence expenditure in the estimates of the Ministries of the Interior, Agriculture and the Colonies, the details of which are

not yet known. In comparison with the total State expenditure for 1938 (52,179 millions francs in the ordinary budget and 13,630 millions in the extraordinary budget, making a total of 65,809 millions francs), the armaments expenditure represents 33.67 % in the new financial year, as against 30.3 % of 63,056 millions for 1937.

Strengthening of the French Navy. Three-Year Plan. At the meeting of the Chamber on January 29th, M. Gasnier-Duparc, Minister of Marine, stated that it was proposed to make a further increase in the French navy so that, in case of war, it would in any case be in a position to maintain the connections between the home country and Africa and the other overseas possessions. The Government would submit to parliament in the near future an extensive naval construction programme which had for some time been under discussion by the Supreme Naval Council. Contrary to the usual practice, the necessary credits for carrying out a three-year plan would be asked for at the same time. The credits would comprise the floating forces, the naval air arm and the necessary buildings on land. The present procedure of asking parliament for money year by year for a single construction section was one of the reasons for the delay in new construction. The systematic extension of the navy since 1922 had had the result that up to July 1st, 1936 about 150 new warships amounting to about 420,000 tons had been placed in commission and three battleships had been modernised. The French navy had at present a total of 630,000 tons, including 475,000 tons of modern vessels, as against 332,000 tons of modern Italian vessels and 90,000 tons German. At present, therefore, the French navy was superior to the Italian and German, even taking both together. In view, however, of the efforts being made by other countries and the obsolescence of a number of French vessels, France could not consider herself satisfied with the present position. The naval estimates for 1937 therefore already contained a building plan of 43,570 tons outside the normal programme. In addition, the Supreme Naval Council considered further reinforcements were necessary in order to bring the navy up to a total of 850,000 tons. The Ministry of Marine endorsed this demand, if not in full, at any rate to a substantial extent. ("Temps" No. 27,540 of Jan. 31st, "Daily Telegraph" No. 25,483 and "Morning Post" No. 51,354, both of Jan. 30th, "Le Capital" No. 4431 of Feb. 23rd, 1937.)—In this connection René La Bruyère wrote in the "Petit Parisien" of February 5th, 1937 that the new naval construction programme extending over several years was not yet fixed. But he could say that it would include all the necessary types of ships: apart from battleships of 35,000 tons, one or two aircraft carriers of 15,000 tons which could carry forty aircraft and do 30 knots, also cruisers of 8000 tons, large and small destroyers, large and small submarines. In other words, the navy intended to bring in a complete naval construction law. "Le Jour" of December 10th, 1936 had already announced that the new great building programme would contain 39 ships with 273,000 tons, including five additional battleships of 35,000 tons, and that the number of the 8000 ton cruisers would probably be ten. The five battleships would thus be additional to the two already under construction ("Richelieu", begun on October 22nd, 1935 and "Jean Bart" begun on December 12th, 1936).

The French Three-Year Building Plan. Commandant A. Thomazi wrote as follows in "Le Yacht" of June 12th, 1937: During the debate in the Chamber on the naval estimates for 1937, the three-year building programme prepared by the Ministry of Marine came up for discussion. The last of the ships provided for in the plan were to be laid down in 1939 and completed by the middle of 1943. This programme has not become law, but various newspapers have given figures which have not been contradicted and which may be regarded as correct. According to these figures, the following are to be laid down in addition to the present building plans; two battleships of 35,000 tons; two aircraft carriers of 19,000 tons; two cruisers of 8000 tons; 12 submarines of a total of 20,000 tons; 23,000

tons of light surface vessels; three tank steamers, each with a capacity of 4500 tons. In addition, provision is made for building 60 new air squadrons (board and other naval aircraft). The total increase would amount to about 175,000 tons, or approximately 58,000 tons per year. The necessary personnel would be gradually raised from 67,000 to 80,000 men, and from 4180 to 5400 naval officers; at the same time the number of engineers and administrative officers would be correspondingly increased. The programme provides in particular for replacement construction for obsolete ships. A real increase in the navy would only take place in respect of the two aircraft carriers.

The submission of the proposal as a law was opposed on the grounds that a large programme covering several years might give other countries reason to increase their armaments. On this point, M. Gasnier-Duparc, Minister of Marine, stated that, in spite of his personal preference for a building plan on big lines extending over a lengthy period, he realised the necessity of submitting to Parliament a plan of new construction every year, as in the past. Commandant Thomazi points out in conclusion that it can no longer be counted on that the proposed three-year building plan will become law. It will, however, tacitly retain its validity and be put into execution just as in the case of the proposal of 1922 which did not become law but is still followed as a guiding principle.

Increase in the Personnel of the French Navy. The Government submitted to the Chamber a draft law on the further increase in the numbers of officers and men in the navy. The number of naval officers is increased from 2,112 to 2,340 and the engineer officers from 418 to 516—exclusive of reserve officers and midshipmen. The number of men is to be increased from 61,113 to 70,817. The latter figure is considerably in excess of the strength provided for in the 1937 naval estimates, which mentioned a figure of 66,890 men. ("Nation Belge" No. 65 of March 6th, 1937.)

The French Navy Estimates for 1938. The ordinary navy estimates for 1938 (from January 1st, 1938) provide for current expenditure amounting to approximately 2,123 million francs, as compared with 1,757 million in the 1937 estimates. The increase therefore amounts to 366 millions. In the extraordinary estimates covered by loan (Compte des investissements en capital) an amount of 2,460 million francs is provided for new constructions and works for the navy, i.e. 190 millions less than in 1937. The total naval expenditure for 1938 thus amounts, according to the estimates, to 4,583 million francs as against 4,407 millions in the current year (and 3,395 millions in 1936). There is thus an increase of 176 millions for 1938, which is raised to 179 ½ millions when it is considered that 3 ½ million francs for training aircraft pilots for the naval forces is no longer included in the navy budget but in the air budget. *Personnel:* The number of men is to be increased from 67,000 to 69,500 in order to provide crews for the new constructions to be placed in commission next year, including the "Strasbourg" and three destroyers. No provision is made for an increase in the number of officers. A law on this subject which is at present before Parliament has not yet been passed. The number of officers is therefore at present still the same as that fixed in the law of 1929. According to particulars given by Commandant Thomazi in "Le Yacht" of October 16th, 1937, the new estimates provide 1,303 million francs for new constructions, as against 1,367 million for the financial year 1937, i.e. a reduction of 64 millions. The amounts provided for the Navy Air Arm are also less than in the previous year: for aircraft in series the amount is only 176 millions instead of 206 millions last year, while the Army Air Arm obtains 1,125 millions for the same item as against 879 millions in 1937. The distribution of the naval forces in 1938 will not differ considerably from the present: High sea fleet: A. Atlantic squadron. 1. Ships with full crew: 3 battleships (including "Dunkerque"), 1 aircraft carrier ("Béarn") with three board squadrons, 3 cruisers of 7,600 tons, 1 mine

cruiser ("Emile Bertin"), 7 flotilla leaders, 12 destroyers, 1 submarine flotilla. 2. Ships with reduced crew: 1 battleship, 2 flotilla leaders, 7 destroyers. II. Mediterranean squadron. 1. Ships with full crew: 7 cruisers with 1 air squadron, 1 aircraft depot ship ("Commandant Teste") with 2 air squadrons, 11 flotilla leaders, 3 destroyers, 1 submarine flotilla. 2. Ships with reduced crew: 3 cruisers, 4 flotilla leaders, 4 destroyers. 3. Training division: 2 older battleships ("Courbet" and "Paris"), 3 cruisers and 3 flotilla leaders.

French New Construction 1938. According to "France Militaire" No. 16,780 of October 26th, 1937, the building programme for 1938 is to include: 2 aircraft carriers, probably of the maximum tonnage and armament allowed under the London Naval Agreement of March 25th, 1936 (23,000 tons and 15.5 cm.); 1 cruiser, "De Grasse" type of 8,000 tons; 3 large destroyers, "Le Hardi" type of 1,770 tons; 3 light destroyers "L'Agile" type of 1,000 tons; 1 submarine "La Praya" type of 1,540 tons; 4 smaller submarines, "L'Africaine" type of 700 to 800 tons; 2 motor torpedo boats. The new constructions will therefore amount to nearly 67,000 tons as against about 43,600 tons in the previous year. The reason for this, according to "France Militaire" is that a considerable number of ships will soon reach the age limit and will require replacing. In the years 1922/23 to 1924/25, the ships laid down included 3 cruisers of the "Duguay-Trouin" class, 26 submarines of various sizes and 18 destroyers of the "Simoun" class.

The Result of French Air Rearmament up to date. In his speech on the opening of the new air-port at Bordeaux on June 18th, M. Pierre Cot, French Air Minister, reviewed the position and development of the French air force since June 1936. A year ago, he said, of the 1023 first-line aircraft provided for in the plan adopted by the Government at the end 1933 and passed by Parliament in 1934, only barely 60 % were available as modern aircraft. The modern air material had been increased in the last twelve months by 110 %; at the end of 1937, this increase would amount to 180 %. The reserve aircraft would be increased by 80 %. The bombing aircraft had increased by 400 %. No other air force, he said, had achieved so much in one year; the French air force had again become one of the most powerful in the world, and occupied the second position in Europe, coming immediately after Soviet Russia. The aircraft industry had been assisted by standardisation and by transfer to the State. Production had increased in one year by about 30 % and would be 100 % greater at the end of 1938 than in 1936. Lastly, the organisation of the air force had been improved and adapted to present requirements. In order to obtain sufficient capable officers for the front, the upper age limits had been lowered and at the same time the number of officers required had been increased by 25 % in one year. In addition the military scientific training of the officers was constantly being improved in order to give the troops leaders who were intellectually and technically well prepared. The reserve personnel of the air force had been reorganised ("Temps" No. 27,678, June 19th, 1937).

The Transfer of French Aircraft Works to the State. The Air Minister, M. Pierre Cot, on June 2nd made communications to the Aviation Committee of the Chamber on the position in respect of the taking over of the French air industry by the State. He said that up to the present 17 expropriations had been pronounced by the Air Ministry. For actual aircraft construction six regional groups had been formed, a company had been founded for engine construction, there was a committee for coordinating the various companies and for studying joint questions, and lastly a sales office for the export of flying material. The cost had amounted up to the present to 250 million francs. He added that the small companies founded to administer the firms taken over by the State would receive definite form by an increase in their capital. In order to show the result of manufacture M. Pierre Cot made a comparison between the years 1936 and 1937. He said that in the first four months of this year the construction of aeroplane bodies had decreased by

2.75 % and the construction of engines by 10 % as compared with the previous year. This decline was, however, less than in the case of some works remaining in private hands. He therefore hoped that his building plan, which provided for 1500 aeroplanes could be carried out in three years instead of four. An improvement in the production results was to be expected at the end of the current year. ("France Militaire", No. 16,658 of June 4th, 1937.)

Netherlands

Netherlands Defence Estimates 1938. Period of Service. Effectives. The estimates for 1938 submitted to Parliament on September 21st show a total expenditure of 703,196,000 florins as against 657,794,000 for 1937. Of this amount, 110,359,000 florins represent ordinary expenditure and 41,620,000 florins extraordinary expenditure to be raised by the mother country for national defence, making a total of 151,979,000. According to the "Times" Nos. 47796 and 47802 of September 22nd and October 4th, 1937, about 37,200,000 florins of this amount is to be devoted to increases in the navy, i.e. more than double the amount in 1937. The newspaper estimates the increase in next year's national defence expenditure at about 25,500,000 florins compared with the last financial year, without counting the increased expenditure for the proposed extension of the period of service and the increase in effectives. The ordinary defence estimates for 1938 are 30 % higher than in 1937 and 1936, while the extraordinary estimates are eight times as high as in 1937 and about five times as high as in 1936.

According to a draft law amending the Defence Law, which was introduced by the Government at the same time as the new defence estimates, the period of service of the infantry is in future to be extended to 11 months and the annual contingent of recruits is to be raised from 19,500 to 32,000 men, i.e. by more than half. In addition, it is proposed to abolish the system under which men have hitherto been exempted from military service on account of a brother having been called up and the system of payment in lieu of service, so that in future exemption can only be granted on the ground of incapacity for service. On account of the urgency of strengthening the army, these amendments are to be applied to the 1938 class. The annual cost of the draft law is estimated at about 12 million florins, to which must be added 5 millions for increases in active officers and n.c.o.'s necessitated by the amendments, i.e. a total of 17 millions per year. In addition there are non-recurring costs of 22 millions for the construction of new barracks ("Temps" No. 27775 of September, 25th, "France Militaire" No. 16755 of September 27th, 1937).

Netherlands Naval Policy and Estimates 1938. According to the "Times" No. 47806 of October 4th, 1937, of the 151,979,000 florins which the mother country will contribute in accordance with the 1938 estimates to the defence of the Netherlands and their possessions, £4,160,000, or approximately 37,232,000 florins is intended for increasing the navy, an amount which the "Times" describes in its leading article of October 4th as more than twice as high as the sum expended in 1937. The increase is mainly due to new shipbuilding. The new estimates provide for the following new constructions: 1 cruiser of an improved "De Ruyter" type to replace the "Sumatra" (launched on December 29th, 1920), 3 flotilla leaders, 6 submarines, 8 mine-layers and 12 mine-sweepers. These demands are all the more remarkable as the 1937 estimates already provided for the new construction of 2 destroyers, 4 submarines (ordered on April 11th, 1937) and 4 mine-sweepers. The fleet in the Netherlands Indies, in order to carry out its task, must, in accordance with a memorandum recently submitted by the Minister of Defence van Dijk to the Second Dutch Chamber, be raised as far as possible to the following strength: 3 cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders, 12 destroyers, 18 submarines and 72 aeroplanes. The cost of new construction for this purpose and for the requirements of the home fleet will amount to 17,500,000 florins per year (as against only 6,700,000

hitherto). The naval estimates for 1938 also include 2 million florins for arming merchant ships with guns, so that they may be used in case of war for guarding the Dutsch coast. ("De Standard", September 4th, and "Morning Post", No. 51555 of September 23rd, 1937.)

Italy

Italian Defence Estimates 1937/38. On January 13th the Cabinet approved the estimates for 1937/38 (from July 1st, 1937), providing the following amounts for defence: Army 2,491 million lire, Navy 1,793 million lire, Air Force 1,250 million lire, making a total of 5,534 million lire. As compared with the current financial year, the new estimates of the three arms show increases of 200, 250 and 280 millions respectively, making a total of 730 millions. The increase in expenditure (5,534 millions instead of 4,804 millions) thus amounts to 15.2 %. As the total State expenditure for 1937 is estimated at 23,770 million lire, the defence expenditure at 5,534 millions represents a proportion of 23.3 %. Other Ministries, however, also have military expenditure, for instance 1,614 millions for the Colonies and 1,794 millions for national education. ("Corriere della Sera" No. 9 of January 10th, "Forze Armate" No. 1176 of January 11th and "Temps" No. 27523 of January 14th, 1937.)

By a Royal Decree amending the estimates of 1936/37 and 1937/38 the following supplementary amounts making a total of 301 million lire were granted to accelerate military armament: 200 million lire as a first instalment for creating an army corps in Libya; 64 million lire to improve the air defence throughout the country; 37 million lire for extraordinary expenditure on technical material and work in connection with national defence.

Strengthening of Italian defensive power. The Grand Council of the Fascist Party decided at its meeting of March 1st, 1937, as a supplement to the four-year plan started in October of last year, upon a further suitable reinforcement of the Italian defensive power, the prolongation for five years of the duties entrusted to the General Commissariat for the manufacture of war material, the complete militarisation of all active forces of the nation between 18 and 55 years with the regular calling-up of annual classes that can be mobilised, and the attainment of a maximum of autarchy for military requirements with the extensive cooperation of science and technical skill, if necessary to the disregard of civil requirements. ("Daily Telegraph" No. 25,508, March 1st, "Forze Armate" No. 1198 and "Corriere della Sera" No. 53, both of March 3rd, 1937.)

Frontier Defence Corps. A law approved by the cabinet on April 13th, 1937 refers to the final organisation of the "Frontier defence corps" mentioned in the army estimates for 1936, which is to guard the defence works on the frontier and in case of emergency to serve as first covering troops. ("Forze Armate" No. 1215, April 14th, 1937.)

The Ministry for the Colonies was converted into a "Ministry for Italian Africa". A special head command was established for North Africa, under whose orders all the forces of the army, navy and airforce stationed in that area are placed. The Commander-in-Chief is the General Governor of Libya. ("Corriere della Sera" No. 87 of April 11th, 1937.)

Italian Naval Policy. In the report on the Navy Estimates for 1937/38 (from July 1st, 1937) submitted to the Chamber on April 6th, amounting to 1,858 million lire, i.e. about 250 millions more than in the previous year, the following statements are made on Italian naval policy: The most important events in recent times in the sphere of naval policy have been (1) the starting of the British naval base at Singapore, (2) the cancellation of the prohibition to fortify certain British, American and Japanese possessions in the western Pacific, and (3) Great Britain's desire for the most favourable possible naval base in the eastern Mediterranean. In view of these events and of the new Italian possessions overseas, attention must be called to the necessity of improving Italy's delicate position in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Italy's naval policy does not aim at a competition in naval armaments, but it must take account of the immense

armaments prepared by the main Naval Powers. Special consideration is required for the development of naval bases and increased protection against air attacks by strengthening the naval air arm and the coast air force.

The Minister of Marine, Admiral Cavagnari, when presenting the new navy estimates in the Chamber, like the Rapporteur, pointed out that Italy was compelled to adapt herself to the armaments of the great Naval Powers. The increase in the estimates would make it possible during the next year to complete certain works which had already been begun in the naval bases of the home country and the colonies, and to take further steps to raise the preparedness for defence of the overseas possessions. A part of the new credits would go to increase the personnel, about 300 units of all kinds. As a proof of the accelerated rate of building in Italy, he stated that the two 7874 ton cruisers "Guiseppe Garibaldi" and "Duca degli Abruzzi" (speed over 35 knots; ten 15.2 cm. and eight 10 cm. guns; four aeroplanes) would be placed in commission in the near future, although they had only been launched a year ago. ("France Militaire" No. 16624 of April 23rd, 1937.)

In the "Corriere della Sera" No. 90 of April 15th, 1937, A. Ginocchietti examines the tasks of the Italian navy after the foundation of the Empire. The author starts with the decision of the Grand Fascist Council of March 1st this year to strengthen the Italian navy. The navy of Imperial Italy, he says, must be capable of protecting the Fascist fatherland wherever it may be necessary. The protection of interests does not merely include the safeguarding of the commercial sea routes. The much greater and most important problem is to create the necessary favourable conditions for the decisive naval battle. The future Italian fleet must therefore be a real battle fleet. In addition to the lighter surface and submarine forces essential for minor warfare, large, rapid, heavily armed and effectively armoured battle cruisers were to be demanded as the main core of the navy, i.e. ships which alone offered the possibility of holding their own under equal conditions against the most powerful adversaries of the enemy fleet. The Naval Powers ranked according to the number of powerful battleships which their navies possessed.

The Rise of the Italian Navy. Varo Varanini, in connection with the formation of a new battleship division from the battleships "Conte di Cavour" and "Giulio Cesare" which after their conversion have again been incorporated in the fleet, referred in "La Sera" ("Il Secolo") of June 11th, 1937 to the vast development of the Italian navy. The new battleship division was, he said, a first step in the development of the programme recently explained in Parliament by the Minister of Marine, Admiral Cavagnari, which aimed at the creation of a high sea fleet which would be ready for battle at all points. The naval manœuvres recently held in the Gulf of Naples had shown what had been achieved after the War: in 1921/22 they had begun with the three flotilla leaders of the "Leone" class (1526 tons) and the 6 torpedo boats of the General class (635 tons). These were followed, under the impulse of the Duce, by seven heavy Washington A cruisers (10,000 tons and 20.3 cm. guns), from "Trento" and "Trieste" in 1923/24 to the "Pola" in 1931. At the same time the twelve flotilla leaders of the Navigatori class (1628 tons and 12 cm. guns) were laid down in 1926/27; since 1927/28 the additions had been in all twelve light B cruisers (5000 to 8000 tons and 15.2 cm. guns), including in the first place the four first cruisers of the Condottieri class of 5000 tons, followed by eight more, namely two each of the "Cadorna", "Montecuccoli", "Duca d'Aosta" and "Garibaldi" types (the latter of 7874 tons). In 1934/35 four further flotilla leaders (1850 tons) were added. In addition the destroyer and submarine flotillas and the number of auxiliary ships were correspondingly increased. In spite of the scrapping of older ships which could not be used, the total tonnage had constantly increased since 1926. A new era of naval construction started with the laying down of the two battleships "Littorio" and "Vittorio Veneto" (begun in 1934: 35,000 tons; 38.1 cm. guns). From 1923 to 1936,

the Italian navy had increased by about 150 new warships with an approximate total of 260,000 tons.

Launching of two Italian 35,000 ton battleships. The battleships "Vittorio Veneto" and "Littorio" were launched on July 25th at Trieste and August 22nd at Genoa respectively. Their main features are: displacement: 35,000 tons; length: 230 metres; speed: 30 knots; armament: nine 38.1 cm., twelve 15.2 cm., twelve 10 cm. anti-aircraft, 20 machine-guns, four aeroplanes. They were laid down on October 28th, 1934. Construction was delayed by the Abyssinian War, and the work was only fully reassumed at the end of 1935, so that the actual period of construction, as the Italian newspapers point out, has hitherto been only 19 months. When the two vessels are completed at the end of 1938 and during 1939 respectively, they will be the strongest in the world. The Italian navy will then possess the following modern vessels: six battleships, namely the two new ones and the four completely modernised older capital ships "Andrea Doria" and "Caio Duilio" (21,555 tons each), "Giulio Cesare" and "Conte di Cavour" (23,622 tons each); seven heavy A cruisers of 10,000 tons; 12 light B cruisers of approximately 5000 to 8000 tons; 15 larger destroyers (reconnaissance) of 1528 and 1628 tons; 44 destroyers of 845 to 1498 tons; 36 torpedo boats; 98 submarines. ("Forze Armate" No. 1254 and 1266 of July 26th and August 23rd, 1937).

In an article on "the Mediterranean problem" in the "Revue des Deux Mondes" of September 1st, 1937, the French naval writer, René La Bruyère describes the formation of a submarine fleet of about 100 submarines as "the sensational result" of Italian naval policy. This programme, he says, clearly shows Italy's determination to create a fleet which is in a position to close the connection between the western and eastern halves of the Mediterranean, especially as Italy is at the same time creating further bases and greatly developing her air force. In about eighteen months Italy will be the only Naval Power to possess entirely modern 35,000 ton battleships, as the French battleships "Richelieu" and "Jean Bart", and the five British battleships begun this year will not be ready by that time. The result for France will be a critical period of Italian naval superiority in the Mediterranean.

Norway

Norwegian Armaments. In connection with a journey of inspection by the Minister of Defence Monsen through northern Norway, various press organs wrote in favour of strengthening armaments. Deputy Colbörnsen (according to a report in "France Militaire" No. 16,710 of August 5th, 1937) urged the Government to raise the military credits to 55 million kr. a year. The estimates for 1937/38 contained 38 millions of defence expenditure, to which is added 7 millions granted on June 14th by the Storting as a first instalment of the 21 millions to be spent in the next three years on strengthening the defence. In the current financial year, therefore, 45 million kr. is available. The proposal of the deputy in question would accordingly mean an increase of 10 million kr. "France Militaire" pointed out that the Norwegian army was only reorganised in the autumn of 1936, the fortifications were improved and air defence was developed. The air force was to be increased in July this year from 64 to 160 aircraft. All these measures were due to the necessity of protecting the country against Russia's aspirations towards extension from the White Sea.

Reorganisation of Norwegian defence. The parliamentary National Defence Committee set up in March decided on April 28th to apply 21 million kr. over a period of three years for strengthening Norwegian defence. The money was to be raised by an increase in taxation on large incomes and by an extraordinary capital tax. The decision was approved by Parliament. The Conservatives had demanded 90 million kr. for armaments ("Temps" No. 27629 of April 30th, 1937).

Norwegian Navy Estimates 1937/38. The navy estimates for 1937/38 (from July 1st, 1937) amount to about 12,710,000 kr.

of ordinary expenditure (as against 11,800,000 in the current year); in addition, there are 700,000 kr. from the Crisis Fund as in the previous year and 1,620,000 kr. in the special estimates of the coast artillery (previously 1,530,000 kr.). Accordingly the total estimates for the navy in the new financial year amount to 15,030,000 kr. as against 14 millions for 1936/37. The increase of 1,030,000 kr., of which 568,580 kr. is in the normal estimates, is partly due to the slight increase in vessels placed in commission. New construction calls for 2,872,000 kr. in the ordinary estimate and the above-mentioned 700,000 kr. in the crisis estimate, making a total of 3,572,000 kr. (as against 3,500,000 kr. in the previous year). This will defray the cost of the continuation of the two torpedo boats "Sleipner" and "Aegir" and the commencement of a further torpedo boat of this class. The new Norwegian total estimates for 1937/38 amount to approximately 522 million kr., i.e. 28,200,000 kr. more than in the previous year. Of this amount national defence calls for 38 million kr. ("Tidskrift for Sövaesen" III. 37, "Temps" No. 27642 of May 14th, 1937.)

Poland

1. *French Defence Loan and Armaments Credits.* The Franco-Polish agreement concluded on September 6th, 1936 during the Paris visit of Marshal Smigly-Rydz and worked out in detail on November 30th, 1936 regarding a loan and credits for the purchase of Polish war material in France and for the erection of arms factories in Poland was approved by the French Chamber on December 29th, 1936 and by the Polish Sejm on January 5th, 1937. Including the former railway loan (of 540 million francs), the loan amounts to a total of 2,600 million francs (approximately 650 million zloty), i.e. 1,350 million francs as a long-term loan payable in cash in four annual instalments for armaments purposes (nearly 337 million zloty), and 1,250 million francs as a military credit, of which four-fifths is to be used for supplies of war material from France and the remainder for erecting arms factories in Poland. ("Times" No. 47546, 47565, 47569 and 47572 of December 1st, 23rd and 30th, 1936 and January 2nd, 1937.) The supply of the first instalment in cash and material, according to the "Times" No. 47575 of January 6th, 1937, began in January.

2. *Four-Year Armaments Plan.* On January 22nd the Cabinet decided upon an armaments plan extending over four years, according to which a total of 1,000 million zloty is to be transferred to the National Defence Fund in the years 1937 to 1940. The amounts will be covered at first from the French loan, and later from internal loans and credits. ("France Militaire" No. 16556, Feb. 2nd, 1937.) M. Kwiatkowski, Minister of Finance and Vice-President of the Cabinet, gave an account of the Four-Year Plan in the Sejm on February 5th. He said the armaments plan formed a part of the programme of public works over a period of four years requiring the total amount of 2,500 million zloty. The original Four-Year Plan of June 1936 (1,800 million zloty) would thereby be considerably extended out of military considerations. It had been decided for military reasons to create a new armaments industrial district in the centre of Poland in the neighbourhood of the town of Sandomierz (Sandomir) on the Vistula, about 180 km. to the south of Warsaw, a district that was well equipped with natural resources (water power, gas, oil). The plant would be completed in about ten years and would take over the industrial works of importance for national defence which were now scattered about, and those situated in an unprotected position near the frontier in Upper Silesia. The programme of public works provided for a first instalment of 800 million zloty for 1937, including 136 millions from the French loan. ("Times", No. 47603, "Daily Telegraph", No. 25490, "Morning Post", No. 51361, all of February 8th, 1937.)

Sweden

Swedish Defence Estimates 1937/38. The defence estimates for 1937/38 (from July 1st, 1937) amount to 170,560,000 kr.,

namely : army 99,480,000 ; navy 45,570,000 ; air force 22,970,000 ; joint expenditure (Ministry etc.) 2,540,000. In comparison with the current year, the new estimates require almost 500,000 kr. more ; but on considering a refund from pay deductions for pensions which occurs in the new estimates for the first time, the actual increase in expenditure is more than 1,500,000 kr. The surpassing of the normal budget of 148 million kr. established by the Defence Ordinance of 1936 by the amount of 22,500,000 kr. is due, accordingly to the "Ny Militär Tidskrift" of January 1937, to allowances for increased cost of living, the higher cost of materials for the army and coast artillery in the years 1936-37 to 1938/39 and increases in prices since last year. Of the 79,500,000 kr. provided in the ten-year armaments plan for the improvement of army and air material, of which 50 millions is to be allotted to the first three years 1936/37 to 1938/39 and the remaining 29,500,000 kr. to the ten years from 1936/37, 17 millions and 7,750,000 are included in the new estimates, the latter amount mainly for air material, making a total of 24,750,000 kr. (as against 17,000,000 and 5,850,000, making a total of 22,850,000 in the previous year). The increase in personnel planned for 1937 to 1940 is already taken into account in next year's estimates to the extent of one-third. The increase comes into force in the army administration and air force on July 1st and in other departments on October 1st. According to the plan, an annual amount of 9,800,000 kr. is provided for aircraft, to which is added a non-recurring amount of 993,000 kr. The changes in organisation, as reported by the "Temps" No. 27,554 of February 14th, 1937, include the appointment of a higher command and the creation of a common Defence Staff for the army, navy and air force.

New Swedish Naval Construction Plan. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Vice-Admiral de Champs, submitted a Memorandum to the Government on the necessary reinforcement of the Swedish navy, its reorganisation and the question of types of ships which had been under discussion for a long time. According to "Tidens Tegn" of September 4th, the "Times" No. 47782 of September 6th and "Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet", IX, 1937, which give extracts from the report to the Swedish Naval Officers' Association by Lieutenant-Captain Ericson, who is on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, the memorandum contains the following proposals : 1. **New Construction.** In amendment and extension of last year's ten-year building plan for 1936/37 to 1945/46, the following are to be built in the five financial years 1938/39 to 1942/43 : 3 armoured cruisers (of 8000 tons, six 21 cm. guns, speed 28 to 30 knots, cost 34,600,000 kr. each, making a total of 103,800,000 kr.) ; 4 torpedo boats (4,300,000 kr. each, total 17,200,000 kr.) ; 3 small submarines for coast defence (2,500,000 each, total 7,500,000 kr.) ; 1 submarine depot ship 3,600,000 kr., 12 torpedo motor boats (together 7,500,000 kr.) ; 2 destroyers of an improved "Ehrenschild" type (about 1000 tons each) instead of the two small destroyers to be built according to previous plans in the years 1941/45 (extra expenditure 4,000,000 kr.). The following are also considered necessary : 500,000 kr. to increase docks and 600,000 kr. for various purposes. The total cost of the supplementary five-year building plan thus amounts to 145,200,000 kr. The "Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet", IX, 1937, estimates the total cost of construction during the five years in question at 185 million kr. 2. **Reorganisation of the navy.** It is proposed to create two fleets, one in the east and one in the west. The Baltic fleet would consist of the existing armoured ships, 2 destroyer flotillas, 1 torpedo boat flotilla and 4 submarine flotillas, while the west coast fleet would have to comprise 1 armoured cruisers, 1 destroyer flotilla, 1 torpedo boat flotilla and some older submarines.

The Memorandum gives the following considerations as grounds for these proposals. The Swedish navy has to fulfil the following main tasks within the total national defence : cooperation in preventing landing attempts by foreign forces, defence of the islands and of the parts of the coast not protected

by the skerries and protection of merchant shipping. As regards the last point a totally new position has arisen by the stationing of strong foreign forces suitable for warfare on the high seas in the Antarctic. The Swedish navy must therefore be better able than in the past not only to operate in the skerries and coastal waters but also on the high seas, and to meet an attack from the east and a threat from the west. The possibility must be counted on that foreign attacking Powers may use their battleships against Sweden.

Soviet Russia

Russian Defence Estimates 1937. According to the "Times", No. 47583 of January 15th, 1937, the new Russian defence estimates for the calendar year 1937 amounting to 20,102 million roubles were adopted by the Central Executive Committee on January 13th. To this sum must be added, as the "Daily Telegraph" No. 25467 of January 12th, 1937 reports, 2000 million roubles included for the first time in the estimates of the new Commissariat for the Armaments Industry, so that the direct armaments expenditure is calculated at 22,102 millions. In comparison with the total State expenditure for 1937 which, according to the above-mentioned issue of the "Times", amounts to 97,700 million roubles, the percentage would be about 22.6 %. As the "Daily Telegraph" No. 25463 of January 7th, 1937 points out, however, this figure is not comparable with the percentages of defence expenditure in other countries ; for the Russian Estimates include considerable amounts (according to the experience in previous years more than a quarter of the total) which according to general budgetary ideas are not usually regarded as State expenditure. Mention may be made, for instance, of the State subsidies for Russian socialised economy. In addition, the estimates of other Ministries in many cases contain items which serve military purposes. After taking these considerations into account, the above-mentioned percentage of 22.6 % representing the ratio of military expenditure to the total State expenditure should be increased to 30 or 35 %. The increase in this year's Russian defence estimates as compared with the previous year amounts to 7,286 million roubles (22,102 millions less 14,816 millions) or 49.2 %. When compared with the year 1932, in which the Russian defence estimates amounted to 1,279 millions, they will be found to have increased 17 times.

As an explanation of the gigantic increase in the Russian armaments expenditure, the Commissary of Finance Grinko gave as one reason the news that the Russian defence treasury must in future pay the general prices for supplies obtained in the country, while the War Commissariat had hitherto been charged very low special prices. But, according to the "Nation Belge" No. 13 of January 13th, 1937, he added that the increase in expenditure was mainly due to the measures decided upon last year for a general increase in Russian armaments : inter alia, the doubling of the effectives of the army (from 1,500,000 to 3 millions), the strengthening of the air force and the development of the navy.

Russia's naval plans. "France Militaire" No. 16632 of May 3rd, 1937 gives details taken from reports in the "New York Herald Tribune" (Paris Edition) and the "Daily Herald" regarding the great Russian naval plans announced by Admiral Orlov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian naval forces, at the Soviet Congress in November last year. According to these plans, Russia intends as from the present year to lay down in the first place two battleships of 35,000 tons and ten cruisers. During the naval negotiations which took place a short time ago in London the Russian Government was granted by England naval equality with Germany and it now desires the recognition of naval equality with Japan. Russia at present possesses 130 submarines, though most of them are of the coastal type and not suited for high seas. A considerable number of the submarines are in the Pacific. "France Militaire" recalls the statement by the Japanese Minister of the Interior Suhiyama

that Japan must draw her own conclusions from the great Russian rearmament on land, at sea and in the air, and must also increase her own forces. The Japanese six-year plan, he said, takes account of this requirement.

The "Morning Post" No. 51419 of April 17th, 1937 learns from Washington that the Soviet Union is endeavouring to obtain technical assistance from the United States in developing the navy. Two American shipyards, it states, have received orders for the supply of plans, materials and equipment for a modern battleship to be built in Russia with 40.0 cm. guns. The American Government has, however, not yet given its consent.

According to "France Militaire" No. 16734 of September 2nd, 1937, Russia has ordered several warships from the United States, including three battleships of the latest construction, of 35,000 tons with a main armament of nine 40.6 cm. guns. Reserve tubes are to be supplied for these guns, as Russia is not in a position to manufacture them. The total order will amount to about 175 million dollars. The "Daily Telegraph" No. 25646 of August 10th, 1937 calculates a building period of four years.

The "Daily Telegraph" No. 25506 of February 26th, 1937, also estimated the total number of Russian submarines at the beginning of this year at 130. The danger of the Russian submarines stationed in the Pacific for Japan was, it said, obvious, when it was remembered that Vladivostok was only about 400 sea miles from the west coast of the main Japanese island. The Russian Pacific fleet was increased on an average by one new submarine per month, so that there would be more than 50 Russian submarines there at the end of this year.

Czechoslovakia

Increase in the Czechoslovak Defence Estimates. The "France Militaire" No. 16,705 of July 30th, 1937 reports from the "Lidove Noviny" that next year's Czechoslovak defence estimates for 1938 show an increase of 700 million kr., mainly for increasing the personnel of the army. The ordinary defence estimates, which amounted to 1,360 million kr. in 1937, will thus be increased for 1938 to 2,060 million kr., so that the total defence expenditure of the War Ministry, including the annual amount of 315 millions from the Armaments Fund, will amount to 2,375 million kr.

Reorganisation of the Czechoslovak Army. According to the "France Militaire" No. 16664 of June 11th, 1937, the Czechoslovak army has been redivided. Until 1937 there were 4 district military commands, in Prague (for Bohemia), Brno (Moravia-Silesia), Bratislava (Slovakia) and Kaschau (Sub-Carpathian Russia). Recently, instead of these the following 7 army corps have been created: 1st Army Corps, staff at Prague (comprises a part of Bohemia), 3 infantry divisions; 2nd Army Corps, Königgrätz (remainder of Bohemia), 2 infantry divisions; 3rd Army Corps, Brno (south west of Moravia-Silesia), 1 infantry division; 4th Army Corps, Olmütz (remainder of Moravia-Silesia), 2 infantry divisions; 5th Army Corps, Trentschin (North West Slovakia), 1 infantry division and 1 brigade of mountain infantry; 6th Army Corps, Kaschau (Eastern Slovakia), 2 infantry divisions and 1 infantry brigade; 7th Army Corps, Neusohl (remainder of Slovakia), 2 infantry divisions and 1 brigade of mountain infantry. In all 12 infantry divisions, 2 infantry brigades and 2 mountain brigades. The paper observes that some parts of this reorganisation are possibly not yet to be regarded as final, especially the distribution of the divisions among the army corps. It states that at present each Czechoslovak infantry division has 2 infantry brigades consisting of 2 regiments each. It was observable at the last manoeuvres that certain divisions had only 3 infantry regiments, and it is possible that this organisation may be finally adopted for the Czechoslovak army.

Increase in the Czechoslovak Army Effectives. By means of an addition to the Defence Law, the Czechoslovak Minister of Defence was empowered, with the consent of the Government,

to raise the annual contingent of recruits to an unlimited extent beyond 70,000 men if this appeared necessary in the interest of national defence. Hitherto the Minister of Defence was only entitled under a supplement of May 11th, 1932 to the Defence Law to exceed the limit of 70,000 conscripts originally fixed by at most 5000 men with the consent of the Government. This limitation is now repealed so that there will be a possibility in future of raising the contingent solely by means of a decree within the discretion of the Government. ("France Militaire" No. 16,572 of February 20th, 1937.)

United States

Further increase in the American armaments expenditure for 1937/38. The Budget message sent by President Roosevelt to Congress on January 8th for 1937/38 (from July 1st, 1937), as in previous years shows a considerable increase in the ordinary expenditure for national defence. According to the estimates published in the "Army and Navy Journal" of January 9th, 1937 and the memorandum on the subject, provision is made for 416,486,000 dollars for the army (including the War Department) and 563,996,000 dollars for the Navy; the total defence expenditure, therefore, amounts to 980,482,000 of nearly 1000 million dollars. In the financial year 1936/37 (up to June 30th, 1937), the army estimate adopted by Congress amounted to 388,245,000 dollars and the navy estimate to 529,820,000 dollars, making a total of 918,065,000 dollars; the increase is therefore 62,417,000 dollars. In the financial year 1935/36 the defence estimates amounted to 744,800,000 dollars and in 1934/35 to only 533,600,000 dollars. In comparison with the total estimated State expenditure of 6,158 million dollars for 1937/38, the new defence estimates represent nearly 16 %. The "Morning Post" No. 51,336 of January 9th, 1937 calculates that the sums available next year for military purposes from the fund for providing work amount to about 10,835,000 dollars which would be additional to the above 980,482,000 dollars. (Also the "Times" No. 47,578 of January 9th, 1937.)

The final amount of the new army estimates is 28,241,000 dollars higher for purely military expenditure than the last estimates approved. As regards the regular army, provision is made for an active strength of an average of 12,175 officers and 165,000 men (previously 156,000); the national guard is to consist of 205,000 officers and men (previously 200,000); 25,000 officers of the reserve (out of 95,000) are to practise 14 days (previously 20,000), and 35,000 men are to attend the civil training school for 30 days (previously 31,500). 172,000 scholars and students will receive military training.

The Army Air Arm will be allotted in the new financial year 60,500,000 dollars of direct expenditure within the army estimates, instead of 59,400,000 dollars in the current year, i.e. 1,100,000 dollars more. 449 additional aeroplanes will be provided for the active army and 81 for the National Guard and the organised reserve. In the next two years, a total of 2320 army aeroplanes is to be reached.

Development of the American Army Air Arm. In the Army and Navy Register of September 25th, 1937. Major General Westover, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Air Arm, gives the following table in order to meet unjustified criticism and prove that the amounts granted for the Army Air Arm as compared with the total military expenditure of the War Department has constantly shown a rising percentage in recent years (in round millions of Dollars).

Financial Year	Army Expenditure Total	Army Air Arm, direct and indirect expenditure	Percentage
1933/34	243,33	53,42	21,96
1934/35	273,49	68,37	24,99
1935/36	382,65	85,84	22,43
1936/37	394,10	96,87	24,58
1937/38	393,46	101,85	25,89

In a further table, he shows that the personnel of the Army Air Arm has also constantly increased. The figures are as follows : 1933/34 : 1299 officers and 14,316 men ; 1934/35 : 1303 and 14,720 ; 1935/36 : 1359 and 15,640 ; 1936/37 : 1408 and 17,286.

Reorganisation of the American Fleet. The proposed reorganisation is intended to give the battle force a maximum of fighting power, to equip the scouting force better for its duties by transferring to it the patrol aircraft squadrons, and to ensure greater striking power by closer tactical connection between the two forces. At the same time all the destroyers are to be combined under a sole command, a measure which has constantly had to be postponed on account of lack of cruisers in the scouting force, thus rendering possible a more regular training. ("Times", No. 47,797 of September 23rd, "Army and Navy Journal", September 25th and October 2nd, 1937.)

Since October 1st, 1937, all the destroyers of the scouting force have been transferred to the battle force, while at the same time the 17 patrol aircraft squadrons which have hitherto belonged to the base force have been transferred to the scouting force. Both the battle force and the scouting force are, as in the past, stationed in the Pacific.

According to the reorganisation plan of the American fleet published in the "Army and Navy Journal" of October 2nd, 1937, the home fleet, after the changes proposed in the financial year 1937/38 (July 1st to June 30th) have been carried out, will be made up as follows : 1. *Battle Force.* a) *Battleships* : 4 divisions with a total of 12 battleships (3 with 40.6 cm. guns and 9 with 35.6 cm. guns). b) *Cruisers* : 2 divisions with a total of 8 light B cruisers (7050 tons) ; a further division is to be added later with 2 new light B cruisers (10,000 tons ; 15.2 cm.) ; making in all 10 light B cruisers. c) *Destroyers* : 2 destroyer flotillas with a total of 7 destroyer squadrons (of 9 destroyers in 2 divisions) and one single division (4 destroyers) which will be extended in 1938/39 to a squadron. Total 67 destroyers. In addition in each flotilla 1 light cruiser as leader. d) *Aircraft carriers* : 1 division with "Saratoga", "Lexington", "Ranger" ; to be added later a second division

with "Yorktown" and "Enterprise" after they are completed. e) *Mine vessels* : 1 mine squadron with 2 divisions, with a total of 9 mine-layers or mine-sweepers. 2. *Scouting Force.* a) *Cruisers* : 4 divisions with a total of 16 heavy A cruisers (10,000 tons, 20.3 cm.). b) *Aircraft carriers and depot ships* : 5 scouting formations (Patrol Wings), inter alia in Coco Colo (Colon) and Pearl Harbour (Hawaii), with aircraft-carrier "Wright", aircraft-carrier "Langley" and a number of small tenders. In addition, 17 patrol aircraft squadrons, 2 each on "Wright", "Langley" and "Thrush" (Norfolk), 3 each on "Owl" (Seattle) and in Coco Colo, 5 in Pearl Harbour. 3. *Submarine fleet.* With the battle force 1 squadron with 2 divisions, making in all 12 submarines ; in New London 8 submarines, in Pearl Harbour 2 divisions with 10 submarines ; total 36 submarines. 4. *Training Squadron* : 3 battleships, "New York", "Texas", "Arkansas" and the battleship "Wyoming" which has been converted into a training ship under the London Agreement of 1930.

The American Navy Estimates for 1938. According to the Army and Navy Journal of April 17th, 1937, the Navy Estimates for 1938 (1937/38, starting July, 1st 1937), after the discussions in both houses of Congress, now amount to 516,258,000 dollars. As compared with the preliminary estimate of the Navy Department of 563,996,000 dollars, therefore, a cut of 47,738,000 dollars has been made. On comparing the above new estimate of about 516 million dollars with the estimate for the current year 1937 (1936/37), the final amount of which was 526,546,000 dollars, it should be borne in mind that the defence estimates for 1936/37, according to the Army and Navy Journal of April 24th, 1937, were cut by 47,881,000 dollars in January this year as the result of an economy by the President in order to reduce the total deficit on the American budget. As these economies are mainly connected with a delay in shipbuilding, the greater part of the sum of 47,881,000 dollars doubtless falls on the Navy, so that the real naval expenditure for 1936/37 is only about 480 million dollars. The estimate for 1937/38, amounting to approximately 516 million dollars, therefore in practice represents a substantial increase over the current year.

Documents

THE THREE-POWER AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

I. GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL OF NOVEMBER 25TH, 1936

The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command ; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist International in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social wellbeing, but is also a menace to the peace of the world ; desirous of cooperating in the defence against Communist subversive activities ; have agreed as follows :

Article I.

The High Contracting States agree to inform one another of the activities of the Communist International, to consult with one another on the necessary preventive measures, and to carry these through in close collaboration.

Article II.

The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities of

the Communist International to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement.

Article III.

The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. It comes into force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for a period of five years. Before the expiry of this period the High Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the further method of their cooperation.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly and properly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Berlin on November 25th, 1936—that is, November 25th of the 11th year of Showa Period.

(Signed) von Ribbentrop, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the German Reich.

(Signed) Mushakoji, Imperial Japanese Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador.

Additional Protocol to the Agreement against the Communist International of November 25th, 1936

On the occasion of the signing to-day of the agreement against the Communist International, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows :

(a) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will work in close collaboration in matters concerning the exchange of information over the activity of the Communist International as well as investigatory and defensive measures against the Communist International.

(b) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will within the framework of the existing laws take severe measures against those who at home or abroad are engaged directly or indirectly in the service of the Communist International or promote its subversive activities.

(c) In order to facilitate the cooperation of the competent authorities provided for in paragraph (a) a permanent committee will be set up. In this committee the further defensive measures necessary for the struggle against the subversive activities of the Communist International will be considered and discussed.

The protocol is also signed by Herr von Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador.

Statement by the German Government on November 25th, 1936

By this agreement concluded between the Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, a light has finally been cast into the thick mists with which the Communist International endeavoured to cover Europe and the whole world.

Two Great Powers have thus united in a strong and firm declaration that they will neither give way nor capitulate before the threats of red anarchy.

This agreement states with complete clearness that it merely relates to defensive action. For it is not the two High Contracting Parties that have challenged the Communist International, but it is the Communist International that has endeavoured to disturb the world to its depths and to hurl it into the most serious and scarcely imaginable confusion by means of an uninterrupted series of provocative acts, attempts at revolutionary risings, anarchistic subversive movements and unscrupulous tendencies of national disintegration.

The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, in defending themselves against these attempts by the means which they think fit, are not only exercising their own right but are carrying out their political and moral duty. For the revolutionary tendencies of the Communist International not only threaten in the most serious manner the entire civilised world but wantonly play with the most sacred possessions of the nations. It is therefore expressly emphasised in the agreement concluded to-day that its aim is to serve the maintenance of internal peace and social well-being, and also of world peace.

In view of the fact that in Article II the High Contracting Parties jointly invite other States whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities of the Communist International to adopt defensive measures or to take part in this agreement, it is made perfectly clear that the agreement is directed against no one, but that its sole aim is to oppose a clear and unmistakable halt to the revolutionary attempts of the Moscow International.

The National Socialist movement from the first day of its existence has most consistently waged the fight against Communism. It has had to sacrifice over four hundred killed and tens of thousands of wounded to the murderous activities of the Communist International. It knows Bolshevism. And it hopes that it is also known to Bolshevism.

Since the Führer assumed power, the National Socialist German Reich has taken upon itself on the widest front this struggle of the National Socialist movement. Both the movement and the Reich have very clearly recognised the acute danger to which the civilised nations are exposed by the Communist International and they have shown the necessary determination and courage to remove it unscrupulously and radically from Germany. The Reich and the nation are now proof against Bolshevism.

The Moscow Red International, for its part, since the assumption of power by the Führer, has left no means untried to regain in other ways the position in Germany which it lost through the victory of National Socialism.

In a wide-spread, infamous world propaganda it is endeavouring to incite the nations of the whole world against Germany; it would be prepared at any time, if it were able, to overthrow National Socialist Germany in a sanguinary war.

These attempts at encirclement have failed all along the line. A strong army now protects the frontiers of our Reich.

The propagandist strangling manoeuvres of the Moscow Red International have, however, been thrown back by Germany with courageous and stubborn tenacity; at our Party Congresses in Nuremberg we have even gone over to the attack on these attempts.

How necessary it was to avert this danger from Germany has received a bloody example and terrible proof in the countless violated Spanish women, the innumerable tortured and tormented children, the murdered families, burning churches and towns laid waste.

Germany has opposed an unsurmountable obstacle to these red subversive intentions.

The most profound practical effect of our consistent struggle against Bolshevism, however, is the agreement concluded to-day between Germany and Japan. Two civilised States thus openly defend themselves against the devilish attempts of the Communist International. They show the world how this danger must be met with complete clearness and firmness.

This agreement is intended to make a valuable contribution to the peace of the world, which is threatened in the most serious manner by the unscrupulous machinations of the Communist International. It makes it perfectly clear that the High Contracting Parties do not desire to provoke, but will no longer allow themselves to be provoked.

The German nation will, however, look forward with calm security to any future developments. The German Government is on guard and will know how to ward off any impending danger with the proper means. An enemy to the Communist International has arisen that knows communism and therefore attacks it effectively.

May other nations learn from this, so that the agreement may really be a beginning in the struggle against the menace to the highest cultural possessions of mankind and therefore in favour of true world peace.

Statement by the Japanese Government, of November 25th, 1936

On the occasion of the signature of the German-Japanese agreement, the Japanese Government made a statement on November 25th, 1936 to the effect that, since the foundation of the Communist International which, with its headquarters in Moscow, aimed at the destruction of the national and social structure of every country, the Comintern in accordance with its principles of world revolution had undertaken actions which profoundly threaten world peace.

At the VIIth Comintern Congress, it was decided to form a united front to combat Fascism and Imperialism, directed mainly against Japan, Germany and Poland. The same applied to the support of communist armies in China to fight against Japan.

A glance at the events in Spain would suffice to convince anyone of the extraordinary importance and of the malevolent influence of the Comintern on the well-being of the nations and on the peace of the world. In particular, the countries which protested to the Soviet Government against the activity of the Communist International during the Comintern Congress should be aware of the harmful effect of that organisation.

Like China, which was exposed to the ravages of the communist armies, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang also suffered from the machinations of the Comintern. In Manchukuo the Comintern had endeavoured by forming district committees to win robber gangs and to use them for their aims. In Japan, where the extreme left for a time lost power after the Manchurian events, the energy of the communist movement was again increased after the VIIth Congress of the Comintern.

The Japanese Government had, it was true, always carried on an unequivocal policy in respect of the Comintern. In view of the increasing danger, however, Japan was now compelled, in order to safeguard her security and to maintain peace in Eastern Asia, to take stronger defensive measures.

As the organisation and activity of the Comintern was international in character, every measure of defence must be taken in international cooperation. Germany had taken firm action against Communism since 1933. Japan and Germany were in a similar position in respect of the Comintern. The Japanese Government had therefore found it necessary to conclude an agreement which represented the first step in defence against Communism.

The agreement related to joint defence against the subversive measures of the Comintern and provided for the exchange of information regarding the activity of the Communist International. Its object was consultation and the execution of defensive measures with the possible inclusion of further Powers.

In conclusion, the Japanese Government refers to the Additional Protocol to the Agreement and expresses its desire that as many States as possible may adhere to the defensive measures against the danger of the Comintern. Lastly it specially points out that there are no other arrangements at the side of this agreement, that Japan has no intention of forming any special international bloc and that the agreement is not directed against any third country.

Statement by Ambassador von Ribbentrop on November 25th, 1936

At the VIIth Comintern Congress, Bolshevism declared war to the death on all order-loving States, and proclaimed as its object the carrying out of the revolution in all States and the foundation of the Bolshevik world dictatorship.

The latest victim of this desire for destruction on the part of the Bolshevik mischief-makers is Spain. That country of old European culture is to-day laid waste by civil war, its towns and villages are everywhere in ruins, and the Spanish nation is subject to afflictions and agonies which are scarcely paralleled in history.

These are the dreadful results of the interference of the Communist International in execution of the decisions taken at the VIIth Comintern Congress. The Comintern had nothing else in mind than to start the "Soviet Republic of Spain" by propaganda and violence, in order to continue from there to undermine Europe. Who is to be the next victim?

Many States, for instance America, have raised the sharpest protest against the decisions of the VIIth Comintern Congress but without result.

Germany and Japan, who are not prepared to tolerate any longer the machinations of communist mischief-makers have now taken action.

The conclusion of the agreement that has been signed to-day by Germany and Japan against the Communist International is an epoch-making event. It is a turning point in the defensive struggle of all nations loving order and civilisation against the forces of subversion.

By the conclusion of this agreement our Führer and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan have carried out an historical act which will only be appreciated to its full extent by coming generations.

To-day a strong defensive front of two nations has been formed, and they are equally determined to bring about the failure of any attempts at interference by the Communist International in their countries.

Japan will never permit the spread of Bolshevism in Eastern Asia. Germany forms the bulwark against this plague in the heart of Europe. Lastly Italy, as the Duce has declared to the world, will hold high the anti-Bolshevist banner in the south.

I am convinced that the countries which are not yet aware of the Bolshevik danger will one day be grateful to our Führer for having recognised clearly and in good time this menace to the world.

The agreement provides for an invitation to other States to take part in this struggle.

We desire and hope that the other civilised States will recognise the necessity of the concentration of all against the work of the Communist International and will adhere to this agreement. In this way it will be possible definitely to ward off this world enemy, to maintain internal and external peace and to save our ancient culture.

Statement by the Japanese Ambassador, Count Mushakoji, on November 25th, 1936

I wish to express my sincere pleasure that the agreement against the Communist International has to-day been concluded between Japan and Germany.

The Communist International, as is generally known, is an international organisation which possesses its cells throughout the world and aims at the subversion and violation of existing States.

As the interference of the Communist International in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but also threatens world peace as a whole, it is natural that every civilised State for reasons of self-maintenance should protect the life and well-being of its own people against this danger. It should be pointed out that there is only one effective means of guarding against this international communist organisation, namely the cooperation of the States.

Japan and Germany, against whom the decision of the VIIth Comintern Congress is specially directed, feel themselves to be the most threatened by the subversive work of the Communist International and are therefore the first to decide to unite against this danger.

I am convinced that the Japanese Empire under the glorious régime of His Majesty the Emperor and New Germany under the heroic leadership of the Führer and Chancellor will, as guarantors of world peace in the East and West, contribute by this step to the pacification on the world.

II. ITALY'S ACCESSION TO THE GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT ON NOVEMBER 6TH, 1937

On November 6th, 1937 a Protocol was signed at the Palazzo Chigi in Rome, by which Italy accedes to the Agreement against the Communist International concluded on November 25th, 1936 between Germany and Japan. The protocol was signed: for Italy by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Galeazzo Ciano; for Germany by the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich, Herr von Ribbentrop; for Japan by the Ambassador Hotta.

Protocol

The Government of the German Reich,
The Italian Government and
The Imperial Japanese Government,

Considering that the Communist International continues constantly to endanger the civilised world in the West and East, disturbs and destroys its peace and order,

Convinced that close cooperation between all States interested in maintaining peace and order can alone diminish and remove this danger,

Considering that Italy, which since the beginning of the Fascist Government has combated this danger with inflexible determination and has eradicated the Communist International in its territory, has decided to take its place against the common enemy side by side with Germany and Japan who for their part are animated by the same desire to guard against the Communist International,

Have agreed as follows, in accordance with Article II of the Agreement against the Communist International concluded on November 25th, 1936 in Berlin between Germany and Japan:

Article I.

Italy accedes to the Agreement against the Communist International together with the Additional Protocol, concluded between Germany and Japan on November 25th, 1936, a copy of which is annexed.

Article II.

The three Powers signing the present Protocol agree that Italy shall be considered as an original signatory of the Agreement and Additional Protocol mentioned in the preceding article, the signature of the present Protocol being equivalent to the signature of the original text of the said Agreement and Additional Protocol.

Article III.

The present Protocol is considered as an integral part of the above-mentioned Agreement and Additional Protocol.

Article IV.

The present Protocol is drawn up in the German, Italian and Japanese languages, each text being regarded as an original. It comes into force on the date of signature.

In faith whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Protocol and thereto attached their seals.

Done in triplicate at Rome, the 6th November 1937—in the XVIth year of the Fascist era, i.e. the 6th November of the 12th year of the Showa period.

Signed. Joachim von Ribbentrop.

Signed. Ciano.

Signed. M. Hotta.

* * *

After the signature of the Protocol, Ambassador von Ribbentrop made the following statement:

"The agreement concluded to-day between Germany, Italy and Japan to guard against communism is an event of historic importance, for by this means a powerful and definite halt is called to the further menace to the world from the Third International."

The subversion of national States by Bolshevik propaganda within as a preparation for armed intervention from without is still the aim of the Comintern. This agreement, which is not directed against any State and is open to others is therefore a guarantee for the free development of the national life of the peoples and a guarantee for world peace."

The Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, said:

"With the signature of the Three-Power Pact, the three Great Powers, Italy, Germany and Japan, combine against the dangers of Bolshevism. The healthy and constructive forces of all civilised countries will be at one with them."

The Three-Power Pact pursues no secret aims. It is not directed against any State and it is open to all States who desire to join with us in joint action. It is an instrument that is placed realistically in the service of peace and of the civilisation which Fascism has maintained and will defend against every danger."

The Japanese Ambassador Hotta made the following statement:

"Italy, Germany and Japan, in signing a protocol, have desired to express their determination to protect themselves against the Communist International which threatens the peace and order of the world. As the three countries belong by their tradition to the oldest nations and by their claims to the youngest and are at the same time the most industrious in their national existence, I have not the slightest doubt that the agreement will have a good influence and will show fruitful results."

Mussolini's Telegram to the Führer

"I thank Your Excellency for the message which you have sent me today and which has given me great pleasure. With the Anti-Communist Pact concluded today, Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany have formed a new bond of community and agreement with each other and with Japan for the joint defence of civilisation and of world peace. I request you to accept my congratulations and my friendly personal greetings. Mussolini."

Telegram from the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, to the Führer

"In the conviction that the protocol signed today by the representatives of Germany, Italy and Japan regarding the accession of Italy to the Anti-Comintern Pact represents a stage in the history of the defensive struggle of our nations against the international danger of communism, I express to Your Excellency my warmest congratulations together with my sincere wishes for the future of the allied German nation."

Telegram from the Führer to Mussolini

"On the day of Italy's accession to the Anti-Comintern Agreement, I cordially greet the Fascist Government as a member of the community of parties to the Agreement. I express my sincere pleasure that Italy is now formally united with Germany and Japan in joint defence against the subversive work of world Bolshevism which threatens their internal peace.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler."

Telegram from the Führer to the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye

"On the day of Italy's accession to the Anti-Comintern Agreement, I desire to express to Your Excellency my own sincere joy that the community of nations which have combined in defence against the subversive work of world Bolshevism which threatens their internal peace, has now been formally increased by a further member.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler."

III. ADOLF HITLER ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BERLIN-ROME-TOKIO AGREEMENT

From the appeal in the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich in remembrance of the events of November 9th, 1923.

"Germany is not isolated. We all can be happily confident that the isolation which we suffered for 15 years is over, and not as a result of say-nothing participation in unimportant assemblages of nations, but as a result of the importance which Germany has created for herself. As a result of this importance we have won new relations which cannot, perhaps, be regarded as fitting into the League of Nations ideology. However, they are suitable for us and for our interests. And they suit the interests of other nations which have entered into these relations with us.

The firmest guarantee for the permanence of such relations is not phrases of one kind or another, but the clear and sensible appreciation of their suitability for their purpose. This suitability has brought together three States. First a European axis and now a great worldpolitical triangle. I am convinced that the effort of our old opponents to spread unrest throughout the world will be made more difficult in the measure in which this triangle fortifies itself. For it consists not of three powerless images but of three States which are prepared and determined to protect decisively their rights and vital interests."

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COLONIES AND RAW MATERIALS⁽¹⁾

The Position of the International Discussion.

I.

The Present-Day Importance of Space and Raw Materials

Speech by General Ritter von Epp, at the Swedish-German Association, Stockholm, October 21st, 1937

From the political point of view, one of the special features of our time is that efforts are considered necessary on every hand to safeguard the peace of the world, and in particular of Europe. In addition to a few scattered actions for laying the foundations of this peace, there are countless theoretical discussions which aim, or appear to aim, at the same object.

One of the predominant themes of this world-wide discussion is the "German colonial question"—an international debate on the German claim to the return of the German colonies and the claim to a definite reparation of the injustice of Versailles.

Why is this particular theme the central point of the public discussion, not only in countries which administer German overseas property in the form of mandates? Why does world public opinion react in this particular case with a flood of proposals for a solution, which, however, for the present only come from unofficial quarters?

How is it that even opinions averse to the return of the colonies to Germany are based on the admission that the issue is a "burning question" and "an important problem"?

The sole reason is that facts cannot be talked away, and that the definite or indefinite feeling of an existing serious disturbance of world equilibrium arising out of the spirit of Versailles results in a conscious or unconscious reaction. It is because conscience is aroused. There is something to justify or defend.

If Germany's colonial demand were merely an arbitrary demand, if it were merely a cover for an unjustified striving after power, world public opinion would not discuss the question as soon as it proved on closer examination to be a mere pretence.

* * *

From the biological point of view, Germany's colonial claim is based on the natural recognition that the possibilities of life of every nation lie primarily in the forces of its territory and secondarily in what the industry and knowledge of its people can draw from the potentialities of the soil. Industry and knowledge are in the long run valueless or of very restricted importance if they lack material for use, just as on the other hand the forces of the territory can only be rightly exploited by the industry and capacity of the people. From the geographical point of view, there is a nation living in the heart of Europe which, despite the greatest possible human effort, the maximum

degree of achievement and the highest capacity, is not in a position to ensure the foundation of its existence from the resources within its territory.

There is a third factor, of psychological nature, due to natural causes, which has proved itself unconditionally and universally in history to be opposed to any permanent peace, namely that peaceful mutual relations and real unity cannot be created or permanently maintained as a result of superfluity obtained on the one side and distress imposed on the other side.

These are the factors around which the international discussion moves, with the desire, consciously or unconsciously, to recognise them or to reject them.

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of Europe has been almost trebled. In an area which accommodated about 180 million people in 1800, there were 450 millions in 1914. The German population rose from about 20 millions in 1800 to 67.8 millions in 1914.

The trebling of the population in an area which remains unchanged is equivalent to a reduction by two-thirds of the potentialities or resources of the territory.

The demand for the return of our soil does not arise from the German desire for conquest, but is a consequence of a vital law of mankind, which acts in a similar manner on other nations according to their position.

In the case of Germany there is in addition her central position. While the great civilised nations of the west are situated round the great centre of Germany, they have almost all free access to the other parts of the globe. Germany has only the narrow passage through the British Channel.

On considering the factor of natural growth, we must bear in mind that the process does not stand still. Its progress changes according to the time, the period and the place. In the case of some nations it is constant, and in the case of healthy nations it is a governing factor. Statesmen must take account of it. It constitutes part of the new ideas.

The lack of resources of the soil could only be made up by the increased capacity of technical inventions and the mechanical industry. It is true that machines replaced enormous numbers of men; but on the other hand—I take the case of Germany—the machine placed the German people in a position to provide work and bread for the surplus population. But this again was

⁽¹⁾ See Nos. 192-206 of May-July 1937.

only possible because the achievements of the mechanical system worked up quantities of raw materials of which only a small part was to be found in German territory. On the other hand it was not possible to dispose within the German frontiers of more than a small part of the products created or refined with the assistance of machinery. The raw materials had to be imported from other parts of the world and the products had to seek a market in other countries.

Such a process and the position to which it gave rise was only possible on the basis of world trade based primarily on the idea of a peaceful course of world policy, respect for private property and for business activity in the world. I shall have something to say later of the manner in which this basis was destroyed.

At the side of this development, Germany, by acquiring her colonies, obtained valuable tracts of land for the future nourishment of her people by the resources of her own territory; she extended the food potential of her territory.

The brief period of economic development work carried out by Germany in her colonies proves the existence of planned German action and displays a development unsurpassed by any colonial Power. Germany did not take the path of violent conquest, or of a policy of exploitation or overcropping. She worked according to a plan. This is proved by the capital investments, the construction of railways, telegraphs and other means of communication, the erection of buildings and cultural and social institutions. The total colonial trade increased eight times in volume from 1898 to 1913. In 1914 the Imperial grant amounted to only about a third of the actual revenue of the colonies and merely served to maintain the protectorate troops and the administration. All the other expenditure, such as the interest on the loans, the financing of traffic constructions etc. was already covered by the colonies themselves. At the beginning of 1914 the German colonies entered the stage of successful economic development.

Germany had laid the foundation for developing to a wide extent within the territories under her sovereignty resources which formed a necessary complement for the maintenance of her surplus population.

Then came the Versailles "Diktat", crude, stupid and mendacious. Germany's colonial territories were placed under foreign sovereignty and utilisation. And Germany was not only deprived of the necessary oversea reserves of space, but also of 13 % of her home space.

The colonial empire which, though comparatively small, was of great importance for Germany's future, came under the exploitation of nations and States which had not the slightest need of further colonial possessions. This is clear from the fact that they could not develop these territories at all because they were too busy elsewhere, but merely drew from them the profit obtainable according to their development at that time. For England and France this profit amounts approximately to a further 5 % to what they already draw from their colonies, and in the case of Belgium about 2.3 %.

It can be objectively proved by figures that our colonies under mandate, as compared with neighbouring territories of the mandatories enjoying the same climatic and other conditions in respect of production, have been promoted to a much less extent in respect of all raw materials and many other economic matters. The export figures (for instance for oil fruits and oil seeds from the Cameroons and Togoland as compared with the Congo and Nigeria) show clearly that the colonies have been more systematically developed than the mandated territories. (The same picture is shown by the export figures of building and other timber of the Cameroons as compared with French Equatorial Africa, and by the exports of cotton from German East Africa as compared with Kenya-Uganda.)

Germany was placed in a position of need by those who were themselves not in that position, so that only about two-thirds of the German population can live on the resources of their own territory, and that the other third can only live if the goods that are lacking are obtained elsewhere.

This is an indisputable fact.

* * *

At the present time a group of statesmen and politicians endeavour to put a construction on these historical and economic facts which aims, by means of artificial combinations and catch-words, at evading the possibly hard recognition of their own mistakes at Versailles and the clamour for revision.

The tactics of our opponents is to point out that the German colonies had a very small share of Germany's trade before the War, and that they are therefore of little importance to Germany at the present time.

The invalidity of such an argument becomes immediately clear when one considers not only the importance of our colonies before the War but the importance which they have gained in the last 25 years as a result of the economic and political methods of those who at present advance these arguments.

The disturbances of normal economic development caused by Versailles entirely reversed the pre-war position. Before the War, Germany had about 12,000 million Dollars invested throughout the world, and was able to use the yield of these investments to buy the raw materials which she required. The dictated Peace deprived Germany of her entire foreign capital. Before the War the raw material markets were completely free. International commercial relations were based on long-term commercial treaties. Since Versailles the opposite tendency has prevailed.

Of what significance is it for the present capacity of Germany's colonies that they did not represent a predominant item in German total trade before the War? Of what significance is this for their importance in view of the economic position created by Versailles?

In order to judge the value of colonies in general and of the German colonial possessions in particular, only the present figures and the present position are of importance.

What are these figures for Germany's colonies?

Taking into account the neglect of economic development by the mandatory administration to which I have already referred, the total exports of raw materials from the German colonial possessions in 1935 amount to about 159 million Marks. Experts working on the basis of exact particulars make the conservative calculation that in 8 or 10 years the exports can be raised to about 500 million Marks. This means that in a comparatively short space of time Germany could cover roughly 12% of her total imports from her colonies. The imports of tropical products in 1935 amounted to 731,720,000 Marks or 15.5 % of the total; the comparison shows that Germany could cover a very great part of her imports of tropical products from her own colonies without expending foreign currency.

Apart from the fact that our colonies have not been administered by us since 1914, figures relating to the present capacity of our colonial possessions are subject to the further consideration that the production cannot be influenced by the German market, and that there is therefore no relation between the increased requirements in the mother country and the colonial capacity of production.

The calculated colonial export of 500 million Marks a year must be considered not only in relation to these figures, but also from the point of view of the increase in value, i.e. the figure obtained by comparing the value of the raw material with the value of the product obtained or refined from the raw material. For instance, if half a kilo of raw cotton costs about 65 Pfennigs, the 10 pairs of stockings made from this quantity cost 10 Marks. Handwork, industry, transport and trade produce many times the value of the original raw material. It is of very special importance that this co-efficient

is usually very high in the case of colonial products. For instance in the case of fuel it is about 2, cotton about 10, raw cocoa about 12 ½. It is extremely favourable in the case of almost all tropical oil seeds etc.

A further increase in the value of raw materials from a country's own colonies is obtained by re-export. Colonial raw materials, after being refined in the home country and re-exported, produce amounts of foreign exchange with which other raw materials can be obtained from other countries.

All these considerations demonstrate the value of one's own raw materials bought in one's own currency, and the importance of one's own economic territory overseas. But they also show the importance to be attached to deprecatory statements about the value of colonies in general.

A statesman (Mr. Eden, on September 20th) recently stated at Geneva that only 3 % of all raw materials come from colonies. In so far as such tactics have not been sufficiently dealt with by the above remarks, it must be pointed out—as was done by the Polish representative on that occasion—that at the present time not 3 % but 9.7 % of all raw materials on the world markets come from the colonies. This figure, moreover, takes no account of future possibilities of development nor of what a productive nation can obtain from the possibilities of space and material in its colonies.

The "Daily Express" of September 22nd gives the following comment from the pen of Lord Beaverbrook, who certainly cannot be charged with pro-German sentiments:

"... In support of his reasoning he said that the colonies only produced 3 % of the raw materials of the world.

That implies a condemnation of his own Government. For the British colonies alone could produce far more raw materials if they were properly developed by the Government..."

A further important contribution to the colonial debate is thought to consist in the objection that in 1912 in East Africa, "Germany's largest, finest, most populated and most valuable colony", there were only about 4000 Germans. This fact is used in an endeavour to make us understand that our colonies, in addition to their economic insignificance, were valueless as settlement territories.

These facts advanced by the other side are just as relevant or irrelevant as the fact that the entire British world empire, with its 443 million inhabitants, is inhabited by an insignificant number of British: the motherland 45 millions, the colonies 11 millions. It would hardly be possible to prove to the inventors of such arguments that the percentage of British in the British world empire amounts to half that of the 4000 Germans to which they refer in East Africa.

People live on the resources of the space which they inhabit—its soil, water and even air—that is what I call the space potential; in this connection the presence of people in one territory or another is of quite secondary importance. Great Britain lives on the resources of its Empire; Belgium feeds its surplus population from the space potential of the Congo, without thinking of sending its unemployed to Central Africa, although there are 266 inhabitants per square kilometre in the mother country, while in the Congo there is only 1 Belgian per 175 square kilometres and per 1000 natives. It is also quite clear that 137 persons per square kilometre cannot live on the resources of Germany's space, whereas in Sweden 15 persons have an approximately equal standard of living per square kilometre of comparatively equal if not better space potential.

The resources of the territory, or the space potential, form the core of the colonial question, as also of the raw material problem and the life of the nations in general.

* * *

For nations that do not possess sufficient resources within the frontiers of their own State, there are three solutions by which they can be extended: the acquisition of colonies, foreign trade, and the production of raw materials from their own soil by chemical and technical means.

The question of extending the territory in the continent of Europe does not come into consideration. Apart from the fact that it is not one of the peaceful solutions, it can, in view of the present position of the population of Europe and the distribution of living space in that continent, hardly lead to a real extension of space. A violent solution of this kind would be entirely based on a fundamental illusion. The frontiers would be changed, but the populations within them would remain the same. This is not the least lesson of Versailles.

The production of raw materials by chemical and technical means and mere foreign trade form only a conditional substitute for colonies, i.e. for the natural space potential. It is conditional on account of the onesidedness of such possibilities, which sooner or later always make the lack of natural resources felt.

It is true that no nation will claim to obtain everything that it needs for its economy from the resources of its own territory. No country alone possesses all the necessary raw materials. That is even true of Russia, of the United States and of the British Empire. But it is undoubtedly true that these countries are in an extremely favourable position in respect of their national supplies of raw materials, infinitely more favourable in any case than the Have-nots, who must consequently use every means of securing the basis of life within their own territory in other ways. This is especially true of a nation that, in comparison with the number, working capacity and standard of living of its population, is poorly equipped with such resources by nature and situation and encounters difficulties in the international exchange of commodities which not only impair its prosperity but may endanger the existence of the masses. No industrial country is in such an inferior position as Germany in this respect, but, in spite of this, very little comprehension is shown for her efforts to improve her position, although economic autarchy is constantly spreading on all sides and, after the experience with Italian sanctions, economic nationalisation has everywhere become a predominant tendency. But in proportion as the systems of autarchy and protection gain ground, the possibilities disappear of making up for the lack of resources by mere foreign trade; the greater the difficulties of obtaining raw materials, the greater are the efforts to produce them by chemical and technical means and the more urgent is the natural demand of the Have-nots for the return of their former colonial possessions which they acquired by peaceful and legal means.

* * *

The above facts call for a final reply to two further pretexts advanced against Germany's demand that the colonial question should be cleared up:

First, that the Have-nots, i.e. Germany, are in front of an "open door", of a "supply of raw materials open equally to all", and secondly that the raw material question is not a colonial question.

The "open door" proves on closer examination to be a carefully closed door. Since 1924 the most important countries of the world market have gone over to extreme protectionism. At the head of them, England by means of the inter-imperial economic system (Ottawa) has secured a very special preferential position on the great raw material markets. England has the least cause of all to speak of the free access of others to raw materials. The Customs preferences granted to a mass of British goods range from 5 to 40 %. Let us take a few examples at random from the long Customs list. Bermudas: import duty on motor cars 30 % ad valorem, for the United Kingdom only 10 %; Sierra Leone: import duty on shirts, boots, shoes, umbrellas 60 %, for the United Kingdom only 20 %; Solomon Islands: import duty on machinery 12 ½ % for the United Kingdom duty-free; Honduras: import duty on nails, nuts, wire, metal fencing 20 % ad valorem, for the United Kingdom 10 %; barbed wire and wire cloth 5 %, for the United Kingdom duty-free; essential and medicinal oils 30 %, for the United Kingdom 15 %; toys and games 25 %, for the United Kingdom 12 ½ %.

British Somaliland : Customs provisions : " Preference duties are the lowest rates charged on goods produced or manufactured in a part of the British Empire or coming therefrom . . . Goods shall not be regarded as manufactured in the British Empire unless at least 25 % or in special cases 50 to 75 % of their value is due to the cost of material grown or produced in a part of the British Empire or to work carried out in a part of the British Empire."

Fiji Islands : Import restrictions and prohibitions : " Colours and dyestuffs which are not the produce or manufacture of the British Empire ; all derivatives of coal tar, commonly known as intermediate products, which are used as dyestuffs . . . or which can be converted into dyestuffs or further worked . . . all oil colours, all vegetable colours and any other synthetic colours . . . "

Nigeria : Import prohibition for all cotton tissues and all kinds of artificial silk.

All these are goods for which Germany is especially dependent on export.

The effects of the restrictions on the acquisition of raw materials have also been passed over in silence in the international discussion. In the British Malay States and in British Nigeria there are discriminatory export duties on tin ore. These British export duties are not the only ones. In French Indo-China the Customs Tariff states : " Products exported from French Indo-China to France or to the French colonies are exempt from any export duty. Products exported to other foreign countries are subject to the export duty tariff."

Shipping between France and the colonies and other French oversea possessions may take place by ships of any flag, " but the transport of colonial products from ports of the colonies to France is reserved for the French flag."

Export duties exist in Italian, Spanish and Portuguese colonies.

From the above extracts from foreign laws and the examples given, it will be seen that, as a result of the most various special provisions, the colonial territories of the European Powers certainly do not present an open door. A glance at the import duties is sufficient to show how threadbare is the statement that the Have-nots only need to have sufficient foreign currency in order to have their share of colonial wealth. In the first place the compulsion of paying in foreign currency is in itself a burden ; in the second place, countries deprived of their former property have no other means of obtaining foreign means of payment than by the sale of goods. Foreign exchange for imports and other payments can only be obtained by exports. For such countries, goods have become the only real means of payment in world economy. But they cannot market their goods on account of prohibitive import duties.

The tremendous preponderance of imports from the colonial Powers into the colonies which they administer as compared with imports from other States is carefully passed over in silence. Imports from France into Morocco represent 43.7 % of the total, from Great Britain to Nigeria 55.2 %, from Belgium to the Congo 43.4 %. The part played by Germany at present as a supplier of the requirements of her colonial territories as compared with the former position is particularly illustrative. Take South West Africa and German East Africa as examples. The place which Germany occupied in the total imports and exports in 1912 has now been taken by the British Empire.

German South West Africa

	1912	1933
Supplying countries	Percentage of total imports	
Germany	81.4	11.1
British Empire	13.2	77.7
Markets	Percentage of total exports	
Germany	83.1	18.5
British Empire	1.1	64.1

German East Africa

Supplying countries	Percentage of total imports	
Germany	51.3	10.2
British Empire	22.5	46.1
Markets	Percentage of total exports	
Germany	56.7	11.8
British Empire	10.8	53.9

The above figures clearly show the predominant part of the British Empire in the total trade of the two mandated territories. Germany's share in her other African colonies shows an even smaller percentage.

But even if payment is made in foreign exchange there is no question at present of equal rights for all, as the political influence of the possessing Powers, even if not openly displayed, may make it quite impossible for potential opponents to obtain certain raw materials.

The alleged " open door " is proved by statistics to be a pure farce.

But there is a further proof.

The same authority that refers Germany to the " open door " and that repeats at every opportunity : " You can buy from us on the same conditions as ourselves ", and expressly adds : " Germany's raw material question is not a colonial question ", recently stated on the same occasion (Mr. Eden's speech at Geneva on September 20th, 1937) that it was prepared " to enter into negotiations with any Governments desiring a reduction of colonial preferences."

The protagonists or such contradictions are refuted in their own country. A memorandum by the British National Union of Manufacturers expresses itself unequivocally against any sacrifice of the Empire preferential system and states that the offer made is not calculated " to satisfy a country whose object it is to regain its lost colonies."

* * *

Such jugglery and attempts at diversion do not change the facts nor the effects of these facts on the life of the German people. They are, moreover, only used in order to maintain the Versailles " Diktat " unchanged in this sphere.

As against this, Germany's demand that the exceptional position should be removed and that her indispensable property should be returned to her rests on a sound basis. It is legally and materially based not only on the principles of the natural right to life, but also on the previous history of the so-called Treaty and its contents.

The claim is not inequitable and not exaggerated. Germany does not desire to take away any of the property of other nations, but she desires the return merely of the part of the overseas territory that belongs to her ; she formerly acquired it in a legal manner and now absolutely requires it for her economic life. The Leader and Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, made this perfectly clear at the last Party Congress at Nuremberg.

I should like to conclude my remarks on space and economy in connection with the colonial question with the reflection that an improvement in the economic position of Germany would help the recovery of world trade. Just as it is impossible in the long run to deprive a highly developed people of 68 millions one-sidedly of their right to live, it is equally impossible to exclude an intensive economic territory in the heart of Europe from the economic process and cultural activity—in short from a world that has become so small. This is contrary to commercial common sense.

From what force is the decision to come in this critical question which is of such importance for the future of Europe ? We in Germany and many thinking people throughout the civilised world count on the forces of common sense which are making constant headway and on the disappearance of the psychosis

arising out of and created for the War. The statesmen and leading politicians will also abandon the idea that nations can arbitrarily or as a punishment be deprived of their necessary living space and that these nations will submit to such a position patiently and unresistingly, just as in another sphere the opinion will also be abandoned that parts of a growing nationality can be torn away and placed under the sovereignty of other foreign nations without permanently endangering peace between the nations. When these old-fashioned ideas have been removed, the remaining fragments of the devastating Versailles "Diktat" will fall, and a new idea will bring about a new settlement of the present intolerable position—an idea that takes account of the right to live and the moral factors of the nations.

I imagine this will take place as follows. Just as the doctrine of human rights, i.e. the rights of the individual, governed the internal politics of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of the vital right of the national individualities will assume a leading

role in the foreign policy of the twentieth century. This will be a logical continuation, for the individual needs the force of his nation in order to protect and satisfy his claim to life.

I even go further and think that the western nations, at any rate of the European continent, which form a cultural community dating back over a thousand years, have every reason to suspend the constant struggle with each other to extend their territory or improve their standard of living, because thereby they seriously jeopardise their predominant position in the world. There are signs of this on the political horizon. The consequence of this view would be that the white nations which have themselves enough living space in the world should not prevent those who do not possess such space from obtaining it wherever it exists in a free and unused state in the world. Colonies today mean a basis of life which is not in direct connection with the mother country. It is of no importance how far the road is to that aim if the other countries do not block the road.

II.

The Treatment of the Raw Material Problem by the League of Nations

A Critical Review of the Report of the Raw Material Committee of September 8th, 1937 and of the Discussion on the Subject in the Eighteenth Assembly of the League

The Raw Material Committee of the League of Nations, the first development of whose work we reviewed in our May/July issue, No. 192/206 (page 87), a special number on the problem of "Colonies and Raw Materials", has published in document A. 27 1937 II.B an examination of complaints and difficulties experienced with regard to the supply and to the acquisition of and payment for, raw materials. Annexed to this publication were 1. a memorandum by Professor Ivar Högbom on the development of world production of raw materials and 2. a memorandum by two members of the Committee on the improvement of regulation schemes.

During the discussion in the Assembly and Second Committee, the representatives in particular of the colonial countries, England and France, spoke in favour of this report. As we observed in our No. 2 of October 15th, the report was subject rather to a political interpretation and stress was laid on the statement in the introduction to the effect that colonial territories only produce three percent of the raw materials of the world; inter alia, this caused Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary to state in the Assembly on September 20th that the raw material problem was not primarily or even essentially a colonial problem; the French delegate M. Faure also used this argument in the Second Committee. We will revert later to the value of these statements.

We may state immediately that, as a result of the inquiry, the report reaches the conclusions (page 30) that certain difficulties in regard to supply exist, but none of them is insuperable. The difficulties in regard to payment vastly transcend in importance those in regard to supply and "the Committee would be failing in its duty if it held out any hope of an easy solution of them". It states further that there is doubtless an inequality in the distribution of raw materials and that certain countries have particularly serious difficulties in supplying their requirements. The report mentions certain measures for alleviating these difficulties, but the only general and permanent solution of the problem of commercial access to raw materials is to be found in a restoration of international exchanges on the widest basis. The formation of such a

solution, which would involve political, financial and economic factors, is, it states, far beyond the competence of the Committee, but, in the interest of a practical result, it suggests that the report should be referred to the Financial and Economic Committees of the League.

It will be seen from these general conclusions, which occupy 25 lines in the report, that the Raw Material Committee showed an amount of caution which, if it were not borne in mind that various influences are always observable in League reports, would almost seem to be exaggerated.

1. *Qualifying Statements.*

Whether this caution is to be regarded as reserve is a matter of opinion. Generally introductions to reports give an opportunity of expressing tendencies which are not always identical with the conclusions, but provide the framework within which the conclusions are shown up. We have already referred to the statement in the introduction regarding the notorious "three percent". The limitation contained in the report on this point is however passed over in silence by those who used this argument. The report says: "It should not, however, be concluded from these figures that the importance of colonies, as sources of raw materials, can be neglected. The importance of a particular material is not indicated by its aggregate weight or value in international trade, but consists in the greater or less degree of indispensability which it possesses for the industry of the consuming countries."

The introduction to the report points out that the raw material problem has two aspects: difficulties of the consumers and difficulties of the producers. In the depth of the depression a few years ago, the question was how to save the producers of raw materials from ruin in view of the heavy drop in prices.

Another statement in the introduction, which may be considered to have a qualifying effect, is to be found on page 9. It is to the effect that public opinion is easily led to suppose that the existence of raw materials in a particular territory means that they are available for economic exploitation. In this connection reference is made to two diagrams in Professor Högbom's memorandum indicating the limits of economic

exploitation. For many forms of raw materials, it states, the potential production, for instance of the interior of Africa, is not always commercially accessible. In some countries, considerations of economic profit may lead them to accept certain burdens in this connection.

In another place—and this may also be considered as a qualifying statement—the introduction opposes the view of a part of public opinion that the raw material problem is purely a colonial problem; there are, it says, only three typical colonial raw materials: palm oil, rubber and copra.

It will be seen from these qualifying remarks in the introduction that, in view of certain political aspirations of have-nots, some conclusions have been picked out and that a preface appears to be more important than the conclusions.

2. *Lack of objectivity.*

Reference may be made to one part of the report which is certainly not governed by objective considerations. According to the terms of reference, under which the Committee had to work in the sense of the Assembly resolution of October 9th, 1936, political interpretation and views were excluded from its work. The introduction states, *inter alia*, that it was not the Committee's function to discuss the distribution of the territories from which raw materials were drawn or the question of restricting raw material supplies in order to discourage aggression. It is therefore surprising that, in the most important place in the report, on page 30, immediately after the conclusions, there should be a declaration by M. Rosenblum which compromises the entire value of the report. This Soviet Russian declaration expressed the view that the Committee had not shown sufficiently clearly how the problem of raw materials was affected by present-day conditions. The difficulties connected with the supply of raw materials were disclosed mainly in the financial distress of certain industrial States which was due mainly to their armaments policy, their ambitions and aggressive acts. Financial assistance for countries lacking in raw materials which was recommended in the report should only be granted if these countries could prove that the credits would not be used for purposes detrimental to the peace of the world. At the present time, the attention of the Assembly should be drawn to the fact that raw materials were being used by certain States for aggressive and warlike purposes.

One wonders what such a declaration, the only one which appears in the report, and that as a conclusion, has to do with the report.

3. *Barriers to the access to raw materials.*

What is the result of the Committee's inquiry into the difficulties experienced with regard to the supply of and payment for raw materials? In the first place, there is an obvious contradiction between the result of the experts' work and the conclusions. This contradiction lies in the fact that it cannot be concluded from the indication of obstacles in the report that there are ways and means of finding a practical solution.

As regards the supply of raw materials, the report makes the following statements:

1. In order to safeguard the supply of food, some countries temporarily prohibit the export of wheat, vegetable oils and other foodstuffs. 2. There are cases where export prohibitions and restrictions have been placed on industrial raw materials with the object of retaining them for the use of domestic industry or of economising the natural resources of a country. 3. Export prohibitions in order to preserve a monopoly. 4. Export prohibitions and restrictions on raw materials with the object, in the case of colonial territories, of preserving for the mother country the right to apply some form of processing to the raw material. 5. It is an essential part of almost all international regulation schemes relating to the supply of raw materials that the export of the regulated commodity is restricted by the Governments of the participating countries. 6. Apart from international regulation

schemes, certain countries attempt to regulate the trade in commodities of which they are either the principal or very important producers.

The report brings out the scope of these prohibitions and states that serious objections can be taken to prohibitions and restrictions which are designed to apply pressure on other countries, to preserve uneconomic industries or to maintain an artificial level of prices, by arbitrarily raising or lowering the supply on the market or by maintaining monopolies.

The report then goes on to discuss export duties, which, it says, are used as a form of restriction on export in order either to reserve raw materials for domestic industry or to protect a domestic processing industry. It then refers to export duties imposed in the mother country and in the colonies for purely revenue purposes. Lastly, it mentions export duties which are discriminatory in character. Different duties, it states, are imposed on export goods to foreign countries, or lower duties are charged on goods exported from a colonial territory to the mother country than on those exported from that territory to other countries.

The finding of the report in this connection seems to us to be remarkable; the Committee has no knowledge of any complaint in sufficiently precise terms to enable it to determine whether any real discrimination is involved.

The report thus gives a formidable list. International conferences have been unable to put an end to these obstacles. Moreover no one has ever had any hope that these duties, prohibitions and restrictions could ever disappear; they are too firmly rooted in the sphere of interest of certain richly endowed States and Empires and form a component part of the economic defence organisation of such countries; it is reserved for League organs to speak of the hope of improving these conditions.

4. *The bar before the "open door".*

In view of the terms of reference received by the Raw Material Committee from the Assembly ("the time has now arrived when discussion of, and enquiry into, the question of equal commercial access for all nations to certain raw materials might usefully be undertaken"), section III of the report deals with questions relating to the development of natural resources—a subject which was described in the interim report as "the régime of concessions".

There are some very just statements in this section, but they are of no practical use because recommendations to which they might lead are sought for in vain.

After pointing out that economic advancement depends to a large degree on a progressive development of natural resources, the report continues:

"But this progress has not been uniform; while some countries command natural resources in excess of their needs; others are less favoured; moreover, in some of these latter the population is still steadily increasing. The Committee has not found it within its competence to discuss population questions as such, nor the question of the adjustment of population to geographical and economic conditions and industrial changes. For countries with rapidly increasing population, however, one solution of the resulting difficulties can be found in industrialisation, especially when international migration is at a standstill. Since, however, this industrialisation can only be built upon a basis of imported raw materials, it is of vital concern to these countries that they should be assured of unrestricted supplies of raw materials and of a market for their increased output.

Such supplies can normally be obtained by purchase from abroad; but, in making payment, some countries encounter difficulties, which are examined in another part of the present report, owing to a shortage of foreign exchange. They would experience less difficulty if they could take part in the development of sources of supply in foreign countries."

Up to this point there can be no objection to the statements of the report, though in accordance with the "terms of refe-

rence" the question of a transfer of sovereignty over such sources of raw materials is not mentioned. But the conclusion that is drawn shows that it is intended to treat the raw material problem only within the general complex of economic questions and independently of them. But, after the above quotation, the report continues: Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the development of new sources of supply requires, in the initial stages, an investment of capital which may, for a considerable period, be unremunerative. Such development, involving at least some expenditure in foreign exchange, may therefore involve a greater demand on financial resources than direct purchase from existing sources of supply. This wise remark might be called naive, if it was not a case of theoretical discussions. For the advantages of direct exploitation and the investment of capital are obvious as compared in the long run with purchase, even if—and there is no question in the report of anything else—such direct development of raw materials takes place on foreign soil. The advantages of one's own methods of work and one's own means of transport and the primary interest of the exploiting party in the direction of rational organisation need merely be borne in mind in order to make up for the apparently cheaper price of direct purchase. Though it is a matter of importance that in the initial stage the investment of capital remains unremunerative for a comparatively lengthy period, that has never prevented any enterprise in the world from taking the risk with a view to future profits. The report or its authors have quite overlooked the fact that risk has always been the main driving force and soul of economic work and individual initiative, and that in any case countries lacking raw materials are less afraid of such a risk than of the constant anxiety that their sources may at any moment be exhausted as a result of innumerable fortuitous circumstances and currents of interests; it may be that the sovereign State has impaired international relations with the foreign exploiting party in a totally different sphere and is applying reprisals, or that the exploiting party who is graciously permitted to extract the resources from the soil of the foreign country is deprived of his rights at the moment when his work has reached the profitable stage. At the same time such a proposal by the League is not only inadequate, but an attempt is even made to frighten countries lacking in raw materials from investing capital for the development of raw materials in foreign countries. If such development work is to function normally in the international interest, after the right of the countries lacking in raw materials has been recognised and after it has even been recommended that they should themselves develop such materials, it can only be a question of transferring territories to the sovereignty of such countries.

In reply to the endeavour of certain members of the Committee to find means for removing the obstacles which, in certain overseas territories rich in raw materials, stand in the way of the establishment of firms and finance undertakings, the report states: "It should be recognised that the Governments of countries which are important suppliers, actual or potential, of raw materials have a responsibility not unreasonably to hamper the development of their raw materials. Their legislation on this subject should not be framed in such a way as to protect their own interests only, but should also take into account the interdependence of all countries."

* * *

The report goes on to state that the position in sovereign countries and that in colonial territories must be discussed separately. It considers that it may be necessary—for economic, social and political reasons—for Governments to reserve certain forms of enterprise entirely to their own nationals and that they should have a right of control over the development of their natural resources by foreigners. Harmful results might follow from a sudden influx of foreign capital or from a mass immigration movement upon the existing organisation of a country. This also applies to colonial territories, where such control

should be exercised by the Governments in order to safeguard the interests of the native populations. The colonial Powers, it states, have frequently stressed these social obligations.

The report then points out that Governments which control colonial territories are in a position to secure special privileges in the colonial territory for nationals of the mother country which may be withheld from other nationals. Experience shows, it states, that even where such privileges do not exist the mother country normally enjoys a predominant position, being favoured by all the links binding them to one another, and especially a common language, long-established commercial and financial relations and cultural affinities. It has been stated, according to the report, that even where there is no formal discrimination, advantages are sometimes secured for the nationals of the mother country by deliberate policy or administrative action. In these circumstances, the Committee recommends a progressive modification of this state of affairs in a more liberal direction; it also recommends that the Governments concerned should be invited to consider the possibility of taking action in this direction. Apart from the question of discrimination, it was pointed out to the Committee that certain countries were anxious to take part in the development of natural resources of colonial territories which were not yet exploited. Some members of the Committee expressed the hope that nationals of countries poor in raw materials of colonial origin might be given direct access to natural resources by means of concessions for which their own capital or labour could be used. They also suggested that the régime of the "open door" which prevailed in the Congo Basin by virtue of the treaties and in territories under A and B mandates should be extended. The next paragraph of the report states that these proposals are not designed to alter the political status of colonial territories or to convert them into mandated territories. Certain members referred, however, to the possibility of an international convention in order to open up direct access to raw materials. Other members, however, pointed out that the Governments controlling such territories could not be invited to assume international obligations which might conflict with their duties to the local inhabitants.

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Our above statement that development under foreign sovereignty offers innumerable disadvantages is proved by the further mountain of obstacles to which the report itself refers. This is clear merely from the desire of the Governments "to reserve certain forms of enterprise entirely to nationals of the country" and also to reserve "the right to exercise a measure of control over the development of their resources by foreigners". This involves discriminatory treatment—a fact which the report does not conceal—and it merely requests the Governments to adopt a more liberal policy. This is slight consolation. Apart from the primary advantages which a sovereign State guarantees to its nationals by all kinds of links, stress is also laid on the privileges for a territory which in practice is only handed over to foreigners if it is of no interest whatever to the nationals, especially if these foreigners by reason of their industry make anything out of the valueless object. Do not these privileges of the sovereign State contain an incitement to what has already been done, in a less legal manner, with the German colonies? At the moment when these colonies reached the stage when they became profitable, the work done by innumerable German farmers with such heavy sacrifice for over twenty years was destroyed and expropriated—destroyed when it meant competition, and expropriated when it gave an easy profit.

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At the end of the part on the subject of complaints and difficulties in respect of the supply of raw materials, the report deals with international schemes for regulating the production and sale of raw materials and the question of monopolies. The

former series of questions, which is clearly separated from the monopolistic form, obviously appears to be favourable in the report. The plans established by the Governments, it states, have generally been an important factor in the improvement in economic conditions in producing countries during the depression. The conclusion to this section points out that every such scheme should make adequate provision for effective representation of consumers and should be subject to the supervision of the Government which could take immediate action in the event of an unreasonable rise of prices or other effects prejudicial to the consumers. This conclusion is no doubt due to the critics who referred to the unjust policy of the formation of stocks in the interest of a price policy as carried out by the cartels, so that it might be concluded that there was no essential difference between these planned regulation systems and monopolies. As regards monopolies, various forms are merely enumerated, and the report draws special attention to natural monopolies for the production of certain raw materials, such as helium gas (United States), jute (India), cinchona bark (Netherlands Indies) and camphor (Japan). It is undeniable, the report states, that such monopolies may give rise to apprehensions in consuming countries, but these fears should not be exaggerated; such monopolies are very rare and the monopoly price cannot rise above a certain level.

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We pointed out at the outset that the report does not consider that all these facts which constitute difficulties for the access to raw material of countries not possessing them are insuperable. But a glance at all these obstacles is sufficient to show their extent. Naturally, if they are considered individually, the conclusion may be reached that a particular obstacle can be removed without great difficulty. But unfortunately each one of these obstacles is in some way bound up with others, and it cannot be expected that international trade will be released in the near future from the fetters of the present compulsory system. If it were possible to reduce these obstacles, the League of Nations in which 61 nations of the world are represented, would have no doubt reached practical results in the interest of its own prestige. But it is a long way from theoretical considerations to practical results. In theory there have frequently been signs of clear understanding since the War. But the unreasonable connection of all international problems and troubles with the "Peace Treaties" of 1919 has shown disastrously hitherto, in spite of the clear understanding of many experts, that the senselessness, the destructiveness and the danger in all matters has relentlessly brought the nations closer to the edge of chaos. If international reason and the wisdom of the experts had placed their seal on the decisions in the practical negotiations of the nations, especially in the economic sphere, we should not have experienced the failure of the London World Economic Conference and the fact that, immediately after that failure, certain colonial Powers developed their preferential systems to a greater extent than ever before.

5. *The Policy of the Open Door and Colonial Equality of Rights.*

The raw material question of today is not new, but it is the raw material question of yesterday. In the last two decades it has not been possible to clear up definitely the economic troubles caused by the War. In the present-day discussion of the raw material problem, it is so easily forgotten that the main claimant of raw materials in the world, Germany, has claims which, at the end of last century, were settled to some extent by the acquisition of colonies after prolonged international discussions. At that time England and France were sensible enough to reach a practical solution of the raw material problem by dividing up the raw material territories, and the treaty details of the Congo Act testify to a far-sighted international economic policy and the international feeling of responsibility towards the natives which

was at that time advanced particularly by Germany. If one considers Germany's industrial development since that time and the increase in the German population, and if on the other hand one considers the loss of the sources of raw material that Germany possessed before the War due to the seizure of the colonies and the loss of territory by the mother country, the present German claim to the possession of raw materials appears with an urgency and a moral justification which cannot be denied. The German foreign investments before the War, amounting to about 25,000 million Marks brought in 1,000 million Marks in interest every year. German services, in particular shipping and the insurance enterprises, gave considerable profits. It was possible to use these receipts for the payment of raw materials and colonial products. The Versailles Treaty deprived Germany of the major portion of her foreign investments. Such a position cannot be met by inadequate desires, recommendations and methods put forward with the intention of preventing a redistribution of raw material territories and limiting the scope of the raw material problem as if it were to be settled by international treaties and the good will of the main owners of raw materials. The first part of the report by the Raw Material Commission of the League of Nations merely shows up to the present that peaceful and reasonable economic relations do not exist in the world and that there are a number of obstacles which give little hope of improvement for the countries that are poor in raw materials. The League experts are well aware that the raw material problem is an export problem for the countries lacking in raw materials, even if their recommendation were followed. But export business is only possible at present by sacrificing prices. If concessions were made to the desire to export, for instance on the part of Germany, resulting possibly in an increase in German exports by means of a reduction of prices thus enabling foreign exchange to be procured for the purchase of raw materials, such a procedure would undoubtedly sooner or later be nullified by a similar policy on the part of foreign countries. Such a procedure would also bring about no change in the fact that the great Colonial Powers would continue to reserve their own industrial products for their exports to their colonies. They would defend with all the means in their power the world markets which they had secured by treaty provisions. A reduction in German export prices would, however, only have an ultimate possibility of success if there still remained open doors in the world, but it would have no success in a world economy that is independent of price laws and is governed by State treaties, customs duties and quotas. There is therefore no guarantee that German export can be increased in this way and that the supply of raw materials can be thus improved.

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In this connection we must deal with an argument that has recently been put forward by a certain neutral press, namely that the return of the German colonies would necessarily lead to changes in the economic structure of the international market in raw materials which would ultimately further restrict German exports and result in an unfavourable balance for Germany.

It is astonishing to find theoretical considerations in which the authors are on the one hand compelled to belittle the present value of the former German colonies in order to be able to state that their return to Germany would be of no avail, and on the other hand to draw the conclusion that a return of these colonies would have an alarming effect on the international raw material market. We are accustomed to these unstable arguments on the part of the opponents of the German colonial claim and it is possible to overlook them. But some criticism is necessary in cases where the simpleminded reader himself begins to believe that the former German colonies are apparently of importance, a belief that is confirmed by official and reliable figures. These reliable figures are, however, then twisted in a most unobjective manner. It is, for instance, pointed out that the German imports of the most important raw materials amounted to so much each,

while the production of the same materials in the former German colonies only covered a small percentage of these imports and would therefore only facilitate the supply of the Third Reich to a very small extent. It is entirely overlooked that the direct connection between the raw material production and the processing industry, i.e. the direct use derived by German national economy from German overseas production, would improve the German position in respect of raw materials because Germany would be enabled, by increasing her economic wealth, to purchase more on the international raw material market. In this process of circulation it is clear to all who regard matters from the economic and not from the political point of view that even a small percentage of certain raw materials represent an improvement of the German balance of payments on account of the work bestowed upon them in order to convert them into finished products, even if the export remains the same in the shape of released capital which had formerly to be used for these raw materials.

For the economic importance of the former German colonies does not lie merely in the supply of raw materials as such. One need only glance at the trade figures of the present mandates in order to realise the direct and indirect advantages with their innumerable ramifications for the mother country.

"Any country that takes the responsibility and bears the expense of administering colonies, or mandates, will inevitably hope to secure the larger share of the trade of these territories, particularly the import trade. And if there are valuable resources to be exploited it is natural that the nationals of the governing State should be the first to be informed of them. If railroads or bridges are to be built, harbours constructed and public buildings erected, the more lucrative contracts are not likely to go to the nationals of other countries." This paragraph is to be found in the authoritative book by the American Mr. Gerig "The Open Door and the Mandates System", to which a member of the Mandates Commission, the Geneva Professor Rappard, wrote the preface. In one chapter, "The Open Door in Practice", Mr. Gerig openly and justly opposed the view taken by a part of public opinion that the mandates had only troubles and burdens and no other interests than those of the native population.

Germany's claim to colonies of her own has also been interpreted as an intention on her part to cut herself off from the world market. Colonies in the possession of Germany, it is said, would be nothing more than an advance contribution to a striving after economic autarchy which would make reasonable commercial relations still more difficult.

This charge may be met by referring to the report of the Raw Material Committee with which we have dealt above and in particular by putting the question: Why are these strivings of colonial empires not in the first place generally established, and why are they not at the same time stated to be a tendency observable in almost all countries? In point of fact, however, such a charge does not hold water in the case of Germany. In so far as the German aspirations are symptoms of economic independence, they relate at the present time exclusively to the safeguarding of the food of the German people; the guiding principles aim solely and unequivocally at the best possible utilisation of German soil, while it is recognised that Germany, even with colonial possessions, would as an industrial country still require large quantities of raw materials for which she would be dependent to a large extent on foreign supplies. Even at the time of the worst boycott and under present international economic conditions, the low level of which, as the Raw Material Committee pointed out, has been caused by a great number of obstacles, Germany has been and is one of the best consumers of raw materials in the world. It would be only just and equitable to testify that this good customer has in practice promoted the resumption of international economic relations in its own interest to the extent of its power. The allegation that there is any danger of Germany cutting herself off in future, if her

former colonies are restored, is a malicious statement which should not be used in discussion especially by those who in the same breath advance the original argument that the former German colonies could not cover Germany's requirements of raw materials.

The same people who express such fears on the other hand, as mentioned above, speak of the "vast changes in the structure" of the international raw material market on the return of the former German colonies. They overlook the entire practical development of such a case. In particular, they forget that these "changes in structure" are not the result of a war. They will in any case not have such catastrophic effects on the present owners as occurred in Germany in 1919 when an international policy aimed at the economic downfall of Germany and that downfall was to be brought about not least by the seizure of colonies which had been legally acquired.

Germany, on the other hand, has a good historical right to make the statement that in her future colonial possessions she will put the principle of the open door into practice to the same extent as others. In our opinion this provides the best assurance that a return of the colonies to Germany would not involve any revolutionary change in the structure of the international raw material market. Germany was a protagonist of the practical application of the principle of the "open door". As one of the greatest consumers of raw materials in the world, Germany will also in future recognise this principle to the same extent as it is followed by other colonial Powers. But there are no grounds in history to question Germany's feeling of responsibility in respect of a just settlement of international economic relations. In the book by Mr. Gerig quoted above, detailed information is given regarding pre-War practice and the practice of the present mandatory Powers, and the German colonial policy of the "open door" is recognised to the full. He writes on page 72/73:

"Germany was the one Great Power which did not win her colonial empire by conquest. The Open Door policy was adopted by Germany at a time when she was protesting against the closed doors of other territories and when she was taking the initiative in promoting the Conference of Berlin for equality of treatment in the Congo. Germany took a new departure in Open Door methods by negotiating with England bilateral reciprocal and unlimited Open Door treaties for their respective territories in Middle Africa and in the Pacific. There is no evidence from trade statistics, tariff schedules, and informed authorities which leads to the conclusion that the Open Door was not practised. The equal economic opportunity for other countries practised by the German colonial administration from 1885 to 1914 stands as a record of which the German nation may well be proud."

From this quotation it is possible to judge on the one hand of the injustice which madly destroyed international economic relations in 1919. But on the other hand it becomes constantly clearer that the same problems formerly came up for discussion, with the sole difference that they were solved without unnecessary hypocrisy on the basis of equal rights. In the solution of the raw material problem, however, the condition of equal rights forms a basis of discussion which has not yet been recognised, as is only too clearly shown by the report of the Raw Material Committee.

6. *Payment for raw materials.*

The question of the payment for raw materials shows the insufficiency of the proposals put forward in the League report, and the report itself states that the difficulties encountered are much greater than those connected with the supply of raw materials. Moreover, the examination of the complaints and difficulties with regard to the acquisition of and payment for raw materials, described in the report gives views which only require to be emphasised.

But here again it must unfortunately be pointed out that the scope of this question is reduced by the fact that in the

first place the hard lot of the countries producing raw materials is described in detail and on the other hand the increase in the demand for raw materials is attributed to the armaments policy of the countries. The report goes into the various conditions affecting the balance of payments of various countries—a position which, after the depression which started in 1929, some countries endeavoured to meet by means of clearing agreements. In most cases, it says, this led to a situation in which foreign exchange transactions became entirely dependent on the clearing system. The report observes :

“Some of the countries concerned may, however, plead that they were forced to adopt exchange control and clearings in consequence of restrictions imposed by other countries on imports ; some have found that, despite the devaluation of their currencies, they were unable to abolish their exchange restrictions.”

It goes on to state :

“Further, though it must be recognised that the United Kingdom tariff has not prevented a very substantial increase in imports to the British market, the abandonment by the United Kingdom of the system of free trade and the introduction of protection have undoubtedly influenced unfavourably the balance of payments of the European countries which in the past depended largely on free entry into that market.

In this connection, it should be mentioned that the great colonial empires and political systems of a comparable character have tended during recent years to strengthen more and more the commercial ties which unite their various constituent parts ; this tendency has necessarily affected the rest of the world, although, generally speaking, these political systems have no exchange restrictions and though their economy cannot be regarded as self-sufficient.

The position varies in different cases. In the British Empire, what principally affects other countries is the system of mutual preferences which prevails in the United Kingdom, the Dominions, India and certain parts of the Colonial Empire. The United States maintains a special Customs regime with her overseas territories, the Philippines and Cuba and, apart from this, introduced a particularly high Customs tariff at the beginning of the depression. Again, France, Portugal and Japan are all united with their overseas territories by systems of mutual preferences and, in some cases, by a form of Customs union which, of course, represents a much closer network of commercial relations than a preferential system.

Any preferential system must tend to have some adverse effect in the countries to which it does not apply. The development of preferential systems does not accord with present efforts to mitigate restrictions on international trade, and, in certain cases, it may cause indirect difficulties for countries requiring raw materials.”

The report then draws attention to the effects of the cessation of capital movements, which led to the financial crisis of 1931, and to the almost complete disappearance of international credit which brought about changes in the trend of trade. The disequilibrium between the different national economic systems, which it ascribes partly to monetary depreciations, contributed to preserving and reinforcing Customs barriers and quotas. The Committee considers that the solution of the present difficulties in regard to the payment for raw materials requires concerted action to restore freer circulation of capital, goods and labour, and that any progress in this direction should help to meet certain countries' complaints in regard to payments for raw materials. Such action could, however, only be effective :

“(a) If the countries which at present restrict foreign exchange transactions find means to modify their financial and economic policies so as to re-establish confidence and if they succeed in re-establishing the free negotiability of their currencies ;

(b) If measures can be taken which will protect the countries which have imposed foreign-exchange control, and now desire to abolish this system, against the very dangers in which it had

its origin, and which they have reason to fear might again arise if it were abolished ;

(c) If the impediments to trade—such as high or preferential tariffs, quotas, clearings, etc.—can be diminished so as to give the debtor countries the possibility of meeting their obligations ;

(d) And, lastly, if there is a movement towards an international standard which will facilitate the settlement of the balances arising from mutual exchanges between nations, a matter which to-day presents so many complications.”

In this connection, the Committee suggested that practical remedies might be sought, particularly in the following directions :

“(a) The Committee would welcome every effort to abolish clearings. For this purpose, it would be necessary to study in detail the possibilities of financing commercial transactions concluded under the present systems, in order to remove difficulties due to the fact that these systems have to a great extent eliminated credit operations which were previously normal.

The purpose of these suggestions is to facilitate the acquisition of raw materials through the operation of credit, and, in the same connection, it has been suggested that the existence of reserve stocks of such materials might also open up the possibility of credit transactions.

(b) Closer co-operation between the central banks might make it possible to meet certain difficulties against which countries are unable to take effective independent action.

(c) Lastly, there is the vital question whether means can be found of granting financial support under suitable conditions to countries subject to exchange control and wishing to abandon it, in such a way that these countries may be protected against the dangers of an initial deficit in their balance of accounts resulting from this abandonment.”

The report goes on to state that an increase in exports would help to bring about internal conditions such as would enable exchange control to be abandoned. In this connection, the report mentions a proposal to the effect that the scope of application of the principle of the “open door” should be extended as regards trade to territories found, after examination, to be similar in economic conditions to those to which the principle is already applied, namely the Congo Basin and the A and B mandates.

* * *

On examining the suggestions made in the report regarding the difficulties of payment for raw materials, the impression is unavoidable that, although it mentions the difficulties raised in particular by the colonial Powers by means of their preferential duties and Customs systems, more is on the whole demanded from the countries which have difficulties with their payments than can reasonably be expected of them. The only practicable suggestion is the grant of financial assistance, although such assistance is only designed to remove the protective measures which in particular the countries lacking in foreign exchange are obliged to take. To say the least, such financial assistance is a very complicated matter. For what could be the possible meaning of such financing unless these countries were from the outset given some guarantee of greater export possibilities and of a regular and normal supply of raw materials ? Moreover the entire problem of payment is dependent on phenomena in the world market which will not soon disappear. It must be constantly borne in mind that, for instance, the German efforts to export are frustrated by a series of counter-measures. Germany's industrial competitors have endeavoured in the past and are endeavouring at present to increase their output as much as possible. This competition between the individual industrial countries has become infinitely keener in recent years. Unfortunately the report does not make clear that the devaluation in some countries has had no other meaning than that export goods have been almost given away. But the preferential system of some colonial States has reduced German exports

still more than the general depression, and it is just these conditions that have brought German foreign trade into the rigid track of barter under clearing and compensation agreements. Freely available foreign means of payment, in other words hard cash, are only received in payment for German exports to the extent of scarcely 20 %. The natural structure of German foreign trade, which consisted in using the traditional substantial foreign exchange surpluses in trade with European countries and with the main German markets in order to pay for overseas raw materials, has been unfavourably influenced by the compulsory and protective measures imposed upon Germany. It is quite ridiculous to state with an undertone of reproach that foreign exchange control must be removed because it is one of the greatest evils. The worst effects of exchange control are felt, not by foreign countries, but by the German foreign merchants who, under the pressure of this exchange position, are deprived of free initiative and are subject to restrictions of all kinds. Germany has obviously the greatest interest in being released from these compulsory measures, but it is the present compulsory economic system aggravated by the vast protective measures of the colonial Powers that has brought international trade to such a pass that for some time past there has been a raw material problem even for the League of Nations and that there are countries lacking in raw materials whose future has become a threatening danger, a danger for themselves and for the world.

7. "Is the raw material problem a colonial problem"?

3 % = 10.96 %. The Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, and the French delegate, M. Faure, at this year's Assembly, made the very best political use of the findings of the raw Material Committee. Why so much fuss about a "negligible quantity" of 3 % which the Colonies are only able to supply. The raw material problem is not a colonial problem.

In order to refute these "three percent", we have in the first place examined the statistics used by the Raw Material Committee of the League of Nations. On page 7 of the Committee's report we found the statement that the material in question existed in a few copies in the Library of the League, where it was available for examination. The documents in question are numbered E./M.P./13 a, b, c, and c addendum. We found the participation of the colonies in world production of raw materials in document E./M. P./13 (a), where the percentages for 48 raw materials are given according to countries; these are divided into three groups, i.e. main countries, certain small countries (Palestine, Syria and the Philippines) and colonies. The percentages are calculated on the basis of weight, 100 % being equal to the total world production. On the basis of this table we have worked out in figures what is the truth of these "three percent" which have been used for political ends. To our astonishment, we have reached the conclusion that the material of the League of Nations is in contradiction with the statement in the introduction to the report of raw materials. The figures of the above-mentioned document give a result not of three percent or approximately that percentage, but in exact figures 10.96 %. It is in any case three times the amount. In the following table we have extracted the individual figures for 1935 from this point of view from the League document, so that the reader may observe for himself the curious fact that on the one hand a report by League experts, in its introduction, gives a handle to political exploitation, namely that the share of the colonies in the world production of raw materials is only three percent, while the same report refers to statistics which in fact show 10.96 %.

(The percentage is even greater, because the table in the League document does not include in particular important colonial raw materials, such as palm oil, tungsten, hemp and chrome, which for instance, according to John de Wilde's table in Foreign Politics Reports show the following percentages

Percentage of the World Production of Raw Materials (World Production = 100%) obtained in Great Britain, Germany and all the Colonial Territories in the World.

Table prepared by this Journal according to the material used by the Raw Material Committee of the League, in particular League document E./M.P./13 (a) of June 7th, 1937.

Year 1935

Product	Great Britain incl. Dominions, colonies and Mandates	Germany	All the Colonies in the world	British Colonies without Mandated Territories
Wheat	16,8	3,1	1,3	—
Rye	0,6	16,3	—	—
Rice	33,6	—	10,9	1,0
Barley	10,0	6,7	3,9	0,1
Oats	9,6	7,8	0,2	—
Maize	3,6	—	3,9	0,4
Potatoes	3,3	18,5	0,2	—
Beet sugar	0,7	16,7	—	—
Cane sugar	35,1	—	12,5	6,5
Coffee	1,9	—	8,7	1,3
Tea	34,1	—	22,2	12,3
Cocoa	48,2	—	69,9	51,3
Tobacco	25,9	—	4,1	0,7
Groundnuts	37,3	—	22,8	4,6
Copra	30,4	—	68,2	26,6
Soya beans	—	—	1,8	—
Linseed	14,4	0,5	0,3	—
Cottonseed	29,2	—	3,3	0,7
Olive oil	0,2	—	9,2	0,2
Whale Blubber ...	52,1	—	—	—
Cotton	26,9	—	3,1	1,3
Flax	1,2	1,9	—	—
Jute	97,8	—	—	—
Wool	47,9	1,0	2,7	0,3
Silk, raw	0,2	—	0,3	—
Silk, artificial	13,3	10,9	1,1	—
Fibre	7,2	24,8	—	—
Rubber	58,9	—	93,5	57,3
Pulp wood, mech...	33,8	11,7	3,0	3,0
Pulp wood, chem. .	12,1	10,9	0,4	0,4
Coal	25,0	12,6	0,4	—
Lignite	3,6	78,0	—	0,1
Petroleum	1,8	0,2	3,7	1,0
Iron	26,7	3,1	5,5	2,5
Manganese	19,4	3,1	13,6	12,5
Molybdenum	0,2	—	1,5	—
Copper	27,9	1,8	19,7	12,5
Lead	40,6	4,4	3,6	3,1
Zinc	63,1	9,2	7,0	6,5
Tin	43,5	—	56,7	36,2
Bauxite	8,7	2,4	14,6	8,1
Nickel	85,2	0,4	8,8	0,1
Magnesite	4,9	1,1	—	—
Quicksilver	—	—	—	—
Sulphur	—	—	0,5	—
Pyrites	6,2	3,5	5,7	5,5
Phosphate	11,5	—	38,2	3,3
Basic slag	6,6	41,2	—	—
Total 48 raw materials	—	—	527,0	—

of the colonies in world production : tungsten 25.52 % (including India with 76.90 %); palm oil and palm kernel oil 98.99 %; chrome 34.50 %. The importance of hemp (sisal) is also not shown by the table; the vast areas under sisal in the former German colonies, however, indicates that hemp is also a definitely colonial raw material. It is not clear why these raw materials as such are not also included in the table.)

We do not claim that this calculation is a special revelation. But colonies have more value for one than for another. This is pointed out in the report where, in referring to the three percent it makes the qualifying remark that the importance of a raw material is not indicated by its weight or value in inter-

national "trade. B on the other hand, there can be no excuse for the "three percent" if they are only intended to include production of importance for trade. When the conclusion is drawn in public speeches from the platform of the League of Nations that the raw material problem is not a colonial problem because the share of the colonies in the world production of raw materials only amounts to three percent, this is either a deliberate attempt to deceive public opinion, or lack of responsibility is shown by the failure to use the actual figures which are available to everyone in the above-mentioned League document.

8. Only three "typical" colonial raw materials?

In addition to the "three percent", the introduction to the raw material report unjustly makes a further qualifying remark. On page 10 it states that the raw materials which are typically colonial number only three—viz., palm oil, rubber and copra. Here also, one need only turn to the same League document to prove the inaccuracy of this statement. A glance at our table will suffice. It is in any case true to state that if certain raw materials are produced in the colonies to a greater extent than 10 % of the world production of raw materials, they may justly be regarded as definite colonial raw materials. If this is recognised, we find that according to the League calculation there are 12 products where the percentage is over 10.

There are, however, other calculations which in our opinion are equally reliable and which give a higher percentage of participation. For instance, the above-mentioned table by John de Wilde which we reproduced in our special number 192/206 "Colonies and Raw Materials", page 71, gives the following colonial participation in the world production of raw materials: groundnuts 82.60 % (according to the League calculation only 22.8 %); copra 100 % (in the League table only 68.2 %, although the report states that copra is a 100 % colonial raw material). Soya beans are given in the League table at only 1.8 % while de Wilde calculates 88.2 %. The following differences may also serve as examples: Olive oil, Wilde 17.80 %, League 9.2 %; molybdenum, Wilde 8.28 %, League 1.5 %; magnesium, Wilde 15.19 %, League nil; phosphate, Wilde 54.46 %, League 38.2 %; chrome, Wilde 34.50 %, League nil.

There is therefore every reason to state that if all the raw materials at present produced in the colonies were added together, and if a calculation of the probability of the productive and economic capacity of the colonies had been made, the "three percent propagandists" would have had a less superficial insight into the question and would have remained silent. The statement regarding the three percent is therefore, to put it mildly, an arbitrary play on statistical figures. If the report had examined the percentage represented by the share of certain consuming countries in the colonies, this would have been a useful contribution. It would have shown, for instance, that Germany alone obtains 18 % of her raw materials and food-stuffs from mandated territories and colonies, and this percentage is even increased to 22 when the dominions are included; moreover, this calculation does not take into account the possibilities of development. General Ritter von Epp, in his speech of October 21st at Stockholm, which we reproduce at the beginning of the present number, mentions in this connection a reply by Lord Beaverbrook to Mr. Eden's speech at Geneva. No better reply to that speech could have been given. Moreover, these three percent were disputed even at Geneva; among others, the Polish delegate stated that at the present time not 3 % but 9.7 % of all raw materials in the world came from the colonies.

Juggling with percentages designed to fulfil a political aim can in any case not promote the discussion on this problem. If the discussion were to be continued in this way, League experts might be placed in the most awkward position, for the document in question, which we have used to refute the statement regarding the "three percent", also contains, for instance, the figures

for 1925 and 1929 which show an even greater share of the colonies in the world production of raw materials; these two years might be taken to reach a more normal judgment, because 1925 was a time when the colonies were extensively developed and Customs duties and similar obstacles did not exist to the present extent, while 1929 was a boom period just before the general world depression.

9. Great Britain's wealth.

The above statements are sufficient to prove that the importance of colonies for the supply of raw materials is to be estimated higher even in pure figures. The League discussion, therefore, really evaded matters, in order to safeguard the interest of certain colonial empires. As regards the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, the representative of the greatest colonial empire in the world, who stated during this discussion that the raw material problem was not a colonial problem, it is possible however, to draw attention to British wealth in order to throw a moral light on the value of his statements. The above table is prepared for this special purpose. It gives a comparison between the British Empire and Germany. These figures are taken from the same League document that we have used above; we therefore give them with reservation and merely in order to evade the reproach that we have used German figures.

Of 48 raw materials in the list, the British Empire has 45 and Germany 26. In making this comparison, it must be added that, in the case of almost all the 26 raw materials of which Germany has a percentage in the list, she is dependent on imports, so that the production of these materials is not sufficient for her needs. On the other hand, it may be stated that the British Empire is only dependent on imports or supplied from abroad in three or four cases. Such a comparison may appear to be too simple, but it shows the extreme contrast which exists through the fact that there are rich countries in the world, while others live in a constant, threatening nightmare in dread of the next harvest and even of the anxious question of food for the people for the next few months. These facts are not made any the less by the representatives of rich countries talking at every opportunity of international responsibility and at the same time avoiding difficult questions by trifling and superficial remarks.

10. The value of the former German colonies.

The belittling of the importance of colonies for countries lacking in raw materials and the exclusion of an international discussion on any possible redistribution of colonial territories is still in the interest of certain colonial Powers, although the arguments used against such redistribution are sometimes very naive. It will be remembered that, at the beginning of the discussion on raw materials, there was another percentage which played a similar part to the "three percent" at present made use of by the Raw Material Committee. For there have been constant references until the present time to the statement that, before the War, Germany's trade with her colonies amounted to barely 0.5 % of her total foreign trade. Here again—and it is characteristic of the view taken by colonial Powers who own an Empire consisting of a third of the surface of the globe—it is not realised or there is no desire to realise that modest amounts from colonies have a totally different importance in the case of countries lacking in raw materials. These countries that are rich in raw materials could afford, for instance, to neglect the economic development of the German colonies under mandate for nearly ten years. In spite of this, it is a fact that the natural resources of the former colonies have in recent years shown great prosperity.

The reports submitted in November to the Mandates Commission of the League by the various mandatory Governments have given a striking proof of this. From the two examples of the Cameroons and Togoland, for which territories M. Besson, the repre-

sentative of France, gave information, the facts and the rights and wrongs of the raw material problem may be made obvious to the experts of the Raw Material Committee.

M. Besson stated that the imports of Togoland under French mandate in 1936 amounted to a total of 20,593,500 francs, and in 1937 they had risen to 38,097,000 francs, while the exports amounted in 1936 to 24,818,000 francs and in 1937 to 51,234,000 francs. We have as yet no information regarding the share of the various countries in this trade. But we gave the figures in our "Colonies and Raw Materials" number for the year 1935. In that year the imports were 31,208,000 francs and the exports 34,692,000 francs. The distribution according to countries was as follows:

Supplying countries:

Germany	Fr. 1,728,000
France and colonies	„ 3,518,000
Great Britain	„ 10,556,000
Netherlands	„ 1,439,000
United States	„ 3,162,000
Japan	„ 2,177,000

Sale markets:

Germany	„ 6,635,000
France and colonies	„ 20,442,000
Great Britain	„ 1,977,000
Netherlands	„ 1,364,000
United States	„ 1,992,000

It must be recognised in this connection that trade follows the flag, even in the case of mandated territories. In the case of Togoland under French mandate for the year 1935, Germany was only able to supply a quarter of the value of the goods she bought from that territory; that should also be noted.

M. Besson's figures are also convincing enough against the statement by the Raw Material Committee and its political exploitation on the platform of the League that the raw material problem is not a colonial problem. The exports of palm kernels from Togoland under French mandate rose from 13,133 tons to 21,505 tons, palm oil from 2094 to 3281 tons, copra from 4300 to 5656 tons, coffee from 11 to 162 tons, maize from 3183 to 7807 tons.

M. Besson's figures may be further supplemented by pointing out that in 1935 the exports of cocoa amounted to 11,100 tons and cotton to 1535 tons, to mention only the most important export products.

The mandated territory of Togoland is therefore a colonial raw material territory of the first order. If at the present time such brilliant economic progress is reported by the French authorities, it must be borne in mind that German hard work and German colonising capacity created the foundations and conditions for this success. In the course of sixteen years Germany raised the imports and exports of Togoland from nothing to 10,630,000 marks and 9,140,000 marks respectively in 1913, and the French State Commissioner for Togoland, M. Bonnacarrère said in 1920: "Germany was well on the way towards making Togoland a model colony".

M. Besson's figures for the Cameroons under French mandate show the same features.

The exports of palm kernels rose from 37,000 tons in 1935 to 44,000 tons in 1936, palm oil from 7900 to 10,000 tons, maize from 6 tons to 4000 tons, coffee from 1300 to 2000 tons, bananas from 7700 to 16,000 tons.

The information of the League Secretariat of November 11th does not show that the same territory in 1935 exported 7725 tons of groundnuts, 23,375 tons of cocoa, 77,013 tons of building timber, 19,274 tons of mahogany.

In what direction did this trade go? In 1935 it was distributed according to countries as follows:

Supplying countries:

Germany	Fr. 5,626,000
Belgium	„ 3,657,000
France and colonies	„ 19,473,000
Great Britain	„ 24,935,000
Netherlands	„ 1,686,000
United States	„ 10,549,000

Sale markets:

Germany	Fr. 6,047,000
Belgium	„ 1,306,000
France and colonies	„ 60,770,000
Great Britain	„ 4,853,000
Netherlands	„ 16,221,000
United States	„ 6,583,000

In 1913, Germany's foreign trade with the colony of the Cameroons amounted to: imports 34,620,000 marks and exports 29,150,000 marks. It may therefore also be said of this territory under mandate that German colonising work created the primary conditions for the present economic position which the French representative stated at the end of his report was one of great prosperity.

"It cannot be denied that Germany in many respects transferred her methodical spirit, her orderly qualities and her characteristic discipline to her former colonies and to a great extent promoted the development of the territories now under mandate." In the special number of this Journal, to which we have already referred, we quoted this sentence in connection with the colonial guilt lie and the charge put forward by the French that Germany was incapable of colonising. We repeat this sentence because at this year's Assembly of the League of Nations the Socialist politician, M. Faure, as representative of France, did not reach this objective view of the matter in discussing the raw material problem. The sentence was uttered by his party friend, M. Moutet, the present French Colonial Minister, on August 26th, 1924 in the discussion of the mandatory question at the XXIIInd Inter-Parliamentary Conference at Berne. Such a statement should still be valid for responsible French quarters. It is directly connected with the raw material problem. Germany would certainly not, as she undoubtedly did, have promoted the economic development of her former colonies to the utmost, if she had not bitterly needed the raw materials which they could supply. For Germany her former colonies were raw material territories. For Germany, in any case, the raw material problem has always been a colonial problem. We demonstrated this convincingly and most objectively in our special number. The above examples of Togoland and the Cameroons are only used as examples as they happen to be of present interest and have become known through the reports to the Mandates Commission. These examples do not relate to the most extensive of the former German colonial territories, though they were also formerly among the richest.

The importance of the other German colonies from the point of view of raw materials may be further demonstrated by two more examples, namely former German East Africa and South West Africa, which are at present British mandates.

The foreign trade of East Africa in 1923 amounted to: imports 53,360,000 marks and exports 35,750,000 marks. In 1935 the imports were £2,990,000 and the exports £3,354,000. The main exports in the same year included 5,003 tons of rice, 18,886 tons of coffee, 10,140 tons of cotton and 4,115 tons of copra. It should further be noted that in 1935 German East Africa, as a mandated territory, exported no rubber whatever, whereas in 1912 the export of this commodity amounted to 10,019 tons. The principal countries participated as follows in the foreign trade of the mandated territory:

Supplying countries:

Germany	£317,700
Great Britain	£866,000
Netherlands	£ 44,100
British India	£145,000
Japan	£655,800
Kenya and Uganda	£285,300
United States	£197,700

Sale Markets:

Germany	£250,000
Belgium	£343,300
Great Britain	£710,200
Netherlands	£ 67,000
British India	£320,000
Kenya and Uganda	£787,100
United States	£131,100

The foreign trade of the former German colony of South West Africa amounted in 1913 to 43,420,000 marks of imports and 70,300,000 marks of exports. The export trade of South West Africa as a mandated territory in 1935 was as follows: imports £1,499,000, exports £2,454,000. In 1935 the most important exports were: 128,400 carats of diamonds, 3545.3 tons of vanadium ore, 4900 tons of copper ore, 3010.4 tons of jute, 82.4 tons of lamb skins, 109,200 sheep and goats, 87,100 horned cattle.

The share of the most important countries in the trade of this mandated territory in 1935 was as follows:

Supplying countries:

Germany	£ 191,700
Great Britain	£ 69,300
Union of South Africa	£1,039,700
United States	£ 38,500

Sale Markets:

Germany	£ 326,100
Belgium	£ 81,400
France	£ 63,700
Great Britain	£1,151,000
Union of South Africa	£ 756,700

These two examples of German East Africa and South West Africa clearly show the preponderant commercial advantage which the mandatory Powers obtain from these territories. After such facts, if an attempt is made in any quarter to dispose of the German claim to colonies as a demand for raw materials with the remark that colonies are only a burden and mandates a source of anxiety, this may be regarded as nothing less than hypocrisy. When, in addition, the mandates are constantly advancing in the direction of incorporating the territories more and more in the administrative body of the neighbouring colonies—a tendency again shown in the recent mandate report of the French Government on Togoland—there should be no further discussion as to the value and interest attached by the mandatory Powers to these former German colonies.

The above facts also show very clearly how far removed the Raw Material Committee is from a solution of the problem and how many reservations and qualifications must be made in the report; for the questions to be considered relate to the smallest part of a problem the solution of which is not to be sought in facilities for means of payment, but in the reparation of a political injustice. In a field belonging to others, illegal owners who already own everything are now reaping what those who have no possessions, once wrung with the sweat of their brow from the soil of Africa. The involuntary description in mandatory reports of the riches of these former German colonies will, it is to be hoped, help public opinion to realise the full extent of the injustice formerly done to Germany.

11. To what extent can the German requirements of raw materials be covered by the possession of the former colonies?

The statement that the return of the mandated colonies could have scarcely any influence on Germany's position in respect of foreign exchange and raw materials can be entirely refuted by the export figures of these territories. The following table shows that the exports of the former German colonies in 1936 amounted to over 200 million marks.

Exports of the German Colonies under Mandate in the year 1936				
Raw Materials	Total Exports from the mandated ter- ritories in 1936		Colonial Exports and German Export Requirements	
		Con- verted into Millions of RM.	German Import Surplus in 1936	Calculated Share of the Exports from the Colonies in the Ger- man Import Surplus %
	tons		tons	%
Oil fruits, oil seeds and oils	240,000	35	1,740,500	14
Flax, hemp etc.	84,000	34	196,700	43
Sisal hemp alone	82,000	—	31,400	261
Cocoa	47,000	19	76,200	61
Coffee	20,000	16	155,300	18
Bananas	72,000	16	117,800	61
Hides and Skins	10,000	13	135,500	7
Mineral Phosphate	554,500	12	1,125,200	49
Cotton	14,000	11	310,000	4
Wool and other animal hair	2,000	4	122,000	2
Wood	35,000	2	2,504,900	1
Rubber	2,000	2	81,600	3
Grain (Maize, millet, dari etc.)	22,000	2	394,000	6
Gold, ounces	390,500	33	—	—
Diamonds, carats	188,000	12	—	—
		211		

If the colonies were returned, Germany could therefore count in the near future on a considerable economy of foreign exchange. The value of the raw materials and foodstuffs which, if the colonies were intensively developed, would flow from them to the mother country is estimated at 500 to 600 million RM. according to a conservative calculation made two years ago. In the meantime world prices have considerably risen. On the basis of present prices, the colonies, if properly developed could supply Germany with raw materials and foodstuffs of a value of 600 to 700 million RM. per year.

We showed in detail in our special number that the return of her former colonies would represent a decisive solution of Germany's distress in respect of raw materials. To review the position briefly, it may be said that Germany's great dependence on imports of ores and all tropical raw materials, in particular oil seeds and fibres, might be very considerably mitigated by the production of the German colonies. In the Cameroons, Togoland and German East Africa there is sufficient suitable land to safeguard Germany's supply of the most important fat substances, such as palm oil, palm kernels, groundnuts and soya beans. It is possible to plant rubber in German East Africa and the Cameroons to an extent that might make Germany independent of supplies from other countries. The German requirements of textile raw materials, such as wool, cotton, flax, hemp and jute, can be to a large extent covered in the former German colonies. For instance, the German requirements of cotton can be satisfied to the extent of nearly 40 %. The former German protectorates also give rise to the highest hopes in respect of mining. Many things that seemed utopian before the War, such as the mining of iron ore in Africa, have already become realities in other colonial territories. For instance, the mining of copper, tin and gold offer the best prospects for the future in these territories and there is no doubt of the existence

of light metals and coal. In addition, these former German colonies are capable of supplying large quantities of wood, including in particular ebony. It is important for all European countries to safeguard their supply of wood, as the supplies of European wood for the manufacture of paper and cellulose may only last another twenty years. Lastly, the colonies offer rich possibilities for planting cocoa, coffee, tea, bananas and lemons, commodities which are now indispensable for a modern civilised State. In view of their climatic conditions and soil, the former German colonies would thus represent an extremely important basis of raw materials, if Germany developed them intensively under her own sovereignty.

* * *

There is no doubt that, in view of the obstacles mentioned in the report of the Raw Material Committee and of the insignificant recommendations which the Committee made for a juster distribution of the raw materials of the world, the question of the development of raw material territories by a country with its own means and from the point of view of its own requirements is of much greater significance than the present position of unequal and unjust administration by a few groups of countries, while countries poor in raw materials are more or less dependent on the discretion and good will of the principal owners of raw materials. The League of Nations, in dealing with the raw materials question, has for obvious reasons evaded this fundamental fact, and has entirely left out of account the actual cause which led to the international discussion of this problem.

12. *Raw materials, the growth of the population and armaments.*

During the discussion, a tendency made itself manifest which had nothing whatever to do with the raw material problem. The threadbare argument was taken up that the particular distress of certain countries in respect of raw materials was only due to their present requirements for armaments. We have already referred in this connection to the statement by the Soviet delegate Rosenblum. In the Second Committee of this year's League Assembly, the French delegate, Paul Faure, said: "If raw materials, opportunities of emigration and work for all, and national credits were to be placed at the disposal of all States, they would have to be used in the service of peace, and not for purposes of hegemony and conquest." This is the concluding sentence in a speech by a delegate of France, that is to say, of a colonial Power who allowed a socialist politician to speak to the Assembly on a subject which, to judge by his entire speech, he obviously knew nothing about. The argument that colonies are a burden for the mother country shows that the socialist Faure, who thus defends imperialism, is not informed about this discussion. In addition, he used an

argument that may be attractive for political meetings, but is not in the interest of his country. He said: "The fact of having many children does not, however, confer the right to conquer foreign territories. That is especially the case when the authorities of those countries which complain most of lack of space for their growing population redouble their appeals, their grants, and their subsidies with a view to increasing the birth-rate still more." It is a sad state of affairs when the discussion of great questions involving the fate of the nations is brought down to such a low level on an international platform. It is in any case incomprehensible that a representative of France at Geneva can utter such a sentence on behalf of France, when at the same time the Government of his country is issuing a postage stamp portraying a mother with her child and bearing the inscription: "Pour sauver la race".

The argument "raw materials for armaments" which M. Faure used to the full was however immediately given the right reply in the same meeting. The Norwegian delegate, M. Maseng, quoted a number of figures proving that the raw materials required for armaments represent a very small part of all raw materials and of the necessary foodstuffs. He concluded from these figures that the raw material problem exists independently of the question of armaments.

13. *Concluding Remarks.*

With these remarks we may leave the criticism of the League discussion and the evasive statements of the report by the Raw Material Committee. It endeavoured to show the raw material problem as if the lack of raw materials was rather due to the bad will of those who are at present clamouring for raw materials and as if the cause of the entire evil was to be regarded as the maintenance of legislation on exchange control and the clearing procedure. Nowhere in the report is there any indication that these methods are not the primary causes but the undesired result of an economic situation in countries who have only been placed in such a position of defence by the introduction of preferential systems in the great colonial empires. The path recommended in the raw material report of the League of Nations leads to the ultimate object even less than did the point of departure of this League debate, i.e. the demand put forward at the Assembly of September 1935 by Sir Samuel Hoare for the "guarantee of participation by all nations in the products of the world". The interpretation of this demand as an extension of the policy of the open door and an extension of the mandatory system has also shown that in both cases limits are imposed upon a just and equitable fulfilment of the German claim to colonies.

The raw material problem is a colonial problem, which cannot be solved by means of percentages or in any other way except by the reparation of the injustice of Versailles.

THE BEBLIN MANIFESTATIONS ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT ⁽¹⁾

DNB. Berlin, Nov. 25th. On the occasion of the anniversary of the signature of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement, the Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels and the Japanese Minister of Communications M. Nagai spoke at midday today on all German and Japanese transmitters.

Dr. Goebbels' speech was as follows:

"A year ago the responsible Japanese and German Governments decided to answer the Communist International's declaration of war against culture and tradition, progress and world peace, with an agreement intended to immunise their two peoples against the plague of Bolshevism and to erect a bulwark against the subversive undermining work of the Communist International.

A year is a short time for international agreements. The fact that the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement has nevertheless in this one year attained an importance extending far beyond the frontiers of the two nations is a proof of the necessity of such an agreement and the beneficial effect of joint work. International Bolshevism has now recognised that a dam is erected here against the floods of chaos and anarchy, which can no longer be broken through.

The German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement is by no means one of those empty agreements in which the trouble taken has hardly ever been in a proper relationship to the subsequent result and which have therefore caused serious disappointment to the nations since the War. This agreement is a matter of conviction among the active elements of two young and determined nations, and there can be no clearer proof of the rightness of the way we have chosen and the usefulness of closer cooperation than the fact that the Italian Government has accepted the invitation conveyed in Article 2 of the agreement and has recently acceded to it.

It may also be stated on this first anniversary that inner approval of the agreement is constantly growing in many other countries.

This attitude is all the more comprehensible as there has been in the meantime no lack of evidence that the Communist International is still endeavouring to interfere in the internal affairs of the nations and thus to threaten not only their peace and social well-being but world peace as a whole.

In transmitting my greetings on the anniversary of the Anti-Comintern Agreement to our friend the Japanese nation, on behalf of the entire German people, I combine with it the wish that the joint work within the framework of this agreement, which is not directed against a third State and which serves as a defence of cultural possessions against subversion and menace by the Communist International, may continue to be crowned with success."

The broadcast speech of the Japanese Minister of Communications, M. Nagai, was as follows:

"On the momentous first anniversary of the Japanese-German agreement against the Communist International, I venture to send my sincerest greetings by wireless from distant Japan to our friend the German nation which, like the Japanese nation, is striving to realise the ideal of world peace. Through knowledge of German science, art and literature, I have always felt myself closely connected with the great German people. When at the present time I picture to myself the new German Reich which, after the Great War, has again courageously arisen from great political and economic disorders under the banner of the swastika, together with its Führer, Adolf Hitler, I am filled with sincere admiration. Our nations, which have a great political and high cultural tradition in common are, in spite of all difficulties, constantly striving towards justice and public order. They are animated by the ideal of a State based on morality. The moral national ideologies of our two nations are expressly opposed to the materialistic subversive ideology of Communism, which serves to satisfy

low materialistic interests of mankind and seeks to unite the world on this basis.

The Sino-Japanese conflict is for us a holy struggle, which aims at calling the Nanking Government to account for its anti-Japanese attitude, freeing the Chinese people from the Red danger and safeguarding peace in the Far East.

It is a great joy to us that our friend Italy has recently also acceded to the Anti-Comintern Agreement, thus further strengthening our anti-Communist camp.

The so-called principle of the status quo ante, by which it has hitherto been thought world peace could be preserved, leads today to many contradictions and conflicts and is now on the point of breaking down. The aim of our struggle is to found world peace on the basis of a new order and on a great and just spirit. By strengthening the anti-Communist camp, the axis of which connects Tokio-Berlin with Rome, we are firmly convinced that new and strong foundations will be laid for world peace and therefore also for the well-being of mankind."

* * *

DNB. Berlin, Nov. 25th. The Japanese Ambassador, Count Mushakoji, on the anniversary of the conclusion of the German-Japanese Agreement gave a reception, in the course of which he made the following speech:

"It is a very special occasion that brings us here together. It is the first anniversary of the day which initiated a new era in modern world history.

On November 25th, 1936, Japan and Germany solemnly agreed henceforward to wage a joint struggle against the danger threatening the sound development of their two nations from the false ideology and subversive activity of the Comintern.

It is impossible at present to foresee the world historical importance of this step, to which, as you are aware, Italy recently has wisely acceded. There is now, as the Führer has said, a "triangle" which has taken up the first systematic international defensive struggle against the paralysing, life-destroying poison of the Comintern.

I am very glad to have the opportunity of taking part in this great work, in common with the Germans who will carry out the wise and far-reaching intentions of the highly gifted leader of your Fatherland which he has led to fresh power.

May our agreement be now and for ever a symbol of the good relations between our two countries which, combined in cordial friendship, pursue no other aim in this agreement than the protection of their development in order to make a substantial contribution to the safeguarding of world peace."

Dr. Darre, Reich Minister, replied to the Japanese Ambassador:

"The world political significance of the event of which we are today celebrating the first anniversary, has just been described by you, Mr. Ambassador, in convincing terms. We have also learned with satisfaction of the statement made by the Imperial Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, on the occasion of the anniversary of the signature of the Anti-Comintern Agreement in Tokio.

The extent to which we in Germany are impressed with the importance of the defensive front thus created is proved by the interest with which German public opinion greeted the conclusion of the pact between Germany and Japan and the recent accession of Italy. I do not need to emphasise the fact that the German Government unreservedly abides and will abide by the agreement. This has been sufficiently pointed out by the Führer and Chancellor.

We Germans have sufficiently experienced the disintegrating activity of the Comintern to realise its danger. By this pact we desire to protect ourselves jointly against this menace to our cultural and ideal possessions; it is directed against that menace and not against any country."

(1) See No. 4, 1937.

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THE VERSAILLES LEAGUE OF NATIONS

and

The End of a Mistaken Method

I. Italy's Withdrawal from the League of Nations

After a short sitting of the Grand Fascist Council, at which on Mussolini's proposal the immediate withdrawal of Italy from the League of Nations was approved by acclamation, Mussolini announced the resolution of the Grand Council to break with Geneva to the crowd assembled in the Piazza Venezia shortly after 10 p.m. in the evening of December 11th, 1937.

As in the case of earlier demonstrations in which the Duce had proclaimed to the Italian people and the whole world from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia so many momentous resolutions and decisions, the vast square was once again filled that night with a closely packed gathering of people.

The Secretary-General of the Fascist Party, Starace, first announced the resolution of the Grand Fascist Council, the grounds for which were then set forth by Mussolini in the following speech:

Mussolini's Proclamation of December 11th, 1937

The historical decision which the Grand Council has acclaimed and which you have received with your most enthusiastic shouts could not be longer postponed. We have wished, for long years, to offer to the world a spectacle of unheard-of patience. We had not forgotten, and shall not forget, the opprobrious attempt at economic strangulation of the Italian people perpetrated at Geneva.

But some people had thought that at a certain moment the League of Nations would have made a gesture of dutiful reparation. It has not done so. It has not wished to do so. The good intentions of certain Governments vanish as soon as their delegates come into contact with that destructive environment represented by the Geneva Council of fools, manœuvred by turbid occult forces, enemies of our Italy and of our revolution.

In these circumstances our presence at the door of Geneva could not be tolerated any longer: it wounded our doctrine, our style, and our martial temperament. The hour came when a choice had to be made in the dilemma: either inside or outside. Inside? (A shout

from the crowd of "No!"). Outside? (Another shout from the crowd this time of "Yes!"). So now we shout "Enough!" and turn our backs without regret on the tottering temple where men do not work for peace but prepare for war.

It is simply grotesque to believe, or to profess, that pressure has been brought to bear to determine our attitude; there has been none, nor could there be any. Our comrades of the Berlin and Tokyo axis have, in very truth, shown the most complete discretion.

The exit of Italy from the League of Nations is an event of great historical significance which has attracted the attention of the world, and its consequences cannot yet be completely foreseen. But it does not mean that we shall abandon our fundamental lines of policy, directed towards collaboration and peace. We have, in the past few days, given a conspicuous proof of this by setting the seal of peace in the waters of the Adriatic.

The threatening voices which from time to time arise and which perhaps will again arise from the herds of the great democracies—(loud hoots from the crowd)—leave us completely indifferent. Nothing can be done against a people such as the Italian people, which is capable of any sacrifice whatsoever. We stand armed in the air, on the land, and on the sea, strong and tempered by two victorious wars. But above all we have the heroic spirit of our revolution which no human force in the world will ever be able to bend.

Communication by the Italian Government to announce its withdrawal from the League of Nations

Rome, December 11th, 1937.

Secretariat League of Nations — Geneva.

In consequence of the decisions of the Grand Council of Fascism I hereby inform you that Italy withdraws from the League of Nations on December 11th, 1937 XVI.

Galeazzo Ciano,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome Breaks with Geneva

"For years we have given the world an exhibition of unexampled patience."

No one can dispute the accuracy of this assertion, who has watched the collaboration of Italy on the League of Nations since the existence of the latter, and especially in recent years, and her efforts to make the Geneva institution into a workable instrument of peace, based on political actualities and not on illusions and make-believe. Again and again in the course of these years Mussolini has urged with this object, on the one hand, revision of the dictated Peace Treaties and, on the other hand, reform from top to bottom of the Covenant of the League with which the Peace Treaties are so intimately bound up.

One need only recall the *Resolution of the Grand Fascist Council of April 8th, 1932*, in which a note of warning was sounded—at a time when the Disarmament Conference was still in being, though it was already showing signs of its ultimate petering out—to the effect that the Grand Council reserved the right to review anew the question of the attitude of Italy to the Geneva League. In the summer of 1933 the Four Power Pact was concluded with the object—at any rate in the form originally given to it by Mussolini—of strengthening the main supports of the League building and distributing the weight between them in such a manner as to increase their powers of resistance. It was entirely in accord with the realities of the European position that the four Powers Germany, England, France and Italy should take acute political problems in hand between themselves, and that procedure for the purpose should be proposed of a sufficiently elastic character to cope with all eventualities. Unhappily French policy was able appreciably to nullify the scheme by linking it up with the League machinery. The original and essential idea indicated the direction in which international relations must develop, if progress was to be achieved. It is with the great Powers concerned in any given connection that the ultimate settlement, even of those problems in which a wider circle of States are interested, rests. It was senseless therefore and, in many cases, purely disingenuous to plead constraint of the minor Powers as an argument against this contention of fact. In Geneva, as elsewhere, it is always the attitude of the great Powers which determines the course of negotiations. A concert of the great Powers, organised on elastic lines, in no sense means that other States are compelled to do its bidding. Moreover, when the great Powers are united, union of all the States concerned is as a rule easy of attainment.

The opposition of France was responsible for the breakdown of the Four Power Pact: it was equally responsible for the collapse of the Disarmament Conference.

The withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference as well as from the League on October 14th, 1933 caused the Italian Government once more to subject the whole position of the League to searching review. The result was the famous *Resolution of the Grand Fascist Council of December 6th, 1933*, by which Geneva was faced with the question whether it was prepared to undertake a fundamental reform of the League's organisation, methods and objectives. The main features of the Italian Reform plan were the establishment of a healthy hierarchical principle within the League, the object being (as in the case of the Four Power Pact) to make direct understanding between the great Powers the principle, and to embody the principle in the Covenant. The practical effect of the Reform would have been to restrict the principle of unanimous decision in the Assembly and Council of the League. But the Italian proposals were never elaborated in detail or put into the form of a draft. The developments in the external political situation put any such step increasingly out of the question for Italy.

On March 18th, 1934, when the French reaction to the English, Italian and German proposals for a stabilisation of armaments was on the point of delivering the death-blow to the idea of disarmament, Mussolini again urged reform,

and made the further continuance of Italy in the League conditional on its acceptance. But year followed year, and not the slightest effort was made by Geneva, though more than one South American State also began to advocate reform, and the recognition of the need for it made headway also amongst the neutral countries of Europe. So far as Geneva was concerned, there was not so much as a discussion of past failures—still less, of any positive proposals for the future.

Instead, there followed in September 1934 the admission of the Soviet Union to the League, with all the disruptive Communistic influences that this brought with it, and in the autumn of 1935 the Sanctions War against Rome. The League now came forward as the instrument of the "power-policy" of imperialistic ideas.

On November 18th, 1935, when 52 members of the League led by England resolved to put an "economic stranglehold on the Italian people", the relations between Italy and the League passed for the first time into the stage of serious crisis. On May 12th, 1936 the Italian delegation was ordered by Rome immediately to break off any further participation in the discussions of the Sanctions Committee, and to leave Geneva. Since that moment Italy has ceased to be represented at Geneva. Deeply embittered, Mussolini nevertheless refrained from drawing the ultimate conclusion; and even when (to quote the expression used by the Duce in his Speech of May 2nd, 1936) the white flag of surrender had at last to be hoisted on the battlements of the world sanctions fortress, though he did not spare the comments which the situation indicated, he was still prepared to add that Italy would not leave the League until the League itself made her continued membership impossible. Italian diplomacy continued its endeavours to make an end of the conflict with Geneva and, since England as the Power principally concerned stood behind the League, to come to an understanding with the latter. The so-called Gentleman's Agreement of January 2nd, 1937 in regard to the strained conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean was a step in this direction.

In these negotiations Italy did not at any time demand formal recognition of Italian sovereignty in Abyssinia, or even acknowledgement of the Roman Empire proclaimed in Rome on May 9th, 1936. She would have been quite satisfied with a finding (which was no more than justified by the facts) in the semi-obscurity of a League Committee to the effect that the ex-Negus was no longer the representative of a State with the requisite qualifications for membership.

At the beginning of the Assembly which met in September 1936 the "Temps" wrote (September 24) as follows:

"There would appear to be a tendency in Geneva to forget that the purpose of the League is not to play the part of a Super-State and apply unbending—and, incidentally, ill-defined—rules to every eventuality as it arises, but to work with a consciousness of responsibility for the maintenance and the strengthening of peace. It is not called upon to make difficulties, but to remove such difficulties as exist in a spirit of conciliation. No State, however powerful, can go against facts; nor, for all the authority which it enjoys in virtue of the statutory instruments which gave it being, can the League. In the present instance the facts weigh more heavily than any considerations of a legal or sentimental character. The facts, which no impartial observer can contest, are none other than the conquest of Abyssinia by the Italian arms, the failure of the League's well-intentioned efforts to prevent this consummation, and the absence of any sort of possibility of Fascist Italy renouncing, directly or indirectly, the annexation of the territory in question. If one is not prepared to declare war on the Italian people, and thereby to kindle a conflagration in all the four corners of Europe—which would be an act of the worst insanity—one must put up with the position as it stands. This being so, to allow a delegation of the Negus to take part in the discussions at

Geneva as the representative of an Empire which is no longer either independent or sovereign is tantamount to excluding Italy from participation in the activities of the League.

"It may be that such an eventuality does not specially perturb the representatives of those minor Powers which do not believe themselves to be exposed to the danger of being involved in a new European war. But that is not the attitude of those other Powers which know that active and continuous co-operation by Italy is essential for the organisation of peace, and that, if Italy were to turn her back on Geneva, the whole work of the League and even its existence would be in question... The peoples, whose security depends on a new Pact in Western Europe, will then learn the price they are called upon to pay for the errors of Geneva, and the sacrifices demanded of Europe for the maintenance "jusqu'au bout" of a policy which may square with the Covenant but has long since been outmoded by the facts."

Sensible, but unfortunately fruitless, observations! At the September meeting of the Assembly, though the great Powers had apparently come to an understanding on the above basis, the world witnessed the scandal—how it came about, has not yet been entirely cleared up—of Ras Tafari being expressly admitted by the Credentials Committee to the discussions of the League Assembly. Even so, Italy did not withdraw. Speaking at Milan on November 1st, 1936, Mussolini once more took occasion to define his attitude in relation to the League. He did not mince matters. It was, as it were, a final ultimatum—o rinnovarsi o perire! Reform or ruin! Geneva, he made it clear, must make an end of the illusions and ideologies of Wilson, the make-believe of disarmament, collective security, peace one and indivisible, universality of the League, and equality of its members. "It is extremely difficult for it to reform. So be it! It can be left in peace to die. After all, it is not necessary, in order to pursue a policy of peace, to wander through the lobbies of the League of Nations." But the formation of Geneva delayed and so acted—apart from useless discussions in a Reform Committee set up by the Assembly on October 8th, 1936—as to prevent any progress with this issue, for all its vital importance for the League.

On July 24th, in an article in the "Popolo d'Italia" headed "Reality and Fictions", Mussolini once again arraigned the childish practice of building castles in the air as a means of shutting the eye to realities. In pungent terms he contrasted political affectations and political realities. How many fictions, he wrote, had the post-war period seen pass into oblivion, from the dream of union of all peoples to the vain effort of a vanquished Emperor to maintain under League auspices a shadow existence!

Again in his great Speech in Palermo on August 20th, 1937, delivered on the eve of the Assembly, the Duce sought to build a bridge to Geneva. The much remarked exchange of letters between him and the English Premier Chamberlain had just taken place, on which renewed hopes of improved relations between Italy and England were based. In the Palermo Speech Mussolini once again approached the Geneva Registrars with a request, not for a birth certificate for the new Roman Empire, but only for a certificate of the demise of the former Ethiopian Empire. He warned Geneva not to increase still further the confusion already prevailing in the League by splitting the Members on the Abyssinian issue. But the Assembly issued neither birth nor death certificates. The sterile formalism of Geneva once more prevailed. The Abyssinian issue was not, it was argued, acute for the reason that—mainly as the result of insistent recommendations by the English Foreign Office—no Abyssinian delegation was present, so that the Assembly was spared the necessity of considering whether a no longer existent Abyssinia could really still be regarded as a member of the League. It was of course true that England or France or any other member of the League could have raised the issue; and it is significant of the unsteadiness

and indecision of English policy that the first step towards a solution in the shape of the prevention of the appearance of Ras Tafari or his delegation was not followed by any further action on the part of the United Kingdom. England and France preferred to leave the next step to the minor Powers. But when some of these minor Powers, hoping to rejuvenate the League by inducing Italy to return to Geneva, took steps behind the scenes to clear up the situation, their efforts were once more ineffective. Why this was so, is for the present the secret of those concerned.

Mussolini's warnings and his efforts to meet the League half way were once more thrown to the winds. The hopes aroused by the correspondence with Chamberlain remained unfulfilled. The "protocollary" differences between Rome and Paris became more acute, when Mussolini proceeded to draw the conclusion from the attitude of the Quai d'Orsay in leaving the post of French Ambassador in Rome unfilled for a whole year because of the French unwillingness to give the King of Italy his Imperial title in the speech of reception, and decided himself to withdraw the Italian Ambassador from Paris on October 31st, 1937.

Once again Mussolini, by means of an article in the "Informazione diplomatica" of September 10th, conveyed to London his conviction that England and Italy should delay no longer to discuss the position through the normal diplomatic channel, and come to an arrangement on the issues outstanding, if it was not intended to suggest that there was no serious background to the differences, and the whole thing was a put up job. The only answer was the "No!" with which the Under-Secretary, Lord Cranborne, shortly afterwards replied in the House of Commons, on behalf of his Chief, Mr. Eden, to a question whether His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposed to recognise the King of Italy as de jure Emperor of Abyssinia.

* * *

The enumeration of these facts should suffice to prove the justification of the step taken on December 11th. It was merely a sign either of a weak memory or of scarcely concealed irritation that foreign newspapers expressed their surprise at the time chosen by Mussolini and his abrupt procedure. It was equally little to the point that the same papers regretted this step at the very moment when attempts were being made to clear up the European situation within a reformed League of Nations and a rapprochement had already been begun between the authoritarian and democratic groups. It is the same play with words that we experienced on the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference, when it was stated that disarmament was on the point of being realised.

The only reply to this is that the question of reform has merely increased the list of the opportunities that have been lost by the victorious Powers since the War, upon which were based so many problems that could have been solved by good will on all sides and a true desire for peace.

As regards the efforts made by the papers in question to belittle the Italian step by stating that it was only a formality since Italy had not cooperated at Geneva for one and a half years, or that the withdrawal would only become effective in two years by which time it was hoped that Italy might return, we would merely refer to the fitting remarks by Jacques Bardoux in the "Temps" of December 24th:

"On December 11th the Duce stated that Italy was withdrawing from the League and breaking with the League Council. This gave rise immediately to comments, not all of which came from Geneva, to the effect that this decision was of no importance, in the first place because it had been foreseen for a long time, and in the second place because the withdrawal would only become effective in two years and that this would give more than enough time to restore world peace and to regild the Geneva arms.

According to this version, therefore, the Duce had merely chosen the balcony of the Piazza Venezia, convened the Grand Council at midnight and brought together the blackshirts for the sole purpose of giving a notice of withdrawal which would only come into effect on December 11th, 1939. In order to justify a simple decision, which was calculated to take place at a certain time, he had pilloried the poisonous environment of the Geneva Council which was directed by mischievous and secret forces and had stated that the Italian presence on the threshold of Geneva could no longer be borne as it was contrary to "our views, our mode of life and our martial temperament."

If Count Ciano's telegram had been merely a legal notice of withdrawal, would Hitler's Government on the following 12th of December have issued an official declaration again bringing up the Duce's charges against the instrument of the status of Versailles, 'the beneficiaries of which pulled the wires'; would he, like Mussolini, have pilloried this Geneva policy of collective security 'which has in reality merely led to collective insecurity' and is only 'unreservedly supported by Moscow', and would he have stated that 'the return of Germany to the League of Nations can never again come into consideration'?"

* * *

II. Germany's Definite Alienation from the Geneva League

The German Official Declaration of December 12th, 1937.

The decision of the Fascist Government to declare the departure of Italy from the League of Nations and the highly important statement with which the Duce has justified this decision find full understanding and the warmest sympathy in Germany. For some time past no doubt could have existed as to the fundamental attitude of Italian policy to the League.

The words spoken by Mussolini in the May Field in Berlin about the false gods of Geneva still ring in all our ears. But it is of the greatest importance that the Italian Government have finally clarified the situation by the decision announced yesterday.

The League receives therewith the reward of its political achievements and merit. At no period of its existence has it proved competent to make a useful contribution to the treatment of actual problems of world politics. On the contrary it has exercised only a harmful, even dangerous, influence on the whole political development of the post-War period. Under the protection of alleged ideals it became more and more the instrument of particular wire-pullers of the Versailles order. Instead of guiding international politics along the road of fruitful development through a reasonable balance of the natural forces and needs of the nations, Geneva has principally occupied itself with the elaboration and application of methods for working against such a development.

Italy has left the Geneva League, not in order to abandon her policy of peace and cooperation, but in order the better to carry it out. In this connection, Mussolini referred to the reinforcement of "peace on the Adriatic", which had been further strengthened by the visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister Stoyadinovitch and had removed all the friction which might formerly have threatened peace in this stormy corner of Europe.

As the semi-official "Giornale d'Italia" pointed out on December 18th, no one in Rome, or moreover in Berlin and Tokio, is thinking of forming a bloc, a new League of Nations or any other international association. The distinction between League and anti-League is, it states, now clear, and it is made clearer and extended by Italy's determined gesture. It is definitely established that the cooperation of the Powers represented at Geneva has no longer the right to describe itself as work for world peace. The League of Nations now remains the organ of an Anglo-Franco-Bolshevist group of Powers whose instrument it has become more and more with the object of chloroforming and holding down the aspiring nations. The atmosphere has, it says, been cleared by this development which is further emphasised by the simultaneous withdrawal of Italy from the International Labour Office, the social counterpart of the political Geneva League.

The complete failure of the League is to-day a fact which requires no further proof, and no further discussion. The hopes which, above all, many small nations placed in the League have given way to the realization that the Geneva policy of collective security has in fact led to a collective insecurity. It is only from Moscow that an unqualified testimonial to the Geneva ideals is to be heard to-day. It is a confusion of cause and effect to attribute the shattering of the League to the lack of universality, as is still done here and there. The grounds which compelled first Japan, then Germany, and now also Italy to leave the League are evidence of where the radical mistakes of its construction and of the political tendencies governing it are to be found. It is a hopeless effort to desire to remedy these radical weaknesses through partial reforms.

Whether the Powers remaining at Geneva still desire to make the League a serious factor in their politics is their affair. They have, however, no longer the right to put forward the League as the chosen representation of the world of States and as the highest organ of international cooperation. The Reich Government, in any case, in full agreement with the Italian Government, will not let themselves be moved from the conviction that the political system of Geneva is not only a failure but pernicious. A return of Germany to the League will accordingly never come into consideration again.

III. The Balance Sheet and Result of the Mistaken Formation and Mistaken Development of the League of Nations

The German declaration shows almost more clearly and in greater detail than the Italian the net result of the mistaken development pursued by the League of Nations from the moment of its foundation.

1. Creation of the Versailles League of Nations

The ideal of a League of Peace, for centuries the preoccupation of political thinkers no less than practical statesmen, became during the cruel World War the focus of intense longing on the part of the suffering peoples. The stupendous upheaval of the World War was needed to induce in them the will for co-operation in a legally constituted association designed to render impossible a repetition of such a catastrophe and to eliminate war altogether. But the ideal conception of such an association

which the peoples had in mind was very different from that which was actually brought into being after the issue of the war was decided.

The idea of a League of Nations was taken up and developed by the American President Wilson during the war. His whole programme, his principles for the liquidation of the war and, above all, his Fourteen Points, were the bases and conditions precedent to the realisation of the League of Nations idea. On the subject of the League itself Wilson said little: seven only of his 60 war speeches make any reference to it. But what he did say was of decisive importance for the reason that his principles were accepted by both belligerents by agreement before the Armistice as the basis of the Peace.

In two passages Wilson developed the idea of a League of Nations as part of the "Points" laid down by him as constituting the main lines of the Peace. The Fourteenth Point, as formulated in the great "programme" speech of January 18th, 1919, was as follows:

"A general association of the peoples must be formed on defined contractual terms, so as to ensure to great and small nations alike their political independence and the integrity of their territory."

The Third and Fourth of the five Points laid down in the Speech of September 27th, 1918 were as follows:

"There can be within the League of Nations no particular, self-seeking economic combinations, no economic boycott or exclusion in whatever form, save in so far as powers of economic penalisation by exclusion from the world's markets are entrusted to the League itself as means of correction and enforcement."

"In the common family of the League of Nations there can be no associations, no alliance, nor yet special treaty obligations or agreements."

The above references do not say much; and the President's utterances did not in fact contain any comprehensive picture of the proposed League. They are as defective in this respect as were his principles for a peace based on law as opposed to force. It is not however a fact, as was frequently contended, that the Fourteen Points were so vague as not to afford a sufficiently specific basis for their application as the foundation of the peace negotiations. In a letter dated January 31st, 1920 Colonel House, Wilson's closest associate and confidential agent, protests with emphasis against this suggestion.

It had, he said been stated that many of the Fourteen Points were so indefinite and couched in such general terms that they were really meaningless, and that the Entente might therefore rightly refuse to interpret them as they were meant. This was not true, for every point was discussed before the conclusion of the armistice and the explanations covered many typewritten pages. They had been cabled in advance to the President for his approval. Clemenceau, Orlando, Lloyd George and the others could therefore not say they did not understand the meaning. These explanations lay on the table every day when we discussed the armistice in Paris. They had often asked the meaning of some point or other and he had then read extracts from the approved explanation.

The Wilsonian principles were also taken as the basis for the elaboration and expansion of the League of Nations project. The ideals which the President of the United States held out to a war-weary world may have been no more than a sign-post indicating the road to a genuine League of Nations; but at any rate the belligerents had undertaken to follow that road.

At the Peace Conference in Paris all such principles and considerations were forgotten, as were the bases for the conclusion of Peace to which all had agreed. Wilson sacrificed them all to the stronger will of his Allies. Nor was it merely the stronger will of the Allies that was "en cause". "The subtlest sophisters and most hypocritical draftsmen were set to work, and produced many ingenious exercises which might have deceived for more than an hour a cleverer man than the President." So wrote J. M. Keynes, who represented the British Treasury at the Peace Conference.

When again it is remembered that the draft of the Covenant was evolved in eleven sittings lasting one and a half weeks (from February 3rd to February 13th), it is impossible not to agree with the American delegate, Secretary of State Lansing, when he writes in his well known book on the Versailles negotiations as follows:

"The fact that the work was completed in ten meetings and in a week and a half is sufficient in itself to raise doubts as to the thoroughness with which the work was done and as to the

care with which the various plans and numerous provisions proposed were studied, compared, and discussed. It gives the impression that many clauses were accepted under the pressing necessity of ending the Commission's labors within a fixed time. The document itself bears evidence of the haste with which it was prepared, and it is almost conclusive proof in itself that it was adopted through personal influence rather than because of belief in the wisdom of all its provisions.

To harmonise the conflicting views of the members of the Commission—and it was well known that they were conflicting—and to produce in eleven days a world charter, which would contain the elements of greatness or even of perpetuity, was on the face of it an undertaking impossible of accomplishment."

Wilson had represented the establishment of the League of Nations to himself as the real aim of the peace negotiations, and had done so with all the force of a fanatical idealist. On February 14th he was due to leave the Conference, in order to be present in Washington before March 4th, on which date Congress was to break up. Accordingly, he was anxious to attain his object in this respect at any rate, even if it meant a certain hurry. On February 14th he was in fact able to register the assent of the Conference to the Covenant of the League of Nations at a plenary meeting.

The Great Powers came in the first instance to an understanding; and the decision was theirs. The hurry was not necessarily unwelcome. Even at this stage of the proceedings Wilson had a conception of the League which was far and away superior to what actually emerged. At the Second Plenary Meeting of the Paris Conference on January 25th, 1919, at which the League figured as the first item on the Agenda, he stated in a "programme" speech that the chief purpose of the Conference was to call a permanent order of Peace into being, so as to enable Peace to outlive the peace of the Peace Treaties. Of the Peace Treaties themselves, he had already said they would have sooner or later to be modified and amended, and the chief thing to do was to create the machinery which would make it possible to supplement and amend them and ensure their future continuance.

This sequence of ideas explains why Wilson was moved to abandon his former view and insist on the linking of the Peace Treaties with the League. His change of view on this point was first voiced in his Speech of September 27th, 1918, and was expressed with increasing precision as time went on at the sittings of the Conference.

There is no question therefore that Wilson sought to put the League in a position of precedence in relation to the dictates of the Peace Treaties, of which (as he saw it) it was to serve as a corrective. His own draft of the Covenant (Article III), which he submitted to the American Delegation on January 10th, 1919, provided for the possibility of territorial resettlements in the future on a self-determination basis, with the assent of three-quarters of the Members of the League. "The Contracting Parties recognise without restriction the principle that the peace of the world ranks in importance before any question of political jurisdiction or delimitation of frontiers."

But all this was at the beginning of the Conference. Even before the official negotiations began, the Wilsonian draft had been extensively modified to suit the wishes of the other Great Powers, in the same way as the Wilsonian Plan of February 3rd, of which also hardly anything remained. The resulting settlement was the opposite of that projected by the President. The peace of the world was relegated to the second place, and the League of Nations was converted into an organisation for the execution of the Peace Treaties. Of Wilson's ideas there remained only a torso in the shape of Article 19. When on February 14th, 1919 the draft of the Covenant of the League was submitted to the Paris Conference, Lord Robert Cecil said the main object of the League was to assure the maintenance of the territorial settlement as it emerged

from the Peace Treaties. At the First Session of the Council on January 16th, 1920 the French representative, Léon Bourgeois, after describing the meeting of the Council as the birthday of a new order in the world in which the primacy of Justice over Force was acclaimed by all free peoples, went on to point the Cecilian moral with the assertion that the League's chief object was to guarantee the possessions and the independence of its Members, and to uphold the "just frontiers" which the Treaty of Versailles had established.

The fate of the scheme at the hands of the American Congress is well known. On the last day of the Session, March 4th, 39 out of a total of 96 Senators declared themselves against acceptance on the ground that the association of the Peace Treaties with the Covenant of the League, especially in the case of Articles 10 and 16, not only implied a limitation of American sovereignty, but also threatened to entangle the United States in the labyrinth of European diplomacy and involve it in European conflicts. The two-thirds majority required for the acceptance of the Covenant was thus not attained. That was the first and most serious blow to the Covenant. The second followed on March 19th, 1920, when the ratification of the Peace Treaty was rejected so far as the United States was concerned; and with it the idea of a United States of the World in the form of a League of Nations was finally and definitively interred.

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At the secret sittings of the Conference the ideal of the League of Nations was thus stultified and distorted in the same way as the other Wilsonian principle of a peace based on law as opposed to force. In the eyes of the Allied Principal Powers the establishment of the League was not the opening of a new era, but a continuation of the efforts and aims they had pursued at the Paris Conference. They never had any intention from that time on of adjusting the principles of their policy to the conception of the League. The States responsible for the enforced Peace of Paris were the same States as created the League; and in so doing they adapted its statutes to suit their own requirements. The negotiations for the creation of the League were based on the same premisses as those on which the Peace Conference was based. The feature of both was the effort to proclaim the predominance of the victorious Powers in permanence and, as President Wilson's Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, put it, to make the League a weapon in the hands of the strong to arrest the normal development of national strength and national effort on the part of those whom defeat had rendered powerless. The free peoples were not even asked for their opinion. The Great Powers had taken steps from the outset to secure their own preponderance in the membership of the different Bureaux and Committees over the other belligerents and the neutrals. The Great Powers issued the invitations to their Allies to attend the Conference. They dictated the Covenant of the League, as they dictated the Peace Treaties. If the others showed at any moment a disposition to revolt against this or that decision, Clemenceau flung the weight of the 12 million troops of the Great Powers into the scale against them. He enumerated the battalions, and exclaimed curtly: "C'est un titre!" The sceptre he wielded was not the sceptre of Justice, but the sceptre of Power. Similarly at the First Session of the League in Geneva it was repeatedly made clear that the Covenant, as settled by the Allies, must not be touched; and in support of this contention it was argued that the Allies had fought for the freedom of the world and, but for their victory, there would have been no League of Nations at all.

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To what extent the neutral Powers were thereby induced, whether by persuasion or by threats, to waive their misgivings and reservations, will never be made public. They had at any rate plenty of time to think out their position, and they had in fact indicated their own views on the creation of a League of Nations long before. They were made acquainted

with the text of the Covenant on February 14th, 1919. In the second half of March they received an invitation to express their opinions; but a short time-limit was attached, and it was made plain that there was no question of any substantial changes, and that there was no intention of negotiating with them in regard to particular points. The proceedings were accordingly conducted and concluded in a Sub-Committee in a couple of afternoons (March 20th and 21st). The most the neutrals were able to achieve was the concession that their representations would be considered by the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference. The final text of the Covenant shows only the slight traces of the influence of the neutrals.

It is certain that it was with no joyful hearts that the neutrals joined the League. Of the general objections which they raised against it, the chief point was undoubtedly the fact that it was conceived as an organ for the execution of the Peace Treaties. It was moreover to be anticipated that the exclusion of the Central Powers would necessarily bring the latter into opposition to the League, and so incidentally to the neutrals, thereby binding the latter to the cause of the Allies. A further point which the neutrals no doubt made was that, as the League would not be in a position to give adequate support to its Members in the event of war, and as on the other hand the Members were called upon to assume heavy military responsibilities, they might well find themselves in the position of being compelled to use force against a State with which they had every desire to live on good terms.

There can indeed have been hardly a single one of the smaller European States which regarded the Paris Peace terms as just or wise, or welcomed them as a satisfactory conclusion to the World War. The majority of these States were under no illusions as to the possibility of such terms remaining for long in force: they realised that they were bound to lead to new conflicts and serious upheavals, whether in the near or distant future. If nevertheless they joined the League, it was firstly because of their weakness in presence of the victors of the War and the powerlessness of their own resources, and secondly because they hoped that they would be in a better position inside than outside the League to avert impending evils and promote revision of the Covenant.

The only country to which a special legal status was conceded—a part from the United States, which received special recognition of the Monroe Doctrine in Article 21—was Switzerland. The Swiss National Defence Commission had pronounced against Switzerland joining the League in a Report dated July 14th-18th, 1919. It was not until the Swiss authorities had carried their point on the whole issue of neutrality, the Allied Powers waiving all claim to military aid from Switzerland and recognising the Swiss right to refuse the passage of foreign troops across Swiss soil (even in the event of action by the League for the assistance of a victim of aggression, i.e. action under Article 16, paragraph 3), that the Swiss people voted in the Plebiscite of May 16th, 1920 for accession to the League by 414,830 votes to 322,939. (See in this connection our detailed account of the question of Swiss neutrality in No. 166/170 of September 29th, 1936.)

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The League of Nations Commission fixed the final text on April 10th and 11th, 1919, and it was thereupon adopted by the Conference in plenary session on April 28th with a small addition. The representations of the German Peace Delegation were, as all the world knows, entirely disregarded; and in the answer to the German counter-proposals which the Allied and Associated Powers conveyed in the Ultimatum of June 16th, 1919 it was said:

"The Covenant of the League of Nations forms the basis of the Peace Treaty for the Allied and Associated Powers. They have carefully considered all its provisions. They are convinced that it is to the advantage of justice and peace and provides

an element of progress in the relations between the nations which the future will strengthen and develop."

Never in the history of the world was there a prophecy of which there was so little fulfilment.

The Covenant of the League did not specify when it was to come into force. Its entry into force was therefore conditioned by the Peace Treaties; and it accordingly came into force at the same date as the latter, i.e. on January 10th, 1920, on which date Germany ratified the Treaty of Versailles. The Council met for the first time on January 16th, 1920 in Paris, and the Assembly for the first time on November 15th in Geneva.

The First Act of the tragedy of the League had begun.

2. The Tragedy of the League and its Causes.

"We thought that we were engaged in the task of removing the debris of a great war, of rearranging the map of Europe more in conformity with the wishes of its population, and of laying down the solid foundation of a peace which, with a little goodwill, with help from the League of Nations by the operation of moral forces, might be eternal."

This hope, which Lord Balfour, one of the British delegates at the Paris Conference, expressed in the Third Assembly of the League of Nations on September 8th, 1922, was not fulfilled either then or later. The five dictated Peaces of Paris created an unlimited number of possibilities of conflict which the League organisation could not and did not wish to settle, because it had neither the wisdom nor the moral strength to exclude the political motive, political interests and political influences of the beneficiaries of these dictated Peaces from their solutions or attempted solutions and to prevent these influences from becoming the determining factor. It regarded itself primarily as a political union for the purpose of maintaining as far as possible the position created in 1919.

According to the preamble of the Covenant, it was the duty of the League to promote international cooperation between the nations and to achieve international peace and security. For this purpose the Members also agreed to assume certain obligations not to resort to war; to prescribe open, just and honourable relations between nations; to establish firmly the understandings of international law as to the actual rule of conduct among Governments; to maintain justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another.

It need not be pointed out that these ideal principles were incompatible with the continuance of the Paris peace decisions, not to speak of the arbitrary interpretations and extensions to which they have been subject. But, apart from this, the provisions of the Covenant were not sufficient to realise the lofty programme which was set up. There was a gulf fixed between the guiding principles and the objects aimed at by the principal allied Powers in setting up the Versailles League. This preamble was merely a last reminder of the hopes attached by the peoples of the world at that time to the promised league of peace. For the fact that this preamble might also contain a programme for the future was slight consolation for the neutral States that were caught by it, and this consolation subsequently lost its grounds of justification. The manipulators of phrases at the Paris Conference produced many astonishing achievements and covered up many contradictions. But it was impossible to announce principles at the head of the League Covenant and to sweep them all away in the dictated peace provisions attached to them. This preamble was in any case misleading, since it was intended to give the impression that the States had combined to form an international legal community. In reality they created a purely political organisation which incidentally also assumed certain legal, administrative, social and humanitarian tasks.

The sovereign authority which was to stand above the interests of all the members made the League a servant of the policy of power of the victors in the War. It soon became

clear that the fine names by which it was called in all languages were not in accordance with its essential character. It was not a league of the nations, but a league of the Governments for whom peace merely meant a continuation of war by other means. The law under which the League of Nations came into being was not the peace idea of Wilson, but the revenge idea of Clémenceau who had no difficulty in taking advantage of the tragical error into which Wilson had stumbled and finally in obtaining his agreement.

This spirit of 1919 never left Wilson's creation; not even after the Allied and Associated Powers had been joined by the neutrals and subsequently by the countries vanquished in the War.

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In spite of the bitter disappointment and irritation caused by the shameful breach of the preliminary peace treaty of November 5th, 1918 concluded on the basis of the fourteen points of President Wilson's peace programme, and in spite of the scornful rejection by the victorious Powers of Germany's first application for admission to the League of Nations, no nation had in 1919 a stronger and more sincere faith in President Wilson's message and in the promise contained in the preamble to the Covenant than the German, and no nation gave its fulfilment a greater chance of success. For half a generation the German nation fought for that fulfilment at Geneva, without ever being anything else than an object of the League, or rather of its Franco-British policy, which committed the greatest political and psychological blunders against Germany. It is therefore not the German nation, but the League which in its belief in its own infallibility and omnipotence has thrown away the chance that was given it.

It is not difficult to draw up a long list of the sins and omissions of Geneva, starting with the connection of the Covenant with the Paris Treaties. A mass of great ideas and impulses were awaiting realisation and development. But the League has really only functioned where it was able to act as the executive organ of the Treaties of 1919. These treaties gave it in the interest of the victorious Powers a number of definite tasks, the execution of which was desired by the united will of those Powers and could therefore lead to the object in the manner which suited them best (the so-called popular plebiscites in the ceded territories, the administration of the Saar territory, the supervision over Danzig, the veiling of the seizure of colonies by the mandatory system, the so-called protection of minorities, the suppression of the freedom of German waterways by international river commissions etc.). In all other questions not directly connected with the dictated Peace Treaties, which should have formed the real field of activity of the League, however, it failed from the outset. It has not succeeded in settling a single political or economic question of importance with its own methods and forces (such as, for instance, the Vilna conflict, the Russo-Polish war, tension in the Far East, the South American wars, the Abyssinian war, the disarmament problem, the settlement of reparations, the freedom of world economy, the distribution of raw materials, the evacuation of the Rhineland and the Locarno question). In addition, through the fact that it always bowed to the tendencies of certain Powers that aimed at strengthening their own position of power behind the facade of the general safeguarding of peace, it has prevented rather than promoted real progress in the development of international relations. This has been shown in particular by its efforts in the sphere of the general safeguarding of peace by treaty (Geneva Protocol, General Act, harmonisation of the Kellogg Pact etc.). And in the particular sphere for which it was set up in accordance with President Wilson's intentions, i.e. the revision of treaties that have become inapplicable and dangerous to peace, it has taken no action whatever in spite of this duty being especially entrusted to it under Article 19 of the Covenant.

Since Germany's appearance at Geneva, and even earlier, she has devoted herself without any resentment and with indefatigable zeal to these objects, and it was not her fault that one League ideal after another became an illusion in the world of international actuality and that national interests and forces proved to be stronger than international idealism. The victorious Powers, it is true, in creating the League of Nations gave the appearance of meeting the needs which the nations felt particularly strongly at that time. But in reality it was only a practical instrument for pursuing the special interests of a particular group of these Powers and therefore failed under their decisive influence wherever there was no question of realising those special interests.

In fact the League from the outset suffered from a disease world of international actuality and that national interests disease really lay in the fact that the political conditions created by the dictated Peace Treaties of 1919 rendered quite impossible a comprehensive organisation of the States for the purpose of fruitful political cooperation. But this does not excuse the further fact that the actual leaders of the Geneva association, though they recognised that all the failures were not the result of uncontrollable higher forces but were so many constant proofs of faulty construction from the outset and from the foundation, never thought for a moment of removing or even of improving these disastrous mistakes, in order to make the League an instrument of solidarity among the nations instead of a strait waistcoat for certain nations and a tool of diplomatic class policy.

The work done at Geneva after the War was either pure formalism or the rigid maintenance of the Paris Treaties. Nothing has done the League more harm than this. Born in the atmosphere of Versailles, it remained a guardian of a bad order of things instead of a seer and a leader to fresh shores. It lived in a world of apparent paper successes. It was of no avail that events and facts always took a different course and that it always turned out that they were not commanded by the augurs of Geneva. It did not matter that the Geneva decisions were always overthrown by facts. New decisions were taken, new agreements concluded and new hopes created. The important point was that the entire system turned on its function as executor and maintainer of the order of 1919.

Coalition, not collectivity was the watchword which was openly expressed by the representatives of France at Geneva and for which they desired the League authority to be exerted. It is not peace, but the intention to mobilise the world against Germany that characterises French League policy which is responsible for the moral and technical deterioration of the Geneva machinery.

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An English politician of the last generation, John Morley, considered that any policy was only possible by means of compromises. No one will object to difficulties being removed by mutual concessions. But it often happens that they are neither put on one side nor overcome and optimistic illusions are soon followed by real disillusion. It is possible to make many sacrifices for the desire for peace, but it is not possible at the same time to attack the essential vital forces of a nation and that moral and spiritual substance which alone imparts a meaning to existence. It was the misfortune of League policy that it took no thought of psychology and was couched only in juridical forms and formulae, into which ideas of criminal law frequently crept. The sanctity of treaties is no doubt a fine thing, but then the treaties must also be sacred. But it is impossible to cover an evil treaty with a halo of sanctity. It is therefore also wrong to state that Germany has deliberately infringed sacred legal principles. It is merely a creation of hatred that is collapsing. Versailles is dying of its own disease, the germ of which it contained from the outset, and of the injustice that was falsely

described as the peace of the nations. The dictated peace was ultimately bound—and this was the greatest mistake of its authors—to fail on account of the impossibility of permanently keeping down a nation like the German and of thus ordering development to stand still, as if there were no other possibilities outside the framework of the treaty.

The League has also failed because it placed itself in the service of this error. It was based on a doctrine and not on real life. Real life therefore dispensed with it.

The procedure followed by the subtle diplomacy of Versailles could ultimately not hide the fact that decisions are in the long run always dependent on the vital needs and conditions of the nations and their common life and that diplomatic works of art, however subtle they may be, which are not based on the solution of the most burning problems and their causes, ultimately collapse in the face of reality.

The failure of the Geneva method, therefore, need not be taken tragically, for there are sufficient other means of exchanging ideas on international cooperation. Diplomatic relations continue, and—as has often been shown by the Members of the League themselves—the Geneva machinery is not essential for conferences.

Non-membership of the League and the rejection of the method of collective security as exercised at Geneva do not imply the lack of a desire for peace and harmonious cooperation. Germany and Italy have opposed to the complicated and confusing Geneva procedure the more natural and much simpler method of settling definite international problems by means of bilateral agreements and they endeavour to apply a suitable method to each particular case. This principle does not in any way preclude multilateral agreements for questions which a number of States have a common and equal interest in settling. But it does preclude collective settlements in the Geneva sense in which States that are not concerned are included merely for the sake of the principle of collectivity.

The need for collective cooperation is as great for Germany and Italy as their readiness to take part in it. But such a system, in its own collective interest, must comply with the demands clearly formulated by Adolf Hitler in his great declaration of 1935 and laid down in thirteen points. The central point was the sentence: "The German Government is at all times prepared to take part in a system of collective cooperation to safeguard European peace, but in that case considers it necessary to allow for the law of eternal evolution by leaving the path open for the revision of treaties."

It would have been well if these thirteen points had not fallen into oblivion outside Germany, for they constituted most noteworthy proposals for the reconstruction of European cooperation.

And if attention had been paid to the desires for the revision of the Geneva Covenant put forward by Italy, if the "law of eternal evolution" had been followed, the conflict between England and Italy or (to take account of the declarations of British statesmen) between Italy and the League of Nations would not have taken place.

Germany and Italy have in the meantime developed on these foundations a new principle of peace, which has already stood the test. This principle is embodied in the numerous bilateral treaties which Rome and Berlin have concluded with the most important neighbouring States and by which individual security in Europe has been strengthened. Outside Geneva new chapters in the safeguarding of peace have been written. That collectivism which was merely intended to safeguard possessions has been replaced by something new, and its disappearance leaves no anxious gap. Cooperation between the Powers has not become more difficult than before. On the contrary, it has been facilitated by the fact that now the boundaries have been marked out for all hopes which were possibly attached to the patched-up Geneva system as a possible object

of barter and bargaining. By the decisive action of Rome and Berlin the last veil was torn aside and the world was faced by actual reality in order to reach true peace by a fundamental change in the former methods.

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The German declaration denies the Powers remaining at Geneva the right to regard the League of Nations as a qualified representative of the international world and as the highest organ of international cooperation. These Powers will presumably not all adopt this view. However that may be, the League has forfeited two factors of power, and the relations between England and France on the one hand and Italy and Germany on the other hand can in future no longer be settled within the framework of the Geneva League. The Geneva method is in any case no longer the monopoly method for the settlement of international problems and for the safeguarding of peace.

The conclusion of the German declaration that, in view not only of the "failure" but of the "pernicious" political system of the Geneva League, Germany will never return to the League, in any case creates a clear position which must be taken into consideration by those who compelled Italy and Germany to make it. Whatever the Council and Assembly may decide in future will never be anything more than the expression of a one-sided group.

The era of an idea of collectivity which was intended in the main to serve the advantages and cause of the powerful possessing countries in the world by means of too transparent guarantees of security and peace, has at any rate been closed. It is to be hoped that its place will soon be taken by that other system of sincere and frank conciliation between one nation and another on the basis of complete equality of rights and consideration for mutual vital interests, in order to open up the path to unrestricted international cooperation in the sense of justice and harmony.

IV. A Reminiscence from the Year 1934 - A Neglected Warning

Text of the Speech by M. Motta, Swiss Federal Councillor, on September 16th, 1934 in connection with the Admission of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations.

In connection with the plenary session of the League Assembly, the Sixth Committee (Political Questions) met on September 16th, 1934 to deal with the application for the admission of Soviet Russia. The Chairman of the Committee, M. de Madariaga, representing Spain, opened the meeting devoted to the Russian problem with the not unfitting announcement of a British draft resolution on slavery and then opened the discussion on the application for the admission of Soviet Russia.

The first speaker, M. Caeiro da Mata, Portuguese Foreign Minister, based his Government's decision to vote in the Assembly against the admission of Soviet Russia on the incompatibility between the fundamental principles of the Russian system and the views of the civilised nations of the world which rested on centuries of tradition. The admission of Russia would involve the danger of the encouragement of the destructive propaganda of Moscow, on account of which the Portuguese Government had constantly refused to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government.

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The Portuguese Foreign Minister was followed by the head of the Swiss delegation, Federal Councillor Motta, who gave the following explanation of the Swiss "No!"

"The position adopted by the Swiss Federal Council with regard to the application of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is generally known. Criticised by some, defended by others, this position must be justified and explained all the more as it is contrary to the expressed policy of the greater number of delegates and especially of the three great Powers represented amongst us. I shall endeavour to justify and to explain it with the moderation which alone lends arguments their full weight, but also with that frankness which we owe to one another.

Switzerland is the only State which entered the League of Nations as a result of a plebiscite—that is, of the direct vote of the people and of the cantons. The struggle which took place over this all-important issue was one of the most heated and moving in the long history of our country. The Federal Government advocated the entry of Switzerland with all the authority at its command and its advice was followed. The founders of the League had shown us their confidence in choosing Geneva as the seat of the new institution. Swiss public opinion has

always been and still is very appreciative of this great honour. One of its consequences, happy on the whole, has been to concentrate public attention in our country, more perhaps than elsewhere, on the work and activities of the League. Proximity almost always makes for interest.

From the beginning we have been resolute advocates of universality. We have proved it by our acts. Were I not fearful of betraying a lack of taste, I might be tempted to quote the speech I delivered on November 20th, 1920, on the opening of the first Assembly. Therein, directly alluding to Russia, I expressed the hope that, having been "cured of her madness" and "delivered from her misery", she might some day seek and find in the League the help indispensable for her reconstruction.

In spite of its constant and warm friendship for the Russian people, the Swiss Government has, however, never felt able to recognise *de jure* their present regime. It is determined to maintain this negative and expectant attitude. Our Legation at Petrograd was pillaged in 1918 and one of its officials killed. We have never secured so much as a word of apology. When, in 1918, an attempted general strike nearly plunged our country in the horrors of a civil war, a Soviet mission, which we had tolerated in Berne, had to be expelled *manu militari*, because it was found to have had a hand in the agitation.

As soon as the possibility of admitting the Soviet Union into the League began to be discussed this year in diplomatic circles, the Federal Council unhesitatingly informed Parliament that it could not, for its part, favour such a step. We realised that an affirmative vote would in fact, if not necessarily in law, lead to the resumption of regular diplomatic relations. That was out of the question. From a proper sense of caution, however, the Federal Council at that time, and until it became necessary to take a more definite decision, maintained its freedom of choice between a categorical negative note and abstention, the latter being, in its opinion, only a disguised form of refusal.

Since then, and as the chances of a Russian application became closer and more imminent, the problem has come to be publicly discussed with increasing vigour. I shall in a moment explain why and how our public opinion has reacted, but before doing so I beg leave to say a word about the significance and force of public opinion in Switzerland.

Swiss public opinion is always free; it is also spontaneous. Our Press is entirely free. The Federal Council has nothing resembling a semi-official Press. No pressure is ever exercised,

no indications even are received from above. At the same time, we have many and various patriotic associations which cultivate and stimulate public spirit. We should not be the democracy we are, were it otherwise. We are proud of this democracy; it is one of the reasons of our very existence. Without democracy no Switzerland. If, therefore, on any matter of importance, the Press and these patriotic associations take a like stand, irrespective of political party, region and language, we are confronted with the national will clearly proclaimed. The Government must take account of it. It must do so all the more when its own opinion coincides with that thus expressed. Such is the case here.

Holding to essentials and leaving aside all secondary factors, let me now state how the problem of the admission of the Soviet Union into the League presents itself to us.

Does a regime, does a Government which proclaims and practises an expansive and militant Communism fulfil the necessary conditions of admission?

I shall refer neither to the Preamble nor to the literal provisions of the Covenant. The arguments they suggest are very powerful, but they are of minor importance when compared with the fundamental principles of the Covenant, with its main purpose, with that which it does not explicitly mention because it goes without saying and is therefore necessarily assumed.

In every sphere—religious, moral, social, political, economic—this form of Communism is the most radical negation of the ideas by which we breathe and have our being. Most States even prohibit simple Communist propaganda, all regard it as a political crime as soon as it seeks to pass from the realm of theory into that of action.

Soviet Communism combats the ideal of religion and all that is spiritual in every form. Lenin compared religion to opium. Freedom of conscience is but a mere semblance. The servants of religion and their families are deprived of food cards. Churches are desecrated and fall in ruin. Moscow had five hundred churches and chapels; forty are said to remain. Christian churches the world over feel smitten in the spirit and in the flesh of all those who there profess and proclaim their belief in Christ. A so-called petition for the martyrs was, last year in Switzerland, covered by over two hundred thousand signatures!

Communism dissolves the family; it suppresses individual initiative; it abolishes private property; it organises labour in forms which it is difficult to distinguish from forced labour. Russia is afflicted with the dark curse of famine. Impartial observers wonder whether this famine is a purely natural phenomenon or whether it is the consequence of an economic and social system vitiated in its very roots.

But these characteristics of Communism, which I have sought objectively to define, still do not give a true picture of Russian Communism. There must be added another essential and distinctive trait which still more completely puts it into opposition with the most fundamental and most universally recognised principles prevailing in relations between States. Russian Communism seeks to strike root everywhere. Its ambition is world revolution. Its nature, its aspirations, its inner urge, all make for foreign propaganda. Its vital law is expansion beyond political frontiers. For Communism to abandon these aims would be to deny itself; but by pursuing them, it becomes our common enemy, because it threatens us all. It would be easy for me to base each of these statements on authoritative texts drawn from official Bolshevik literature, but I would spare you superfluous quotations. We are faced with uncontroverted and uncontrovertible truths.

But I perceive the first objection. We hear it said: let us not confuse the Communist Party with the Bolshevik State.

This is no objection. The Bolshevik State, the Communist Party and the Third International to which it owes its birth are all morally one. The Bolshevik State was founded to carry out the programme of the Communist Party. Lenin had united in his person the functions of head of the State and of the Party. The present Secretary-General of the Party, without being the nominal head of the State, is its true master. The bonds between the State and the Party are indissoluble. The Party issues orders, the State carries them out.

I perceive a second and more important objection. Let me formulate it before examining it.

Attention is called to the fact that the Soviet Union is an immense country of a hundred and sixty millions of inhabitants. Facing Asia on one side and Europe on the other, astride in a way on two continents, it cannot safely be ignored and deliberately left aside. The League of Nations is only a new form of international co-operation. It is not an institute of ethics, but a political association whose principal aim is to prevent wars and to maintain peace. If, by admitting Russia, we can serve the cause of peace, we must suppress our fears, our doubts, the repugnance which Governments may feel. May we not hope that continuous co-operation with other States within the League will promote an evolution beneficial for all and for Russia itself in the first instance?

You would rightly be surprised were I to deny these considerations all value. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and Italy have already placed similar views before the Federal Council through the ordinary channels of diplomacy—that is, through their representatives at Berne. The conversations which, as head of the Political Department, I was privileged to have with these gentlemen, were pursued in a spirit of friendship and confidence. I never had the slightest feeling of any, even indirect, pressure. Let me make that clear in order, in the general interest, to dispel any possible misunderstandings.

While, however, we appreciated the points of view of other Governments, and particularly those of the three Great Powers, we were obliged to adopt another for ourselves. A country like Switzerland, which is neither able nor willing to play a part in high international policy, must necessarily pursue its own conceptions. In certain cases, we must deny ourselves opportunity, even of the highest and most legitimate order. We can emulate other countries only in the arduous pursuit of moral values.

Now, we cannot believe in this evolution of the Bolshevik regime, for which we hope no less than you. We cannot sacrifice to the principle of universality the idea of a necessary minimum of moral and political conformity between States. The League is or should be, in our view, one of the greatest of all human conceptions and realisations. When, on May 16th, 1920, the people and the cantons of Switzerland, overcoming all the obstacles due to their historical traditions, decided that the Confederation should join the League, they generously obeyed the call of an ideal.

To-day the common feelings of all patriotically and nationally minded Swiss is that the League is embarking on a hazardous undertaking. As we see it, it is venturing to wade water and fire. If Soviet Russia all of a sudden ceases to insult the League, which Lenin defined as an institute of brigands, we read the explanation of this novel attitude in the fiery letters of the Far-Eastern sky. We have no confidence. We do not feel able to co-operate in an act which will confer upon Soviet Russia a prestige which it has not here to fore enjoyed.

But the die is cast. *Alea jacta est.* We prefer to warn, to put you on your guard. We hope the future may show that our

misgivings were unduly exaggerated. We count on all the other States to help us in preventing Geneva from becoming a centre of dissolving propaganda. We will be vigilant. That is our duty. For the present, it suffices for us to know that, in oblivion of its past, Soviet Russia will not be admitted to the League by a unanimous vote and crowned with laurels of triumph.

When it has been admitted, the Council and the Assembly will be faced with several questions that are still pending before them. The Assembly's resolution relating to the independence of Georgia will not sleep the sleep of death. Armenia, Ukraine, other countries will still enjoy the interest of men of goodwill. Let it not be said: These questions will no longer be raised. The sympathies of civilised mankind will never fail heroes fighting for life and liberty. No statute of limitations will deny their claims.

And above all, when the Soviet delegates are in Geneva we hope that voices may be raised here to demand explanations of their Government on behalf of the conscience of mankind, voices to denounce this anti-religious propaganda which is without precedent in the annals of humanity and which plunges Christendom into grief and tears and, with Christendom, all men who believe in God and who invoke his justice.

I have finished. I have endeavoured to express the feelings of the immense majority of the Swiss people. We do not want to preach to others, but I was impelled to speak my mind. Had I refrained from so doing, I should have been unfaithful to my trust.

It is to the honour of the Assembly that the procedure of admission, however delicate, has been followed in a calm and serene atmosphere. The Swiss people will take cognisance of decisions of the majority with cool composure and with that wise democratic discipline which it owes to its secular traditions.

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The former Foreign Minister, M. Jaspard, spoke on behalf of Belgium and pointed out that his country had not established diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia on account of the lofty considerations set forth by the Swiss delegate. The Soviet Union had never made any reparation for the loss and damage caused to a large number of Belgians by the new regime in Russia. Belgium would not vote against the admission of Soviet Russia but would abstain, merely because three Great Powers with whom she had close relations hoped that this admission would promote international cooperation.

The Argentine delegate, M. Cantilo, gave an even shorter statement of the reasons why his country abstained. Recalling the outrages to which the diplomatic representatives of his country were subject in Russia in 1918 and 1920, he said the Argentine had not forgotten these matters and would abstain from voting.

The Netherlands representative, M. de Graeff, beat all records in brevity. In two sentences he referred to the reasons set forth by M. Motta, and said the Netherlands would vote against the admission.

The Vote.

The resolution by which the Sixth Committee recommended the admission of Russia to the League was adopted by 38 votes against 3, with 7 abstentions.

Thus a truly historic meeting came to a close. The loud and spontaneous applause accorded by almost all delegations to the serious and noble statement of the Swiss attitude by Federal Councillor Motta shows that some delegations who voted for Russia shared the Swiss view, though they did not think fit to draw the same political consequences as Switzerland.

The Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations on September 18th, 1934 by 39 votes out of 49. Seven countries abstained from voting, and three countries (Switzerland, Portugal and the Netherlands) voted against. A permanent seat on the League Council was then accorded by 40 votes out of 50, there being 10 abstentions.

The Trojan horse had entered the Geneva League. The President, M. Sandler, said in his speech of greeting: It will be for the future to show all the consequences of this event. The 18th of September marks a turning point in the history of the League of Nations.

In his maiden speech, M. Litvinov soon gave the answer. He told all those who had hoped that the League of Nations would bring about an evolution in Bolshevism that this was not the case.

M. Motta's gloomy prophecy was fulfilled almost as soon as it was uttered. The 18th of September was such a turning point in the history of the League as was not dreamt of at that time, or at any rate not to this extent or with this rapidity.

V. The Present Position of the Efforts at League Reform ⁽¹⁾

During the 100th Session of the Council in January, the work of the Reform Committee is to be again taken up. Italy's withdrawal and the German declaration will not be without effect on this work. As we pointed out in our No. 2 of October 15th, the fundamental attitude of last year's Assembly to two resolutions—the Argentine and Chilian—is proof of the hopelessness of any progress. A general feeling of "malaise" was observable to any close observer. The acceptance of those resolutions was like a bite from a sour apple taken with a view to preventing the threat of withdrawal of further Members. As long as the League has existed it has made attempts at reform, but all these attempts have failed over questions of procedure and the Covenant has undergone no substantial change. In particular, the discussion last September on these League questions, with the numerous reports on reform, showed that it was hopeless to amend the League Covenant which legally and politically expressed the principles of a dictated peace and served to enforce that peace.

On this point no illusions must be created by the fact that, in September last year, the question of separating

the Covenant from the Peace Treaties was referred to a legal committee for examination. Before that committee started its discussions, the restriction was laid down that the connection between the Peace Treaties and the Covenant was purely formal and had no legal significance; the Committee was also not to deal in any way with the material competence of the League. The Report of the Legal Sub-Committee states at the outset that it was not the duty of the Committee to propose any modification of the Peace Treaties, or to deal with the powers conferred upon the League by those Treaties. Its duty was merely to eliminate certain expressions in the Covenant which might induce other States to stand aloof from the League of Nations and to remove misunderstandings as to the essential characteristics of the Covenant. The report of the jurists accordingly goes on to make proposals in accordance with Article 26 of the Covenant, amounting throughout to the omission and redrafting of passages in order to avoid the mention of the "Allied and Associated Powers" and the "Peace Treaties".

The stairway of the League procedure, which some incorrigible optimists think should in theory lead rapidly to the

(1) See No. 171/175 of November 27th, 1936: The Question of League Reform.

summit of the entire League construction, has however in practice always led downwards, namely to the document cellars. In particular the question of the separation of the Covenant from the Peace Treaties, the title of a theme which has been thoroughly exploited at Geneva in order to create the impression that the League of Nations has the courage to deal with the most delicate issues, sank so rapidly to disappointment that after barely three months this question is referred to as a nightmare. From the restrictions in principle to which we have briefly referred above, this question sank to the next downward stage, namely the draft resolution in the report to the effect that from the first day of its existence the Covenant has had an independent existence, as is clear from the purposes of the League. It was however desired to remove certain difficulties arising out of a number of expressions employed in the Covenant, which might be considered an obstacle to the entry of certain States into the League of Nations. The Assembly should therefore decide :

1. to recommend to Governments of Members the prompt ratification of the Protocol embodying the amendments referred to above ;

2. to request the Secretary-General to communicate the text of the said amendments to Members of the League and to States non-members to be named by the Council.

It is characteristic of the opposition raised against this obvious compromise that the Reform Committee, to which the report was submitted for adoption by the Sub-Committee, after a short discussion agreed, contrary to the original intention, not to submit it to the League Assembly that was sitting at the time, but to send it first to the individual member States.

This is, in particular, a means of gaining time. Any further special desires by the Governments, whether of a radical nature or not, will require further meetings ; a new draft will be agreed upon of which it will not be known whether it tears down or raises still higher the walls erected as a protection in front of the spirit of Versailles. At any rate it is clear that the contents and results of the negotiations on the separation of the Covenant from the Peace Treaties have not been advanced by a discussion which at one time might have been of the highest importance. The statement that the entire question must be conducted in accordance with Article 26 leaves it entirely obscure. Even if the report of the Committee of Jurists, which has now been submitted to the Governments, were accepted by the States Members and if the Assembly next September took a corresponding decision, the proposed changes in the Covenant could not take effect until "the Members of the League whose representatives compose the Council and a majority of the Members of the League whose representatives compose the Assembly" had ratified the amendments. The entire question is therefore doubly postponed by procedure.

In this connection, it is particularly noteworthy that the report which M. Umana Bernal (Colombia) submitted to the Reform Committee on the "Choice of Methods" for amending the Covenant reached the conclusion that amendments in the Covenant such as those proposed by the Committee of Jurists hardly ever come into effect. Even if the proposed purely formal amendments really came into effect, that would not be a material and essential reform, nor could it be regarded as a symbolical gesture of moral effect, especially as the most careful efforts were made to prevent this act from being described as a clear departure from the past. The League Covenant would remain as before the formal instrument for justifying and maintaining the *status quo* of 1919, especially as regards the territorial provisions of the Peace Treaties.

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While a purely negative judgment can be given of the past work in connection with League reform, no more favourable result can be expected in the future.

Valuable indications are given in this respect by the reports which were to be prepared on the basis of the plan of work drawn up by the Reform Committee. As we showed in detail in our No. 2, a number of these reports had been submitted at the time of the September Assembly, but the Committee did not get beyond the question as to which of them should be dealt with first ; it was finally agreed that Lord Cranborne's report on the problem of universality should be the first item on the agenda of a future session.

Below we give an outline of these reports which are only intended "for information" and which draw no conclusions but merely serve to state the questions.

1. *Problem of Universality.*

(a) Report by Lord Cranborne (United Kingdom) on the participation of all States in the League of Nations.

While showing cautious scepticism regarding praise of the universality of the League as a panacea, a distinction is made between three possible types of League organisations :

1. The "coercive type", characterised by the absolute obligation of the Members to impose sanctions in certain circumstances.

2. The "non-coercive type", with machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes, but no coercive means.

3. The "intermediate type", in which the Members of the League would be able to decide in each particular case, without any general legal obligation, what measures—possibly including sanctions—should be taken.

The rapporteur does not hide his sympathies for this third solution, while as regards the others he notes the paradox that in the case of the "coercive type" universality could scarcely be reached, while the "non-coercive type" though leading more readily to universality would at the same time destroy the actual value of the League.

He further raises the question whether the lack of universality and not, for instance, the inherent facts of certain situations or the lack of cooperation of the members have been mainly responsible for the failure of the League ; however decisive the reform, it could not lead to the desired object if certain States were in principle opponents of the assumption of definite collective obligations.

(b) Report by Lord Cranborne on Cooperation between the League of Nations and Non-Member States.

The report draws the following conclusions from the experience gained :

1. For cooperation with the League there must be a concrete interest on the part of the non-Member States concerned.

2. Cooperation appears to thrive best in an atmosphere free from rigid rules. Nevertheless, it is possibly of value to formulate more complete and exact rules of guidance on the basis of former practice.

3. Cooperation is easiest and most complete in regard to technical and economic matters.

4. One of the fundamental obstacles may lie in the "general spirit of non-cooperation" which, in the Rapporteur's view, characterises certain States. The root of the problem is the production of a desire for cooperation.

As a rule, he said, collaboration with non-members could not be a substitute for universal membership. This collaboration had disadvantages. It involved an element of uncertainty and might place the League under certain circumstances in the position of a beggar ; but above all, an extensive collaboration of States might make membership of the League appear super-

fluous. The question of collaboration would however be of particular importance if it appeared that universal membership could only be reached by a revision of the Covenant which was too radical to meet with general approval.

(c) Report by M. Pardo (Argentine) on the Co-ordination of Covenants.

The Rapporteur expressly points out that the urgent task is not the "coordination of texts of treaties", but the "coordination of measures" which would be taken in a time of crisis on the basis of the League Covenant on the one hand and the "universal peace pacts" on the other hand.

(d) Report by M. Stein (Soviet Russia) on Regional or Continental Organisation of the League of Nations.

The report reaches the conclusion that the continental—regional organisation of the League of Nations is only admissible as a subsidiary means of strengthening the general obligations assumed by the Members of the League.

2. Article 16.

(a) Report by M. Rutgers (Netherlands) on the General Obligations under Article 16.

The Rapporteur first points out that various factors have impeded the evolution of the system of collective security. Apart from the lack of universality, the non-application of Article 8 of the Covenant, and the unfortunate experience in the matter of Article 16, he mentions the factor of disputes affecting the territorial *status quo* and states that some Members of the League contested the equity of the new frontiers. It was, he says, a matter of regret, in this connection, that Article 19 had been incapable of settling certain political disputes.

M. Rutgers considers that if it were proposed to reduce the League's function to that of a purely advisory organ, it could only be with the object of achieving the universality of the League. Subject to this aspect, all the Members of the League doubtless intended to maintain the system of collective security. Several Members of the League, for instance the former neutrals, were however in favour of restricting the obligations under Article 16. In view of this tendency, it seemed impossible for the Committee to think of making these obligations more burdensome. Good work could, however, be done by removing existing unclearness; the proper method for this would be an interpretative resolution regarding Article 16.

(b) Report by M. Paul-Boncour (France) on Regional Pacts of Mutual Assistance.

The report crassly summarises the well known French view. The main value of these pacts, it states, is to render possible effective military sanctions to a regional extent; in case of flagrant aggression, the parties are to be authorised to take immediate action, the League being frankly left out of account by the phrase: "Les droits du Conseil étant ultérieurement réservés". According to M. Paul-Boncour, the objection that such regional pacts constitute alliances is met by the fact they are open to the accession of any State. The Eastern Pact negotiations and the subsequent attempt in the original wording of the Franco-Soviet alliance to exclude the League of Nations show that regional pacts are nothing more or less than veiled alliances, and that the question of responsibility is intentionally left unclear.

(c) Report by Nasrollah Entezam (Iran) on Article 10 of the Covenant.

The Rapporteur is in favour of maintaining the guarantee contained in Article 10—territorial integrity and existing political independence—unless its abolition were offset by a political accession of first-rate importance, such as the admission of the United States to the League. The Rapporteur is inclined towards the view—which is contrary to current practice—that

in case of a breach of Article 10 there is an obligation to impose military sanctions.

The Belgian, M. Rolin, once said that Article 10 was the quintessence of the League Covenant, i.e. that it occupied the predominant position in the Covenant. In 1920 a Canadian proposal was made to omit this article. At that time, on the occasion of the First Assembly of the League, the world was given documentary proof that the League of Nations was intended as an instrument for the maintenance of the territorial possessions under the Paris Peace Treaties. In course of time, however, some Members of the League neglected the obligations which they might be called upon to assume under Article 10, and the view became general that every Member had to decide for himself to what extent he was compelled to ensure the fulfilment of his obligations under Article 10 with his own military forces; the problem, as set forth in the report by Nasrollah Entezam, can thus be regarded as a backward movement which will be only welcome to the beneficiary States of 1919.

(d) Report by M. Undén (Sweden) on Article 11 of the League Covenant.

The Rapporteur endeavours to interpret as broadly as possible the rights granted under this article to the Council and Assembly to settle conflicts, but hesitates to recommend a change in the Covenant. The individual proposals remain within the limits of the previous attempts or are entirely theoretical in character, such as, for instance, the statement that the organs of the League are able under Article 11 and also under Article 19 to make proposals to change the *status quo*.

Here also it must be remembered that Lord Robert Cecil frankly disclosed the proceedings of the peace-makers in this connection and pointed out that Article 19, which provides for revision, was a part of Article 10 in the first draft of the Covenant, but that the recognition of change, which is faintly expressed in Article 19, was not to apply to the territorial provisions of Versailles; with this argument the *clausula rebus sic stantibus* in a mutilated form was separated from Article 10 and became an independent article 19; no hope can be entertained of peaceful revision on the basis of Article 11 or of Article 19—which merely provides that the Assembly may advise etc.; League practice has already given so many disappointments that such an expectation must be rejected as the great illusion of League enthusiasts.

(a) Report by M. Umana-Bernal (Colombia) on the execution of the principles of the Covenant. Choice of methods.

The report comes to the conclusion that a change in the Covenant is only possible by means of Article 29. Practice shows, however, that this method encounters great difficulties and that in many cases it has led to no result. The consensus of opinion is that the League organs cannot give a binding interpretation of the Covenant. Lastly, practice has not given encouraging results in the supplementary agreements to the Covenant.

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It will be seen that the general trend of the above reports is that they contain no trace of a serious desire for reform amounting to a breach with the former League practice and in particular with the system of collective security. This applies not only to the statements by MM. Paul-Boncour, Stein and Entezam, who are even in favour of strengthening the collective obligations and supplementing the machinery of sanctions, but also to the reports by MM. Undén and Rutgers; both these reports, it is true, incline to the views of the anti-sanctionist group of the former neutral States, but hesitate to depart in the slightest from the existing legal position. As regards the two reports by Lord Cranborne, it will be observed that they attempt to find an intermediate solution between the uncondi-

tional adherents of the idea of universality—to which in particular the small States belong under the leadership of Chile—and its opponents, in particular Soviet Russia. This attempt would appear to be doomed to failure because the two interests in question are entirely opposed to each other; while Soviet Russia and her friends aim solely at exploiting the League of Nations as an instrument of battle against the “Fascist States”, the object of the smaller States is in particular to avoid implication in a conflict between the Great Powers. The solution which Lord Cranborne recommends—though he does not do so expressly—i.e. to convert the League of Nations into an intermediate type between the present coercive type and a non-coercive type would therefore presumably not satisfy either of the two Parties. Moreover the system of collective security would be maintained in its essential characteristics, and its effects would be more incalculable than before.

THE CHILIAN ACTION IN THE QUESTION OF REFORM

Extract from the speech by M. Edwards, Chilean delegate, in the Reform Committee on September 10th, 1937

Having been invited by the Chairman to let him have any suggestions I might wish to make, I sent him a reply in which I expressed my Government's deep regret that our work was proceeding so slowly.

Our Chairman's communication to which I was replying showed that the tendency to adjourn the question of the reform of the Covenant, which my Government considers as urgent and of primary importance, was persisting, and that in spite of the efforts made by him and by the General Secretariat, League of Nations circles were displaying some lethargy (not to say resistance) in reaching a decision to follow the only direct course which could lead to universality.

No action has been taken with regard to the suggestion my Government has made on three occasions, namely that the States non-Members should be consulted as to possible reforms. Nor has this suggestion been considered up to the present. Yet it is the only means of approximating to, if not actually achieving, universality, and without it there can be no improvement in the application of the Covenant. Several Members of the League of Nations have expressed the same view, but as yet there has been no sign even of a study of the procedure for opening such a consultation. An in the meantime the League is entangling itself in an inextricable network of platitudes and more or less theoretical resolutions.

It has always seemed to us elementary logic that if the collaboration of a sovereign State is desired in an international organisation, the first step must be to invite it to discuss the foundations on which that organisation is to be constructed, or reorganised, and to explain in what conditions it would be prepared to co-operate. To suppose that sovereign States can be placed before accomplished facts is to display undue optimism. Suppose, as I think we all desire, we decide upon certain reforms—for instance, the separation of the Covenant from the Peace Treaties, the amendment of Article 4, the application of Article 8 (which seems to have been overlooked for a long time, although it is one of the fundamental bases of the Covenant), the deletion of Article 10 and the amendment of Article 11, the definition of the vague Articles 16 and 17, the reform of Article 21—and then find that several States non-Members might have considered joining, or returning to, the League of Nations if these changes, adjustments and omissions had been of another character. Should we have to begin our work again and to admit that we had been writing in water? Or should we abandon any attempt to satisfy them, in the belief that the League of Nations is more effective and has greater prestige and authority if it is incomplete?

What is essential, in my Government's opinion, is that no effort should be spared to make the League universal. We believe no sacrifice is too great in the interests of universality.

As far as concerns the universality of the League of Nations, which we all desire, the procedure hitherto adopted has led us in 1937 to a situation far worse than that of 1936. Instead of advancing, we are losing ground. In 1936 four States had already left us; in 1937 there were seven. We are afraid that this progression will accelerate if the first step of all towards universality is not taken at once, namely, the consultation of States non-Members to ascertain their ideas and their desires with regard to changes in the Covenant.

The members of the Committee will remember that it was in the month of July 1936 that the Head of the Delegation of Chile to the League of Nations, M. Rivas Vicuna, formulated the request he had the honour to repeat to the Assembly in September, a request which it was my duty to formulate yet again, for the third time, at the only meeting held by our Committee in December last, and which I have just formulated to-day for the fourth time on behalf of my Government.

Our efforts have met with a disheartening silence. We have heard and read theoretical pronouncements on the universality which all seem to seek, which all seem to recognise as essential if the League of Nations is to do effective work or even to continue. Yet universality is still suspended in the heavens like those stars which shine but give the world neither heat nor light. The earnest, clear, precise suggestion of the Delegation of Chile has never been the subject of examination, still less of a decision. To-day, I repeat, is the fourth time we have made it in a year. Is it this time to meet with a more encouraging reception? I hope so with all my heart, for that would be the most eloquent testimony to the real desire of the League of Nations to extend its foundations and to become universal.

After nine months, during which the Committee held no meetings, we are convened to a preliminary meeting at which we are presented with the whole of the work accomplished. But this work covers only certain special items of reform, which are to be examined after the Assembly.

Unless a special session of the Assembly is convened, we shall have no opportunity, during 1937, of discussing in the great deliberative body of our League any ideas on which we may reach agreement. The conclusion reached by the Committee of Twenty-Eight will come before the 1938 Assembly, and it is to be feared that this further delay will add to the number of those who feel discouraged.

The preliminary and fundamental question of a consultation of States non-Members is not included in our programme of work for either this preliminary meeting or the meeting to be held at the end of the Assembly.

It would seem that we shall have no report from the Committee which could be discussed during the Assembly. Once more we shall see a discussion vital to the League of Nations adjourned as being premature. May I venture to remind you that as early as the 1920 Assembly, when the Delegation of the Argentine Republic raised the question, *inter alia*, of universality—raised it in terms which do great credit to the foresight of its Government—it was declared to be premature. It would be tragic if after seventeen years it were still regarded as premature. If, during the general discussion on the annual report of the Secretary-General, proposals concerning universality and the consultation of States non-Members—which would, of course, have to be referred to a committee—are submitted to the Assembly, it is obvious that it is our Committee of Twenty-Eight which should deal with them.

It would seem more logical to convene the Committee of Twenty-Eight and ask it to reach a decision and submit a report to the Assembly.

This, however, is the moment when it is suggested that we should adjourn our discussions until after the Assembly is over.

I submit to the Chairman and to my colleagues that it would be wiser not to take that decision. It would be better to hold ourselves in readiness to study any proposals that may be presented during the Assembly to the effect that States non-Members should be invited to send us their views on the reform of the Covenant.

I even go so far as to believe that we might with advantage inform the Assembly when its discussions open, that we are prepared to meet to examine these proposals, if necessary, and that we desire as far as possible to speed up the procedure so that results may be achieved on which the Assembly might express an opinion this year.

My Government's attitude has been interpreted in some circles as aimed only at the return to the League of Nations of certain great Powers. It certainly has this aspect of the question in mind, since without their help it is difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to apply the principles of the Covenant, but our preoccupation, our principal object, is wider.

It must not be forgotten that seven of the twenty States of Latin America have withdrawn from the League of Nations among them the biggest State of all. Brazil, which has a population of 48 million and a territorial area almost as great as that of the United States of America. What reason is there for not inviting them to express their views and to co-operate with us in the reform of the Covenant itself? Chile views with regret their exclusion from discussions which naturally interest them.

Most of the admirable reports we have received testify to the legal training of the Rapporteurs and the scrupulous care with which they have analysed the questions referred to them. They deal with specific aspects of the Covenant such as, for instance, the separation of the Covenant from the Peace Treaties, the internal organisation of the League, Article 11, Article 16 and Article 21. Three others—those of the representative of the United Kingdom, Viscount Cranborne and that of the representative of the Argentine Republic, M. Pardo—approximate more closely to the Chilean point of view.

I could say a good deal about these reports, but I must refrain from speaking on them until we have had an exchange of views on what I deem to be the preliminary question of the Chilean suggestion.

But I wonder why, after 18 years of a precarious and difficult existence, we continue to study hypotheses. Why, instead of groping in the dark and guessing what kind of League of Nations would attract the States non-Members, do we not ask these States frankly, point blank, for their views?

We must insist first on a preliminary consultation of the States non-Members and must endeavour to confer on the League of Nations something more than indirect, and above all doubtful, universality,—I mean the complete, frank, indisputable universality, which would result from direct membership of the League in full knowledge of the facts.

That has been Chile's aim for the past year, convinced as she is that the League of Nations is in danger—in imminent danger—unless it alters its course.

What we wish to bring about is not the end but the renaissance of the League.

I will confine myself to-day to explaining to my colleagues on the Committee of 28 the general bases of the Chilean point of view. We consider that the invitation to non-Member States is a preliminary question covering all the proposals for reform which can possibly be made and all the reports submitted to us.

I shall have the honour to communicate my Government's views to the Assembly and to dwell on certain special aspects of the League's situation as it appears to a State which considers it its duty to analyse it openly, enumerating its good points and its shortcomings, its virtues and its vices, with the noble aim of making if only a minute contribution to the task of restoring to the League the breath of life which is gradually departing from it.

* * *

At the Assembly the Chilean delegate on September 14th repeated his warning, and at the decisive meeting of the Committee of Twenty-Eight on September 25th on the question of a further adjournment which was demanded in particular by the Soviet Russian Foreign Minister Litvinov, he accompanied it with the following solemn declaration:

"The Governments of the South American States might find themselves unable to continue their cooperation with Geneva if they gained the impression that there was a firm intention to deprive the League of its character of universality. Any decision regarding an adjournment and any obstacle preventing the Assembly from discussing the matter in its present session might result in very serious consequences."

As a result the Assembly on October 4th exerted itself to the extent of passing the two resolutions, the first of which—dealing with the procedure of consulting non-Members on the question of reform—will only come before the Council in the January session, while the second decides upon the convening of non-Members to the peace endeavours of Geneva in case of a war or threat of war.

VI. Unconvincing Remarks by the "Times" of December 13th, 1937 on the Italian Declaration of Withdrawal

"The decision to leave the League of Nations, makes no real change in the international situation. If Italy has remained nominally a member—with a seat, moreover, in the Council—in actual fact she has held herself aloof from the work of the League for the past eighteen months.

The step announced with so much emphasis on Saturday formally confirms a long-standing defection and puts an end to ambiguities which were of no use either to the League or to Italy herself. Yet, in spite of all the difficulties with which it has had to contend, it has done much invaluable work, and it remains the necessary nucleus for developing an effective organization for the promotion of peace, the need for which is beyond dispute—

in the present confusion. The scene just staged in Rome should prompt all who desire this end to examine very coolly and very carefully the means by which it may be reached.

So far as this country is concerned there can of course be no question of abandoning the League, of scrapping an immensely valuable piece of machinery, just because it has proved unequal to a strain far greater than it was ever designed to bear. That would be to throw up in despair all hope of securing international cooperation on a common platform under accepted rules, and to leave to force and opportunism the whole conduct of human affairs. If the League in its present form has failed, then the Governments composing it must seek for a new form which

will have a greater chance of success. Discussion during the past year has revealed two conflicting tendencies. There are some who would have the League ignore the awkward fact that it no longer comprises even a majority of the Great Powers, and endeavour to make up by vigour what it lacks in strength, dictating settlements and seeking to impose them even at the risk of war. Yet the only conceivable effect of this policy must be to accelerate and harden the division of Europe into two opposing camps, with the League Powers on one side and on the other the Powers which desire some modification of the *status quo* and which suspect the League of being in effect, under a high sounding name, just an alliance to prevent any change. That would not be a League system as originally understood, which presupposes the widest and most representative membership and itself as the instrument of peaceful revision, but a reversion to the old system of the balance of power, increasing instead of diminishing the danger of war. The goal of peace, organized and secure, is not to be reached along this road. To emphasize the coercive character of the League would tend to make it even less representative than it is at present. Faced with the prospect of a violent clash between the two groups of Powers, many of the smaller countries would be tempted to provide for their own safety by a timely withdrawal. It may well be argued that most of the present difficulties have arisen just because too much attention has been paid to prevention and coercion and too little to construction and reconciliation.

The essential object of the League is the same as that of the Kellogg Pact—to substitute discussion and settlements by consent for war and the threat of war. It can best serve this purpose by acting as an international clearinghouse, for removing causes of friction, for redressing grievances, and for reconciling differences. Whether we like it or not, the world is not ripe for the creation of a super-State overriding national sovereignties and imposing by force obedience to the general will. What is immediately practicable is not a compulsory arbitration court, whose awards would have the force of law, but rather a court of conciliation, which would strive to promote agreement in cases of dispute. There are two courses, supplementary one to the other, by which the League can be revived and started again on a career of great and increasing usefulness. One is by working out practical proposals for removing the main causes of international conflict, economic as well as political, if indeed it is possible to separate the two. The other is to induce as many countries as possible to cooperate in this work. Few countries are likely to deprive themselves of the benefits resulting from international collaboration when they see the collaboration of others beginning to bear fruit. Thus the machinery of the League has been at work for more than a year seeking the basis of a concerted policy for economic recovery. Economic distresses are among the most powerful factors responsible for the existing tension in international politics. It would be an invaluable contribution to political appeasement if this preparatory work could be accelerated, and the League enabled to formulate effective measures for promoting world trade and for bringing the general standard of living nearer the higher levels of which the modern world is capable. Any success in this field must have an immediate tranquillizing effect upon the political situation. It would, moreover, provide a powerful inducement for Powers outside the League to resume their collaboration. In the meantime the Governments concerned for the maintenance of the League ideal, with all that it implies, can make their best contribution by resisting the tendency to split Europe into two opposing *blocs* and by promoting whatever agreements and appeasements are found possible."

* * *

We agree that the great City newspaper has in the past few months constantly used this train of thought as a warning and admonition to Geneva, for instance in the two leading articles of April 14th, 1937 (The League to-day) and of September 14th, 1937 (What the League can do). We recall the numerous

letters to which it gave space in order to issue a warning against making the League a super-State or a Ministry of War.

Two letters to the "Times".

Probably the criticism of the methods and aims of the Geneva League has never been so thoroughly probed as in the letter published in the "Times" on April 14th, 1937, which was signed by prominent persons of the most various views and experience. This letter is still of current interest, since it shows openly and frankly the defects which ultimately caused Italy and Germany to withdraw from the League.

"Sir,—On January 1st you published a "Declaration on Peace". It originated apparently from the International Peace Campaign and is being backed by the League of Nations Union. On March 18 there followed a supporting appeal signed by a number of mayors, clergy, and other notable persons. It is now clear that there is an organized campaign to get support for the campaign all over the country. In both letters it was declared that war can be averted and a stable peace permanently maintained if the members of the League of Nations make plain their determination to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant and take any measures required for the prevention or repression of aggression, including, if necessary, military sanctions.

The declaration also urged the importance of establishing within the framework of the League effectual machinery for remedying by peaceful means international conditions which might lead to war, though it made no practical proposals for doing so.

If all nations were members of the League, if the League possessed power to revise treaties, reduce barriers against the movement of goods and of people, and to remedy other conditions calculated to lead to war, economic sanctions might prevent aggression without serious risk of war. But it is quite clear that the present international tension and crisis is fundamentally due to the fact that the League has not been able to deal with any of the major problems of the contemporary world. It has been unable to modify frontiers admittedly unsound, to abate economic nationalism—though this is by far the biggest single cause of social unrest, dictatorship, and international tension—or to limit armaments, just as it was unable to give to Germany, even when it was a republic, the "equality" which was its natural right. To urge us, therefore, to commit ourselves not only to economic but to automatic military action, instead of equipping the League to do justice as between nations, is simply to increase and not diminish the risk of explosion. It will inevitably result in dividing the world into two great military alliances, the one standing for the *status quo*, the other for revision of it, with more and more of the smaller Powers returning to neutrality, as Scandinavia, Belgium, and Switzerland are already doing.

By far the most urgent duty of the League to-day is to formulate the practical proposals which it thinks would remove the main causes of international conflict. Until it has done this with some prospect of being able to give effect to its proposals, and until it commands universal membership, to strengthen its sanction system is merely to increase the probability of war, to turn every local war into a world war, and in the end to destroy the League altogether.

We believe that the ideals of the League represent the only road towards lasting peace. But we believe that the way to restore the League is not to turn it into an international war office, but rather to prove that it is an effective instrument for reconciliation, for the settlement of international disputes by pacific means, and for the removal of the causes of war.

Yours faithfully,

Arnold, Astor, Henry Carter, John Fischer Williams, Edward Grigg, Hardinge of Penshurst, George Lansbury, F. O. Lindley, Lothian, Edith Lyttelton, Charles E. Raven, Rennell, Sanderson, Donald Soper, Trenchard.

* * *

Lastly we may mention in this connection another letter published in the "Times" on May 4th, 1937 to which reference has frequently been made since that time in other papers. It was written by P. A. Molteno who died on September 19th, 1937 at the age of 76 years and whose life as a politician and member of parliament, as a scientist and philanthropist, and as a friend of the former Prime Minister Cambell-Bannerman and of the Boer General Louis Botha, was recorded in the "Times" of September 21st in a detailed obituary notice.

German offers! This was the title of his letter to the "Times", in which he described to his readers impressively and briefly the series of opportunities lost by British diplomacy (and thus also by the League of Nations).

"Germany seems to have made a number of offers in the direction of peace, and also made substantial contributions to the peace of Europe. Allow me to refer to some of them.

Hitler has recorded that Germany has renounced all intention of seeking a reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine. Has solemnly recognized and guaranteed France her frontiers as determined after the Saar plebiscite, and has further declared "We are prepared to do everything on our part to arrive at a true peace and a real friendship with the French nation." Has made peace with Poland. Has offered to join in complete disarmament. Has offered to limit her army to 200,000, and when this was abandoned, offered to limit her army to 300,000. This was refused. Has stated her willingness to be ready in principle to conclude pacts of non-aggression with neighbouring States, and to supplement these pacts with all provisions which aim at isolating the war maker and localizing the area of the war.

That Germany is ready at any time to limit her arms to any degree that is adopted by the other Powers.

Prepared to take an active part in all efforts which may lead to a practical limitation of boundless armaments. Prepared to agree to the prohibition of the dropping of gas, incendiary, and explosive bombs outside the real battle zone, and stated that this limitation could then be extended to complete international outlawry of all bombing.

Hitler also offered the concrete proposal for an air pact on the basis of parity of strength as between France, England, and Germany.

Prepared to agree to any limitation which leads to the abolition of the heaviest arms especially suited for aggression such as (1) heaviest artillery, (2) heaviest tanks.

Declared Germany's readiness to agree to any limitation whatsoever of the calibre strength of artillery, of battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, and of the size of warships, the limitation of the tonnage of submarines, or their complete abolition in the case of international agreement.

Prepared to agree to prevent the poisoning of public opinion among the nations by irresponsible elements, orally or in writing, through the theatre or cinema, having already taken steps to this effect in Germany.

Of all these proposals the only one which eventuated in agreement was his offer to limit the Germany Navy to 35 per cent. of the British Navy.

In his speech on March 7th, 1936, he recalled all these proposals and their complete rejection except for the Naval agreement with Britain.

Finally, on March 21st, 1936, he made the offer of a most comprehensive peace plan to the British Government and people, including an offer to return to the League of Nations. This has had no answer, but a query was addressed to the German Government by the British Government in regard to certain points of the offer.

Thus there appear to have been a number of opportunities open to British diplomacy for forwarding the conclusion of real peace in Europe, and the restriction of the mad race in armaments. We are without information why, with the exception of the Naval agreement, no advantage has apparently been taken of these opportunities".

* * *

In view of these warnings and admonitions of the "Times", have not the authors of the article of December 13th perhaps not had the feeling they should have headed their doubtless well-meaning remarks with the words: "Too late"? Had they not the inner conviction that the time limit which has run since 1919 for the Geneva League is now definitely and irrevocably past, after waiting 17 years for it to take up its real task?

* * *

The "Daily Telegraph" perhaps took a more realistic view of the position on December 13th, when it wrote:

"Saturday's declaration, in fact, simply recognises, *de jure* a state of things that has long existed *de facto*.

On the other hand, it is claimed in Italy that this severance from the League is "the beginning of a new period of international relations"; and in one sense that may be true. With three of the Great Powers—Germany, Japan and Italy—withdrawn from the League; with the United States sympathetic but disinclined to share any responsibility; and with Russia weakened by Stalin's drastic "purges," it is evident that questions requiring international settlement can no longer be referred to the League with confidence or even with utility; because the writ of the League will no longer run. The method of direct negotiation between the Powers concerned—as in the present conversations between Great Britain, France and Germany—will be the only practicable resort".

* * *

A Belgian expression of opinion.

In this connection we may reproduce a Belgian view, as expressed by the "Independence Belge" of December 14th.

"Now that Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States and Brazil have left the League, the latter no longer corresponds in any way to what its founders meant it to be, when they conceived a genuinely universal instrument of peace. Nor does it correspond any longer to what the Belgian Government had in mind when it joined the League. The League is now fast becoming the political organisation of an ideological group, which is as much as to say, a weapon of war directed against another group. It belies in so doing its peaceful mission; and we should be making ourselves the accomplices of such a betrayal if we continued to co-operate under such equivocal conditions. Is it our desire to risk the maintenance of our policy of independence by taking sides against our convictions in a connection where the interests of peace no less than our own interests indicate on the contrary the very utmost caution? The Geneva ulcer must be cut. Belgium must either withdraw from the League or take the initiative towards a new policy in Europe, that is to say, towards an international reorganisation, based this time on the co-operation of all Powers (irrespective of the ideological group to which they belong) and taking the experience of the post-war years into account. We for our part would prefer the second alternative to the first, not being advocates of what we should regard as a retrograde, selfish and, for that matter, dangerous step. We believe, moreover, strongly that, if the ideal

of international co-operation has had so many set-backs, that has been because there has been a disposition to leave out a stage, and not because it was utopian in itself. Before therefore we can proceed to a World League of Nations, we must first rebuild Europe.

It is in any case essential to take the initiative towards a new European policy. France and England are at present embarked on a church steeple policy devoid of any trace of

imagination: and we shall soon have no choice left between excited and selfish nationalisms on the one hand and a false internationalism on the other revealing itself with every month that passes as more and more what it really is, namely, an engine of war. If one reads Hitler's speeches, one sees that there is plenty of room for a genuine international organisation based on foundations of reality. Here is the angle of approach, if the worst is to be avoided."

VII. The Idea of Political Collectivity⁽¹⁾

By Baron von Neurath, German Minister of Foreign Affairs

The conception of a policy of collectivity or collective security is a typical example of the manner in which real political tendencies and activities ultimately lead to the formation of a catchword which claims a higher morality for itself as compared with other political views and thus exercises a wide influence. An attempt to shape international relations in accordance with a more or less far-reaching solidarity of States quite naturally appears to be a method which represents an epoch-making advance over other methods used in the past. It is obvious that this catchword has its origin in the ideology of the League of Nations, which desired and was intended to represent the perfect realisation of political collectivity. The principle of collectivity can moreover not deny this origin although attempts have recently been made to gain acceptance for it outside the framework of League policy. If, therefore, my subject leads me in the first place to make some remarks about the Geneva institution, I have naturally no intention of repeating the reasons for Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations or of expressing any views about the policy hitherto pursued by the League from the point of view of specific German interests. That is a closed capital which needs no further comment. What I desire rather is again to draw attention to some points of principle in the League Covenant which characterise the attempt proclaimed at Geneva to organise the States in such a manner that the ultimate questions of the destiny of the peoples, the questions of peace and war, should find their answer solely in the joint and total will of all States.

It may of course be said that even such a fundamental and general examination of League principles is entirely superfluous, as the failure of these principles has at present almost become a political platitude, and there not many politicians left who seriously believe that a better realisation of the League ideals can be attained in the future. In a recent debate in the British House of Commons it was stated openly in an authoritative quarter that the League of Nations was not in a position to fulfil its proper function of securing peace, that it offered no guarantee against a war of aggression and that there was therefore no point in constantly emphasising the confidence in the Geneva methods and the desire to make them more effective. However gratifying this frank recognition may be in comparison with the opinions expressed until quite recently on this subject in England, it was again stated at the same time that the League principles as such were thought to be right and that their failure

in practice was primarily due to the fact that some of the powerful States were outside the League. To make lack of universality of the League of Nations responsible for the failure of the policy of collectivity is, I am convinced, a direct confusion of cause and effect—a confusion that shows that, despite all the obvious experiences, it is still necessary to deal with the fundamental aspect of these problems.

We entirely understand, even at the present time, that mankind, shaken to its foundations by the War, was to a great extent filled with hope and trust in 1919 when it was offered a league of all States which was to guarantee for all future time the pacific settlement of State conflicts and the suppression of any war of aggression, a league in which all would stand for one and one for all. But it is less comprehensible that those who knew the position, especially in the countries that remained neutral in the War, did not even at that time recognise and strongly oppose the points which must have shown from the outset how faulty was the construction of the Geneva institution. And those who at that time could not or would not take fully into account the intentions of certain great victorious Powers in the direction of a policy of power, should have seen, even if only as jurists, the serious defects displayed by the Covenant of the League of Nations from a purely objective standpoint. Since these matters have long been known, I will merely refer in this connection to the following points which must still be borne in mind in order to obtain a proper judgment of the value or worthlessness of the idea of collectivity.

The Covenant prescribes a certain procedure for the pacific treatment of all conflicts between States, whether of a legal or political nature, whether of limited scope or of vital interest for the nations concerned. At the same time, it strictly forbids the States to take action with their own forces to safeguard their interests, however legitimate they may be, until the procedure in question has been complied with. If such a radical system was thought possible and if it was really considered that it could be put into effect, would it not have been a matter of course that the League procedure should from the outset be so arranged that, at any rate in principle, one of the parties should be really ensured a definitely binding, impartial decision of the conflict and at the same time the loyal execution of such decision? But this was not done in the Covenant. It leaves open the possibility that a decision attained by one party in its own favour is not carried out by the other party, and the further possibility—and this applies particularly to important political disputes—that no objective decision is reached at all. In that

(1) Address delivered at the Academy of German Law at Munich on October 30th, 1937.

case, the party in question, after devoting many months to the pacific system, is ultimately compelled to utilise its own means of force in order to obtain its rights, without being able to claim the support of the Members of the League. It has always been pointed out with satisfaction that the time necessarily spent in complying with the procedure of conciliation is in itself a particularly effective means of preventing war. But this would only be an argument, if the State concerned obtained real compensation for a loss that is often irreparable, and not merely the consolation that it had acted in accordance with the Covenant.

But that is not the most important point. What about the authority which, according to the Covenant, is called upon to give a decision in political disputes? Could it ever be thought that the League Council could claim to be an impartial judge, although the majority of its permanent Members, the representatives of the Great Powers, and also its non-permanent Members are in many, if not in most, cases directly or indirectly concerned in the dispute, and would therefore be judges in their own case? Moreover, on what material principles should the decision of this authority be given? According to the text and spirit of the Covenant, the supreme law is scrupulous respect for existing law, in particular treaties that have been concluded. But the League Covenant does not take into consideration the fact that every legal system which is formally applicable is, and must necessarily be, subject to evolution if it is not to destroy the healthy development of life, and that in a peace system which lays claim to totality there must not be lacking an effective factor which guarantees the reasonable further development of the law and therefore a revision of the treaties in accordance with the vital needs of the nations. It is true that one cautious article, worded almost shamefacedly, hints at this necessity, without however drawing the consequences in a manner which could be put to practical use.

Lastly, we come to the most important point in which the idea of collectivity should find its most immediate expression. Despite all obvious defects and gaps in the system of conciliation, the authors of it thought they could crown their system of safeguarding peace by a mutual guarantee of the territorial possessions of the States and by sanctions against the so-called peace-breaker. Every Member of the League was to assume joint responsibility for the observance of the League Covenant and to take action, even to the sacrifice of its most important interests and by the use of its military forces, so that a conflict between other States which in no way concerned it and which possibly could not be settled amicably might not lead to warlike entanglements. That was to be the correct course, although it could in no way be foreseen now a reliable answer could be given to the decisive question as to the establishment of the aggressor or what would happen in the not improbable case that the Members of the Council took opposite views on this question of the aggressor, or finally how a decision of the League could be successfully put into effect if it were directed against a State of great economic and military power or, still more, against a group of such States.

To assuage all these serious doubts, the only fact that could be referred to in the League Covenant was that it contained a definite promise of general disarmament. From the point of view of the new peace system, therefore, the carrying out of

general disarmament should undoubtedly have been treated as the most important and first task in order to ascertain whether the promise was to be taken seriously or, as has turned out to be the case, was merely an empty promise.

When at the present time we regard the League in the light of events that have occurred since its foundation and in the light of its failures which have constantly become more striking, we find that everything which the birth certificate of this first and most comprehensive attempt at incorporating the idea of collectivity gave grounds for expecting has been fully confirmed. It became more and more evident that the political forces which supported the Geneva institution and determined its practice did not really aim at the introduction of a just legal order corresponding to the real needs of the life of the nations, but were directed, under the protection of this alleged ideal, towards the pursuit of definite onesided interests of power. A system such as that represented by the Covenant, in view of the defects which I have pointed out, proved to be a very suitable instrument for a policy directed towards the perpetuation of a given political position and the maintenance of a certain position of power which had once been established. But this combination of moral promises, utopian ideas and political intentions has proved fatal to the League of Nations in practice. I will give a short review of this practice in so far as it is directly connected with the fate of the idea of collectivity and its various modifications.

The basic tendencies of the years of work by which it was desired to develop and safeguard the peaceful organisation of the world soon became quite clear. The famous Geneva protocol of 1924, it is true, was a perfect draft treaty for the pacific settlement of conflicts between States, but it laid down the supreme principle that the treaties of 1919 were sacred and should not be subject to any evolution. At the same time, every care was taken in the Protocol to enable sanctions to function automatically in spite of the difficulties to which I have just referred. The Geneva protocol came to grief through the resistance of England, but the tendency of the subsequent efforts of the leading League politicians remained the same. There is no doubt that the representatives of some Governments have throughout endeavoured sincerely and in good faith to bring about real progress in the shaping of international relations. But they were unsuccessful against a group of Powers that desired to utilise the Geneva machinery in order to maintain their political possessions to the full and, in case of a conflict, to secure for the use of their own military resources the moral and also practical support of the League of Nations. It is very instructive to follow the efforts made to attain this transparent aim in the years after the rejection of the Geneva Protocol by means of a new form of a policy of collectivity. As there was no longer any hope that, in case of conflict, military sanctions would be applied in their totality as was originally planned, that is to say with the participation of all the League Members possessing strong armies, the idea of the so-called regional pacts became more and more prominent in the Geneva discussions. Under the auspices of the League Council, individual groups of States were to combine to conclude special treaties, under which they undertook to grant each other immediate mutual assistance in case of war. The composition of these groups of States was not, as the word "regional" would seem to imply, to be determined from a

purely geographical point of view, but the States adjoining each other might be joined by other non-contiguous States if the latter had a special interest in so doing.

The proposal for such regional pacts and the manner in which they were to be brought about have formed the subject of many long discussions in Committees; model drafts have been prepared, and there has been no lack of urgent recommendations that they should be used. Such pacts have, however not been concluded within those groups of States which the authors of the idea had principally in mind. While all these efforts were being made round the committee table, the League of Nations with its ideas of collectivity encountered one failure after another in the world of real political events. It was incapable of contributing to the solution of any of the concrete problems that arose; in none of the cases which led to warlike complications could it do good service by means of its procedure for safeguarding peace. The Disarmament Conference, at which the idea of regional pacts was put forward with special emphasis, led to a disastrous fiasco. In only one case did it take the decision to apply seriously the main requisite of the policy of collectivity, namely sanctions; but it has been rightly pointed out that in this particular case it would have been far better if the League had remained true to its tradition merely to indulge in talk. But while the most faithful adherents of the League of Nations could no longer speak merely of a crisis, but had to recognise complete failure, the idea of regional pacts was not dead. According to everything one hears, it again appears to play a considerable part in the discussions taking place at Geneva regarding a reform of the League of Nations.

There is naturally no occasion for us in Germany to adopt an attitude towards such plans of reform. But it is a matter of importance for us that the idea of regional pacts has in recent years arisen also outside League policy. Especially in this recent period, if I am not mistaken, the catchword of collectivity or collective security has become current for this idea. I will merely point out quite incidentally that for some time the Government of the Soviet Union has made itself the main propagandist of these ideas and in addition has invented for its own particular purposes the further catchword of the indivisibility of peace.

It is easy to see what difficulties would be encountered by an attempt to introduce a collective system of pacts with an obligation of mutual assistance even if this attempt were made, not in the form of universality, but in the form of regional pacts. Such a system of pacts, like the sanctions system of the League of Nations, would also fail in case of emergency. If it functioned at all, it would certainly only be in such a manner that other political agreements and interests of the participants, lying outside the alleged aim of the pact, would play the decisive part. Even if it is considered possible that the parties to the pact would in case of emergency neglect all other agreements and interests and keep strictly to the pact, the fact would still remain that this would always act in favour of the stronger party with the stronger military forces, since it would be difficult to imagine an effective protection of weak military parties against superior military parties.

More concrete proof of this may be given by a definite example. For this purpose I will select the plan of a so-called Eastern Pact which was put before us in the summer of 1934. Although

the negotiations were at the time carried on confidentially, the draft pact and the other essential details have in the meantime been published. I can therefore refer to it without hesitation, especially as the proposal put forward at that time is now of no importance. But I will leave on one side everything that was not typical for the regional pact idea but was connected with the special political peculiarities of this particular proposal.

The proposal was to the effect that Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should undertake to consult together in case of a crisis, and in case of an attack by one party against another party to support the attacked country. It was also provided that in certain important cases of conflict, France should also take part in the consultation and military support. It will be immediately obvious to what doubts even the selection of these eight, or in certain cases nine, Powers must give rise, when the nature of the political relations existing between them is borne in mind. Moreover, no provision whatever was made as to what would happen if the Powers that had undertaken to support each other were of different opinions as to which of the countries involved in the conflict had been attacked. In such a case, the result would necessarily have been either that the smaller parties would immediately bow to the will of the stronger party, or that opposing groups would be formed within the parties so that there would be war by all against all. Lastly, it could not be overlooked that in so far as such a pact really strengthened the security of certain participants, it would under certain circumstances act to the disfavour of States outside this group—a result which would not be in the interest of general peace.

I am convinced that the same or similar objections would also arise in other cases in which attempts might be made to introduce such a hard and fixed system as an unconditional agreement of mutual assistance for a more or less large group of States. Such projects, in the most favourable case, that is to say if they are really considered as an equal guarantee by all parties, will merely remain on paper and only give an illusory feeling of increased security. But in less favourable cases they will serve to camouflage and strengthen alliances between individual parties to the disadvantage of other parties. Naturally I do not mean that the conclusion of multilateral security pacts which also form a basis of obligations of military guarantee are politically impossible. It is well known that Germany has expressed her willingness to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a new Western Pact to take the place of the Rhineland Pact of Locarno. It is not possible at present to make a public statement regarding the position of these negotiations, which have for obvious reasons been placed in the background by other more pressing political problems. But it is obvious from the outset that such a pact is only thinkable if, as was essentially the case with the old Rhineland Pact, it is restricted to the settlement of concrete, well defined eventualities, and if the extent of the obligations to be assumed by the various parties is made clear in advance; but on the other hand it is unthinkable if the intention is to apply an abstract scheme of an unlimited obligation of mutual assistance between the participating Powers.

According to all experience inside and outside the League of Nations, it may be taken as a definite law that an effective organisatory combination of States is only possible if it serves

exclusively to attain objects which these States all have the same interest in attaining. Abstract ideas of collectivity, the transfer of hard and fast constructions to any problems whatever and to any geographical areas whatever are not only of no use, but they render political progress more difficult. The German Government, recognising this elementary fact, has always been in favour of dealing with every concrete international problem according to the methods suited to that particular problem, not to complicate it unnecessarily by combining it with other problems and, in so far as problems between only two Powers are concerned, to choose the path of direct understanding between those two Powers. We may point out that these political methods have proved their value to the full not only in the interest of Germany but in the general interest. In this connection, I need only refer to the German-Polish agreement of January 1934 or the German-Belgian exchange of notes of the middle of October this year. I state my opinion quite frankly that such agreements are of much greater use in the direction of

safeguarding peace that all the proposals that have hitherto been advanced on the basis of the idea of collectivity.

There is one thing that I should like to emphasise in conclusion. Voices are frequently raised abroad which place the unconditional preference for collective security methods on an equality with the will for peace and international cooperation, while at the same time the rejection or even the criticism of such methods is regarded as a lack of desire for peace and cooperation. If the adherents of the idea of collectivity refuse to be converted either by the experience of the last few decades or by a calm consideration of the real political possibilities, they should at any rate refrain from claiming a higher morality and greater good will for themselves. Let them show what tangible results they have obtained with their plans. For myself, I see none. In politics and in peace policy the decisive factor is success, and not merely the setting up of fine objectives which may look tempting but are not realisable in practice and are therefore worthless.

VIII. Flight from Collective Security?

SWITZERLAND AND COMPLETE NEUTRALITY

Declarations by Federal President Motta in the Swiss National Council on 22nd, Decembre 1937

From the interpellation by National Councillor Gut.

Switzerland joined the League of Nations, as the records show, in the expectation that the League would become universal at no distant date. The course of events was the exact opposite. The United States of America never joined; and—what for us is the decisive consideration—of our four neighbours numbering some 150 million people, two great Powers numbering over 100 millions are no longer members. If the provision “*rebus sic stantibus*” is applicable to our accession to, and continuance in, the League, we have long since been in a position to plead the clause in operation and draw the logical conclusions. We have not taken that step; and the retrograde development of the League has merely proceeded to the accompaniment of a succession of reservations on our part as the circumstances indicated. Our reservations were made in the form of independent declarations of our view of the relation between the Swiss political principle of neutrality and our obligations to the League.

I recall in that connection the declaration made by Federal President Motta in Geneva on October 9th, 1935 on the occasion of the Ethiopian dispute, the decision of the National Council on January 28th, 1936, the declaration of the Federal Council on September 4th, 1936, and our own resolution of March 10th, 1937. These successive statements point the unanimous moral that Switzerland does not mean to depart from the principle and tradition of her century-old, perpetual neutrality, that she reserves the right to interpret and fulfil her obligations under the Covenant of the League within the limits of that neutrality and in the full possession of her sovereignty, and that she cannot recognise any sort of obligation which implies the imposition of sanctions, the nature and effect of which are such as to jeopardise the maintenance of her neutrality.

These statements were plain; they were unilateral: they left the door open to subsequent restatement of our neutrality in future conflicts according to the nature of the case.

The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Assemblies of the League, which dealt with the liquidation of sanctions and the reform of the Covenant, destroyed the last hopes of a rapid modification of that instrument in such a way as to mitigate the danger arising for us in connection with sanctions. Article 16, said the representative of an authoritative great Power, “must not be touched. Economic sanctions must remain obligatory on every member of the League.”

In presence of such a standpoint, when even newspapers of countries which are supporters of the League assert that the withdrawal of the three great Powers has transformed the Geneva institution into the organ of an “axis”, we can no longer refuse to admit the force of the argument already more than once put forward beneath this roof that under present circumstances, when our second great neighbour has formally notified its withdrawal, any form of “differentiation” cannot be other than dangerous and open to misunderstanding, and that everything therefore points to the reassertion of our traditional neutrality.

Numerous utterances in the Press from all parts of Switzerland have been emphatic in this sense; and it is noteworthy in this connection that French and Italian and German Swiss organs are in complete agreement in the matter. The unmistakable efforts of Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian countries to cut loose from “active” and “relative” neutrality and revert to neutrality plain and simple and “undifferentiated”—which, under present circumstances, is tantamount to saying, freedom from sanction obligations—have not failed to secure the attention which is their due.

Statement by Federal President Motta

Federal President Motta answered Herr Gut's interpellation as follows. He said:

The Federal Council will give as definite an answer to Herr Gut's interpellation as is possible under existing circumstances.

But I must not fail in the first place to thank Herr Gut for submitting his interpellation and arguing it in the admirable speech to which we have just listened. What I have now to say is no personal utterance of my own : it is the fruits of common and unanimous deliberation. I have put it in writing, in view of the extremely delicate nature of the subject, so as avoid the pitfalls that beset the path of improvised utterances.

What you are interested in, what you want to hear from the Federal Council, is what in the opinion of the latter is likely to be the effect on the position of Switzerland in the League of Nations of the decision taken and made public by the Italian Government on December 11th. That decision is, in our opinion, a pregnant one. We do not share the view of those who seek to belittle its significance and seriousness by saying or writing that Italy's withdrawal from the League makes no difference to political realities, and that it does no more than give legal form to a position of fact which has already existed for more than two years. In spite of everything we always hoped that Italy, once her sovereignty over Abyssinia was recognised, directly or indirectly, would no longer refuse to resume her active co-operation with the League, as befitted a country which was among the League's founders. The policy of the Federal Council, as Parliament is aware, has always been guided by the desire to see such a resumption of Italian co-operation realised. Our hopes have been belied by the events. It would be useless to attempt to place responsibilities in the matter; and we resolutely decline to embark on any such attempt.

But what we cannot shut our eyes to is the fact that the League of Nations of the year 1937 can hardly be said any longer to resemble the picture which we had of it in 1920. We entered the League as a result of a highly controversial, but quite definite, decision of the Swiss people. The motive which led to that decision was a noble one and, in my opinion, politically wise. The chief difficulty in the way arose out of our traditional neutrality. We believed at the time that, provided our neutrality was fully assured in the military sense, we could venture to take part in the League, inasmuch as the risk of such participation would be offset by the additional guarantees of security which the new institution would afford us. A further consideration was the circumstance that the Swiss city of Geneva had had the honour to be chosen as the seat of the League.

Our neutrality was laid down by the 435th Article of the Treaty of Versailles and by the London Declaration of February 13th, 1920; and we had every reason to assume that the question was thereby satisfactorily settled. Today we are faced with the urgent duty of enquiry as to whether that settlement meets in every respect the requirements of our security. More than once in recent years we have had reason to doubt whether this was the case. So long as all our neighbours were members of the League, it was justifiable and natural that we should feel assured in these respects. Even the withdrawal of Germany did not arouse

direct uneasiness on our part, for the possibility of her return to the League did not seem entirely out of the question. But the withdrawal of yet another of our great neighbours now makes it imperative for us to concern ourselves with this grave issue.

The Federal Council's view is that the Confederation must now proceed without delay to make it clear that we cannot be content with differential neutrality, and that our neutrality must be comprehensive in accordance with our tradition of centuries and with the geographical position and past history of our country.

The Federal Council took the first steps in this sense two years ago in 1935. On October 10th of that year, on the occasion of the armed conflict between Italy and Abyssinia, it informed the Assembly of the League in Geneva through the mouth of the head of the Swiss delegation that Switzerland did not feel bound to apply economic and financial sanctions except in so far as they left her neutrality unaffected. We did not apply the particular sanction which consisted in a complete rupture of commercial relations with Italy. Again, when it was a question of prohibiting the export of arms and war material, we based our prohibition of export of these things to either belligerent on the Hague Convention concerning the rights and duties of neutrals. Our attitude in this connection gave rise to certain criticisms, and led to a certain amount of misunderstanding on the part of some of the members of the League; but we were able nevertheless to carry our point.

A year later, in 1936, the Federal Assembly had occasion to express its views on the policy followed by the Federal Council under the circumstances referred to; and we had the satisfaction of finding that the whole Assembly was at one with us without distinction of parties.

Then came the question of the revision of the League Covenant. Switzerland is a member of the Committee of 28 States appointed for this purpose. In a letter to the Secretary-General of the League dated September 4th, 1936 the Federal Council gave expression to its views on the subject of reform, and took occasion to reassert its views and standpoint in the matter of neutrality.

The Federal Council has never lost sight of the desirability of taking every favourable opportunity to clear up the legal position of Switzerland in the League. When on August 1st last the Federal President broadcast a message to Swiss nationals in foreign countries, he did not omit to point out to them that the general course of political developments had led Switzerland to lay increasing emphasis on her desire for neutrality, even in relation to the League of Nations. I am given to understand that these utterances attracted attention in foreign countries. Here in Switzerland they did not give rise to further discussion, presumably because they synchronised with another speech which I had the honour to make, also on August 1st, in Giornico.

The appropriate moment has now come; and the Federal Council is called upon to act with firmness and calm, without precipitancy or undue haste. Rest assured that we shall do all that is in our power to rise to the occasion. As to the end in view, indeed, there is something in the nature of moral unanimity; but as to the means to the end, as to the

proper course to take, opinions differ. The Federal Council asks you in this connection to give it time for ripe consideration. The Political Department proposes, after taking counsel with certain persons who command its confidence, to submit a report in writing to the Federal Council in the course of January next. This departmental report will form the basis of a subsequent report by the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly. The Federal Council will proceed in closest touch with Parliament and public opinion. We observe that a Committee has recently been constituted with a view to a plebiscite for the purpose of embodying the principle of neutrality in the Constitution and defining its legal effect in constitutional form. The Committee, which consists of honourable persons whose patriotism is beyond question, will be well inspired if it leaves the Government a free hand to proceed by means of the ordinary diplomatic machinery and does not intervene to curb or hinder our proceedings. I have good reason for supposing that the Committee in question has already modified its views, and will refrain, at any rate for the present, from giving publicity to expressions of opinion on international policy which could not fail to assume an impassioned character. Public discussions of such a character might do very serious political and moral harm.

No one should think of demanding the withdrawal of Switzerland from the League. We are the country in which the League has its seat. We cannot forget that the aim of the League was to promote peace through justice. I admit that it has only partially fulfilled that aim. But its value as a symbol is not thereby affected, and is beyond criticism at the hands of all impartial observers. International co-operation is one of the necessities of the modern world. The form of such co-operation may be shattered and replaced: the need for such co-operation remains beyond dispute. The peoples long for justice and security. They wish the great Powers would not regard one another as rivals, but would concert their efforts to ensure the happiness of humanity. All States must have a meeting-ground where they can make themselves heard. The function of the small States, especially when they combine in common efforts, is fruitful and beneficent.

It would be distressing to leave in the lurch a field of activity which we have learnt in the past eighteen years to know and appreciate increasingly.

Moreover, we must not create the impression, or give rise to the suspicion, that we desire to follow any particular system of great Powers like planets moving in prescribed orbits. We are neutral, because we desire to be free and independent. The chief value of our neutrality is its function as one of the most precious safeguards of our independence and inviolability.

This neutrality is not at present threatened, and will no doubt not for a long time to come be threatened, as a result of our belonging to the League. In its military aspects it is beyond question. All the States which are signatories of the Versailles Treaty have placed on record their conviction that maintenance of the neutrality of Switzerland is an international obligation essential to the cause of peace.

The League of Nations as it stands can no longer contemplate the possibility of sanctions of an economic character against any party. The system of sanctions is in

future unworkable in practice. Article 16 of the Covenant is, as it were, crippled. Without abandoning its interest in the need for collective security, the League of Nations will in future have to seek salvation in other directions. If it desires to revert to the ideal of universality, it will take courage and renounce resort to physical force, in order to become what it truly is and should be, a mighty and beneficent instrument of peaceful co-operation. The renunciation of the resort to force will not prove a source of weakness, but rather a turning-point on the road to rebirth. Those arguments which give rise to irritation will no longer be heard in the council chambers of the League; and their absence will strengthen the force of the appeals which the League may make to do justice and practise moderation.

The League of Nations is exposed, through no will of its own, to the danger of transformation into a coalition opposed to another coalition. It will know how to avoid this misfortune, which could not but prove menacing — and that in a very short space of time. No! Whatever happens, Geneva must not become the seat of a coalition. The Federal Council does not for a moment doubt that Powers like Great Britain and France, supported by the firm resolution of the other States—I have in mind primarily the Netherlands, Belgium, the Scandinavian States, Austria and many others—will be on their guard against allowing the League of Nations to fall into the fatal and unpardonable error of becoming the handmaid of this or that ideology, thereby belying its nature, its *raison d'être*, its aims and its efforts.

Switzerland will continue in the future, as in the past, to play in the League of Nations a modest, but yet not insignificant, part.

A POLISH VIEW

An Article from the semi-official "Informations politiques polonaises" of December 14th, 1937

The problem of the League has been developing for a number of years past. The forms which that development has assumed of late have been of such a serious nature that it is neither excessive nor exaggerated to speak of a "crisis of the League". This state of things finds its clearest expression in two recent events—the decision of Italy and the German declaration by which it was followed.

Polish policy has made systematic efforts for a long time to prevent the development of the situation in which the League of Nations now inevitably finds itself after the final withdrawal of Italy. Unfortunately, these efforts have not met with the appreciation which they deserved at the hands of the members of the League. Poland, it should be remembered, was the first country to suspend the operation of sanctions against Italy by a decree of the Polish Cabinet dated July 27th, 1936, i.e. some days before the resolution of the Co-ordination Committee. In a statement made on December 18th, 1936 to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate the Polish Foreign Minister stated that the Ethiopian question was closed, so far as Poland was concerned, with the suspension of sanctions. He added that he hoped the next session at Geneva would finally wind up the affair. This was not the case, however; and the Polish Govern-

ment accordingly instructed its delegate to raise the question officially at the Assembly in May 1937. The representative of the Polish Government there stated that, as the Polish Government was not interested, directly or indirectly, in the part of Africa concerned, their sole concern in the Ethiopian dispute was its bearing on the future of international co-operation within the framework of the League, and the existence of the League should be based on realities. The Polish Government accordingly regarded the Ethiopian question as closed, so far as Poland was concerned.

Press comment in certain countries endeavours to belittle the significance of the Italian decision and the German declaration, suggesting that they are "purely symbolic". We are unable to share that view for two reasons—in the first place, because the Covenant of the League was conceived as the statute of a universal international body and, in the second place, because in spite of the failure to make it universal at any time since its foundation there was nevertheless a moment when the League system at least covered all Europe, so that it was reasonable to suppose that it had an important part to play as a European institution at any rate. That conception may be said, as a result of recent events, to be in process of dissolution: it was already greatly weakened before those events.

Some of the Press comment in question goes on to argue frankly that what the League of Nations should now do is to assume the championship of a certain school of doctrine—and that, not merely in connection with international policy, but also in respect of the internal political structure of States.

If such were ever accepted as the attitude of the States represented on the League, the Geneva institution would become nothing more than the camp of a particular doctrine, which is as much as to say, the camp of one particular party in a "religious war".

The attitude of the Polish Government in this matter is well known. It has been stated in Parliament and through the diplomatic channel. But the circumstances of the present moment are such as to seem to call for its restatement.

Speaking on January 15th, 1936 in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Diet, the Polish Foreign Minister, Col. Beck, stated that the internal political systems of other countries could not affect the decisions of Polish policy. "It is a sign of the times," he said, "this variety of political systems in different countries, and the general process of political development along the most diverse and sometimes conflicting lines. To look no further, of the six States which are neighbours of Poland, each has adopted a different internal form of government, which it champions in the name of different political doctrines. Each governs itself under a different system and by different methods. If one attempted to direct international policy, and to determine one's political attitude in regard to particular countries, in accordance with the brand of constitutional doctrine they affect, the whole world would be likely to end by finding itself faced with a situation comparable to that prevailing in the period of the wars of religion."

On December 10th, 1936 the Polish Government submitted a memorandum to the Secretariat of the League on the subject of the work proceeding in connection with the reform of the Covenant. In this document the Polish Government drew atten-

tion to the fact that the League was created and conceived as an organisation with a universal basis. The Polish Government pointed out that the reality was very far from this ideal, and expressed a fear that under these conditions the labours of the League might become academic and abstract, while at the same time the most serious problems of international life would develop outside the League. Such a state of things, it added, might expose the League to the danger of succumbing to the attempt to turn it into a bloc of States, whose interests might well conflict with those of States not members of the League.

The Polish Government has always been opposed to the idea of a division of the world into two hostile camps. It draws particular attention to this danger, and is of the opinion that it can only be averted by creating conditions favourable to the realisation of the principle of universality.

The Polish Foreign Minister returned to the question in a statement made to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate on December 18th, 1936. Once again he uttered a warning against the danger of the formation of two blocs—one of League members and the other of non-members. "Our aversion," he said, "to being shut up in one or other of two camps which, if they do not openly combat one another, are none the less mutually hostile, is part and parcel of the principles of Poland's foreign policy, and is at the basis of those conceptions in the light of which we turn to a number of important States. The discussion on the Spanish peril has brought the force of this peril to light. I am glad therefore to be able to say that up to the present we have been able, in conjunction with certain other countries, effectively to oppose this tendency."

The force of the standpoint above indicated appears perfectly clear. It is to be interpreted as an expression of the friendly interest we feel in an international institution which makes contacts possible on a very wide basis, and so enables solutions to be sought for questions in dispute by the meeting of representatives of countries holding different views round a conference table. If, however, there were to become apparent a definite tendency in Geneva to engage in the conflict of doctrines, the Polish Government would be compelled to consider carefully whether such a development would not be inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Polish policy, and to determine its future relations with the League of Nations accordingly.

All the Governmental declarations above quoted, as also the line taken by the representatives of Poland at Geneva in connection with particular concrete questions dealt with by the League, show clearly that Polish policy regards the possibilities of restoration of the atmosphere of confidence in Europe as bound up with the respect due to all States as the associates of one another in all international understandings, and no less with the respect due to the right of every nation to model its internal activities according to its own ideas and conceptions.

SWEDEN AND THE LEAGUE

From the Speech of the Swedish Foreign Minister, Hr. Sandler, in Upsala on November 6th, 1937 on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the "Laboremus" Association in Upsala

Hr. Sandler referred in his speech to the dangers to Swedish security inherent in the present situation, and in particular to the anxieties and uncertainties which have been apparent in

the discussions in the newspapers on Sweden's position as a member of the League and her resulting obligations. There is talk, he said, as to its not being clear whether Sweden is pursuing under present circumstances a League of Nations policy or a policy of neutrality; and it is said, we ought to come to a definite decision as to which we mean to pursue. Those responsible for our foreign policy are reproached for the deplorably passive attitude they are said to adopt, without any clear conception of the obligations incumbent on Sweden as a member of the League.

In all this discussion of Sweden and the League the question of what Sweden's security stands to gain as a result of membership of the League is relegated to the background. The discussion turns entirely on the importance and the greater or lesser degree of menace attaching to the dangers involved. It is unquestionably true that the general political situation is quite different from what it was at the time of the Locarno Pact, which was the point de départ and the justification of the Swedish disarmament programme. But the moral of the changed situation has already been drawn; and the results are apparent in the reorganisation of the Swedish defence forces. There will, I think, be substantial agreement in all quarters of our country as to the impossibility, in an age of aggression, of replacing our own defence resources by reliance on international obligations and international solidarity. But closer consideration reveals the existence of other factors in the problem. The position is not the same in all our neighbours' countries. The dangers inherent in our League obligations, which loom so large, are offset by the consideration that Sweden herself is exposed to relatively small risks; that is to say, the risk of a direct aggression against Sweden is not large. The real danger, it is said, is of our country being involved in a conflict which does not in any way affect in its origins either Sweden or Swedish interests. Hence the argument that membership of the League threatens to involve us in such disputes.

That argument implies that Sweden is exposing herself to dangers which she would not otherwise encounter, for the benefit of the general security and without increasing her own security. If that were so, it would be plain indeed that we ought to advocate withdrawal of our country from the League. But the fact that there are only very few who advocate this extreme view in itself suggests that the public is apprehensive of the consequences of such a step and uncertain as to the correctness of this view. The problem of Swedish security is by no means confined to the estimate of the dangers of direct aggression. Hence the inclination to attach indirect security value to the maintenance of the League organisation even in the case of countries least exposed to danger, so long as the international community is credited with the slightest ability to avert conflicts in this continent, or at any rate to evade or mitigate them.

As to the membership of the League itself, I have nothing to add to the Statement of Reasons which the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riksdag issued in May against leaving the League. The Statement of Reasons said:

"The present international position does not, in the opinion of the Committee, constitute a reason for our country leaving

the League. If Sweden were to take such a step alone, the effect might be to place the country in a position of anything but desirable isolation, which might be interpreted as indicating a change in our foreign policy. If on the other hand a number of small States left the League together, there would be a danger that such a reduction in the membership of the League would have the effect of converting the latter into a bloc of States in the nature of an alliance. Such a development would enormously strengthen the opposition between the different groups of Powers, and would intensify the existing tension in Europe—which in turn might diminish the security of the States which left the League. The Committee is of opinion that it is in the general interest to try and uphold the League, so as to enable it to carry on the important work of international co-operation on which it is engaged in various connections."

But the chief point of the discussions in the Press is not the membership itself so much as the question of our attitude in regard to the obligations arising out of membership: in which connection the sanction obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant are naturally given prominence. Here again the programme of the Swedish Government will be found embodied in the Statement of Reasons of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The Statement of Reasons reproduces, and explicitly endorses, the declaration published in Geneva on July 1st, 1936 by the Foreign Ministers of seven States, of which Sweden was one, and in particular the following passage:

"We recall that directives for the application of Article 16 were agreed upon in 1921, and declare that, so long as the Covenant of the League as a whole is applied only in any incomplete and inconsistent manner, we are obliged to take the fact into consideration in connection with the application of this Article."

It is added, with an expression of the approval of the Committee, that the Swedish Government attached the Statement of Reasons to an official communication to the League of Nations on the application of the principles of the Covenant in August 1936. The Committee goes on to point out that the position of the bigger Powers differs from that of the smaller Powers appreciably in more respects than one, in so far as the assumption of risks in connection with the measures contemplated in Article 16 is concerned. The Committee considers it desirable that the Swedish Government should take steps, in conjunction with the Governments of those States with which we are closely associated, to promote within the League of Nations a modification of the provisions of Article 16 in accordance with the standpoint of the smaller States and in the sense of the Statement of Reasons. "The continued discussion of the question of the application of the Covenant and the possibility of its revision within the League will," the Committee adds, "no doubt afford opportunity for the Government to indicate its attitude in the matter before the competent organ of the League concerned."

All this is known to the public, or ought to be. But the question then arises, and has been the subject of discussion, whether—given the programme I have described—anything is being

done to carry it out or to secure recognition for the points which it embodies. I may say that the anxiety now expressed in regard to our alleged "purely passive attitude" closely resembles the emphatic apprehensions formerly apparent in certain organs of the Press in regard to the "excessive activities" and "too frequent journeys" of the Foreign Minister!

The apprehensions to which the present situation is liable to give rise in the case of a country like Sweden derive partly from the legal misgivings which the present uncertainty as to the precise scope of our obligations is apt to arouse, and partly from the political misgivings occasioned by the grouping of the Powers in and outside the League.

I myself attach by far the greater weight to the political misgivings to which I have referred. The real danger, as I see it, is of the League developing into a system of alliances directly opposed to the States outside the League. It should however be remembered in this connection that the United States will not allow themselves to be included in any such grouping, and that there are powerful forces within the League which are perfectly alive to the necessity of preventing any such development. So far as we ourselves are concerned, the best and only effective safeguard against this danger is for Sweden to pursue an independent policy of her own in concert with the other States not tied by alliances, and to avoid any identification of our interests with those of any particular group of great Powers.

As regards the legal misgivings, there is an error current which it is necessary to remove. It is not the case that the Covenant of the League gives certain Powers any claim against us which they can put forward, as occasion arises, in the matter of the application of sanctions. The Covenant is a collective instrument; and no one of the sovereign members of the League more than any other has the right to assert a particular legal interpretation of that instrument. Any such claim must be based on the Covenant itself, and not on interests which have nothing to do with the League; and, as such, it can only be put forward by the organs of the whole body, viz. the Council or Assembly, and in both these cases our country has the power of putting its view. The system of application of Article 16, as proclaimed in the directives of 1921 and as tried for the first and only time in connection with the sanctions experiment in the case of Abyssinia, has been shown by experience in that case to be such as to enable individual States to protect their vital interests. The very idea of penalties for a member of the League for defective application of Article 16 is fantastic at a time when the whole Article is being treated as if it did not exist in presence of the gravest violations of the provisions of the Covenant. The States against which the Geneva declaration of 1936 was directed could indeed with good reason answer that a law, which does not apply to all and on every occasion, has ceased for the time being to be a law.

There is another important distinction to be made in this connection. On the one hand there is the question of the attitude which is made necessary by the weakness of the League and the notorious absence of consistency in the application of the Covenant. It is quite another question what ultimate interpretations of this or that provision of the Covenant will be prac-

ticable and effective over an unlimited future. We do not know how long the present period will last, or what will come after it. We simply cannot say what sort of a League there will be in five years, or ten years, from now. A certain reserve is therefore indicated in connection with any proposed change in the League's constitution. Under present circumstances the general position is such as to render suspect any and every application of Article 16. That is indeed the present position *de facto*. Neither the Spanish War nor the War in the Far East have so far led to any application of the provisions of the Covenant.

When the question of Sweden's entry to the League was under discussion in this country, the principal point of discussion was what changes such a step would involve in our traditional policy of neutrality. The application of Article 16 with its military sanctions, its economic sanctions and the right of passage across our territory were felt to be departures from the old system of neutrality. The present is a favourable moment to put forward once again the consideration of those rules by which the Northern and neutral nations would have the League direct its activities—at the time when we joined the League these rules were never able to obtain an altogether satisfactory hearing—and so to revert on one important point to the old policy of neutrality. The point I have in mind, now as in the discussion in Parliament, is the special point of the right of passage across our territory.

For my own part I am convinced that the sovereign right of States to allow or refuse passage across their territory has such strong support on the part of the members of the League that it is possible to proceed forthwith to an interpretation of the provision of the Covenant concerned. An interpretation of this particular provision would eliminate that deviation from our former neutrality policy which weighs heaviest in the balance after the military sanctions. Concrete achievement is here possible without adversely affecting the future potentialities of the League's development. I would ask those who are not content with this, and want a reversion to "absolute" neutrality, to begin by trying to determine exactly what sort of neutrality they want. Is it Swedish neutrality, or neutrality of the Northern Powers? That is a question which everyone who speaks of "indivisible Northern peace" has to answer. Is it to be a neo-American "cash and carry" neutrality, or the maintenance of the neutral economic rights of the pre-war period? Words solve no problems; and catch-words are no sort of intelligent way of approach to the problem.

I will sum up.

The attitude of Sweden in relation to the League, was discussed in May last in the Riksdag. By the acceptance of the Statement of Reasons of the Foreign Affairs Committee by Government and Parliament alike, the authorities responsible for the governance of the country approved certain general rules of guidance in the matter of membership itself and the obligations resulting therefrom. Those rules will be observed.

The manner of their observance was also indicated in the course of the debate in Parliament. Discussions will take place within the framework of the League, with the co-operation of all the States free of alliances, in connection with the question now under consideration of the applicability of the Covenant

and the possibilities of its revision. Nothing has happened since the debate in Parliament to suggest any departure from the programme then adopted.

Sweden has done everything in her power to secure rapid handling of the whole body of questions. We are prepared, as soon as the work is seriously begun, to put our views as publicly stated and approved by the country.

We cannot ignore the possibility of the whole process of clearing up the position in the League being postponed, or of our views not getting a proper hearing. Should that be so, it does not mean that we recognise the existence of claims under the League Covenant, since in such a case it is clear that the conditions precedent to its general application are not present.

The reservations made by virtue of our adhesion to the Geneva declaration of the alliance-free Powers of July 1936, our letter to the Secretary-General of the League of August 1936, and the attitude taken up by the Swedish Government and Parliament in May 1937 will be maintained.

The maintenance of our attitude depends lastly on our own resolution to stand by it, and on the resources on which any independent policy on the part of Sweden must be based.

That means that the application of the directives for the assertion of our country's position as a member of the League

must go hand in hand with a policy of preparedness and appreciation of the necessity of the assertion, in opposition (it may be) to the views of other Powers, of that freedom of action and independence of judgment which the uncertainty of the situation and the vital interests of Sweden demand.

The first steps towards such a policy of preparedness have already been taken, and further steps will follow. Such a policy includes, over and above the fulfilment of the defence resolution, the action to be taken in connection with the neutrality of the Northern Powers and the supply of commodities to all the Northern countries, and lastly measures for the uninterrupted provision of certain articles currently required.

The strengthening of our resources for the maintenance of an independent and neutral policy in relation to the contentious and changeable interests of the great Powers is under present circumstances, in my opinion, the more important of our two tasks. Respect for our right to draw our own conclusions from the current weakness of the League will not diminish, but increase, our prospects of positive political action within the League in an intermediary capacity, should the openings for such action be greater in the future than they are at present.

It was to be expected that the German-Italian step would exercise a lasting effect on those States Members of the League of Nations who are anxious to maintain their independence against the Great Powers.

In the first place the former neutrals.

After the League of Nations had become a guarantor of Versailles, the Allies had every interest in bringing all the neutrals into the League as soon as possible, and this for two reasons. In the first place it was desired from the outset to reduce the possibility that the neutrals should in any way take the part of the vanquished. In the second place the neutrals were needed in order that, by their indirect participation, the dictated Peace of Versailles should appear to them and to the vanquished as an order of things approved by the public opinion of the whole world. In this manner it was worth while to couple the dictated Peace with the League Covenant. Anyone who sat at the table of the League also sat indirectly at the table of Versailles. He could be made to take part morally and in his own interest in the *status quo* established at Versailles.

The participation of the neutrals was naturally not to the advantage of the real League idea under the Versailles conditions. From the ideal point of view they would naturally have given it a clearer imprint. In view of the natural reasons bound up with their own existence and the greater impartiality implied by their neutrality, they were necessarily interested in a real League of Nations and a real peace. The victors were aware of this, and therefore endeavoured from the outset to make cross-connections between the dictated Peace and the neutrals. This was also the reason why the League Covenant was made

an integral part of the Versailles Treaty, although this combination was a blow to the idea of neutrality. But there were many other cross-connections, by which the neutrals were caused to be interested in and bound by Versailles. The question of the International Labour Organisation was incorporated as Part XIII of the Versailles Treaty; the neutrals were admitted to the Mandates Commission in order to compel them to give moral and legal support to the seizure of the German Colonies. They were placed in the Commissions of internationalised German rivers. The League was made in as many cases as possible the arbitrator, guarantor or court of appeal for certain articles of the dictated Peace. Neutrals were intentionally allowed to take part in the administration of German territories placed under the League of Nations.

In short, care was taken that the League of Nations, and thereby the neutrals, became executory organs for the provisions of Versailles.

But it was also desired that the tension which still remained and the enormous political, moral and spiritual pressure created by the peace dictates should be transferred to the neutrals. The League Powers therefore endeavoured as far as possible to undermine the conception of neutrality legally, politically and morally. Hence the desire of France to bring about an international system of sanctions; hence England's desire that all wars should be League wars. In this manner the neutrals and the small Powers must help to bear pressure entirely unconnected with their interests. They were lured with the fiction of real and permanent protection and a complete guarantee of their existence. In reality they were made guarantors of the

discord and violence of Versailles. Thus they had to keep aloof from Germany and to regard with distrust any German attempts to escape from the most oppressive of the dictates of Versailles. For, in view of the Geneva joint responsibility, they might be involved at any moment in the fight for one or another of the provisions of Versailles, and in certain cases in sanctions of all kinds against Germany. But when they honestly called for a better League of Nations or openly favoured an impartial settlement of a dispute—for instance in questions of minorities—they had had to keep silent so long and so often when the League idea had been falsified and law and reason had been violated, that they could not make their voice heard. The same applied to the so-called *b o r d e r S t a t e s*. With the foundation of the League of Nations, all these States have forfeited the right to safeguard and defend their own interests with suitable means and have had to give up the protection afforded by neutrality under international law without acquiring any really reliable fresh support.

They suffered from the fiction of equality exactly in the same way as the vanquished. Their equality and equal rights really existed only on paper. In practice, they were compelled to join one or other group of Powers. For all these reasons the Versailles League of Nations could not be what they had expected.

This became obvious to them in the *s a n c t i o n i s t* war against Italy. While the three colonial Powers, Italy, England and France had to defend a direct interest, the smaller and medium-sized States, when approached with a view to sanctions, had to ask themselves how the matter concerned them. It was indifferent to them what happened four thousand miles away in the heart of Africa. Some of them had no special interests either in the Mediterranean or in Africa; but on the other hand they were dependent upon freedom of trade. Many had to consider what the economic consequences would be if they joined the anti-Italian front without having any direct conflict of interests with Italy. What nevertheless impelled them to add their quota to the crusade of the League of Nations was in the first place the hope that the League would do its duty without regard to person or subject and would at some time become a protector and guarantor for themselves. As on the other hand certain Great Powers either appealed to their idealism or left them no choice but to cooperate, they were justified in expecting that they would not be disappointed. For this was to be the first test case, a lesson and example as a result of which the authority of the League would be ultimately established over all nations and the Geneva machinery would function in future cases.

So the small and medium-sized States came to the Geneva battle ground, received their instructions and moved forward

to the line of siege, while a stubborn struggle was taking place behind the scenes between England and France; the shadow of the Bafana agreement of January 7th, 1935 always stood behind France, so that she was unwilling to enter the sanctionist front. But the thorn of exasperation entered the flesh of the Italian people, while the Negus was filled with vain hopes.

When, after the imposition of economic and financial sanctions, the military question of oil sanctions was raised and the Geneva League was to be converted into a war machine, it ultimately appeared that, despite all the provisions of the Covenant, the individual Powers were no longer prepared for the sake of maintaining a principle to engage their countries and peoples beyond the limits prescribed by their own interests.

The final result was inevitable. With the ultimate victory of Italy, the sanctions front crumbled and then collapsed.

After these experiences it was difficult to assume that the States which were not directly concerned would a second time hasten to the League standards, and it is natural that many of these States are again taking refuge in neutrality or are at any rate reserving the right and freedom to refuse to take part in sanctions of any kind. The former neutrals (Switzerland, Holland, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland) did this in the famous declaration of July 1st, 1936 mentioned by the Swedish Foreign Minister, M. Sandler, in his speech. In the meantime this tendency has been further strengthened in some cases in view of the fresh tension in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific. Belgium has followed them, and Poland has taken advantage of the German-Italian step to express clearly her intermediate position between the camp of the League adherents and that of the League opponents. In Yugoslavia the discussion in the Finance Committee on the budget of the Foreign Ministry on December 27th showed that, as the deputy Kostrenchitch stated: "We must be convinced that the League of Nations, as a universal institute for the organisation of world peace, has entirely collapsed, is at present in a state of complete ideological and organisatory dissolution, and no longer offers any security whatever to its members." Similar opinions are heard from Hungary, where in particular the helpless minority policy of the League strengthens the opposition.

In any case, in spite of an attitude of reserve still maintained in some quarters, the neutrality aspirations of League Members situated "between the fronts" have been greatly encouraged. And though these aspirations do not yet take the form of complete alienation from the Geneva League, they nevertheless result in a more decisive rejection of the obligations of Article 16 of the Covenant and thereby in the beginning of a flight from the system of collective security.

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THE CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN

The Spanish fronts—especially the diplomatic and political fronts—after the warlike atmosphere in the summer and autumn of 1937 became calmer towards the end of the year. We have therefore complied with various suggestions and wishes expressed by our readers that we should give as complete an account as possible of the events up to date of this diplomatic and political struggle, which has mainly taken place round the table of the Non-Intervention Committee in London. In view of the voluminous documentation and the mass of other important material, we have been compelled by pressure on our space to refrain from reproducing texts and have had to confine ourselves to a chronological report of the main events, in which we have reproduced the most important material either verbatim or in report form.

The Spanish civil war and the policy of non-intervention adopted towards it by the European Powers have raised a large number of legal and political problems, to which the jurists and politicians will no doubt still have to devote their attention. The object of this non-intervention policy is to localise not an international war but a civil war. It implies the self-defence of the Powers against the dangers of European complications. To that extent the system of control which it involves is something new; it is an international police action which has never previously been taken or put into effect on this scale. The Spanish example is therefore extremely instructive and as important for the future as for the immediate present. It is true that in this case it relates to a civil war which is solely the business of the country concerned. But in the internal Spanish conflict, so many immense problems of a political and ideological nature have come to light that other nations have felt themselves to be affected. To his extent there was a danger to peace. That danger was at first averted by the policy of non-intervention, the formation of a practical organisation which, however inadequately and unsatisfactorily it has functioned, was nevertheless the means of preserving Europe from the danger of sparks from the conflagration.

But if we consider the question as to why and for what reasons this policy of non-intervention did not give the entire result expected of it—namely to put an end to this unhappy fratricidal struggle as soon as possible and thus to remove an obstacle from the path of a new, positive and useful work of European reconstruction—and why this policy was, on the contrary, on several occasions on the point of collapsing and could only be saved with difficulty, the course of this policy up to the present has facilitated a reply to this question.

From the beginning of the civil war there were on the one side Powers who could not regard General Franco's struggle merely as a revolt against a legal State authority but who saw in the action of the nationalists the way in which this part of the old European continent could be preserved from the fate of becoming a province of world Bolshevism. That the Soviet Union, on the other hand, regarded the red Spanish Government as a pacemaker for its own ideas and from the outset supported it to the greatest possible extent, was only to be expected. In addition, other Powers, on account of certain sympathies or other political considerations, did not disguise the fact that the victory of Franco's movement was undesirable or at any rate inconvenient to them. Hence their adherence to the view that first Madrid, then Valencia, and now Barcelona represents the legal Government, while Franco, though controlling three-fifths of the entire country, is nothing more than a rebel and insurgent. The taking of sides for an ideology, especially in France, in view of the open sympathies felt for Red Spain by the Popular Front under the influence of the

Second and Third International, constantly exercises pressure on responsible Government circles with a view not only to making non-intervention more elastic in favour of Red Spain, but of sacrificing it wherever possible and thus opening the barriers for the unhindered transport of arms and men; this tendency has subsequently been strengthened by considerations of naval strategy, since it is difficult to accept the idea that Franco's troops represent a nationalist rejuvenated army which is aware of its own strength and is capable of leading Spain to victory, thus affecting the sea connections between France and her North African colonies. Similarly, the attitude of the United Kingdom has developed from the ideological views of liberal and labour circles to the naval considerations of the Government brought about by the tension with Italy. At the present time therefore we find the internal events of the civil war more and more overshadowed by the anxiety of the Great Powers to maintain European equilibrium, so that unfortunately in the case of the two western Powers full consideration is not given to the Power that has been proved to be the originator of this civil war and to its admitted aim of making Spain a branch of Moscow and a jumping-off place for the further bolshevisation of Europe.

This mentality is also the cause of the numerous serious attempts at disturbance which—in spite of the repeated assurances from Germany and Italy—always culminated in assertions that these two Powers intended to misuse the Spanish troubles for egoistic, imperialistic and even territorial aims, such as intentions on Spanish Morocco or the possession of the Balearic Islands. These alarmist rumours were generally set on foot when Germany and Italy repeated their attempts by all the means in their power to check the sabotage of the non-intervention policy which took place behind the scenes and, in respect of sea and land control, while maintaining absolute parity, to introduce more powerful and effective safeguards in the part of the control plan which had proved ineffective or even dangerous, in order by means of more comprehensive supervision, to give full effect to the idea of non-intervention and thus to the localisation of the civil war.

These attempts, which were ultimately concentrated on the two central points of the non-intervention policy—the question of volunteers and the cognate question of the grant of belligerent rights to both parties—in the solution of which the non-interventionist States were to place their entire relationship to Spanish events on the basis of neutrality under international law, met with the greatest resistance from the Soviet Union. In view of the hesitant attitude of France and England, the Soviet Union succeeded not only in constantly sabotaging the efforts of the London Committee but also, by means of its diplomatic counter-blasts in torpedoing the cooperation of the four naval control Powers.

Spain for the Spaniards! This is the watchword that guided the German-Italian proposals which, by their logic and realism, showed the way in which the aim of the policy of non-intervention could be successfully reached. It was not and is not Germany or Italy that tried to destroy the European equilibrium in Spain or elsewhere; but they did not wish it to be destroyed by the Soviets more than it has already been destroyed by the Franco-Russian alliance and by the penetration into the Mediterranean which resulted from the Straits Agreement of Montreux. Consequently, a Spain rising out of the victory over communism is in the highest sense a European affair, after which the great Powers can and should find the way to each other undisturbed by the influence of Moscow.

CHRONICLE

OF THE EVENTS OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND THEIR EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY

1936

July

13. Murder of the leader of the national movement, Calvo Sotelo, by political adversaries in Madrid.
15. Withdrawal of Spanish parties of the Right from Parliament.
17. Outbreak of disturbances in Spain. Extension of a military rising, starting from Spanish Morocco, under General Franco.
24. Formation of a Spanish National Government at Burgos.
31. Speech by the French Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, to the effect that France would remain neutral in the Spanish civil war. Denial that arms are supplied by France to Madrid.

August

1. French Government's appeal to the British and Italian Governments to conclude an agreement on non-intervention in Spain.
4. Affirmative reply from the British Government, with a suggestion to include Germany and Portugal.
5. The French Government suggests the inclusion of the Soviet Union and requests the Soviet Government, through the French representative in Moscow, to accept the proposed agreement.
6. Affirmative reply from Italy with an inquiry whether moral solidarity with one of the parties to the Spanish civil war is not in itself a form of intervention, whether the obligation of non-intervention is to bind private persons and whether measures are to be contemplated for controlling the observance of this obligation.
6. Affirmative reply of the Soviet Union with a request for the inclusion of Portugal and the cessation of any support granted to the nationalists.
7. The French Government transmits to the Governments of the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union and Portugal a draft Non-Intervention Agreement on an embargo on the delivery of arms, ammunition and war material, including aeroplanes and warships.
8. Decision of the French Council of Ministers to stop the export of arms, ammunition and war material to Spain.
11. Declaration of the Spanish National Government at Burgos on the false rumours of an agreement for the grant of concessions to Germany and Italy in Spanish Morocco.
13. Broadcast appeal of the Madrid Government to the democratic Powers not to remain neutral, but to support the "legal" Government.
13. Conference of the French trades unions with the Socialist and Communist Parties on measures to be taken to support the Madrid Government.
14. Affirmative reply from Portugal regarding the proposed Non-Intervention Committee, with a request for the inclusion of the Soviet Union and for French and British support in case of the spread of Communism to Portugal.
14. Communication from the French Government to the Italian Government that the proposed Non-

August

- Intervention Agreement should also be extended to a prohibition of the participation of foreign volunteers.
15. Franco-British agreement on the text of the French proposals for preventing the export of arms, and its communication to the Governments of Germany, Italy, Portugal and the Soviet Union for their assent.
 17. Affirmative reply from the German Government. Willingness in principle to accede to the Non-Intervention Agreement on condition that all States producing war materials equally undertake that the embargo also covers supplies from private persons and that measures are taken immediately to prohibit the departure of volunteers.
 17. British merchant ships are authorised by the British Government to reply to attacks made on them in the Mediterranean.
 19. The United Kingdom decrees a complete prohibition of the export of arms to Spain.
 19. The German refugee ship "Kamerun" is fired on and searched by red Spanish warships.
 20. Sharp protest by the German Government stating that in future all measures will be taken against such acts which are contrary to international law.
 20. Brazil breaks off diplomatic relations with Spain.
 21. Italy's agreement to the draft Non-Intervention Agreement subject to the settlement of questions of detail.
 21. Portuguese Government's reply with the following reservations: guarantee for the national security of Portugal, mediatory action with the parties to the civil war, defence of European culture against a subversive form of the State in Spain, prohibition on indirect intervention, effective control measures, prohibition of the use of poison gas by the parties to the civil war.
 22. Note from the British Government to the Madrid Government that a blockade on the Spanish coasts cannot be recognised in the absence of a state of war.
 23. Agreement of the Soviet Union to the draft Non-Intervention Agreement.
 24. The arms embargo is put into force by the German Government with immediate effect.
 25. Note from the British Government to the Spanish National Government warning it against attacks on British shipping.
 26. French Government's proposal to convene and set up a Committee of Control.
 27. Note from the American Government to the Madrid Government that it cannot recognise a blockade of the Spanish coast, but maintains the principle of the freedom of the seas.
 27. British Government's proposal to set up a Non-Intervention Committee.
 27. General Franco is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish national forces.
 28. Italian and Soviet Russian arm embargoes are imposed.

September

1. Mexico considers herself entitled to continue supplying arms and ammunition to the Madrid Government.
5. The Madrid Government declines the request of the diplomatic corps to humanise warfare.
9. First meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee. England, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Soviet Union and 21 other States took part. A sub-committee of the Non-Intervention Committee was formed to supervise the execution of the Non-Intervention Agreement. This sub-committee consisted of representatives of France, England, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Sweden.
23. Uruguay breaks off diplomatic relations with Madrid.
25. Speech by del Vayo, Foreign Minister of the Madrid Government, in the League Assembly, describing non-intervention as a legal monstrosity since it places the "legal" Spanish Government on the same footing as the "rebels".

October

- 6 and 7. Soviet Russian note to the Non-Intervention Committee on an alleged breach of the Non-Intervention Agreement by Portugal, Italy and Germany.
7. The Spanish National Government is taken over by General Franco.
9. The Non-Intervention Committee transmits the Red Spanish and Soviet Russian complaints to Germany, Italy and Portugal.
12. Further Soviet Russian note to Lord Plymouth, Chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee demanding supervision of the Portuguese ports by British and French ships in order to prevent alleged deliveries of arms through Portuguese ports.
15. Negative reply by Lord Plymouth on account of the lack of proof of the alleged breach of the agreement by Portugal.
20. British action at Madrid and Burgos in favour of the exchange of hostages.
21. German note to the Non-Intervention Committee repudiating the Soviet Russian accusations and proving the breach of the agreement by the Soviet Union.
23. Portugal breaks off diplomatic relations with Madrid.
25. Statement by Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister on his negotiations in Berlin and Berchtesgaden: "We also discussed the position of Spain and it was agreed that the national Government of General Franco is supported by the firm determination of the Spanish nation in the greatest part of the territory where it has succeeded in restoring order and civil discipline as opposed to the anarchic conditions which had reigned there. At the same time we reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention in Spanish affairs and again confirmed the maintenance of the international obligations entered into in this respect. It is unnecessary to add that we were of one opinion that Germany and Italy have no other desire than that Spain—in her absolute national and colonial integrity—should soon again resume the position in the life of the nations which is her due."
26. Rejection of the British proposals for an exchange of hostages by the Madrid Government.

October

28. Finding of the sub-committee of the Non-Intervention Committee that the agreement had not been broken by Italy and Portugal.
29. Debate on Spain in the British House of Commons. Mr. Eden summarised the development of non-intervention policy since the beginning of the Spanish civil war. In particular he met the charge that the non-intervention policy acted one-sidedly against the Madrid Government. He gave a warning that all the reports of alleged breaches of the agreement should not be believed. As an example he mentioned the charges of the Soviet Union—the main source of complaints of the non-intervention policy—against Portugal all of which had proved baseless. The opposition must not be more Soviet than the Soviets. The non-intervention policy was a safety curtain, and the only one that the Government could at present apply.

November

9. Transfer of the red Spanish Government from Madrid to Valencia.
12. Acceptance in principle of a plan of control for the arms embargo by the Non-Intervention Committee.
13. A decree by Franco's Spanish National Government that all laws and decrees issued by the red Spanish Government since July 18th are invalid.
17. Declaration of the Spanish National Government regarding Russian supplies of arms to Barcelona.
18. Recognition of the Franco Government by Italy and Germany.
19. Speech by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons. The British Government does not recognise the two Spanish parties as belligerents. Statement that, as regards the keeping of the obligation of non-intervention, other Governments are more to blame than Germany and Italy.
20. Mr. Eden's speech at Leamington. England's duty in the Spanish civil war is to prevent its spread beyond the frontiers of Spain. This has hitherto been successful in spite of the fact that the Non-Intervention Agreement has not been strictly kept.
21. General Faupel (retired) appointed German chargé d'affaires to the Franco Government. Letters of credit handed over on November 29th.
27. Note from the Valencia Government to the League of Nations. Appeal to Article 11 of the Covenant on account of the recognition of the Franco Government by Italy and Germany.

December

- 1 and 3. The British Bill on the arms embargo to Spain accepted by both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Commons, Mr. Eden dealt with the accusations made by the opposition regarding the alleged pro-Franco policy of the Government. In the first place he said it was the practice in civil wars to recognise belligerent rights. Contrary to previous practice, England had not done this, but had pursued a policy of non-intervention. Thus she had not favoured Franco at sea, where he was the stronger. Mr. Eden rejected as baseless the accusations made principally by the Soviet Union against Germany, Italy and Portugal of not keeping the Non-Intervention Agreement. If volunteers came from both sides this was at present not a breach of the agreement in which the question of volunteers had not been settled. But this was not England's fault.

December

2. British proposal to the Non-Intervention Committee to issue a prohibition of the participation of foreign volunteers in military action in Spain.
5. Anglo-French memorandum of December 4th to Germany, Italy, Portugal and the Soviet Union regarding an extension of the agreement and joint mediation in Spain.
7. The sub-committee of the Non-Intervention Committee expresses itself in favour of a prohibition of volunteers to Spain. The German representative, Ambassador von Ribbentrop, recalls in this connection his proposals on the subject on August 17th, likewise also the Italian representative, M. Grandi.
9. Anglo-French statement on the note of December 4th, asking that, in the interest of European peace, no action should be taken which might signify foreign interference in the Spanish conflict.
9. Acceptance by the Non-Intervention Committee of the sub-committee's report on the question of indirect intervention.
9. Reply of the Soviet Government. The Soviet Union does not regard the supply of war material to the "legal" Valencia Government as an act of intervention.
12. Reply from the German Government. Germany refers to her note of August 17th proposing a prohibition of volunteers which was, however, rejected by other Governments.
12. Replies from the Italian and Portuguese Governments, in principle identical.
12. Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations referring to the Anglo-French action, condemning any intervention, and recommending the Powers represented on the Non-Intervention Committee to spare no pains to render the non-intervention undertakings as stringent as possible and to take effective measures for their supervision.
16. Mr. Eden, in reply to a question in the House of Commons regarding the Balearic Islands, said the Italian Government, in reply to a written enquiry of November 12th, had stated verbally that no agreement had been made with General Franco which would result in a change of the status quo in the western Mediterranean.
18. In the debate on Spain in the House of Commons, Mr. Eden again defended the Spanish policy of the Government, which was not dictated by sympathy for either party but was intended to serve the best interests of Europe. The policy of non-intervention, in spite of its insufficiency, had reduced the danger of a European war by restricting the conflict as far as possible within narrow limits.
23. Meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee. The supervision plan for the import of arms by land and sea was to be submitted to the Powers represented in the committee.
24. Anglo-French proposals in Berlin, Rome, Lisbon and Moscow for preventing the influx of volunteers into Spain.
29. Affirmative reply from the Soviet Government.
31. Lord Plymouth, Chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee, transmits the plan for the control of arms imports to the British Foreign Secretary for transmission to the Governments at Burgos and Valencia with a request for their views within ten days.

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4. The Portuguese Government declares its agreement in principle with the Anglo-French proposals of December 24th, 1936.
6. Unanimous decision of both houses of the American Congress regarding the prohibition of the export of war material to Spain. Put in force on the 8th by the signature of the President.
7. German Government's reply to the Anglo-French proposals of December 24th, 1936. Expression of surprise at the repeated appeal on a question forming the subject of discussion in the committee and repudiation of the impression that Germany and Italy were to blame in the question of volunteers. Further reference to the rejection by England and France of the prohibition of volunteers proposed by both at the outset. Reference to the results of the one-sided encouragement of elements combating the Spanish National Government after the unhindered influx of foreign volunteers for months to Red Spain. Nevertheless willingness to cooperate if all possibilities of direct or indirect intervention in the Spanish conflict are excluded once for all by the removal of all non-Spanish participants, combatants and political agitators and propagandists and by the restoration of the position of August 1936.
7. Reply from the Italian Government identical in principle. Special reference to indirect intervention, including public announcements, financial support and public collection of funds. Criticism of the previous erratic, restricted and biased method in the treatment of the question of non-intervention.
7. Belgian Government's claim on the Madrid Government for compensation for the murder of Baron de Borchgrave in Madrid.
8. Visit of the French Ambassador in London to Mr. Eden. Statement that the French Government has received information regarding the impending landing of German volunteers and German engineers to erect fortifications in the Spanish Morocco zone.
11. Reply from the red Spanish Government to the Belgian note regarding Baron de Borchgrave is considered by Belgium as unsatisfactory. It is decided to send a further protest note.
11. Instructions from the British Government to its diplomatic representatives in Berlin, Rome, Paris, Lisbon and Moscow explaining the reasons for its action of December 24th, proposing an extension of the plan prepared by the Non-Intervention Committee, noting the general agreement of the five Governments, and requesting the diplomatic representatives to hand in a note of January 9th, proposing that this plan should be speedily examined and making further proposals for an adequate and effective system of control for preventing direct and indirect intervention.
11. On the occasion of the New Year reception of the diplomatic corps in Berlin, statement by the Führer and Chancellor to the French Ambassador, François Poncet, regarding the rumours of alleged landings of German troops etc. in Spanish Morocco.
12. Communiqué by the Havas Agency on the conversation between Hitler and Poncet: At yesterday's diplomatic reception in Berlin Chancellor Hitler assured the French Ambassador that Germany had no intention of infringing the integrity of Spain or Spanish possessions in any form.

January

The French Ambassador gave the assurance on behalf of his Government that France was firmly determined to respect the integrity of Spain within the framework of the existing treaties.

12. Speech by Mr. Eden at the banquet of the International Press Association. He spoke in favour of a free choice of Government in Spain. The Spanish Government would be neither Communist nor Fascist.
13. Affirmative replies from the Portuguese and French Governments to the British suggestions of the 11th and the Note of the 9th January.
15. Affirmative reply from the Soviet Government.
15. Unanimous acceptance by the Chamber of the French Government's proposal for a prohibition of the recruiting and despatch of volunteers. Adopted by the Senate on the 21st by 285 votes with 21 abstentions.
19. Statement by the Mexican President, Cardenas, that Mexico would continue to supply war material to red Spain.
19. Speech by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons. He first pointed out that the danger of the spread of the Spanish civil war had substantially decreased.

"But if any hon. member believes that as the outcome of this civil war in Spain any single foreign Power—or pair of foreign Powers—is going to dominate Spain for a generation, to rule its life, to direct its foreign policies, then I am convinced he is mistaken in his judgement and I would reply to him that of all the possible outcomes of this civil war that is the most unlikely. I will tell the House why.

We should be strongly opposed to any such happening, and I have no doubt that we should not be alone in our opposition, for there would be all the 24,000,000 of Spanish people themselves.

Yet there are British interests in this Spanish conflict and they are twofold. First, that the conflict should not spread beyond the boundaries of Spain; and, second, that the political independence and the territorial integrity of Spain shall be preserved.

More recently we have been engaged in this problem of volunteers, which has raised the whole issue of non-intervention in a still more acute form. It is true that this question of volunteers was not dealt with in the early days of this dispute, and to that extent certain Powers, we must recognize, have a case when they complain that this was not done."

He further admitted that the question of volunteers had not been dealt with in the first few days of the conflict and that in this respect certain Powers had had grounds for complaint. He went on to refer to the Morocco incident of the beginning of January, the investigation of which by British officers and officials had proved the baselessness of the rumours, as had moreover been shown by Adolf Hitler's statement to the French Ambassador in Berlin.

25. Affirmative replies from the German and Italian Governments to the British note of January 9th. Regret that the proposals regarding volunteers in the note of the 7th were not considered.
27. Statement by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons that the officer entrusted with a journey through Spanish Morocco had not observed the presence of any German troops.
28. Final British note stating that a time limit for carrying out the embargo on volunteers was to be fixed immediately after the agreement on the plan of control and that the German-Italian

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proposals regarding withdrawal of the foreigners fighting in Spain was to be examined.

29. Statement by the Portuguese Government denying press reports regarding an agreement with Germany on Angola. Sharp criticism of the propaganda of certain newspapers.

February

5. In a note to the Non-Intervention Committee, the Soviet Government raises objections to division into zones for supervising the Spanish coasts and demands mixed naval units with the participation of the Russian navy.
9. Note from the Valencia Government offering France and England economic, military and territorial advantages in Spanish Morocco in return for stronger support against Franco. (Disclosed on March 17th by the Government in Salamanca.)
9. Negative replies from the British and French Governments (published on April 11th).
- 10-11. Meeting of the sub-committee of the Non-Intervention Committee. Portugal rejects the proposals for the supervision of her frontiers. Discussion of the Soviet Russian proposals for setting up mixed naval units in the coast control.
15. Communiqué on the meeting of the non-intervention sub-committee, recommending a general prohibition of recruiting and transit of volunteers as from the 20th/21st together with the putting into force of the system of control worked out by the technical advisory sub-committee between March 6th and 7th, 1937.
16. The Non-Intervention Committee approves the decisions of the sub-committee, the representative of Portugal making some reservations. Appointment of an international supervisory office. Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy are entrusted with the coast control. The essential feature of this control, which is exercised outside Spanish territorial waters, does not consist in the declaration of a blockade, but the States taking part in the Non-Intervention Committee are to instruct their merchant ships to call at certain ports in order to take supervisory officers on board. The duty of the warships is, however, restricted to seeing that this provision is observed. If they find that the provision has been infringed they are not authorised to search the suspected vessel, but have to write an official statement which is transmitted through their Government to the Non-Intervention Committee.
18. German, Italian and French laws are issued for preventing the participation of foreign volunteers. Prohibition of entry, departure, transit and recruiting.
20. Official declaration by the Portuguese Government in order to clear up errors regarding Portugal's attitude to the question of control.
21. The embargo on volunteers is put into force by the 27 States represented in the Non-Intervention Committee.
- 21 and 24. Statement by Lord Plymouth in the Non-Intervention Committee and by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons regarding an Anglo-Portuguese agreement on the control of the Portuguese-Spanish frontier by British officials.
26. Communiqué on the meeting of the non-intervention sub-committee. Discussion of technical questions regarding naval control. The representatives of the Soviet Union and Portugal state on behalf of their Governments that they will not take part in naval control. This statement is repeated on the same day in the plenary meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee.

March

3. General Faupel, appointed as German Ambassador to the Spanish National Government, hands his letters of credit to General Franco.
3. Note from the Franco Government to the signatories of the Algeciras Act on the smuggling of arms and other machinations on the frontier of French and Spanish Morocco.
5. The dispute between Belgium and the Valencia Government on the Borchgrave case is brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice.
6. In the non-intervention sub-committee the plan of supervision for the Spanish frontiers is adopted; it is adopted on the 8th in the full committee, which then has to deal with the further forms of non-intervention.
- 23 and 25. Meeting of the non-intervention sub-committee and the full committee. On account of Soviet charges against Italy, the Italian Ambassador Grandi refuses to discuss the withdrawal of the volunteers. The German Ambassador von Ribbentrop demands guarantees that the proceedings of the committee should not be used for propaganda purposes and unjustified accusations.

April

1. Protest note from the Valencia Government to London and Paris against the alleged use of Italian regular troops in Spain.
11. Publication of the reply of March 20th from England and France to the Valencia Government's offer of February 9th to grant privileged rights in the Spanish Morocco zone.
12. In a speech at Liverpool Mr. Eden repeats the views that he expressed in the House of Commons on January 19th regarding the probable result of the Spanish civil war.
15. At the meeting of the non-intervention sub-committee, the Soviet Ambassador Maiski takes back the charges made on March 23rd against Italy. The questions of volunteers is referred to a technical sub-committee.
19. International control is put into force.
- 14, 19 and 20. Spanish debate in the House of Commons on questions connected with the blockade of Bilbao. Refusal of belligerent rights, protection of British ships in Spanish waters outside and inside the three-mile limit. Instructions of the British Admiralty. Warning to General Franco. Mr. Eden opposes the demand put forward by the opposition that the Valencia Government should be recognized as a belligerent. Such rights could only be granted to both parties, in accordance with previous practice of which he gives three examples.
- 14, 19 and 20. Franco Government's protest against the continued breaking of the Bilbao blockade by British warships. On the 12th the Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, had stated in the House of Commons that, in view of the position at Bilbao, England could not tolerate any interference with her shipping and could not recognise or assume belligerent rights in this question.

27. Destruction of the town of Guernica which was set on fire by red Spaniards (see Mr. Eden's speech in the House of Commons on May 6th, the official finding of the Spanish National Government of May 3rd, and the verbal protest of Ambassador von Ribbentrop to Mr. Eden on May 5th regarding the tendentious reports of the British press alleging that the destruction was caused by German bombing aeroplanes).

May

5. Meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee. Statement that the control plan was fully working on land and at sea as from April 30th. Sharp

May

- repudiation by the Chairman, Lord Plymouth, of tendentious press reports on the proceedings in the committee.
- 5, 7 and 18. Discussions in the non-intervention sub-committee and the full committee on the humanisation of the civil war by the prohibition of the bombardment of open towns and the abandonment of air bombardment.
14. Rejection of a truce by the Spanish National Government.
17. British note to the Powers regarding mediation of a truce.
- 24-26. Attack by red Spanish airmen on the international control ships lying in the harbour of Palma. On the 26th the Italian s.s. "Barletta" is hit, six officers being killed. Italy makes a protest on the 28th in the Non-Intervention Committee.
27. The Foreign Minister of the Valencia Government, Alvarez del Vayo, transmits to the League of Nations a White Book on an alleged Italian expeditionary corps in Spain.
28. Soviet Union's reply to the British note of the 17th, agreeing to the proposal for a truce only in case the Spanish nationalists first lay down their arms.
29. Resolution of the League Council to transmit the Red Spanish complaint to the London non-intervention committee.
29. Bombardment by red Spanish aircraft of the German armoured vessel "Deutschland" acting as control ship in the roads of Ibiza; 31 German seamen were killed and 73 wounded.
30. Statement by the German Government on the bombardment.
31. Bombardment of the fortified Red Spanish port of Almeria by German naval forces as a reprisal for the bombardment of the "Deutschland".
31. Note from the German Government to the Non-Intervention Committee on the bombardment of the "Deutschland" and the bombardment of Almeria, and the decision to refrain from cooperation in the system of control so long as there is no guarantee that such attacks on control ships will not be repeated.
31. Similar decision of the Italian Government.

June

2. British note to Germany, France and Italy on the resumption of a guaranteed naval control.
8. Soviet complaint to the Non-Intervention Committee against the negotiations of the four naval control Powers outside the committee. On the 9th the complaint is declared by the Chairman of the Committee to be groundless.
12. Agreement between the British Foreign Secretary and the Ambassadors of Germany, France and Italy regarding the resumption of guaranteed naval control.
16. German-Italian statement on the basis of the agreement on the question of control. Resumption of cooperation in the Non-Intervention Committee and active participation in coast control.
- 15 and 18. Attempts by red Spanish submarines to torpedo the cruiser "Leipzig".
19. Statement by the Reich Government on these incidents. Meeting in London of the representatives of the four naval control Powers on the basis of the agreement of the 12th.
- 21 and 22. Discussions in London lead to no result, as no agreement can be reached on the German proposal to make an immediate joint naval demonstration. Official London communiqué of June 22nd on the result of the four-Power discussions.

June

23. Discussion in the House of Commons on the bombardment of the "Deutschland" and the attempt to torpedo the "Leipzig". In this connection Mr. Eden states that the rumours that German guns have been placed at Ceuta—opposite Gibraltar—have not been confirmed.
23. Note from the German Government to the Governments represented in the control committee, to the effect that there is no solidarity among the control Powers and that Germany definitely withdraws from the control system.
23. Official Italian statement regarding the definite withdrawal of Italy from the control system.
24. Detailed attitude of the Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro in principle to the note of the 23rd.
25. Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Eden in the House of Commons appreciate Germany's reasons for withdrawal from the control system. They recognise the moderation in the attitude of the Reich Government.

Mr. Chamberlain warns the press, the members of the House and foreign countries to weigh their words carefully before uttering them, and to reflect on the consequences of a hasty and thoughtless remark.

"In the high mountains there are sometimes conditions to be found when an incautions move, or even a sudden loud exclamation, may start an avalanche. That is just the condition in which we are finding ourselves to-day. I believe, although the snow may be perilously poised, it has not yet begun to move, and if we can all exercise caution, patience, and self-restraint we may yet be able so save the peace of Europe."

In the further course of the debate, Mr. Eden defends himself against a sharp attack by Mr. Lloyd George who accuses the Government of cowardice in the exercise of its policy.

"Russia has kept very well in the background. Whereas in fact there is no doubt that war materials, aeroplanes, tanks, and so forth supplied to the Government side in Spain from Russia is very large in quantity. I cannot say how much, but hon. members will find no difficulty in arriving at assumptions on their side.

For the majority of the people of this country the preservation of peace is of some account. Non-gentlemen opposite, and I think the right hon. gentleman himself (Mr. Lloyd George) assume as a matter of course that if non-intervention was abolished it would benefit the Spanish Government.

If non-intervention ceased, is it the view that belligerent rights should be granted? But suppose belligerent rights were granted, how much of these arms would reach the Government in Spain. It is perfectly well known that General Franco is much the stronger on the sea and the exercise of belligerent rights would mean that he would have comparatively little difficulty in intercepting the majority of these supplies of arms going to Spain.

If you do not grant belligerent rights, what is the alternative? Then each country sending arms to Spain has to protect its ships carrying these arms right into Spanish territorial waters, and it does not require very much imagination to see the danger to Europe which must inevitably arise from that. One has to consider these aspects before we abandon the policy of non-intervention, and those who invite us to abandon it must also consider them."

25. Anglo-French decision to propose to the Non-Intervention Committee that they should alone exercise naval control, in order to fill up the gap left by the withdrawal of Germany and Italy.
27. Speech by Adolf Hitler at Würzburg on the "Deutschland" and "Leipzig" incidents and on

June

the consequences for Germany of the failure of the four-Power negotiations.

"National Socialist Germany has only one desire, namely while maintaining her own rights to live at peace and to cooperate in friendship with the whole world. We have however grounds for doubting the effectiveness of certain international pledges or assurances. I have endeavoured in one particular case to test the effectiveness of such international agreements in practice. You are aware that recently Communist Bolshevik criminals treacherously attacked a German ship with bombs, causing us 31 dead and 73 wounded. I therefore decided that we would ourselves give these gentlemen of Valencia without delay the kind of warning which I am convinced is the only one capable of calling such criminals to order and making it clear to them that the time has gone for ever when the German nation could be treated in this way.

It was said that that would be a quite unjustified action. In these modern times, such measures should be entrusted to those institutions which are at present everywhere trying to take the protection of the interests of the nations out of the hands of the individual States and to place it in collective hands.

I gave way to this demand and we returned to the control committee with the desire and sincere hope that such plans would be put into practice.

After our declaration that we would henceforward immediately fire on every approaching red aeroplane and surface vessel, the Bolshevik criminals could no longer make attacks on the surface, and they therefore went below the surface and made four torpedo attacks on the "Leipzig".

We then expected that international solidarity would bring about a collective and joint protection of peace. But, as you have seen, the result was that Committees were to be set up to investigate etc. etc.

All we asked was that the authorities at Valencia should at any rate be shown by means of a joint declaration of all the control Powers concerned that they are no longer dealing with one, but with all Powers. But it was no longer possible to carry out even this modest action. You can therefore see what we Germans would have to expect if we ever placed the fate of the Reich in the hands of such institutions or such agreements.

But the people in London may be convinced that the experience we have gained on this occasion will be a lesson to us which we shall never forget.

From now onward in such cases we shall prefer to take the freedom, independence, honour and security of the nation into our own hands. We are, thank God, today strong enough to be able to protect ourselves.

From these events we have drawn consequences which will have their effect over our entire future. Phrases uttered in parliaments and by statesmen will not deceive us in future. We suffered an attack, we saw the treatment accorded to it, and we are cured for ever.

I did what it was my duty to do. A trial was made and no one in the world can now say that we were maliciously in any way prejudiced against collective agreements.

No! If this collective agreement of June 12th had stood the test, we might have considered whether we could not continue. But after this smallest of agreements proved unworkable in practice, let us take warning, so that we may not suffer a similar disappointment some day in a worse case.

June

Every cat may burn its paw once and every man may once make a mistake, but only fools make the same mistake twice. Neither I nor the German nation are anxious to subject ourselves to the same danger a second time."

29. Germany and Italy in the Non-Intervention Committee oppose the assumption of naval control by England and France alone.

July

2. Counter-proposals by the German and Italian Governments in the Non-Intervention Committee, including the recognition of both parties as belligerents, whereby the entire control procedure would be substantially simplified and facilitated and the gap in the naval control would be filled. Count Grandi gives many examples proving the ineffectiveness of the patrol control. Rejection by the representatives of England, France and the Soviet Union.
7. Note from General Franco to the Non-Intervention Committee claiming recognition as a belligerent.
9. Rejection of the Anglo-French and the German-Italian proposals by the Non-Intervention Committee. The French Ambassador, M. Corbin, threatened that his Government would raise the control on the Pyrenees frontier unless the Portuguese Government cancelled a similar measure which it had taken shortly before on the Spanish-Portuguese frontier. Identical note from the French Government to the Non-Intervention Committee on the 12th. Ambassador von Ribbentrop on the part played by Moscow. Count Grandi points out that Italy is not pursuing territorial or political intentions in Spain, but is aiming at protecting Christian civilisation from the Bolshevik danger. At the suggestion of the Netherlands representative, the British Government is requested to draw up a plan of reconciliation.
12. Statement by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons that there are many precedents of cases where Great Britain has recognised "insurgents" as belligerents.
14. The British plan of reconciliation is submitted to the Powers in the Non-Intervention Committee. The various proposals are as follows:
A. Reconstruction of the system of supervision.
(1) Supervision of traffic entering Spain by sea.
(a) The system of placing observers on ships visiting Spanish ports to be continued. (b) The naval patrol system to be discontinued and replaced by the establishment, with the consent of both parties, of international officers in Spanish ports under proper safeguards. (2) Supervision of traffic entering Spain by land. — B. Further measures for meeting the present situation and for filling certain gaps in the supervision system. (3) With a view to the more effective application of the policy of Non-Intervention, all Governments parties to the Non-Intervention Agreement to recognize the two parties in Spain as possessing a status which justifies them in exercising belligerent rights at sea in accordance with the rules governing such exercises but subject to special conditions. (4) Extension of the system of supervision on sea. (5) The Committee to inform Non-Member Powers of their intention to recognize the belligerent status of the two parties on the above terms, and to invite their cooperation with a view to making the policy of Non-Intervention more effective. (6) Supervision of foreign aircraft which enter Spain under their own power in specified aerodromes in Spain. — C. Withdrawal of foreign Nationals. — D. Execution of above programme. (a) Establishment of officers in Spanish ports, and withdrawal of naval patrol, as soon

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as possible; (b) Establishment of commissions to make arrangements for and supervise the withdrawal of foreign nationals. (c) Recognition of belligerent rights to become effective when the Non-Intervention Committee place on record their opinion that the arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign nationals are working satisfactorily and that this withdrawal has in fact made substantial progress. — E. Immediate Action by His Majesty's Government to be authorized by the Committee to enter immediately into discussions with the two parties in Spain on the following points:
(1) The establishment of officers in Spanish ports.
(2) Withdrawal of foreign volunteers including the establishment of the Commissions in Spain.
(3) The conditions on which belligerent rights are to be granted.

These proposals were published together with a summary of the proposals of the technical sub-committee on the withdrawal of volunteers, which had been prepared several weeks previously but had not yet been discussed and published.

15. Debate in the House of Commons on the plan. Detailed statements by Mr. Eden on the various points.
16. Unanimous adoption of the plan by the Non-Intervention Committee as a basis of discussion. French reservation regarding the order of the points. The questions of control and volunteers should be cleared up before the discussion of the grant of belligerent rights to the parties. The opposite view was taken by the Portuguese representative. The Soviet representative reserved the right to make substantial proposals for amendments.
20. Meeting of the non-intervention sub-committee. Adjournment as no agreement was reached on the differences of opinion regarding the order in which the points should be dealt with.
22. Debate on Spain in the House of Commons. Violent dispute between Mr. Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, and the opposition on the protection of refugee ships by the British navy against attack and removal. The opposition demanded such protection in view of the humanitarian tasks of these vessels. (This relates to the evacuation of the town of Santander which was defended by Valencia troops.) Mr. Duff Cooper denied the correctness of this view. He said that it was very difficult to draw a line between humanitarianism and military assistance. While it was easy to say that humanitarianism demanded that we should see that women and children did not suffer, it might be held that action taken in the way of importing food or of diminishing the demand for food by taking away women and children was military assistance. Let us beware of incurring the accusation so often thrown at this country of cant and humbug when we say that it was a monstrous thing to starve women and children.

Let us remember that for 4 ½ years we did every thing is our power to starve the women and children of Germany, and if we had then been approached by the United States or some other great Power with the demand that we should allow foodstuffs to go in to the population, should we have said on humanitarian grounds that we could not refuse so reasonable a request? The Admiralty had taken the definite line from the beginning that they would protect ships flying the British flag on the high seas. When ships went into territorial waters they forfeited the right to British protection in the same way as a British subject when he went into Spain did not expect, if he knew there was a civil war being carried on, to be protected by the British Army.

July

These ships which were chartered by the Basque Government and paid large sums of money to go in and assist the Spanish Government in the war they were carrying on against the insurgents were performing valuable service for the Spanish Government. They were volunteers as much as any of the volunteers from Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and France who were alleged to be fighting on either side. They were taking part in the war, and could they really expect that the British Navy would see them safe to harbour? If the British Navy agreed to that, how could they be sure their commitments would end there? There was only one alternative he could suggest.

Mr. Wedgwood Benn. — "Common humanity."

Mr. Duff Cooper said that was the most useless suggestion he had ever heard. Common humanity in this case would mean firing on a Spanish ship, entering into the war, and risking the lives of British sailors for a cause which not one man in this country outside the Opposition benches thought worth while fighting for.

26. Further meeting of the non-intervention sub-committee to discuss a British questionnaire, an Italian counter-proposal and German proposed amendments to the British plan. The entire plan failed, as the Russian Ambassador Maiski, in spite of his original acceptance, suddenly stated that his Government was not in a position to accord belligerent rights to General Franco, as provided for *inter alia* in the plan, since this would place the "rebel general" juridically on the same footing as the "legal" Spanish Government. Moreover the Committee was not competent to decide this question.
30. Meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee. The failure of the British plan was noted and the meeting was adjourned for an indefinite period. Ambassador von Ribbentrop sharply criticised the obstructionist policy of the Soviet Union, the only one of the 27 Governments represented in the Committee to state that it was averse to the principles of the plan and to its early discussion.

August

6. Bombardment of British, French and Italian vessels in the Mediterranean by unknown aircraft.
6. Meeting of the non-intervention sub-committee. Renewed adjournment, as the differences of opinion on the British plan were not removed.
24. General Faupel, the first German Ambassador to the Spanish National Government retired for reasons of health.
27. Further meeting of the non-intervention sub-committee. Examination of a technical control report. Request to parties in arrears to pay their committee contributions as the control office would otherwise be unable to work.

September

1. Torpedo fired at the British destroyer "Havoc" on the Spanish Mediterranean coast by an unknown submarine.
6. For this reason, the British and French Governments invited Italy, Germany, Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Egypt to a Mediterranean Conference in order to decide upon defensive measures against submarine piracy.
6. Note from the Soviet Russian Government to the Italian Government accusing it of being responsible for the torpedoing of two Russian ships in the Eastern Mediterranean. Repudiation by the Italian Government.
9. In view of the provocative attitude of the Soviet Union, the Italian Government declined to take part in the Mediterranean Conference and proposed that the question should be referred to the Non-Intervention Committee.

September

9. Reply from the German Government declining to take part in the Mediterranean Conference on account of the lack of solidarity among the Powers in the case of the attempts to torpedo the "Leipzig". Identical proposal to refer the matter to the Non-Intervention Committee.
13. Adolf Hitler's statement at the Nuremberg Party Congress. Warning to Europe of the danger of Bolshevism. "It is a gross distortion of facts to state that the Bolshevik oppressors of the people are the bearers of legal power while the combatants for National Spain are illegal revolutionaries. No! We regard General Franco's men as representing what is pure and permanent in Spain and the usurpers of Valencia as the international revolutionary troops paid by Moscow who are today afflicting Spain and may tomorrow afflict some other country.
- Can we be indifferent to these events? First I would like to state briefly the following fact: The press of our western democracies and the speeches of many politicians constantly tell us how great are the natural spheres of interest of those Powers. It appears quite natural to the representatives of those States that as a matter of course their interests should include every sea and every State in Europe and also extend outside Europe. On the other hand, there are immediately outbreaks of indignation as soon as a nation not belonging to this exclusive circle of international possessors also dares to speak of definite interests outside its own frontiers. As regards this pretension, I should like to make the following remarks.
- England and France constantly tell us that they possess sacred interests in Spain. What kind of interests are they? Are they political or economic interests? If they are political interests, we do not understand this any more than we should understand if any one stated that he possessed political interests in Germany. How and by whom Germany is governed does not concern anyone but ourselves, so long as this regime does not intend or does not practise hostility against other States. But if England and France are thinking of definite economic interests in Spain, we will admit this immediately, but it must be pointed out that we claim exactly the same economic interests for ourselves.
- Just as people in England and France state that they are concerned at the idea that Spain might possibly be even occupied by Italy or Germany, we shudder at the possibility that it might be conquered by Soviet Russia. Such a conquest need not take the form of occupation by Soviet Russian troops, but it becomes an accomplished fact as soon as a bolshevist Spain has become a section, that is to say an integral part of the Bolshevik Moscow central authority, a branch which receives political instructions and material subventions from Moscow. We regard every attempt to extend Bolshevism in Europe in principle as a displacement of the European equilibrium."
- 10-14. Mediterranean Conference at Nyon at which the Soviet Commissary of Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, again made fierce attacks on Italy and Germany.
13. Anglo-French invitation to Italy to take part in the Mediterranean control.
14. Italian Government's protest against the division into zones in the Nyon Arrangement of the 14th and claim to absolute equality of rights with all other Powers in every zone.
17. Additional protocol to the Nyon Arrangement. Extension of the control to attacks by surface vessels and aircraft.
21. Anglo-French invitation to Italy to take part in a conference of the naval experts of the three coun-

September

tries in Paris to deal with a modification of the Nyon Arrangement and Italy's participation in the Mediterranean control. The latter accepts on the same day.

22. Much commented conversations of the French Foreign Minister Delbos with the Italian delegate to the League, M. Bova-Scoppa, on the occasion of the League Assembly at Geneva, regarding Italy's accession to the Nyon Arrangement and a conversation on Spain between the three Powers. As regards the latter a step was taken by the diplomatic representatives of France and England with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Rome during Mussolini's journey to Germany.
- 27-29. Conference of the Anglo-Franco-Italian naval experts in Paris. Italy accedes to the amended Nyon Agreement.
- 27-30. Debate on Spain in the Sixth (Political) Committee of the League of Nations. On the 30th the Committee adopted a draft resolution stating that, if the foreign volunteers are not shortly withdrawn, the Members of the League, in so far as they are represented in the Non-Intervention Committee, would consider the end of the non-intervention policy.

October

2. Identical Anglo-French note to Rome. Reservation regarding the necessity of a Three-Power agreement, otherwise it will be difficult for the Governments to maintain the obligations which they have assumed under the international agreements to prevent Spain being supplied with arms and men. The question of volunteers is placed in the foreground and there is no longer any question of the recognition of the parties as belligerents.
2. The draft resolution of the Sixth (Political) Committee of the League of September 20th is rejected by the League Assembly by 2 adverse votes (Albania and Portugal) and 14 abstentions (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Panama, Venezuela, Cuba, Uruguay, Ireland, South Africa, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Switzerland).
7. Fresh diplomatic step by England and France in Rome. Request for an early Italian reply to the note of the 2nd.
8. Speech by the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, at the Conservative Congress in Bournemouth, in which he hopes that Italy will agree to the plan of a Three-Power Conference.
9. Italian reply. It first repeats the previous assurances regarding the political independence and territorial integrity of Spain, the mother country, the islands and colonies, and then points out that Italy and Germany first drew attention to the question of volunteers, the prohibition to despatch them and the measures for their withdrawal. It goes on to refer to previous notes and statements in which the Italian Government stated that it could never subordinate the question of the recognition of belligerent rights to the two parties to the question of the withdrawal of volunteers. For it is incontestable that volunteers only took part on the side of Franco after strong foreign forces had taken part on the other side by whom they were provoked. It refers to the attitude of the Valencia representative at Geneva, whose speech had excluded all possibility of the withdrawal of the volunteers. Lastly, the note states that Italy is still prepared for negotiations, but only in the Non-Intervention Committee and with the participation of Germany.
12. Conversation of Mr. Eden with the French Ambassador in London, M. Corbin, on the convening of the Non-Intervention Committee.
12. Speech by General Franco at Burgos denying the reports of a cession of Spanish territory.
- 13 & 14. Cabinet discussion in London and Paris.

October

15. Article in the "Times" to the effect that the Comintern is responsible for the outbreak and prolongation of the civil war and is to blame for the "competition in intervention".

15. Speech by Mr. Eden at Llandudno. He said England and France would no longer admit tactics of procrastination in the Non-Intervention Committee. The United Kingdom had observed the letter and the spirit of the non-intervention policy.

"I want to make a clear distinction between non-intervention and indifference. We are not indifferent to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Spain. We are not indifferent to the foreign policy of any future Spanish Government. We are not indifferent to the complications which may arise in the Mediterranean as the result of the intervention of others. We are not indifferent to vital British interests in the Mediterranean. A clear distinction must be made between non-intervention in what is purely a Spanish affair and non-intervention where British interests are at stake." We should continue to be watchful to see that our interests in the Mediterranean and in the maintenance of our line of communications with the Near East and India were not endangered.

"A feature of the present situation is proclaimed intervention, the glorification of breaches of agreement. In such conditions no one can complain if the patience of those who have striven to keep their responsibilities towards Europe constantly before them is wellnigh exhausted. I, for one, should certainly not be prepared to utter criticisms of any nation which, if such conditions continue, felt compelled to resume its freedom of action."

16. Re-assembly of the non-intervention sub-committee after a long interval. A French plan is submitted which is substantially similar to the British plan of July 14th. The plan contains five points: Withdrawal of the volunteers within as short a time as possible. Grant of belligerent rights to both parties as soon as the international commissions have found that the withdrawal of the volunteers has taken place to a sufficient extent. Influence to be exercised by the Governments represented in the committee on the Governments of Salamanca and Valencia for the immediate withdrawal of a certain number of volunteers in proportion to the numbers fighting on both sides (symbolic withdrawal). Renewed undertaking by the Governments represented in the committee not to allow further volunteers or air material to be sent to Spain. Introduction of a stronger system of control.

The French Ambassador, M. Corbin, stated that France would resume full freedom of action if no agreement could be reached on the proposals within a time limit to be fixed. On behalf of the British Government, Lord Plymouth accepted the proposals. England would also regain her freedom of action if the proposals failed. The Italian representative, Count Grandi, also agreed, but demanded that for the symbolic withdrawal there should be the same number on both sides.

The German representative, Ambassador von Ribbentrop, again explained in detail the German point of view in the question of volunteers. He pointed out that at the end of July, the British plan, which was adopted by 26 States represented in the committee, was buried on account of the refusal of the Soviet Union to grant General Franco belligerent rights. He also pointed out that both on August 17th, 1936 and at the end of January 1937, Germany and Italy had made proposals for the prohibition of volunteers, but these had not been accepted by England and France. It was therefore a misrepresentation or a deceptive manoeuvre when at the present time a certain international press

October

regarded England and France as the originators of the idea of the withdrawal of volunteers. He then turned to the intentions of the press in question to put pressure on the committee's work by more or less open threats, such as for instance that the Pyrenees frontier would be opened and freedom of action regained. Lastly he dealt with Mr. Eden's statement in his last speech; his criticism of the committee's work could not be directed against Germany or Italy who, in treating the question or volunteers had always been animated by the spirit of cooperation. Mr. Eden's criticism had not been directed in the right quarter, namely the Soviet Union whose dilatory tactics were responsible hitherto for the failure. The present talk of the exhaustion of patience, freedom of action etc. was therefore not comprehensible. Germany and Italy, as originators of the idea, were at all times prepared to discuss the question of the withdrawal of volunteers within the entire framework of the British plan and on the basis of the French proposals.

The Russian Ambassador Maiski gave a negative reply but was prepared to submit the proposals immediately to his Government.

18. The Italian Government announces the number of Italian volunteers on the National Spanish side as 40,000. Official communication on the 25th in London and Paris.
19. Ineffectual negotiations in the non-intervention sub-committee on the British and French plan. The representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Maiski, prevents any agreement by constantly refusing to connect the question of volunteers with the recognition of General Franco as a belligerent. The Soviet Government could only consider the grant of belligerent rights when the last volunteers had left Spanish soil.
20. Fresh Italian proposal, supported by Germany, to send a commission to Salamanca and Valencia and regarding the symbolic withdrawal of an equal number of volunteers on both sides. Mr. Eden in the chair, together with M. Corbin, stress the very great progress implied by these proposals. The representative of the Soviet Union reserves his attitude.
21. Mr. Eden informs the House of Commons that at the end of the meeting of the 19th he saw no alternative but for the sub-committee to report to the Non-Intervention Committee that it had failed, together with all the consequences of such a decision. But at the eleventh hour a new and very welcome contribution had been made by the Italian Government.
22. The Powers, excepting Russia, agree in principle on the text of a draft resolution to be submitted to the Governments regarding the withdrawal of volunteers. The central point of the differences of opinion is occupied by the symbolic withdrawal of volunteers and the powers of the two counting commissions, together with the time of the recognition of belligerent rights. On the former point France and England take the view that the numbers counted by the commissions are irrevocable and must serve as a final basis for the proportional withdrawal. Not only the Soviet Union, but also Italy and Portugal, however, reject such calculations and the symbolic withdrawal based upon them. Count Grandi proposes a figure of 5000 volunteers. In the Russian view the grant of belligerent rights should only be discussed after the main body of the volunteers have left Spain. The Soviet Union reserves the right to decide when this moment has come.
26. Further resolution by the non-intervention sub-committee. The symbolic withdrawal of volunteers is dropped. Commissions are to negotiate with both Spanish parties regarding the withdrawal.

October

The question of belligerent rights is to be settled on the basis of the British plan.

29. At the meeting of the Committee M. Maiski states that his Government can no longer take responsibility for a continuance of the non-intervention policy and can therefore accept neither the British plan of July 14th nor the French proposals of October 16th. In contradiction to this, however, he states that he will only reject point 2 of the resolution which deals with the question of the grant of belligerent rights. He will therefore abstain from voting. Ambassador von Ribbentrop emphasises the danger which the Soviet Union's attitude and its unusual methods involve for the Non-Intervention Committee and the entire European position.

28-31. Transfer of the Valencia Government to Barcelona.

November

1. Very frank and informative speech by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, dealing with the charges that the Government has not taken stronger action on the Spanish question in the League of Nations and that—according to Mr. Lloyd George—its non-intervention policy has favoured the Franco Government.

“Let me assure you that the League never showed any enthusiasm to handle the Spanish problem, for the very simple reason that the League knew how sharp were the divergencies of view within that organization about Spain.

Whatever the merits or otherwise of trying to impose sanctions in the Spanish dispute, there was never the remotest chance of the League doing anything of the kind, and frankly I do not think it right to come to this House and even to discuss the possibility of these things when we know how utterly unreal it all is. The truth is—and it must be faced—that the whole world does not look upon the Spanish dispute exactly in the same way as hon. gentlemen opposite. There is no doubt that there are a great many nations members of the League who want General Franco to win. That belief is particularly strong among South American States who are related in blood to the Spanish people. On this issue the League and world public opinion in the great democracies is very sharply divided, and if we do not face that fact it is frankly useless to attempt to discuss this Spanish problem at all.

May I come to Mr. Lloyd George's criticisms? The right hon. gentleman drew, a highly coloured picture of the international situation and of the Spanish situation in particular, but, like many accomplished lightning artists, the right hon. gentleman left out all those elements in the composition of his picture which he found most inconvenient.

I think we must proclaim the fact that the international brigade saved Madrid a year ago. The right hon. gentleman drew a highly coloured picture of the international situation and of the Spanish situation in particular, but, like many accomplished lightning artists, the right hon. gentleman left out all those elements in the composition of his picture which he found most inconvenient.

The result of the Nyon Agreement, though not its aim, has been to facilitate the arrival of very large quantities of material to Spanish Government ports, and of course there have been enormous quantities of material arriving in Spanish Government ports throughout the year. There is no need for me to dive into secret service sources for that. I have only to look at the official figures of the Soviet Government.

These figures, official Soviet Government figures, show that Spain is now Soviet Russia's third best

November

customer, and that she took from Russia in the last nine months 440,000 tons of goods valued at £3,500,000. The trade was hardly complementary, because at the same time Spain only exported 44,000 tons of goods. The interesting thing which the figures show is that from January to September this year Russia shipped to Spain nearly 10 times as much in weight and $4\frac{1}{2}$ times as much in value as in the corresponding period for 1936.

Some of these increases are very interesting. For instance there is a very large figure for tractors, a very large figure for fertilizers, large figures, as one would expect, for oil, oil products, and so forth.

I could not stand here and tell the House that during the summer months of this year there have been more material reaching the insurgent forces than there had been reaching the Government forces. I could not suggest that. It certainly has been very large, but this is still not the point I want to make. The point that I want to make is the connexion of the question at sea with the fact that the Government of Spain can get not only war material but anything at all.

Supposing it is admitted that normally belligerent rights would have been granted, the granting of such rights in the present conditions would have been immensely beneficial to the power which was stronger at sea—at present, of course, the insurgent forces. What happened was that non-intervention sought to create a new form of neutrality. Say if you will that it has succeeded or failed, but the result of that new form of neutrality has been that belligerent rights have not been granted and the result has been to deprive the Power that is stronger at sea—surely this country of all others should understand the importance of that—of the use of its superiority. At the moment the insurgent forces are paying a very heavy price at sea for the assistance they may be receiving from foreign nationals on land, the weight of the policy of non-intervention has been on one side. I venture to forecast that when full details are given of what has arrived in Spain, in the way of munitions and so forth on both sides some hon. members will have some surprises."

2. Further discussion of the draft of July 14th in the sub-committee. Ambassador Maiski states that in the question of belligerent rights he will merely abstain and not give an adverse vote. But the Russian standpoint on this question remains unchanged. Though he no longer makes the grant of belligerent rights conditional upon a hundred percent withdrawal of the volunteers, he does make it conditional upon the withdrawal of the main body and upon the assurance that the intervention will not be renewed. The Soviet Union reserves the right to decide when these conditions are fulfilled.
4. Acceptance of the new draft of the 2nd by the Committee, the Soviet Union abstaining. Unanimous approval of the recommendation of the chairman, Lord Plymouth, that the British Government should be authorised to submit the draft to the Spanish parties for their comments.
6. Notes to this effect from the British Government to the Governments at Valencia and Salamanca.
11. British agreement with the Franco Government regarding the mutual exchange of commercial agents.

This agreement caused sharp criticisms from the opposition, which led to long debates in the House of Commons on November 4th and 8th. The opposition charged the Government with having used this measure, which was connected with the release of seven merchant ships seized by the Franco Government in order to conclude a transaction which was a first step towards its recognition as a legal Government and a belligerent, and in the second place with having thereby infringed the non-inter-

November

vention agreement. In both debates, therefore, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Secretary explained the reasons which had led to the agreement with the Franco Government.

"There is no intention on the part of his Majesty's Government to make any variation in the attitude which they have consistently adopted towards the contending parties and which is governed by the international agreement for non-intervention to which they have subscribed. They are however bound to take account of their responsibility for the protection of British nationals and British commercial, industrial and financial interests throughout the whole of Spain.

It has become increasingly evident that the numerous questions affecting British interests in these areas cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by means of the occasional contacts which have hitherto existed."

Nobody denied that General Franco was in control of two-thirds of Spain at the present time or that there were large British interests there or that those territories were large buyers of British goods and sellers of products that we needed. There are many million pounds sterling of British capital invested in this area. The greater part of this is in respect of iron ore, copper and lead mines. During the first nine months of this year the insurgent territories purchased from this country goods of the value of just over 2,000,000 pounds out of a total purchase of 2,800,000 by the whole of Spain. The amount of coal purchased during those nine months was 500,000 tons. This trade was worth taking normal steps to protect and further.

It was wrong to say that the release of the seven ships was the price we had paid to Franco. It was the precondition of the negotiations and the exchange we got was the exchange we wanted—the presence of consular officials at Salamanca and other points.

The answer to the question as to whether this arrangement constituted any form of recognition was "No". The agreed communiqué which would be issued very shortly would make it clear that it did not constitute recognition of General Franco's side as a Government or as a belligerent. Naturally Franco had the same right to appoint a commercial agent in London.

12. Acceptance in principle by the Non-Intervention Committee of a plan of control for imports into Spain.
16. The United Kingdom appoints a Commercial Agent to the Spanish National Government.
16. Surprising acceptance of the British plan of July 14th and the resolution of November 4th without reservations by the Soviet Union.
20. Acceptance by the Spanish National Government of the resolution of November 4th which had been sent for its comments.
30. Reply from the Barcelona Government to the British Government regarding the resolution of November 4th. The reply, like that of the Franco Government, contains a number of questions and objections to the proposals contained in the resolution.
30. Recognition of the Franco Government by the Japanese Government.

December

7. Meeting of the non-intervention sub-committee. The Spanish replies to the resolution of November 4th are noted. The chairman is authorised to engage in informal negotiations with the Powers concerned for the withdrawal of the volunteers.
7. British note to the Franco Government, describing the blockade of the Red Spanish Mediterranean ports announced on November 28th as contrary to international law, since no belligerent rights have been granted to either party.

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THE JUBILEE SESSION OF THE LEAGUE COUNCIL

General Observations.

On January 24th the Council of the League of Nations met for its 100th Session. The jubilee atmosphere could not in any case have been festive; and the depression was not exactly relieved by the postponement of the original date of the meeting from the 17th of the month owing to the French Cabinet crisis.

There were 26 items on the agenda, of which 21 related to internal, social or cultural activities of the League. Of the remaining five, three were items for adjournment viz. the questions of Disarmament, the Locarno Pact and Alexandretta. Consequently, the general interest was finally concentrated on two points, the Dispute in the Far East and the question of the Reform of the Covenant, both of which—as, for that matter, all other points, settled or unsettled—turned on the fundamental issue of the continued existence of the Geneva institution. That fundamental issue was raised in its clearest form by the Chilean representative when he pointed out that eleven nations, four of them having a claim to a permanent seat on the Council and representing between them a population of 360 million people, had no longer any connection—or had only a very loose connection—with Geneva.

It was common knowledge that a plan of campaign had been evolved in Paris on January 25th between Chautemps, Delbos and Eden, following on the London conversations between the French Premier Chautemps and the French Foreign Minister Delbos on the one hand and the English Premier and Foreign Secretary Chamberlain and Eden on the other on November 29th and 30th, 1937, and the subsequent visit of the Secretary-General of the League Avenol to London and Paris at the beginning of January. To save the Sick Man of Geneva from complete collapse, it was proposed that the representatives of the two Powers should make a common declaration at the opening meeting of the 100th Session in favour of the League and the inviolability of the Covenant, as a counterblast to the defeatist tendencies of certain members and a reassurance on the subject of their preoccupations as to the application of Article 16 of the Covenant. But the plan miscarried.

* * *

Attempts have always been made to ascribe the paralysis of the League to those that stand outside this "Association of Nations". In the first period of the League's failure, the cause of the entire evil was regarded as the absence of the United States and subsequently, after the withdrawal of Japan, Germany and Italy, more serious charges were concentrated on these States and the tones became constantly shriller. With the admission of Soviet Russia and after the outbreak of the Spanish civil war, it was repeated more and more frequently that the States which regarded the League as an organisation serving the egoistic policy of certain Members were aggressor States, and the Red Spanish delegate Del Vayo was able in the Reform Committee, without fear of contradiction, to describe

Japan, Germany and Italy as criminals and to refer to them as States that stood "hors la loi".

The "jubilee speeches" made on January 27th at the first public meeting of the 100th Session of the Council, however, proved once for all the emptiness of a theory which aims at finding scapegoats to bear the actual, legal and moral blame. For the principal result of these speeches was to disclose profound differences of opinion even within the relatively small Council of the League. The gulf which was evident the first day was seen in its entire depth on the following days when the so-called Reform Committee of Twenty-Eight received declarations regarding the universality of the League. In so far as an estimate can already be formed of the crisis of the League, a future League Assembly will ultimately subject the methods and procedure of this institution to a criticism which can in no way be ascribed to actions taken and humiliations received from outside. For such criticism is determined exclusively by the vital interests of a great number of States which, with a view to the realisation of the lofty League ideals, have in the course of years shown more courage and a greater readiness to make sacrifices than certain League Powers who are so suspiciously fond of describing themselves as the bearers of the League banner.

"The historians of the future may well ask whether the decline of the authority of the League of Nations has not been due as much to the doubts and scepticism of some of its more important Members within as to the criticism and attacks of its professed opponents without." The Chinese delegate, Wellington Koo, who has taken part as a member in the Council meetings from the beginning, uttered the above words on the occasion of the meeting of January 27th. He could not be expected to express himself more sharply. But in fact his remarks only contained a half-truth.

They should have been supplemented by the words: "and also to the fact that the League was formed in order to perpetuate an unjust peace for all time." In a leading article in "Gringoire" of February 4th, 1938, a man who should know, namely André Tardieu, in dealing with this hundredth session of the Council frankly gave his confirmation to this idea. He said the League system had not arisen spontaneously out of the War; nothing better had been found than to safeguard peace by a union which was to be given a "force collective". This system of 1919 had failed and no one had had the courage to admit that it was necessary to return to the old system of alliances. The League of Nations had its brilliant future behind it, and this fact remained unaltered even by Paul-Boncour's speeches.

* * *

It would be possible to pass over this 100th session and no event of any great historical importance would be overlooked. As far as the actual agenda was concerned, the traditional avoidance of decisions showed for the hundredth time the

high measure of proficiency attained in the Geneva school of procedure. Of the twenty-six items on the agenda, there were only two of any importance. The first was the Assembly resolution of October 4th, 1937 regarding the request for the suggestions of the non-Member States in order to render possible cooperation with the League. The Council was to deal with the preparatory measures; as was to be expected the question was adjourned till the May session. It was desired to await the result of the proceedings of the Committee of Twenty-Eight, while, in addition, according to the usual League formula since 1920, "in view of the present position", there are no prospects of taking "premature" steps.

A second important item on the agenda was provided by the China resolution of the Assembly of October 6th. In the foreground was the question of possible assistance to China, which had been demanded in vain by the representatives of that country at the 18th Assembly and which had also been refused by the Brussels Conference which took place later. The Assembly resolution of last year merely granted moral support to China and recommended the Members to refrain from any action which might weaken China's power of resistance. The question was now to be considered to what extent China could be assisted individually. In the negotiations which took place behind closed doors the most important point was China's threat to demand sanctions, in which she was supported by Soviet Russia. The rumours that this course was being adopted were for a time fostered by the fact that Washington was kept informed of the negotiations, so that the fiction gained ground that individual assistance for China was planned by the main Powers in cooperation with the United States. That the wish was father to the thought ascribed to China was finally made clear in a remarkable manner by a categorical declaration from Washington and by a statement of the facts which the press bureau of the China delegation found it necessary to issue. The Council of the League of Nations left the Chinese question *de facto* as it was, that is to say, its new resolution did not go beyond the statements contained in the resolution of October 6th; Poland and Peru abstained from voting. The Polish Foreign Minister, M. Beck, based his abstention on the view that, as regards individual assistance, the words in the resolution "in consultation with other Powers similarly interested" rendered possible action on the part of a group of States to which the Geneva organisation had no right to give a free hand in advance.

Apart from these two more important items, the 100th Session of the Council was, however, enlivened by incidents which were the subject of critical remarks without being on the agenda. Some parties wished to deal immediately with the Roumanian Jewish question, on which petitions had been submitted by the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Committee for the defence of Jewish rights in Central and South-Eastern Europe. This matter was disposed of under the rule that the Council can only adopt an attitude to the question when a reply to the petitions has been duly given by the Roumanian Government.

The very people who in this connection made an artificial attempt at dramatisation endeavoured to belittle another subject of importance for the future of the League which was dealt with in secret discussions.

The "revolt of the small States". It was merely a fortuitous circumstance that the claims of various small League States reached the stage of serious discussion at the very moment when it was desired to raise a song of praise to the principles of the League of Nations at the 100th session of the Council. After these States had been compelled by the failure of sanctions against Italy to refuse in their own vital interests to accept in advance any future undertakings of an automatic nature, especially after the recognition of total war shows that even economic sanctions are of a military nature, the small States, as loyal Members of the League and in the

interest of that body, expressed unreservedly the objections which they had felt since 1921 to the sanctionist machinery of Article 16. If these States, after great political events—the failure of the Disarmament Conference and the consequent breach of the obligations under Article 8, the complete failure of sanctions against Italy, the disastrous effects of the Franco-Soviet Pact, the denunciation of the Locarno Pact, and the Spanish civil war which Moscow is trying to exploit for its world revolutionary plans—made a justified attempt to remain outside the conflicts of the Great Powers, no one could reproach them for this, though this has been done by certain people who regard neutrality not as an honourable concept but as a one-sided view and as an obstacle to the League Covenant. Neither these nor other recriminations and attempts at intimidation were able to prevent the responsible statesmen of these countries from reminding the League of its pacific tasks, which had been entirely overlooked.

The external cause of this "revolt" did not, however, even start from these countries themselves. It was only when Paris and London, shortly before the 100th session of the Council, stated semi-officially that a joint declaration regarding Article 16 had come within the range of possibility, and that such a declaration, on the occasion of a jubilee, would have the effect of expression of power and would represent League sanctions as inviolable, the moment had come for the neutrals to give their veto. The most ridiculous charges have been made against these States on this account. They have been given the ominous title of "dissidents", their conception of neutrality has been described as "degenerate", and while, on the one hand, they were stigmatised as "tools of the dictatorships", on the other hand attempts were made to frighten them by the argument that they would one fine day be "eaten up by the aggressor States". Moreover, M. Litvinov, after his advice had not been followed before the beginning of the hundredth public session of the Council, vented his anger on these States by referring to them contemptuously as "faint-hearted", for, he said, people did not come to Geneva "merely to pray".

But all this does not alter the fact that the protests of these States, at the head of which were Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and even Poland, had the result that the League of Nations was once again prevented from sliding down the slope to an "alliance of the democracies against the dictatorships". The Great Powers mainly interested in the League of Nations therefore agreed for the moment to postpone the inclusion of the small States in the sanctionist system. While the representatives of the latter agreed not to say anything in their speeches at the 100th session of the Council which might make still clearer the obvious weakness of the League, the Great Powers represented on the Council for their part abandoned the idea of declaring concretely in any way their adherence to Article 16. None of the speakers referred to Article 16 in their jubilee speeches, but all kept to the general principles of League policy, thus contributing to the remarkable character of this meeting of the Council of January 27th. From this alone a correct judgment may be formed of the kind of discipline used in order that League circles and the pro-League press might give the impression that the result of this session, including the declarations made in the Reform Committee, was a confession by all of the correctness of League methods. It was a confession which should merely be regarded as conditional. Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and others such as Poland will not let themselves be prevented from considering sanctions otherwise than as optional, nor will Switzerland abandon the struggle for the restoration of her complete neutrality. The discussion in the Reform Committee, with which we deal in another chapter, only showed unanimity to adjourn the questions of revision and interpretation. The crisis of the League was established at any rate as clearly by the same States as their conditional confession of faith, and if we compare the speeches and declarations of this jubilee session, we realise not only

the profound differences of opinion, but also the real significance of this adjournment, the formal grounds for which were that a solution of the existing internal problems of the League of Nations could and should only be sought in an "improved atmosphere".

* * *

The hundredth session of the League Council was awaited with ill humour, and the delegates left Geneva in a depressed mood. As regards the points of discussion for which there was no other solution than an adjournment till better times, the ill humour was justified. Some of the diplomats must have cursed the convention attached to the number 100, for the crack in the foundations of the Geneva construction is so serious, that no artificial devices are sufficient to make it bear the burden placed upon it. This ill humour was also not disguised by conventional speeches. Most of these members were compelled—contrary to previous custom when many regarded it as obvious but did not expressly say so—to make a reservation on behalf of his Government in one part of his speech to the effect that, in view of the Rump Parliament of the Nations, it was not possible merely to carry on a pure League policy. Even in this sense the speeches of January 27th are significant, and the confession of faith in the League of Nations which they contain does not play the decisive part. It is desired to retain Geneva, because some institution must exist which offers possibilities of personal contact and discussion for as great a number of nations as possible. But this is in contradiction with the many decisive steps taken by a small group of League Powers, for which however the majority has had to bear the responsibility. It is also in contradiction with the fact that the most important decisions in international post-war policy have been taken outside Geneva, and that by Powers who were directly interested in a particular question.

It was constantly heard at this session how good and valuable it was to admit the crisis of the League; it was pointed out that the League is still in its childhood. But the fact was overlooked that this child inherited the spirit of its parents and was ordered, before it could stand, to carry the world on its shoulders. Under this great burden after twenty years the growing stripling has broken down and it shows a lack of any sense of responsibility to place further burdens upon him. For the ultimate question is not to care for a sick man but to organise the peace of the world with the best means and the most suitable methods.

Let us examine the "jubilee speeches" in this sense.

The British Foreign Minister, who was the first to make a statement, exposed the British attitude to the League of Nations in a reserved tone which seemed to be weakened in important points to the extent of unclearness. His statement is of special significance on account of its reference to the preamble of the Covenant, the general principles such as the achievement of international peace and security and the promotion of cooperation between the nations. Here we hear the British reservation, namely to take up negotiations in the interest of general peace also with nations that are not Members of the League of Nations.

Since British foreign policy clearly shows a leaning towards "Realpolitik" in this connection, the future conduct of Great Britain towards League action must appear uncertain at any rate for adherents of the League. Great Britain regards the League as one method of maintaining peace, but she points out that as a result of the withdrawals the zone of cooperation has been reduced and the League methods can only be applied where circumstances permit. Great Britain continues to hold fast to the principles of the League because, according to Mr. Eden's statement, it is still the best instrument of international cooperation; from this idea may be derived the British view

that peace can only be attained if all nations work together in some system.

As there is at present no prospect of such cooperation, though this must be ascribed to those who have hitherto rejected international cooperation outside Geneva, the British statement concludes with the remark that, under present circumstances, it is impossible to change the Covenant. This paved the way for the result of the discussions in the Reform Committee which met the next day, i.e. further postponement.

The French Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, as was to be expected, laid greater stress on the loyalty of France to the League of Nations. But it was not so easy for M. Delbos as subsequently for M. Paul-Boncour. France also does not omit to state that, in spite of frank advocacy of the Geneva institution, she is nevertheless prepared to seek all possibilities of peaceful settlement and cooperation with States outside the League. In view of this statement, it is difficult to understand the French pessimistic view that peace is to be based on force, if it does not receive the blessing of the League of Nations. Such a statement, which is in accordance with the "theoretical" continuity of French foreign policy, is moreover in contradiction with French practice, for since the War France has neither abandoned the old pre-war system of alliances nor have the aims of this system become more League-minded by the formal registration of treaties with the Secretariat. Many people have been unable to understand up to the present how this system of alliances which is directed against the vanquished Powers of the War and which finally through the alliance with the Soviet Union in 1935 brought the unrest in European relations to its culminating point can be openly and frankly declared to be compatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In face of the difficulties arising for the League M. Delbos thinks the remedy lies in the necessity of union among the Members themselves. Too much had been expected of the League and it was reproached for the gap between the hopes of yesterday and the disappointing realities of today. At these words his British colleague will no doubt have called to mind that struggle in which the collective security system so deplorably failed because, as had been always hoped and expected, it had not first had to be tried on Germany.

As an obvious proof of the resort to force, M. Delbos assumed that the danger of war and the further competition in armaments were the result of non-observance of the Covenant and of a weakening of the League. At this, his British colleague no doubt thought his own thoughts and may have remembered his own statement in the House of Commons on May 21st, 1935 in connection with the violated disarmament article, No. 8, of the Covenant and the responsibility of the French policy on this matter.

We have refrained from reproducing the text of the remarks by the Russian Foreign Minister Litvinov. They are the usual propaganda statements, the length of which is in inverse ratio to their constructive contents. The speech in question consists in the first place of a glorification of the Russian love of peace and loyalty to the League of Nations, and in the second place of open or concealed attacks not only against Fascism and National Socialism, but also against other League States that do not entirely believe in the genuineness of the Russian assertions. It is to be hoped that they will now do so after Litvinov has again reminded them that the Soviet Union, in view of "justified doubts" as to whether most of the League States were prepared to keep their League engagements for the maintenance of peace, considered for a long time whether it should enter the League. But when these doubts were removed and in addition an invitation was received from the majority of League Members, Russia kindly consented to

accept, and has since that time given no cause for doubt as to the fulfilment of her obligations.

"Whenever matters went as far as the real execution of these obligations by the fulfilment of collective decisions, the Soviet Union did not seek pretexts for evading these obligations but, on the contrary, loyally carried them out, sometimes even to the detriment of its national interests." Moreover Russia does not require this. In the same breath M. Litvinov pointed out that the Union did not need to depend on the advantages accorded to it by the League, but that it could rely on its own strength, its own armed forces, its own resources and finally on the enthusiasm and patriotism of its peoples. For this reason the Soviet Union was, in the words of M. Litvinov, one of the firmest and staunchest champions of the League as an instrument of peace, on account of its sense of international duty and international solidarity. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union was therefore free from deviations and zigzags. M. Litvinov then made matters clear to those unbelievers who accepted the admission of the Soviet Union to the League in the hope that this Power had abandoned or at any rate would abandon its aim of the Communist world revolution. Has the Communist danger become less in many countries since the admission of the Union into the League? Among the many current publications of the Secretariat there is a "Chronology of International Treaties and Legislative Measures". Not the least of its space is devoted to decrees and regulations which States have been obliged to issue in order to drive Communism out of the country. Litvinov with his "straight-forward policy" naturally does not refer to this, but to the preservation of peace and, despite some disappointments, he kindly gives most of the other Member States a certificate to the effect that that is also their desire though some of them are "rather hesitant". He passes ironically over the objections to the formation of blocs, and after cleverly juggling with the idea of such bloc formation, finally says: "We naturally form a block, a peace bloc, or rather a peace axis." This is a clear hint, and the Geneva institution has no meaning for Litvinov and his Moscow superiors if it is not an organisation for combating the aggressors which are to be sought solely in that other bloc or axis. The reasons why all the other speakers at this meeting of the Council rejected the idea of the formation of a bloc now become clear, and the necessity for such statements is merely a proof of the tendency and determination of certain Members of the League to form such an ideological bloc inside the League.

The statement by the Polish Foreign Minister, M. Beck, regarding the League of Nations have the advantage of showing clearly by their brevity the attitude of reserve adopted by Poland and are given from the standpoint of the attentive observer. Poland's interest in the League is not thereby weakened. International cooperation in the sense of the present Polish foreign policy comprises above all a European adjustment either with the League of Nations or, if it appears necessary, without it. This policy is confirmed in the final sentence of the Polish statement, in so far as certain conceptions are given their full weight: States are sovereign; their political independence, a principle of the Covenant, gives them an inalienable right as against decisions of the League to determine what contribution they can make to the League in case of certain conflicts, in accordance with their individuality and the extent of their responsibility; this is all the more justified as the present position of the League has made it impossible for it to attain its original objects. On the basis of this practical admission Poland gives her cooperation on the assumption that the consolidation of peaceful relations takes the course of friendly cooperation between all nations.

At this hundredth session of the Council, only one delegate spoke against the League, namely the Chinese representative, Mr. Wellington Koo, who is at

present the doyen of the representatives of the Powers at the Council table. While it is possible, in view of the tragic disturbances with which China is at present visited, to feel some understanding for the sharp accusations made against the Members of the League, the Chinese representative appears to have forgotten that, at a time when certain executory regulations of the dictated peace treaties were issued by the League, he, as a member of the Council, threw his vote into the scale in respect of decisions which represented a great injustice to the countries concerned and thus helped to create the position in which the League is now placed. In this matter China co-operated without understanding Europe, or without basing her understanding on anything but a "victory mentality". At the present time Wellington Koo demands absolute comprehension for China from all the European States. In so far as he presents the counter-bill to certain Powers for whom his support was at that time necessary, this may be comprehensible. But even these have not met the bill, while the United States whom he dealt with so tenderly have hitherto given the cold shoulder to the desires and hopes of China and other Members of the Council, as was undisguisedly shown at the Brussels Conference. The Chinese question as dealt with by the League has again confirmed the method followed at Geneva in particular by the Great Powers—and sometimes also by China—of placing one's own interests above the ideas and ideals of the Covenant. Mr. Wellington Koo may be right in regretting this. But this does not entitle him, without going into the reasons of the Powers that have withdrawn from the League, to speak of them as "ogling" with aggressions and breaches of the law. Neither Germany nor Italy have attacked China nor broken any treaty concluded with her, nor have they given her any other cause to make such accusations. And as far as her conflict with Japan is concerned, under its surface which appears to be so simple and clear there are deeper political, social, economic and cultural causes which cannot be simply classified as "aggression and breach of treaty". In the Far Eastern conflict it is even more obvious than in the Italo-Abyssinian and in the Spanish conflicts that, instead of localising it, it is extremely foolish to demand that it should be extended to a world conflagration and that nations should be involved that have nothing whatever to do with it. And this for the sole reason that, nearly twenty years ago, on account of the exaggerated idealism of some and a determined, materialistic and egoistic determination on the part of others to perpetuate the dictated peace of Paris, an Article 16 was adopted which has developed more and more into a danger for peace.

On behalf of the Little Entente, the Roumanian Foreign Minister, M. Micescu, expressed his approval of the ideas and principles of the League. As regards international cooperation he said it could not be effectively attained without universality and pointed out that in any case, in view of the lack of universality, an ideological conflict with non-Member States was intolerable. As a second principle he emphasised the equality of rights of all Members. But the Little Entente only desires a partial application of this principle formally and legally to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, in view of the third principle mentioned in the declaration, namely the demand for a collective and effective guarantee of the present *status quo*. The picture of the League of Nations of 1938, he continued, bore little resemblance to that of 1920.

This is quite true. But it appears to us that this incomplete picture of the League in 1920 was viewed differently by its Members according to the improvements which were still to be made in it. That these improvements at the same time brought conflicts was certainly not in the minds of those who hoped that the further development would make the League a factor of adjustment and of the revision of discriminatory provisions which were a danger to peace. That it did not ultimately become this is due not least to the fault of Roumania and of the Little Entente as a whole.

Text of the most important speeches at the opening meeting on January 27th, 1938

M. A d l e, President, Representative of Iran : It was a little over 18 years ago, on January 16th, 1920, that the first meeting of the Council was held, inaugurating thereat a new system for the collaboration of sovereign States.

The League has an impressive record of accomplishment. There have been failures—serious failures. This is surely inevitable in all great experiments, but should not make us any the less resolved to do what lies in our power to contribute to the success of a system in whose principles we continue to believe.

In this modern world where the acts of one State may react upon the wellbeing of other members of the world community with a rapidity undreamt of by even the immediately preceding generation, a League is a vital necessity.

Mr. E d e n, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland : You have referred, Mr. President, to the fact that this is the 100th meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. This fact is in itself sufficient to show that the League has given its proofs. It has a record of achievement which should not be forgotten by those who are more apt to contemplate its failures. Diplomatic successes have little news value while diplomatic failures have resounding consequences which continue for long to be heard and felt. The League can legitimately be proud of its achievements but there can be no advantage in shutting our eyes to certain events, however regrettable and however much we may deplore them. By the defection of some of its more important Members the League is now faced with the fact that the area of cooperation is restricted, and that its ability to fulfil all the functions originally contemplated for it is thereby reduced. We are compelled regretfully to recognise that fact ; but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not think it inappropriate, at a moment when they have to acknowledge the repudiation in some quarters of the League of Nations to declare that their faith in the aims and ideals that inspired it remains unchanged.

The principles on which the League was founded are laid down in the Preamble to the Covenant. They are the promotion of international cooperation and the achievement of international peace and security on the basis of respect for international law. To those principles His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hold fast, and they believe that true peace and orderly progress and prosperity cannot be looked for in the world unless all nations cooperate in some system based upon those principles.

For the moment we must realise that in the present circumstances the League is not in a position to achieve all that was hoped of it. It was designed to hold all the nations of the world together in resistance to war and injustice. It was born of the universal desire to avoid a recurrence of the horrors through which the world had just passed. It was an idea hailed by all nations as responding to an urgent and spontaneous impulse. Believing, as we do, that that impulse survives, we can hope that it will ultimately prevail, and that differences will be narrowed to those of method. For that reason and others, it seems to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom essential, in these difficult times, to retain what still exists. They consider that the League, despite its existing limitations, is the best instrument which has yet been devised for giving effect to the principles of international cooperation, and they are therefore determined to keep it in existence, to give it their full support and to make use of its machinery and procedure to the fullest extent that circumstances permit. Within the limits which they have to recognise, they intend to make it as efficient an instrument as possible.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will welcome any cooperation in the work of the League which non-Members may be disposed to give, and they do not regard their membership of the League as preventing or hindering friendly

relations with non-Members, since they see no reason why such relations should involve them in any departure from the principles to which I have referred. In the meantime they still believe that one day, possibly with more or less adaptation to circumstances, the League will become the universal organisation which its founders contemplated.

For the present, if and for so long as other great Nations withhold their collaboration, the field of action by the League is to that extent, in practice, inevitably restricted. Attention has recently been drawn in more than one quarter to the danger of widening this breach by the advocacy of any particular system of government. The League has never been, and His Majesty's Government for their part are resolved to do all in their power to ensure that it shall not become, the home of any ideology save that of peace through international cooperation. Let us hold fast to our principles, if we believe in them, and devote our whole energies to proving their worth. Let us not be drawn into any sterile and embittering controversy with those who do not think and work with us at this moment. Let us rather hope that an appeasement may be achieved that will unite all nations in the desire once again to find the way of peace through cooperation. When that day comes, it may be that we shall unite in finding new and better methods and in adapting or modifying our procedure, but for the present we must recognise realities and our best course would seem to be that we should continue to use the instrument that lies ready to our hand, for all the purposes for which it is fitted, and thus show our faith in the essential principles on which the League was founded.

M. D e l b o s, France : The Government that I represent desires to assert its fidelity to the League of Nations and its continuing confidence in its future. Not that it closes its eyes to the difficulties through which the League is passing : but it sees in those very difficulties and in the consequences resulting therefrom, the proof that it is necessary for us to unite more closely in order to find remedies for them. The crisis which is at present affecting Europe and the whole world indeed shows that perils grow greater in proportion as the League's principles are forgotten. Doubtless because too much was expected of it, the League is reproached with the distance which separates the hopes of yesterday from the disappointing realities of to-day ; because, only too often, it has appeared powerless, people have drawn the conclusion that its methods are ineffective—instead of endeavouring to apply them all the better.

How can we now fail to perceive the errors underlying the desertions and defections which we have to note ? It has been stated that peace and war can be kept in separate compartments. Now, we see the intercommunication between conflicts ; we see it manifested in the most significant examples, affecting the most distant sectors of the world. The war in Spain, although a civil war and therefore the least likely to affect and influence other nations, has had serious effects throughout Europe, and who can claim that it is unrelated with the conflict in the Far East ?

Do not such observations prove that the destinies of peoples are inter-connected, and that peace is all the better guaranteed for each, the more it is ensured to all ?

What reproach may rightly be levelled at the fundamental ideas of the Covenant, which are the criminal absurdity of war, the danger of an armaments race, the free collaboration of peoples knowing that isolation is a mortal danger, the obligation to respect treaties and to settle conflicts peacefully ? If those ideas are abandoned, the relations between States no longer repose on anything but relationships of force ; the unstable equilibrium of which is liable at any moment to be overthrown, thus leading to war.

We find an obvious proof of this in the fact that as belief in those ideas has grown weaker, the dangers of war have grown more serious, with an acceleration in the armaments race and an increasing anxiety engendered by economic and political inse-

curity. Such are the results of a departure from essential principles, and that is why we must go back to those principles.

But because this is an ideal, there are those who conclude that it is chimerical. The fact is that the ideal, far from being harmful to action, is the indispensable condition of action. Even those who combat the Covenant and tax it with expressing an ideology, have had to invoke another, and bilateral methods tend to widen breaches in collective conceptions.

Are we going to abandon ideas of collective methods at the moment when their necessity is obvious to all? If we fail to recognise those of the League of Nations, we shall quickly be compelled to discover them anew; nothing, therefore, is more legitimate and more necessary than an active revival of international opinion.

There can be no question of intervening in the internal system of other countries; how could the League wish or be able to do this, since all forms of Government are represented in the League in mutual respect for the preferences of each Member?

We have to defend our conception of the relations between States against the risks of international anarchy. The League of Nations offers the peoples of the world the best setting for peaceful collaboration. If it has not realised all the hopes that were placed in it, all its possibilities still subsist. Only too frequently people forget the service which the League and the institutions attached to it, such as the International Labour Office, have rendered in all fields, the contacts and the agreements which the League has facilitated between Governments—and Governments which, without the League, would not have known one another; the part which the League has enabled many States to play whose voices would not have been raised at all or would not even have been heard. Such States have largely benefited by the spirit of comprehension and mutual assistance introduced by the Covenant into international relations.

Salvation depends on the will that we are able to place in the service of the ideal which is common to us. It does not lie in abstention, which would be imprudent because it would lead to isolation, but it lies in collaboration of all in favour of peace. How can we doubt our possibilities, since the nations grouped at Geneva constitute, if they have the will, a material and moral force that is greater than any other? Though circumstances of fact have been such as to impose limits on the application of the Covenant, we must none the less maintain the will to put those principles effectively into action. There can be no question of creating or crystallising antagonisms; France, resolutely devoted to literal and democratic principles, as also to the ideal by which we are inspired, none the less remains ready to seek with other States all possibilities of peaceful settlement and collaboration.

The Government of the French Republic, which maintains complete confidence in the League of Nations, is profoundly convinced that it is in the extent to which the League of Nations is animated by those who have charge of it that peace will be maintained and organised.

M. Beck, Poland: I listened with the greatest attention to the statements made by the distinguished Members of the Council of the League of Nations who have preceded me on the occasion of the 100th Session of the Council. It would seem to me that these declarations reflect the interest which States bear in the future of international collaboration within the framework of a permanent organisation. So far as my own Government is concerned, it has emphasised this interest on various occasions. But these statements show at the same time an understanding of the present situation, which unhappily is so far removed from the objects and the aspirations that were assigned to the League of Nations at the moment of its inception.

Quite recently I had an opportunity to make clear my Government's views on this problem. The ideas and principles which I set forth in our own Parliament still determine our attitude

both within the League of Nations and also in other fields of international co-operation. In collaboration with other countries we shall endeavour to maintain an equilibrium between duties and rights. The Government which I have the honour to represent is devoted, above all, to a real sense of international collaboration, considering that modifications or evolutions in form of that collaboration are of secondary importance.

Noting that in present conditions vital decisions have to be taken individually by the Governments of sovereign States with a full realisation of their responsibilities, the Polish Government is resolved by its decisions to contribute to the consolidation of peaceful relations and friendly collaboration between all countries.

Mr. Wellington Koo, China: During the nearly two decades of its existence the League of Nations has never found its prestige and authority at such a low ebb as it finds them to-day. Notwithstanding its duty to promote international co-operation and achieve international peace and security, the world is confronted with a state of lawlessness and violence seldom witnessed in the long course of history. There has been raging for several years an economic war between nations unprecedented in its intensity and violence. There is also a war of ideologies, the bitterness of which approaches that of religious wars in the Dark Ages. Peace has been broken in two important regions of the world, and a sense of insecurity prevails everywhere. All nations, great and small, are feverishly arming for fear of being attacked suddenly. International law, instead of being established as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, is openly challenged or swept into the limbo of oblivion; while treaty obligations, far from receiving that scrupulous respect which is properly due to them in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, have been wilfully disregarded with impunity. The whole world finds itself on the brink of an abyss, and thoughtful people everywhere feel apprehensive even of the near future.

Yet every conflict which exists in Europe or in the Far East, every threat of peace, nay, every problem that seriously divides the nations to-day, is embraced under the Covenant of the League, which provides not only principles for settling them but also the necessary machinery to bring about a settlement. But of all these conflicts and problems the League of Nations, instead of discharging its sacrosanct duty as a great dominant factor of justice, peace and security, has become a passive spectator. In spite of its past record of achievements, it now merely serves as a platform for empty platitudes and a centre of wordy excuses for inaction. In the face of such delinquency, can it be wondered at that the friends of the League begin to lose heart in its future to the gratification of its enemies, and that its prestige and authority before the world should have been steadily declining?

The historians of the future may well ask whether the decline of the authority of the League of Nations has not been due as much to the doubts and scepticism of some of its more important members within as to the criticism and attacks of its professed opponents without. The argument most frequently advanced in favour of a policy of lassitude and indifference in the face of overt aggression is that the League is not what it was intended to be, namely, a universal association including all the principal Powers as members. It cannot be contested, however, that the absence or withdrawal of certain Powers from the League does not relieve its actual members of the obligations which their membership comports under the Covenant. "A scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples" is ordained by the Covenant, and it is an indispensable basis of order and stability in international relations. If the members of the League do not take their duties under the Covenant seriously, how could they expect other nations not members thereof to be more scrupulous in their observance of treaties and feel deterred by the existence of the League?

It is a fact that the action of the League because of its lack of universality, cannot be as effective as it would be if its membership comprised all the important Powers of the world. But it does not follow that all action of the League to restrain aggression and safeguard peace would produce no salutary effect. Those vital provisions of the fundamental charter of the League designed to enforce peace and prevent aggression have not been fully tested. In the experiment of three years ago brought about through courageous and far-sighted initiative, the ultimate failure was due, not to any unsoundness of the provisions applied, but rather to the incompleteness of the measures adopted and the sudden, unexpected breakdown of solidarity of action among the League members. As a consequence, there exists a feeling of restlessness and want of confidence in the League on the part of a number of member States. The League has to-day fallen so much in the estimation of the world that it is necessary to make a radical change in its policy if it is to be rescued from its state of apparent paralysis and threatened disintegration. Instead of always seeking to avoid responsibility behind a veil of pretended prudence, it should boldly try to live up to its obligations and discharge its sacred mission in the world of maintaining peace and restraining aggression. By constantly refraining from positive, constructive action in the face of grave situations, it plays into the hands of its enemies who wish first to discredit it and then bring about its destruction, and disheartens its own friends who desire to see it develop into a veritable citadel of world peace.

The principle of collective security is the only logical principle the realization of which may lead the world to an era of durable peace. It is predicated upon the axiom that the combined strength of the whole is greater than any of its parts. And the League of Nations, which is the embodiment of that principle, should deservedly represent the hope of the peace-loving nations. For the strength and resources of even those who remain outside and who cherish or actually pursue a policy of violence and aggression in disregard of law and order in the world, are not comparable to the collective strength and resources of the entire membership of the League of Nations, especially when reinforced as was the case from time to time in the past, by the co-operation or parallel action of that great peace-loving democracy on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. It is the want of faith, the lack of conviction, or the persistent spirit of national egoism, which accounts for the ineffectiveness of the League and the steady eclipse of its authority and prestige.

M. Munters, Latvia: On the occasion of the hundredth session of the Council of the League, I feel it my duty to reaffirm the unqualified adherence of my country and people to the ideal of international peace and to the principle of international collaboration which form the basis of this great institution. We firmly believe that the ideas on which the organisation of the League and its Covenant are based are sound, and correspond to the instinctive longing and the universal desire of the people of the civilised world. Moreover, we believe that the period of trial which the League is passing through will eventually lead to a new maturity of its ideology and hence to a strengthening of its authority and position.

The Covenant to which the Members of the League have pledged themselves is, in our view, not only a legal instrument, but primarily a great political act. Herein resides the source of both its strength and its weakness. A political act for the establishment of permanent world peace must be universally accepted; it must, on the other hand, take account in its application of political realities. These two vital conditions of an effective working of the Covenant are, to a great extent, correlated and interdependent. Their absence is the cause of deficiencies of which we have had a number of discouraging experiences and which, in their accumulation, have reacted on the confidence

of individual States in the League itself and resulted in numerous manifestations of doubt and disappointment.

But doubt and disappointment are essentially transitional states of mind, and they must necessarily develop into something of a more definite character. I wish to associate myself with the expression of hope which may be read into the declarations we have heard at this table that this development will assure a successful future to the League of Nations. The doubts which exist to-day should develop into the reasoned conviction that the League is a useful and indispensable framework for pacific and equitable international intercourse. Its disappearance would mean chaos and the establishment of the rule of force. The feeling of disappointment should give room to a realistic appreciation of political forces and tendencies, the reconciliation of which constitutes the essence of international collaboration. This implies the necessity of avoiding ideological antagonism between the League and non-Member States.

Mr. President, I would like to end on a note of gratitude to the League of Nations for all the valuable services it has rendered to its Members and to humanity.

M. Micesco, Roumania: As this is the first occasion on which I have had the honour to speak at this table, I am very glad to take this opportunity, afforded by the meeting of the hundredth session of the Council, to repeat on behalf of the Little Entente the expression of our devotion to the ideals and principles which were at the basis of the League of Nations. We are indeed amongst those who participated with enthusiastic faith in drawing up and putting into force the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is all the more pleasant to me to recall this fact since the Covenant in our eyes represented the possibility of ensuring the triumph of the three great principles on which the maintenance of peace between the nations depends. These principles are: the organisation of international co-operation, the establishment of absolute equality as between States, and collective guarantee of the territorial integrity and the political independence of all States Members.

So far as international co-operation is concerned, we have always considered, and we continue to believe, that this cannot be organised in an effective and continuous way unless the League of Nations is ensured that character of universality to which it has aspired since its inception, and failing the attainment of this, unless it maintains its activity within a setting that is devoid of all ideological conflict with States that are not Members of the League.

So far as the principle of equality is concerned, it seems to us impossible to conceive of an association of States the members of which do not enjoy equal sovereignty, do not enjoy the same rights, and are not subject to the same duties.

Finally, as regards the guarantee of the territorial integrity of States Members, we conceive this under the aspect of a guarantee that is both collective and effective, based upon the existing *status quo* and upon our political independence.

Such, indeed, were the principles which led us to sign the Covenant, and such still remain the principles on the basis of which we conceive our collaboration with the League of Nations. This all the more since we have been assured from the most authoritative quarter that there can be no question of intervening in the internal régime of any country, and that it is agreed that all forms of government being represented here, it follows that mutual respect for national conceptions must remain the rule. We must indeed note that our institution has not realised all our desires, nor justified all our hopes, and that the League of 1938 hardly resembles the picture that we conceived of it in 1920. Nevertheless, although we are compelled to make such an observation, we promise, as loyal Members of the League of Nations, our joint support to any effort which, taking full account of realities, shall be of such a nature as to ensure the application and the maintenance of the principles on which we based our adhesion to the Covenant.

Mr. Undén, Sweden: I have listened with the very keenest satisfaction to the statements that have been made which have expressed a firm will to support the League of Nations in a spirit that is in conformity with the principles on which it was founded. The Swedish nation remains firmly devoted to the League of Nations. It is convinced that the League will retain the character of a vast international organisation within which any State desirous of making a sincere and effective contribution to the common stock will find its place. Sweden belongs to the category of States that have sometimes been called States which have no alliances. For them participation in the League has in no sense the meaning of an alliance with any country or any group of countries. Through their collaboration with other Members within the League these States consider they are able to contribute towards ensuring that the League of Nations remains an international association in the real sense of the word and towards ensuring that they shall not defend the national and selfish interests of any particular State or group of States. The attitude of the League of Nations has frequently during the past years caused disappointment among the nations. I shall not now embark upon a discussion of the causes of the weakening of the League, nor shall I express any view as to the responsibilities incurred in that respect by different Members of the League, nor in fact shall I discuss the question whether another attitude adopted at decisive moments by Members of the League might have led to events taking a different turn and thereby leaving intact the very foundation of the League. Unfortunately the facts are there and it is an act of loyalty to recognise that the application of the provisions of the Covenant, the realisation of the aims which the League of Nations set before itself, has proved too great a task for its means has gone beyond the strength which its Members were prepared to put into the services of the common cause. The situation thus created calls for serious consideration, and the meeting of the Committee of Twenty-Eight will doubtless offer an appropriate occasion for such discussion. I am convinced that a discussion by that Committee for the purpose of throwing light upon the situation and better defining the relations between the League and its Members would in reality result in strengthening the

links between those States who are Members of this institution.

M. Spaak, Belgium: Belgium remains faithful to the League of Nations. For my country the principles of the Covenant represent a high ideal to which sooner or later all peoples of the world must rally unless the world is to sink into anarchy. Belgium believes in the necessity for international law which shall be scrupulously observed. She sees therein the safest guarantee against all enterprises of force. For herself she is prepared to accept all solutions of conciliation and arbitration and she rejects with horror the idea of war. She is firmly convinced that the pacific ideal is the highest and most noble ideal that people can set before themselves. But the devotion that I intend to express towards these governing ideals cannot prevent me from emphasizing the evil from which the League of Nations suffers. On reflection, nothing would seem to be more dangerous to the very principles I have just stated than that such a situation of fact should be repeated, and it makes it possible to believe that the Members of the League are incapable of expressing their aspirations in action. Discredit is unfortunately fatal for our institution if it should seem to be merely the manifestation of a praiseworthy intention whereas it ought to be an effective implement. The peoples of the world must be given back their confidence in the League of Nations and the principles for which it stands. To bring that about they must be promised only what we are sure we can do. Moreover, was not this the work to which the Assembly invited us to set our hands, on July 4th, 1936, when it stated that it was desirous of strengthening the authority of the League of Nations by adapting the application of these principles to the lessons of experience. This it would appear to me implies a loyal effort to give the League of Nations a necessary universality. Belgium does not intend to renounce the possibility of any progress in the domain of law and international organisation, but she intends to serve her ideal without departing from reality. It is in this spirit she proclaims herself faithful to the League of Nations, being prepared to collaborate in anything that may render the League powerful and living.

THE DISCUSSION IN THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY-EIGHT FOR THE REFORM OF THE COVENANT

Those Members of the League who want it to remain exactly as it is at present as the instrument of their common policy gave it clearly to be understood at the meeting of the Council on January 27th that the renewed discussions in the Committee for the Reform of the Covenant would have to conform strictly to the limits of the agenda, i.e. would be confined to a discussion of Lord Cranborne's Report on the universality of the League. It was in any case perfectly clear to everybody that the Committee would not under present circumstances take any action, and that it would put off recommendation "till better days".

But it was not possible to bar the subject altogether. Though on the one hand the declarations in the Council refrained—as the result of a compromise reached in previous negotiations behind the scenes—from any expression of sympathy for Article 16, the discussions in the Reform Committee on the other hand centred in Article 16, the starting-point of the criticisms of the so-called "mutineers" being none other than the necessity of any collective security system being based on universality as a condition precedent.

On this as on previous occasions the discussion in the Reform Committee ended to the satisfaction of the pro-sanctionist party in a victory over the "captious critics". Such "victories"

inside Committees of the League can hardly be said to come as surprises; and the result on the present occasion changes nothing in the realities of the situation. The only striking feature about such victories is that it is always the same elements that emerge victorious; and that is really the greatest reproach that can be urged against the League. For the outcome of this discussion, the origin of which was the failure of the League attempt to apply Article 16, is simply that everything remains as it was. There will never be any reform of the Covenant, or at any rate no thorough-going reform. That is the conclusion that emerges from the discussion.

The stage management of the discussion was itself a demonstration of how a "revolt" can be quelled by means of the procedure Report, Counter-Report and Concluding Remarks. The real Report on this occasion was the Council meeting of January 27th. The Counter-Report was the "Neutrals' Day" which introduced the discussion in the Reform Committee. In conclusion, as at all public meetings, the safe speakers were put up—i.e. in this case the champions of sanctions and the further extension of the same—in the belief, for which there is as much foundation at Geneva as elsewhere, that the public always applauds the last speaker. The last speaker on this occasion was the French delegate Paul-Boncour.

It was the heavy-weights in the competition for Article 16 who spoke; and they spoke in the following order—Czechoslovakia, China, U.S.S.R., Colombia, Red Spain, Mexico and France. Some of them said that they were not against Fascist countries as such, but only against them because they had aggressive tendencies. It was left to del Vayo, the delegate of Red Spain, to say the Fascist countries were “hors la loi”. The representative of Colombia was allowed without opposition to describe the policy of neutrality as “public enemy Number One”; and the third of the group, the “godless” Litvinov, hastened to add in this connection that it was no good waiting till “God is for us all”, for people did not come to Geneva “merely to pray”.

The Press which is in the service of these tendencies had precluded the proceedings with unsavoury polemics against those delegates who in the interest of their own security, as well as from a true understanding of what is meant by international co-operation, were not prepared to toe the line. The chief offences in the eyes of these organs of the Press were the “scandalous” utterances outside Geneva of the Polish Foreign Minister Beck, the Swedish Foreign Minister Sandler and the Swiss Federal President Motta, all of which preceded the 100th Session of the Council and were treated by the Press in question as indicative of the “danger” that the Reform Committee might possibly at the eleventh hour live up to its name.

Although these utterances and the declarations to a similar effect which were duly made in the Reform Committee were unconnected, except in the most indirect way, with the attitude of Italy and Germany, it was inevitable that the counter-attack and the rally in defence of Article 16 should take the form of an offensive against that attitude; and any hesitations on the point were nipped in the bud by crediting Germany and Italy with the intention of destroying the League. These tactics have had one result at any rate. The idea of the formation of ideological blocs has now reached such a stage of development in the case of certain Members of the League, despite verbal assurances to the contrary within the League, that any amendment of the Covenant in the sense of those who advocate change may now be said to have become all but impossible. The decisive utterance on this issue came from Paul-Boncour. The countries, he said, who have left the League made the elimination of Article 16 the principal point in their attack on the League. That, he said, is a striking proof of the fact that they regard Article 16 as the chief danger to themselves. Consequently it is an indispensable necessity to uphold Article 16, and even to develop and extend it in the interests of the peace of the world. No other attitude could nowadays be expected of Paul-Boncour.

His utterances breathe, as always, the very spirit of Versailles. The only charge is that, since the renewal of Germany's strength and the emancipation of Italy the division of States into “conquerors and conquered” has been abandoned in favour of the division into “peaceful and aggressive peoples” or alternatively “democratic and Fascist systems”, to be regarded accordingly with the same mistrust and to be handled by the same methods.

France, U.S.S.R., China, Red Spain, Mexico and Colombia in common contempt of the non-Member States took occasion in the course of the Reform discussions to advocate the development and extension of the automatic sanctions system of the League, making scant concealment of their motives. It was no more than cheap phrases therefore when they hastened in the same breath to add, by way of a sedative for the “desponded” delegates, that they too were opposed to blocs.

It is in point of fact astonishing, when one reads the statements of a whole number of delegations, to observe what weight they all attach to the avoidance by the League of the establishment of blocs at all costs.

The declarations by the Neutrals clearly indicated the limits to be set in this connection. The fact that they differ from one another in certain respects cannot obscure the fact that their support of the collective security system of Article 16 is subject

to very important conditions and to far-reaching reserves, and that even so they insist on a purely voluntary application of the Article on the basis of the directives of 1921.

It means very little, in the light of such interpretative explanations of the Article amounting as they do to a further important extension of the directives in question, that a formal majority was found to approve the principle of collective security. The criticism to which the principle was subjected loses none of its significance from the fact that the adoption of an escape resolution in favour of universality was successfully prevented. It was not only Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the Argentine and Chile who gave clear expression to their views on the subject: Poland and Belgium also made it plain that under present circumstances there can be no question of any enforcement by the League of the collective security system. The recent negotiations of the Little Entente and Balkan Entente have also shown that there is no longer any such overwhelming conviction in favour of another war of position by those within the League against those who stand outside, when normal friendly relations are possible without the League.

But what power of action is left to this League with its present Constitution and its inevitably European—rather than international—orientation, when a series of European States put forward such far-reaching reservations, and back them by cogent and cumulative arguments drawn from the realities of the European situation?

And if, in spite of this, and in spite of the pressing warnings that have been given, a discussion of this kind ends in a general certainty on the part of all the participants as they return to their respective countries that fundamental reform of the Covenant can never be carried, it is true to say that all the legal and political arguments against Geneva which have hitherto been urged still hold good, and that all hopes reposed in Geneva will continue to prove, as they have hitherto proved, vain.

Statements in the Reform Committee

Opening of the meeting by the Chairman M. Bourquin, Belgium: Members of the Committee will recall that when they dispersed at the end of September it was agreed that at the present session the Committee would consider Viscount Cranborne's Report on the participation of all States in the League of Nations. Together with its many other great merits, this Report has the advantage of considering the problem before us in its widest aspect. Of course it does deal with special and detailed questions also, or raises such questions, but above all it deals with the general conception of the League of Nations, and I think that Members of the Committee will agree that our exchange of views to-day ought to be confined to these general, and, in a sense, preliminary considerations. Since our first session the international situation has developed rapidly and preoccupations have emerged or become accentuated. No doubt these will find their echoes in our discussions, and I hope the discussion will provide full opportunity for the frankest expression of these preoccupations, of course in the atmosphere of confidence which always prevails in this Committee.

M. Undén, Sweden: During the present meeting of the Committee of Twenty-Eight we shall certainly not find it possible to deal thoroughly with all the problems that arise. Political conditions at the present time are uncertain, obscure and no one can say with certainty whether the League of Nations will be in a position to take initiatives and to proceed to those contacts that are necessary with a view to realising in a wider measure than at present that universality which is one of the objects towards which the League must direct its efforts. In the Swedish Government's opinion the question of universality is closely bound up with that of collective security. That is why I have asked to be allowed to speak in order to set

forth the Swedish Government's attitude in this respect. At the beginning of his statement the Rapporteur says that there are three different ways in which the organisation of the collectivity of nations for the maintenance of peace may be regarded. In the first place there is a League of a coercive character. Such a League is based upon the idea that its Members are in certain circumstances bound to impose sanctions of one kind or another. The present League of Nations possesses this characteristic. The second type of organisation is a League of a different character, of an opposite character, that is to say, of a non-coercive character. Its Members have not accepted any obligation other than that of consulting together in the event of one Member violating the rules of the society. Between these two there is a third kind of society which the Rapporteur describes as intermediate. Such a League would be based on the idea that on the one hand the Members do not in advance undertake an obligation to impose sanctions, but on the other hand they do not abandon the possibility of taking part in them should it prove necessary, or should the occasion arise.

It is clear from the Rapporteur's statement that the realisation of a League of this kind can be conceived in various ways. The Rapporteur has not expressed his opinions in detail on the various alternatives which offer in this respect. Doubtless the League of Nations as defined by the provisions of the Covenant does possess the characteristics of a League of a coercive character. The Covenant is based on the idea that peace cannot be ensured merely by promises of non-aggression and by arbitration and conciliation agreements. Article 11 and Article 16 are both based on the concept of a League of Nations capable of intervening, not merely through mediation or through the adoption of resolutions and protests, but also in certain circumstances, if inevitable, by measures so serious that an aggressive State would expose itself to risks that were too great if it endeavoured to realise its aims by force. In view of the fact that the League does not possess an international military force, it follows that its means of effective intervention in the event of war or threat of war depend entirely on the solidarity of its Members, a solidarity which the Covenant makes a juridical obligation.

I am convinced that the ideas which are at the basis of the Covenant are correct in themselves. The League of Nations cannot, in the long run, maintain its cohesion or exercise an influence over international politics if it abandons in principle all means of pressure other than those of a moral character. An organisation of States which makes of respect for peace a fundamental principle of international law cannot regard with indulgence the violation of that principle without exposing itself to the danger of gradual decomposition. It is a sociological fact that violations of law against which action is not taken in the ultimate resort by coercive measures do rapidly lead to further violations, and very soon cause the principles of law to lose their influence over men's minds. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the idea of collective security, however true it may be, cannot be realised in practice unless the League obtains a wide adhesion from the nations, unless it obtains, as is so often said, universality, this expression being taken in a relative sense. It is naturally impossible to indicate in any exact or general way the essential extent of participation, but no one, I think, will dispute the fact that a League of Nations which is very reduced in numbers finds it impossible to operate in accordance with the letter of the provisions of the Covenant. Further, the question must be asked, as the rapporteur has asked it, whether other factors than the number of members do not, indeed, influence the possibilities of the League from the standpoint of the taking of coercive measures. It is, indeed, possible that even should a large number of States belong to the League, economic and financial sanctions might prove to be ineffective in view of the resources possessed by the aggressor, his geographical situation or other circumstances which enabled him to offer a lengthy resistance; nor can we ignore the fact that, in a given case, economic and financial sanctions may

appear to be inexpedient owing to the general political and economic situation of the world. The Covenant of the League of Nations does not take expressly into account any of the circumstances to which I have just referred or other situations that are of obvious importance. In the letter, Article 16 imposes on each member the duty of applying economic sanctions to the aggressor as soon as a war breaks out, but this system has never operated in practice. During the history of the League many acts of aggression and of war have occurred with which the League has had to deal. Now, Article 16 has been applied on one occasion only, and then in an incomplete and hesitating manner.

The experiences of recent years are of particular interest. During this period there have been conflicts about Manchuria, the Chaco War, the Italo-Ethiopian War, the conflict in Spain and the war in the Far East. I shall not attempt to indicate the reasons and the facts why, in each of the cases mentioned, the Members of the League have adopted an attitude of reserve; I shall confine myself to pointing out that the small States, who are often regarded as timid and hesitant in the matter of the application of sanctions, cannot rightly be held responsible for the failure of the League of Nations. On the contrary, it is rather the States which in theory support Article 16 with the greatest enthusiasm who have had objections to put forward against the application and pursuit of economic sanctions during these years. I desire to add, in passing, that I am not making any criticism; I do not at present in any way wish to open up a discussion with a view to fixing possible and ultimate responsibility. What I desire is, in particular to point out that to judge of the attitude taken by different States in the matter of sanctions, account must be taken not only of the declarations during the discussion but also, and above all, of their acts. I am convinced that a large number of Governments, if not all, represented in the League of Nations are of the opinion that in practice the provisions of Article 16 cannot at the present time be applied in their entirety. No State represented here could deny the evidence or dispute the fact of failure to apply sanctions during recent years in several cases in which, in accordance with the Covenant, sanctions were obligatory. Certainly I could not indicate the reasons which my colleagues, each for his own part, would desire to put forward to explain the attitude of their respective Governments. Probably the reasons urged would vary considerably. In my capacity as representative of the Swedish Government I would define the situation thus: following on the experiences of recent years, in view of the weakness of the League of Nations and the general political situation, the Members of the League have been led to recognise that the system of sanctions does not operate in an obligatory and automatic fashion. To any one who does not share this view, and who is prepared to state that economic sanctions continue to be obligatory and automatic, I would venture to point out that by taking that attitude he is reproaching his own Government for having failed in its obligations. Is there for instance, a single State amongst us—I venture to put this question—which, in accordance with the provisions of Article 16, is applying sanctions in the conflict now taking place in the Far East?

The system of sanctions is, I would note, for the moment in actual fact suspended. So, many statesmen have made pronouncements, both before the organs of the League and outside this institution, which go to show that they do not close their eyes to realities; and in this connection I would venture to refer to the passage in the speech of M. Delbos in the last Assembly in which he stated, in particular, that it would for the moment be chimerical to believe that the means of action which have been allowed to grow too weak are totally applicable as from to-day. Another expression of the same thought is to be found in the communiqué of July 1st, 1936, published by the Foreign Ministers of seven States, including Sweden, on the eve of the cessation of the sanctions applied against Italy. In this commu-

niqué the following statement appears: "Whilst recalling that guiding principles were adopted in 1921 for the application of Article 16, we declare that, so long as the Covenant as a whole is applied only in an incomplete and inconsequent manner, we are compelled to take account of this fact in the application of the said Article."

However regrettable we may find the development that has taken place, it cannot in any case be denied that it *has* taken place. Taking note of the fact that the League refrains from intervening according to the methods laid down in the Covenant in conflicts that are taking place, it serves no useful purpose to close our eyes to the fact that this failure is the result of a comparison of the formal provisions of the Covenant, on the one hand, with the realities of the present time on the other hand. In my opinion we cannot but recognise openly that, for reasons which are well known, the League is not capable of carrying out the programme of the Covenant in its entirety. The conclusion to be drawn from this observation is that the League of Nations, in practice, no longer has the characteristic of a coercive League corresponding to the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant. By the force of events, without any amendments to the Covenant, the practice has become established according to which Members of the League do not consider themselves bound to undertake coercive action against an aggressor State. This practice implies that at present time the League of Nations should be described as a League of the intermediate type, according to the rapporteur's expression.

I would like to add that the remark which I have just made regarding the application of the Covenant does not imply abandonment of the idea of collective security for the future. It does not even necessarily mean that at the present time the League abandons the possibility of intervening effectively in the case of a conflict through a spontaneously established collaboration between the Members of the League, a collaboration which might, in certain circumstances, be extended to non-Member countries.

The objection may be put forward to what I have said that a finding of the kind I have set forth would mean a further weakening of the Covenant and of the League; but the League is not weakened by recognising the weakness from which it actually suffers in fact. It is weakened rather by offering to the nations of the world repeated occasions for remarking the nonconformity of doctrine with practice. By maintaining in the present situation, which I should personally like to describe as a transition period, the friction of a system of automatic and obligatory sanctions we do not bring about the realisation of such a system. On the contrary, there is a danger that the League may be reproached with failing in its undertakings towards its Members, and that, on the other hand, Members may be reproached with failing in their undertakings towards the League. Such a result would inevitably be prejudicial to the political and moral authority of the League; it should be avoided.

M. Gorgé, Switzerland: The report which Viscount Cranborne has drawn up on the question of universality suffers from one defect. Doubtless it is its only one, but it is that it comes rather late. This lateness is not, however, in any way due to its author. If the report had been discussed without too great a delay, our deliberations might perhaps have led to happier results than we can expect from them to-day. The fact is, that in the meantime universality has received a further blow, the gravity of which it would be vain to hide.

As M. Spaak said the other day in the Council, the ill is there, and we can only fear that our remedies — if we do indeed discover any — may have lost something of their curative value owing to delays which we have not been the only ones to regret.

But though Lord Cranborne's report deals with a problem of which recent events have inevitably diminished the practical application, it does nevertheless raise certain questions of which

the present importance cannot be doubted. Starting rightly from the idea that the problem of universality is governed by the very character that it is desired to confer upon the League of Nations, Lord Cranborne gives us a choice between three solutions: a League of Nations of a coercive character, a League of Nations of a non-coercive character, and a League of Nations of an intermediate character—that is to say, one endowed with a system of optional coercion. Thus we come straight away to consider the fate of Article 16 of the Covenant.

Article 16 thus becoming at this stage in our work the pivot upon which the whole reform of the Covenant seems to revolve, it is comprehensible that certain States should have thought it necessary to stop at that point. That a discussion of this character is delicate, we agree; it might easily clash with legitimate convictions or generous hopes. For our part, contrary to what has been said for example in a certain section of the Press, we are anxious to do nothing which might needlessly add to the difficulties—which are already sufficiently great—with which the League of Nations is now struggling.

But when a discussion is opened on a problem like that of sanctions we are bound to express our opinion. This problem does appear on our agenda; Sweden, in particular, has expressed her intention of stating her attitude thereto. That being the case, how can Switzerland argue from her special situation in order, for tactics' sake, to avoid any discussion of a matter which affects both the general interests of the League of Nations and its own essential interests? Our silence would not have been understood by our own public opinion.

After the statement made on December 22nd in the National Council by the head of our Foreign Political Department, M. Motta, Federal Councillor, some will perhaps think that the time has come for our country to make clear what is its position as a neutral State with regard to the League of Nations. This, however, is neither the time nor the place to take up that problem.

In this Committee, my duty is a more modest one. It relates only to one aspect of our neutrality within the League of Nations, namely, the problem of sanctions.

Switzerland was certainly defending her own interests, but she does not think that by denouncing certain illusions that were brought about by the breach of Article 16 she was doing a disservice to the interests of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, the confederation none the less remained faithful up to that point to the principle of sanctions. She was to remain faithful to it; she was bound to do so; she had undertaken engagements, therefore she was bound to keep them to the extent that was possible in view of the neutrality which had been universally recognised. To-day she finds herself in a different situation. What she was still able to do in a League of Nations which included three of her neighbours and which might still keep some hope for the return of a fourth, she would no longer be in a position to do without exposing her neutrality to most serious dangers in a League which two great neighbouring Powers had left and from which moreover two other great Powers, geographically distant, were absent. These facts in our eyes are decisive; they remove the political and psychological basis for differential neutrality which render Article 16 inapplicable for Switzerland. As M. Rutgers points out in his analytical statement, a League of Nations which is deprived of the co-operation of four great Powers renders more doubtful the eventual efficacy of sanctions contemplated in the Covenant, and increases the burden of those sanctions for the States called upon to employ them. In our case the increase in the burden would be so great that it would go beyond what we could reasonably sacrifice to international solidarity. Our very existence is at stake. It will be perhaps better understood to-day why we have so constitutionally the necessity for struggling in the cause of universality. Swiss people gave their co-operation to this great institution only in view of the hope that ultimately it would

rally to its cause all the countries which are the creators of civilisation. Devoted as it is to a neutrality that is not selfish and is a necessity, jealous as it is of a political maxim which has freed it from struggles internally, whilst reducing the possibility of threats from without, how could my country not through a vital instinct revert to its traditional neutrality when the League of Nations gives disturbing signs of weakness? This so-called differential neutrality involves more sacrifices than has been generally recognised. Those sacrifices were counter-balanced by the very fact that the League of Nations was sufficiently compact for its universality not to be seriously compromised; there was an equilibrium. To-day the equilibrium is broken. We must deduce consequences from that fact. We have done everything possible not to reach this position. In September at the last Assembly our delegation exerted itself still further in order to facilitate the entry, the return or the continuance in the League of States whose co-operation in our view would give its full significance to such an effort of international collaboration as is ours. Doubtless, this effort to rally all might have led to increasing the elasticity and, let us say it quite clearly, to weakening certain Articles of the Covenant, but, as the Federal Council pointed out, what the Covenant would have lost in juridical substance it would have gained in moral effectiveness. Unhappily—and we regret it very deeply—our efforts, asserted with those of others in favour of universality, remained fruitless. We do not abandon that great objective; far from that, because that must be the objective of any real League of Nations. Doubtless Article 16 in the present political configuration of the world contains nothing that is particularly threatening. It is, it has been said, smitten with paralysis. As has been stated on various occasions, and as the Swiss Government notes once more, the League of Nations has in fact been brought back to the intermediate type referred to in Lord Cranborne's Report. If this were indeed the fact we would be justified, as far as we are concerned, in concluding that there is nothing that now prevents our neutrality from regaining the serene heights of impartiality, for if sanctions were optional Switzerland might have abstained. Though Article 16 may be devoid of binding force it has none the less remained in the Covenant. Controversies may arise as to its juridical value. Now as the Belgium Government said in a Note dated November 10th, 1936, it is important that in so serious a matter States should know as clearly as possible the extent of burdens falling upon them and of the external co-operation of which they are assured. At present we are in a state of uncertainty; this uncertainty is disturbing. Public opinion is uneasy. A state of disquiet exists. It would be advantageous to overcome this. The moral authority of the League would gain thereby.

For these reasons we felt we should associate ourselves with the initiative taken by Sweden. Sweden's preoccupations on this point are shared by ourselves; her findings, too. We draw different conclusions, but the starting point is the same. Just as the Swedish Government is, we are convinced that by taking note of facts as they are the League of Nations would be doing its own cause a real service. It would be emerging from an equivocal position which is bound to weigh heavily against its credit. We are resolved loyally to pursue our collaboration in this great institution for international co-operation. The League may, if it can but find inspiration in the spirit that should be hers, accomplish great things for the good and welfare of humanity. All that we ask—we ask nothing more—is that it should grant us conditions which enable us to collaborate with it without endangering the very bases of our national existence. We appeal to your clearheadedness as to your friendship. Act so that the League of Nations is sufficiently elastic not to drive away from it those who can no longer assume a burden which political circumstances have rendered too heavy. The League of Nations, it has been said, has often been behindhand in accepting an idea. Let us not this time be behindhand in noting a fact, in recognising the optional character of Article 16.

M. Rutgers, Netherlands: I should like to take the opportunity of the Report on the universality of the League to-day to submit a few observations concerning the obligations of Members of the League of Nations as arising under Article 16. I had the honour to prepare a report on this subject. You may think, perhaps, that it is not necessary for me to add anything further. May I remind you, however, that in that report I was not expressing the opinions of the rapporteur but as far as possible was dealing with the situation impartially. Now I am in a position in which I can speak freely and express my own personal views, and, what is more important, the views of my own Government.

As I stated in my report, there are several causes that have hampered the development of collective security. The first of these is the absence of universality in the League of Nations. If all the countries of the world were united it would be comparatively easy to take the necessary action to restrain any refractory State, but the situation is certainly very different at the present time, when the majority of those States that would be entitled to occupy permanent seats upon the Council are outside the League of Nations. A rupture of obligations under the Covenant might now, in all probability, be due to the action of very highly armed States, and therefore those who were called upon to take action in consequence of that rupture would have to bear very heavy sacrifices, and their resultant success would be by no means certain. Then in the next place there is the question of peaceful changes of existing territorial and other arrangements. Fourthly, as I have mentioned in my report, we must remember the unhappy results of the application of Article 16 on the one occasion on which it has been applied. It is difficult, I think, to say which is the worse—the failure to apply a provision or the application of a provision leading to failure on the only occasion on which it is applied.

What conclusions can be drawn from our observations? On July 1st, 1936, the Foreign Ministers of seven States, including the Netherlands, published a special statement—a statement that has already been quoted this morning. Now we are able to make the following observations. The military sanctions provided for in Article 16 have always been recognised as optional in character. The economic sanctions provided for under Article 16 were in accordance with the letter of that Article deemed to be compulsory. They depend, however, in practice, not merely on the question of whether a *casus foederis* has arisen but on a whole series of factors that cannot be defined beforehand, and one of these factors that must be taken into account is the political relations existing at any given moment between the Great Powers. I think we should be doing an ill service to collective security if we shut our eyes to the reality of facts. I think it is no exaggeration to say that there has been in fact a tacit revision of Article 16 so that the League, instead of being a coercive body, is now nothing more than an optionally coercive body. Those countries that have not permanent seats on the Council cannot allow the idea to be accepted that sanctions are to be applied when the Governments occupying permanent seats decide that they should apply. That would make of the small States nothing more than auxiliaries in carrying out action that was decided upon by the Great Powers without at the same time any guarantees being offered to those small States acting as auxiliaries. Nothing can be more harmful than a state of confusion, of doubt.

It is not with any feeling of satisfaction that the Netherlands Government has been led to take note of the present facts as I have outlined them. We adhered to the Covenant in a spirit of complete conviction; with, as we thought, a full knowledge of the consequences it involved. We do not—we never did—desire to return to the old system of general neutrality on the outbreak of any war. We still support the idea of collective security, but we feel bound to recognise facts. The prospects that were contemplated, the conditions that were anticipated when the Covenant was drafted, have not been realised. There-

fore, the obligations imposed in the light of those prospects and conditions can no longer continue. Indeed, of those obligations, we may say that some are dead and buried.

Burial, however, involves the idea of resurrection.

* * *

The above speeches have been given at length for the reason that they state in positive and definite terms the attitude of the speakers on the question of Article 16, and are not merely collections of meaningless phrases. Starting from different standpoints, they have the same aim in view.

The remarks of the Polish delegate Komarnicki also came within the category of far-reaching reservations on the subject of Article 16. Komarnicki referred to the speech of the Polish Foreign Minister Beck in the Polish Diet of January 10th, to his declaration in the Council, and further to the Polish Government's Memorandum on the Reform of the Covenant of December 9th, 1937. The French paper "Populaire", an organ of the Front populaire, described the Polish representative's utterances as "scandalous", and made great play with the "duplicity of a country which proclaims its alliance with France and continues at the same time to flirt with Hitler."

The representative of the Argentine, Cantilo, reminded his audience that the Argentine had striven for the universality of the League as a genuine instrument of Justice and Peace at a time when there was no such intention on the part of those responsible for its foundation. The reference is to the decision of the former Allied and Associated Powers that the conquered countries must give proof of a change of heart by an initial period of "probation" before they could be admitted to the august society. The efforts of the Argentine in this connection must have afforded ample evidence of the strength of the opposition to universality at every period of the League's existence. The explanation of that opposition is quite simple. The establishment of equal rights for all would have meant the abandonment of the policy of using the League as an instrument for the enforcement of the dictated Peace Treaties by the former victors. The connection between the two conceptions is equally unmistakeable today.

The efforts of the South American countries to evolve peace methods of their own for the prevention of war have led them, without any desire on their part, into a position of continually increasing antipathy to the tendencies which have been at work on the transformation of the Geneva institution into a conscious coalition of Powers and will continue, if they have their way, to transform it still further. But what to the South American countries appears as a first necessity of the situation—such steps, for instance, as the co-ordination of the League Covenant with the Saavedra Lamas Pact—is as far from the intentions of the champions of Geneva collectivism as Buenos Ayres is from Geneva—not to say, Moscow. The years of negotiation in the attempt to co-ordinate and the continual postponements of the negotiations are sufficient proof of this divergence of views.

The Argentine representative suggested that the Committee might at any rate do its duty to the extent of drawing up rules for application in "better times", while adhering for the immediate future to the "Directives" of 1921. But everyone has not the same idea of what is meant by better times. There are members of the League to whom it would be as the breath in their nostrils to be able to make a second "test trial" of the sanctions machinery. "Better times" is a relative term. This much is certain that the League of Nations has never bettered any time.

The Chilean delegate Valdes-Mendeville spoke immediately after the Czecho-Slovak representative, the Czecho-Slovak Ambassador in Paris, Osusky. The latter had just said he could well understand the anxieties of Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands; but the violation of a rule

ought not to be taken as a reason for doing away with the rule. The Ten Commandments were violated every day; but they still stood. To this sally Valdes-Mendeville answered that the question at issue was not the reform of the Ten Commandments but the reform of a man-made institution.

Chile, he went on to say, had been engaged for two years past in the struggle for universality. What was yesterday merely a desirable objective had today become a vital and imperious necessity. The achievement of universality was the only justification of the League's existence; and it was only the hope of its achievement which had induced Chile to join the League. The first and greatest breach in the principle of universality was the refusal of the United States to join; but that did not prevent Chile from continuing her loyal co-operation with the League at the time. Again in 1926, when another great American nation withdrew in the person of Brazil, Chile did not lose heart. In 1932 moreover complete universality was realised de "facto".

"All States, including those whose important co-operation is lacking to-day, were gathered round the table of the Disarmament Conference. The long proceedings led to a complete fiasco. Was this merely the failure of a Conference? No, it was the collapse of Article 8 of the Covenant, which opens up the entire construction, that is to say, the first article of a complete system for the maintenance of world peace, the article which signified a universal economic and political hope. In view of this brutal collapse of Article 8 and of all the decisions and events which ensued, can it be thought that the obligations under other articles, such as that of collective action, must be maintained in their entire force and scope? We are of opinion that such a statement is not only vain, but is extremely dangerous."

At the close of the discussion the Chilean representative was led, in presence of the negative results, to make the following declaration:

"Chile has constantly taken the view, and is to-day more than ever convinced, of the necessity of a substantial reform of the Covenant in a general discussion between Member and Non-Member States, and considers that this is the only solution and the only effective attempt to procure real authority for the League by means of far-reaching authority."

The Government of Chile, after noting the negative results of this Committee and taking into consideration the practice for the application of the Covenant in the past, is compelled, in the present position and so long as that position exists, to reserve formally her freedom of action, both as regards the impending discussion in the Council on this question and as regards the League of Nations in general."

The other countries represented on the Committee made short statements through the mouth of their representatives to the effect that they did not consider reform of the Covenant opportune for the moment, or on other grounds had no objection to the adjournment of the discussion. Of the utterances of the unflinching Sanctionists, two extracts must be made from the speeches of Litvinov and Paul-Boncour. Our readers shall be spared the remarks of Del Vayo, representative of Red Spain, the bombastic character of which was such as, even in the judgment of his friends and supporters, to outdo any previous performances of the Spanish Popular Front champions at Geneva.

With the self-conscious tone of a 150 per cent. League enthusiast Litvinov proceeded "with every kind of waggishness", as a leading Swiss newspaper put it, to review the speeches of the Neutrals. Their attitude he sarcastically described as an attempt to turn the League into something between a diplomatic Academy and a philanthropic institution. Their watchword seemed to be "Each for himself and God for us all".

"The cynicism of Litvinov," wrote the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, "could not fail to create a deplorable impression in view of the highly unsatisfactory situation of the League, for which the fatal activities of the Soviet Union at Geneva are themselves more than a little responsible." That is a mild way of putting it; but it reveals the beginnings of a glimmering of what the part played by Moscow at Geneva really means. Coming from such a quarter,

the charge of selfishness launched against States whose loyalty to the League and its Covenant is more unsullied than that of any other member of the League and constitutes indeed the last element of moral support of that tottering institution, is nothing less than shameful. Continuing in the tone of a schoolmaster, the representative of Moscow set to work to ply the Neutrals with questions with the object of making them appear ridiculous. Should their neutrality be regarded as unilateral or bilateral? Did they expect the League of Nations to protect their neutrality, or should the League itself remain neutral when their neutrality was violated? Litvinov in this passage of his speech himself supplied the proof that in the eyes of the Soviet Union the Geneva institution is worthless except in so far as it can be organised as a coalition directed against the Soviet's enemies, the "aggressor States". If the U.S.S.R. had been concerned to pacify the "mutineers", it would never have made such play with this argument. But that is not the purpose of the U.S.S.R. at all. Moscow's whole aim and object is to create a bloc, which Litvinov is clever enough to disguise as a Peace bloc, but which on closer inspection is revealed as an ideological bloc directed against the Fascist States.

The line taken by the Russian was followed up by his Ally, the French representative Paul-Boncour. He described Litvinov's speech as "admirable". Article 16 was the "point vulnérable" of those who were out to shatter the League. It was a mistake in his opinion to sacrifice the Covenant in the interest of increase of the League's membership. To advocate such a course was to misapprehend the "true interests" of Geneva. Article 16 was more valuable as an asset than the co-operation of countries outside the League or, for that matter, the lukewarm support of members whose attitude he could understand but never approve: such lukewarm supporters failed to realise that "the burden of to-day may become the lucrative investment of to-morrow." Such was the theme of this representative of France. One would like to know to what extent it really represents the attitude of his Government.

The clean-cut contributions of this master of French dialectic to the problems of League policy are not new. It is a source of satisfaction to him to be able with fine-spun arguments to discuss such questions as the maintenance of Article 16. He is ready to discuss them with his last breath, heedless of the resulting postponement of the solutions until such time as the League itself has gone under.

STATEMENT BY M. JOSEPH BECK, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE DIET, ON JANUARY 10TH, 1938

Gentlemen,

The period with which I propose to deal today is a part of that series of years which I have defined in my previous statements in parliament as a period of fundamental change in the methods of international policy.

I would like to recall briefly that I have characterised this change as a disturbance of the methods proposed for the settlement of relations between States in the post-War atmosphere. It was thought at that time that the sudden shock would radically and definitely bring about a change in the methods of thought and action of humanity.

As far as we are concerned, we have always affirmed our sympathy with the idea of seeking fresh paths to spare mankind the victims and sacrifices suffered at the particular point where the best forms of agreement might possibly have prevented them. Nevertheless, apart from the deeper changes which take place in the structure of international life, the very forms assumed from the outset by this new idea carried the germ of many failures and on more than one occasion necessarily gave rise to reservations.

Conclusions.

It is intelligible in the light of such discussions, proceeding merrily ever since October 10th 1936 and always without result, passing from the Assembly to the Council and from the Council to the Committee and then back again to and fro, to and fro, how heavy, dead and unpractical every ripple of the waves that go out from the Geneva institution must be. The Jubilee of the Council was also the jubilee of the adjournments. It is astonishing with what obstinacy the League goes on spinning its old threads regardless of the ever-recurring rents in the fabric. The obsolete and inoperative methods of the past still dominate its activities. There is scarcely even an attempt to face the confused realities of the modern world with clear vision and wholesome thinking. International law a live thing? Yes, indeed! But what can the Geneva League claim to have contributed to the development of international law in the shape of a living or directive idea or a transmutation of theory into practice? On the contrary, the League has become more and more of an instrument of political interests instead of a regulator of unsolved and dangerous problems calling, not merely for attention, but for settlement in such a way as to relieve tension and promote peace. The law of which it is the embodiment is to-day responsible for more injustices than ever. Its binding connection with the dictated Peace treaties has prevented the League from making the decisive transition from the present system of attempts with unsuitable means to settle disputes or prevent wars to a system of actual and effective establishment of real peace.

A leading article which appeared in "The Times" on the Jubilee of the Council pointedly remarked that, if the League was no longer in the same position as it was when Germany, Japan and Italy were members of it, that was due to the failure of the democratic countries to make any attempt to transform its character. In principle, its character had remained unchanged throughout the years since its foundation. It served no useful purpose, "The Times" concluded, to ignore the fact that the countries leaving Geneva left it because they felt the League was more concerned with the maintenance of the "status quo" than with the revision of the Peace treaties.

"Much phrase-making and very little conviction!" Such was the verdict of the Paris "Journal" on the speeches of the Geneva matadors. "Words, words, nothing but words!" So it ended its comments on the League Session. Well! There was nothing new in that.

During the period of which I propose to speak, this process of transformation and these failures sometimes assumed a drastic character, and yet it would be difficult to maintain that this process has already reached its conclusion. I venture today to give again a detailed analysis of these general phenomena. I will begin by reviewing our own affairs.

Here the picture I am about to paint will not be so pessimistic. In previous years I have frequently had occasion, in speaking to you, Gentlemen, to insist on the tendency of our Government always to examine in a strictly realistic fashion each of the problems concerning our State, independently of contingencies and changing currents of opinion in the world.

It is for this reason that we have been charged on more than one occasion with our alleged excessive predilection for "bilateralism" and for too scrupulous a limitation of our conversation to those parties who could give a direct decision in the problems under discussion.

I think today we can dot the i's and state that we have endeavoured to work in such a manner that none of the essential political interests of Poland should if possible be injured or

dragged into the confusion observable in methods of international cooperation based on too wide a plan.

Our relations with our neighbours, which are essentially governed by our two pacts of non-aggression with the Soviet Union and the German Reich, are independent of any international institution or procedure. Indeed, these treaties were concluded while both these Powers were outside the League of Nations; they are based on well thought-out reasons and political interests and they continue to retain their full value.

Our two treaties of alliance, with France and Roumania, though they are in no way opposed to the Covenant of the League of Nations and even mention the Geneva institution in their text, date back to the year 1921, that is to say to a time when the organisation of the League of Nations was insufficiently defined and when these alliances were regarded essentially as a matter in themselves, and not as a rider or supplement to the League Covenant.

The greatest measure of confusion was introduced into these problems by the Locarno agreements. However that may be, the obsolete form of those agreements is now a thing of the past.

I think I may regard it as a significant fact that, particularly during the last two years, the scope, vitality and advisability of these alliances have been thrown into relief, both here and in the allied countries, while our direct contact with those countries has been expressed in a manner that was both important and particularly agreeable to us. It is this particular fact which best determines the character of these agreements.

The stay in Poland of eminent statesmen of other European countries cannot, in my opinion, but confirm the fact that while, on the one hand, the foreign policy of Poland tends deliberately to restrict its action in accordance with the real means at our disposal, on the other hand we do not conceive our duty too strictly and we endeavour to strengthen and develop the friendly agreements with the States with whom we may have common interests or common conceptions.

Under these circumstances we may note that the past year has brought practical possibilities of contact, exchange of views and cooperation with other States. We may therefore repeat that it is rather the forms of international life that have weakened and not its essence.

Reverting to matters which directly concern Poland, I would also remind you of the important results that we have attained through the fact that, as far as we are concerned, we do not refuse to seek new forms. For this reason, by endeavouring, in agreement with the Government of the German Reich, to consolidate our relations which are based on the principal of good neighbourly feelings, we have decided to settle one of the most essential problems in this sphere, namely that of the treatment of national minorities on both sides of the frontier. We had at our disposal no system which has resisted the test of life.

But, while realising clearly the object to be attained, we found in the declaration of November 5th, 1937 a new model which, I am convinced on the one hand reasonably guarantees the internal cohesion of each of the two States and on the other hand is calculated to create proper conditions for the co-existence of an important group of citizens attached to their own culture with the principal national element of each of the two States. I consider that this act—together with the simultaneous liquidation last July of the last traces of the interference of external elements in certain parts of Polish and German territories—as a very essential fact which is destined to consolidate and strengthen the principles of the agreement of January 1934.

As regards our second neighbour, in the opposite geographical direction, namely the Soviet Union, the past year has brought no essential changes. Our attitude and our policy continue as in the past to be based on the Pact of Non-Aggression of 1932 with all its supplements, so that the current problems which have arisen have been settled in an atmosphere of objective negotiation.

On going further to the East, mention should be made of the fact that last Autumn the Legations at Tokio and Warsaw were raised to the rank of Embassies, and this is a testimony

of the spirit of good-will and mutual esteem which characterise Polish-Japanese relations.

A chronological statement of a whole series of visits which have been paid to Warsaw and of contemplated visits are sufficient to prove both the sustained interest which we have in the Baltic and the importance which we attach to the consolidation of relations conceived on a plane of wide cooperation with the States bordering on that sea. A sentiment of constantly increasing solidarity connects us with those States with which we have a common frontier, either by land or sea, with the sole exception that is well known to you.

Similarly in the Danube basin we are anxious to maintain our traditional friendships and I hope that our relations in that region will continue to develop happily. As regards this question it should be borne in mind that, of the various political plans and conceptions that have been put forward, the idea that enjoys the greatest favour in Poland is that of settling relations in this sphere in accordance with the principles proposed by the French and Italian Governments during the visit of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to Rome in January 1935.

Permit me, Gentlemen, again to remind you of my opinion of the present situation: (1) the crisis of the forms of international life has been aggravated; (2) we can state without fear of contradiction that Polish policy has suffered relatively least from this cause.

I return to the crisis which is connected with the League of Nations, its difficulties and failures. Indeed, certain undoubted successes obtained by means of international arrangement reached outside the League of Nations do not give a favourable testimony of its present position.

For a long time I have been unable to avoid the impression—which I have moreover communicated to the Chambers in my remarks on this subject—that there are two radically opposite tendencies at Geneva. On the one hand, practice and experience have shown beyond question that the integral application of the principles of the Covenant goes beyond the means of the instrument called upon to put it into effect. On the other hand, it is paradoxical to note not only the progress of doctrinary or political passions which tend to impose on this poor League of Nations more and more arduous tasks, but also a formal tendency to widen, by means of theoretical formulae applied only on paper, the gaps in the effective activity of the League. Polish diplomacy, being desirous of maintaining a correct attitude in the actions of our country and being moreover anxious for the very fate of the Geneva institution, has endeavoured for more than two years to bring this dangerous contradiction into relief, and to find for the definite settlement of the problems raised at the Geneva sessions its own course which is determined both by respect for treaty undertakings and by a sense of realities and a clear view of the future.

Naturally I do not mean by this that the search for better and juster solutions of international conflicts is an unreal undertaking.

But, what is unreal?

It is, in the first place, the alleged possibility of maintaining a state of affairs in which the statute and regulations of an institution destined to embrace all the countries in the world are only applied in the long run by a certain number of States between themselves and to others. Moreover the fact that the League of Nations did not from the outset combine all States and more particularly the States possessing the greatest power was in itself a source of crisis. We definitely realised this from the time when the League of Nations even lost its character of a European organisation. This state of affairs was particularly aggravated when various acts and declarations reduced almost to zero the hope that a number of States of the first importance whither Geneva would return to it.

Moreover we are not alone in affirming that it is impossible for a group of States alone to bear the heavy burdens and obligations which are imposed by the Covenant of the League of Nations on its Members while the other States are relieved of these burdens. I allude in particular to the obligations which a State individually might be compelled to fulfil automatically, solely on account of its participation in the League, the obligation of undergoing sacrifices and acting against other States.

Public opinion in the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and other countries insists definitely on this point.

We are also not alone in maintaining that the Geneva meetings cannot, without prejudice to the whole of world policy, degenerate into federations of doctrines and still less into a bloc which would direct its action against other blocs. Quite recently, Mr. Eden, in his statement in the House of Commons, emphasised this point of view.

But views on this problem die hard and conclusions on this state of affairs are reached so slowly that I have been compelled to have recourse to the press in order to explain our attitude to Polish and foreign public opinion. On several occasions I have taken the opportunity of presenting to the Chambers the Government's view regarding the very idea of the League of Nations and of stating the importance I attach to the existence of this international institution. But I have also had occasion to state no less clearly that it would be impossible for Poland to adhere to doctrinal blocs or to make our State an instrument of a policy the aims and means of which are not clearly defined by ourselves.

We have no intention of taking any initiative to accentuate the present crisis of the League of Nations. But we must always know exactly for what we are responsible, what are our definite commitments, under what conditions and on what principles international institutions take their decisions. The main reason that leads me to raise this problem in public is, on the one hand, the fact that in certain quarters of international public opinion the changes recently brought about by the withdrawal of Italy and the German declaration regarding the League of Nations have been taken too lightly, and on the other hand the opinion disseminated in various quarters that the League of Nations could not but profit from present events. It is difficult to avoid the impression that certain persons would like the League of Nations to be an instrument directed against the so-called totalitarian States. It is striking to note that these same persons would like, as it were, to "totalise" international life by using the League of Nations for the purpose. This seems to me to be a flagrant contradiction which needs no comment. I merely wish once more to emphasise the fact that we respect the right of all to handle their affairs in the way most suited to their conceptions, provided they do not claim to model the others, and ourselves in particular, on their own lines.

There is another danger at Geneva. It is moreover a matter of procedure rather than of written principles. As I have already pointed out, as new problems arose, it was fairly natural that the difficulties encountered by the League should cause certain States which were interested in these problems or which could at any rate influence their solution to meet in more or less numerous Conferences. We have taken part in some of these steps, in particular in the Committee for non-intervention in Spanish affairs, in the profound conviction that this was the only practical means of avoiding an extension of the complications which might arise out of the events in Spain. On the other hand, we have categorically opposed, and will continue to do so in future, the consistent practice of causing the League of Nations with all its Members to adopt decisions taken by a single group of States outside the League of Nations. I am very much afraid that, in the opinion of many countries that have already a sort of attachment to the international action accomplished at Geneva, this latter factor has had a certain discouraging effect on their attitude towards the Geneva institution.

I have endeavoured to give you an analysis of certain organic defects of the League of Nations and of the influence of the events of the last few years on its action.

Nevertheless, the statement of the political problems which directly concern us shows that we have come out fairly well. It does not follow that we shall escape complications in certain spheres. I am thinking of the fate of certain Polish ideas and measures which we desire to realise with the assistance of the cooperation of Geneva with the other States. As you are aware, we have put forward in this field some questions which are of keen and direct interest to us, in particular emigration and the access to raw materials. The discussion to which these questions have given rise has enabled our demands to be made known to and understood by the other States.

Independently of general subjects, the League of Nations has in its hands the decision of a concrete problem, the future of Palestine. This question constitutes an essential factor for the settlement of the general problem of Jewish emigration. This problem, in turn, constitutes a very important section in our entire emigration problem. For reasons varying according to the countries and their conditions of life this problem has moreover exceeded its local framework and become a European question. All these problems are and will remain essential for us, independently even of the fate of the League of Nations, for they are practical questions which demand constant attention. We hear more and more frequently of plans and ideas for a reconstruction of international, economic and financial relations. We have been compelled to note that there are no serious prospects of the success of these plans so long as people close their eyes to the urgency of the problem of raw materials and that of emigration.

It is obvious that if the League of Nations proves to be powerless in this respect we shall not abandon our efforts to find, either by agreement with the various Powers or by means of some collective action, effective means of solving problems which not only concern our vital interests but also constitute a part of the general work of reconstructing a normal and tolerable life in the world. I must add that the first result of the study of this problem is by no means discouraging.

The anxieties of which I have spoken are largely due to the fact that the League of Nations, in the time of its prosperity, took upon itself great rights and obligations in the entire world. The means of accomplishing these tasks were not always well calculated; we have had an opportunity of observing this in the sphere of action of our direct interests, for instance in the Free City of Danzig.

Geneva will still have much trouble with the problems arising in various parts of the world and I really do not know how the Geneva collectivity will meet the obligations it has assumed.

It would be risky at the present time to make any prophecies as to the fate of the Geneva institution. It seems to me equally doubtful that the next session of the Council of the League in January can bring any decisive decisions in this respect. But I have the impression that the undeniable weakening of the League cannot fail to increase the feeling of individual responsibility of the various Governments, the vast majority of whom undoubtedly desire a peaceful existence for their peoples and therefore also for others.

It is therefore with the keenest interest that we follow the attempts to bring about discussions between the various capitals, since we are convinced that the experiences of recent years and a sound appreciation of the position by the European States will not allow us to be faced with proposals for international cooperation which are contrary to the immovable principles of our policy and to our vital interests.

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SPEECH BY THE FÜHRER AND CHANCELLOR, ADOLF HITLER, BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG ON FEBRUARY 20th, 1938

I. Text of the Statements on Foreign Affairs

Gentlemen, men of the German Reichstag!

I am well aware that you, and with you the German Nation, were expecting to be called together on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the day on which we entered into power, to the end that you, the elected representatives of the Reich, might celebrate with me the beginning of a new period in the development of our nation, a date that is fraught with so many memories for us National-Socialists.

My reasons for calling the meeting of the Reichstag for to-day were twofold: in the first place I wished to make a number of changes in important posts and it seemed to me fitting to make them after, rather than before, January 30th; while in the second place I deemed it advisable to effect a further and very necessary understanding is a certain department of foreign affairs before addressing you.

You all expect, and justifiably, that on such a day there should be not merely a report on the past, but also some suggestion as to what may be expected in the future. My speech to-day will, therefore, contain both.

The new National Socialist Army

A great German peace army — Party and Army

Gentlemen, eighteen years ago, at this time, I first proclaimed the programme of the Party. Then, during the period of Germany's deepest humiliation and greatest helplessness, at a time of inconceivable misery, I proclaimed as one of the aims of the National-Socialist Party the abolition of the army of mercenaries forced upon us by the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of a great, strong national army. As an unknown soldier in the Great War, I formulated this daring programme. For fourteen years I fought for it against a world of internal enemies and hate-inspired foreigners. In five years I have brought this programme to realisation! As regards this, the greatest achievement of the New Reich, there is no need for me to go into details. I only wish to make known the following facts:

Germany's peace-time army is complete! A powerful German air force protects our homeland! A new navy guards our coasts! Together with the gigantic general increase in our production, it was possible to carry out an unparalleled rearmament programme!

If wiseacres abroad are comforted by the thought, we are quite willing to let them believe in the existence of the Lord only knows what kind of differences between the Armed Forces and National Socialism. We do not in the least begrudge them this kind of satisfaction. However in case they should ever wish to come to other conclusions, I will say the following to them now: There is in Germany no problem of a National-Socialist state and a National-Socialist Party, and no problem of a National-Socialist Party and National-Socialist Armed Forces. In this Reich, everyone who holds a responsible position is a National-Socialist!

Every man carries the National-Socialist emblem on his cap. Every institution of this Reich is under the command of the supreme political leader, and they have all pledged themselves to, and are united in, the will and determination to uphold this National-Socialist Germany, and, if it should become necessary, to defend it to the last. It would be a mistake to believe any other version on the authority of those who in Germany have already proved the poorest prophets. The Party leads the Reich in political matters, and the Armed Forces protect the Reich. Each institution in the Reich has its allotted task, and there is no one in a responsible position in this state who doubts that I am the authorised leader of this Reich and that the nation through its trust in me has given me a mandate to represent it everywhere and in every sphere. Just as the German Armed Forces are devoted to the National-Socialist state with unswerving loyalty and obedience so the National-Socialist state and the Party which leads it feel pride and joy in them. We see in them the consummation of National-Socialist training which holds the individual German under its influence from early youth onward. The political and mental attitude which he acquires in the political organisations is here supplemented through his training and education as a soldier.

On this occasion I cannot fail to mention with appreciation those men who, as the trustees of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, have helped me to build up this wonderful instrument.

When the first great work of reconstruction was completed, I was compelled to respect Field-Marshal von Blomberg's wish to retire in order to restore his impaired health after all his exertions. But I should like to express here my own and the German nation's thanks for this soldier's infinitely steadfast and loyal work for the new Reich and its armed forces. This work will always be inseparable from the history of the foundation of this Reich. The same is true of the activity and admirable work of General von Fritsch, and of all those who in the rejuvenation of our political and military corps of leaders have, with great unselfishness and generosity, given up their places to younger men.

We all know what sort of a foundation the former Reichswehr of a hundred thousand men was for the quick rearmament of the German armed forces. But we know also that the mighty tasks presented require for their performance a steady influx of younger men to take the places of those who have grown old. Above all we know that the tasks of the future demand a stronger concentration of the political and military power in the Reich than was perhaps necessary before. I therefore resolved, after Field-Marshal von Blomberg's retirement, to place under my own direct command the three services and to make them directly subordinate to me personally as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. I hope thus to achieve in the shortest possible time that strengthening of our

military powers of defence which the general conditions of the time seem today to require.

As its elected Leader I should like to assure the German people today that however much peace means to us, we are equally resolved to defend our honour and the inalienable rights of our people. Though I stand for the cause of peace, I shall always see to it that that instrument which I am convinced is the only sure and effective guarantee of peace in such troubled times, is never weakened, much less taken away from the German people.

And though I can assure the world of the German people's sincere and profound love of peace, I must assert, beyond all doubt, that this love of peace has nothing to do with feeble renunciation or with cowardice and dishonour. If ever an international campaign of hatred and defamation seeks to wreck the peace of our Reich, steel and iron will protect Germany and her people. And then, as quick as lightning, the world would see to what extent this Reich, Party and armed forces are imbued with the same fervid spirit and will! It is, however, not my intention especially to defend the honour of the German Officers' Corps against the slanderous attacks of international journalists. Nor is it necessary to do so. For, after all, there are two kinds of journalists, the truth-lover and the perjured, despicable liar, deceiver of the people, and warmonger. But there is only one kind of German officer!

Thought for the future

Gentlemen, you have just listened to the description of the great progress which Germany has made thanks to the National-Socialist revolution and under the leadership of the Party. But the greatness of this achievement compels one to be concerned for the future.

The economic programme for the future is known to you. No other way remains to us but to work harder and thus to produce more. The German people is a people which makes high demands on life. If the rest of the world were influenced by great statesmen instead of by journalists, it would be thankful for this fact. For, the higher the standard of living and culture of a nation, the greater will be its longing for peace. It is peace alone which can enable it to accomplish those things which make a high standard of life possible.

Lack of fertile soil

Our economic position is difficult—not, however, because National Socialism rules in Germany, but because in this country there are 140 human beings to the square kilometer, because we have not been given those great natural resources which other nations possess, because, above all, we have a lack of fertile soil. If the British Empire were suddenly to be dissolved to-day and England were to be restricted to its own living space, then perhaps the English would better understand the difficulty of the economic problems which confront us. The fact that Germany has mastered these problems and the manner in which she has done so are miracles and something of which we can be really proud. Germany possesses no sort of gold or foreign exchange reserves, the reason for this not being that National Socialism is in power, but that the non-National-Socialist, democratic-parliamentary State was despoiled for 15 years by a world eager for plunder; Germany is a country which has to support 140 people to the square kilometer and possesses no colonies whatever; Germany is lacking in numerous raw materials and is neither able nor willing to lead a fraudulent existence on credits; but this same country has reduced its unemployment to zero, and has not merely maintained its standard of life, but has even improved it and has done all this by its own efforts. Now when a people has accomplished a miracle of this sort, then those nations at any rate should be silent who, in spite of the most favourable economic conditions, hardly manage to solve their own unemployment problems.

Currency cover

In future too it will be our task to preserve the German people from all illusions. But the worst illusion is to imagine

that one can enjoy anything which has not first been created and produced by labour; in other words, in future too it will be our duty to make it clear to every single German, in town and country, that the value of his labour must always be equivalent to his wage. That is, the farmer can only get for his agricultural products what the townsman has previously earned, and the townsman can only get what the farmer has won from the soil, and taken all together, they can all only exchange what they produce, and money only plays the part of intermediary. It has no utility-value of its own. Every mark more paid in Germany presupposes that a mark's worth more labour has been performed. Apart from that this mark is a mere piece of paper without purchasing power. But we want our German Reichsmark to remain an honest note, an honest token for the product of labour just as honestly performed by another. This is the true cover for a currency, the only real backing. In this way we have made it possible, without gold and without foreign exchange, to maintain the value of the German mark, and have thus secured the value of our savings at a time when the countries which are overflowing with gold and foreign exchange have been compelled to devalue their currencies.

A new phase of national production

The increase in the birth rate alone will force us to increase our production in order to secure a greater competence for the community. In the years 1934-35 we saw ourselves compelled to apply German labour power in the most primitive way in order to make it effective at all. In those years spades and shovels were the tools used by hundreds of thousands of German men. With the gradual revival of our economic life there took place also a slow transformation in our working methods. Today Germany suffers from a lack of skilled workers. Unemployment as such is almost entirely abolished. We are now entering a new phase in our national production. The task is now slowly to replace primitive working methods by those that are improved and technically perfected. Our goal must be to relieve the highly qualified worker of primitive work and to give him appropriate work to do. But the most primitive work we shall leave to machines created by the skilled work. But in bringing this about we must take care that we do not remove the workers from the country districts, in which this change-over to machinery can only take place gradually and subject to certain conditions. But this goal can best be attained if we make up in a natural way for our lack of workers by perfecting our working methods, thus enabling us to stop the flow of the lowest type of labour from the country districts.

That is in a few words a programme which will indeed take years to realize. But like all National-Socialist projects it will, in the long run, be accomplished.

The colonial claim

But however much we may achieve thus in the way of an increase of production, the hopeless inadequacy of the space allotted to the German nation will not thereby be removed. Therefore our demand will become more and more insistent as the years go by for those colonial possessions which Germany after all never deprived any other nation of, which are practically worthless to the powers that hold them but appear indispensable to our own nation.

I should like here to point out that it is futile to hope that we shall bargain away our demand in return for credits. It is not credits that we want, but those fundamental necessities of life which will enable us, by our own efforts, to secure the existence of the nation. Above all, we do not want naive assurances that we shall be permitted to buy what we need. Once and for all we reject such declarations, which are felt in our country to be only a mockery. There is no economic recipe which could be a complete substitute for the possibilities of intensive economic activity in one's own currency area.

Distrust of Conferences

You will not expect me, gentlemen, to define my attitude to the separate international plans which at the moment seem to awaken, to a greater or less degree, the interest of various governments. These plans are too vague and too nebulous for me to express any opinion on them. But above all I want you to realize that I have the deepest suspicion of all so-called conferences, which may perhaps provide their participants with hours of interesting and stimulating conversation, but which generally lead only to the disappointment of the hopes of mankind.

Rejection of the Geneva League as an institution for perpetuating injustice

You will agree that if my programme in 1933 had been that we should wait until a world economic conference came to our assistance, Germany would probably have 15 million unemployed today, if we had not indeed perished completely in Bolshevik chaos.

Neither can I admit that certain definite natural demands be connected with political bargaining which has no bearing on them. Recently it has again and again been rumoured that Germany was about to revise her views concerning a possible return into the League of Nations. Notwithstanding the danger that the journalists of the democratic world press, who are as dense as they are indolent, may by tomorrow have forgotten again what I am about to say, I should like to state once more the following:— In the year 1919 there was imposed on several nations a treaty of peace which involved violent interference with national communities and property rights, to an extent hitherto inconceivable. The violence done to national and economic life, the tearing asunder of national communities took place behind a smoke screen of moral phrases which were perhaps good enough to soothe the bad consciences of the perpetrators, but which seemed to the victims to be only a bad joke. After this act of violence had completely and decisively altered the map of the world, from a territorial as well as from a demographic point of view, a League of Nations was founded whose task it was to be to make permanent this insane and unreasonable action as a final conclusion to the political and economic development of the nations and to fix the results of the Treaty as the eternal and unalterable foundation for the life and boundaries of human communities on this planet. In future no one was to seek to change by force what had arisen through force. But in order to mitigate somewhat the insanity of such an atrocious violation of humanity, the possibility was at least kept open that in future this violent reorganization of what had arisen through thousands of years might be modified in a legal, that is to say reasonable, way.

This somewhat difficult task was then, incidentally as it were, assigned to the League of Nations.

Germany herself had, to begin with, no right at all to join this noble society for the moral defence of former acts of violence, but only received the gracious permission to do so through the memorable Reich Chancellor, Gustav Stresemann. Now you know, Gentlemen, what a failure this institution has been. It never was a League of Nations, for, from the very beginning one of the greatest powers in the world did not belong to it, while yet another important power resigned later; neither was it an institution of justice nor yet, as is still maintained to-day with astonishing affrontery, of the principles of justice; it is an institution for the maintenance of a state of things which has arisen from the injustice of a thousand years. For either might is right, or might is wrong.

But is might is wrong to-day, then might was wrong in the past. If, therefore, the present condition of the world has arisen through might, and there is no doubt that this is so, then this condition is one which was produced by a wrong. The League of Nations does not, therefore, defend a condition of right, but one born of a thousand years of wrong. We do, indeed, hear that all this is to be changed. We often hear, for instance, that English politicians would be only too delighted to give us back our colonial possessions if they did not suffer so much from the thought of all the wrong and violence which the natives would thereby undergo. In the year 1918 when the League of

Nations had not yet come into existence, it was quite possible to hand over these territories to their new owners without the consent of the natives, in order later to have this transfer morally confirmed by the League of Nations. To be sure, if one were to extend this noble principle that a colony may only belong to the owner expressly desired by the natives to the past history of colonial acquisitions, the colonial possessions of the world powers would probably be seriously diminished. (Applause) All these colonial empires have in fact not come about through plebiscites, much less democratic ones, of the people living in them, but have been acquired by naked and brutal force.

They are to-day, of course, inseparable parts of the states in question and as such form a part of that world order which is always represented to us, by democratic politicians in particular, as the 'World Order of Law'—of that 'law' which the League of Nations exists to protect. I quite understand that those who have an interest in the maintenance of this legal order see in the League of Nations a convenient moral forum for the maintenance and, if necessary, the defence of the possessions which they formerly acquired by force. But what I do not understand is that the nation which has itself been robbed by such an act of force should in its turn become a member of this illustrious society. And I must protest against the accusation that we are not ready to stand for the principles of law because we are not in the League of Nations. On the contrary: we are not in the League of Nations, because we believe that it is not an institution of justice, but rather an institution for the defence of the wrong done at Versailles.

But there are in addition a series of objective considerations.

1. We left the League of Nations at the time because, true to the principles of its birth and constitution, it denied us the right to equal armaments and therewith equal security.

2. We shall never join it again, because we have no intention of being involved in the defence of injustice in some part of the world by a majority decision of the League.

3. We believe that we are thereby doing a service to all those nations who are so unfortunate as to rely on the League as a factor of real assistance.

For, in the case of the Abyssinian conflict, for instance, we should have held it better to have had, to begin with, more understanding for Italy's vital needs and secondly to have given the Abyssinians less hope and, above all, fewer promises. This would perhaps have made possible a simpler and more reasonable solution of the whole problem.

4. But, if the worst should come to the worst, we have no intention of allowing the German nation to be drawn into conflicts in which our own interests are not involved. We are not willing to stand up for the territorial or economic interests of other nations if Germany obtains no visible advantage thereby. In addition we do not ourselves expect support of this kind from other nations. Germany is resolved to impose upon herself a wise restriction in her interests and demands. But if German interests should anywhere be seriously at stake, we shall not expect assistance from a League of Nations, but shall straightway assume that we shall have to do what is necessary ourselves. And it is as well to be clear about this, for it will always impose on our wishes and hopes that moderation which we often unfortunately fail to see among those who enjoy collective security.

Finally: 5. We do not intend in future to allow an attitude to be prescribed for us by an international institution whose actions do not resemble those of a reasonable human being, but those of the ostrich. Since the League of Nations is itself obviously incapable of understanding historical or economic necessities and of fulfilling the demands based on them, and since on the other hand the essential interests of nations are in the long run stronger than formal consideration, a peculiar situation would arise if it were to continue for a hundred years. For it is very probable that in the year 2036 new states will have arisen, or others have disappeared, without it having been possible to register this new situation at Geneva.

I will therefore sum up by saying once more that Germany has not the slightest intention of ever returning to the League, especially now that Italy has left it. This does not mean that we refuse to cooperate with other powers; on the contrary, it means only that we refuse to undertake obligations which are incalculable and in most cases impossible of fulfilment.

Recognition of Manchukuo

Germany was once compelled by her membership of the League to associate herself in such an unreasonable action; she was, thank Heaven, as a result of leaving it, in a second case able to act in accordance with reason and justice. But I make known to you today, gentlemen, that I have now decided to make the necessary correction in respect to the first case.

Germany will recognize Manchukuo. By deciding to take this step we make a final break between a policy which is phantastic and incomprehensible, and one which implies a sober respect for real facts.

No relations with the Soviet Union

We are of the opinion that Germany has made many valuable contributions to cooperation with other powers. The Reich today cannot be considered isolated, either politically or economically. I have on the contrary endeavoured since taking office to establish the best possible relations with most of the other States of the world. There is only one state with which we have not sought to establish good relations, nor do we wish to enter into close relations with Soviet Russia. More than ever do we see in Bolshevism the incarnation of the human destructive instinct.

But we do not make the Russian people as such responsible for this ghastly ideology of annihilation. We know perfectly well that a small, powerful set of Jewish intellectuals plunged a great nation into a state bordering on insanity. This would not concern us so much after all, had this doctrine remained within the frontiers of Russia herself, since Germany has no intention of foisting our conceptions of life on the Russian nation. Unfortunately, however, the Bolshevism of international Jewry attempts from its breeding-ground in Soviet Russia to rot away the very core of the nations of the world, to overthrow the existing social order and to substitute chaos for civilization.

We certainly do not seek for contact with Bolshevism. On the contrary, it makes persistent efforts to corrupt the rest of mankind with its thoughts and ideas, and by so doing to plunge the world into a disaster of unprecedented magnitude. And here we are ruthless foes. We overcame the communist machinations of Moscow in our own land, and we have not the least intention of allowing Germany to be annihilated from without by the material forces of Bolshevism.

British statesmen have repeatedly assured us of their desire to maintain the "status quo" in the world. Since this is the case let her apply it here. Whenever a European country falls a prey to Bolshevism, a shifting of positions becomes apparent. For the territories thus bolshevized are no longer sovereign states with independent, national lives of their own, but are now mere sections of the Moscow Revolutionary Centre. I am aware that Mr. Eden does not share this view. M. Stalin does, however, and is perfectly frank about it. In my opinion M. Stalin is still at the moment of speaking a much better judge and interpreter of Bolshevik views and aims than a British Cabinet Minister! Therefore we look upon every attempt to spread Bolshevism, no matter where it may be, with utter loathing, and where it menaces us, we shall there oppose it.

Germany and the conflict in Eastern Asia Relations with Japan

This explains our relations with Japan. I cannot agree with those politicians who think they do Europe a service in harming Japan. I am afraid the defeat of Japan in Eastern Asia would never benefit Europe or America but only Bolshevik Soviet Russia. I do not consider China strong enough, either spiritually or materially, to withstand on her own any attack by Bolshevism. I believe, however, that even the greatest vic-

tory gained by Japan would be infinitely less dangerous to world-peace than any success achieved by Bolshevism. Germany has concluded a pact with Japan to counteract Comintern aims. She has always been on friendly terms with China, so I think under the circumstances, we may best be considered truly neutral spectators of this drama. I need hardly say we all earnestly desired, and still desire, appeasement between these two great Eastern nations, and the ultimate restoration of amicable relations. We are certain, however, that peace would have been restored long ere now, if certain elements had not, as in the case of Abyssinia, upset the balance in Eastern Asia by putting their advice and perhaps promises of moral assistance into the scale of one party. This attitude—as matters stand—could only have a platonic significance. A drowning man, however, clutches at every straw. It would have been more expedient to have drawn China's attention to the full gravity of her position, instead of citing, as so often before, the League of Nations as the safe guarantee of peace and security!

No matter at what time and in what manner happenings in Eastern Asia may ultimately right themselves, Germany, in the defensive attitude she adopts towards Communism, will always regard and appreciate Japan as an element of security, and a guarantee, moreover, for the culture of mankind. For just as we are perfectly certain that Japan's greatest victory would not affect the civilization of the white races in the very least, so do we not doubt for a moment that a victory gained by Bolshevism would signify the end of the present thousand-year-old civilization of the white races!

In this connection I should like to defend myself most emphatically against those idiotic attacks which accuse Germany of betraying the interests of the white race in the conflict in the Far East, because of the attitude we have adopted. Really, I must confess we are simply amazed when forced to read such assertions in French and English newspapers. That just this very National-Socialist State, always the object of attack on account of its racial policy, should now suddenly have the honour of drawing the sword for racial ideals, or, rather let us say racial interests, is a huge jest in world-history. Germany has no territorial interests in Eastern Asia. She has the natural wish to carry on trade and commerce, and in so doing she is not obliged to support any one party. But one thing we are obliged to do, and that is to recognize the fact that a Bolshevik victory would destroy all possibilities here.

Moreover, Germany once possessed territory herself in Eastern Asia. True this did not prevent certain powers with the help of a coalition of white and yellow races from expelling the German Reich from the country. To-day we have really no longer any desire to receive invitations to return, to Eastern Asia, let us say.

Attitude to the Spanish civil war An independent National Spain

Neither has Germany any territorial interests which might be connected in any way with the terrible civil war now raging in Spain. The situation there is similar to that which once prevailed in Germany. The attack inspired and conducted both personally and materially by Moscow, is directed against a national independent state and arouses the fierce opposition of a national population unwilling to be slaughtered. And precisely as in the case of Germany, the democratic International is on the side of the Bolshevik incendiaries. The German Government would see in the bolshevizing of Spain not only an element detrimental to the peace of Europe, but also one disturbing to the balance of power on the Continent. If Spain were to become a section of the Moscow Centre, there would be grave danger of the spread of this plague of annihilation and destruction, the consequences of which we could under no circumstance view with indifferent calm. We are indeed happy in the knowledge that our anti-Bolshevik attitude is also shared by another state.

German-Italian relations: Common views of life and State

Italo-German relations are based on conceptions of life and state policy common to both nations, as well as on co-operative action in warding off the international dangers that menace us both. How greatly this fact is appreciated everywhere in Germany, was most strikingly evidenced in the joyous enthusiasm with which the creator of the Fascist State was wel-

comed in the Reich. One fact at least ought to be acknowledged by all European statesmen. If Mussolini had not conquered Italy in 1922 with the help of his Fascist Movement, the country would in all probability have fallen a prey to Bolshevism.

The dire consequence to Western culture in the event of such a collapse would be inconceivable. They very thought of such a possibility is horrifying to a man of historical vision and sense of responsibility based on a knowledge of the facts. Benito Mussolini enjoys the admiration of the German people to a phenomenal extent.

Italy's position resembles that of Germany in certain respects. Under the circumstances, therefore, it was but natural that, suffering as we both do from over-crowding, we should evince keen understanding for the activities of a man and his government who, refusing to allow their people to be sacrificed on the altar of the phantastic ideals of the League of Nations, were fully determined to save their nation. And all the more so, since there is no doubt that the apparent ideals of the League of Nations coincide rather too closely with the exceedingly realistic interests of its chief powers.

Furthermore, Germany and Italy have taken a common stand with regard to the Spanish conflict. Its aim is to see a national Spain which enjoys complete independence. The Italo-German friendship, springing as it does from definite sources, has become an element of stabilization in the appeasement of Europe. The connection of both states with Japan presents the most powerful of all obstructions to the further advance of the menacing power of Russian Bolshevism.

Relations with France and England

There has been much talk and still more writing in recent years about the differences between France and England on the one hand, and Germany on the other. I do not quite see wherein these differences are supposed to be embodied. Germany has no further territory in Europe to claim from France, a point I have frequently stressed. We hope the regaining of the Saar districts has now definitely closed the chapter of Franco-German territorial disputes.

Nor has Germany any quarrel with England, unless perhaps it may be our wish for colonies. There is, however, not a single reason for any kind of possible conflict.

The international press campaign

A danger for peace and a heavy burden on international relations

But what does poison friendly relations between the two states, and consequently causes trouble, is the intolerable Press campaign which is being conducted in these countries under the slogan of "Liberty for expression of personal opinions". I have little use for the reiterated sentiments of foreign statesmen and diplomats who declare that there is no law in these countries to put an end to lies and calumnies. Here it is not a case of private affairs, but one concerned with the fellowship of peoples and states. And we are not in a position to make light of such things for any length of time. We simply cannot close our eyes to the effects of such a virulent campaign. If we do so, it may easily happen that in certain lands the malicious machinations of weavers of lies will succeed in arousing hatred of our country, which, if disregarded, will gradually develop into a universally hostile attitude towards us. The German nation could not possibly face this with the necessary power of resistance, since our own Press policy prevents the expression of such hostility towards these nations. And this is a grave menace indeed, and one that endangers peace. For this very reason, I refuse to tolerate any longer the unbridled and persistent scoffing and slandering to which our country and people are subjected. We shall answer these calumnies in future and that with real National Socialist thoroughness.

What has been disseminated during the last few weeks alone in the way of insane, impudent and stupid statements about Germany, is simply outrageous. When Reuter invents attempts on my life, and English papers tell of large-scale arrests in Germany, of the closing of Germany's frontiers towards Switzerland, Belgium and France, etc., of the alleged flight of the Crown Prince from Germany, of a military rising, of the imprisonment of German generals, or, as an alternative, of the march

of German generals to the Chancellery, when reports are rife that Himmler and Göring had quarrelled over the Jewish question, and that I was therefore in a difficult position, or that a German general had formed contacts with Daladier with the help of intermediaries, that a regiment had mutinied at Stolp, that 2,000 officers had been cashiered, that the whole of German industry had been mobilized for war, that differences had arisen between the Government and private industry, that twenty German officers and three generals had fled to Salzburg that fourteen generals had fled to Prague with Ludendorff's corpse, that I had lost my voice, so that our cunning Goebbels was looking for a man who could imitate it and my speeches could be made by gramophone records. I fear that tomorrow this same journalist will either doubt my identity, or else will say that I made the gestures and a gramophone was behind me, and so on. Mr. Eden boasted in a recent speech of the various liberties of his land. One special liberty he failed to mention, liberty for journalists to slander and jeer at other nations, their organizations, men and governments, to their heart's content! We might of course say all this stupidity is not worthy of being taken seriously. After all millions of foreigners in Germany see that there is not a single word of truth in it. What a contrast to the Soviet member of the League of Nations, who banishes strangers from his land, and even closes the Consulates, whilst in Germany everyone is at liberty to accumulate experiences on the spot.

But such obstacles to international amity cannot be permitted indefinitely. I am glad to state that a section of the foreign Press did not participate in the despicable attacks on the honour of other nations. But the harm caused by such incitement is nevertheless so great that in future we do not intend to tolerate it without a flaming protest. This crime is all the more serious when it deliberately aims at goading on the nations to war. I need only mention a few facts in this connection.

State leadership and press policy

Let me remind you of the sudden, slanderous reports of last year when it was alleged that Germany had landed 20,000 men in Spanish Morocco. It was indeed fortunate that this infamous lie could be immediately refuted. But what would happen if such a dementi could not be made quickly enough to avoid trouble.

This list of major crimes also includes statements that Germany and Italy had formed an alliance to divide up Spain, and a recent malicious statement to the effect that Germany and Japan had made a pact to possess themselves of the Dutch colonies. Can one call this an honest trade, or still speak of a liberty which enables international criminals of this kind to keep the world in a state of constant unrest? Are not these people war-mongers and war-makers of the most infamous kind? The British Government wishes to limit armaments or ban bombing. I once proposed that myself. But at that time I also suggested that it was still more important to prevent the poisoning of public opinion by infamous articles in the Press. What has strengthened our feelings towards Italy—if that were at all possible—is the fact that in that country State leadership and Press policy follow one path. The Government does not talk of mutual understanding while the Press agitates for the opposite course.

This chapter on the disturbance of international relations includes the impertinence of writing letters to the Head of a foreign state asking for information about sentences passed in Courts of Law. I would suggest that certain members of the House of Commons concern themselves with sentences passed by the British Courts Martial in Jerusalem, and not with the sentences passed in the German People's Court. We can understand interest in German traitors, but it does not improve relations between England and Germany.

For the rest, let no one imagine that such tactless intervention will have any influence on German Law Courts or on their sentences. I for instance, would never allow a member of the German Reichstag to interfere in matters of English justice. The British Empire has wide interests, and we recognize them as such, but the affairs of the German Nation and Reich are directed by the German Reichstag, and by me, its representative,

not by a delegation of English letters-writers! I am sure it would be a most praiseworthy achievement were we to come to an international agreement, so as not only to prevent the use of poison, incendiary and explosive bombs, but above all to prevent the circulation of those newspapers which do more harm to the promotion of friendly relations between nations than any poison or incendiary bombs.

Strengthening of military forces

Since such an international press campaign is not conducive to appeasement, but must rather be regarded as a grave menace to peace among the nations, I have decided to carry on with the reinforcement of Germany's Armed Forces as a security against the day when these threats of war might actually turn into bloodshed and terror. The necessary steps were taken on February 4th and the work is being carried on speedily and efficiently. Germany at any rate has a sincere desire to restore mutual confidence between herself and all the Great Powers of Europe, as well as with other States. If this is not successful, it is not our fault. We earnestly believe that little can be expected at this time from conferences and single conversations because of this attitude on the part of the Press. It is impossible to deceive oneself as to the following facts. This international Press campaign against peace will immediately destroy every attempt to arrive at an understanding between peoples and nations. It will immediately misinterpret or distort the meaning of every conference. It will immediately place a false light on every agreement. And there is, therefore, nothing to give one confidence under these circumstances that any good can come out of such conferences or out of such conversations, as long as governments on the whole are not in a position to act decisively because they must always consider the public interpretation placed upon their actions.

For the time being exchange of notes

We believe, therefore, that for the time being the only practical way of arriving at an understanding is through the normal diplomatic exchange of notes, thus preventing too crude falsifications of the International Press.

Though Germany does set a limit to her interests, this must not be taken as a lack of interest in everything that goes on in world outside. We are happy to have been able to maintain normal, and in part also, friendly relations with most of the states that border on Germany. We believe that by so doing the feeling of general tension has been relieved. We are filled with deepest satisfaction at the genuine wish to maintain a real neutrality, that we have observed in several European States. We believe we can see in this an element of increasing calm, and therefore of increasing security.

Germany's thought for Germans abroad

But we see also, on the other hand, the deplorable consequences of the economic and population problems caused by the violence done to the map of Europe in the mad act of Versailles.

Over ten million Germans live in two of the States adjoining our frontiers. Till 1866 they were constitutionally united with the whole German people. They fought up to 1918 in the Great War shoulder to shoulder with the German soldiers of the Reich. Under the terms of the Peace Pact they were kept against their will from forming a union with the Reich. This in itself is sufficiently distressing. But about one thing there can be no doubt. The fact that they are now citizens of other states should not deprive them of their natural rights as members of a national community. Yet a people has the right to self-determination, as we were solemnly assured in Wilson's Fourteen Points which served as the basis of the Armistice. This cannot be overlooked simply because the people in question happen to be Germans! In the long run it is intolerable for a self-respecting world power to be permanently deprived of its entity, and to know that across the frontier are kinsmen who have to suffer severe persecution simply because of their sympathy, their feeling of union, and their common point of view with the whole German people.

Of course, we realize that a frontier settlement pleasing to all is scarcely possible in Europe. It should, therefore, be all the more important to avoid all unnecessary humiliation of national minorities, for it is quite enough that they must be separated from their homeland without adding to this the pain of persecution for belonging to a different national community. We can prove that it is possible with a good will to find ways of compensating, that is, of relieving the tension. If one tries to prevent the solution of the problem in this way and uses force in so doing, then one day this violence will be returned with violence. We cannot dispute the fact that as long as Germany was feeble and powerless, she simply had to endure these persecutions of Germans across her frontiers. Just as England looks after her interests which cover a large part of the world, so also will the Germany of to-day look after her comparatively restricted interests. And to these interests of the German Reich belongs also the protection of those fellow-Germans who live without our frontiers and are unable to ensure for themselves the right to a general freedom, personal, political, and ideological.

The German-Polish détente

We are glad to be able to state now in the fifth year after the first great foreign political agreement of the Reich that in our connection with the state from whom we might have expected the greatest opposition, there has occurred not only a loosening of the tension, but also during this year has been a pronounced "rapprochement". Of course I realize that we have a certain circumstance to thank for this—the circumstance that there was then no western parliamentarianism in Warsaw, but rather a Polish marshal, an outstanding character, who realized the importance to Europe of relieving this tension. That work, regarded at the time with scepticism by many people, has endured the test of time, and I may well say that dating from the moment that the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts at disturbing affairs in Danzig and appointed a new Commissioner, a man of high personal qualities, from that very moment the danger point to European peace entirely lost its threatening aspect. The Polish State respects the national relations of Danzig, and Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. So it was possible to find the way to an understanding in spite of attempts to disturb it, and, beginning with Danzig, to remove difficulties in relations between Germany and Poland, thus arriving at a sincere spirit of friendly co-operation.

The German-Austrian Agreement Another contribution to European peace

I am happy to be able to tell you, Gentlemen, that during the past few days a further understanding has been reached with a country that is particularly close to us for many reasons. The Reich and German Austria are bound together not only because they are the same people, but also because they share a long and common history, and a common culture.

Difficulties in full measure have presented themselves since the agreement of the July 11th brought about an attempt to clear away misunderstandings and hindrances on both sides, thus preparing for a final reconciliation. Had this not occurred it was clear that an intolerable situation might one day have developed, whether intentionally or otherwise, which might have brought about a serious catastrophe. It is then as a rule no longer within the power of man to stay the course of a destiny that first arose through negligence or stupidity! I am glad to be able to assure you that these considerations and their interpretation correspond with those of the Austrian Chancellor whom I invited to come to visit me. The idea and the intention were to bring about a relaxation of the tension in our relations with one another by giving under the existing legislation the same legal rights to citizens holding National-Socialist views as are enjoyed by the other citizens of German-Austria. In connection with this there should be a practical contribution toward peace by granting a general amnesty, and by creating a better understanding between the two States through a still closer friendly co-operation in as many different fields as possible, political, personal and economic. All this is a result of the Agreement of the July 11th.

I want to express in this connection before the German people my sincere thanks to the Austrian Chancellor for his great understanding and the warm-hearted willingness with which he accepted my invitation and worked with me so that we might discover a way of serving the best interests of the two countries, for after all, they are interests of the whole German people, whose sons we all are, wherever we may have been born.

I believe that in reaching this mutual understanding we have also made a contribution to European peace.

The best proof that we are right in this supposition is the rising fury of democratic world citizens who are always talking about peace, and yet let no opportunity pass of inciting to a war. They are angry with, and infuriated by, this work of understanding. It is therefore a permissible conclusion that our work was good. Perhaps this example will be helpful in gradually bringing greater relief to the tense situation in Europe. Germany is willing, in any event, supported by her friendships, to leave nothing untried in order to preserve that greatest good, that is the basis for every future work, namely, peace.

I can assure you, gentlemen, that our relations with the other European powers, as well as with the states outside Europe, are either normal or else very friendly. I need only point to our cordial friendship with Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and many other states. Our foreign trade balance has given you an impressive picture of our economic cooperation.

Joint defence with Italy and Japan against the Comintern

But above all stands our cooperation with those two great powers who have recognized a world danger in Bolshevism, just as Germany has, and are determined to unite their strength in common defence against the Comintern movement. That this work of cooperation with Italy and Japan may ever become closer is my sincere desire. In addition, we are happy for every relief of tension that can be effected in the general political situation. For however great may be our success we are not in doubt of the need of strengthening international cooperation.

The German nation not warlike but soldierly

The German people in its whole character is not warlike, but rather soldierly, that is, while they do not want war, they are not frightened by the thoughts of it. They love peace, but they love their honour and their freedom just as much. Fifteen terrible years lie behind us as a warning and a lesson, which, I believe, the German nation will always remember and never forget.

Construction of a new form of nation and State

In all fields of our national existence it has only now become possible to set truly great tasks, and above all to ensure the material means which are the prerequisite for the realisation of great creative plans. Thus National-Socialism corrected in a few years the deficiencies of centuries, and redressed the results of the sins of numerous preceding generations. Thus by putting an end to the internal state and party divisions, we were able to undertake and also in part to complete those tremendous tasks which today inspire the entire German people with pride and therefore with self-respect. Imposing traffic routes, gigantic industrial structures, unique city planning and buildings, tremendous bridges, are today under construction, are about to be built, or in part are already completed! By the end of the next five years the Germans will be conscious of achievements which can well fill the entire people with the greatest pride.

One of the greatest of these achievements, however, is the setting up of a form of government of the people and the State, equally remote from parliamentary democracy and military dictatorship. National Socialism has given the German people a form of government which, as a party, not only mobilizes the people, but also organises them. This organisation is such that the most natural principle of selection appears to guarantee the continuance of a stable political leadership for all time to come. This is perhaps one of the proudest chapters in the history of the past five years.

Contrary to the impression some petty international journalistic hack may have, National Socialism did not capture the German Foreign Office on the 4th February. National Socialism controls all Germany, without the slightest exception, and has done so ever since the day five years ago when I left the building in Wilhelm Platz as Reich Chancellor. Above all, however, in these five years the National-Socialist Party has not only made the nation National-Socialist, but has also given to itself that perfect organisation which makes certain its continued existence for all time. The greatest safeguard of this National-Socialist revolution with regard to leadership, consists both within and without in the complete penetration of the Reich and all its organisations and institutions by the National-Socialist Party. Its protection against the outside world, however, is entrusted to the new National-Socialist Armed Forces.

Faith in the German People

Gentlemen! You have authorized me to act by adopting the laws giving me full power. I have laid before you an account covering five important years in the life of the German people. I cannot close without assuring you how great is my faith in the future of our people and the Reich, that we all so warmly love. My motive as an unknown soldier in taking up the struggle for the regeneration of Germany was my belief in the German people—not belief in her public institutions, her social order and social classes, her parties, her state and political power, but belief in the eternal values inherent in our people. And above all there is my belief in the millions of individual German men and women, who just as I was once myself, are nameless servers of our community and our people. It is for them that I endeavoured to build up this new Reich! It shall belong to no class, it shall belong to no one group of men, for it shall belong to the whole German people. I shall try to make it easier for my people to find their path of life on this earth and to make their existence happy. What I have called into life during these years was backed by no idea of self-gain. All is, and will be, transitory. That which remains for us is a substance of flesh and blood, the German People. Party, State, Army, Trade and Industry, all are institutions and organisms which are of value only as a means to an end. History will decide their value according as they serve this end, which is the people.

They are passing factors, but our people is everlasting. To serve it with my whole strength was, and is, the happiness of my life. To thank my many excellent collaborators without whom I should never have succeeded in this work, is a pleasant duty to me. In this hour I pray that the Almighty will give His blessing in the years to come to our work and action, to our judgment and to our strength of resolution, that He may guard us from all false pride as from all cowardly submission, that He will let us find the right way, which He in His providence has allotted to the German people, and that He may give us always the courage to do right and never to waver or weaken before any force or danger.

Long live Germany and the German People!

II. EXTRACT FROM ADOLF HITLER'S REPORT OF RESULTS ACHIEVED

Germany's economic, social and cultural development since the assumption of power by National Socialism The vast achievement of five years

An account of the economic progress in figures

And to-day, in giving you, Gentlemen, and the whole German nation this account of things, I can point to such tremendous and such unique accomplishments that they alone contain the highest justification for the methods which we have followed and thus also for the security of these accomplishments. As I have already stated, the German economic situation in 1932 had also fallen to such a low plane that many persons who were specially trained as experts in this field were unable to see any prospect whatever of improvement.

Courage to act

When on the January 30th the late President entrusted me with the Chancellorship, this aspect alone of the condition of the Reich appeared practically hopeless. The best minds had failed in their attempts to remedy it! All traditional economic methods had proved useless! A malignant fatalism had taken possession of our people. They listened more and more to those who preached that everything must first be destroyed before any reconstruction could be considered.

The people themselves had no clear idea of the possible way to recovery, but only a dull feeling of increasing misery, more or less ascribable to fate. They were accordingly equally prone to agree with those who said this was the result of an immutable course of development and, at the same time, to follow anyone who had some bogus enterprise which promised the simplest and easiest possible way out of an unbearable situation. And time was all the more pressing since not only had the income of the individual been undermined, but the finances of private and public corporations were also on the verge of ruin. It was at such a juncture that I took over the Chancellorship and leadership of, and consequently the responsibility for, the German Reich!

In view of such a disastrous situation it was essential to begin with far-reaching measures and to act at once.

There was neither time to be lost nor any hope that a continuation of halfway measures would lead to any other result than that already existing. If the nation was to be saved at all it could only hope for courage to act, and not courage to talk or to criticize.

When in a country hundreds of thousands of farmers are about to lose their houses and lands, when hundreds of thousands of enterprises must close their doors, employees and workers are being dismissed, when an army of 6,000,000 unemployed, constantly increasing, more and more burdensome to the finances of the Reich, the states and the communes, is scarcely able to buy vital necessities in spite of all assistance rendered, when an intellectual proletariat is growing up whose acquired knowledge acts as a curse rather than as a blessing, when all the flourishing industrial cities are becoming desolate and huge areas beginning to become depopulated for want of a market for their products, when in other regions children of three and four years have not developed teeth because of an appalling poverty and the resultant undernourishment, when neither bread nor milk can be obtained for them, when the statement of a hard-hearted enemy that our German nation contains 20,000,000 people too many is thus almost becoming a terrible reality, then such a nation does not cry for journalistic scribbles or parliamentary prattlers, it does not cry for commissions of inquiry, international debates, ridiculous votes or insipid platitudes from so-called "statesmen" at home and abroad! No! It cries for action which will bring salvation in spite of all prattling and silly newspaper articles. It has no interest in the literary discourses of drawing-room Bolshevik international correspondents; it is

interested solely in assistance which will snatch it back from the utmost misfortune! And above all, a man who feels it his duty at such an hour to assume the leadership of his people is not responsible to the laws of parliamentary usage or to a particular democratic conception but solely to the mission placed upon him. And anyone who interferes with this mission is an enemy of the people.

Without foreign assistance

And in giving this account to the German people to-day I can look proudly and frankly into the eyes of all those hundreds of thousands and millions who, in town and country, earn their honest bread by the sweat of their brow. In these five years I too have been a worker. Only, my personal cares were increased by the care for the present and future of 68,000,000 others.

And so, just as they can justly refuse to allow ignoramuses or idlers to disturb them in their work, I have declined to permit my work to be disturbed by incompetent nincompoops, ne'er-do-wells, or malicious idlers. I have had a right to take steps against anyone who, instead of helping, saw his mission only in unfair criticism of our work. Nor does a profession of faith absolve a person from his obligation to adjust himself to the work of those who are carrying out the salvation of a nation. But that I have had a right to protect this work of mine and of all of us from such disturbers of the public peace, I should now like to prove by the results of this work. They are indisputable, but above all they are made more remarkable by the fact that in most cases I had no models of former achievements to go by, except my own common sense and the determination never to give in to obstacles, but to defy them bravely and courageously.

In this connection I should like to point out another fact here, namely Germany's economic salvation is due solely to the nation's own efforts under its own leadership. Foreign countries contributed absolutely nothing. Except for hateful rejection or limited priggishness we know of nothing that could even be counted as a positive interest in Germany, to say nothing of assistance.

Nor did I ever expect anything else. For us National Socialists it is a cardinal principle of our political and economic faith not to look for salvation in the form of any kind of aid from outside, whether of a political, economic or financial nature, but to seek such aid solely in the orbit of our own wisdom and energy.

Increased national income — Increased production

In the centre of our policy has been a realisation that the standard of living of the nation can only be the result of the total production of vital goods, i.e., that every wage and every salary paid out in Germany possesses only the real value represented by actual work done in the form of goods produced. A very unpopular doctrine at a time which echoes with the cry of "higher wages and shorter hours"!

When I took over the leadership of the Reich the number of unemployed had risen to well over 6,000,000 and the number of members of families thus concerned to more than 15,500,000. Thus the solution of this problem meant not only paying out the money for these fifteen million people to live, but, above all, to produce the goods to be bought with this money. Hence the National-Socialist economic programme is not a programme of money but essentially one of production. The greater the volume of production, the greater will be the share which the individual enjoys. Money itself is only an auxiliary in the service of distributing the goods of production. But in order to give the nation the position in the world which it needed for the unhampered

carrying out of its vital tasks, it was necessary also to carry out an additional production of national armaments which do not benefit our people directly but only indirectly. But it was obviously out of the question to identify German salvation with fraudulent currency manipulations, i.e., to defraud our fellow-citizens by such things as sliding scales of wages, and therefore also of prices. Rather, it was necessary to increase production in order to insure a constant purchasing power for the increasing income of the nation.

Let me give a brief extract from our economic life in the form of sober figures to indicate whether and to what extent National-Socialism has solved these problems.

In 1932, that is before the National-Socialist assumption of power, the German national income amounted to 45.2 milliard Reichsmark. It increased to 46.6 milliard Reichsmark in 1933, and in 1937 reached the round figure of 68 milliard Reichsmark.

In contrast to this increase in income, the general cost of living index remained practically unchanged, being 120.6 in 1932 and 125.1 in 1937.

That is to say, while the national income increased by nearly 50 %, the increase in the general cost of living index was only 4 %.

The reasons for this are to be found in the growth of our total production.

The value of industrial production rose as follows :

1932	37.8 milliard
1933	39.9 "
1937 more than	75 "

Corresponding to these in detail are also the turnover figures, for example in trades, which were as follows :

1932	9.5 milliard
1933	10.1 "
1937	22 "

For purposes of comparison I should like to note here also the turnover figures for retail trade :

1933	21.8 milliard
1937	31 "

But agricultural production, in spite of an intensive cultivation of the soil, also shows increasing results. The production figures are :

1932	8.7 milliard
1937 over	12 milliard Reichsmark.

That we are concerned here not merely with the problem of price fixing, but with one of increased production, is proved by the fact that it was possible, in spite of the increased buying power of the German nation and the consequent increased demands especially on the food market, to raise the amount of supplies from home production, which in 1932 amounted to 75 %, to 81 % in 1936.

If the value of industrial products thus increased from 37.8 milliard to over 75 milliard, this can be illustrated in particular by separate examples. In the five years of National-Socialist guidance in economic affairs,

paper manufacture	has increased by	50 %
the manufacture of Diesel oil	" "	66 %
the production of coal	" "	68 %
the production of oil-fuel	" "	80 %
the production of mineral oil	" "	90 %
the production of artificial silk	" "	100 %
the production of kerosene	" "	110 %
the production of steel	" "	167 %
the production of lubricating oil	" "	190 %
the production of petrol and other fuels	" "	470 %
the production of aluminium	" "	570 %
the production of staple fibre	" "	2500 %
etc.		

End of unemployment

This vast increase in national production formed those values which assured the German Mark its buying power and its stability, although in the same period—corresponding to this increased production—the number of unemployed decreased from over 6.5 million at the time of the National-Socialist assumption of power to 470,000 at the beginning of October 1937.

But the number of those newly included in the process of production amounts to some 2 million.

Increase in foreign trade and credits

This tremendous economic activity is also expressed in foreign trade figures. Without taking part in world economic conferences, without having at our command the gigantic possibilities of other world powers, we have succeeded in increasing our foreign trade in imports

from 4.2 in 1933 to 5.5 milliard in 1937
and in exports

from 4.9 milliard in 1933 to 5.9 milliard in 1937.

The confidence of the German people in its economic policy is also in accordance with these facts, and finds its expression in the increase in savings deposits. In the public savings banks the deposits increased as follows :

1932	11.4 milliard Reichsmark
1933	12.1 "
1936	14.6 "
1937	16.1 "

An accompanying factor of this national economic planning was the organic reduction of interest, which for short term credits decreased

from 6.23 % in 1932
to 2.93 % in 1937,

and also for long term credits sank

from 8.8 % in 1932
to 4.5 % in 1937.

The State revenues were as follows :

1932	6.6 milliard
1933	6.8 "
1934	8.2 "
1935	9.6 "
1936	11.5 "
1937	14.0 "

In 1938 they will amount to more than 17 milliard.

From the abundance of evidence of this tremendous increase in German production and of the economic revival, I shall select only some extracts with a few figures.

The rise in production Coal and Minerals

One of the most important foundations of our national economic system is our wealth in coal.

The production figures were as follows :

1932	104.7 million tons
1933	109.7 "
1934	124.9 "
1935	143.0 "
1936	158.0 "
1937	184.5 "

The figures for lignite present a similar picture :

1932	122.65 million tons
1933	126.79 "
1934	137.27 "
1935	147.00 "
1936	161.37 "
1937	184.70 "

Gentlemen, this annual increase of some 80 million tons of coal and 62 million tons of lignite represents a value of a different kind than is indicated when in the much-extolled democracies the money in circulation is increased by so many milliards without any corresponding value. No less impressive is the picture afforded by a review of steel and cast iron production and of iron ore. The Steel production was as follows :

1933	9,660 million tons
1934	13,555 "
1935	16,010 "
1936	18,614 "
1937	19,207 "

while in 1938 it will amount to some 21 million tons.

In the same period the production of cast iron increased from 1.4 million tons to 3.7 million tons.

These are the results of a process of production, the external signs of which are the tens of thousands of factory chimneys which are once more smoking, the thousands and thousands of factories and workshops in which those millions of Germans whom National Socialism has delivered from unemployment find work and a livelihood once more.

After the U.S.A., Germany is today once more the leading steel country in the world.

German iron ore production was as follows:

1932	1.3	million	tons
1933	2.6	"	"
1934	4.3	"	"
1935	6.0	"	"
1936	7.5	"	"
1937	9.6	"	"

By means of the measures introduced earlier, the production of iron ore will be increased by 1940 to 20 million tons; in addition there is the supplementary production initiated by Field-Marshal Göring in execution of the Four-Year Plan; in this connection the Hermann Göring Works will in 1940 represent a contribution of over 21 million tons. German iron ore production will thus amount in 1940 to at least 41-45 million tons, as compared with 1.3 million tons in 1932. From this the German nation may see that its distress is being relieved not by idle talk, but by unique measures on a vast scale.

There is a similar increase in German production in a number of other fields.

For example, the production of bauxite increased from 1,360 tons in 1932 to 73,280 tons in 1937.

The extraction of magnesite rose from nil to 21,000 tons. The production

of fluorite from 36,000 to 127,000 tons,
of barium sulphate from 110,000 to 423,000 tons,
of graphite from 21,000 to 24,000 tons,
of asphaltic lime from 33,000 to 109,000 tons,
of arsenic ore from 2,800 to 26,400 tons,
of pyrites from 165,000 to 420,000 tons,
of nickel ore from nil to some 87,000 tons,
of lead and zinc ore from 1.18 to 2.4 million tons.

The extraction of crude potash increased from 6,415 million tons in 1932 to 14,460 million tons.

The production of mineral oil increased from 238,600 tons in 1932 to 453,000 tons in 1937.

The production of volatile fuels, i.e., petrol, etc. increased from 386,000 tons in 1933 to 1,480,000 tons in 1937 and this year will amount to more than 1,700,000 tons, although the large plant set up in connection with the Four-Year Plan will not yet contribute to the total.

The production of Diesel oil increased from 60,000 to 120,000 tons,

of lubricating oil from 45,000 to 140,000 tons,
of oil-fuel from 167,000 to 320,000 tons,
of kerosene from 19,000 to 40,000 tons.

The production of wool increased from 4,700 tons to 7,500 tons in 1937;

of flax from 3,100 to 24,000 tons,
of hemp from 210 to 6,000 tons,
of staple fibre from 4,000 to over 100,000 tons,
of artificial silk from 28,000 to over 57,000 tons.

I might illustrate this series by many more examples. They are all documentary evidence of work such as has never before been accomplished in our nation.

In a few years, however, the vast additional results of the Four-Year Plan will supplement these successes. What, in view of a world achievement of this scope, is the purpose of the absurd comments of critics at home and abroad, of the scribbling of half-witted or ill-intentioned journalists or parliamentary incapables? Is it not finally a joke of history when in those very countries which are themselves suffering from depressions, people consider it necessary to criticise us and to give us good advice?

Without advice and above all without help from others we have attempted to overcome a state of distress in the face of which many another country is still helpless.

Increasing traffic

I should now like to present to the German people the results in some other fields of our work.

In 1932 German engineering industries had a turnover of 37.1 million Reichsmark

1933	of 42.1	"	"
1934	55.8	"	"
1935	73.3	"	"
1936	88.7	"	"
1937	(first nine months)	111	million Reichsmark.

The following numbers of motor vehicles were licensed:

1932	56,400	motor cycles,
1937	234,000	"
1932	41,100	passenger vehicles,
1937	216,000	"
1932	7,000	commercial vehicles,
1937	59,600	"

Altogether 5 ½ years ago Germany had 1 ½ million motor vehicles, as compared with 3 million today. The "People's Car" will, however, supply very different figures in a few years' time. Whereas in 1937 roughly five times as many motor vehicles were licensed as in 1932, the export of motor cars has increased almost eightfold as compared with the same year.

This increase in motor transport is accompanied by an increase in general transport.

German inland shipping conveyed

in 1932	73.5	million tons,
in 1937	130	million tons of goods.

The great new river regulation schemes and construction of canals will supplement the already vast system of our inland waterways and lead to further increases in transport.

German ocean shipping conveyed

in 1932	36	million tons,
in 1937	61	"

The idle tonnage to be seen in 1932 along the Elbe and Weser and in all other German coastal districts has disappeared.

New ships are also being built in our shipyards. In 1932 our shipyards had orders for 22,000 tons, and these only from Germany itself, foreign orders being practically non-existent. At the end of 1937 we have 370,000 tons of home orders and 350,000 tons of foreign orders. A further 400,000 tons await laying down, thus making a total of 1,120,000 tons. The new constructions for the Navy are not included in these figures. In other words, the German shipyards, which in 1932 had orders amounting to 22,000 tons, are at present working on orders for 1,120,000 tons for merchant shipping alone.

In the German Railways the average week-day car loading figures for goods transport were in 1937 47 % higher than in 1932. The receipts from goods transport have increased accordingly. In 1937 there was an increase in receipts of 70 % as compared with 1932, an increase of 78 % in tons hauled and an increase of 88 % in ton-miles.

The number of motor lorries owned by the German State Railways increased from 217 in 1932 to 3,137 in 1937, the number of road transport routes from 53 to 1,131, and the mileage from 800 to 29,200. Long distance buses increased to the same extent. The total number of persons carried by the Railway buses has increased from 480,000 in 1932 to 2 ½ million today.

The State Railways returns also show an increase in effective ton-mileage, which rose from 178 milliard to 274 milliard, that is, an increase of 54 %. A similar increase is to be observed in all other fields of Railway traffic, as ultimately shown by the receipts. In 1932 they amounted to 2,234 milliard, by 1937 they had increased to 4,480 milliard Reichsmark.

The increase in the postal services confirms this great general revival in German economic life. The number of letters handled increased from 5.6 milliard in 1932 to 6.4 milliard in 1937. The number of parcels from 227 million to 296 million. The number of postal cheque accounts from 1,021,819 to 1,119,372. The credit balances on a yearly average from 461 million to 729 million Reichsmark. The postal cheque transactions from 703 million to 904 million. The turnover in postal cheque business from 103 milliard to 161 milliard. The number of telephones from 2,960,000 to 3,578,000. The amount of air-mail postings from 135,000 kg. to 3,600,000 kg. The total returns from 1,658 million to 1,940 million.

The Post Office motor coaches conveyed in 1933 60 million people, and in 1937 over 80 million. The distance covered in air-mail delivery increased from 19,375 miles to 39,750 miles. The distance covered annually from 5 ½ million miles to 11 million miles. The number of air passengers from 100,000 to 326,000. The number of air-ports has increased by more than 100 since 1933, with an additional 62 landing grounds for passenger and industrial purposes.

Since 1933 the numbers of the German Air Sports Association had risen to 600,000 members, in 1937 the National-Socialist

Flying Corps has 3 million members, including 50,000 active members, with 6 flying schools and 22 permanent gliding camps, 400 aeroplanes and 4,600 gliders.

Roads, bridges and house-building

The development of German road construction is enormous. For the maintenance and development of German roads, including the Autobahnen (Reich motor roads), the following sums have been spent:

1932	440 millions,
1933	708 "
1935	1325 "
1937	1450 "

1500 miles are under construction. The system of Autobahnen is the largest building undertaking in the world and already, with a displacement of 240 million cubic meters of earth, by far exceeds the building achievement of the Panama Canal.

Between 1934 and 1937 approximately 6,000 miles of highways were widened, giving them a 6 metre carriage-way and an overall width of 8 to 10 metres. On 4,600 miles heavy or medium surface was laid. 344 bridges were repaired or newly built, hundreds of level crossings done away with and by-passes constructed.

In the same period 3,750 miles of first and second class roads were widened, 3,000 miles equipped with heavy or medium heavy surface, 600 bridges for these roads were repaired or newly built, and here, too, numerous level crossings done away with and by-passes constructed.

The following large bridges were built:

6	bridges over the Rhine,
4	" " " Elbe,
2	" " " Oder,
3	" " " Danube,
1	" " " Weser,
1	" " " Pregel.

Approximately 3,400 additional bridges were built in connection with the Autobahnen.

The tremendous increase in achievement in these and other fields is paralleled by the increase in our housing activity. In 1937 340,000 dwellings were constructed, this being more than double the figure for 1932.

Altogether since the National-Socialist assumption of power over 1,400,000 dwellings have made available on the housing market.

Social welfare achievements

An account of the action of National Socialism

New social legislation

I should like to supplement the foregoing with some details concerning our great organisations and our social welfare work.

The total membership of the German Labour Front for 1937 is 17,973,000 members. Including the corporative members the number exceeds 20 million. This does not include the members of the Reich Chamber of Culture or of the Reich Food Estate.

The following are the achievements for the welfare of the working population.

The wage arrangements before the advent of the National-Socialist régime may be summed up as follows: 13,000 wage schedules, bargaining between groups out for their own interests, hard and fast agreements, levelling of working conditions, wages under the standard log, struggles for power, strikes and lock-outs, general dissatisfaction. After five years of National-Socialist constructive work: 7,000 wage schedules, clearly defined legal relations, no hard and fast agreements, but minimum basis rates, wage scales according to performance, no class war with strikes and lock-outs, no wages under log standard, effective protection of all social interests, social settlement though the German Labour Front, social peace all round.

Holidays before the National-Socialist régime: Holidays mostly at the worker's own expense, no legal claim, long period of waiting before the first holiday granted, insufficient holiday period, at the most 5 days. After 5 years of National-Socialist constructive work: each working individual has a claim to holidays with pay, minimum and not maximum holiday fixed, grading of holidays according to length of service in firm, age, number of years employed and difficulty of work; a short period of waiting, as a rule only 6 months before the first holiday

is granted, increased holiday period up to 18 days for young persons, holidays also for seasonal workers, healthy recreation by means of cheap "Kraft durch Freude" tours.

Wage-policy before the National-Socialist régime: Wage equals price for the article "work", schematic maximum wages, wages influenced by unemployment, wages below log standard, piece work under pressure, no stability of income, loss of earnings on public holidays. After five years of National-Socialist constructive work: Assurance of the right to work, assurance of a minimum income, increase of wages with the increase of production, relation of wages to performance, stability of income, sound and honest piece work conditions, preferential treatment for large families, payment for public holidays.

The people's health, education and sport

Public health: In recognition of the fact that the maintenance of the health of the working individual is of the greatest importance for nation and Reich, the German Labour Front has devoted special attention to this question, as is shown by the following figures: 1937: Factory investigations and visits, approximately 17,000. Medical examination of employees, treatment being started in cases of illness, approximately 620,000. Some 36,000 factory inspections were carried out. Improvements of a social nature undertaken by the works since 1933 exceed the sum of 600 million Reichsmark. All this was formerly wasted through strikes and lockouts.

The following improvements or new constructions were carried out: 23,000 working premises; 6,000 factory grounds; 17,000 dining and rest-rooms; 13,000 wash-rooms and changing toms; 800 club houses; 1,200 sports grounds.

Improvements were also carried out in the crew's quarters on 3,600 ships. 5,000 villages have already taken part in the village improvement campaign.

Cultural welfare

By means of the German Popular Education Organisation German workers were able to take part in some 62,000 activities, including lectures, courses of lectures, popular educational activities in works, towns, and villages, study-circles, conducted tours, study-tours, exhibitions, etc. In 1936 over ten million people took part in these activities. There were approximately 22.1 million visitors to 48,000 theatrical performances, and in addition over 18.6 million visitors to approximately 47,000 film performances, 5.6 million visitors to approximately 11,000 concert performances, some 3.3 million visitors to approximately 1,800 factory exhibitions, and about 121,000 other cultural events with altogether more than 50 million participants. In addition some 600 workmen's community camps (Reich Motor Road camps, Alpine Road camps, military construction camps, etc.), with over 180,000 members, were provided for. Recreation was provided for 190,000 members of the Armed Forces and of the Reich Labour Service in over 300 special programmes. 74,000 men took part in land and sea trips etc. Over 30 joint functions were held for the armed Forces and the Reich Labour Service, 225,000 taking part. About 500,000 people attended 480 works concerts given by army and Labour Service bands. Altogether over two million people were given the possibility of a recreational use of leisure.

In the field of sport since 1934 approximately 21 million people have taken part in over 1 million classes. At the seaside resorts about 350,000 people were afforded an opportunity for sport. Over 4,500 sports instructors are in charge of sports activities. When has more ever been done for the worker?

Travel, hiking and the organisation of holidays have developed considerably. Cruises have been made to Norway, Madeira, the Azores and Italy; the following figures give a survey: Since 1934 altogether 384 cruises with 490,000 participants, over 60,000 land trips with over 19 million participants, and 113,000 walking tours with some 3 million participants have been carried out. The German Labour Front has nine large ocean steamers at its disposal, four of which it owns. Expenditure up to date for the "Kraft durch Freude" fleet alone amounts to over 21 million Reichsmark. The total expenditure since 1934 for "Kraft durch Freude", without investments and shipbuilding, amounts to approximately 77 million Reichsmark. Since the founding of "Kraft durch Freude" in 1934 a total of 155 million participants in the programmes has been counted.

The Labour Service represents an entirely new and purely National-Socialist departure. In 1933 there were in the voluntary Labour Service about a dozen large and 100 small Labour Service associations. After a period of transition of 1 ½ years the structure of the new Labour Service was in the main assured. At present it accommodates some 400,000 men per annum in two six-months periods. The female Labour Service comprises 25,000 girls. Since 1933 1,850,000 young German men and 120,000 girls have been through the training of the Labour Service.

Care of the young

The picture of German youth organization is equally impressive. Before the National-Socialist assumption of power German youth was split up into numerous organizations. Today throughout the entire Reich there is only one youth organisation, the Hitler Youth and League of German Girls, comprising in 1937 over 7 million members, 59 regional and higher regional leaders, 1,365 district and girl leaders, 9,000 sub-district girl leaders, 550,500 subordinate leaders of both sexes serve this greatest of modern youth movements.

The number of participants in the Reich Apprentices Competition was:—

1934	500,000	boys and girls
1935	750,000	" " "
1936	1,036,000	" " "
1937	1,800,000	" " "

A similar picture is presented by the Reich Sport Competition:—

1932	1.6	million participants
1934	2.5	" "
1935	3.7	" "
1936	5.8	" "
1937	6.1	" "

The Naval Hitler Youth comprises 45,000 boys, the Motor Hitler Youth 60,000 boys. As part of the campaign for the encouragement of aviation 55,000 members of the German Jungvolk were trained in gliding for group activities. 74,000 boys of the Hitler Youth are organized in its flying units. 15,000 boys passed their gliding test in the year 1937 alone. Today 1,200,000 boys of the Hitler Youth receive regular instruction in small-bore rifle shooting from 7,000 instructors. At present for the Hitler Youth alone 1,400 homes and a large number of schools are under construction.

The Youth Hostels Organization has 2,000 youth hostels at its disposal; in 1937 some 8 million spent a night in the hostels, this figure being over eight times as large as that for all the other youth hostels in the world together.

In the interests of the health of these boys and girls 4,000 doctors are engaged in the Hitler Youth, 800 dentists, and some 500 chemists, who are assisted by 40,000 ambulance boys and 35,000 first-aid girls. Over 30,000 doctors nominated by the Public Health Department look after the health of the individual boys and girls. The whole German youth is medically examined once a year, i.e. over a million individuals being examined.

German winter relief work

The German Winter Help Organization is at the head of the great social institutions. It produced:

1933	350	million Reichsmark
1934-35	360	" "
1935-36	371	" "
1936	408	" "

making a total of approximately 1,490,000,000 since 1934.

This is over 300 million more in voluntary contributions than the famous Defence Contribution of 1912-13 produced. This vast social assistance organization is supplemented by the endowment "For Disabled Workers" with donations of over 10 million Reichsmark. The Actors and Musicians Relief Fund amounts to 3½ million Reichsmark, and the Goebbels Foundation to over one million Reichsmark.

Before the National-Socialist assumption of power there existed nothing which

could even compare with these tremendous achievements.

Cultural development

Increasing share in cultural values

The extent to which the whole nation shares in this general recovery may be seen in the constantly increasing number of visitors to theatres and cinemas, and in the immense increase in the number of listeners-in. In 1937 alone 15 political exhibitions were held and were visited by more than 18 million people. The number of wireless licenses increased from 4.2 million in 1932 to 9,087,000 in 1937. The returns increased from 93 million to 204 million. The production of wireless receiving sets was as follows: 1932, 1,011,000; 1937 to 1,681,000 plus 475,000 People's Sets. Altogether since the beginning of the National-Socialist régime over 10 ½ million receiving sets have been produced.

The number of German theatres giving performances was 199 in 1932 and 263 in 1937. The number of those employed in the theatrical business increased from 22,000 to 30,730. I mention this in order to refute those assertions of some ill-intentioned foreign journalists to the effect that since our assumption of power cultural life in Germany has declined.

A complete picture of German cultural development may best be obtained from the esteem in which it is held by the rest of the world. Many important prizes, certificates of honour and gold medals seek to give expression to this esteem.

The total circulation of illustrated papers increased from 9.5 million to 15 million in 1937. Even the number of foreign journalists visiting Germany increased from 872 in 1932 to 2,973 in 1937 alone. Tourist traffic recorded in 1932 14,305,000 registrations and 49 million night's lodgings. This had increased by 1937 to 27 million registrations and 103 million night's lodgings. The number of foreign visitors increased from 1,114,000 registrations in 1932 to 2,400,000 registrations in 1937, and the number of night's lodgings from 2,673,000 to over 7 million. Cinema receipts amounted in 1932 to 176 million Reichsmark and in 1937 to 290 million Reichsmark.

If I now end this review of German recovery, which I wish to summarise only by a few illustrations and facts selected from a vast number, I can find no better conclusion than that provided by the increase in our birth rate. For in 1932 970,000 children were born in Germany. This number increased each year, in 1937 amounting to 1,270,000. Altogether since the National-Socialist assumption of power the German nation has been blessed with 1,160,000 children. These children not only give us cause to be proud of our German women, but also cause to be grateful to Providence. In five years, 1,160,000 children were born to the nation, who will later be able to help it in its peaceful work.

* * *

Gentlemen, I have endeavoured here, by means of a brief presentation of a few facts and figures, to offer you documentary proof of a work of reconstruction, which is unique in its extent and effects. I and all my collaborators, together with the entire German people, can be proud of the last five years, in which such gigantic achievements have been made in all spheres of our economic life. In contrast to this, how ridiculous is the criticism of all those people who can oppose to the National-Socialist work of reconstruction only their stupid or malicious incoherent babbling. We also know that, apart from professional loafers and trouble-makers, the entire German people believes in this work. So far as the lies invented by the pathological minds of lying foreign journalists are concerned, the tales they choose to tell their credulous readers could remain a matter of complete indifference to us Germans, if this constant campaign of hate did not threaten the peace of the world! For this campaign does not diminish our actual achievements. They remain; they can neither be talked nor lied out of existence. We have taken precautions and made sure that these international prophets of hatred and poison will not succeed in other ways as well.

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THE REUNION OF GERMANY AND GERMAN AUSTRIA

A Documentary Report

I.

The Legal Accomplishment of the Anschluss on March 13th, 1938

The Federal Constitutional Law regarding the Reunion

Vienna, March 13th, 1938.

It is officially stated :

The following Federal Constitutional Law has today been promulgated :

In virtue of Article III, paragraph 2, of the Federal Constitutional Law regarding extraordinary measures in constitutional matters, B. G. Blatt I, No. 255, 1934, the Federal Government has decided as follows :

Article 1

Austria is a land of the German Reich.

Article 2

On Sunday, April 10th, 1938, a free and secret plebiscite of the German men and women of Austria over twenty years of age will be held with regard to the reunion with the German Reich.

Article 3

In the plebiscite the decision will be taken by a majority of the votes given.

Article 4

The necessary provisions for carrying out and supplementing Article 2 the present Federal Constitutional Law will be issued by decree.

Article 5

1. The present Federal Constitutional Law comes into force on the date of promulgation.

2. The Federal Government is entrusted with the execution of the present Federal Constitutional Law.

Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Wolff, Hueber, Wenghin, Jury, Neumayer, Reinthaler, Fischböck.

The constitutional accomplishment of this Federal Constitutional Law is hereby attested.

Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Wolff, Hueber, Wenghin, Jury, Neumayer, Reinthaler, Fischböck.

The Reich Law regarding the Reunion

Berlin, March 13th, 1938.

The Government of the Reich has decided upon the following "Law of March 13th on the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich" which is hereby promulgated :

Article I

The Federal Constitutional Law of March 13th, 1938, adopted by the Austrian Federal Government regarding the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, hereby becomes a law of the German Reich. (Here follows the text of the Federal Law which is reproduced in the opposite column.)

Article II.

The law at present in force in Austria shall remain in operation until further notice. The law of the Reich shall be introduced in Austria by the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich or by the Reich Minister authorised by him for the purpose.

Article III.

The Reich Minister of the Interior is authorised, in agreement with the Reich Ministers concerned, to issue the necessary legal and administrative provisions for carrying out and supplementing the present law.

Article IV.

The present law comes into force on the date of its promulgation.

Linz, March 13th, 1938.

Adolf Hitler,
Führer and Chancellor of the Reich.

Göring,
General Field-Marshal,
Reich Minister of Aviation.

Frick,
Reich Minister of the Interior.

von Ribbentrop,
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

R. Hess,
Deputy of the Führer.

II.

THE RECENT PREVIOUS HISTORY OF THE MARCH 13TH, 1938

I. The Development of German-Austrian Relations from July 11th, 1936 to February 12th, 1938

(a) THE AGREEMENT OF JULY 11TH, 1936.

"Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution towards the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore normal and friendly mutual relations.

"It is therefore declared :

"(1) In the sense of the statement made by the Führer and Reich Chancellor on May 21st, 1935, the German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria ;

"(2) Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence.

"(3) The Austrian Federal State Government's general policy and its policy towards Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936, and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary as partners in the said Protocol are not hereby affected.

"Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary conditions are established by the Governments of both countries, the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary conditions."

Exchange of Telegrams between the Führer and the Austrian Federal Chancellor, of July 12th, 1936.

The Austrian Federal Chancellor to the Führer :

"The conclusion of this agreement, the aim of which is to restore neighbourly relations between the two German States, affords me the welcome opportunity to greet your Excellency as Führer and Chancellor of the Reich, and, at the same time, to give expression to the conviction that the effect of this treaty will bring profit to Austria and the German Reich and thus prove a blessing to the entire German people. I believe myself to be of one mind with your Excellency that, beyond this, we have by the agreement between the two States rendered valuable service to the general peace.

v. Schuschnigg."

The Führer and Reich Chancellor to the Austrian Federal Chancellor :

"The greetings which your Excellency has transmitted to me on the occasion of the conclusion to-day of the Austro-German agreement are reciprocated sincerely. I join to it the wish that by this agreement the traditional relations resulting from a community of race and historic identity through hundreds of years may again be restored, in order to clear the way for a further common task to the advantage of the German people and for the consolidation of peace in Europe.

Adolf Hitler,
German Reich Chancellor."

Exchange of Telegrams between Schuschnigg and Mussolini, of July 12th, 1936.

Telegram from Schuschnigg to Mussolini :

"It gives me pleasure to inform Your Excellency that I have just signed an agreement with the German Minister, who was authorised for the purpose by the Leader and Chancellor of the German Reich, with the object of again shaping the relations between Austria and Germany in a normal and friendly fashion. In this connection I remember with pleasure the repeated and extremely valuable conversations with Your Excellency, in the last instance at Rocca delle Caminate. I am convinced that Your Excellency will share my satisfaction at the agreement reached, which represents a valuable contribution to the general work of peace. I would like to take this opportunity of again assuring Your Excellency of my sincere friendship and of my determination to continue to cooperate, in agreement with Your Excellency, with Italy under Your Excellency's strong and successful leadership, on the basis of the well-tried Rome protocols."

Telegram from Mussolini in reply to Schuschnigg :

"I thank Your Excellency for your kind telegram. The agreement signed by Your Excellency with the representative of the Führer and Reich Chancellor must be greeted with satisfaction by all who have the cause of peace at heart. The agreement marks a notable step towards the reconstruction of Europe and the Danube countries. In this spirit, as you will remember, the question was discussed at the meeting in Rocca delle Caminate and subsequently examined on the basis of the Italo-Austro-Hungarian agreement.

It is a particular pleasure for me to repeat the assurances of the perfect friendship and cooperation of Italy with the Federal Government in accordance with the Rome Protocol, which will continue to form the basis of the relations between Italy and Austria in the change in her relations with the Reich—a result that is greeted with sympathy by the Italian Government and people."

(b) THE CONVERSATION AT THE OBERSALZBERG ON FEBRUARY 12TH, 1938.

The Official Communiqué on Dr. Schuschnigg's Visit to the Führer and Reich Chancellor.

Berchtesgaden, February 12th. The Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, accompanied by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Guido Schmidt, and Herrn von Papen, the German Ambassador to Austria, visited Herr Hitler, the German Chancellor, at Obersalzberg to-day. Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, was present.

The visit was paid on Herr Hitler's invitation.

This informal meeting was occasioned by a mutual wish to confer on all questions concerning relations between the Reich and Austria.

The Joint Official Communiqué issued in Berlin and Vienna on February 15th, 1938 regarding the Result of the Conversation

In the conversation that took place on February 12th between the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, and the Führer and Reich Chancellor at the Obersalzberg near Berchtes-

gaden, all questions of the relations between Austria and the German Reich underwent thorough discussion. The object of this conversation was to clear up difficulties which had arisen in the execution of the agreement of July 11th, 1936. It was agreed that both Parties were determined to keep to the principles of the agreement and to regard it as a point of departure for a satisfactory development of relations between the two States. In this sense, after the conversation of February 12th, both Parties decided to carry out immediately steps which guarantee the establishment of such a close and friendly relationship between the two States as is in accordance with the history and general interest of the German people. Both statesmen are convinced that the steps which they have decided upon form at the same time an effective contribution to the peaceful development of the European situation.

(c) THE MEANING OF THE AGREEMENT OF BERCHTESGADEN.

1. Statement by Adolf Hitler in his Reichstag Speech of February 20th, 1938.

"I am happy to be able to tell you, Gentlemen, that during the past few days a further understanding has been reached with a country that is particularly close to us for many reasons. The Reich and German Austria are bound together not only because they are the same people, but also because they share a long and common history, and a common culture.

Difficulties which have presented themselves since the agreement of the July 11th have brought about an attempt to clear away misunderstandings and hindrances on both sides, thus preparing for a final reconciliation. Had this not occurred it was clear that an intolerable situation might one day have developed, whether intentionally or otherwise, which might have brought about a serious catastrophe. It is then as a rule no longer within the power of man to stay the course of a destiny that first arose through negligence or stupidity! I am glad to be able to assure you that these considerations and their interpretation correspond with those of the Austrian Chancellor whom I invited to come to visit me. The idea and the intention were to bring about a relaxation of the tension in our relations with one another by giving under the existing legislation the same legal rights to citizens holding National-Socialist views as are enjoyed by the other citizens of German-Austria. In connection with this there should be a practical contribution toward peace by granting a general amnesty, and by creating a better understanding between the two States through a still closer friendly co-operation in as many different fields as possible, political, personal and economic. All this is a result of the Agreement of July 11th.

I want to express in this connection before the German people my sincere thanks to the Austrian Chancellor for his great understanding and the warm-hearted willingness with which he accepted my invitation and worked with me so that we might discover a way of serving the best interests of the two countries, for after all, they are interests of the whole German people, whose sons we all are, wherever we may have been born.

I believe that in reaching this mutual understanding we have also made a contribution to European peace.

2. Extract from the Speech by the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, in the Bundestag at Vienna on February 24th, 1938.

The Reich Chancellor and Führer of the German Reich invited me to a verbal discussion, which took place on February 12th at the Obersalzberg. The famous agreement of July 11th,

1936, which was intended to safeguard and regulate the friendly relations between the two German States, had given rise in its execution to certain difficulties which, if they continued unsolved, represented a serious source of danger. The fact that this personal contact was regarded as a political sensation far beyond the frontiers of our country and of the German Reich is by itself enough to show that up till then the endeavour to resolve the tension which had existed for years between Germany and Austria had not been successful—a condition which we were firmly convinced was not our fault, but in the long run intolerable because abnormal.

Every abnormality signifies a contradiction, and every contradiction undoubtedly involves dangers.

Thus, on that day at Berchtesgaden, as I confidently hoped, the agreement with the Chancellor of the German Reich was a milestone which is intended to define, for all future time, the relations of our two States in the interests of all the German peoples and of our Austrian Fatherland in particular—a milestone of peace.

And there is now to be peace. A peace that does justice to both parties. An honourable peace which, if God wills, puts a definite end to a struggle; a struggle that was certainly not in the interest of the German people and of German territory, however ideal the aims.

This conclusion of peace after five years of fratricidal struggle was the aim and object of the meeting at Berchtesgaden on February 12th of this year.

The Reich Chancellor and Führer of the German Reich, in his great speech to the German nation on February 20th of this year, in dealing with the results of the agreements of Berchtesgaden, referred to them as a supplement within the framework of the agreement of July 11th, 1936, and said that difficulties which had arisen in the execution of that agreement of July 11th, 1936 made it essential to try to remove misunderstandings and obstacles to definite appeasement.

Since the events are past, it is superfluous to inquire in detail why the path taken did not in itself lead to the desired result. The new agreement is concluded, and it is our ardent wish that it should bring everything that both parties expect of it.

The agreement now concluded contains all the factors of success and all the prerequisites of a satisfactory development and a complete peace.

Those who mount the barricades out of idealism and not out of calculation, in the belief that they are doing their duty, have never been the real beneficiaries of the revolution; if fate remains kind to them, they have therefore always had a claim to reconciliation on the return of calmer times. This is the meaning of amnesties. The decisive factor is not whether in individual cases the amnesty is properly appreciated and is granted to those who are worthy, but it is the fact that a line can be drawn under everything that is past in order that a fresh start may be made.

We have given plenty of proofs of good will and confidence. We have invited those who were formerly bound to the Social Democratic Party to cooperate in the Fatherland Front; we have given the possibility of cooperation under absolutely equal conditions to those formerly bound to the National Socialist Party and to the adherents of other groups. The German Peace, as I should like to call the agreement reached, expressly opens up the way to those who profess National Socialist ideas to cooperate with all others, in so far as the principles which they profess are in open, clear and unequivocal harmony with the principles of the Constitution, which has created the independent German and Christian Austria divided into States and under authoritative guidance, and in so far as they are in harmony with the principles of the Fatherland Front at the side of which there can be no political party and no political organisation and within which attention is paid to the equality of rights of all

while steadfastly maintaining its principles. This will be the task of the Front in the next few weeks.

The Reich at the same time repeated the assurance that it would take care not to interfere in the inner political affairs of Austria, and this is to be done by the Reich Government being prepared to take steps which preclude the interference of Reich departments in Austrian affairs; it is agreed and laid down that those who have hitherto been illegal in Austria can in no way count on protection by extra-State departments or on toleration by the Austrian Federal Government, but rather that any illegal activity will inevitably meet with the retribution laid down in the laws.

I have spoken of an honest peace. We are well aware that we could, and we did, go as far as that limit beyond which it is written: "Thus far and no farther". We have not been afraid to reach this limit because, trusting in the word and the personality of the Reich Chancellor, who is so successfully guiding the destiny of the great German Reich, we have resolved, in common with him, to strike out a path which, it is our firm conviction, is for the good of the Austrian Fatherland and the whole German people and in the interest of European peace.

I am anxious to state that, fully conscious of the responsibility and bearing fully in mind the vital interests and peaceful condition of our Fatherland, I am prepared without mental reservations and in absolute frankness to keep the word given by Austria. I and all of us shall be happy if a hard time which called for sacrifices and which reached its conclusion with a hard day on February 12th has led to a real German peace, a peace which the sacrifices would make it worth while to maintain and to extend.

3. Extract from the Speech by Dr. Seyss-Inquart, Austrian Minister of the Interior, at Linz, on March 6th, 1938.

In the sense of the Constitution, confirmed by the treaties of July 11th, 1936 and February 12th, 1938, Austria is free and independent. What does that mean? We do not base our independence on the peace treaties. Together with the front leader, the German nation in Austria unanimously rejects these treaties as a basis, even as a legal basis, for Austrian independence. For us, Austrian independence means free decision, free right of self-determination of our own strength, and responsibility borne here in the country. We are aware of the good friendships we have in the world, and we are determined to keep them.

Austrian independence is based on the guarantee of the German people. In the German people the State treaties of July 11th and February 12th and the statement by the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich make the position quite clear. The Austrians go their

political way without interference from departments of party and Reich in the clear and unshakable certainty that the German people in Austria will only go a German way.

What this people creates in the way of social arrangements and spiritual and cultural values must be in accordance with its nature and have sprung from the soil of the homeland. This is the ultimate significance of our conviction, our national conviction, namely that our spiritual and physical values and forces rest and are based upon Germanism. This conviction gives us on the soil of this State the social obligation to use these forces and values for the national community. This fund of ideas has been gained above all from the experience of the frontier district and its bleeding national boundaries and is therefore Austrian.

Adolf Hitler, the Führer and Reich Chancellor, is a son of this Upper Austrian land. The Führer of the German Reich in his Austrian years of apprenticeship learned with suffering to know national distress and frontier distress. This knowledge was one of the factors in deciding his future path and the liberation of the German Reich and nation from the disgrace and compulsion of the so-called peace treaties. This liberation of the German nation after the most dreadful defeat in its history also helped Austria to regain her foreign political and military freedom. We Austrians therefore thank the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich.

The clear recognition of this fact leads to clear decisions and findings and to a clear division of responsibilities between the people and the State.

We stand in the frontier district. Here there can be only one watchword—the protection and development of the many-sided forces of the nationalism that is attached to the soil. The attitude may vary according to the temperament and nature of our people in Austria, but there is one question that is perfectly clear: the political conscience always demands the active consciousness of membership of the entire nation. He who forms part of a front against the entire nation cannot assert that he is thereby serving the German cause. That cause goes beyond the inner political sphere of which I will speak later and forms the whole of the German task in Austria. Since the Federal Chancellor and leader of the Front has stated that this principle is one of the principles of the Front, and that it is far from the intentions of the Front to abandon it, we can agree to cooperate in the Front without reservation and without giving up our ideas. The question of the State form is more frequently placed in the foreground of internal political discussions than is called for by the needs of the time and the nation. This question is not urgent at a time when the entire people is still struggling for its rights and its resurrection. It is certain that this question also can only be solved by the entire German destiny.

II. The Breach of the "German Peace" by Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg

THE ATTEMPT AT A "POPULAR CONSULTATION" WITH UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS

Proclamation by Dr. Schuschnigg, Leader of the Front, of March 9th, 1938.

For a free German Austria! People of Austria!

For the first time in the history of our Fatherland, the leadership of the State demands an open confession of adherence to the home country. Next Sunday, March 13th, is the day of the popular consultation. All men and women in Free Austria, whatever your profession or class, are called upon to make your

confession before the whole world. You are called upon to state whether you are willing to go the way we are going which strives towards national concord and equality of rights, the ultimate victory over party division, the German peace inwards and outwards, the policy of work.

The watchword is: For a free, German, independent, social, Christian and united Austria; for peace and work and equality of rights for all who confess their adherence to nation and Fatherland.

People of Austria, therefore, arise as one man and vote "Yes". Greetings.

Dr. Kurt Schuschnigg, Federal Chancellor.

Extract from the Proclamation regarding the Plebiscite Regulations.

All members of the Fatherland Front, without regard to age, and also all members of the F. F. who are Austrian citizens and born not later than 1914, are entitled to vote. When the right to vote is proved, the document is stamped. The person concerned is then requested to place his voting paper in the urn. The paper can be given in open or folded. It is permitted to hand in the voting paper in an envelope. Envelopes are not supplied. A list of the persons who have voted must be posted at a place decided by the head of the province (Mayor of Vienna). The official voting paper is a paper of usual size of 5 by 8 cm. with the word "Yes" printed on one side. Such papers are under all circumstances considered as affirmative votes.

All members of the Plebiscite Commission must be members of the Fatherland Front and, if possible, be in office. The supply of clerical staff is regulated by instructions from the head of the province.

The beginning and end of the voting is fixed by the head of the province. The voting documents are the membership card of the Fatherland Front, the membership card of the Peasants' Union, the Austrian trade card and the trades union card or identity cards or certificates of residence or registration cards, in any case only documents which establish the identity. The document submitted is stamped to the effect that the person has voted. Anyone personally known to the Plebiscite Commission may be allowed to vote without producing a document. The persons entering the polling booths must submit their documents to the president.

Persons wishing to vote "No" must write the word "No" by hand on a paper of the same size. Papers containing the word "No" with any addition are invalid. Blank papers, i.e. papers which have neither the word "Yes" (written or printed) nor any remark in writing are considered as affirmative votes. All other papers are invalid.

* * *

The Federal Chancellor spoke as follows on the significance of the plebiscite in his speech at Innsbruck on March 9th:

"The Sunday which calls for the declaration of the adherence of this country to its principles, the unity of the people, peace and our programme of work, however simple and self-evident the watchword may be, is undoubtedly of special importance. I take the responsibility for this decision on myself alone. I stand and fall, with everything that I desire and think, with this declaration of adherence to be given by the Austrian people. But I believe that this responsibility could be and had to be assumed, because I cannot imagine there is a single man or woman who knows what is at stake who could be against this plan at the present time."

Protest against the Unconstitutional Plebiscite Conditions. An Article by Dr. Jury, of March 11th, 1938.

Dr. Jury, the deputy head of the "National Political Section", discussed the "popular consultation" from the point of view of the Austrian National Socialists in the "Wiener Neueste Nachrichten". The morning edition was confiscated on account of this article.

Dr. Jury wrote: By the agreements of July 11th, 1936 and February 12th, 1938 the two leaders of the German States have guaranteed the independence of our Austrian fatherland and have thus made this the basis of the brotherly community of combat and fate of the entire German people. We Austrian National Socialists have also recognised the principle of Austrian independence and have publicly undertaken to keep all legal

provisions. By my entry into the legislative corporations I have become a co-guarantor of the Austrian May constitution to which I have sworn a sacred oath.

We National Socialists are accustomed to take our oaths seriously, and it is therefore our obvious duty to consider whether we will follow on roads which threaten to depart from the ground of the Austrian constitution.

The principles set up by the Federal Chancellor for the "popular consultation" have been placed outside discussion by all Austrians. All political groups that can be taken seriously in Austria have for a long time taken their stand on these principles. To reject them would be high treason to Austria and to the entire German people. But we refuse, by agreeing to what is self-evident, to reply "Yes" to what may be read between the lines in this watchword of the "popular consultation".

We Austrian National Socialists are fighting not only for a free and German, an independent and social, a Christian and united Austria, but we are fighting for the indivisibility of the principles of the Austrian constitution. We cannot and will not tolerate that, by omitting two of the most important principles of new Austria from the question put in the plebiscite, namely the authoritative leadership and the corporate organisation of our State, the way is opened up to the democratic form of State and thereby to the Popular Front and to the bolshevisation of our beloved fatherland. We Austrian National Socialists are at any time prepared to reply "Yes" to the Austrian May constitution.

But we must decisively decline to reply "Yes" to a departure from the sworn principles of our constitution under pressure of being branded as traitors to our people and country.

The third principle of the question put to the vote contains those demands which we Austrian National Socialists have always put forward and the fulfilment of which has been guaranteed to us by the Federal Chancellor on the basis of the Berchtesgaden agreement. But equality of rights has not yet been guaranteed to all Austrians who are true to their people and fatherland. The right guaranteed to us of a share in the decisions of the Governments of the "Länder" is simply rejected by the governors. The right to a share in the decisions within the framework of the Fatherland Front could hitherto only be achieved to a very small extent on account of the existing Front barrier. The cessation of discrimination against National Socialists, which was established at Berchtesgaden, has hitherto not been fulfilled.

This lack of equality of rights has been particularly shown in the last few days in the conditions for carrying out the "popular consultation", and the effect is that we National Socialists are given no possibilities whatever of controlling the freedom of the plebiscite, the secrecy of the ballot and the counting of the votes. In view of the absence of lists of voters and uniform voting identity papers, the door is opened wide to a forged vote, and in view of the lack of measures for securing the secrecy of the ballot and in view also of the preliminary voting provided for in public institutions, the way is opened up for terrorism, especially as even today any other vote than "Yes" is pilloried as treason to Austria.

For these three reasons, i.e. the unconstitutional tendency of the question put to the vote, the illegality of the form of plebiscite which endangers peace and work, and the absence of equality of rights in the execution of the "popular consultation", we Austrian National Socialists must decline to take part in this "popular consultation" which is not provided for in the Austrian constitution and must therefore be regarded as a purely private initiative the result of which cannot be controlled.

A "popular consultation" which has a political tinge, which departs from the principles of the Austrian constitution and which moreover in this form is not provided for by the constitution, not to mention the legislation, calls forth the dangers of internal disturbances and a change of course in foreign affairs. For these two reasons, we Austrian National Socialists decline to take part in an action which is not founded on the law and would bring about an unconstitutional position.

"Behind the Back of the Cabinet"

London, March 10th. Reuter reports from Vienna: In the office of Dr. Jury, deputy for Dr. Seyss-Inquart as head of the National Political Section, a spokesman gave Reuter the following authorised declaration:

"We are instructing our adherents to abstain from voting in the plebiscite on Sunday. We are in principle decided to keep

to the agreements of July 11th, 1936 and February 12th, 1938. But we are not prepared to declare our decision in this form. In addition, the manner in which the plebiscite is brought about can only be characterised by an expression which I prefer not to use. It was decided without consultation with the Cabinet and behind its back. The entire manner in which the plebiscite is to be carried out makes it possible for the voters to vote several times and gives the officials of the Fatherland Front unrestricted control over the ballot, so that the door is open to all kinds of abuses.

The Postponement of the Plebiscite

Vienna, March 11th. About 7 p.m. the following announcement was made on the Austrian wireless:

"The Federal Chancellor and Front Leader, after reporting to the President of the Federation, has decided to postpone the plebiscite fixed for Sunday the 13th instant."

III. The Collapse of the Schuschnigg Government and the Elementary Irruption of the National Socialist Rising

(a) SCHUSCHNIGG'S WITHDRAWAL

The Broadcast Speech of the Federal Chancellor on March 11th, 1938

"This day has put before us a tragic and decisive situation. I have to give my Austrian fellow-countrymen the details of the events of the day.

"The German Government to-day handed to President Miklas an ultimatum, with a time-limit attached, ordering him to nominate as Chancellor a person to be designated by the German Government and to appoint members of a Cabinet on the orders of the German Government; otherwise, German troops would invade Austria.

"I declare before the world that the reports issued in Austria concerning disorders created by the workers and the shedding of streams of blood and the allegation that the situation had got out of the control of the Government were lies from A to Z.

"President Miklas asks me to tell the people of Austria that we have yielded to force, since we are not prepared in this terrible situation to shed blood, and we decided to order the troops to offer no serious—to offer no resistance.

"The Inspector-General of the Army, Gen. Schilharsky, has been placed in command of the troops. He will issue further orders to them.

"So I will take leave of the Austrian people with the German word of farewell, uttered from the depths of my heart. 'God protect Austria.'"

and a Correction by the "Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro" of March 11th, 1938

The former Austrian Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, in speaking on March 11th at about 7.50 p.m. from the Vienna broadcasting station, made a number of untrue statements.

He stated, inter alia, that the Government of the German Reich had sent an ultimatum with a time limit demanding the formation of a new Federal Government. This statement by Schuschnigg is untrue. Such an ultimatum was not issued by the Government of the Reich, but such demands were made to the Federal President by Austrian departments and Austrian Ministers in view of the position in Austria which was becoming constantly more critical and of the policy of the Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg which was steering towards a catastrophe.

Herr Schuschnigg further states that the Government of the German Reich demanded in the form of an ultimatum

that the Federal President should "choose the Government according to the proposals of the Reich Government." This is also not in accordance with the facts, but Austrian Government circles, fully recognising the position in Austria, made such demands of the Federal President.

Thirdly, the former Austrian Federal Chancellor states that it is untrue that disturbances have broken out in Austria and that the Government is not master of the situation. Hundreds of reports sent from Austria all over the world prove that innumerable conflicts had already taken place, that Marxist disturbances had occurred in many places, that for instance Communist crowds had armed themselves in the Vienna Neustadt and that a number of attacks had been made when Schuschnigg read his untrue statements.

(b) THE PROVISIONAL ASSUMPTION OF POWER BY DR. SEYSS-INQUART, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

An Appeal by Dr. Seyss-Inquart.

Vienna, March 11th. Dr. Seyss-Inquart, Federal Minister for Internal Affairs and Defence, broadcast the following speech at about 8.20 p.m.:

"Men and women of Austria, German patriots: With reference to the happenings of to-day and with special reference to the events we are now expecting, I state that I am still in office as Minister of Defence and the Interior and that I feel myself responsible for the maintenance of order in this country.

"I demand that all of you keep the peace and order. During the next few days discipline must be especially strict.

"If there are any meetings they must not have the character of demonstrations. I demand that those formations of the National-Socialist party responsible for order and safety shall ensure that absolute peace and order are everywhere maintained. I am sure that the Government will have the unreserved support of all.

"I remind you especially that there must be no question of resistance either on the part of the populace or the executive against the German Army, which is now entering the country. It is most important that peace and order should be maintained everywhere.

"Keep your heads, remain calm and see to it that we advance towards a happy future."

Seyss-Inquart's Appeal for the Despatch of German Troops.

Telegram from Dr. Seyss-Inquart to the Führer and Reich Chancellor, on March 11th, 1938, at night.

"The Provisional Austrian Government," which, after the resignation of the Government of Schuschnigg, sees as its task the restoration of peace and order in Austria, addresses to the German Government the urgent request to support it in its task and to help it in preventing bloodshed.

For this purpose it asks the German Government for the dispatch of German troops at the earliest possible time."

Seyss-Inquart.

* * *

The Appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Federal Chancellor and the Formation of the Seyss-Inquart Government.

Vienna, March 12th 1.30. From the balcony of the Federal Chancellor's Palace, Dr. Jury announced the appointment of Dr. Seyss-Inquart who, after the resignation of the Schuschnigg Government, had been requested by the Federal President Miklas "under pressure of the internal political situation", to take over the office of the Federal Chancellor. At the same time he announced the new list of Ministers.

IV. The Proclamation by the Führer on March 12th, 1938

Germans,

We have witnessed the fate of our racial comrades in Austria with deep pain for many years. An eternal historical link, which was first broken in 1866, but which was further strengthened in the World War, has placed Austria ever since in community with the German people and their fate. The sorrow, which was first put upon this country from outside and then from inside, was felt by us to be our own in the same way as we know that for millions of German-Austrians the unhappiness of the Reich was the cause of a similar sorrow and sympathy.

When the nation in Germany once more found the way to the proud consciousness of being a great people, thanks to the victory of the National-Socialist idea, a new era of sorrow and of the sorest trial began in Austria. A régime lacking every legal mandate attempted to maintain its existence, which was denied by the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people, by the most brutal measure of terror, by bodily and economic chastisement and destruction.

Thus we, as a great people, had the experience that more than 6,000,000 of our own stock were oppressed by a numerically small minority which had simply seized the necessary power. The deprivation of political rights corresponded to an economic decay, which stood in fearful contrast to the blossoming of a new life in Germany.

Who can hold it against these unhappy racial comrades that their looks turn with longing towards Germany, towards that Germany with which their forefathers had been linked for so many centuries; that Germany with which they fought shoulder to shoulder in the hardest war of all time, whose culture was their culture, and to whose culture they had themselves contributed so much of great value in so many spheres? To restrain these opinions meant nothing more than to condemn hundreds of thousands of people to the greatest mental distress. If years ago this sorrow was borne with patience, the will to set aside this oppression became ever stronger with the growing prestige of the Reich.

Germans, I have attempted in the last year to warn the former rulers of Austria against this course; only a madman could believe that he could in the long run rob the people of their love for a nation of com-

mon stock by oppression and terror. European history proves that a stronger fanaticism results in such cases. This fanaticism forces the oppressor to resort to increasingly sharp methods of violation, and these in their turn increase the horror and hatred of those oppressed.

I therefore attempted to convince those who were then responsible that in the long run it would be impossible for a great nation, because it would be unworthy of it, continually to be compelled to see people of the same race, persecuted and imprisoned only on account of their origin or their adherence to this race. Over 40,000 refugees were compelled to enter Germany alone. Ten thousand are in prisons, dungeons, and concentration camps; hundreds of thousands have been reduced to beggary and impoverished. No nation in the world would tolerate in the long run such a state of affairs on its own frontiers. If it did it would only deserve to be despised.

In 1936 I tried to find some way which would offer the prospect of alleviating the tragic fate of this German brother nation in order thus, perhaps, to facilitate a genuine reconciliation. The Agreement of July 11th, however, was signed only to be broken again in the very next hour. The overwhelming majority remained outlawed. Their pariah position in this State was in no way alleviated. He who openly confessed that he belonged to the German nationhood continued to be persecuted, no matter whether he was a National-Socialist roadworker or a veteran army leader of the World War who had won recognition.

I then tried for a second time to bring about an understanding. I endeavoured to make the representative of this régime, who met and faced me—the leader chosen by the German people—without any legitimate mandate, I endeavoured to make him understand that this position would in the long run be untenable because the increasing indignation of the Austrian people could not eternally be held in check with increasing force. I endeavoured to make him understand that from a given moment it would also become unbearable for the Reich to look on silently while this oppression continued. For if to-day already colonial solutions are made dependent upon questions of the right of self-determination of the inferior nations concerned, then it is unbearable that 6,500,000 members of an old

and great nation are virtually placed below these rights by its régime.

I, therefore, wanted to obtain by a new Agreement that all Germans in this country should receive the same rights and be given the same duties. This Agreement was to have been the fulfilment of the treaty of July 11th, 1936.

A few weeks later we saw unfortunately that the men of the then Austrian Government were not thinking of keeping the spirit of this Agreement. In order to procure an alibi for their continual assaults on the equal rights of Austrian Germans a "popular demand" was invented which was calculated to deprive the majority of the country of its rights for ever. This procedure was to be confined to one occasion only. A country, which for many years has had no elections, which has none of the machinery necessary to ascertain the views of the electors, suddenly ordered a plebiscite which had to take place within three and a half days. There were no lists of voters nor voting cards; there was no scrutiny of the rights of persons to vote; there was no undertaking to keep the vote secret; there was no guarantee of the impartial carrying out of the election; there was no security for the counting of the votes. If these were the methods adopted to give a régime the appearance of legality then we National-Socialists in the German Reich had been fools for 15 years. We went through hundreds of elections and with the greatest difficulty we gained the approval of the German nation.

When the late President of the Reich finally called on me to form a Government I was the leader of by far the largest party in the Reich. I have since always endeavoured to secure from the German people the legal approval of my position and my acts. If, however, the methods which Schuschnigg wanted to apply are the correct ones, then the plebiscite in the Saar was only a piece of chicanery which was intended to render

more difficult the return of this territory to the Reich. In this matter we are of a different opinion. I believe we are all entitled to be proud of the fact that we secured the confidence of the Germans in the Saar plebiscite in such an incontestable manner.

The German population of Austria have at last risen against this attempt to carry out a deceptive election. The German Reich will not tolerate the persecution of Germans in this territory in future because of their attachment to our nation or adherence to certain views. The Reich wants peace and order.

I have therefore decided to place from now on the aid of the Reich at the disposal of the millions of Germans in Austria. Since this morning the soldiers of the German Armed Forces are marching over all the German-Austrian frontier. Tanks, infantry divisions, detachments of Storm Troopers are marching on the ground, while the German Air Force is in the blue sky—they were summoned by the new National-Socialist Government in Vienna. They are the guarantors that within the shortest possible time the Austrian people will at last be given an opportunity to decide their future and their fate by a real plebiscite. Behind these columns is the will and the determination of the entire German nation.

I myself as Führer and Chancellor of the German people will be happy once again to be able to enter this land which is also my home as a German and a free citizen. The world must realize that the German people in Austria these days are experiencing utmost bliss and joy. Austria sees in the brothers who have come to her help the saviours from their deepest misery.

Long live the National-Socialist German Reich! Long live National-Socialist German Austria!

V. The Achievement of the Anschluss by the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler and the Federal Chancellor Dr. Seyss-Inquart

The Declaration

that Article 88 (Prohibition of Anschlusss) of the Treaty of St. Germain is invalid

(a) THE HISTORICAL EVENTS AT LINZ
ON MARCH 12TH, 1938.

Greeting of the Führer and Chancellor by Federal Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.

"My Führer! At a moment of the greatest significance for the German people and, in its more distant effects, for the shaping of European history, we greet you, my Führer and Reich Chancellor, for the first time again in Austria. The time has come when, in spite of the dictated Peace, compulsion, ill-will and incomprehension on the part of a whole world, Germans have finally found their way to each other. Today the German nation stands united and indivisible in order to bear any struggle and any suffering as one people. The way was difficult, hard and called for sacrifices. It led through the most terrible defeat of the German people, but from that very defeat arose the great and

glorious idea of the indivisible community of destiny, the consciousness of one living nation, the idea of National Socialism.

You, my Führer, have felt the distress and suffering of the people as a son of this frontier district. Out of this determination arose in you the great thought of staking everything in order to lead the German people out of this, its most serious defeat.

You have achieved it. You are the Führer of the German nation in its struggle for honour, freedom and right. Now we Austrians have for all time freely and openly, proudly and independently, proclaimed our adherence to this Führer, while at the same time solemnly declaring that Article 88 of the Peace Treaty is ineffective.

The great forces of the Reich enter our country under the jubilation of Austria. Austria's soldiers greet the field-grey

Germans who have come, not in spite of us, but in order to prove clearly and definitely that the German people has come in its entirety to safeguard German right before the whole world and to protect it for all time. The national German Reich of order, of peace and of the freedom of the peoples is our aim, we stand on the threshold of its dawn and Adolf Hitler is its Führer.

My Führer! We Austrians thank you. I can merely speak as a simple man, but I can say from the hearts of millions of Austrians: We thank you. We have always fought together with you. I believe we have fought a good fight to the end. But now we greet you with the joy of all German hearts:

Hail, my Führer!

Adolf Hitler's Speech.

"Germans!

German men and women!

Herr Chancellor, I thank you for your words of greeting. In particular I thank you who have come here to give your testimony that it is not the will and the wish of a few to found this great national German Reich but that it is the wish and will of the German people.

Some of our well-known international seekers after the truth will perhaps not only see the truth here to-night but also admit it afterwards.

When I left this town I carried with me the same faith which fills me to-day. Imagine my feelings now that I see my faith fulfilled after so many years.

Providence, in calling me forth from this city to the leadership of the Reich, must have bestowed a mission on me, and that mission can only be to restore my dear homeland to the German Reich. I have believed in this mission, have lived and fought for it, and I think I have now accomplished it. You are all witnesses and sureties of this.

I do not know on what day you will be called upon. I hope it will not be far distant. Then you will have to give your own confession of faith, and I believe that I shall then be able before the entire German people to point with pride to my home country.

This result must then show the world that any further attempt to tear this nation asunder will be vain.

Just as you will then be pledged to make your contribution to this German future, the whole of Germany is ready to make its contribution. It is already doing so today.

The German soldiers whom you see marching in from all parts of the Reich at the present time are champions ready and willing to make sacrifices for the unity of the entire great German people, for the power of the Reich, for its greatness and glory, now and for all time.

Germany, Sieg-Heil."

b) THE FÜHRER ON SCHUSCHNIGG'S BETRAYAL

A Conversation of Adolf Hitler with the English journalist, Mr. Ward Price at Linz.

Linz, March 13th.

I had a long talk with Herr Hitler in his room at the Hotel Weininger at Linz, in which he gave me a full and frank account of the reasons which had led him to send his troops into Austria.

"Will the developments of to-day have any effect upon the Anglo-German conversations that are beginning?" I asked Herr Hitler.

"On our side, none at all, and I hope none on the British side," he answered. "What harm have we done to any foreign country? Whose interests have we hurt by falling in with the will of the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people to become German?"

"What is your attitude towards the Anglo-French note of protest?" I asked.

"I cannot understand it," was the reply. "These people here are Germans. A protest note from other countries about my actions with regard to them has no more sense than a note

from the German Government would have which protested against the relations of the British Government with Ireland."

"I assure you in all sincerity," he said, "that four days ago I had no idea at all that I should be here to-day or that Austria would have been embodied as she is from to-night with the rest of Germany on exactly the same basis as Bavaria or Saxony.

I have done this because I was deceived by Herr Schuschnigg, and to betray is something which I will not tolerate. When I give my hand and word on any matter I stand by it, and I expect anyone who enters into an agreement with me to do the same. I came to terms with Herr Schuschnigg by which he was to cease his oppression of the majority of the people of his country. I dealt quite fairly with him in my Reichstag speech. I gave him the chance to say: 'I have come to terms with the German Government, and I will loyally co-operate in carrying them out.' Instead Herr Schuschnigg tried to spring this plebiscite (the one on a 'free Austria' he had planned for yesterday) on his country.

At first I could not believe the news. I sent an emissary to Vienna to find out if it could possibly be true. He reported that it was true. So I determined to act at once, with the result that on the very day he was going to hold his plebiscite I have brought about the union of Austria and Germany. That union will be submitted to another national plebiscite, but you will see the result. It will be a sweeping majority like it was in the Saar.

This is my home, I have long grieved to see the people to whom I belong by birth oppressed and suffering. More than two thousand of them have lost their lives. Many have been in prison. Some have been hanged for their political opinions and their faithfulness to German ideals.

A minority of ten per cent. has oppressed a majority of ninety per cent. Well, I have put an end to all that. But I have done still more. I have prevented the majority from avenging itself on the oppressors. I hope the world will realise that it is a work of peace I have performed here. If I had not intervened and the Schuschnigg Government had tried to carry through its trick plebiscite there would have been bloody revolution here. Austria might well have become another Spain in the heart of Europe.

I am a realist. Look at my relations with Poland. I am naturally ready to admit that Poland—a land of 33 million inhabitants needs an outlet to the sea. It is a bitter thing to us that this has to be obtained at the expense of a corridor through German territory, but we realise what it means to the Poles. There are Germans living under the Polish Government and Poles living under the German Government.

If the two countries quarrelled each would oppress its minority. It was far better to settle our differences by agreement.

I hope that all nations will recognise from what has happened in Austria the folly of oppressing their national minorities.

Wait a little and see what I will do with Austria. Come back in four years' time, and you will find that the number of the Austrian unemployed has greatly fallen. You will see how much better off and happier the people of Austria will be."

c) EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN HITLER AND MUSSOLINI ON MARCH 12TH, 1938.

Hitler to Mussolini

To His Excellency the Italian Prime Minister and Duce of Fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini:

— Mussolini, I shall never forget it.

Mussolini to Hitler

"Hitler, Vienna. My attitude is determined by the friendship between our two countries, consecrated in the axis.

— Mussolini."

III.

GREATER GERMANY HAS ARISEN**Adolf Hitler's Entry into Vienna on March 14th, 1938**

Immediately after his triumphal entry into Vienna, at a quarter past seven in the evening, the Führer addressed the Viennese people from the balcony of the Hotel Imperial:

"My German men and women compatriots! What you are experiencing I have myself experienced with you in the last five days. It is a great historical change that has come over our German people. What you are

passing through in this moment the entire German people is passing through with you.

It is not only the two million people in this city but 75 millions of our people in one Reich. They are all deeply affected and moved by this historical turn of events, and they all make a solemn promise: whatever may happen, the German Reich as it stands today will never again be broken up or torn asunder by anyone."

WITHDRAWAL OF THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT MIKLAS AND THE APPOINTMENT OF SEYSS-INQUART AS REICH STATTHALTER

Vienna, March 13th. The official news agency reports:

"Federal President Miklas, in reply to a letter from the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, of March 13th, 1938, has resigned his functions. His powers are transferred, in accordance with § 77, para. 1, of the Constitution of May 1934, to the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Seyss-Inquart."

Vienna, March 15th. The Führer and Reich Chancellor has appointed the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, Reich Statthalter of Austria with seat in Vienna.

IV.

THE ANSCHLUSS DEMONSTRATIONS IN VIENNA AND BERLIN**I. The Liberation Festivities on the Heldenplatz in Vienna on March 14th, 1938****(a) SPEECH BY THE REICH STATTHALTER
DR. SEYSS-INQUART**

My Leader, as the last supreme organ of the Federal State of Austria, I report to the Führer and Reich Chancellor the fulfilment of the legal decision in accordance with the will of the German people and its Führer. Austria is a "land" of the German Reich. I announce to the German nation and to the entire world that Adolf Hitler, as Führer and Reich Chancellor, has entered the stronghold of the old capital and guardian of the Reich. The aim for which centuries of German history have struggled, for which uncounted millions of the best Germans have bled and died, the ultimate aim in the fierce fight, the ultimate consolation in the bitterest hours—has now been achieved. The Ostmark has returned home. The Reich has again arisen; the national German Reich has been created.

My Leader, the forces of all the generations of the German people are concentrated in your will, and you, my Leader, created the achievement for all generations of the German future. Today all Germans from all eternity greet the Führer as the consumator, today the Führer greets the new eternal Germany.

My Leader, We have only one thing to say: we thank the Führer. We say thanks—the thanks which are unbounded love and unconditional loyalty. My Leader, wherever the way leads, will follow. Heil, my Leader.

(b) ADOLF HITLER'S SPEECH

German men and women.

Within a few days there has been a revolution in the community of the German people the extent of which we are able to see to-day, but the significance of which only later generations can measure.

In recent years those at the head of the régime which has been overthrown often spoke of the special mission which in their eyes this country had to fulfil. A leader of the Legitimists described them exactly in a memorandum. The role of the so-called independence of Austria which was founded in the Peace Treaties and was dependent on the grace of the foreigner was to hinder the creation of a truly great German Reich and to bar the way to the German people's future.

I now proclaim for this land its new mission. Its mission answers to the vocation which once called hither German settlers from all parts of the old Reich. The oldest East March of the German people is from now on to be the newest bastion of the German nation and so of the German Reich. For centuries in the unquiet times of the past the storms of the east broke on the frontiers of the old march. For centuries more, for all future she is to be again an iron guarantor of the security and freedom of the German Reich and so a surety for the happiness and peace of our great people. And I know this, the old East March of the German people will fulfil its new task just as the old task was solved and mastered.

I speak in the name of the millions of men, of this wonderfully beautiful German land, in the name of the Styrians, of the Lower Austrians and the Upper Austrians, of the Carinthians, the Salzburgers, the Tirolese, and, above all, in the name of the city of Vienna, when in this moment I assure the 68,000,000 of other fellow-Germans in our broad Reich: "This land is German."

It has understood its mission, it will fulfil it, and it will be surpassed by none in loyalty to the great German national community.

But our task will now be, by work, industry, common action, and cooperation, to solve the great social, cultural, and economic tasks, but above all to make Austria ever more a fortress of National-Socialist devotion and National-Socialist determination to develop and construct.

I cannot, however, finish this appeal without recalling those men who have made it possible for me to bring about this great turning-point in so short a time with the help of God. I thank

the National-Socialist members of the Government, and at their head the new Reichs-Statthalter Dr. von Seyss-Inquart, I thank the innumerable party officials, but I thank, above all, the innumerable nameless idealists, the fighters in our formations, who, in long years of persecution, have proved that the German people, placed under pressure, only becomes still harder. These years of suffering have confirmed me in my conviction of the high value of the German-Austrian man, working within the framework of our great national community. The wonderful order and discipline of this mighty event is also evidence for the power of the idea inspiring these men.

So in this hour I can make before the German people the greatest report of my life of a task carried out. As Leader and Chancellor of the German nation and of the German Reich I report before German history that my homeland has now entered the German Reich.

Germany and her new member, the National-Socialist Party, the Army, our Reich, Victory Heil!

II. The Anschluss Demonstration in Berlin on March 16th, 1938

(a) GREETING OF THE FÜHRER BY FIELD-MARSHAL GÖRING.

My Leader!

I greet you today in the name of the entire people and of the capital of the Reich, and in the name of the armed forces. Words cannot express, my Leader, what each of us feels today.

You have brought us the whole of Germany. The brothers are liberated.

You have brought us your home country, not with violence but with your heart.

May I at this moment, my Leader, return into your hands the full powers which were accorded me by confidence in these days.

My Leader, in the name of all, I greet you.

(b) SPEECH BY REICH MINISTER DR. GOEBBELS.

My Leader!

Over there a festive city awaits you. Hundreds of thousands, even millions, have marched out as an advance detachment of your people to express their thanks.

It is only a few days since you left us on that Saturday morning. What a change has taken place in the meantime. In the last few days and nights we have witnessed your triumphal journey through our German Austria. We have all listened in with beating hearts when you, my Leader, made history, when you brought back your home country into the great union of our German Reich.

How often have we not seen in your Obersalzberg that Austrians, children and women, and even men, marched past you with tears in their eyes. These tears of national suffering have now become tears of national joy.

How often have we stood at your side on the terrace of your house when you looked longingly towards Salzburg. And now, my Leader, you have brought your home country back to the Reich.

For that not only our German compatriots in Austria thank you, but also the great German people, that great German people that now stands in its hundreds of thousands and millions in the streets of Berlin in order to greet you, my Leader, and give you their heartfelt and joyous thanks. I am proud to be the interpreter of these feelings.

Thus I greet you, and thus we all greet you on your return to Berlin, with our old cry:

Adolf Hitler, Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil!

(c) SPEECH BY ADOLF HITLER

My comrades!

You can imagine what feelings have been and are mine in these days. I am so happy that fate has chosen me to bring about this great union of the German people. And I am glad to know and to see that the entire German people today rejoices here and in all other German lands, and most of all in the land which was the most unhappy a few days ago and is today the happiest.

We have all the certainty that no one will ever again dissolve our union. Should any persons yet doubt it, they will obtain the final confirmation on April 10th.

Germany has become and will remain Greater Germany; the German people as a whole from east to west and now from south to Berlin will see to that. Heil!

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE AUSTRIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE DIPLOMATIC NOTIFICATION OF THE ANSCHLUSS TO THE FOREIGN POWERS ON MARCH 14TH, 1938

Vienna, March 15th. The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wilhelm Wolf, yesterday evening handed over the duties of the Austrian Foreign Office to the Reich Foreign Minister, and stated, after Herr von Ribbentrop's arrival: "As the last Austrian Foreign Minister, I transfer with heartfelt joy the affairs of the Austrian Foreign Office into your hands. We Austrians have only one Fatherland. That is Germany."

Berlin, March 15th. The diplomatic representatives of the Reich yesterday received instructions to notify the foreign Governments of the Reich law of March 13th on the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, with the addition that the Austrian diplomatic representatives abroad have received orders to place themselves and their staff at the service of the German representatives.

V.

THE HISTORICAL REICHSTAG MEETING OF MARCH 18TH, 1938

Dissolution of the Last Small German Reichstag

I. Adolf Hitler's Speech

Deputies, Men of the German Reichstag!

I have convened you to this short meeting today in order from the bottom of my heart to give you a report on events the importance of which you will all appreciate.

In addition I must notify you of decisions which affect the German people and the German Reichstag itself.

When I spoke to you a few weeks ago I gave you an account of five years of reconstruction work in the National Socialist State, the total results of which may well be described as unprecedented.

From the deepest moral and political humiliation, from economic distress and social disintegration, our people has risen to a height which even the most optimistic adherents of our own movement would have found improbable in such a short time, and which all our opponents would have considered simply impossible.

In the course of that report, in speaking of political problems I also dealt with the question the danger of which could only be constantly neglected by certain European ignoramuses.

The Nationality Principle.

Even in the last century, the former State conception racially limited, subject to religious confessions and dynastically circumscribed, had given way to a new ideal which had a stronger hold on mankind. The principle of nationality fixed the aim of this period of our new history. It brought about the decay of State forms which had arisen out of former conditions and created the European national States in accordance with new aims. A number of nations had already succeeded by the beginning of the present century in giving the corresponding State expression to their national unity. Other nations were bearers of this ideal as the binding principle of their actions during the greatest war of all times right through to the final fulfilment. The only people in Europe to whom this most natural of rights, denied them earlier by fate, was still denied by the new events; was the German nation.

Racial differences, religious disunion and dynamic self-seeking had hitherto prevented the German nation from acquiring the State unity which generations had longed for. The War and its ultimate result increased the German disunion and appeared to add to all other misfortunes the perpetual evil of the national separation of most valuable parts of the nation from the mother country. Wilson's right of the nations to self-determination, which was one of the factors that caused our nation to lay down its arms, was replaced by the most brutal national violation of countless millions of our German compatriots. Rights which were granted as a matter of course to the most primitive colonial tribes were withheld from an old civilised nation of this world on grounds that were as untenable as they were offensive.

In my speech of February 20th I stated that there will hardly be a settlement of racial and territorial conditions in Europe that will be satisfactory to all. This means that it is not our view that the aim of a national State must be to put into

effect on all sides, whether by protests or deeds, territorial demands which, though based on national needs, cannot ultimately lead to any general national justice. The countless national enclaves in Europe make it in some cases simply impossible to draw a frontier that is everywhere equally just to racial and State interests.

But there are State constructions which bear in themselves the character of conscious and deliberate national injustice to such an extent that they can only be maintained in the long run by the most brutal force.

The Violation of the Right of Self-Determination of the Austrian People.

For instance, the formation of the new Austrian rump State was a measure that implied the sheer violation of the right of self-determination of six and a half million people of the German race. This violation was admitted with cynical frankness.

It was of no importance to the well-known discoverer of the rights of self-determination, independence and freedom of the peoples, nor to other interested and pious rulers of the world who then were so much preoccupied with righteousness on the earth, that the free will of six and a half millions, should be strangled by this so-called Peace Treaty and that they should thus be compelled by force to acquiesce in the violation of their right of self-determination and to accept an unnatural separation from the great common motherland.

Indeed, when it was decided in Austria, in spite of this, to hold a plebiscite—I should like to remind democrats in London and Paris particularly of this point—and over 95 per cent. of voters were in favour of incorporation, then the apostles of the new rights forbade the result of this peaceful demonstration of the true will of those unhappy people separated from their parent nation with the help of brutal force.

The tragedy of this was that the State of Austria represented from the outset a State completely unable to live. Economic distress was correspondingly dreadful, and the people's mortality figures rose in the most fearful manner. In a town such as Vienna alone, last year there were twenty-four thousand deaths to ten thousand births. I do not say this in order to make an impression on the worthy democrats of the world, for I know that their hearts have no feeling whatever for such matters. They can look on calmly while half a million people are slaughtered in Spain, without being moved in the slightest. But they do not blush to simulate the deepest indignation when the business foundations are removed from a Jewish propagandist in Berlin or Vienna. No, I only mention this in order to point out in a perfectly detached manner that the crime of the dictated Peace Treaty pronounced for millions of persons the death-sentence, which has been gradually executed, by creating nations which could not live.

Pressure and Counter-Pressure.

That persons should be willing to secure for themselves positions in the Government at the expense of their people

by personally supporting such sham sovereignty organized from the outside does not surprise anyone who has an insight into the moral and spiritual weaknesses of mankind. It is as little to be wondered at that among the mass of national-thinking people affected there began to spread slowly a disgusted bitterness and that there rose a fanatical determination to destroy one day such unnatural and disgusting maltreatment and to set up in place of a lying democratic violation of the people the more holy rights of the eternal racial life.

But as these oppressed people attempted to alter the lot which was forced upon them an increased power had to be employed against them, for only thus can the most natural of feelings and hopes be suppressed. This then leads to that mutual constantly increasing alternation between revolt and oppression. But he who knows any history can have no doubt that in the long run the stamina of racial maintenance is as a rule stronger than the efficacy of any oppression.

In addition, even the most brazen cannot in the long run speak of a "right" when injustice is so dreadfully and clearly in evidence that it is impossible arbitrarily to describe an action, according to whether it suits particular interests, at one time as the legal basis of national life and at another time as a diabolical attempt to disturb the peace of the nations. The plebiscite, carried out under international supervision, showed that the Saar territory is inhabited, apart from a few thousand people of French race, only by Germans. But the fact that this small percentage was nevertheless sufficient to compel a territory to undergo a plebiscite before its reunion with the Reich was permitted is in the grossest contrast with the attitude adopted when it is a matter of millions and millions of German people. In this case the fulfilment of the desire to return to the fatherland is simply rejected as being inopportune for the democracies and even the mere hope is branded as a real crime.

Right Must Remain Right.

The Double Morality of the League of Nations.

Such a violation of right cannot be permanently embellished with the transparent morality of certain international institutions. Right must be right even where Germans are concerned. And who will be surprised that the people who have been so obstinately deprived of this right have been compelled to secure it for themselves? The nations are a creation of God's will and of everlasting duration, but the League of Nations is a highly dubious construction of human fallibility and of human greed and interests. This is certain—just as the nations have lived for innumerable centuries without the League of Nations, so there will soon be no more League of Nations. And, in spite of this fact, the nations will continue to live for centuries. This institution would only have a meaning if its ideas were reconciled with those higher ideas which correspond with a general and equal and thus better notion of justice.

It is therefore clear that a State moulded by force such as Austria, if prevented by force from joining the motherland and already condemned to death economically, can only be maintained by the permanent use of force. So long as Germany lay in the deepest distress, its attraction to our millions living outside was limited—although even they desired to unite themselves in spite of the misery then prevailing in the Reich.

But in so far as the German Reich again arose, in so far as the German people was again filled with a new national faith and was lifted up by a new confidence, it was natural that the gaze of the oppressed and ill-treated compatriots outside the boundaries of this Reich should be turned with ever increasing longing to the great mother country. Since finally the economic recovery of Germany began to show its effects more and more clearly from year to year, the mere instinct of self-preservation also propagated the idea of an "Anschluss" with a State

which appeared to overcome even this distress despite all difficulties. On the other hand the indignation grew within the Reich in proportion as the constant prosecution of the Germans living on our frontiers was recognised.

Germany has now once more become a world Power. But which Power of the world would calmly tolerate in the long run that a host of its own members numbering millions should be most bitterly ill-treated before its very gates? There are moments when it is impossible for a proud nation to look on any longer.

The Conversation at Berchtesgaden.

The Last Attempt.

I therefore decided also for these reasons to bring about the conversations in Berchtesgaden known to you with the former Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg.

I explained to this man most solemnly that a régime lacking every kind of legality and which fundamentally ruled only by force must in the long run get into continually growing conflicts with that expression of public opinion which is diametrically opposed to its tendencies. I endeavoured to explain to him that this development must lead, on the one hand, to an ever-increasing rejection, on the other hand to an ever-increasing oppression, and that in view of the revived great power of the German Reich revolutionary upheavals were bound to take place in the long run.

The consequences could, in these circumstances, be a further increase of terror. Finally a state of affairs must arise which would make it impossible for a Great Power with a sense of honour patiently to continue to look on or declare itself disinterested.

I left Schuschnigg in no doubt on the matter that there was no German-born Austrian with a feeling of national decency and honour who did not at the bottom of his heart long for a union with the German people and would strive towards it. I begged him, a German Austrian, to spare himself and the German Reich a situation which sooner or later must lead to a grave dispute.

I proposed to him a way which might lead to a gradual internal *détente* and consequently to a slow reconciliation, not only between the people of Austria itself but between the two German States. I pointed out to Schuschnigg that this would be the last attempt on my part and that I was resolved in the event of a miscarriage of this attempt to protect the rights of the German people in my country with those means which, on this earth from earliest times, alone remained when human understanding declined to listen to the call of justice.

Not a single decent nation has died for the sake of democratic formalities; moreover, people think least about them in those democracies who talk most about them.

Schuschnigg Breaks his Word.

Deputies, men of the German Reichstag, on February 20th, in your presence I stretched out a hand to the former Chancellor Schuschnigg.

In his first answer he rejected this hand. He began to fulfil the obligations agreed upon with a hesitancy which marched side by side with the obviously hostile attitude of other States to those obligations. Moreover we are now in a position to know that a part of the lying campaign against Germany was inspired by the Press office of Herr von Schuschnigg himself.

There could no longer be any doubt that Herr von Schuschnigg, who possessed no legal right of existence and who violated German Austria with a dwindling minority,

was determined to break this agreement. The first reports of a planned plebiscite appeared on Tuesday, March 8th. They seemed so fantastic that they were thought to be pure rumours. On Wednesday evening we received knowledge through a really astounding speech of an attempted attack not only against the agreement worked out between us but also, and principally, against the majority of the Austrian people.

In a country in which for years there had been no elections, in which there were neither election files or lists, it was laid down that there should be an election in exactly three days. The vote in question was put in such a way that a refusal appeared punishable according to the laws then in force. There were no lists of voters, and it was therefore impossible to examine such lists in advance; complaints were excluded; secrecy of the ballot was neither safeguarded nor desired; those who voted "No" were branded in advance; those, who voted "Yes" had every opportunity of falsifying the vote; in other words Herr Schuschnigg, who was well aware that he had only a minority of the people behind him, endeavoured by an unexampled election fraud to obtain a moral justification for the open breach of the undertakings which he had assumed. He desired a mandate for a further and even more brutal oppression of the overwhelming majority of the German-Austrian people. This breaking of his word and this measure could only lead to an insurrection. Only a crazy and blinded man would believe he could thus stop the mouth of the tremendous majority of the people in order to give a legal foundation in the eyes of the world to an illegal régime.

This insurrection, however, in the outbreak of which there could be no doubt and which showed itself immediately, would have led this time to a new and, on this occasion, terrible shedding of blood. For if the flames of passion once burst out from such a lasting injustice, all experience shows that they can only be extinguished with blood. That is proved clearly enough by historical examples.

I was determined to put an end to the further violation of my home country. I therefore immediately gave orders for those measures to be taken which appeared adequate to save Austria from the fate of Spain.

The Alleged Ultimatum.

The ultimatum about which the world suddenly began to complain consisted of nothing more than the hard assurance that Germany would no longer tolerate a further oppression of her German-Austrian compatriots, and therefore of a warning against adopting a course which would necessarily have led to bloodshed.

That this attitude was wise was proved by the fact that within three days of intervention my whole country rushed to meet me without a shot being fired and without a single victim, so far as I am aware, although to the sorrow of our international pacifists. If I had not complied with the wish of the Austrian people and its National Socialist Government, it is very certain that a position would have arisen which would have subsequently made our intervention necessary. I desired to spare that fine country infinite unhappiness and suffering. For if hate once begins to burn, reason begins to disappear. There is then no just appreciation of guilt and expiation. National fury, personal vengeance and the lower instincts of egoistic propensities combine to raise the torch, and in their rage seek for victims without regard to justice or the consequences.

Perhaps Herr Schuschnigg did not think it possible that I would decide to intervene. He and his supporters may thank God that I did so, for probably only my decisive action saved his life and the lives of thousands of others—lives which they no longer deserved on account of their complicity in the death

of countless Austrian victims of the movement but which the National Socialist State, as sovereign victor, accords them.

The Fulfilment of the Highest Historical Task.

Moreover I am happy to have been the man who carried out the highest historical task.

What prouder satisfaction can there be in the world for a man than to have led the people of his own country into the greater national community. And you all realise my feeling of happiness that I did not need to conquer a heap of ruins and corpses for the German Reich, but that I was able to give it an unimpaired country with joyful people. I have acted in such a manner that I can take the responsibility as a German before the history of our people, before the dead and living witnesses of our national community, before the Holy German Reich and my beloved home country. The decision which I took is now backed by 75 million people and in front of them stand henceforward the German armed forces.

The Echo Abroad.

Thanks to Mussolini.

It is almost tragic that an event which at bottom merely removed a central European tension which would have been in the long run intolerable is met particularly by our democracies with discomfiture and lack of comprehension. Their reactions were either incomprehensible or offensive. It is true that a number of other States had expressed their disinterestedness in advance, or had declared their warm approval. These included not only most of the smaller European countries, but also a number of great States. I mention among them only the noble and understanding attitude of Poland, the friendly and cordial agreement of Hungary, the declarations of Yugo-Slavia which were dictated by heartfelt friendship and the assurances of the most sincere neutrality by a number of other States.

I cannot conclude the enumeration of these friendly expressions of feeling without dealing in greater detail with the attitude of Fascist Italy. I felt obliged to explain to the leader of that great Fascist country, who is such a great friend of mine, in a letter, my reasons for my action, and to assure him in particular after this event not only that nothing will change in the attitude of Germany towards Italy, but that Germany regards—just as in the case of France, so also in the case of Italy—the existing frontiers as given frontiers.

It should like to express from here to the great Italian statesman, in the name of the German people and in my own name, our warmest thanks.

We know what Mussolini's attitude meant for Germany in these days. If there could have been a strengthening of the relations between Italy and Germany it took place then. An ideological unity, a unity of interests has become for us Germans an indissoluble friendship. The land and the frontiers of this friend, however, are to us inviolable.

I repeat that I shall never forget Mussolini's attitude. The Italian people may know that the German nation stands at the back of my word.

In this case again, the axis which binds our two countries has done the greatest service to the peace of the world. For Germany only wants peace. She will not do any injury to other peoples. But she will herself in no circumstances tolerate an injury and, above all, she is prepared at all times to give her last man for her honour and her existence.

May it never be thought that this is a mere phrase and, in particular, may it be understood that a great nation with

a sense of honour cannot permanently look on while millions of people of its own blood are constantly subject to oppression.

**The Fulfilment of an Eternal German Dream.
The Confession of Faith of 75 Millions.**

My Comrades! Deputies! Men of the Reichstag!

I believe that, in these great historical hours when, thanks to the force of the National Socialist idea and to the revived strength of the Reich to which it has given rise, an eternal dream of the German people has been realised, not only a single part of our people can be called upon to confirm by its agreement the great event of the final foundation of a really great German national Reich. On April 10th millions of German Austrians will make their confession before history of their adherence to the great community of the nation and destiny. On the first steps in this path they shall no longer be isolated in the new German Reich.

The whole of Germany will henceforward accompany them. For from March 13th of this year their path is the same as the path of all other men and women of our people. On April 10th therefore for the first time in history the entire German nation, so far as it is to be found in the great national Reich today, will come forward and give its solemn testimony. Not six and a half millions will be asked, but seventy five millions.

In the second place, I thus dissolve the Reichstag of the old German Reich and order the election of the new representation of Greater Germany. I also fix the date for April 10th.

I thus call upon nearly fifty million electors of our people and request them to give me that Reichstag with which it will be possible, by the gracious help of God, to accomplish the great new tasks. The German people must again consider in these days what I have achieved with my co-workers in the five years since the first election of the Reichstag in March 1933. It must find that a result unprecedented in history has been achieved.

I expect of my people that it will have the insight and the strength to take again an equally worthy decision.

Just as in 1933 I asked the German nation, in view of the vast work lying before us, to give me four years time to solve the great problems, I must now make a second request.

German people, give me another four years so that I can now exploit the accomplished union for the benefit of all. After the expiration of this period the new German peoples' Reich must have grown into an indissoluble unity, anchored in the will of its people, politically led by the National-Socialist party, protected by its young National-Socialist armed forces, and rich in the prosperity of its economic life.

When today we see the fulfilment of this, the boldest dream of many generations, we have a feeling of unlimited gratitude to all those who, by their work and also by their sacrifices, have helped to attain this supreme object. Every German stem and every German district have given their painful contributions towards the success of this work. But the last victims of German reunion to rise before us at this moment are those numerous fighters who were the faithful heralds of the union now achieved in the old Ostmark which has at last returned to the Reich, and who as blood witnesses and martyrs uttered with their last breath the words which henceforward will be sacred more than ever before:

One people—one Reich—Germany, Sieg Heil!

**The Closing Speech by Hermann Göring, President
of the Reichstag.**

Deputies,

Before this old Reichstag dissolves to meet again as the Reichstag of the Greater German National Reich, permit me in the name of all of you to express thanks to the man who has just brought this vast national Reich into existence.

When at the last meeting of the Reichstag the Führer gave his report we listened to words of prophecy and warning. This unprecedented report left a tremendous impression upon us. These words of prophecy and warning went unheard. The word was broken. Our German brothers in Austria were subject to a threat. At that moment the representative of the Germans in Austria asked the German people and the German Führer for brotherly help. That brotherly help was accorded. German troops marched into Austria in order to prevent the worst.

Twenty years after Versailles the powerful revival of our Reich has been demonstrated before the eyes of us all. But when our troops entered Austria, they did not come as aggressors or conquerors, but were joyfully received as brothers of Greater Germany. And this unprecedented joy rose to a tempest wherever the dearly beloved Führer himself came to the Germans in Austria.

This joy of the liberated people was heard here in Germany. It penetrated throughout the world and convinced those who had been deceived as to the true wishes of the German people in Austria.

At the same time the troops and the Führer, on entering Austria, got the dreadful impression of distress and misery created by the Governments of Austria in the past. But, despite distress, misery and poverty, the spirit and attitude of the German people in Austria, who in their liberation joyfully welcomed the Führer, remained unbroken.

You all listened in to the moving scenes which occurred when all these sufferings gave way to liberation. But you, my Leader, entered your home country as a liberator. You were a liberator, just as you were a saviour to us in our deepest distress. You brought your home country back to the Reich as a country with fine people and rich treasures. Now, under your leadership, these treasures will be taken up and this country will develop and blossom, in the same way as you have led the former poor and tortured Germany to its highest unprecedented blossoming period. The Four Year Plan, which has hitherto signified the combination of all forces here will now be undertaken with the joyful support of the Germans in Austria.

But how, my Leader, did you win your home country? Not by oppression and violence but by the strength of your heart, by that confidence and that wonderful magnanimity and goodness which are your main characteristics.

Not a shot was fired. No court of vengeance gave judgments of blood. Goodness and pardon for the past, hope and unshakable confidence in the future; that is what you gave to your home country. You did not give wounds, but you healed wounds. This was accomplished by you in a few days.

A new wonderful future arises for Austria. When were there ever such revolutions in the history of the world? All give boundless thanks. We also thank you, my Leader, for maintaining the honour of Germany. How can I find words to express your actions? Has any mortal ever been so beloved as you, my Leader? Has any faith ever been so strong as the faith in your mission? You saved the German people from the

deepest night, you led it forth from impotence and you created the Great Power Germany.

Whatever you demand, my Leader, we will do. But whatever we are able to do will not wipe out our debt of gratitude. May the Almighty keep you in strength and health.

Hail eternally to the dearly beloved Führer who has again made life worth living for us.

Deputies, in the name of Germany we all cry : Hail to our Führer, Adolf Hitler.

II. Plebiscite and Election to the Greater German Reichstag on April 10th, 1938

Field-Marshal Göring announced in the Reichstag the following ordinance of March 18th, 1938 issued by the Führer and Chancellor concerning a Plebiscite and the Dissolution and Re-election of the Reichstag :

1. In order to give the German people as a whole an opportunity of expressing its opinion with regard to the Greater German National Reich created by the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, I order that, in addition to the plebiscite in Austria, a plebiscite shall also take place in the remainder of the territory of the Reich regarding the reunion of Austria with

the German Reich which was accomplished on March 18th, 1938. At the same time I dissolve the Reichstag as from April 9th, 1938 in order to grant to the German compatriots in Austria representation in the Greater German Reichstag.

2. The plebiscite and Reichstag elections of the Greater German National Reich will take place on Sunday, April 10th, 1938.

Berlin, March 18th, 1938.

Adolf Hitler, Führer and Reich Chancellor.
Frick, Reich Minister of the Interior.

VI.

END OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF AUSTRIA IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Berlin, March 18th, 1938.

To the Secretary General.

Sir,

On behalf of the German Government I have the honour to bring to your notice the following law of March 13th, 1938 regarding the reunion of Austria with the German Reich.

(Here follows the law published on the title page.)

On the date of the promulgation of this law, the former Federal State of Austria ceased to be a member of the League of Nations.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) v. Mackensen,
Secretary of State in the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs.

A N N E X

I. Italy's Attitude ⁽¹⁾

1. Adolf Hitler's Letter to Mussolini.

The letter transmitted to Mussolini by Adolf Hitler through the Prince of Hessen is worded as follows (translation from the Italian):

Berlin, March 11th, 1938.

Your Excellency,

In an hour charged with destiny I write to your Excellency to inform you of a decision which appears to be imposed by circumstances and is now immutable. For years the Germans of Austria have been oppressed and ill-treated by a régime without any legal basis. There is no end to the sufferings of innumerable illused persons. Germany alone has sheltered so far more than 40,000 refugees who had to abandon their country, although the great majority of the inhabitants of Austria fully share their ideology and their political ideas.

With a view to removing the tension which was becoming steadily more unbearable I decided to make a final effort to conclude with Herr von Schuschnigg an agreement which would definitely establish complete equality under the law for all. At our conversation at Berchtesgaden I called the attention of Herr von Schuschnigg to the fact that Germany could no longer tolerate the ill-treatment in Austria by a feeble minority of the majority which has national ideas. I myself am a son of this land. Austria is my fatherland, and I know from my own family connexions all the tribulations and sufferings the immense majority of this people which fosters national ideas has to bear.

I drew his attention to the fact that a great Power—I may, indeed, say that this is the sole case of the kind in the world—could not tolerate that people of the same blood and with the same origin, with a common historical past, should for these very reasons be persecuted, ill-treated, and deprived of their rights. I also made it known to Herr von Schuschnigg that if equality of rights for all the Germans of Austria was not re-established, we should one day be compelled to take over the protection of these brothers abandoned by all.

The demands I made were more than moderate. In fact, according to all the principles of reason, right, and equity, and even according to those of a democratic formalism, Herr von Schuschnigg ought to have resigned with his Cabinet, so as to make room for a Government effectively supported by a people's confidence. I did not insist on this. I contented myself with a series of assurances that in the future, within the framework of the existing Austrian laws, unjust though their origin may be, all the inhabitants of this country should be treated equally—equally favoured or equally prejudiced—and that finally, a certain security should be created in the military sphere.

Herr von Schuschnigg gave me solemn assurances and concluded an agreement in this sense. From the very first he did not respect this agreement. To-day, too, he has struck a new

1. Il Führer al Duce

Roma 12 marzo

Alle 22 di stasera, mentre il Gran Consiglio del Fascismo tornava a riunirsi sotto la presidenza del Duce per la terza seduta della corrente sessione, oltre duecento giornalisti italiani e stranieri venivano convocati al Palazzo Venezia nel salone delle Battaglie.

Alle 23, mentre la seduta continuava, il ministro della Cultura Popolare, S. E. Alfieri, si è presentato ai giornalisti e ha comunicato la lettera del Führer portata ieri al Duce in volo da Berlino dal principe d'Assia, e della quale ecco il testo:

Berlino, 11 marzo 1938

Eccellenza,

In un'ora carica di destini mi rivolgo a Lei, Eccellenza, per darLe notizia di una decisione, la quale appare imposta dalle circostanze ed è ormai immutabile.

Da anni i Tedeschi dell'Austria vengono violentati e maltrattati da un regime privo di qualsiasi base legale. Le sofferenze di innumerevoli persone tormentate non hanno limiti.

La sola Germania ha accolto finora più di 40 mila fuggiaschi, i quali dovettero abbandonare il loro Paese sebbene la stragrande maggioranza degli abitanti dell'Austria condivida pienamente la loro ideologia e le loro concezioni politiche.

Allo scopo di rimuovere una tensione che diventa sempre più insopportabile, mi sono deciso a compiere un estremo tentativo col sig. Schuschnigg per raggiungere un accordo al fine di stabilire in modo definitivo la completa uguaglianza di tutti dinanzi alla legge.

In occasione del nostro colloquio di Berchtesgaden ho richiamato l'attenzione del sig. Schuschnigg sul fatto che la Germania non può più a lungo tollerare che in Austria una sparuta minoranza maltratti la maggioranza che ha idee nazionali. Io stesso sono un figlio di questa terra. L'Austria è il mio Paese e dagli ambienti dei miei propri familiari io so quali tribolazioni e quali sofferenze la stragrande maggioranza di questo popolo, che nutre idee nazionali, debba sopportare! Ho attirato la sua attenzione sul fatto che è per una grande Potenza impossibile, posso anzi dire essere l'unica cosa al mondo, tollerare che genti dello stesso sangue, della stessa origine e partecipi di un comune passato storico siano proprio per queste ragioni perseguitate, maltrattate e private dei loro diritti. Inoltre ho messo il sig. Schuschnigg al corrente che, nel caso non venisse ristabilita la parità di diritti di tutti i Tedeschi dell'Austria, un giorno noi saremo costretti ad assumere la protezione di questi fratelli abbandonati da tutti.

Le richieste da me avanzate erano più moderate. Infatti, secondo tutti i principî della ragione, del diritto e dell'equità e persino secondo i principî di una formalistica democratica, il sig. Schuschnigg avrebbe dovuto dare le dimissioni col suo Gabinetto, per cedere il posto a un Governo effettivamente sostenuto dalla fiducia di un popolo. Io non ho preteso ciò. Mi accontentai di una serie di assicurazioni che in avvenire, nel quadro delle leggi austriache (sia pure ingiustamente emanate, ma tuttavia esistenti nell'attuale momento), tutti gli abitanti di questo Paese venissero ugualmente favoriti o ugualmente svantaggiati, e che infine nel campo militare si creasse una certa sicurezza.

Il sig. Schuschnigg mi ha dato solenne assicurazione e ha concluso un accordo in tal senso.

Sin dal primo momento non ha rispettato questo accordo.

Oggi poi egli si è lasciato andare a una nuova colpa contro lo spirito di questo accordo con l'indiretta una cosiddetta consultazione popolare, la quale rappresenta una vera derisione di qualsiasi plebiscito.

Le conseguenze di questa nuova progettata violenza della maggioranza popolare sono quelle temute.

Il popolo austriaco insorge ora definitivamente contro la continuata oppressione, e da ciò risulta ineluttabilmente la necessità di nuove violenze.

⁽¹⁾ In view of their historical importance, we publish the following documents also in the Italian language.

blow against this agreement by decreeing a so-called consultation of the people which represents a very mockery of any plebiscite. The results of this new projected attack on the popular majority are those I feared. The Austrian people is now definitely revolting against the continued oppression, with fresh violence as the inevitable result. Hence the representatives of this oppressed people, both in the federal and provincial Governments, have resigned.

For the last two days the country has been rapidly declining into anarchy. As Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich, and also as a son of this land, I can no longer remain inactive in face of this development of events. I have decided to re-establish order in my fatherland, order and tranquillity, and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion, openly and by its own decision. May the Austrian people, then, create by itself its own destiny.

However this wish may be fulfilled I would assure your Excellency, you who are the Duce of Fascist Italy, most solemnly of one thing. Do not see in this anything but an act of legitimate national defence, an action which any man of character in my place would perform in the same way. You, too, Excellency, could not act differently if the fate of Italians were at stake. I, as Führer and as a National-Socialist, cannot do otherwise.

In a critical hour for Italy I showed you the constancy of my feelings. Do not fear that there will be any change in this respect in the future. Whatever may be the result of coming events I have fixed a definite frontier for Germany towards France, and now I fix another, equally definite, towards Italy, the Brenner. This decision will never be subject to doubt, or alteration. It was not taken by me in the year 1938, but immediately after the end of the Great War, and I have never made any mystery of it.

I beg your Excellency to excuse me first for the haste of this letter and the form of this communication. Events have overtaken us all unexpectedly. Nobody had got wind of Herr von Schuschnigg's last step, not even his colleagues in the Government, and I had always hoped up till to-day that perhaps at the last moment another solution might be possible. I deeply regret that I cannot speak with you personally at this time to tell you all I feel. With unchanged friendship, yours (signed), Adolf Hitler.

2. Minutes of the meeting of the Fascist Grand Council of March 13th, 1938

The Minister for Foreign Affairs had been able to follow the development of the situation in Austria from day to day, thanks to the ample and constant reports he had received from the Italian representatives abroad.

The Austrian Government had informed the Italian Government only *post factum* of the results of the Berchtesgaden Agreement and of the measures which they had taken in consequence.

The Italian Government had decided, for obvious reasons, not to interfere in any way in Austria's internal politics and in the development of a national movement, the logical outcome of which could be easily foreseen.

The Austrian Chancellor's sudden decision to hold a plebiscite had not only not been suggested by the Italian Government, but

Di conseguenza, i rappresentanti di questo popolo oppresso, tanto nel Governo federale quanto nelle altre corporazioni, si sono ritirati.

Dall'altro ieri questo Paese si avvicina in modo crescente all'anarchia.

Nella mia responsabilità di Führer e Cancelliere del Reich tedesco, e anche come figlio di questa terra, non posso assistere più a lungo inerte a questo sviluppo degli avvenimenti.

Sono deciso a ristabilire ormai nel mio Paese ordine e tranquillità e dare alla volontà popolare la possibilità di decidere del proprio destino in modo inequivocabile, chiaro e aperto al suo giudizio.

Che il popolo austriaco possa quindi forgiare da sé il proprio destino! Qualunque sia il modo in cui tale voto debba realizzarsi, una cosa ora io desidero assicurare a Lei, Eccellenza, in modo solenne, a

Lei, quale Duce dell'Italia fascista:

I. Non scorga in questo atto altro che un atto di legittima difesa nazionale e quindi un'azione, che ogni uomo di carattere al mio posto compirebbe nel medesimo modo. Anche Ella, Eccellenza, non potrebbe agire diversamente, se fosse in giuoco il destino di Italiani. E io, come Führer e come Nazional-socialista, non posso fare altrimenti.

II. In un'ora critica per l'Italia io Le ho dimostrato la fermezza dei miei sentimenti. Non dubiti che, anche nell'avvenire, nulla sarà mutato a questo riguardo.

III. Qualunque possa essere la conseguenza dei prossimi avvenimenti, io ho tracciato una netta frontiera tedesca verso la Francia e ne traccio ora una, altrettanto netta, verso l'Italia. È il Brennero.

Questa decisione non verrà mai né messa in dubbio né intaccata. Questa decisione non l'ho presa nell'anno 1938, ma subito dopo la fine della Grande Guerra, e non ne ho mai fatto un mistero.

Mi perdoni, La prego, Eccellenza, in primo luogo la fretta di questa lettera e la forma di questa comunicazione. Gli avvenimenti sono sopraggiunti inaspettati per tutti noi. Nessuno aveva sentore dell'ultimo passo sig. Schuschnigg, neppure i suoi colleghi di Governo; e io avevo sperato sempre fino a oggi che forse, all'ultimo momento, fosse possibile un'altra soluzione.

Mi rammarico profondamente di non poterLe parlare personalmente in questi momenti, per dirLe tutto ciò che sento.

Con sempre uguale amicizia Suo

ADOLFO HITLER

2. Le deliberazioni del Gran Consiglio

Roma 13 marzo

Il Grand Consiglio del Fascismo, sotto la Presidenza del Duce, ha tenuto la terza riunione dell'Anno XVI E. F. il 12 marzo, alle ore 22, nel Palazzo Venezia.

Il Gran Consiglio del Fascismo, dopo aver ascoltato la relazione fatta dal Ministro degli Affari Esteri sugli avvenimenti austriaci e aver preso conoscenza degli ampi, diligenti rapporti inviati dai nostri rappresentanti all'estero, in base ai quali ha potuto rendersi conto giorno per giorno dello sviluppo della situazione nei suoi più esatti particolari, rileva che il Governo federale austriaco non informò il Governo italiano dei risultati del convegno di Berchtesgaden e delle iniziative che lo hanno seguito, che a fatto compiuto.

Comunque, da parte sua, il Governo italiano era, per evidenti ragioni, deciso a non intervenire in nessuna forma nella politica interna austriaca e negli sviluppi di un movimento di carattere nazionale, di cui si poteva facilmente prevedere il logico epilogo.

Il Gran Consiglio rileva in maniera particolare che il plebiscito, convocato improvvisamente dal Cancelliere Schuschnigg, non solo non fu suggerito, ma fu nettamente sconsigliato dal Governo italiano, non appena avutane conoscenza, sia per il modo sia per la sostanza e per la forma.

Il Gran Consiglio considera quanto è avvenuto in Austria come il risultato di uno stato preesistente e l'aperta espressione dei sentimenti e della volontà del popolo austriaco, confermata in modo non equivocabile dall'imponenza delle manifestazioni pubbliche con le quali gli avvenimenti sono stati salutati.

Il Gran Consiglio prende atto col più profondo interesse di una lettera che, in data 11 marzo, il Führer ha diretto al

had been contrary to the advice tendered by them as soon as they were made aware of the decision, both as regards the manner, substance, and form of the plebiscite proposed.

The Fascist Grand Council regarded the events in Austria as the outcome of a pro-existent state of affairs and as the free expression of the will of the Austrian people, plainly manifested by the imposing popular demonstrations which had followed them.

The Council had listened with profound interest to the letter regarding the events in Austria which Signor Mussolini had received from Herr Hitler.

The Fascist Government had declined a French invitation to take part in concerted action against Germany on the ground that it would have been groundless and purposeless and would merely have rendered the international situation more difficult.

3. Mussolini's Speech in the Chamber on March 16th, 1938

"In the last few days a great event has changed the political map of Europe. Austria has ceased to exist as a State. It has become a part of Germany. The plebiscite of April 10th will confirm this fact. The Austrian drama did not begin yesterday, but in 1848, when tiny Piedmont dared to defy the Hapsburg colossus of that time. The drama was accelerated after the War and has lasted twenty years. Its conclusion has taken place at a rapid rate under the influence of irresistible natural forces and has only surprised the absent-minded or the ignorant. A rapid review of the past twenty years clearly shows that what has occurred was necessarily bound to occur. In spite of the paper barriers of the Treaties, the river has reached its mouth.

The birth of the Austrian Federal State goes back to November 12th, 1918, a few days before the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire. As first worded, the Austrian Federal Constitution, under the Socialist Government of Bauer-Renner, declared that Austria was an integral part of Germany with the name "German Austrian Republic". But it went still further. Many Austrian provinces voted immediately in spontaneous plebiscites for junction with Germany, with the exception of Vorarlberg which expressed itself in favour of union with Switzerland. The Weimar Constitution of the German Social Democratic Republic of August 1919 said: "The territory of the Reich comprizes the territory of the German 'Länder'. Other territories can combine with it if their populations express their wish to do so." Article 61 of the Constitution expressly stated that, after union with Germany, Austria had the right to take part in the Reichsrat with a number of deputies proportionate to her population. It is therefore established that at the beginning of Socialist rule the idea existed both in Weimar and Vienna that the union of the two countries into one country was a logical development.

Then came the Peace Treaties, first that of Versailles and then that of St. Germain which—it must be stated—imposed on Austria the maintenance of her independence. But this obligation appeared from the outset so absurd and at the same time so precarious that a door was left open for the future. Austria could abandon her independence—an unprecedented occurrence in the history of the nations—with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

The Social Democrats were followed by the Christian Socialists under Seipel, who was, however, also unable to improve the political and economic position of the country. Austria practically fell under the wheels of material and moral chaos and under the guardianship—and not only the financial guardianship—of the League of Nations. This lasted till October 1st, 1926 when Seipel again came into power with the formula: Austria is a German State; it is not against Germany. Three

Duce, concernente gli avvenimenti austriaci, in relazione ai rapporti italo-germanici, lettera che sarà resa di pubblica ragione.

Il Grand Consiglio prende atto, inoltre, della ripulsa opposta dal Governo fascista all'invito francese per concertare un'azione che, per essere senza basi e senza scopo, sarebbe valsa soltanto a rendere più difficile la situazione internazionale, e approva la linea di condotta adottata dal Governo fascista di fronte agli avvenimenti austriaci, ispirata a una realistica valutazione della situazione in rapporto agli interessi nazionali.

3. Il discorso pronunciato da Mussolini alla Camera dei deputati a Roma il 16 marzo 1938

"In questi ultimi giorni un grande evento si è svolto che ha modificato la carta politica dell'Europa: l'Austria come Stato ha cessato di esistere: è diventata una parte della Germania. Il plebiscito del 10 aprile consacrerà il fatto compiuto. Il dramma austriaco non è cominciato ieri: cominciò nel 1848, quando il piccolo animoso Piemonte osò sfidare l'allora colosso asburgico; accelerò i suoi tempi dopo la guerra mondiale e durò venti anni. L'epilogo ha avuto il « ritmo » veloce delle forze irresistibili della natura e ha sorpreso soltanto i distratti o gli ignari.

Un rapido sguardo retrospettivo a questo ventennio ci dimostra in modo assolutamente chiaro che quanto è accaduto doveva fatalmente accadere e che il fiume — malgrado le dighe cartacee dei Trattati — sarebbe giunto alla sua foce.

L'atto di nascita della Stato Federale Austriaco risale al 12 novembre del 1918, pochi giorni dopo lo sfacelo dell'Impero. Ora, col suo primo voto, la Costituente nazionale austriaca, sotto il Governo socialista Bauer-Renner, dichiara l'Austria parte integrante del Reich tedesco, col nome di « Repubblica dell'Austria tedesca ». V'è di più. Molte provincie austriache votano senz'altro con spontanei plebisciti l'annessione alla Germania, meno una, il Vorarlberg, che si dichiara favorevole all'unione con la Svizzera. La costituzione di Weimar della repubblica social-democratica tedesca varata nell'agosto del 1919 all'art. 2 dice testualmente:

« Il territorio del Reich comprende il territorio dei Paesi tedeschi. Altri territori possono riunirsi se le rispettive popolazioni esprimano un siffatto desiderio ». E all'articolo 61 veniva specificatamente dichiarato che, dopo la sua unione con la Germania, l'Austria « avrà diritto di prendere parte al Reichsrat con un numero di deputati proporzionale alla popolazione ».

E' dunque stabilito che agli inizi di quella che può definirsi l'epoca socialdemocratica, tanto Vienna quanto Weimar ritenevano logica l'unione dei due Stati in uno solo.

Vennero i Trattati di pace; quello di Versaglia prima, quello di San Germano poi, che imposero, — questa è la parola — imposero all'Austria di rimanere indipendente. Ma la imposizione apparve fin da allora così assurda e al tempo stesso così precaria che si lasciò uno spiraglio aperto sull'avvenire.

L'Austria, caso mai visto nella storia dei popoli, avrebbe potuto « alienare la sua indipendenza » col consenso del Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni.

Passano i socialdemocratici, subentrano i cristiano-sociali con Seipel, ma questo non migliora la situazione politica ed economica.

L'Austria è praticamente in balia del caos materiale e morale e viene posta sotto la tutela — non soltanto finanziaria — della Società delle Nazioni. Ciò dura sino al 1° ottobre del 1926, quando Seipel ritorna al potere nell'ottobre del 1926 con questa formula: « L'Austria è uno Stato tedesco: niente contro la Germania ». Passano altri tre anni di disordini, di intrighi, di miserie, finché Schober nell'autunno del 1929 sale all potere. E' solo con l'avvento di Schober che comincia una politica italiana nei confronti dell'Austria, politica che viene consacrata in un Trattato di Amicizia e di Arbitrato firmato a Roma dallo Schober stesso il 6 febbraio del 1930.

Siamo all crisi economica mondiale che ha ripercussioni tremende sulla fragile economica austriaca. Ancora una volta

years of misery and disorder followed until Schober assumed power in the autumn of 1929.

From this time begins Italy's policy in respect of Austria, a policy which was confirmed in a Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration signed at Rome by Schober on February 6th, 1930.

This brings us to the time of the world crisis which had tremendous effects on the fragile Austrian economy. The idea of the Anschluss again arises in the Curtius-Schober plan of an Austro-German Customs Union. This plan immediately encountered the opposition of France and Czechoslovakia. The Permanent Court at the Hague declared it to be incompatible with the independence of Austria and the plan therefore failed. The position of Austria did not improve and Italy then intervened by the conclusion of the Semmering agreement.

In January 1933 National Socialism came into power in Germany. In March 1933 Dollfuss formed a government and gave it an authoritarian form, while stating that Austria was an independent Christian State, but a German State. The struggle began between the Government and the National Socialist movement. Dollfuss energetically suppressed the Socialist revolt of February 1934, but a few months later came the National Socialist "Putsch" in Vienna. I gave orders for the four divisions of the Upper Adige to march to the Brenner as a mere precautionary measure in view of the sanguinary events which might arise. No Austrian asked us to do so and no Austrian thanked us. The years 1934 to 1936 were governed by the policy of the Rome Protocols. In the meantime, the general political situation of Europe and Austria were fundamentally changed. The diplomatic solidarity of Italy with the western Powers was broken by the sanctions and by the admitted attempt to "strangle the Italian people".

In October 1936 the Rome-Berlin axis was formed. In Austria, in spite of persecution, the National Socialist movement developed very rapidly, not only as a result of a community of ideas but also as a result of the growing political and military power of Germany. This was the moment when Italy advised Austria to approach closer to Germany, for a State that calls itself German cannot exist in an anti-German sense. That would be historical, political and moral nonsense. The German-Austrian agreement of July 1936 was reached with the approval of Italy, and in it Austria proclaimed herself to be a German State.

In spite of this agreement a period of tension began. In 1937 in Venice I made it perfectly clear to Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg that the independence of Austria was mainly an internal question and that the Rome-Berlin axis was the foundation of Italian foreign policy. The meeting of February 12th between the two Chancellors was the last attempt to arrive at a compromise which would have merely delayed the final solution, but would not have prevented it.

Hitler's speech of February 20th and Schuschnigg's speech of the 24th were followed by the sudden announcement of the plebiscite. On March 7th at midday, a representative of Schuschnigg asked me what I thought of this plebiscite. I replied quite categorically that I considered it a mistake and that this was a tool which would fly out of his hands. It would be in the worst taste for me to take any credit for this too simple prophecy.

More or less official quarters on the other side of the Alps ask us why we did not intervene in order to "save" the independence of Austria. Our reply is that we have not assumed either a direct or indirect, a written or a verbal obligation of this kind. The Austrians, it must be admitted, have always shown a natural hesitation in asking us for a strong gesture in defence of the independence of their country, for we should have replied that an independence which requires foreign military assistance against the great majority of the people is no longer independence. Anyone who is acquainted with the

l'idea dell' « Anschluss » risorge sotto la specie di un progetto di unione doganale austro-tesdesca Curtius-Schober. Il progetto non va perchè incontra l'immediata opposizione della Francia e della Cecoslovacchia: viene presentato alla Corte dell'Aja per sapere se tale unione doganale sia compatibile o meno con l'indipendenza dell'Austria; la Corte dice che è incompatibile. Il progetto cade.

La situazione dell'Austria non migliora; è l'Italia che interviene ora direttamente a risollevarne l'economia con gli accordi del Semmering.

Nel gennaio 1933 il nazismo assume il potere in Germania; nel marzo dello stesso anno Dollfuss rinnova il suo Governo in senso autoritario, ma definisce nello stesso tempo l'Austria uno Stato indipendente a cristiano, ma tedesco.

Comincia la lotta tra il Governo e il movimento nazista. Dollfuss è costretto a domare energicamente una rivolta socialista nel febbraio 1934. Pochi mesi dopo scoppia il « putsch » nazista di Vienna. Ordino che le quattro Divisioni dell'Alto Adige si attestino al Brennero.

Fu un atto di elementare precauzione in vista di eventi sanguinosi e improvvisi e dei quali non era possibile misurare la portata.

Nessun austriaco ci domandò di farlo, nessun austriaco ci ha mai ringraziato di averlo fatto.

Segue dal 1934 al 1936 la politica dei Protocolli di Roma; nel frattempo le condizioni generali dell'Europa e dell'Austria sono profondamente mutate. La solidarietà diplomatica dell'Italia con le Potenze occidentali viene spezzata dalle sanzioni e dal tentativo confessato di « strangolare » il popolo italiano.

Nell'ottobre del 1936 si crea l'asse Roma-Berlino. In Austria il movimento, per quanto perseguitato dagli organi dell'esecutivo, si sviluppa con una impressionante velocità, dovuta non solo ad una comunità di idee, ma soprattutto al risorgere rapido della potenza politica e militare delle Germania.

E' il momento in cui l'Italia consiglia all'Austria di riavvicinarsi alla Germania perchè uno Stato che si proclama tedesco non può esistere in funzione antigermanica.

Questo era un assurdo storico, politico, morale. Nascono con l'approvazione dell'Italia gli accordi austro-germanici del luglio 1936 i quali anch'essi partono dalla pregiudiziale che l'Austria si professi come uno Stato tedesco. Malgrado gli accordi comincia un nuovo periodo di tensione.

Nell'incontro di Venezia dell'Aprile 1937 faccio chiaramente intendere al Cancelliere che l'indipendenza dell'Austria era una questione che riguardava in primo luogo gli Austriaci e che l'asse Roma-Berlino era il fondamento della politica estera italiana.

L'incontro del 12 febbraio tra i due Cancellieri rappresenta l'estremo tentativo per una soluzione di compromesso che avrebbe forse ritardata, non certo evitata, la soluzione finale. Discorso di Hitler il 20 febbraio, discorso di Schuschnigg il 24.

Sorge l'idea di un plebiscito improvviso.

Alle ore 12 del giorno 7 marzo, un fiduciario di Schuschnigg mi domanda il mio pensiero sul plebiscito e sulle sue modalità. Era la prima volta dopo molti mesi. Gli rispondo nella maniera più perentoria che si trattava di un errore; questo ordigno — dissi — vi scoppierà fra le mani. Sarebbe di pessimo gusto vantarmi di questa troppo facile previsione.

Ai circoli più o meno ufficiali d'Oltralpe, che si domandano perchè non siamo intervenuti per « salvare » l'indipendenza dell'Austria, rispondiamo che non avevamo mai assunto alcun impegno del genere nè diretto o indiretto, nè scritto o verbale.

Gli Austriaci — bisogna proclamarlo — hanno sempre avuto il comprensibile pudore di non domandarci dei gesti di forza per difendere l'indipendenza dell'Austria, perchè noi avremmo risposto che una indipendenza, la quale ha bisogno dell'aiuto militare straniero anche contro la maggior parte del proprio popolo, non è più tale.

Austrians will know that the first resistance against our intervention would come from themselves.

Italy's interest in the independence of the Austrian Federal State existed but was based on the proviso that the Austrians desired such independence, at any rate as far as the majority of them were concerned. But the events of the last few days in Austria have shown that the profound desire of the people was for the Anschluss.

To those who still aim at an outworn Machiavellism, which we reject, I would say that, if an event is unavoidable, it is better that it should occur with you than in spite of you or even against you. In reality it is a national revolution that has occurred. We Italians are best able to understand it in its historical requirements and also in its methods, which were unexpected, as is in the case with all revolutions."

Mussolini here referred to the measures taken by the Italian statesman Cavour in 1859-61 in order to bring about the union of Italy. He recalled the first military alliance of the young kingdom of Italy with Prussia in the year 1866 which resulted after Sadowa and Custoza in the cession of Venice.

"There are superficial and ignorant people who do not understand Fascist Italy and who think they can impress us with the total figure of the millions of Germans and their presence on our frontiers. In the first place, present-day Italy is not so easily impressed. During the African war, 52 States did not succeed in impressing us. Italy has an iron will and strong courage and takes a straight course. We are so little impressed that we calmly admit that in a few years—solely as a result of the natural increase in the population—while we shall have 50 millions there will be 80 million Germans, not only on one frontier but on ten frontiers; of these the Italo-German frontier is an inviolable frontier between two friendly nations. In this respect, the Führer has always been categorical, even before he came into power. This attitude caused him to be attacked by his opponents. For us Fascists all frontiers are sacred. We do not discuss them but we defend them.

While the fifth act of the Austrian drama was being played in the last few days, the opponents of Fascism hoped that the opportunity had come to set the two totalitarian States against each other and to destroy their solidarity by shocks which would be the prelude to a new World War. This calculation on the part of the democracies, of the free masons and of the Third International was false. The hope was simply puerile and it was also offensive because it cast doubt on our character and our political intelligence.

But why should we not state the fact? Millions of Germans were also in suspense when the hour came for the "testing of the axis". The Germans know today that the axis is not a diplomatic construction which only functions under normal conditions; they know that it has proved to be sound even in this exceptional hour of German and European history.

The two nations whose course ran parallel both in time and manner, united as they are in their conception of policy and life, can now march together in order to give our tortured continent a new equilibrium, which will ultimately permit of the peaceful and fruitful cooperation of all peoples."

Chi conosce gli Austriaci sa che le prime resistenze a un nostro intervento sarebbero venute da loro.

L'interesse dell'Italia all'indipendenza dello Stato federale austriaco esisteva, ma si basava evidentemente sulla pregiudiziale che gli Austriaci tale indipendenza volessero, almeno nella loro maggioranza; ma quanto accade in questi giorni nella terra austriaca dimostra che l'anelito profondo [del popolo era per l'«Anschluss».

Ai "superstiti cultori d'un machiavellismo deteriore che noi respingiamo, si può osservare che quando un evento è fatale, vale meglio si faccia con voi piuttosto che malgrado voi, o, peggio, contro di voi.

In realtà una rivoluzione nazionale è quella che si compie. E noi Italiani siamo i più indicati a comprenderla nelle sue esigenze storiche e anche nei suoi metodi, che sembrano sbrigati, come furono sempre quelli di tutte le rivoluzioni.

Vi sono nel mondo individui così superficiali, così opacamente ignoranti delle condizioni dell'Italia fascista che credono di impressionarci con la cifra globale dei milioni di Tedeschi e con la loro presenza ai nostri confini.

Anzitutto l'Italia, questa Italia non si lascia facilmente impressionare; non ci sono, durante la guerra d'Africa, riusciti cinquantadue Stati.

L'Italia ha una volontà dura, un'anima dura e marcia dritto. Siamo tanto poco impressionati che ammettiamo tranquillamente che fra qualche anno — per il solo fatto del movimento naturale delle popolazioni — mentre noi saremo 50 milioni i Tedeschi saranno 80 milioni, ma non su una sola, su dieci frontiere, fra le quali quella italiana è la frontiera di due popoli amici, una frontiera intangibile.

Il Führer su ciò è stato sempre categorico, anche prima che giungesse al potere, e tale atteggiamento gli valeva stolte accuse da parte dei suoi avversari. Per noi Fascisti le frontiere, tutte le frontiere, sono sacre, non si discutono, si difendono.

Quando il dramma austriaco giunse nei giorni scorsi al quinto atto, gli avversari mondiali del Fascismo spiarono se l'occasione buona non fosse finalmente venuta, per mettere l'uno di fronte all'altro i due Regimi totalitari, e frantumare la loro solidarietà attraverso un urto che sarebbe stato, tra l'altro, il preludio di una nuova guerra mondiale.

Questo calcolo delle democrazie, delle loggie, della Terza Internazionale era errato; la speranza semplicemente puerile, e offensiva altresì, perchè gettava un'ombra sul nostro carattere e sulla nostra intelligenza politica.

Ma perchè non dirlo? Anche milioni di Germanici stettero in ascolto: era giunta l'ora di quel che si poteva chiamare il «collaudo dell'asse».

Ora i Germanici sanno che l'asse non è una costruzione diplomatica efficiente soltanto per le occasioni normali, ma s'è dimostrata solida, soprattutto in quest'ora eccezionale nella storia del mondo germanico e dell'Europa.

Le due Nazioni, la cui formazione unitaria è stata parallela nel tempo e nei modi, unite come sono da una concezione annalogica della politica e della vita, possono marciare insieme per dare al nostro travagliato Continente un nuovo equilibrio, che permetta finalmente la pacifica e feconda collaborazione di tutti i popoli."

II. Speech by Field-Marshal Göring in Commemoration of the War Heroes, on March 13th, 1938

Comrades, German men and women,

On March 21st we celebrate for the twentieth time the day on which the German storm columns left the trenches of position warfare for the great battle in France. The days and weeks of that heroic struggle will never be forgotten by all those who took part in it. Every combatant knew that the outcome must decide the life and existence of Germany. This made the attack all the more violent and the will for victory all the more fierce. In those days the entire inner value of the German soldier at the front was again put to the test. Four years of hard struggle accompanied by deprivations and physical and moral effort had failed to break or even to diminish the will and power of the German national army for attack.

In spite of all courage and intrepidity, fate at that time decided against us. But the heroic courage which came to the fore in the great battle, the spirit of attack of the German combatant on land, at sea and in the air disputed the final victory.

When we today call to mind the great battle in France, our thoughts go back at the same time to all the German front-line soldiers in the Great War. For more than four years the fate of the German nation was borne on the shoulders of these soldiers. The War demanded from them tremendous efforts, they underwent almost superhuman hardships, and they gave their blood and their lives in the fight for people and fatherland.

In the west and in the east, in France and Belgium, in Russia and Serbia, in the Carpathian mountains, in the mud of Galicia, in the plains of Roumania, in the deserts and steppes of Asia and Africa, in the air and in all the seas of the world, German heroism shone forth, conquering and dying. The German combatant of 1914 who went to his death with the song of Germany on his lips has rightly become immortal. But also the German combatant of 1918 who, alone, in silence and almost without hope, died a heroic death in the scrupulous fulfilment of his duty will always remain in our memory as a lasting exhortation.

For years it seemed as if all the fighting, the outpouring of blood and death had been in vain. But now we know that it was not in vain. The spirit of the German combatant created the new Reich. It renewed the old, eternally young German people. It raised a monument to the soldiers of the Great War, which will for thousands of years bear witness to the glory of the German combatant, his exemplary military honour and his devoted brotherhood of arms. In one combatant, the experience of the War made the ideology of National Socialism an iron law. An unknown soldier, at that time lance-corporal and now the supreme commander of the German forces, set alight the sacred flame in the hearts of the German people and created the new Reich of the Germans. Comrades, it is our highest and most honoured duty to thank him constantly for his work, his determination and his effort, when we think of the heroism of our fallen soldiers.

Adolf Hitler, our beloved Führer, fulfilled the bequest of the two millions who gave their lives for Germany. It was only by his never-failing energy, his ardent faith in Germany and the

remarkable power of his personality that the sacrifice of our fallen brothers became a blessing for the people and the Reich. The German nation thanks the Führer now and at all times for this act. And with the German nation, the dumb army of our dead heroes thanks the Führer.

In a great age a King of Prussia once inaugurated the memory day for heroes as a day of national introspection and thought of those who had fallen in the wars of liberation. A day was to be devoted to the heroism of these fighters for freedom. But in the course of years the day became rather a day of mourning than of national enthusiasm. On that day thoughts turned more and more to all the dead, and it became a Sunday of the dead. People borne down with sorrow, in mourning clothes, silently opened the gates of the cemeteries, with tears in their eyes and wreaths in their arms. It was only after the Great War that the real meaning of the day to commemorate heroes again came into honour.

For the fifth time today we remember with deep reverence the heroes of the severest of all wars. It is a beautiful symbol that this day of celebration falls in March, the month of the blossoming of nature. Just as March brings new life everywhere, it has become the month of blossoming in the life of the German nation. On a March day 125 years ago, Frederick William III called his Prussian people to arms, and the struggle began for the liberation of the nation from serfdom and exploitation. On a March day five years ago in the Garrison Church at Potsdam, the venerable Field-Marshal of the Great War sealed his union with the leader of the young generation. Everything that was great and lofty in a great age was united with the enthusiasm and vital force of a rising and aspiring epoch. Potsdam became the cradle of the Third Reich. And again on a March day, the Führer gave back to the German people its military freedom and broke the fetters of the dictated peace of Versailles. A year later, in March 1936, the new Reich for the first time showed the outer world that it had risen again from impotence and disarmament. When German troops marched over the Rhine, when the first squadrons of the young German air arm appeared over the liberated Rhineland, it was clear not only to every German but also to foreign countries that German had again once for all taken her fate into her own hands. And what was then perhaps for the first time clear to many has in the meantime become constantly clearer: Germany is again a World Power.

* * *

It is again the month of March that has brought to Germany her last and supreme fulfilment; Germany has again become united, again a nation inseparably bound up in distress and suffering, in joy and happiness. The German nation in Austria has arisen at this hour in wonderful enthusiasm to acknowledge its German spirit. In the fire of its national passion and its Germanism it has overcome the serfdom, the arbitrary action and the terrorism of a small clique.

An exultation, such as the world has perhaps never experienced, at present roars through German Austria.

World statesmen must recognise with astonishment that they have been deceived for years as to the real feelings of the Austrian people by the false statements of a despotic minority. The Führer has tried every means of giving internal peace to the German people in Austria. For this purpose he showed great moderation by reducing to a minimum the demands which he made of the former Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg at the Berchtesgaden meeting. But after a very few days the latter broke the pledge which he had signed, and endeavoured to apply measures of violence which were a mockery of all justice and to deny the real significance of Austria, her German life, her German existence and her German image by means of an audacious false election and a forged plebiscite. What had become of the sacred right of self-determination of the nations? Was it not to apply to Germans?

The German people in Austria, hardened by fearful torture and violence, rose as one man and expelled its tormentors. The danger of civil war stood at the door of Germany if the tyrants had succeeded in using their power to bludgeon the Germans in Austria. In its profound distress the people called for the German brotherly help through the mouth of its present Federal Chancellor. To us it was the highest duty of honour to comply with this appeal. Units of the German army and air forces therefore entered Austrian territory. They did not come as conquerors or enemies, and they were not met by defence and fighting. Their fight was of a most remarkable nature. They were met with exultation and flowers were thrown on our young combatants. The disappointed world may now recognise that the people in Austria always were and always will be German. Germany rejects with indignation the lies which aim at desecrating this profound feeling. How can there be at present any talk of the violation and compulsion of the weak Austrian nation since it has hitherto been violated and compelled in an unheard-of-manner and its right to self-determination has been trampled underfoot. Who has the right to intervene when Germans wish to join with Germans? What State has been affected or injured? What other interests could be affected, since there was only one interest, the German interest?

Not a single person lives in Austria who is not German in blood and spirit; there is not one who speaks another language than our beloved mother-tongue. It is spirit of our spirit, flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood. Here it is for the German nation as a whole alone to decide.

Now for the first time since the dreadful peace treaties which appeared to kill all life the German people in Austria have an opportunity to confess to the world freely and frankly in complete openness how they wish to frame their lives. Whatever decision they may give, Germany will respect it. But what the result will be is already known to the world which hears this exultation and this sacred enthusiasm. Here also, March 1938 will be the beginning of a new life. The spring of our united

Germany has come. May God grant that it be followed by an eternal summer.

Just as we remember today with deep emotion our dead heroes, we also call to mind in the same breath our dead brothers in arms from German Austria. We remain indissolubly bound together. No power in the world can divide us. It would be thinkable that Germany should go under. But it will be unthinkable that she should ever again be torn asunder.

* * *

But we will bear in mind that Germany has always been unconquerable and invincible so long as she united her sons and daughters in firm determination. But so long as she was a divided nation and exhausted herself without honour and without defence in sterile economic and political struggles, Germany was a plaything for other nations. A friendly hand was never stretched out to help her in her struggle against distress and misery. But the spiritual, economic and moral attack against a German Reich and nation wounded to death became ever fiercer.

But since that nation has again regained its health and the Reich has become great and powerful, it has again found friends in the outside world. Germany acclaimed the Duce of friendly Fascist Italy on his visit to Berlin with joyful enthusiasm. These acclamations contain more than spontaneous enthusiasm. The German nation no longer inclines to outbreaks of feeling. The feeling expressed was rather that of joy and preparedness for the common struggle for right and true freedom in the world. It was also an expression of satisfaction at having a confident and determined companion in the fight against the dark powers of the world. The German nation again felt itself bound to the Duce of Italy in sincere gratitude. It has put into brilliant action the words of fidelity and friendship which he spoke to us last year. His chivalrous attitude and his great understanding for Germany's honour which he has again proved in a decisive and solemn hour will never be forgotten. In this sense the German nation has also keenly welcomed the accession of Italy to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement. The world political triangle Berlin-Rome-Tokio guarantees unity in the struggle against all-destroying Bolshevism, against which we carry on an unsparing fight with all its consequences. We greet in cordial union all fighters against bolshevism in the world. At the same time we remember the heroes who have fallen in this struggle, in particular those who have given their lives in Spain for the victory of culture over the subversive powers of the world revolution.

* * *

The Führer has always declared to the world that Germany, in spite of her internal attitude to the struggle against Bolshevism, sincerely desires peace. Germany desires a peace of honour and justice, in which all nations can live with equal rights and in equal freedom, in which all nations have a share of the good things of the world proportionate to their importance and their population. But we do not want the peace

of the so-called *status quo*, of collective security and of the Geneva entente, which distinguishes between haves and have-nots and between victors and vanquished. To any one who wants true peace with us we hold out an honest hand of friendship.

The Führer has stated more than once that every new treaty concluded by Germany is solemnly sealed with the honour of the German Reich and nation. The German nation takes this statement in deadly earnest. In this connection we have already shown on various occasions that our desire for peace is not an empty phrase. This is proved by the clearing up of our relations with Poland and the new agreement concluded last year for dealing with the question of minorities in the spirit of mutual understanding, and also by the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1936 and the addition to it concluded in July 1937. We cordially greet the efforts of the organisations of former combatants to make connections beyond the frontiers in a spirit of peaceful understanding. We also greet the efforts of the youth of all nations and get to know and to understand each other. We are sincerely glad that our compatriots living abroad are becoming more and more connecting links between the nations in the sense of understanding and peace.

Germany does not desire and will not interfere in the affairs of any other country. But it must be pointed out that the German Reich regards itself in every way as the protector and defender of all Germans, including those outside the frontiers of the Reich. We have endeavoured by peaceful agreements with other countries to maintain the national characteristics and to improve the living conditions of the German minorities. We have used external means of force in the shape of our warships to protect Germans and German interests in Spain. If this action has been used by Bolshevik criminals to provoke Germany and other Great Powers, that is not our fault. The world has been informed that we are not prepared to accept threats or even attacks on German soldiers. Anyone who attacks Germans, and therewith Germany, comes up against German guns that are ready to fire. That is the lesson of the bombardment of the Red Spanish fortification of Almeria. But in this connection we have given the world a fresh example of our desire for peace. In spite of the cowardly attack of Ibiza we have continued to cooperate in the idea of non-intervention. But the renewed attacks of Bolshevik submarines on the cruiser "Leipzig" caused us to adopt a more reserved attitude.

* * *

While our programme is thus in every way directed towards peace, we are quite aware that this peace can only remain, or rather become, a reality, if it is guaranteed by strong, confident and equal parties. Germany is therefore resolved further to strengthen and

maintain her forces as a guarantee of the peace of the world. These forces are aware of the task set by the Führer. They will do their best to emulate the old defensive force which once in the rain of steel of the Great War was described by the enemy as the best in the world. In this sense we greet the old glorious army.

The new armed force will always be aware that it has to protect the honour and peace of the nation. It will do everything to inculcate into every young German who passes through its school the spirit of our dead heroes as the supreme and ultimate aim. The armed force knows that in this it is at one with the party. Both will maintain for all future time the inheritance of our front-line soldiers, the party by training the German people in the soldierly spirit and in the spirit of National Socialism which has developed therefrom, and the armed force by being firmly rooted in National Socialist ideology and by covering and safeguarding the peaceful work of reconstruction. Both are joint supporters of the Reich as the living monument for the fallen heroes of the Great War.

The German armed force and with it the entire German people mourn their dead in pride. We remember the two millions who fell in the fight for the self-preservation of Germany. We remember those who were wounded in the War, the war widows and orphans, who are helped by our constant care to bear their heavy lot. We remember the leaders who led our army in a great time from victory to victory, the late Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, General Ludendorff who has recently gone home to the Great Army, Admiral Scheer and Captain Baron von Richthofen, the model air leader for all times.

We remember the dead heroes who stood at our side as faithful brothers in arms. But we also remember the brave opponents who opposed us and fell in the fight for their people. We remember all the brave German soldiers who in the post-War period have given their lives for Germany in the fight against Bolshevism at home and on the frontiers of the Reich.

We remember the dead of the National Socialist movement, who purchased with their lives the resurrection of the Reich. We know that their contribution opened up the way for our new greatness.

We remember the soldiers who met their death in working for the reconstruction of the new German forces, the army, the navy, and in particular the air force. We remember especially today the 31 dead and the 75 wounded comrades who fell victims to the cowardly Bolshevik attack on the armoured ship "Deutschland".

The spirit of our fallen heroes is revived in New Germany. It serves as a constant spur to work and struggle for the reconstruction of nation and Reich. In this sense, we promise to fulfil their bequest. The German defensive force, as the true representative of the German people, drops its colours before the heroism of those who went to their death for Germany. They all died that Germany might live.

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THE ANSCHLUSS

Documents Dating from the Years 1919 and 1938

1919 : THE ANSCHLUSS PROHIBITION

Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain of September 10th, 1919

The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.

Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles of July 28th, 1919

Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

1938 : THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ANSCHLUSS

Article 1 of the Federal Constitutional Law of March 13th, 1938 regarding the Reunion

Austria is a land of the German Reich.

Article 1 of the Reich Law regarding the Reunion of March 13th, 1938

The Federal Constitutional Law of March 13th, 1938, adopted by the Austrian Federal Government regarding the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, hereby becomes a law of the German Reich.

Extract from the Speech by Federal Chancellor Seyss-Inquart at Linz, on March 12th, 1938

"Now we Austrians have for all time freely and openly, proudly and independently, proclaimed our adherence to this Führer, while at the same time solemnly declaring that Article 88 of the Peace Treaty is ineffective."

Extract from the speech by Adolph Hitler, at Vienna, on March 14th, 1938

"As Leader and Chancellor of the German nation and of the German Reich I report before German history that my homeland has now entered the German Reich."

Extract from Adolph Hitler's Speech at Frankfurt on March 31st, 1938

"For the past five years I have torn out one page after another of the Versailles Treaty from its bindings, not as a violator, but as an upholder, of law, not as a treaty-breaker but as a man who refuses to recognise a godless dictate as a sacred treaty. A few days ago destiny chose me to tear out another such page. This last page is the prohibition of the Anschluss. In three days we conquered a State by the force of an idea."

THE RETURN OF AUSTRIAN GERMANY TO THE GERMAN REICH

An Accomplished Desire

Austria is a "Land" of the German Reich.

This statement is made with monumental simplicity in the First Article of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law of March 13th, 1938, which ushers in the great change that begins a new epoch in the many centuries of the history of the German community of destiny. The peaceful union of the Great German Reich and the rejoining of Germany and German Austria in accordance with the common desire of all Germans is an event of unique historical importance not only for the two countries but for the whole of Europe, both by the manner in which it was accomplished and the effects which it will produce on the future development of political thought and action in this Continent. The people of Austria now begin their march to a further common future shoulder to shoulder with the other stems of the German people. The German cause has conquered, without the drawing of swords or the shedding of blood, but merely by the force of a uniform national will. The right of self-determination has come into its own, even where the "peace-makers" of 1919 and the "peacemaintainers" of Geneva thought they had barred the route. Adolf Hitler has paved the way to this right, and the elementary force with which it made its appearance and was accomplished must give food for thought to all those who still hold that legal paragraphs can be placed above men and nations and that natural phenomena and natural rights can be combated, oppressed or even set aside in Conferences and negotiations and by dictated treaties and instruments.

Ernst Moritz Arndt once described the national idea in the following words:

"The history of the nations is not decided by constitutions and laws written on parchment, or by victories and defeats, but by the unwritten and indescribable laws, in the innermost heart, by the orders which proud souls give to themselves, by the victories which spiritual courage can win day by day, and if the people is to survive, which it must win day by day, and by the defeats which are suffered in the midst of triumphs as a result of softness and self-seeking. It is love and faith that make the nations."

It was reserved for National Socialism to help this idea to make itself felt, this idea of the eternal values of nationalism and of its natural rights. These values have again become the natural, spiritual, and even instinctive, possession of the German people. They attained their highest achievement in these historical March days when all the barriers that restricted these values and rights were swept away with the elementary force of a sudden natural phenomenon, when the longing of eleven centuries of German history was fulfilled in three days and the dams artificially erected against the feelings of national unity and solidarity were washed away. The revolution of the blood has removed all obstacles erected for decades and centuries by corporate, religious and dynastic State forms and interests, by lack of comprehension, hatred and narrow-mindedness, party disputes and arbitrary action, mistakes and misunderstandings. In three times 24 hours it attained what had hitherto appeared to be a remote object difficult of achievement. In three days a revolution unparalleled in history occurred on the age-old cultural soil of this German Eastern Reich. Events succeeded each other with extreme rapidity and the scenes changed as in a kaleidoscope. Those who experienced the downfall of the Danube monarchy are bound to have in mind the glaring contrast between then and now. In 1918 there were disturbances,

paralysing fear, political and economic chaos, from which fragments were painfully saved in order to reconstruct German Austria. In 1938 there was flaming enthusiasm, strict discipline, exemplary order. No incidents, no conflicts, no bloodshed, not the slightest disharmony disturbed this memorable revolution, and thus clear proof was given of the unequivocal will of the vast majority of the population.

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In our last issue we gave a documentary report of the course of these memorable days and of the immediate events which led up to them.

They began with the two agreements between Germany and German-Austria of July 11th, 1936 and February 12th, 1938. They were intended to put into effect the "German Peace" which had been so long desired and to liquidate the inheritance the core of which was to be found in the persecution of the Austrian National Socialists and in the obscure connection between the Fatherland Front and nationally minded circles. The first principle on which these two agreements were based was the establishment of the fact that German Austria was a German State. This meant that the mutual relations between the two States were, in the nature of things, i.e. in view of the common German blood and German destiny, governed by a totally different law than can possibly be the case with international relations in general. Even if the accidents of political development had led to the independence as a State of this German South Eastern Mark, this did not at any time in German history extinguish the inestimable factors which had left its mark on Germans and Germanism on both sides of the frontier.

Only an Austrian Government which had the will and the power to think only of Austria and her history independently of foreign influence and to act accordingly could free itself from diplomatic intrigue and return to the side of its natural friend. The possibility of those agreements yielding good fruit thus depended upon an understanding execution of the two agreements from these points of view, and on the abandonment of the fundamentally monstrous idea that an Austrian solution which would be contrary to the German view could be carried out and maintained by international support. These two conditions, however, made it essential primarily that the Austrian Germans with national socialist views should be given the same field of activity as those following other political ideologies, and that those who upheld an ideology which National Socialism had created and which the German Reich had proclaimed as its own since January 30th, 1933 should not be persecuted or regarded as second-class citizens. The Third Reich would have been untrue to itself if it had accepted a solution which took no account of its ideology, especially as the Reich and the German Austrian adherents of its ideas considered that the strict observance of the existing laws was just as natural as respect for the Austrian constitution.

The two agreements were therefore intended to bring to an end a period of tension which lay heavily on the hearts of all good Germans, and their results were felt with profound satisfaction in both countries as a liberation from heavy pressure in the relations of the two German countries. They were calculated not only gradually to close an open wound but also to remove the threat

to peace which some Powers, whose toy Austria had been for so long, pretended was caused by the disturbance of the relations between the two countries from which they had hitherto drawn rich benefits.

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When therefore on February 12th the "German Peace" was agreed upon at the Obersalzberg between the former Austrian Federal Chancellor von Schuschnigg and the Führer and Reich Chancellor, a construction was to be erected which, while allowing complete independence to the Austrian State, was to grant to National Socialism complete equality of rights and unrestricted cooperation in the work of the internal appeasement of Austria. The first measures taken by Vienna, the reforming of the Government and the announcement of a political amnesty, together with various administrative provisions as announced by the newly appointed Minister for Internal Affairs and Security, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, in his speech at Linz on March 6th, aroused the hope that serious work was being done in connection with the erection of this peace construction which aimed at healing old wounds and preventing new wounds in the interest of the national German common destiny; then came like a bombshell the announcement of a plebiscite. By this means the Federal Chancellor tried to go over the heads of the other members of the Government and, out of purely personal initiative, to force a decision which he hoped would nullify the grant of equality of rights to National Socialism. For this purpose he mobilised forces which were materially and spiritually attached to Marxism and Bolshevism and thus showed that he regarded the national movement as a worse enemy than the adherents of Moscow. This was soon apparent in the declarations of the Reds who, just as twenty years ago, thought they smelled the morning air, felt their time had come and gave an instructive example of Herr Schuschnigg's attempts at conciliation between the national opposition and the former Marxist circles which had entered the so-called Fatherland Front. He was finally compelled practically to declare the country in a state of disturbance.

But the entire preparation for this so-called consultation of the people shows that Schuschnigg did not, as the German nation was relieved to believe and hope, regard the agreement of Berchtesgaden as a magnanimous German act, but as a tactical manoeuvre or trick with which he again hoped to escape from historical necessities. The plebiscite was not only in contradiction with Article 65 of the Constitution under which such a plebiscite must be decided by a constitutional law and announced by the President of the Federation. Some members of the Austrian Government, including the representatives of the national socialist movement took no part whatever in the decision, and its announcement came as a surprise to them. The Federal Chancellor must, however, have known that he would never obtain the consent of these members of the Government to such a plebiscite which, in view of the regulations governing it, must necessarily turn the entire business into a farce in order to win a dishonest game by which he thought he could correct the agreements of Berchtesgaden. It would also have been in the spirit of those agreements to inform the Government of the Reich of his intentions in advance. In addition, Article 65 provided for the possibility of a plebiscite only on certain questions of the legislation. But the watchword given out by Schuschnigg referred to general principles and not to a concrete question of law. Thus the Federal Chancellor, by his wording of the question, called upon the German people in Austria to agree to an intended breach of the Constitution. As in previous phases of the post-War history of German Austria, in this case also the legality principle was intentionally and grossly overlooked both in the sense of the provisions of the Constitution and in the sense of discovering the true views of the people.

It was the last move in a policy of staking all, a disastrous policy, which, thanks to the rising

of the Austrian people, the resistance of the new national Government and its request for the assistance of the Reich, did not lead to disaster. Schuschnigg's game was seen through at the very moment when he began it.

He wished to force a decision when he said at Innsbruck on March 9th: I stand or fall with this plebiscite. The decision has been given, but without his plebiscite and otherwise than he imagined. His decision brought a long suppressed crisis to an open outbreak which immediately and unexpectedly showed up the complete hollowness of his system and his authority which had only been kept alive by artificial means. His Fatherland Front in which the parties formerly dissolved had found refuge in so far as he wished to use them in order to close the path of the national socialist movement to power, turned out to be a piece of stage scenery with nothing behind it. It scattered without struggle in a few hours, as if it had never existed. This rapid disappearance was a proof not only of its inadequacy but also of the fact that it had never been in line with the will of the people. Presumably even many members of the Fatherland Front had at heart no relationship to this artificial construction. As soon as it was no longer supported by a State power that had already become fictitious, it proved to be a soulless illusion. The front that unjustly bore the name of "Fatherland" consisted mainly of compulsory members who merely adhered to it for the sake of their existence and their badge was therefore called the "Existenzklammer". In his Innsbruck speech Schuschnigg coined the further expression that the Fatherland Front would never allow itself to be beaten by the rear, i.e. by National Socialism. In fact this did not take place. What he thought to be the front was in reality the rear, and the real Fatherland Front consisted of the national socialist movement. But Schuschnigg commanded over a soulless apparatus. It stopped working and fell to pieces, as soon as it encountered a spiritual force. The consultation of the people which Schuschnigg wished to hold on March 13th took place one day earlier, but in a different and entirely opposite sense. The storm of enthusiasm which brought about the national socialist revolution in Austria became the unexampled expression of a desire of the people to join the Greater German Reich. "The 13th of May", said the Führer in his Leipzig speech on March 26th, "was to be a day of deception; it became a day of liberation". Austria no longer needed to be "conquered". The swastika banner was already waving over the whole country, when the troops began their march on the morning after the historical night of March 11/12th. Austria was already German and national socialist before the Führer moved a single man or a single gun. The avalanche of the people's will moved forward irresistibly and buried the leaders of the old decayed system under its weight. For this no ultimatum was required. Austria had returned to the Reich even before the governmental and constitutional decisions were taken on March 13th. These were merely the formal conclusion of a development that was already complete. Although the former régime, by its blunt challenge to the popular will, rendered the revolution possible, the time for this had long been ripe. In any case it would have taken place in a not too distant future because it was a physical necessity. It was nothing more than the conclusion of a logical and unavoidable development.

* * *

In a triumphal journey, the only obstacle to which was the enthusiasm of the German Austrians, Adolf Hitler again saw his own home. The unanimous exultation which greeted the German columns with their supreme commander as they marched through the country was a plebiscite which anticipated all formal decisions and created definite conditions. The cry: "One people, one Reich, one Führer!" which arose from the masses in the night from March 11th to 12th on the Ballhausplatz at Vienna and spread like wildfire in a new hours throughout

the whole of Austria gave the Führer more right than Poincaré on a former occasion in German Alsace-Lorraine to say: "Le plébiscite est fait".

The plebiscite will nevertheless take place. Its object is not to prove to the country, but to foreign countries, that Austria has regained her German countenance and that the enthusiasm which took possession of the Austrian people was not merely a spontaneous transport, but a reality that makes it impossible to continue to maintain the fiction of an independent State.

The 10th of April will merely add the acclamation of a people of 75 millions to the great act of the Führer. The Anschluss brought about by the events of March 11th to 14th, and in the meantime sealed by law, will receive its solemn confirmation symbolically and formally by the plebiscite.

* * *

The fact that made the strongest impression on foreign countries was undoubtedly the recognition that people had been mistaken about Austria, about the internal conditions in the country, the strength of National Socialism and the weakness of the so-called Fatherland Front. They deluded themselves and stubbornly closed their eyes to the self-evident facts that became obvious during these days, namely that the natural rights of nationality cannot be simply dismissed by dictates and legal paragraphs, that the patriotism of a nation cannot be bought with money and that two nations related by blood cannot be kept separate or turned against each other by threats or promises.

At the end of April 1934 the Greater German deputy Foppa, in criticising the new Constitution, gave the following warning: "We declare solemnly before the whole world that it is the inviolable natural right of our people to shape its relations with the German Reich as intimately as is compatible with its national aims and its national right of self-determination... We promise to persevere at our national outpost until the vital demand of the Austrian nation is fulfilled, i.e. no solution of the Austrian question without the German Reich, no solution of the Central European problem without Germany."

Such warnings passed unheard. The Powers that thought they had determined German destiny for all time at Versailles and St. Germain in several hundred articles had for twenty years become too much accustomed to the idea that, by means of the independence imposed on Austria, they could drive a permanent wedge of discord between the two peoples. And the Geneva League in whose hands Wilson's gospel of the right of self-determination of the nations had been placed, not only did nothing to prevent this action, but even lowered itself to the role of a willing tool.

It is therefore quite natural that the criticisms of statesmen and of the press make no reference to the right of self-determination.

These Powers in particular have the least right to criticise the "methods" by which the German nation in the Reich and in Austria seized its right after they had done everything they could for twenty years to prevent its accomplishment. No one who carefully reviews this period will seriously affirm that negotiations in Paris, London or Geneva would have led within the next twenty years to the grant of the right to the Austrian people to return to their German home country. A method which, with the enthusiastic approval of the people concerned, has prevented Austria from becoming a second Spain is still infinitely better than that by which the seed of such a development has been sown for two decades.

* * *

We are told by André Tardieu, one of the most important "peacemakers" of Versailles, that treaties are scraps of paper if the aims of a policy of power stand behind their clauses. He openly admitted in his book "La Paix" that the

prohibition of the Anschluss was made mainly in conjunction with France's endeavour, which had till then been unsuccessful, to obtain the guarantees demanded. The grotesque extent to which the hypocritical phrase of the "sanctity of treaties" was distorted in reality is finally shown by a footnote on page 428. This footnote refers to the German reply of September 5th 1919 to the allied ultimatum of September 2nd in which the Allies demanded the omission of the idea of the Anschluss from Article 61 of the Weimar Constitution. Tardieu quotes from the German note the sentence in which the Reich Government of that time declares Article 61 to be null and void and admits that a change is only possible with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. The footnote reads: "As the League Council in this case can only bring about a change by a unanimous vote, France's consent is also necessary." Germany never took any other view of this unanimity principle of the League of Nations and regarded it as nothing more than an instrument for preventing any revision in the interest of the French policy of hegemony.

Anschluss means war. This was always the meaning of the vote which certain Powers, and with them the Geneva League, constantly opposed to the right of self-determination of the Austrian people in connection with such matters as the prohibitions of plebiscites in the Austrian "Länder" from 1918 to 1921, the provisions of St. Germain of 1919, the Geneva Loan Protocol of 1922, the policy of France and the Little Entente in the Danube Basin, the European plans of Briand or the Danube plans of Tardieu and Hodza, the prevention of the German-Austrian customs union in 1931, the new edition of the Geneva Protocols in 1932, the Stresa agreements of 1935 or, finally, the support given to the anti-German policy of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg.

In the League protocols, which "saved Austria from downfall", the Austrian Governments of that time sold the right of self-determination of their people for money and purchased for it the "independence" or "autonomy" of their country. "Independent" Austria was bound with chains, which were not even "golden" but economic gratuities which were paid for by new anti-Anschluss obligations. Austria became a show piece of the Geneva League, and sank to the level of a mandated territory of the League, an object of the so-called policy of equilibrium as understood by certain Powers.

When on December 29th, 1918, M. Pichon, then French Foreign Minister, rejected the idea of the Anschluss in the Chamber, he was interrupted by the deputy Renaudel with the words: "And what if the Austrians sincerely desire union with Germany?" M. Pichon's reply was: "Do you think that victory gives us no rights over the defeated?" By this brutal rejection of the right of self-determination of the nations, the then Foreign Minister again confirmed what the present Colonial Minister Moutet stated in the French Chamber on December 27th, 1917 when the war aims of the Allies were taking shape: The right of self-determination of the nations will be only a façade for the Allies.

In the case of Austria, however, this façade was at the same time a political construction in the interest of the French policy of power. "If Austria did not exist, it would be necessary to create her." These words were spoken by Charles Seymour, member of the American delegation at the Peace Conference and writer on the Austro-Hungarian question in the book: "What Really Happened in Paris", published jointly with Colonel House. After describing the case of Austria, as handled in Paris, as legally incompatible, he concludes with the words:

"It would have been natural in view of the purely German character of its population, to have permitted union with Germany. This was, on the whole, approved by the American delegates, as it was requested by the Austrians themselves. The French however, set their face firmly against any acquisi-

tion of territory by the secular enemy across the Rhine. Certainly union would tend toward the economic rehabilitation of those regions which is so essential to political tranquillity."

"No honest student of European conditions, however, can be blind to the new dangers which have been created. It is undeniable that a considerable stretch of territory has been Balkanized. Occasion for friction between the different states will unfortunately, not be lacking. Each state includes something of a nationalistic minority, which will look for support to its kinsmen, who form the majority in the neighbouring states. We must also expect that difficulties will develop from economic quarrels. Austria is perhaps in the worst plight."

Wilson's own Secretary of State, M. Lansing, in his memoirs, severely censures the deception practised at that time in Paris (The Peace Negotiations):

"There could hardly be a more open repudiation of the alleged right of 'self-determination' than this refusal to permit Austria to unite with Germany however unanimous the wish of the Austrian people for such union."

At the time when the Allies threatened to raise the armistice if Vienna refused to sign, William Martin wrote as follows in the *Journal de Genève* of September 5th, 1919:

"The Conference has fallen into a curious contradiction. Under the pretext that the present frontiers are based on injustice, it has restored to the fullest extent the historical frontiers which were no longer of much value; in order to repair present injustices it has restored the old injustices. The map of Europe of tomorrow will bear a striking resemblance to that of the sixteenth century."

In short, it may be stated that Austria has been deprived of all territories which were necessary for its existence. The result is an Austria of which no reasonable and intelligent man can assume that it will be capable of existence. 'Austria' said an Austrian recently, 'will only be able to live under a colonial régime. We shall be a colony of the Allies'.

Austria, deprived of frontiers, finances, raw materials and food supplies, will be at the mercy of her neighbours. It is only against Germany that she will have no feeling of revenge or irredentism. This fact indicates sufficiently the future development. The Allies can insist as much as they like, by threatening ultimatums, that Austria should be left outside Germany. Threats pass away, but the will of the people remains, especially when it can take its stand on the nature of things and on the secret wishes of a great neighbour. Those who did not want Austria to be capable of existence—there can be no doubt—knew what they were doing and for whom they were working."

* * *

Paris has, therefore, the least right of all to criticise the "method" and to base itself on "right".

The French Senator Bérenger, on December 20th, 1932, when he was Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and rapporteur of the Law under which France was to guarantee a tranche of the Austrian loan, made the following remarks about the Austria of that time:

"Thus in 1920, for a 'European reason' that was imposed, new Austria was erected as an independent republic in the midst of Europe. Certain difficulties immediately made themselves felt: too great a capital for too small a body, since Vienna contains nearly a third of the total population; conflict between the two million town-dwellers and the four million peasants; an excess of old administrative bodies as compared with the reduced number of agricultural and industrial enterprises; a budget, the preparation and maintenance of which is scarcely possible in view of the disproportion between producers and consumers. This resulted in misery, great material and spiritual misery, for new Austria, namely civil war, that scourge of divided States and weakened peoples."

M. Bérenger then went on to confirm again what this "European reason" involved:

"After the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Polish and Hungarian nationalities had again arisen in the centre of Europe, the object was to maintain a balance of power that would prevent Germany from being established at the same time in Berlin and Vienna, on the Danube and on the Elbe, 150 kilometres from Trieste and at the gates of Belgrade and Budapest, while holding the new Czechoslovak State within the two arms of a pair of pincers."

And lastly: "Austria, although German in spirit and race, will thus remain an autonomous State as desired by the Powers during and since the peace negotiations. These Powers, among which France has been one of the first and has shown special activity, bear a great measure of responsibility for the present situation of Austria."

* * *

Adolf Hitler, in his great speech at Königsberg on March 26th, was rightly able to state for the world and for future history:

"It was not out of love for German Austria that it was given so-called 'sovereignty' at that time. No, this was done in the special interest of foreign countries; Germany was to be weakened. She was to be torn asunder and then to remain powerless as in past times. This was the object of this 'sovereignty'. This was also the meaning of the prohibition of the Anschluss. The cause was not love for the German people or love for the German Austrians, but exclusively the idea of weakening Germany and thereby the entire German people. This sovereignty only existed for the benefit of foreign countries."

"In an age when it is regarded as self-evident that all nations in the world should be granted the right of self-determination, the members of a great civilised nation were denied and deprived of this right."

"World conscience and world justice for the first time shine out of the peace treaties to us. When have nations been more shamelessly oppressed as since the time that people began to speak of world conscience and world justice? When have economic territories been more unscrupulously torn asunder than since the time when a 'League of Nations' was founded with the alleged object of serving the interests of the nations?"

German territory and German nationality have been torn asunder and violated without mercy, but also without intelligence. And since that time a deaf ear has been turned to all representations, all protests, warnings and remonstrances."

* * *

That is now all past. There is no longer an Austrian question. Austria is no longer an irresolute and helpless object of international policy.

Today the national right of self-determination has celebrated its greatest triumph, but against the will of those who announced that right while in the same moment doing violence to it.

What has happened in these days has merely made amends for the disastrous mistakes of Versailles and has corrected the political errors which have since been committed under the fateful influence of that dictated Peace. The act of the Paris peacemakers has broken down before the elementary force of the popular will, and the system of the peace treaties, which, with all its divisions of territories and peoples, was at bottom directed against the idea of the nation, has received a decisive blow with the formation of the Greater German Reich. The twenty years' silent war which was inaugurated by the two dictates of Versailles and St. Germain and which called for no fewer victims than the great struggle of the peoples itself, is now at an end. No statesman in Europe could set himself a higher aim than to put an end to this war.

The change of balance in Europe is not slight, but it offers a threat to no one of good will. In the heart of Europe a cell of

order has been created which offers a guarantee that in future this centre will not be a nervous bundle of conflicting interests, but an elements of stability firmly anchored in itself, from which no disturbing effect can again be felt in Europe. The roads to understanding are open, and the Führer and Reich Chancellor has again and again solemnly declared his willingness for an understanding, though unfortunately he has not been listened to. But it must be an understanding which can no longer be based on the Versailles methods. A new era has dawned. It demands an attitude different from that which was born of a peace of hatred, mistrust and violence, which brought Europe to the edge of the abyss.

Against their will the dictators of Versailles and St. Germain have become the instruments of history and of fate. An old dream of all German stems has come true, and a deep longing has been fulfilled: one German nation in a single German Reich. Though wars and revolutions were powerless to accomplish it for centuries, Adolf Hitler in the space of three bare days has brought about the peaceful Anschluss. The Austrian constitutional law of March 13th, 1938, again provides, like that of March 12th, 1919: Austria is a "Land" of the German Reich.

A DOCUMENT FROM THE YEAR 1848

Communicated by Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels in his Speech in Vienna on March 29th, 1938

A Dream has Come True

"We have found in the Reich Archives the original of a proclamation made in the year 1848. This proclamation is drawn up by citizens of Vienna called Johannes Höflich, Klopff and Eurich. This proclamation develops the programme of the Greater German Reich in ten commandments. I think I should not refrain from communicating this ninety year old programme to the German people in Vienna. It is as if this programme had been written today by us. It is called the ten commandments of the time:

1st Commandment. Germans everywhere! Only under the pinions of the united powerful country may freedom be strengthened and may that order prevail which arises out of respect for the law that is inspired by freedom.

Virgin Austria! Only in the united Reich dost thou live the immovable period for which thy people is eternally intended.

2nd Commandment. May the joyful fulfilment of duty be our most passionate thought. Self-sacrifice must be a State principle for each one, for without this no community can live.

3rd Commandment. By the union of all States that have been German from the beginning and by their fusion, equal right for all will be established, and the States that have been shaken by so much injustice will again arise finer and freer under a single roof.

4th Commandment. May he who has no possessions today not be incited to hatred against the possessor. Whoever does so helps to bring about the stoppage of work and to close the sources of nourishment of the people, and he sins against the inheritance of his fathers. Diligence and sparingness will in future be the only conditions of happiness and respect.

The idle and the spendthrifts have no longer any room in Greater Germany.

5th Commandment. Our Germany will be more beautiful than all other countries, better in its foundations and greater in its successes. May the citizens demand constancy in their customs and habits.—A united Germany will grant this to them better than a disunited people divided into two States.

6th Commandment. Our Reich of the united people and all its stems will implant German integrity in all. Equality of rights and—let it not be forgotten—equality of duties. They shall grant concord and security to all and also that self-consciousness which is necessary for every German.

7th Commandment. The concord of the Reich shall have its roots in every citizen. Not by the formulas of a political catechism that is to be learnt by heart, but by the blessed effects of concord itself.

There is only people and only one class, whether the people are landlords, merchants, officials, clergymen, teachers, scien-

tists, artists or soldiers. And the poorer any one of them is, the more certain is he of solicitous protection.

8th Commandment. Our union of both nations shall simplify the Government and not make it more burdensome, it shall cheapen our country and not make it dearer, it shall raise and not lower our standard of education, it shall increase and not reduce our strength.

9th Commandment. The Government of the united German people is called upon to create the new work. It will not build on foundations that are rotten, corrupt or decayed. The Government will rule with new ideas. It will not administer old methods.

10th Commandment. Austria! Austria!
Germany! Germany!

Think of the hour. Take thought firmly and unitedly at times of the greatest danger.

Firmly and unitedly procure the help which you need at no time more than now, by joining together one with another.

That our country may not build a hollow roof of vain know-alls, houses of deputies, official chambers which fall a prey to one self-interest or another, a foundation must be laid on which at all times the power and prosperity of the State may rest firmly and safely. Not a foundation stone of shameless and shocking mutual incitation which will ultimately bring government and people into opposition, but a foundation stone on which the house is built in which the real life of the nation as the bearer of a united people can develop.

We will for ever banish perfidious conservatism, that proved disturber of the State, from this joint house; otherwise the great work of union of the German nation must come to grief on the fanatical ambition of a small number—and this at a time when we are all threatened by our enemy, by the hordes of Russia.

Therefore, Austria! Therefore, Germany! Think of the hour!

This was written by Vienna citizens in 1848, and I now ask you, German men and women in Austria and in the Reich: Is that what we want or not? Is it not as if our fathers had risen from their graves and marched with their Greater German flags in the van of our young revolution? Is it not that the dream which our fathers at that time dreamed in vain has now been gloriously realised by our Führer, that what they as good Germans desired and longed for, what their hearts beat for, what they fought, struggled and sacrificed for, what hecatombs of dead were heaped up for, what the best Germans have for years and until our times been imprisoned for,—is it not as if all this had by a miracle come true?

GERMAN AUSTRIA'S VAIN STRUGGLE FOR HER RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The Dictated Peace of St. Germain A Sad Chapter of Deluded Power Policy

1. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

After the dissolution of the old monarchy of Austria-Hungary had become a historical fact towards the end of 1918 by the secession of the Czechs, Slovaks and Southern Slavs, all the representatives of the German portions of the population of the overthrown State had met within a period of three weeks at a provisional National Assembly. Even before this, namely on October 4th, 1918, the Government of the Monarchy had sent the following note to the United States:

*From the Minister of Sweden to the Secretary of State
Legation of Sweden, Washington DC*

October 7th, 1918.

Excellency,

By order of my Government, I have the honour confidentially to transmit herewith to you the following communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austro-Hungary to the President of the United States of America:—

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war and repeatedly given documentary evidence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and honourable peace, hereby addresses itself to his Lordship the President of the United States of America, and offers to conclude with him and his allies an armistice on every front, on land, at sea, and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the Message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's Address of February 12th, 1916, should serve as a foundation, and in which the view-points declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27th, 1918, will also be taken into account.

Be pleased to accept, etc.

(Signed) W. A. F. Ekengren.

In his message of January 8th, 1918, which is mentioned in this note, Mr. Wilson had announced the basis of the Peace in his famous fourteen points, and the Secretary of State Lansing, in his note of November 5th, 1918 to the German Reich, stated that the Allied Governments had declared their readiness to conclude peace on the basis of the message to Congress of January 8th, 1918.

Wilson's fourteen points, which thus formed the legal basis of the peace negotiations, included point 10, which was worded as follows:

"The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

In the meantime, however, the dissolution of the old Monarchy had taken place, and the United States gave the reply of October 18th, 1918 reproduced below, extending point 10 in recognition of the right of self-determination of the Czech and Southern Slav populations:

The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of the utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of the 8th January

last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States.

Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following:—

"X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States, the Government of the United States has recognised that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a de facto belligerent Government, clothed with proper authority to direct military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks.

It has also recognised in the fullest manner the justice of their nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom.

The President is therefore no longer at liberty to accept a mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and the conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.

October 18th, 1918.

This note in no case annulled the principle of the right of self-determination. While it recognised autonomous development for certain populations of the former Monarchy, this merely signified an amendment resting on a legal basis which was due to changes which had taken place in the meantime. By the recognition of the rights of others, the German populations had all the more right to expect their own unrestricted autonomous development.

2. THE DEMONSTRATIONS OF LOYALTY OF THE GERMAN STEMS OF AUSTRIA

The first claim put forward by the National Assembly on October 21st, 1918 (First Meeting) was the claim to self-determination. It was expressed in a decision that was adopted unanimously:

"The German nation in Austria is resolved to determine itself its future State order, to form an independent German-Austrian State and to regulate its relations with the other nations by free agreements."

The German-Austrian State claims sovereignty over the entire territory of German settlement, in particular also in the Sudeten territories. Any annexation by other nations of German territories that are inhabited by German farmers, workers and citizens will be resisted by the German-Austrian State. It will endeavour to secure access to the Adriatic Sea by agreements with the other nations.

The German nation in Austria will elect a constituent national assembly. The constituent national assembly, elected on the basis of general and equal suffrage, will determine the constitution of the German-Austrian State."

At the second meeting of the provisional National Assembly this desire was brought before world public opinion in the shape of a claim in the note of October 30th, 1918 to President Wilson. This note contains a truthful, unexaggerated statement, based on figures, of the German

populations and connected districts of German settlement that belonged to the German nation. The particulars must be regarded as accurate for the very reason that the representatives at that time must have been aware that they could only represent and claim what could not be contested by anyone. The notes exchanged on the subject later at the Peace Conference give further details, but the particulars in the replies of the Austrian delegation show rather those German portions which were afterwards taken away without regard to population or settlement conditions. In forming a judgment of the German populations of the former Monarchy, therefore, this note should be regarded as authoritative. The following is the complete text:

"Mr. President, We have the honour to inform you that the German nation in Austria has resolved to form an independent German-Austrian State. On October 21st, the deputies of all German constituencies in Austria, elected by general and equal suffrage, met at Vienna and decided: 1. to form an independent German-Austrian State; 2. to constitute itself as the provisional National Assembly of this new State and to take upon itself the task of representing this State until the new constituent National Assembly to be elected by general, equal and direct suffrage is able to meet; 3. to elect an executive committee which will have to represent this State as against foreign countries and to prepare and organise the taking over of the internal administration until the Government of the German-Austrian State is formed. The Germans in Austria are a people of 9.7 million persons; hitherto they have been citizens of the Austrian State, but at present, when the other nations are proceeding to form their independent States, the German nation in Austria is also constituting itself into an independent national State. The new State claims sovereignty over all territories of former Austria in which the Germans form the majority of the population. It claims the right of an entity under international law. It recognises the unrestricted right of the other nations of the Monarchy to determine their position within the community of nations in perfect freedom, and it demands the same right for the German nation. It demands that its representatives should be admitted to the peace negotiations as the representatives of an independent State in order to negotiate with the representatives of the other nations regarding the peace conditions. It reserves the right for its Government to conclude peace.

The Executive Committee states that no one is entitled to negotiate regarding the peace and to conclude peace in the name of German-Austria except the executive authority appointed by the German-Austrian National Assembly. The undersigned Executive Committee of the provisional German-Austrian National Assembly therefore requests you, Mr. President, to give it an opportunity of entering into direct negotiations with the representatives of all belligerent Powers regarding a general peace. The Executive Committee undertakes to accept the following principles: 1. The Executive Committee accepts unreservedly the principles which you, Mr. President, laid down in your Message of January 8th, 1918 and in your addresses of February 12th and July 4th, 1918. 2. The Executive Committee, fully agreeing with the note from the Secretary of State of the United States of October 18th, 1918 to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, regards the Czechoslovak and Southern Slav nations as completely independent States, and is prepared to regulate the relations of the German-Austrian State with the Czech and Southern Slav States by free agreements with those States. The Executive Committee proposes that all disputes between the German-Austrian State on the one hand and the Czech and Southern Slav States on the other hand, in so far as they cannot be settled by free agreements, should be submitted for decision by a Court of Arbitration to be set up in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Conferences. 3. The Executive Committee requests you, Mr. President, to turn your attention to the question of the German territories of the Sudeten lands. In Bohemia there are about 134 districts in which the Czechs form the majority of the population, and 83 districts in which the majority of the population is of German nationality and speaks the German language. These

93 districts represent a territory of 18,385 square kilometres. According to the census in 1910—the previous one being in 1900—2,395,541 persons lived in this territory in connected settlements and spoke the German language in daily intercourse, being mixed with a scattered population of 80,143 persons who used the Czech language. There is, therefore, in Bohemia a connected territory of which the vast majority of the population is German. Similarly, the western part of Austrian Silesia and the northern part of Moravia which borders upon it form a connected territory of German settlement, and the southern districts of Moravia bordering on German Lower Austria are also German. The total number of Germans living in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, according to the last census, is 3,512,682. It is obvious that the new German-Austrian State also claims the German territories of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.

We are convinced, Mr. President, that, in accordance with the principles you have proclaimed, you will, after carefully examining this question, refuse to subject 3 ½ million Germans to the Czech State against their will and to force them into a desperate struggle against the foreign rule with which they are threatened. The age of democracy in Central Europe cannot begin by a people of 3 ½ millions being made subject by force of arms to a people of 6.3 millions. Lasting peace in Europe cannot be based on the creation in the new Czechoslovak State of a German irredenta whose constant appeals to Berlin and Vienna for help would endanger the peace of Europe. Moreover, such an oppression of the Germans would be in contradiction with the principle which you, Mr. President, laid down in point 2 of your address of February 12th last "that peoples and provinces cannot be moved about from one sovereignty to another, as if they were merely objects or pawns in a game", and also with the third and fourth of the principles you laid down that

"Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and

Forth, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world."

We therefore demand that the German districts of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia should be recognised as a component part of the German-Austrian State and should freely determine their future adherence in conjunction with that State. We are prepared to negotiate with the competent representatives of the Czechoslovak nation regarding the delimitation of our territories. Should it, however, prove impossible to determine the frontiers by agreement, we propose that the population of the contested territories should be called upon themselves to decide by a general plebiscite to which State they wish to belong.

We are agreed that this plebiscite should be carried out under the control of the League of Nations by officials of neutral Powers and that all detailed conditions of this plebiscite should be determined by the Peace Congress or by a court of arbitration in such manner that any violation of the voters and any artificial influence on the result of the vote should be precluded. The protection of the national minorities still remaining in foreign territories can be settled by mutual agreement.

These principles would have to be applied in a similar manner to the districts of German settlement in the south and to the determination of the State frontiers against Italy and the Southern Slav States. You have stated, Mr. President, that you are waging war against the Governments of the Central Powers but not against the German nation. You have stated that you wish to achieve equal justice for all nations, including the German nation. We therefore appeal to you to use your authority for the right of self-determination of our nations. As we also take our stand on the principles which you, Mr. President, have proclaimed, any prolongation of the war would be tantamount to the meaningless murder of many people.

We therefore request you, Mr. President, to use your authority to bring about an immediate general armistice on all fronts and to grant us the possibility of entering into direct negotiations with all nations at a general Peace Conference which may result in a Peace that will give each nation its complete freedom and unite all nations into a lasting league of peace.

We have the honour, etc."

On the day when this note was addressed to President Wilson, the representatives of Sudetenland, German Bohemia, German South Moravia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol, Salzburg and Vorarlberg solemnly announced in the National Assembly their adhesion to the new State, which they recognised as their supreme legislative body. On the same day petitions for admission to German Austria were received from the various German language enclaves, so that State Chancellor Dr. Renner was able to make the following declaration at the third meeting of the provisional National Assembly on November 2nd, 1918:

"Deputies of the National Assembly! The basis of our State activity consists of the provinces and districts which, by their free decision, have carried out their accession to German-Austria. One after another, the provinces of Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol and Vorarlberg have completed their accession, have subjected themselves to the decisions of the provisional National Assembly and stated that they submit to the authorities and the official decrees of the State of German Austria. In addition, however, the provinces of German Bohemia and Sudetenland have already been constituted. These "Länder" or provinces have sent their constituent documents to the provisional National Assembly. In addition the district of Southern Moravia with its capital Znaim has proclaimed its independence and has of its own authority decided to accede to the "Land" of Lower Austria. The Böhmerwaldgau has also proclaimed its independence and decided to join the "Land" of Austria. On the basis of these declarations, the Government of the State has prepared and in part carried out all the legal measures which are to put into effect the incorporation of the "Länder" in German Austrian State territory and the union of German South Moravia and the Böhmerwaldgau with Lower Austria and Upper Austria respectively. Today it is therefore for the provisional National Assembly to take note of these declarations of union and by so doing to decide in administrative matters to take account of the desires of these "Länder"."

By a decision of the same date the above-mentioned "Länder" and districts were declared to be territory of the Austrian State and placed under its protection. There could be no doubt as to the legality of this spontaneous procedure, which represented a unique historical attempt to rise above the profound distress of the German people at that time.

3. THE DESIRE FOR ANSCHLUSS WITH THE REICH

While the self-determination of the individual populations to belong to the new State of German Austria ranked first, the second decision of the State, which was adopted unanimously by the National Assembly, was the determination of Article 2 of the Constitution of November 12th, 1918 in the following terms:

German Austria is a part of the German Republic. Special laws govern the participation of German Austria in the legislation and administration of the German Republic and the extension of the application of laws and arrangements of the German Republic to German Austria.

This decision which was subsequently, namely on March 12th, 1919, raised to a law in the shortened form "German Austria is a part of the German Reich" as Article 2 of the Constitution, was expressed on February 4th, 1919 before the meeting of the German National Assembly in the form of a

parliamentary proclamation by the National Assembly of German Austria in the following manner:

The day after tomorrow, February 6th, the newly elected constituent National Assembly of the German Republic meets at Weimar. Conditions have not yet progressed so far or been created for us to take part in it as members with full rights. Nevertheless we must not pass over this great and significant event without consideration. The greater German idea has not died out with us Germans in these districts and has never been dead. Like a glittering star out of the dark clouds, the joyful hope of the realisation of our longing shines upon us in all the grief and anxiety by which we are surrounded—the hope of permanent reunion with our old mother country. With surging enthusiasm, therefore, we greet the German brothers in the Reich. We greet them with cries of joy. The German people in its entirety, inseparably united, no longer divided by the jealousy of the rulers, shall and must again become our home.

For these reasons the plenipotentiaries of the parties of this High House have submitted the following proposal:

"The German Austrian Provisional National Assembly sends its greetings to the Constituent National Assembly of the German Republic at its meeting in Weimar, a place dear to all Germans, and expresses the hope and conviction that the German Constituent National Assembly, in conjunction with the German Austrian representatives of the people, will succeed in again joining the link that was torn asunder by force in 1866, in realising the unity and freedom of the German people and in uniting German Austria with the German mother country for all time."

4. THE SUPPRESSION OF THE WILL OF THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE

With brute force, with cannons and machine-guns and by political arrests, the new State was attacked and its repartition accomplished in the weeks that followed as a result of the new elections that were prescribed for the German Austrian National Assembly; this was borne in silence and was carried out in part by military assistance from the Allies. Instead of a long description, we will quote the Austrian protests as documentary evidence.

Protest and Complaint of the National Assembly of March 5th, 1919

"The Constituent National Assembly raises a solemn protest against the occupation by force of the "Länder" of German Bohemia and Sudetenland, the Böhmerwaldgau, the districts of Brünn, Iglau and Olmütz, and the southern frontier districts of Styria and Carinthia; it declares these territories and districts together with that part of German South Tyrol which is occupied by the Kingdom of Italy under the armistice agreement as an inviolable part of the Republic of German Austria, on the basis of the right of self-determination of the nations and of the free declaration of accession made by these territories.

In the meantime the dispute has broken out regarding these territories. We call the entire world to witness that we leave the decision regarding the ownership of these territories primarily to the Peace Congress and that we have scorned to use force.

Meanwhile, however, the Czechoslovak Republic, on the basis of old and obsolete imperialistic views, has occupied these territories with armed forces, and in the south of the State also territories have been occupied by another neighbouring republic. They have not awaited the judgment of the Peace Congress but have placed might before right.

At this moment we must also think of the occupied territories in the south. Districts of Styria and Carinthia have also been occupied by enemy forces. The position is somewhat different as regards Southern Tyrol which was occupied in pursuance of the armistice agreement, since the occupation is not illegal so long as the armistice agreement lasts. But we maintain that the occupying power had not the right under the Hague Agreement on belligerent rights

in land warfare to hinder or restrict civil activity in the occupied territory; we consider that the population should have been given the right of voting. We therefore include this territory in our protest.

We further declare that these "Länder" and territories, in view of the right of self-determination of the nations and of their free declaration of accession, must be considered as inviolable parts of the Republic of German Austria. In Article 3 the Constituent Assembly protests against the fact that these territories were prevented from free voting and were thereby deprived by illegal force of their representation in the Constituent National Assembly, and reserves the right provided for in §40 of the election regulations to convene representatives of these occupied territories."

Law of March 12th, 1919 on the Occupied State Territories.

The Constituent National Assembly has decided as follows:

Article 1.

The Constituent National Assembly makes a solemn protest against the occupation by force of the "Länder" of German Bohemia and Sudetenland, the district of Znaim and the Böhmerwaldgau, the districts of Brünn, Iglau and Olmütz, and the southern frontier districts of Styria and Carinthia; it declares these "Länder" and territories and that part of Southern Tyrol which is occupied by the Kingdom of Italy under the armistice agreement as an inviolable part of the Republic of German Austria in virtue of the right of self-determination of the nations and of the free declarations of accession made by these territories.

Article 2.

The Constituent National Assembly categorically protests against the fact that these territories were prevented from free voting and were therefore deprived by illegal force from their representation in the Constituent National Assembly and reserves the right provided for in §40 of the election regulations to convene representatives of these occupied territories. The constitutional activity of the Constituent National Assembly is not impaired by the illegal prevention by force of the election of a part of their representatives.

Proclamation of the Sudetenland against the Prevention of Voting, communicated to the National Assembly on March 5th, 1919

"Sudetenland, being prevented by forcible measures of the Czechoslovak State from exercising the right to vote, sends its most cordial brotherly greetings to the German Austrian National Assembly at Vienna on the date of its first meeting. As a sign of protest against the prevention of the election, a general strike is declared today, March 4th, throughout German Bohemia and Sudetenland. Conscious of our indissoluble connection with the German national community, we are today with you, German Austrians, in spirit. Do not forget us. From the bottom of our hearts we long for the day of our liberation from the intolerable yoke of Czechoslovak foreign rule. All political parties of Sudetenland."

5. THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE PARIS "PEACE CONFERENCE"

"The new Governments of Austria and Hungary had a right to expect that the Peace Conference would allot them the territories in the spirit of the fourteen points. To say the least, there was a great moral obligation on the part of the Allies to treat Austria and Hungary with that justice which was so eloquently expressed by President Wilson."

The way in which this right was handled by the Peace Conference is then shown by Charles Seymour in the book quoted above.

"The perplexity of the leading statesmen can be easily imagined when they had to listen to the contradictory claims. Negotiations were carried on about districts of which they had scarcely heard, if at all. How could just decisions be taken in

such a case, and how could time be found for a detailed study. The American delegates demanded in vain that statistical data should be furnished."

Mr. Seymour might have added that these negotiations were carried on without those whose fate was at stake. When the German Austrian delegation, which had arrived in Paris on March 13th, 1919, submitted its full powers to the Conference on the 19th, it was met by the "claw of the tiger" with a refusal on the grounds that there would be no dealings whatever with a "German Austria". Nothing is more characteristic of the spirit of the Allies than the way in which they rejected everything connected with the word "German", or than their arbitrary determination of the name under which the German Austrian people must live in future; this is shown by the following note:

Paris, May 29th, 1919.

Mr. President:

I have the honor of returning enclosed to Your Excellency the full powers which you were kind enough to deliver to me on May 19th, 1919, and concerning which I have received instructions to address to you the following notification.

The Allied and Associated Powers have decided to recognise the new Republic under the name of "Republic of Austria". They therefore declare their willingness to recognize the full powers which were delivered on May 19th, as authorizing the delegates named therein to negotiate in the name of the Republic of Austria.

Please accept, etc.

The President of the Committee on Credentials
(Signed) Jules Cambon.

That there could, however, be no question whatever of normal negotiations with the German Austrian delegation is shown by the following note from Clemenceau of May 31st, 1919, which may be described as a remarkable historical document of blind hatred and force:

Sir:

In your letter of 30th May you expressed the wish to be received by the Supreme Council to present verbally your observations.

According to the rules set out by the Conference for negotiations, the exchange of views must take place only in writing. Therefore, if the Austrian Delegation wishes to present observations it will have all liberty to do so in memorandums addressed to the President of the Conference. These memorandums will be strictly confidential and will be communicated only to the members of the Supreme Council.

Please accept...

(Signed) Clemenceau.

Stenographic Report of the Eight Plenary Session (Secret) of the Peace Conference at the Quai d'Orsay on Saturday May 31st, 1919.

(Note by the Editor: At the decisive moment, after the representatives of the Little Entente countries had put forward their claims at this meeting, President Wilson again uttered a warning against the violation of the right of self-determination of the nations. Below we reproduce the extract from President Wilson's speech from the minutes of the meeting.)

"We are trying to make a peaceful settlement, that is to say, to eliminate those elements of disturbances, so far as possible, which may interfere with the peace of the world, and we are trying to make an equitable distribution of territories according to the race, the ethnographical character of the peoples inhabiting those territories.

And back of that lies this fundamentally important fact that when the decisions are made, the Allied and Associated Powers guarantee to maintain them. It is perfectly evident, upon a moment's reflexion, that the chief burden of this maintenance will fall upon the great powers. The chief burden of the war fell upon the great powers and if it had not been for their action, their military action, we would not be here to settle these questions.

In those circumstances is it unreasonable and unjust that not as dictators but as friends the great powers should say to their associated: "We cannot afford to guarantee territorial settlements which we do not believe to be right and we cannot agree to leave elements of disturbance unremoved, which we believe will disturb the peace of the world."

The provisional reply of the delegation was handed in on June 10th, 1919. It read as follows :

Delegation of the Republic of German-Austria.
No. 229.

St. Germain-en-Laye.
June 10th, 1919.

Mr. President :

The German-Austrian Delegation to the Peace Conference devoted itself with all expedition to a study of the draft Treaties which the Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers were so good as to hand to it, Treaties which aim at the establishment of a durable peace.

Now, notwithstanding the desire of German-Austria to attain this peace as swiftly as possible, despite the absolute necessity of putting an end both to the present conditions of existence in German-Austria and to the distress of a people exhausted by the miseries of the war and its consequences, the German-Austrian Delegation is compelled, while reserving the right to bring forward any needful arguments in its final reply, to point out forthwith to the Allied and Associated Powers that the conditions which it is sought to impose on the German people of Austria would deprive it of the factors indispensable for its material existence as well as for the maintenance of both political and social order.

Every State, if it is to live, requires sufficient territory and the necessary material resources. Now, by the terms of the draft neither its native soil nor the things which are indispensably necessary for its existence are to be granted to German-Austria.

She is to be deprived of her richest and most fertile districts. Against their will, their national feeling and their economic interests, more than four out of ten million German-Austrians are to be placed under a domination which, besides being foreign, is not well disposed towards our nation. It is thus that the German districts of Bohemia, as well as of Silesia, and the German areas of Moravia, are to be incorporated in the Czecho-Slovak State. Here you have coherent areas, inhabited by nearly three million Germans in compact masses, without mentioning considerable isolated districts in Bohemia and Moravia which are likewise, in the view of their populations, portions of Austrian territory. This question, moreover, having regard to its special importance, will form the subject of a separate statement. We cannot understand from what point of view such measures are reconcilable with the principles of equity proclaimed by the Great Powers as the only fruits obtained from the war at the cost of bloody sacrifices. It is proposed to separate, among other districts, the Böhmerwaldgau, including the areas of Neubistritz and the district of Znaim, from German-Austrian territories. It is proposed to enslave thousands of the inhabitants of Lower Austria for the sole reason that their land is well adapted to the industrial undertakings of a neighbor who is anxious to deprive us of our last sugar refinery as well as of the railway junctions most important for our commercial existence. While adducing on the one hand, the alleged argument of historical frontiers, there is no hesitation, on the other hand, in trampling underfoot the historical rights of Lower Austria. Furthermore, the desire repeatedly manifested by the German population of the districts of Western Hungary to be allowed a plebiscite on the question of its adjunction to German-Austria, has been passed over in discouraging silence. After all the sufferings and distress which have been borne by an heroic people, proud of its glorious past, it is sought to dismember the country of Andreas Hofer and definitely to place the Southern Tyrol under an alien domination, even those portions of it which, at the time of the Armistice, escaped occupation. The result would be to deprive extensive German areas in Styria, as well as the basin of Carinthia to half way up its northern slope, both of their liberty and their material resources, without paying heed to the question whether existence is possible for the inhabitants of the strip of territory which would remain between an uncrossable range of mountains and the frontier of a State. The whole block of our native soil, which forms an ethnical and economic unit, is to be parcelled out, and the pieces torn from the live body of a people divided up among rich neighbors who merely seek to crush it under the weight of their material superiority.

These are the general impressions which the conditions of peace as communicated, have produced on us at first sight.

The consequences entailed by these conditions, that is, the parcelling out of German-Austria and the destruction of its economic existence, could not be in harmony with the intentions of the Powers which, at the present time, govern the destinies of peoples and have accepted the responsibility for so doing.

One might be tempted to explain these conditions, on the one hand by the fact that we have not been heard; on the other, by the fact that stipulations which are inapplicable to the conditions in States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, have been merely transplanted into the present draft.

We are unaware whether the Powers realize that the consequences of splitting up our territory and of our economic ruin could not, even supposing that they corresponded to their intentions, be confined to the frontiers of German-Austria; for the collapse of our economic existence must perforce destroy all public authority in a territory situated in the heart of the continent and also bring about the dismemberment of the State and political and social anarchy, while our neighbors would inevitably be involved in this catastrophe of which it is impossible to forecast the after-effects and disastrous results.

We wish to make it absolutely plain that the Government of German-Austria now in power, which has been able, during six months, and only thanks to the utmost tenacity, to preserve order at home and peace abroad, could not assume responsibility for the consequences of such conditions of peace.

Please to accept, etc.,

Renner.

In the days that followed, the delegation submitted to the Conference successive notes on conditions in German Bohemia, Sudetenland, Ostrau, Styria, Carinthia and Tyrol. The representatives of Sudetenland had at the same time sent a memorandum direct to the Conference.

In a note of June 25th, 1919 the delegation then submitted counter-proposals in the form of a treaty text. A whole month of uncertainty passed. The reason for this will be found in the complete report of the German Austrian Peace Delegation regarding these "negotiations". It says :

"On July 20th, at noon, M. Dutasta, the Secretary General of the Peace Conference, appeared at the Villa occupied by Chancellor Renner, accompanied by one officer from each of the English, French, and Italian Military Mission in St. Germain-en-Laye, and delivered to the Chancellor without further formulation the complete conditions of peace with a letter from the President of the Peace Conference dated July 20th.

In this accompanying letter these peace conditions were designated as the "Final Text of the Peace Conditions", and a term of ten days was granted to the Delegation in which to turn in its written rejoinders."

While the Austrian provinces were visited by revolutionary disturbances, while famine claimed a terrible number of victims, this Austrian peace delegation had sat since May 13th, 1919 in Saint-Germain with nothing to do but merely to await what the high Powers vouchsafed to decide regarding the fate of the former Monarchy. The repeated inquiries of the delegation remained unanswered because, as the report points out, the Allies were themselves quarrelling about the booty which was to be distributed. The delegation was intentionally left in uncertainty and then a time limit of ten days was allowed in order to prevent any serious or objective discussion or the preparation of counter-observations by the Austrians. In view of French traffic conditions at that time, as is shown by a note from the delegation to M. Clemenceau, three days were required to reach Vienna in order to obtain the necessary personal contact with the National Assembly. If everything went well, the delegation had four days at its disposal to take up an attitude to a document of 371 articles. "You have ten days time!" The laconic handing-over of the peace conditions by the officers was the symbolic framework of the Allies and showed to the outer world that this was an act, not of right, but of violence.

In so far as the Allies in their observations went into the Austrian counter-proposals, their "reply" may be summarised as stating on one point after another that the delegation had brought forward no new point of view. The Austrian Delegation was thus given on July 20th the last possibility of combating the terrible conditions. On the same day, therefore, a protest demonstration by the National Assembly took place. The "liberal" conditions of the great democracies were again brought appealingly before world public opinion.

The people of German Austria is unanimously of the opinion that what is here offered to us is not a peace of conciliation but a peace of destruction. This peace does not mean for us release from the horrors of war, it merely means the prolongation of war, famine, distress, misery and destruction; in view of the peculiar nature of our conditions of production, it means a slow decline, the dying off of large masses of the people, more terrible and cruel than even rapid physical death. We are torn away from the great Reich of the German nation, our brothers in Bohemia and in the Sudeten territories are torn away from us, together with our brothers in

South Tyrol, Carinthia, South Styria, and even in the mother country Lower Austria.

Anyone who believes that these conditions will acquire definite force must despair of mankind. We hope that these conditions have been put forward in ignorance of the peculiarities of our economic, financial and political position. We hope that our Peace Delegation will succeed in enlightening our opponents as to what our position is and what the results of this peace would be.

The last counter-proposals of the Austrian delegation were transmitted to the Conference on August 6th, 1919; they relate mainly to the delimitation of the frontiers. The covering note to these proposals read as follows:

Delegation of
German Austria
No. 914

St. Germain-en-Laye
August 6th, 1919

Covering Letter

From: Mr. Renner
To: President Clemenceau
Mr. President:

By the Note of July 20th, Your Excellency was kind enough to deliver to me, in the name of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the Text of the Peace Conditions with German Austria.

Referring to that letter, I hasten to send to Your Excellency the remarks presented by the Delegation of German Austria on the Ensemble of the Treaty. In order to facilitate the examination of these remarks and to make them clear, I take the liberty of adding the drafts of the various parts of the Treaty in the form which would result from the adoption of our proposals.

In examining our point of view, the Supreme Council will be kind enough to recognise that the German Austrian Delegation has, in the present state of the negotiations, scrupulously limited itself to ask only the attenuations indispensable to the existence of the German Austrian People and the refusal of which would expose it to anarchy and misery.

According to the Text of the "Conditions" a formal refusal is opposed to the desire of the German Austrian people to remain free and to remain united. Vast German territories of northern Bohemia, of the Sudetes Country, of Bohemia and of southern Moravia, of Styria, of Carinthia as well as of the Tyrol beyond the Brenner, should be delivered to other States and subjected to other peoples. The Germans of the Alps and of the Sudetes, since 1526 Nationals of the sole and same Empire, united together by the ties of blood, by relationship and alliances united and intermingled so as to form effectively only one family, should be assigned to two different States, States which on account of the opposing interests suggested to them shall become natural opponents in the future. This decision of the Powers, who at present dispose of and are responsible for the future of humanity, fills the German Austrian populations with the most poignant bitterness. The economic, political and social reasons proving the necessity of the union of the German Countries of the former monarchy to one and the same State have been clearly proved by the undersigned Delegation in its previous communications. But it was in vain that we invoked the principle of the independence of Nations, a principle proclaimed by the Powers themselves as their war aim, it was in vain that we put forth the right of self-determination. Can it be the over-whelming burden of the disaster which prevents us from seeing clearly through the intentions of the said decision and from being able to recognise the predominant rights which oppose themselves to the liberty of our People? It is not for us to make reproaches, we can only make use of the right to complain and decline the responsibility and to abandon the consequences to historic evolution.

It has been proved that German Austria could not live within the restricted frontiers which are imposed upon her and that the subjection of her nationals by the neighboring States would bring about a serious ferment and a latent danger for peace and social order in the centre of Europe. We are told, however, that we shall be allowed to live nevertheless; we are willing therefore to persuade ourselves that it shall be so, supposing, evidently, that justice shall be made to our territorial aspirations within that measure, reduced to a minimum, upon which we insist in the Appended proposals. We shall therefore bring all our forces and all our efforts into play to brave resolutely the enormous dangers and troubles which are awaiting us. In this moment of distress, we warmly greet the Constitution of the League of Nations and we hope to be able to count on the interest which it shall lend us as well as on the reception which it shall extend to us. That is the only reservation we make.

However, we must declare, right now, that it was in vain that we tried until now to convince ourselves of the possibility of an hypothesis in which we never could be in a position to effectively stand all the burdens which the Treaty imposes upon us. It is our duty to proclaim in advance that, unless the said burdens are essentially alleviated, we shall inevitably succumb under their weight.

Let the High Powers receive this solemn declaration with as much seriousness and interest as it is made with loyalty and frankness. It is incumbent upon us to ask that this burden be made bearable. The German-Austrian People only wishes to live; give him the assurance that it will be possible!...

We know that, as defeated, we are bound to carry out all the demands of the victors. But, while submitting to the conditions imposed by the powers with which the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was at war, in what concerns the assign states of the said Empire, we must firmly maintain the point of view that the liquidation between the latter can be effected only upon the basis of the right of peace, or at least, on that of indispensable consideration between neighbors. In settling the relations existing between us and the other states formed on the territory of the Monarchy, we must insist that our material existence not be rendered impossible. Our downfall, furthermore, would open an abyss for them. Our firm conviction, therefore, is that the provisions, as we have just pointed out, which are absolutely impossible of execution and each one of which, in itself, is fatal for our economic organism, must be eliminated from the Peace Treaty. The discussion of these questions, however, should not prolong the deliberations of the Peace Conference; no other solution, therefore, remains than to abandon to the Commission on Reparations the task of effecting the settlement of them.

In order to show, definitely and prove clearly that the proposed modifications, reduced, as they are, to a most modest measure, do not, in any point, exceed the elementary demands of our viability, it would, in my opinion, be of unquestionable value for all the parties concerned to hear the members of the German Austrian Delegation and to ask them for all the desired explanations, verbally, in the competent committees.

German Austria does not wish to admit that it would answer the intentions of the Great Powers to make it sign engagements which, by the force of facts, cannot be carried out, or the execution of which would put an end to the social and economic life of the state obligated. Furthermore, German Austria—fully aware of its situation—is ready to accept all charges, to make all sacrifices and to sign all conditions which it can carry out and support and which it, therefore, conscientiously and in good faith, can assume without compromising the existence of the people which it represents.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) Renner.

* * *

Shortly afterwards the delegation transmitted to M. Clemenceau the following decision of the National Assembly of August 8th, 1918:

"The Main Committee, on behalf of the entire country, again protests against the attempt of the Peace Treaty to falsify the facts by simulating a mutual state of war which never existed between the nations of the old Danube Monarchy and by abolishing by means of a dictate the clear legal position of the common succession of all nationalities. No instrument of international law, however solemn, can decide that right is not right and that what has never happened is a fact. But, in addition, no such instrument can permanently prejudice the right of national self-determination which is to be violated on all our frontiers, or dissolve the bonds of blood relationship which bind us to our threatened compatriots."

The opponents did not make the slightest effort to give an objective reply to the Austrian counter-proposals and observations. On the contrary, they admitted openly in their reply that German populations were placed under foreign rule. The reply contains the following passage:

"If the Austrian people had during the years which preceded the war made efforts to repress the spirit of militarism and of domination which had animated the governants of the monarchy, if it had raised an effective protest against war, if they had refused to aid and support its rulers in the design to pursue it, one might accord some attention to the defence at the present day. But the Austrian people have been from beginning to end its ardent partisan, it has done nothing to separate itself from the politics of its government and of its allies until their defeat on the field of battle, proof sufficient that conformably to the sacred rules of justice Austria should be held to assume its entire share of responsibility for the crime which has enchained upon the world such a calamity."

What a pretext for trampling underfoot the most primitive principles of the solemnly promised right of self-determination

of the nations and for covering express compulsion by the phrase "the sacred rules of justice".

On September 2nd, 1919, when the final text of the peace conditions was handed to the delegation, the entire dictatorial character of the treaty was again intentionally demonstrated by the fact that the demand for signature within five days was accompanied by the observation:

"In default of such declaration within the time specified above, the armistice concluded November 3rd, 1918 shall be considered at an end and the Allied and Associated Powers shall take all measures judged necessary to impose these conditions."

In the correspondence published in the report of the German Austrian delegation, there is perhaps nothing so disgracefully humiliating as the petition of the head of the delegation to Clemenceau to extend the time limit for two days on the grounds that, as already mentioned, traffic conditions did not permit of such a rapid journey to Vienna. The Supreme Council magnanimously accorded this extension after a decision had been taken by the meeting.

The demand for the right of self-determination was at that time the cry of distress of the entire Austrian people. Let us return to the mother country! On every hand your arbitrary will has decided that three millions of our brothers and sisters are placed under foreign rule. You have founded States which are to act as policemen in watching over our impotence in foreign affairs; you have left an Austria which is condemned in this form to political and social death. This cannot be right, and to state that it is right is an injustice.

On the day of the final reunion of Austria with the mother country, it is well to read again these cries of distress. They are documents which prove convincingly who laid the foundation in Europe of permanent discord and who was responsible for the fact that, more than twenty years after a terrible world war, bloodstained boundaries placed this continent permanently before the danger of a new war. These documents show that the Austrian nation at the very time of its deepest humiliation earnestly and sincerely demanded the Anschluss and they finally refute the statement that the great historical events of the last few days represent an act of violence.

The German Austrian delegation enclosed two protests in the letter to Clemenceau accepting the peace thus imposed, i.e. the decision of the National Assembly of September 6th, 1919 and the protest of the "Länder" of German Austria of September 5th, 1919. They read as follows:

Protest of the «Länder» of German Austria.

St. Germain-en-Laye, September 6th, 1919.

Sir,

With reference to the note of the 2nd inst. in which Your Excellency was kind enough to forward to the German-Austrian Delegation the final text of the Peace Treaty with Austria, I have the honour to inform you that the National Assembly of German-Austria, by a vote taken the 6th instant, has appointed the State Chancellor Mr. Renner, to sign the Peace Treaty.

I am taking the liberty to annex to this communication the text of the declaration voted concerning this subject by the National Assembly as well as a resolution pronounced by the representatives of German Bohemia, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, the Country of the Sudetes, of the Tyrols, and of the Government of the arrondissement of German Southern Moravia, resolution in which the said representatives protest against the subjection of three million and half German-Austrians to foreign domination.

Decision of the National Assembly of September 6th, 1919

The National Assembly solemnly protests before the entire world against the provisions of the Peace Treaty which,—under the pretext of protecting the independence of German Austria—deprives the German

Austrian nation of its right of self-determination, and refuses it the right to realize its ardent desire for union with the mother-country Germany, a desire constituting a vital, economic, intellectual and political necessity. The National Assembly expresses the hope that, as soon as peace shall have dissipated the spirit of animosity and national rancor provoked by the war, the Powers will not continue, thanks to the intervention of the League of Nations, to refuse to the German people its right to unity and its national liberty, a right accorded to all other nations.

It is with the utmost profound bitterness that the National Assembly protests against the decree of the Allied and Associated Powers, a decree unfortunately irrevocable, by virtue of which three million and a half Germans of the Country of the Sudetes are violently separated from the Germans of the Alps, with whom they have formed for centuries a political and economic unity. By this decree they are deprived of their national liberty and subjected to the foreign domination of a nation which in this very Peace Treaty recognizes itself as their enemy.

Deprived of all power to avert this disaster and to spare Europe the troubles that will inevitably result from this offense against the most sacred rights of a nation, the National Assembly of German Austria, before the bar of history, charges with the responsibility for this decision the conscience of the Powers who put it into execution in spite of our most solemn warning.

The National Assembly must unfortunately take this constraint into account, although it considers the Peace of St. Germain as unjust nationally, fatal politically and inexecutable economically. From the political and national point of view, it must throw the responsibility on the Powers; as to the economic point of view, it can only wait until it knows the plans of the Powers as to the execution of the economic and financial clauses. The National Assembly expects that the promises made by the Powers in their reply will be accomplished; it considers the League of Nations as the jurisdiction called upon to do justice to our Republic and to assure it in future; and it instructs the Chancellor to sign the Peace Treaty.

Ad. No. 1176 ex 1919

Protest by the German-Austrian countries

Vienna, September 5th, 1919.

To the General Commission
of the German-Austrian National Assembly at Vienna

Today the Government and the representation of the German-Austrian people are to decide if they can agree to sign the Peace Treaty imposed by the Powers of the Entente, a treaty by which the German Countries of the Sudetes, of the Southern Tyrol, the German territories in Carinthia, in Styria, and in Lower Austria would be delivered to foreign domination.

The representatives of the German countries of the Sudetes, of the Tyrol, of Carinthia, of Styria, and of Upper and Lower Austria confirm, in this fatal hour, that the territorial clauses of the Peace Treaty violate the elementary right of nations to self-determination and also seriously violate the principles which served as a base in concluding the armistice.

The national representations therefore renew, before the entire world, their solemn protest against this forced peace; unanimously, they refuse to recognize the distinction established by the treaty classifying the peoples in two categories: free nations and slave nations.

They declare that the three million and a half Germans, forced by such a peace treaty to submit to foreign domination, will insist to the end of time to affirm their right to self-determination, a right which forms the only possible basis for national constitutions. In the name of the countries represented.

For German Bohemia . . . , for Carinthia . . . , for Upper Austria . . . , for Lower Austria . . . , for Styria . . . , for the Sudetes . . . , for Tyrol . . .

6. THE IDEA OF THE ANSCHLUSS WITH THE REICH IS SUPPRESSED BY A THREAT OF OCCUPATION OF THE RIGHT BANK OF THE RHINE

It is clear from the above documents with what enthusiasm and longing the Austrian people desired Anschluss with the Reich at the hour when the new State was born, and that this desire was legally established in Article 2 of the Constitution of the State.

The Allies, with France at the head, attempted to represent this desire so spontaneously expressed by the German populations of the former Monarchy at the end of 1918 as if it were an intrigue of the German Reich. Leading American historians, experts in international law and delegates to the Peace Conference, such as House, Seymour, Lansing, Hunter Miller and Temperley, regarded this Anschluss as the most natural and proper course. In their

case any ignorance of European conditions might have been pardoned since they lived in another continent. But it was reserved for the European "victors", in some cases deliberately, to set aside all reason and to use the most evil means of attaining their objects.

What can better illustrate the spirit of St. Germain than the fact that on September 2nd, 1919 representatives of the French army and diplomacy in a theatrical setting handed over Clemenceau's peace conditions to the Austrian delegation and gave an ultimatum with a limit of five days for signature, while at the same time issuing a demand to the German Reich, with a threat of the occupation of the right bank of the Rhine, that it should remove from its Constitution the article that stated that German Austria was a German Land.

The ultimatum to Germany of September 2nd, 1919 was worded as follows :

September 2nd, 1919.

To : The President of the German Delegation
From : The President of the Peace Conference

The Allied and Associated Powers have noted the German constitution of August 11th, 1919. They note that the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 61 constitute a formal violation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919.

This violation is double :

(1) Article 61, by stipulating the admission of Austria to the Reichsrat, assimilates this republic to the German lands (Deutsche Lander) which compose the German Empire, an assimilation which is incompatible with the independence of Austria.

(2) By admitting and regulating the participation of Austria in the Imperial Council, Article 61 creates a political bond and a political action common to Germany and Austria, in absolute contradiction with the independence of the latter.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers, after having reminded the German Government that Article 178 of the German constitution declares that "the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles can not be affected by the constitution," request the German Government to take due measures to suppress this violation immediately by declaring the second paragraph of Article 61 null and void.

Without pledging themselves not to take further measures, in case of refusal, and by virtue of the Treaty (notably of Article 428), the Allied and Associated Powers declare to the German Government that this violation of its pledges, on an essential point, will constrain them, if their just demand is not complied with, within fifteen days from the present time, to order at once the extension of their occupation of the right bank of the Rhine.

There was no difficulty in Paris in fiding legal subtleties to deceive world public opinion and to camouflage the aims of a policy of power.

The German Government gave the following reply on September 5th, 1919 to the threat of September 2nd :

The German Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference.

The President of the German Peace Delegation

Versailles, September 5th, 1919

To His Excellency

Mr. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference
Mr. President :

According to their note of September 2nd, 1919, the Allied and Associated Powers are of the opinion that section 2 of Article 61 of the German Constitution, dealing with German Austria's right to participate in the (German) Reichsrat, is a formal violation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty, and they demand therefore that the German Government take the necessary steps within 14 days to eliminate this violation by canceling section 2 of Article 61.

In connection herewith the German Government declares the following :

In discussing Article 80 of the (Peace) Conditions, the German Peace Delegation at Versailles pointed out in its observations on the Peace Conditions, which were presented to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on May 29th, 1919, that Germany never has had and never will have the intention to change the German Austrian boundary line by force, but that it could hardly assume the responsibility of opposing a possible future wish of the population of Austria for a re-establishment of the political union with the German

mother country. The Allied and Associated Governments, in their reply of June 16th, 1919, acknowledged receiving notice 190 that Germany would forgo any change by force of the German Austrian boundary lines. The Germans therefore assumed that it would not be in contradiction of Article 80 of the Peace Conditions, which in its last sentence specifically points towards a future possibility of a change in Austria's political independence with the assent of the League of Nations, if the road to this possibility were paved by an amicable approach between the two countries in accordance with the principles of the right of self-determination of peoples. For this reason Article 61, section 2, has been incorporated in the German Constitution. In its first sentence it regulates German Austria's right to vote in the German Reichsrat merely in case the union of that country with Germany should take place but it does not anticipate the events upon which such a union would depend. In the second sentence of the Section a deliberative voice in the Reichsrat is granted to the representatives of German Austria until the time of a definite union. By this regulation it was intended neither to touch upon German Austria's independence nor upon the conditions which might lead towards a change of this independence which had been recognized by Germany in the Peace Treaty ; for this Section leaves it to Austria's free discretion whether she wishes to avail herself of the right of participation in the sessions of the Reichsrat, and binds that country neither by public nor by international law.

In spite of these facts, the Allied and Associated Governments consider the admission of German Austrian delegates to the Reichsrat as incompatible with the national independence of the country as guaranteed by Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace, for this admission would (in their opinion) put German Austria on a par with the States forming the German Reich, since it would create a political tie between Germany and Austria and would be attended by joint political activity in the two countries. This point of view of the Allied and Associated Governments indicates an interpretation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty which differs from the interpretation held till now by Germany. Germany, faced by the Note of the Allied and Associated Powers, is unable to uphold her point of view in this question. But this does not necessitate a change of the text of the German Constitution. The Allied and Associated Governments, in their Note, have already pointed to Article 178 of the Constitution, which plainly prescribes that the stipulations of the Peace Treaty are not affected by the Constitution. This article was included in the endeavor to eliminate a priori any contradictions which might possibly arise between the regulations of the Constitution and the stipulations of the Peace Treaty, which latter are often rather vague as to meaning. The proviso (of Article 178) affects all regulations of the Constitution, therefore also the above mentioned regulation in Article 61, section 2. If therefore Article 61, section 2, considered separately is at variance with a stipulation of the Peace Treaty, then this Section automatically becomes ineffective.

The German Government declares, therefore, that the regulation of Article 61, section 2, of the Constitution remains ineffective, that specifically the admission of German Austrian delegates to the German Reichsrat can not take place as long as the Council of the League of Nations does not give its consent to a change in German Austria's international status.

Political Clauses for Europe

Although the matter is herewith settled, by the above declaration, in accordance with the wishes of the Allied and Associated Governments, the German Government finds itself obliged to make the following fundamental remarks : The German Government believes itself to have given no occasion for the rough and blunt form of the Note of the Allied and Associated Governments in which they demanded a clarification of supposed contradictions between the German Constitution and the Peace Treaty. If these governments threaten to extend the occupation in case of a refusal of their demand, and try to justify (such threat) by referring to Article 429 of the Peace Treaty, attention must be called to the fact that the Peace Treaty could not possibly support such a measure, not to mention the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments have not even ratified the Treaty and therefore cannot legally base their demands upon it. Article 429 provides for a longer period of occupation under certain circumstances but never for an extension of the territory under occupation. The German Government considers therefore the threat of such a measure as nothing but a deeply regrettable act of violence.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest esteem.
In absence of Baron Lersner
Schmitt.

German Declaration Concerning the Cancelling of Article 61 of the German Constitution. Versailles, September 22nd, 1919.

The undersigned, duly authorised and acting in the name of the German Government, admits and declares that all the provisions of the German Constitution of the August 11th, 1919, which are in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on the June 28th, 1919, are null and void.

The German Government admits and declares that the second paragraph of Article 61 of the said Constitution is therefore null and void, and in particular that Austrian representatives cannot be admitted to the

Reichsrat, except so far as the Council of the League of Nations, in accordance with Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace, should consent to such a change in the international status of Austria.

The present Declaration will be approved by the competent German legislative authority within fifteen days from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Done at Versailles the 22nd day of September 1919, in the presence of the undersigned representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Freiherr von Lersner
Frank L. Polk
Eyre A. Crowe
Jules Cambon
Vittorio Scialoja
K. Matsui.

7. THE LAST ULTIMATUM

The end of the year 1919 coincides with the most tragical days in the destiny of the greater German idea, namely the disregard and destruction of German national rights. The Clemenceaus, Barthous, Tardieus and Lloyd Georges obstructed the natural source of life of a population of seven millions in the selfish interest of an opportunist policy of violence; by threatening a military advance into Germany they compelled the renunciation of the Anschluss in Berlin and Vienna. The nature of the treaties that were claimed to be valid and sacred is shown finally by the ultimatum of the Allies to the German Austrian Government of December 16th, 1919:

"The attention of the Allied and Associated Powers has been drawn to certain actions that threaten in various ways the unity and territorial inviolability of the Republic of Austria. (The Note then gives particulars of the attempts to hold plebiscites for the Anschluss.)

The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that, if the subversive forces in one of these cases were crowned with success, such a preparation would mean the complete collapse of the Austrian State and of equilibrium in Central Europe.

They therefore wish to leave no doubt as to their desire to maintain the territorial provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain in their entirety and to insist on their strict application. In this spirit the Supreme Council has today taken the following decision which I have the honour to transmit to you on its behalf:

The Allied and Associated Powers, inspired by the desire to secure the existence of Austria within the frontiers allotted to it, and determined to ensure respect for the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain, declare that they will oppose any attempt which calls into question the inviolability of Austrian territory or which would have the result, contrary to the provisions of Article 88 of the above Treaty, in any way, directly or indirectly, of compromising the political and economic independence of Austria."

Even three months after the compulsory signature of St. Germain, the Allies were compelled again to safeguard their bungling by threats against the Austrians; subsequently, as we have pointed out above, this task of sabotaging the right of self-determination was handed over to the Geneva League.

* * *

Truth must be sought on the basis of the texts. But those texts must be ignored which, according to this bungled peace treaty, were declared as a sacred principle of international law by those who in 1919 infringed the right of self-determination of the nations and condemned entire peoples to subjection. Such an international law is immoral. But the higher moral exists when the right of self-determination of the nations breaks out from national distress and irresistible necessity at times when the spiritual tensions of these suppressed peoples have only the one outlet, which Schiller in his William Tell ascribes to inalienable national feeling as the idea and spiritual weapon of humanity, namely the right which is assumed when others desire to withhold it.

From this point of view the representative of Great Germany, in the National Assembly on December 20th, 1919, shortly after the threatening note of December 16th, spoke the truth regarding the historical consequences of the act of violence of St. Germain and his words met with the applause of all; today they have a prophetic character:

"The right of self-determination of the nations is on the march, the right of self-determination which the western democracies have proclaimed hundreds and thousands of times and which they have trampled underfoot in the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. But these treaties are merely the works of man. The national right of self-determination will come into its own in spite of them. This we hope and confidently believe. For this reason we, representatives of Great Germany, do not regard the future as entirely tragic and hopeless. And when we see how wretched our position really is in the interior of the State, we have nevertheless a hope for the future and a task for the coming years.

We representatives of Great Germany may be an object of ridicule, but that is a matter of indifference to us. Our guiding principle will always be the song of the old Burschenschaft which arose in the time of Germany's greatest humiliation: 'If all become untrue, we shall nevertheless remain true.' And likewise we accept the oath: 'We will not break our word, we will not become knaves, we will preach and speak of the Holy German Empire.' With this confidence we shall overcome even the worst."

* * *

This confidence was not misplaced and it was fulfilled on March 13th, 1938. It was perhaps a presentiment of future destiny that, as mentioned in the final sentence of the two-volume report of the German Austrian delegation to the Peace Conference, the delegation bearing the terrible document of St. Germain to Vienna made a short stay at Linz on September 12th, 1919, the same place where, nineteen years later, on March 12th, 1938, Adolf Hitler on his triumphal journey to Vienna also stayed and where in the last few days Article 88 of this document was declared null and void.

I. Solemn Adherence of the Austrian Bishops to the German Reich

The following solemn declaration of the Austrian Bishops was sent to Gauleiter Bürckel, the Führer's representative for the plebiscite in Austria, with the following note :

The Archbishop of Vienna. Vienna, March 18th, 1938.

To the Gauleiter.

Dear Sir,

I transmit herewith the enclosed declaration by the Bishops. You will observe that we Bishops have fulfilled our national duty freely and without compulsion. I know that this declaration will be followed by good cooperation.

With the expression of my great respect.

Heil Hitler.

Th. Cardinal Innitzer,
Archbishop.

The solemn declaration is preceded by the following introduction :

Introduction to the Solemn Declaration of the Austrian Bishops with regard to the Plebiscite.

After thorough discussion, we Bishops of Austria, in view of the great historical hours through which the Austrian people are passing, and in the knowledge that in our time the thousand years' longing of our people for union in a great Reich of the Germans is being achieved, have decided to address the following proclamation to all our faithful. We can do so with all the less hesitation as the representative of the Führer for the plebiscite in Austria, Gauleiter Bürckel, has announced his honest line of policy which is to be placed under the motto : "Render unto God the things that are God's, and unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's."

Vienna, March 21st, 1938.

For the Vienna Church District :
Th. Cardinal Innitzer,
Archbishop.

For the Salzburg Church District :
S. Waitz
Prince Archbishop.

The solemn declaration is worded as follows :

Solemn Declaration.

From our innermost conviction and of our free will, we, the undersigned Bishops of the Austrian church province, make the following declaration in view of the great historical events in German Austria. We gladly recognise that the National Socialist movement has done, and is doing, excellent work in the sphere of national and economic reconstruction and social policy for the German Reich and people and particularly for the poorest classes of the population. We are also convinced that, through the effect of the National Socialist movement, the danger of all-disintegrating godless Bolshevism has been warded off.

The Bishops give their blessings to this activity for the future and will also exhort the faithful in this sense. On the day of the plebiscite it is an obvious national duty for us Bishops to confess our adherence as Germans to the German Reich, and we expect of all believing Christians that they should know what they owe to their people.

Vienna, March 18th, 1938.

A. Hefter

Archbishop.

Pawlikowski

Johannes Maria Gföllner

Michael Memelauer.

Th. Cardinal Innitzer

Archbishop.

S. Waitz

Prince Archbishop.

A Second Note from Cardinal Innitzer to Gauleiter Bürckel.

Against Foreign False Reports.

The Archbishop of Vienna.

Vienna, March 31st, 1938.

To the Gauleiter.

Dear Sir,

I feel impelled to send you some observations in order to clear up and correct a report which has come to my notice and which was published on March 28th by the Berlin Havas representative regarding the proclamation of the Austrian bishops.

The Havas representative writes that this proclamation may be brought into connection with the visit paid by the Papal Nuncio in Berlin to the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop two days ago.

In reply I wish to state that the solemn declaration of the Bishops is in no way connected with the visit of the Papal Nuncio in Berlin. On the contrary it was a spontaneous action in view of the important historical hour of the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. This is clear from the introduction with which the Bishops prefaced their declaration.

I must also reject the statement by the Havas representative in the same report that the proclamation is to be regarded as a gesture of détente on the part of the Bishops, for I should consider it beneath my dignity to make gestures in such an important historical situation.

I again declare that the statement of the Bishops and our attitude to the plebiscite in general are to be considered solely as a confession arising out of the call of our common German blood.

In addition, I should like to announce to you quite frankly my most sincere wish in these historical days that the declaration of the Bishops may mark a turning point in the religious and cultural life of our entire nation and that it may inaugurate a period of the greatest inner appeasement and reconciliation between the Church, the State and the Party.

I hope that this letter is calculated from the outset to disarm any false and erroneous statements in future, whether spoken or written, from whatever source they may come.

With the expression of my great respect.

Heil Hitler.

Th. Cardinal Innitzer, Archbishop.

II. The Evangelical Church of Austria's Attitude to the April 10th, 1938

Vienna, April 1st, 1938.

The Evangelical Supreme Church Council has decided upon the following declaration regarding the plebiscite of April 10th, 1938 ; it will be read in all evangelical churches on Sunday, April 3rd, 1938 :

"On April 10th the German people of Austria is called upon, in a frank and free plebiscite, to announce to the whole world that the return to the Reich and thereby the political reorganisation of our home country is in accordance with the profoundest longing and desire of our people. Our evangelical church in Austria has always been united in this longing, without regard to the favour or disfavour of former rulers. The Evangelical Supreme Church Council, therefore, in turning today to the members of the Evangelical Church, does so not out of anxiety lest anyone should not know what he has to do on this decisive day. The Evangelical Church in Austria on March 12th and

on repeated later occasions has already given expression to its undisguised joy at the historical turn of events. Our church, in its capacity as consoler and helper of many struggling Germans in Austria in the past few years—and that far beyond the members of the church—sympathises with the great joy of these days and accepts it gratefully as a gift of God.

We stand by the saving act of the Führer. The unreserved "Yes" of Evangelical Austria as the reply which the people owe to the Führer is for us merely a self-evident national duty of which we need to remind no one. This "Yes" is an expression of sincere thanks to our gracious God for the salvation and liberation of our home country from that oppression which appeared to bring us back to the times of the counter-reformation.

Evangelical Supreme Church Council
Signed : Dr. Kauer."

VÖLKERBUND

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THE PLEBISCITE OF APRIL 10TH, 1938

Over 99 % in Favour of the Anschluss and of Adolf Hitler's Policy

"In a few days we have won more than could formerly be achieved after victorious wars. This time, therefore, it must be a sacred election. The whole of Germany must take part. The whole of Germany must proclaim its faith."

(Extract from Adolf Hitler's Speech at Königsberg on March 25th, 1938.)

"The question is often raised as to why a plebiscite must be held regarding the Anschluss. If we had not held an election, certain seekers after truth in Paris, London and Moscow would have gone on for years trying to convince the world that we had violated Austria. But it will now be brought drastically before the eyes of the world that we did not need to use force. We will show the world that Austria came to the Reich not only voluntarily but gladly. Germany thus preserves Wilson's right of self-determination so bombastically announced but subsequently withheld. If the nations are themselves to decide their fate, Austria must also reply Yes or No. We are convinced that the Austrian people will vote with an overwhelming majority for the Reich and against the principles of the dictate of Versailles. But when it is asked why not Austria alone but the entire Reich is to vote, the answer is: We do not want Austria to go to the polls alone. From now onwards German Austria is to have everything in common with the Reich, even its confession of adherence to the Reich. This election will thus be a truly historical election. Germany votes regarding the Reich and at the same time regarding a five-year period of constructive work of the National Socialist regime."

(Extract from Dr. Goebbels' Speech in Berlin on March 24th, 1938.)

In these two statements by the Führer and Chancellor and by the Reich Minister of National Enlightenment and Propaganda, the significance and profound meaning of the plebiscite is clearly set forth.

A sacred, historical election. Sacred, because in a late hour of world history the supreme vital right of a nation is realised, namely the right to live and work together for everything that belongs together by blood and language, inheritance and past history. The action of Adolf Hitler, who brought back his home country to the Reich without shedding a drop of blood was to receive a confirmation which arose not so much out of a great political act as out of the language of the heart. The confession of the 50 millions was to come from the feeling of unity of all Germans in the Reich and in the South Eastern March. Nature was to regain a right that had been withheld. The German people in Austria were to declare: We wish to return to the Reich. The German people within the old frontiers of the Reich were to declare: Welcome to the German Fatherland.

Never in history has such a declaration been made by a great nation with more power, joy and pride: of a total of 49,493,028 persons entitled to vote in Greater Germany, 49,279,104, i.e.

99.57 %, went to the polls. Of these, 48,751,587, or 99.08 %, voted Yes, and 452,170, or 0.92 %, voted No. In Austria alone, out of 4,474,138 entitled to vote, 4,461,778 went to the polls, and of these 4,443,208, or 99.75 %, voted Yes, and 11,807 voted No. In the old Reich, out of a total of 44,749,227, 44,545,586 went to the polls and 44,039,567, or 99.02 %, voted Yes, while 437,252 voted No.

Over 99 % of all voters, therefore, voted in a general, free and secret plebiscite in favour of the Anschluss and of the leadership of Adolf Hitler. 99 %, that is a figure which can no longer be twisted or tampered with. It must obviously appear quite superfluous to apply election arithmetic to this figure or to calculate decimal places or proportions. The same applies to reflections as to whether such a result can be obtained by external pressure or arts of governments.

But this election was also a historical one. A thousand years of struggle, brought by Adolf Hitler in a bold decision to a victorious conclusion, has now become a part of history by the signature of an entire nation. The voice of the German nation in Austria, which was called upon to take part in a free and honest vote, has placed the seal of the free determination of the nation under the laws of March 13th. The German people in the old Reich and in the Land of Austria have confirmed the great historical fact and thus annulled the „Anschluss prohibition" laid down in the dictates of Versailles and St. Germain against the right of self-determination of the nations and at the same time helped that right of self-determination again to conquer. They have legalised the events of March 13th in a form which democracy cannot object to or cast doubt upon. The democracy of the western countries was beaten in Austria on April 10th with its own weapons. Never has an act of world history been accomplished with such general and profound enthusiasm by an entire nation, and never has such an act been approved and confirmed with such unanimity by a whole people. After such a proclamation, how is it possible honestly to speak of a dictatorship, of an act of violence or of an injustice, when all that was done was to remove a dictate imposed nearly twenty years ago, to correct an act of violence and to make good an injustice done. Those who still think they should criticise the methods should rather, in view of the elementary force which was here displayed, reflect what a dangerous game it was to erect these artificial limits, and what a criminal game was played at Versailles and St. Germain when, under the pressure of the bayonets and the hunger blockade, those articles were compulsorily signed which divided the world in unequal parts and thereby prevented concord among the nations. At the present time not only have an injustice and a violation been annulled, but a great national and European evil has been prevented. For if Austria had become a second Spain, almost all the key positions of Europe would have become the subject of warlike debate. To that extent a pacified Europe will be able some day to celebrate the 10th of April 1938 as the date when its consolidation began.

THE ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT

of April 16th, 1938

L'accordo italo-britannico firmato il 16 aprile 1938

A. PROTOCOL

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Italian Government, animated by the desire to place the relations between the two countries on a solid and lasting basis and to contribute to the general cause of peace and security, have decided to undertake conversations in order to reach agreement on questions of mutual concern; and the said conversations having taken place;

The Earl of Perth, G.C.M.G., C.B., his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome, and Count Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, duly authorised for that purpose by their respective Governments, have drawn up the present Protocol and have signed the Agreements and Declarations annexed hereto, each of which shall be regarded as a separate and self-contained instrument:

1. Reaffirmation of the Declaration of January 1st, 1937, regarding the Mediterranean, and of the Notes exchanged on December 31st, 1936.

2. Agreement regarding the Exchange of Military Information.

3. Agreement regarding certain Areas in the Middle East.

4. Declaration regarding Propaganda.

5. Declaration regarding Lake Tsana.

6. Declaration regarding the Military Duties of Natives of Italian East Africa.

7. Declaration regarding the free Exercise of Religion and the Treatment of British Religious Bodies in Italian East Africa.

8. Declaration regarding the Suez Canal.

The said instruments shall take effect on such date as the two Governments shall together determine.

Except in so far as any of them contain provisions with regard to their revision or duration, each of the said instruments shall remain in force indefinitely, but should either Government at any time consider that a change of circumstances renders the revision of any of these instruments necessary, the two Governments will consult together with a view to such a revision.

The two Governments agree that, immediately after the taking effect of the said instruments, negotiations will be opened, in which the Egyptian Government will be invited to participate so far as all questions affecting Egypt or the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan are concerned, with a view to a definitive agreement on the boundaries between the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland on the one side and Italian East Africa on the other; and with regard to other questions affecting reciprocally:

(a) Italian interests on the one hand and British, Egyptian or Sudan interests on the other hand in the above-mentioned territories; and

(b) the relations between those territories

These negotiations will also include the question of commercial relations between the Sudan and Italian East Africa.

It is also agreed that negotiations between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government will take place as soon as possible on the subject of commercial relations between Italian East Africa and the United Kingdom, India and British colonies, overseas territories, protectorates and man-

A. PROTOCOLLO

Il Governo Italiano e il Governo del Regno Unito di Gran Bretagna e dell'Irlanda del Nord, animati dal desiderio di porre su una base solida e duratura le relazioni tra i due Paesi e di contribuire alla causa generale della pace e della sicurezza, hanno deciso di entrare in conversazioni allo scopo di raggiungere un accordo sulle questioni di mutuo interesse; e le dette conversazioni avendo avuto luogo, Sua Eccellenza il conte Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo, Ministro degli Affari Esteri, e Sua Eccellenza il molto onorevole conte di Perth, G. C. M. G., C. B., Ambasciatore straordinario e plenipotenziario di Sua Maestà Britannica a Roma, debitamente autorizzati all'uopo dai loro rispettivi Governi, hanno redatto il presente Protocollo ed hanno firmato gli Accordi e Dichiarazioni che vi sono annessi, ciascuno dei quali dovrà essere considerato come un atto separato e per sé stante:

1° Conferma della dichiarazione del 2 gennaio 1937, relativa al Mediterraneo, e delle note scambiate il 31 dicembre 1936.

2° Accordo relativo allo scambio di informazioni militari.

3° Accordo relativo a talune zone del Medio Oriente.

4° Dichiarazione relativa alla propaganda.

5° Dichiarazione relativa al Lago Tana.

6° Dichiarazione relativa agli obblighi militari degli indigeni dell'Africa Orientale Italiana.

7° Dichiarazione relativa al libero esercizio della religione e al trattamento degli Enti religiosi britannici in Africa Orientale Italiana.

8° Dichiarazione relativa al Canale di Suez.

Tali atti entreranno in vigore alla data che i due Governi firseranno d'accordo. Ciascuno di essi, a meno che non contenga disposizioni relativamente alla sua revisione o durata, rimarrà in vigore senza limiti di tempo; ma qualora uno dei due Governi in qualunque momento, ritenga che un mutamento di circostanze renda necessaria la revisione di taluno di questi atti, i due Governi si consulteranno allo scopo di procedere a una tale revisione.

I due Governi convengono che, immediatamente dopo l'entrata in vigore dei detti atti, saranno aperti negoziati ai quali il Governo Egiziano sarà invitato a partecipare per quel che riguarda tutte le questioni interessanti l'Egitto o il Sudan anglo-egiziano. In vista di un accordo definitivo sulle frontiere fra il Sudan, il Kenia e la Somalia britannica, da un lato, e l'Africa Orientale Italiana, dall'altro, nonché in relazione ad altre questioni che riguardano reciprocamente: a) interessi italiani, da un lato, e interessi britannici, egiziani e sudanesi, dall'altro, nei territori sopra menzionati, e b) i rapporti fra detti territori, questi negoziati includeranno altresì la questione dei rapporti commerciali tra il Sudan e l'Africa Orientale Italiana.

I due Governi convengono, inoltre, che avranno luogo al più presto possibile negoziati tra il Governo del Regno Unito e il Governo Italiano sulla questione dei rapporti commerciali tra l'A. O. I. e il Regno Unito, l'India, le colonie britanniche, i Territori d'oltremare, i Protettorati ed i Territori sottoposti a mandato amministrati dal Governo del Regno Unito; compresa la questione dell'applicazione, in base a condizioni da stabilirsi, del trattato di commercio e navigazione firmato a Roma il 15 giugno 1883 a tutta l'Africa Orientale Italiana.

Questi negoziati saranno ispirati al comune desiderio di sviluppare i rapporti commerciali tra i predetti territori e di assicurare adeguate facilitazioni al commercio.

dated territories administered by the Government of the United Kingdom, including the subject of the application, on conditions to be established, to the whole of Italian East Africa of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed at Rome on June 15th, 1883.

These negotiations will be inspired by the common desire to further commercial relations between these territories and to ensure adequate facilities for trade.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16th, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.
Perth,
Ciano.

ANNEX 1

Reaffirmation of the Declaration of January 2nd, 1937, Regarding the Mediterranean, and of the Notes Exchanged on December 31st, 1936.

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government hereby reaffirm the Declaration signed in Rome on January 2nd, 1937, regarding the Mediterranean, and the Notes exchanged between the two Governments on December 31st, 1936, regarding the status quo in the Western Mediterranean.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16th, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force,
Perth,
Ciano.

ANNEX 2

Agreement Regarding the Exchange of Military Information.

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government agree that in the month of January each year a reciprocal exchange of information shall take place through the Naval, Military and Air Attachés in London and Rome regarding any major prospective administrative movements or redistribution of their respective naval, military and air forces.

This exchange of information will take place in respect of such forces stationed in or based on:

(1) Overseas possessions of either Party, which phrase shall for this purpose be deemed to include protectorates and mandated territories, in or with a seaboard on the Mediterranean, the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden; and

(2) Territories in Africa other than those referred to in paragraph (1) above and lying in an area bounded on the west by longitude 20 deg. east and on the south by latitude 7 deg. south.

Such an exchange of information will not necessarily preclude the occasional communication of supplementary military information should either Party consider that the political circumstances of the moment make it desirable.

The two Government further agree to notify each other in advance of any decision to provide new naval or air bases in the Mediterranean east of longitude 19deg east and in the Red Sea or approaches thereto.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16th, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.
Perth,
Ciano.

ANNEX 3

Agreement regarding certain Areas in the Middle East.

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Italian Government, being desir-

Fatto a Roma, in duplice esemplare, il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana ed inglese, ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth.

Allegato I

Conferma della dichiarazione del 2 gennaio 1937 relativa al Mediterraneo e delle note scambiate il 31 dicembre 1936.

Il Governo italiano e il Governo del Regno Unito con la presente confermano la dichiarazione firmata in Roma il 2 gennaio 1937, relativa al Mediterraneo; e le note scambiate tra i due Governi il 31 dicembre 1936 relative allo statu quo nel Mediterraneo occidentale.

Fatto a Roma, in duplice esemplare, il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana e inglese, ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth.

Allegato II

Accordo relativo allo scambio di informazioni militari.

Il Governo Italiano e il Governo del Regno Unito conven-gono che nel mese di gennaio di ciascun anno avrà luogo, per tramite degli Addetti militari, navali e aerei, a Londra e a Roma, uno scambio reciproco di informazioni riguardanti qualsiasi rilevante progettato movimento amministrativo o ridistribuzione delle rispettive Forze militari, navali ed aeree.

Questo scambio di informazioni avrà luogo nei riguardi di dette Forze che hanno stanza o base: 1° nei Possedimenti d'oltremare di ciascuna delle due parti (questa frase, ai fini del presente Accordo, sarà considerata come comprendente i Protettorati e i Territori sotto mandato) che si trovano o che hanno coste sul Mediterraneo, il Mar Rosso, o il Golfo di Aden e 2° nei Territori in Africa non nominati nel precedente paragrafo 1° e situati in una zona delimitata all'Ovest dal 20° grado di longitudine Est ed a Sud dal 7° grado di latitudine Sud.

Tale scambio di informazioni non escluderà necessariamente la comunicazione occasionale di informazioni militari supplementari qualora una delle due parti consideri che le circostanze politiche del momento la rendano desiderabile.

I due Governi concordano, inoltre, di notificarsi reciprocamente in anticipo qualsiasi decisione relativa alla istituzione di nuove basi navali od aeree nel Mediterraneo, ad Oriente del 19° grado di longitudine Est, e nel Mar Rosso nei relativi accessi.

Fatto a Roma, in duplice esemplare, il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana e inglese, ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth.

Allegato III

Accordo italo-britannico relativo ad alcune zone del Medio Oriente.

Il Governo Italiano ed il Governo del Regno Unito di Gran Bretagna e dell'Irlanda del Nord, essendo desiderosi di assicurare che non vi sarà conflitto tra le loro rispettive politiche in riguardo alle zone del Medio Oriente a cui si riferisce il presente accordo, essendo anzi desiderosi che lo stesso amichevole spirito che ha presieduto alla firma dell'odierno Protocollo e dei documenti a questo annessi abbia anche, ad ispirare le loro relazioni in riguardo a tale zone, hanno convenuto quanto segue:

Art. 1. — Nessuna delle due parti concluderà alcun accordo o intraprenderà alcuna azione che possa in qualsiasi modo compromettere l'indipendenza o l'integrità dell'Arabia saudiana e dello Yemen.

Art. 2. — Nessuna delle due parti opporrà o cercherà di ottenere una posizione privilegiata di carattere politico in qualsiasi territorio che attualmente appartiene all'Arabia saudiana, o allo Yemen, o in qualsiasi territorio che ciascuno di questi Stati potrà in seguito acquistare.

ous of ensuring that there shall be no conflict between their respective policies [in regard to the areas in the Middle East referred to in the present agreement, being desirous, moreover, that the same friendly spirit which has attended the signing of to-day's Protocol, and of the documents annexed thereto, should also animate their relations in regard to those areas, have agreed as follows :

Article 1. — Neither Party will conclude any agreement or take any action which might in any way impair the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen.

Article 2. — Neither Party will obtain or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or to the Yemen or in any territory which either of those States may hereafter acquire.

Article 3. — The two Parties recognise that, in addition to the obligations incumbent on each of them in virtue of Articles 1 and 2 hereof, it is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should acquire or seek to acquire sovereignty or any privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or to the Yemen or which either of those States may hereafter acquire, including any islands in the Red Sea belonging to either of those States, or in any other islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on July 24th, 1923.

In particular they regard it as an essential interest of each of them that no other Power should acquire sovereignty or any privileged position on any part of the coast of the Red Sea which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or to the Yemen or in any of the aforesaid islands.

Article 4. — (1) As regards those islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on July 24th, 1923, and which are not comprised in the territory of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen, neither party will in or in regard to any such island :

- (a) establish its sovereignty, or
- (b) erect fortifications or defences.

(2) It is agreed that neither Party will object to :

(a) the presence of British officials at Kamaran for the purpose of securing the sanitary service of the pilgrimage to Mecca in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement concluded at Paris on June 19th, 1926, between the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India, on the one part, and the Government of the Netherlands, on the other part ; it is also understood that the Italian Government may appoint an Italian Medical Officer to be stationed there on the same conditions as the Netherlands Medical Officer under the said Agreement ;

(b) the presence of Italian officials at Great Hanish, Little Hanish and Jebel Zukur for the purpose of protecting the fishermen who resort to those islands ;

(c) the presence at Abu Ail, Centre Peak and Jebel Teir of such persons as are required for the maintenance of the lights on those islands.

Article 5. — (1) The two Parties agree that it is in the common interest of both of them that there shall be peace between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen and within the territories of those States. But, while they will at all times exert their good offices in the cause of peace, they will not intervene in any conflict which, despite their good offices, may break out between or within those States.

(2) The two Parties also recognise that it is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should intervene in any such conflict.

Art. 3. — Le due parti riconoscono che, in aggiunta agli obblighi che a ciascuna di esse incombono in virtù degli art. 1° e 2° di cui sopra, è nel loro comune interesse che nessuna altra Potenza acquisti o cerchi di acquistare sovranità o qualsiasi posizione privilegiata di carattere politico in qualsiasi territorio che attualmente appartiene all'Arabia saudiana o allo Yemen, o che ciascuno di questi Stati potrà in seguito acquistare, compresa qualsiasi isola del Mar Rosso appartenente all'uno o all'altro di questi Stati, o in qualsiasi altra isola nel Mar Rosso su cui la Turchia ha rinunciato ai suoi diritti con l'art. 16 del Trattato di pace firmato a Losanna il 24 luglio 1923. In particolare esse considerano come un interesse essenziale di ciascuna di esse che nessuna altra Potenza acquisti sovranità o qualsiasi posizione privilegiata su qualsiasi parte della costa del Mar Rosso che attualmente appartiene all'Arabia saudiana o allo Yemen in qualsiasi delle anzidette isole.

Art. 4. — (1) Per quanto si riferisce a quelle Isole del Mar Rosso sulle quali la Turchia ha rinunciato ai suoi diritti con l'art. 16 del Trattato di pace firmato a Losanna il 24 luglio 1923, e che non sono comprese nel territorio dell'Arabia saudiana o dello Yemen, nessuna delle due parti : a) stabilirà la propria sovranità ; b) erigerà fortificazioni o difese su nessuna di dette isole o nei riguardi di esse.

(2) E' convenuto che nessuna delle due parti farà obiezioni : a) alla presenza di funzionari britannici a Camaran allo scopo di assicurare il servizio sanitario del pellegrinaggio alla Mecca, in conformità delle disposizioni nell'accordo concluso a Parigi il 19 giugno 1926 fra il Governo di Gran Bretagna e dell'Irlanda del Nord e il Governo dell'India, da una parte, ed il Governo dei Paesi Bassi, dall'altra parte ; è anche inteso che il Governo Italiano potrà nominare un ufficiale sanitario italiano che vi risiederà nelle stesse condizioni dell'ufficiale sanitario olandese, secondo il detto accordo ; b) alla presenza di funzionari italiani nella Grande Hanish, nella Piccola Hanish e nel Gebel Zukur, allo scopo di proteggere i pescatori che frequentano queste isole ; c) alla presenza ad Abu Ail, Centre Peak e Gebel Tair delle persone che sono necessarie per il mantenimento dei fari in queste isole.

Art. 5. — (1) Le due parti convengono che è nel loro interesse che vi sia pace fra l'Arabia saudiana e lo Yemen ed entro i territori di questi Stati. Tuttavia, pur esercitando in ogni tempo i loro buoni uffici per la causa della pace, esse non interverranno in alcun conflitto che, malgrado i loro buoni uffici, avesse a verificarsi fra questi Stati o entro loro territori.

(2) Le due parti riconoscono anche che è nel loro comune interesse che nessun'altra Potenza intervenga in tali conflitti.

Art. 6. — Per quanto riguarda la zona dell'Arabia situata ad Est ed a Sud degli attuali confini dell'Arabia saudiana e dello Yemen, o di qualsiasi futuro confine che potrà essere stabilito d'accordo tra il Governo del Regno Unito, da una parte, e i Governi dell'Arabia saudiana o dello Yemen, dall'altra :

(1) Il Governo del Regno Unito dichiara che nei territori dei capi arabi sotto la sua protezione entro tale zona : a) nessuna azione sarà intrapresa dal Governo del Regno Unito che possa essere di natura da pregiudicare in qualsiasi modo l'indipendenza o l'integrità dell'Arabia saudiana o dello Yemen (che entrambi le parti si sono impegnate a rispettare nell'art. 1° di cui sopra), in qualsiasi territorio che attualmente appartiene a questi Stati o in ogni altro territorio che potrà essere riconosciuto dal Governo del Regno Unito come appartenente all'uno o all'altro di questi Stati, come risultato di qualsiasi accordo che potrà in seguito essere concluso tra il Governo del Regno Unito e il Governo dell'uno o l'altro di essi ; b) il Governo del Regno Unito non intraprenderà, nè farà in modo che sia intrapreso alcun apprestamento od opera militare all'infuori degli apprestamenti od opere militari di puro carattere difensivo per la difesa dei detti territori o delle comunicazioni fra le differenti parti dell'Impero britannico ; inoltre, il Governo del Regno Unito non arruolerà gli

Article 6. — As regards the zone of Arabia lying to the east and south of the present boundaries of Saudi Arabia and of the Yemen or of any future boundaries which may be established by agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Governments of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen, on the other ;

(1) The Government of the United Kingdom declare that in the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection within this zone :

(a) No action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom which shall be such as to prejudice in any way the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen—which both Parties have undertaken to respect in Article 1 hereof—within any territory at present belonging to those States or within any additional territory which may be recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to either of those States as a result of any agreement which may hereafter be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of either of them.

(b) The Government of the United Kingdom will not undertake, or cause to be undertaken, any military preparations or works other than military preparations or works of a purely defensive character for the defence of the said territories or of the communications between different parts of the British Empire.

Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom will not enrol the inhabitants of any of these territories, or cause them to be enrolled, in any military forces other than forces designed and suited solely for the preservation of order and for local defence ;

(c) While the Government of the United Kingdom reserve the liberty to take in these territories such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country, they intend to maintain the autonomy of the Arab rulers under their protection.

(2) The Italian Government declare that they will not seek to acquire any political influence in this zone.

Article 7. — The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the Aden Protectorate as defined in the Aden Protectorate Order, 1937, Italian citizens and subjects—including Italian companies—shall have liberty to come, with their ships and goods, to all places and ports, and they shall have freedom of entry, travel and residence, and the right to exercise there any description of business, profession occupation or industry, so long as they satisfy and observe the conditions and regulations from time to time applicable in the Protectorate to the citizens and subjects and ships of any country not being a territory under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of his Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

Article 8. — (1) Should either Party at any time give notice to the other that they consider that a change has taken place in the circumstances obtaining at the time of the entry into force of the present Agreement, such as to necessitate a modification of the provisions of the Agreement, the two Parties will enter into negotiations with a view to the revision or amendment of any of the provisions of the Agreement.

(2) At any time after the expiration of a period of 10 years from the entry into force of this Agreement either Party may notify the other of its intention to determine the Agreement. Any such notification shall take effect three months after the date on which it is made.

abitanti di alcuno di questi territori, nè farà in modo che essi siano arruolati in alcuna forza militare all'infuori delle forze destinate e atte esclusivamente al mantenimento dell'ordine ed alla difesa locale ; c) mentre il Governo del Regno Unito si riserva la libertà di prendere in questi territori quelle disposizioni che potranno essere necessarie per il mantenimento dell'ordine e per lo sviluppo del Paese, esso intende di mantenere l'autonomia dei capi arabi sotto la sua protezione.

(2) Il Governo Italiano dichiara che non cercherà di acquistare alcuna influenza politica in questa zona.

Art. 7. — Il Governo del Regno Unito dichiara che entro i limiti del Protettorato di Aden, come definito nell'Aden protectorate Order 1937, i cittadini e sudditi italiani (comprese le Società italiane) avranno libertà di recarsi, con le loro navi e merci, in tutte le località e porti, e avranno libertà di entrare, viaggiare e risiedere ed il diritto di esercitarvi ogni genere di affari, professioni, occupazioni o industrie, in quanto si conformino ed osservino le condizioni e i regolamenti che sono o saranno applicabili nel Protettorato ai cittadini e sudditi e alle navi di qualsiasi Paese che non sia un territorio sotto la Sovranità, Suzeraineté, Protettorato o Mandato di Sua Maestà il Re di Gran Bretagna, Irlanda e dei Domini britannici al di là dei mari, Imperatore delle Indie.

Art. 8. — 1) Se in qualsiasi momento una delle due parti notificasse all'altra che essa considera che un cambiamento ha avuto luogo nelle circostanze esistenti al momento dell'entrata in vigore del presente Accordo, tale da rendere necessaria una modificazione delle disposizioni dell'Accordo stesso, le due parti entreranno in trattative allo scopo di rivedere o emendare qualsiasi disposizione dell'Accordo.

2) In qualunque momento, dopo spirato il periodo di dieci anni dall'entrata in vigore di questo Accordo, ciascuna delle parti potrà notificare all'altra la sua intenzione di porre fine all'Accordo. Tale notifica avrà effetto tre mesi dopo la data alla quale è stata fatta.

Fatto a Roma, in duplice esemplare, il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana e inglese, ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth.

Allegato IV

Dichiarazione relativa alla propaganda.

I due Governi colgono con soddisfazione l'opportunità che fornisce loro la presente occasione di registrare il loro Accordo nel senso che qualsiasi tentativo da parte di uno di essi di impiegare i metodi di pubblicità o propaganda a sua disposizione allo scopo di arrecare danno agli interessi dell'altro sarebbe incompatibile con le buone relazioni che il presente Accordo mira a stabilire e mantenere fra i due Governi ed i popoli dei loro rispettivi Paesi.

Fatto a Roma, in duplice esemplare, il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana e inglese, ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth.

Allegato V

Dichiarazione relativa al Lago Tana.

Il Governo Italiano conferma al Governo del Regno Unito l'assicurazione da esso data al Governo del Regno Unito il 3 aprile 1936, e ripetuta dal Ministro italiano degli Affari Esteri all'Ambasciatore di Sua Maestà Britannica a Roma il 31 dicembre 1936, nel senso che il Governo Italiano era pienamente consapevole delle sue obbligazioni verso il Governo del Regno Unito nella questione del Lago Tana e non aveva la benchè minima intenzione di ignorarle o ripudiarle.

Fatto a Roma, in duplice esemplare, il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana e inglese ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16th, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

Perth,
Ciano.

ANNEX 4

Declaration Regarding Propaganda.

The two Governments welcome the opportunity afforded by the present occasion to place on record their agreement that any attempt by either of them to employ the methods of publicity or propaganda at its disposal in order to injure the interests of the other would be inconsistent with the good relations which it is the object of the present Agreement to establish and maintain between the two Governments and the peoples of their respective countries.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16th, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

Perth,
Ciano.

ANNEX 5

Declaration Regarding Lake Tsana.

The Italian Government confirm to the Government of the United Kingdom the assurance given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on April 3rd, 1936, and reiterated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to his Majesty's Ambassador at Rome on December 31st, 1936, to the effect that the Italian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tsana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16th, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

Perth,
Ciano.

ANNEX 6

Declaration Regarding the Military Duties of Natives of Italian East Africa.

The Italian Government reaffirm the assurance which they gave in their Note to the League of Nations of June 29th, 1936, that Italy on her side was willing to accept the principle that natives of Italian East Africa should not be compelled to undertake military duties other than local policing and territorial defence.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16th, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

Perth,
Ciano.

ANNEX 7

Declaration Regarding the Free Exercise of Religion and the Treatment of British Religious Bodies in Italian East Africa.

Without prejudice to any Treaty engagements which may be applicable, the Italian Government declare that they intend to assure to British nationals in Italian East Africa the free exercise of all cults compatible with public order and good morals; and in this spirit they will examine favourable any request which may reach them from the British side to assure in Italian East Africa religious assistance to British nationals; and that as regards other activities of British religious Bodies in Italian East Africa in humanitarian and benevolent spheres, such requests as may reach the Italian Government will be examined, the general line of policy of the Royal Government

Allegato VI

Dichiarazione relativa agli obblighi militari degli indigeni dell'Africa Orientale Italiana.

Il Governo Italiano conferma l'assicurazione data nella sua nota del 29 giugno 1936 alla Società delle Nazioni che l'Italia, da parte sua, era disposta ad accettare il principio che gli indigeni dell'Africa Orientale Italiana non dovrebbero essere costretti ad altri obblighi militari all'infuori della polizia locale e della difesa territoriale.

Fatto a Roma, in duplice esemplare, il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana ed inglese ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth.

Allegato VII

Dichiarazione relativa al libero esercizio della religione e al trattamento degli Enti religiosi britannici in Africa Orientale Italiana.

Senza pregiudizio di qualsiasi impegno derivante da trattati che possa essere applicabile, il Governo Italiano dichiara che intende assicurare ai cittadini, sudditi e protetti britannici nell'Africa Orientale Italiana il libero esercizio di tutti i culti compatibili con l'ordine pubblico e il buon costume; e in tale spirito esaminerà favorevolmente ogni domanda che dovesse pervenirgli da parte britannica intesa ad assicurare assistenza di carattere religioso ai cittadini, sudditi e protetti britannici nell'Africa Orientale Italiana; e che, per quanto concerne altre attività di Enti religiosi britannici nell'Africa Orientale Italiana nel campo umanitario ed assistenziale, le domande che pervenissero al Governo Italiano verranno esaminate tenendo presenti le direttive generali del Governo Italiano in materia e le norme della legislazione in vigore nell'Africa Orientale Italiana.

Fatto a Roma, in duplice esemplare, il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana e inglese, ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth.

Allegato VIII

Dichiarazione relativa al Canale di Suez.

Il Governo Italiano e il Governo del Regno Unito riaffermano con la presente il loro proposito di sempre rispettare e uniformarsi alle disposizioni della Convenzione firmata a Costantinopoli il 29 ottobre 1888 che garantisce in tutti i tempi e per tutte le Potenze il libero uso del Canale di Suez.

Fatto a Roma, in duplice esemplare, il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana e inglese, ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth.

B. ACCORDI CONCHIUSI IN FORME DI NOTE
scambiate fra il Conte Ciano, Ministro degli Affari Esteri italiano e il Earl of Perth, Ambasciatore della Gran Bretagna relativi alla questione dell'ammontare delle Forze italiane in Libia, alla politica del Governo Italiano, in connessione con la Spagna, al riconoscimento della sovranità italiana sull'Etiopia, all'adesione del Governo Italiano al trattato navale del 25 marzo 1936.

Il Ministro degli Affari Esteri, a S. E. il Molto Onorevole Conte di Perth, G.C.M.G., C. B. Ambasciatore di Sua Maestà Britannica-Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938-XVI

Eccellenza,

Nel corso delle nostre recenti conversazioni, V. E. ha menzionato la questione dell'ammontare delle Forze italiane in Libia. Ho l'onore di informare V. E. che il Capo del Governo ha disposto una diminuzione di tali Forze. I ritiri sono già incominciati, in ragione di mille uomini alla settimana, e saranno continuati in ragione non inferiore a tale cifra, finchè gli effettivi italiani

n this matter and the principles of legislation in force in Italian East Africa being borne in mind.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16th, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

Perth,
Ciano.

ANNEX 8

Declaration Regarding the Suez Canal.

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government hereby reaffirm their intention always to respect and abide by the provisions of the Convention signed at Constantinople on October 29th, 1888, which guarantees at all times and for all Powers the free use of the Suez Canal.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 16th, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

Perth,
Ciano.

B. AGREEMENTS

SIGNED IN THE FORM OF AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES

between Count Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Earl of Perth, British Ambassador at Rome, regarding the Question of the Strength of the Italian Forces in Libya, the Policy of the Italian Government in connection with Spain, the Recognition of Italian Sovereignty over Ethiopia and the Accession of the Italian Government to the Naval Treaty of March 25th, 1936.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

To His Excellency the Most Honourable Earl of Perth,
Ambassador of His British Majesty at Rome.

Your Excellency,—During our recent conversations Your Excellency has referred to the question of the strength of the Italian forces in Libya.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Head of the Government has given orders for a diminution of these forces. Withdrawals have already begun at the rate of 1,000 a week and will be continued at not less than this rate until the Italian Libyan effectives reach peace strength.

This will constitute an ultimate diminution of these effectives by not less than half the numbers present in Libya when our conversations commenced.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

Ciano.

British Embassy

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

To His Excellency Count Galeazzo Ciano,
Minister for Foreign Affairs at Rome.

Your Excellency,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of to-day's date in which Your Excellency informed me of the intentions of the Head of the Italian Government with regard to the progressive diminution of the Italian forces in Libya.

I shall have pleasure in communicating this information to his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

Perth.

in Libia raggiungeranno il piede di pace. Ciò che rappresenterà, in definitiva, una diminuzione degli effettivi in Libia di non meno della metà delle Forze esistenti al momento dell'inizio delle conversazioni.

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia più alta considerazione.

Ciano.

Ambasciata Britannica-Roma a S. E. il Conte Galeazzo Ciano Ministro degli Affari Esteri-Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938.

Eccellenza,

Ho l'onore di accusare ricevuta della nota di V. E. in data odierna, n. 3514, con la quale l'E.V. mi riafferma le intenzioni del Capo del Governo Italiano relativamente alla diminuzione progressiva delle Forze italiane in Libia. Sarò lieto di portare tale informazione a conoscenza del Governo di Sua Maestà nel Regno Unito.

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia più alta considerazione.

Perth.

Il Ministro degli Affari Esteri, a S. E. il Molto Onorevole Conte di Perth, G. C. M. G., C. B. Ambasciatore di Sua Maestà Britannica-Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938-XVI.

Eccellenza,

Vostra Eccellenza ricorderà che nel corso delle nostre recenti conversazioni io detti a V. E. alcune assicurazioni relative alla politica del Governo Italiano in connessione con la Spagna. Desidero ora di confermare queste assicurazioni e darne formalmente atto.

In primo luogo, il Governo Italiano ha l'onore di confermare la sua piena adesione alla formula del Governo del Regno Unito per l'evacuazione proporzionale dei volontari stranieri dalla Spagna e si impegna a dare pratica e leale esecuzione a tale evacuazione nel momento e alle condizioni che saranno determinate dal Comitato di nonintervento, sulla base della formula suddetta.

In secondo luogo, desidero confermare che se tale evacuazione non è stata completata al momento in cui avrà termine la guerra civile in Spagna, tutti i restanti volontari italiani lasceranno immediatamente il territorio spagnolo e tutto il materiale da guerra italiano sarà ritirato contemporaneamente.

In terzo luogo, desidero ripetere la mia precedente assicurazione che il Governo Italiano non ha alcuna mira territoriale o politica e non cerca alcuna posizione economica privilegiata nella Spagna metropolitana, nelle isole Baleari, in alcuno dei Possedimenti spagnoli di oltremare, o nella zona spagnola del Marocco, o nei riguardi dei suddetti territori, e che non ha alcuna intenzione di mantenere qualsiasi Forza armata in alcuno dei territori suddetti.

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia più alta considerazione.

Ciano.

Ambasciata Britannica-Roma, a S. E. il Conte Galeazzo Ciano, Ministro degli Affari Esteri-Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938.

Eccellenza,

In risposta alla nota odierna n. 3515 di V. E., ho l'onore di prendere nota della conferma in essa contenuta delle assicurazioni che V. E. mi ha dato nel corso delle nostre recenti conversazioni circa la politica del Governo Italiano in connessione con la Spagna. Il Governo di Sua Maestà Britannica nel Regno Unito, al quale non mancherò di trasmettere tale comunicazione, proverà, ne sono sicuro, soddisfazione per il contenuto di essa. A questo proposito occorre appena che io ricordi a V. E. che il Governo di Sua Maestà Britannica considera il regolamento della

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

To His Excellency the Most Honourable Earl of Perth,
Ambassador of His British Majesty at Rome.

Your Excellency,—Your Excellency will remember that, in the course of our recent conversations, I gave Your Excellency certain assurances regarding the policy of the Italian Government in connection with Spain. I now wish to reaffirm those assurances and to place them on record.

First, the Italian Government have the honour to confirm their full adherence to the United Kingdom formula for the proportional evacuation of the foreign volunteers from Spain, and pledge themselves to give practical and real application to such an evacuation at the moment and on the conditions which shall be determined by the Non-Intervention Committee on the basis of the above-mentioned formula.

I desire secondly to reaffirm that if this evacuation has not been completed at the moment of the termination of the Spanish civil war, all remaining Italian volunteers will forthwith leave Spanish territory and all Italian war-material will simultaneously be withdrawn.

I wish thirdly to repeat my previous assurance that the Italian Government have no territorial or political aims, and seek no privileged economic position, in or with regard to either Metropolitan Spain, the Balearic Islands, any of the Spanish possessions overseas, or the Spanish zone of Morocco, and that they have no intention whatever of keeping any armed forces in any of the said territories.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

Ciano.

British Embassy.

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

To His Excellency Count Galeazzo Ciano,
Minister for Foreign Affairs at Rome.

Your Excellency,—In reply to Your Excellency's Note of to-day's date, I have the honour to take note of the reaffirmation contained therein of the assurances which Your Excellency has already given me, during the course of our recent conversations, regarding the policy of the Italian Government in connection with Spain.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, to whom I shall not fail to transmit this communication, will, I feel sure, be gratified at its contents. In this connection I hardly need to remind Your Excellency that his Majesty's Government regard a settlement of the Spanish question as a prerequisite of the entry into force of the agreement between our two Governments.

I have further the honour to inform Your Excellency that his Majesty's Government, being desirous that such obstacles as may at present be held to impede the freedom of member States as regards recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia should be removed, intend to take steps at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations for the purpose of clarifying the situation of member States in this regard.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

Perth.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

To His Excellency the Most Honourable Earl of Perth,
Ambassador of His British Majesty at Rome.

Your Excellency—I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Italian Government have decided to accede to the

questione spagnola come un presupposto della entrata in vigore dell'accordo fra i nostri due Governi.

Ho, inoltre, l'onore di informare V. E. che il Governo di Sua Maestà, essendo desideroso che vengano rimossi gli ostacoli che possano attualmente essere ritenuti un impedimento della libertà degli Stati membri relativamente al riconoscimento della sovranità italiana sull'Etiopia, intende compiere passi nella prossima sessione del Consiglio della Lega allo scopo di chiarire la situazione degli Stati membri a tale riguardo.

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia più alta considerazione.

Perth.

Il Ministro degli Affari Esteri a S.E. il Molto Onorevole Conte di Perth, G.C.M.G., C.B., Ambasciatore di Sua Maestà Britannica-Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938-XVI.

Eccellenza,

Ho l'onore d'informare V. E. che il Governo Italiano ha deciso di aderire al trattato navale firmato a Londra il 25 marzo 1936, in conformità della procedura stabilita all'articolo 81 del predetto trattato. Tale adesione avrà luogo non appena gli atti allegati al Protocollo firmato oggi entreranno in vigore. Nel portare a conoscenza di V. E. quanto precede, desidero aggiungere che il Governo Italiano si propone, nel frattempo, di conformarsi alle disposizioni del trattato predetto.

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia più alta considerazione.

Ciano.

Ambasciata Britannica - Roma, a S. E. il Conte Galeazzo Ciano, Ministro degli Affari Esteri - Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938.

Eccellenza,

Ho l'onore di accusare ricevuta della nota di V. E. in data odierna, n. 3516, con la quale V. E. mi ha comunicato la decisione del Governo Italiano di aderire al trattato navale firmato a Londra il 25 marzo 1936, non appena gli atti allegati al Protocollo firmato oggi entreranno in vigore, e di conformarsi, nel frattempo, alle disposizioni del trattato predetto. Sarò lieto di portare tale comunicazione a conoscenza del Governo di Sua Maestà nel Regno Unito.

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia più alta considerazione.

Perth.

C. ACCORDO DI BUON VICINATO

fra il Governo Italiano, il Governo del Regno Unito e il
Governo Egiziano.

Il Governo Italiano, da una parte, e, dall'altra, il Governo del Regno Unito di Gran Bretagna e dell'Irlanda del Nord per il Kenia e la Somalia britannica ed il Governo del Regno Unito e il Governo Egiziano per il Sudan;

desiderosi di assicurare relazioni amichevoli nell'Africa Orientale;

si impegnano, oltre che a procedere a tempo debito alla discussione delle questioni particolareggiate connesse con le frontiere tra l'Africa Orientale Italiana e il Sudan, il Kenia e la Somalia britannica, come stabilito nel Protocollo firmato in data odierna dal Governo Italiano e dal Governo del Regno Unito, a cooperare in ogni tempo al mantenimento di relazioni di buon vicinato fra i detti territori e di cercare con ogni mezzo in loro potere di impedire che vengano effettuate incursioni o altri atti illegali di violenza attraverso le frontiere di ognuno dei suddetti territori;

convengono che, tenuto conto che, in virtù del decreto italiano del 12 aprile 1936, la schiavitù fu abolita in Etiopia, così come essa era già stata abolita negli altri territori sopra menzionati, nelle relazioni di buon vicinato di cui al paragrafo

Naval Treaty signed in London on March 25th, 1936, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31 of that Treaty.

This accession will take place so soon as the instruments annexed to the Protocol signed this day come into force.

In advising Your Excellency of the foregoing I desire to add that the Italian Government intend in the meantime to act in conformity with the provisions of the aforesaid Treaty.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

Ciano.

British Embassy.

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

His Excellency Count Galeazzo Ciano,
Minister for Foreign Affairs at Rome.

Your Excellency—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of to-day's date in which Your Excellency informed me of the decision of the Italian Government to accede to the Naval Treaty signed in London on March 25th, 1936, so soon as the instruments annexed to the Protocol signed this day come into force, and in the meantime to act in conformity with the provisions of the aforesaid Treaty.

I shall have pleasure in communicating this decision to his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

Perth.

C. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS

Between the Government of the United Kingdom, the Egyptian Government, and the Italian Government.

The Italian Government on the one hand and, on the other hand, in respect of Kenya and British Somaliland, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and, in respect of the Sudan, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government, desiring to provide for friendly relations in East Africa ;

Undertake, in addition to proceeding in due course to the discussion of detailed questions connected with the frontiers between Italian East Africa and the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland as provided in the Protocol signed to-day by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government, at all times to co-operate for the preservation of good neighbourly relations between the said territories and to endeavour by every means in their power to prevent raids or other unlawful acts of violence being carried out across the frontiers of any of the above-mentioned territories ;

Agree that in view of the fact that by virtue of the Italian Decree of April 12th, 1936, slavery was prohibited in Ethiopia, as it had already been abolished in the other above-mentioned territories, the good neighbourly relations referred to above shall include co-operation to prevent the evasion of the anti-slavery laws of the respective territories ;

Agree that nationals of the other Party shall not be enrolled in the native troops, bands or formations of a military nature maintained in the above-mentioned territories, including in particular any such nationals who are deserters from the troops, bands or formations maintained in, or refugees from, the territories of the other Party.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

Perth.
Mostafa El-Sadek.
Ciano.

precedente rientrerà la cooperazione necessaria a impedire l'evasione delle leggi antischiaviste dei rispettivi territori ;

convengono che i cittadini sudditi e protetti dell'altra Parte non saranno arruolati nelle truppe, bande o formazioni a tipo militare di colore dei territori anzidetti, compresi, in particolare, i cittadini, sudditi o protetti che siano disertori dalle truppe, bande o formazioni dei territori dell'altra Parte, o rifugiati provenienti da detti territori.

In fede di che i sottoscritti, debitamente autorizzati dai loro rispettivi Governi, hanno firmato il presente accordo.

Fatto in Roma in triplice esemplare il 16 aprile 1938, in lingua italiana e inglese, ciascuna delle quali farà ugualmente fede.

Ciano Perth Mostafà el Sadek.

Scambio di note col Ministro d'Egitto a Roma

Il Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Roma a Sua Eccellenza Mostafà el Sadek Bey, Ministro d'Egitto, Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938-XVI.

Eccellenza,

Ho l'onore di informare l'E. V. che oggi è stata firmata dall'Ambasciatore di Sua Maestà Britannica a Roma e da me la seguente dichiarazione relativa al Canale di Suez, che costituisce l'allegato 8 al Protocollo che Lord Perth ed io abbiamo pure firmato in data di oggi :

« Il Governo Italiano ed il Governo del Regno Unito riaffermano con la presente il loro proposito di sempre rispettare e uniformarsi alle disposizioni della Convenzione firmata a Costantinopoli il 29 ottobre 1888 che garantisce in tutti i tempi e per tutte le Potenze il libero uso del Canale di Suez ».

Ho l'onore di comunicare la dichiarazione sopra trascritta all'E. V. quale rappresentante della Potenza territoriale interessata.

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia alta considerazione.

Ciano.

Légation de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Egypte à Rome, à Sua Eccellenza il Conte Galeazzo Ciano, Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938.

Eccellenza,

Ho l'onore di accusare ricevuta della nota numero 3518, in data odierna, con la quale V. E. mi informa della dichiarazione relativa al Canale di Suez firmata oggi da V. E. e dall'Ambasciatore di Sua Maestà Britannica a Roma e che costituisce l'allegato 8 al Protocollo che V. E. e lord Perth hanno pure firmato oggi.

Ho l'onore di informare l'E. V. che il Governo Egiziano, quale Potenza territoriale interessata, prende nota del proposito del Governo Italiano e del Governo del Regno Unito e vi si associa.

Mi valgo della presente occasione per rinnovare all'E. V. l'espressione della mia più alta considerazione.

Mostafà el Sadek.

Ambasciata Britannica, Roma a S.E. Mostafà El Sadek Bey, Ministro d'Egitto, Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938.

Eccellenza, ho l'onore di informare V. E. che oggi è stato firmato dal Ministro italiano degli Affari Esteri e da me la seguente dichiarazione relativa al Canale di Suez, che costituisce l'allegato VIII al Protocollo pure da noi firmato in data d'oggi :

« Il Governo Italiano e il Governo del Regno Unito riaffermano con la presente il loro proposito di sempre rispettare e uniformarsi alle disposizioni della convenzione firmata a Costantinopoli il 29 ottobre 1888, che garantisce in tutti i tempi e per tutte le Potenze il libero uso del Canale di Suez ».

Ho l'onore di comunicare la dichiarazione sopra trascritta alla E. V. quale rappresentante della Potenza territoriale interessata.

Exchange of Notes with the Egyptian Minister in Rome.

British Embassy.

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

To His Excellency Mostafa El-Sadek Bey,
Egyptian Minister in Rome.

Your Excellency—I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the following Declaration regarding Lake Tsana was signed to-day by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself as Annex V to the Protocol which Count Ciano and I have also signed to-day :

“The Italian Government confirm to the Government of the United Kingdom the assurance given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on the April 3rd, 1936, and reiterated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to his Majesty's Ambassador at Rome on the December 31st, 1936, to the effect that the Italian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tsana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them.”

Further, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that his Majesty's Government for their part declare that they agree that the assurances given to them in the above Declaration concerning Lake Tsana shall apply equally to the Egyptian Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my high consideration.

Perth.

A Note in exactly similar terms was addressed by Count Ciano to Mostafa El-Sadek Bey.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

To His Excellency Mustafa El-Sadek Bey,
Egyptian Minister in Rome.

“I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the following Declaration regarding the Suez Canal was signed to-day by his Majesty's Ambassador at Rome and myself as Annex VIII to the Protocol which Lord Perth and I have also signed to-day :

The Italian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom hereby reaffirm their intention always to respect and abide by the provisions of the Convention signed at Constantinople on October 29th, 1888, which guarantees at all times and for all Powers the free use of the Suez Canal.

“I have the honour to communicate the above Declaration to Your Excellency as the Representative of the territorial Power concerned.”

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my high consideration.

Lord Perth sent a Note in similar terms to Mostafa El-Sadek Bey

Légation de S. M. le Roi d'Egypte, à Rome,

April 16th, 1938.

To His Excellency the Earl of Perth,
Ambassador of His British Majesty at Rome.

Your Excellency,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Note No. 1159138 of to day's date in which Your Excellency informed me of the Declaration regarding the Suez Canal signed to-day by Your Excellency and the Italian Minister

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia più alta considerazione.

Perth.

Légation de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Egypte à Rome, à S.E. il Molto Onorevole Conte di Perth, G.C.M.G., G.B., Ambasciatore di S.M. Britannica, Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938.

Eccellenza, ho l'onore di accusare ricevuta della nota n. 1-590-38 in data di oggi con la quale V. E. mi informa della dichiarazione relativa al Canale di Suez, firmata oggi da V. E. e dal Ministro italiano degli Affari Esteri e che costituisce l'allegato VIII al Protocollo che V. E. e il conte Ciano hanno pure firmato oggi.

Ho l'onore di informare l'E. V. che il Governo Egiziano, quale Potenza territoriale interessata, prende nota del proposito del Governo del Regno Unito e del Governo Italiano e vi si associa.

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia più alta considerazione.

Mostafà El Sadek.

Il Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Roma, a S.E. Mostafà El Sadek Bey, Ministro d'Egitto, Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938-XVI.

Eccellenza, ho l'onore di informare l'E. V. che oggi è stata firmata dall'Ambasciatore di S. M. Britannica a Roma e da me la seguente Dichiarazione relativa al Lago Tana che costituisce l'allegato cinque al protocollo che lord Perth ed io abbiamo pure firmato in data di oggi :

« Il Governo Italiano conferma al Governo del Regno Unito l'assicurazione da esso data al Governo del Regno Unito il 3 aprile 1936, e ripetuta dal Ministro italiano degli Affari esteri all'Ambasciatore di S. M. Britannica a Roma il 31 dicembre 1936, nel senso che il Governo Italiano era pienamente consapevole delle sue obbligazioni verso il Governo del Regno Unito nella questione del Lago Tana e non aveva la benchè minima intenzione di ignorarle o ripudiarle ».

Ho inoltre l'onore di informare V. E. che il Governo Italiano per parte sua dichiara che esso è d'accordo che le assicurazioni date al Governo di S. M. Britannica colla sopra trascritta Dichiarazione, concernenti il Lago Tana, si applicano ugualmente al Governo Egiziano.

Voglia gradire, Eccellenza, i sensi della mia alta considerazione.

Ciano.

Légation de S. M. le Roi d'Egypte, à Rome, a S.E. il Conte Galeazzo Ciano, Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938.

Eccellenza, ho l'onore di assicurare ricevuta della nota di V. E. in data odierna del seguente tenore :

(Segue il testo della dichiarazione sopracitata.)

Sarò lieto di comunicare questa informazione al Governo Egiziano.

Mi valgo della presente occasione per rinnovare all'E. V. l'espressione della mia più alta considerazione.

Mostafà El Sadek.

Ambasciata Britannica, Roma, a S.E. Mostafà El Sadek Bey, Ministro d'Egitto, Roma.

Roma, 16 aprile 1938.

Eccellenza,

Ho l'onore d'informare l'E. V. che è stata firmata oggi dal Ministro italiano degli Affari Esteri e da me la seguente dichiarazione relativa al Lago Tana, che costituisce l'allegato cinque al Protocollo che il conte Ciano ed io abbiamo pure firmato oggi :

« Il Governo Italiano conferma al Governo del Regno Unito l'assicurazione da esso data al Governo del Regno Unito il 3 aprile 1936 e ripetuta dal Ministro italiano degli Affari Esteri all'Ambasciatore di S. M. Britannica a Roma il 31 dicembre 1936 nel senso che il Governo Italiano era pienamente consapevole delle sue obbligazioni verso il Governo del Regno Unito nella questione del Lago Tana e non aveva la benchè minima intenzione di ignorarle o ripudiarle ».

for Foreign Affairs as Annex VIII to the Protocol which Your Excellency and Count Ciano have also signed to-day.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Egyptian Government, as the territorial Power concerned, take note of the intention of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government and associate themselves therewith.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

Mostafa El-Sadek.

Légation de S.M. le Roi d'Egypte, à Rome.

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

To His Excellency Count Galeazzo Ciano,
Minister for Foreign Affairs at Rome.

Your Excellency,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day's date.

I shall be glad to communicate this Declaration to the Egyptian Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

Mostafa El-Sadek.

Notes in exact the similar terms were addressed to Count Ciano and to Lord Perth.

D. EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS

between Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, and
and Signor Mussolini, Head of the Italian Government,
April 16th, 1938.

Mr. Chamberlain to Signor Mussolini:

I am delighted to learn from Lord Perth of the successful outcome of the conversations between our two Governments, and I would like to say how much I and my colleagues have appreciated the spirit of good will and cooperation which has been applied to our discussions by your Excellency, Count Ciano, and all concerned upon the Italian side.

It is a matter of sincere satisfaction to me, as I am sure it is also to your Excellency, that such a comprehensive agreement has been reached between us. I hope that this agreement, when it comes into full operation, will dispose of all outstanding points of difference between us, and I confidently expect that thereafter the relations between our two countries will once again be found firmly based on the confidence and friendship which so long existed in the past.

Signor Mussolini to Mr. Chamberlain:

I thank you warmly for your message.

I am indeed glad that Anglo-Italian conversations have so happily ended and that the agreement reached gives you as it does me full satisfaction both as regards its scope and the spirit underlying it. It is a pleasure to me to assure you that I have sincerely appreciated the good will and cordial spirit of understanding which your Excellency has shown. I have equally appreciated work done by Lord Perth and by all those who have contributed to realization of agreement.

To have settled in so frank and full a fashion questions outstanding between us places the relations between England and Italy on a solid and durable basis.

I am convinced that there can now be opened between the two countries a new period of confidence and friendship which is what you and I desire and which accords with our traditional relationship.

Ho inoltre l'onore di informare l'E. V. che il Governo di S. M. Britannica da parte sua dichiara che è d'accordo che le assicurazioni ad esso date nella sopra trascritta Dichiarazione, relative al Lago Tana, si applicano ugualmente al Governo Egiziano.

Mi valgo della presente occasione per inviare a V. E. l'espressione della mia alta considerazione. Perth.

Légation de S.M. le Roi d'Egyte. à Rome, a S.E. il Molto Onorevole Conte di Perth G.C.M.G., G.B., Ambasciatore di S.M. Britannica, Roma. Roma, 16 aprile 1938.

Eccellenza,

Ho l'onore di accusare ricevuta della lettera di V. E., in data odierna, del seguente tenore:

« Ho l'onore d'informare l'E. V. che è stata firmata oggi dal Ministro italiano degli Affari Esteri e da me la seguente dichiarazione relativa al Lago Tana, che costituisce l'allegato cinque al Protocollo che il conte Ciano ed io abbiamo pure firmato oggi: « Il Governo Italiano conferma al Governo del Regno Unito l'assicurazione da esso data al Governo del Regno Unito il 3 aprile 1936 e ripetuta dal Ministro italiano degli Affari Esteri all'Ambasciatore di S. M. Britannica a Roma il 31 dicembre 1936 nel senso che il Governo Italiano era pienamente consapevole delle sue obbligazioni verso il Governo del Regno Unito nella questione del Lago Tana e non aveva la benchè minima intenzione d'ignorarle o ripudiarle ».

Ho inoltre l'onore d'informare l'E. V. che il Governo di S. M. Britannica da parte sua dichiara che è d'accordo che le assicurazioni ad esso date nella sopra trascritta Dichiarazione, relative al Lago Tana, si applicano ugualmente al Governo Egiziano ».

Sarò lieto di comunicare questa informazione al Governo Egiziano.

Mi valgo della presente occasione per rinnovare all'E. V. l'espressione della mia più alta considerazione.

Mostafa El Sadek

D. LO SCAMBIO TELEGRAFICO DI MESSAGGI fra Mussolini, il Capo di Governo italiano e Chamberlain, il Presidente del ministero britannico

Roma, 16 aprile, notte

Chamberlain al Duce:

« Sono molto lieto del felice risultato delle conversazioni fra i nostri due Governi e desidero dirVi quanto sia stato apprezzato da me e dai miei colleghi lo spirito di buona volontà e di collaborazione che è stato portato nelle nostre discussioni da V. E., dal conte Ciano e da tutti coloro che dal lato italiano vi hanno preso parte.

« E' per me ragione di sincera soddisfazione, come, ne sono sicuro, lo è anche per V. E., che un accordo di così ampia portata sia stato raggiunto fra noi. Spero che quando quest'accordo avrà la sua piena applicazione, scompariranno fra noi tutti i punti di divergenza e confido che d'ora innanzi le relazioni fra i nostri due Paesi saranno di nuovo saldamente basate sulla fiducia e sull'amicizia che per tanto tempo sono esistite nel passato. »

Il Duce a Chamberlain:

« Vi ringrazio cordialmente del Vostro messaggio. Sono lieto che le conversazioni anglo-italiane si siano felicemente concluse e che l'accordo raggiunto, per la sua portata e i suoi intendimenti, sia di piena soddisfazione per Voi come lo è per me. Mi è grato di aggiungerVi che ho sinceramente apprezzato la buona volontà e il cordiale spirito di intesa di V. E. e l'opera svolta da lord Perth e da tutti coloro che hanno contribuito alla realizzazione dell'accordo.

« L'aver regolato in maniera così franca e così ampia le questioni che erano aperte tra noi pone i rapporti fra l'Inghilterra e l'Italia sopra una base ferma e duratura. Sono convinto che potrà aversi fra i due Paesi un nuovo periodo di fiduciosa amicizia quale Voi e io auspichiamo e quale è nelle tradizioni dei nostri rapporti. »

For the sake of completeness, we also reproduce the text of the Mediterranean Agreement of January 2nd, 1937 and the exchange of notes between Count Ciano and Sir Eric Drummond (now Earl of Perth) of December 31st, 1936, to which reference is made in Annex I of the Protocol.

E. THE MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT
(Gentlemen's Agreement between the United Kingdom and Italy of January 2nd, 1937.)

Rome, January 2nd, 1937.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government :

Animated by the desire to contribute increasingly, in the interests of the general cause of peace and security, to the betterment of relations between them and between all the Mediterranean Powers, and resolved to respect the rights and interests of those Powers.

Recognise that the freedom of entry into, exit from, and transit through the Mediterranean is a vital interest both to the different parts of the British Empire and to Italy, and that these interests are in no way inconsistent with each other ;

Disclaim any desire to modify, or, so far as they are concerned, to see modified, the status quo as regards national sovereignty of territory in the Mediterranean area ;

Undertake to respect each other's rights and interests in the said area ;

Agree to use their best endeavours to discourage any activities liable to impair the good relations which it is the object of the present declaration to consolidate.

This declaration is designed to further the ends of peace, and is not directed against any other Power.

Text of the Notes exchanged in Rome on December 31st, 1936, between his Majesty's Ambassador and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(a) Note of the British Ambassador, Sir Eric Drummond, to Count Ciano, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Your Excellency,—The Royal Italian Government may perhaps be aware that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was asked in the House of Commons on December 16 whether he would lay upon the table of the House the precise terms of the guarantee given to his Majesty's Government by the Government of Italy concerning occupation of the Balearic Islands by Italian subjects.

To this question Mr. Eden replied that the assurances to which reference was made were given verbally. He proceeded to state that his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, acting on instructions, informed the Italian Minister for

Foreign Affairs on September 12th that "any alteration of the status quo in the Western Mediterranean would be a matter of the closest concern to his Majesty's Government."

Mr. Eden continued that, taking note of this communication, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had assured Mr. Ingram that the Italian Government had not, either before or since the revolution in Spain, engaged in any negotiations with General Franco whereby the status quo in the Western Mediterranean would be altered, nor would they engage in any such negotiations in the future. This assurance, the Secretary of State added, was subsequently reaffirmed spontaneously to the British Naval Attaché in Rome by the Italian Ministry of Marine, and the Italian Ambassador in London had on several occasions given to the Secretary of State similar verbal assurances.

In view of these assurances, his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume that, so far as Italy is concerned, the integrity of the present territories of Spain shall in all circumstances remain intact and unmodified. They would, however, be grateful if your Excellency saw your way formally to confirm the accuracy of this assumption, and I have accordingly the honour to inquire whether your Excellency could supply me with such confirmation.

I avail myself of the opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

(b) Note of Count Ciano, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Eric Drummond, British Ambassador :

Your Excellency,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Note of to-day's date in which you draw my attention to a question asked in the House of Commons on December 16th last, and the reply given, by Mr. Eden, on the subject of the assurances given verbally by the Royal Italian Government concerning the *status quo* in the Western Mediterranean.

You reminded me that in taking note of the communication made by his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on September 12th I assured Mr. Ingram that the Italian Government had not, either before or since the revolution in Spain, engaged in any negotiations with General Franco whereby the status quo in the Western Mediterranean would be altered, nor would they engage in any such negotiations in the future.

I have, consequently, no difficulty, on behalf of the Royal Italian Government, in confirming the accuracy of his Majesty's Government's assumption—namely, that, so far as Italy is concerned, the integrity of the present territories of Spain shall in all circumstances remain intact and unmodified.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

THE PREVIOUS HISTORY OF THE AGREEMENT of April 16th, 1938

Retirement of Mr. Eden, Britain Foreign Secretary, on February 20th, 1938, and the Change in Mr. Chamberlain's Italian Policy.

Extract from Mr. Eden's Speech in the House of Commons on February 21st, 1938.

I stand before the House to-day to give the House in a few brief sentences an account of my reasons for having resigned the office of Foreign Secretary.

First, let me make plain the ultimate aim of us all. The objective of the foreign policy of this country is and must always be the maintenance of peace. If, however, peace is to be enduring it must rest on foundations of frank reciprocity and mutual

respect. If we accept this basis for our foreign policy, it follows that we must be ready to negotiate with all countries, whatever their form of government, in order to promote international understanding. But we must also be watchful that in our conception of such negotiations and in the method by which we seek to further them, we are in fact strengthening, not undermining, the foundations upon which international confidence rests.

So I come, with that introduction, to the immediate issue which unhappily divides me from my colleagues. It will be

known to the House that **certain exchanges of view** have been taking place **between the Italian Government and his Majesty's Government** in respect of the opening of conversations between the two Governments. Indeed, his Majesty's Government have been committed to the principle of such conversations ever since the Prime Minister himself exchanged letters with Signor Mussolini last summer. There is no dispute anywhere about that.

The immediate issue is as to whether such official conversations should be opened in Rome now. It is my conviction that the attitude of the Italian Government to international problems in general, and to this country in particular, is not yet such as to justify this course. The ground has been in no respect prepared. Propaganda against this country by the Italian Government is rife throughout the world. I am myself pledged to this House not to open conversations with Italy until this hostile propaganda ceases. I do not want to stress the personal position, which is relatively unimportant, but I might mention in passing the difficult position in which I must have been placed had I to announce in existing conditions to this House the opening of such conversations.

Moreover, little progress in fact, though much in promise, has yet been made with the solution of the Spanish problem. Let me make it plain. I do not suggest, and I would not advocate, that the Government should refuse conversations with the Italian Government, or indeed with any other Government which shows any disposition to conversations with us for the betterment of international understandings; yet we must be convinced that the conditions in which these conversations take place are such as to make for the likelihood, if not for the certainty, of their success. In my judgment those conditions do not exist to-day.

I am compelled for a few moments, if the House will allow me, to **review the past**, for this situation has a background. We have made—while I was privileged to be Foreign Secretary I was responsible for—several attempts in the past 18 months to better our relations with Italy. They have all failed in the main, though not wholly, because of the Spanish problem. In January of last year, after difficult negotiations, we signed the Anglo-Italian Agreement. Within a very few days, indeed almost simultaneously, the first considerable consignment of Italians left for Spain. It may be held that this was not a breach of the letter of our understanding, but no one, I think, surely will contend that it did not run counter to its spirit.

That same agreement contained a specific clause dealing with the cessation of propaganda, yet propaganda was scarcely dimmed for an instant. Again, last summer, the Prime Minister and Signor Mussolini exchanged letters, and after that in a few days the relations between our two countries took a marked turn for the better. Of that there can be no doubt.

Then what happened? Then ensued the incidents in the Mediterranean with which the House is familiar and the glorification by the head of the Italian Government of the victories of Italian forces in Spain. My submission is that we cannot risk a further repetition of these experiences. Therefore, it is my contention that before his Majesty's Government open official conversations in Rome with the Italian Government, conversations which have, and rightly have, as an objective not only an improvement of Anglo-Italian relations, but appeasement in the Mediterranean as a whole—before that can be done we must make further progress with the Spanish problem; we must agree not only on the need for withdrawal and on the conditions of withdrawal. We have had assurances enough of that in the past. We must go farther and show the world not only promise, but achievement. The withdrawal must have begun in earnest before those conversations in Rome can be held on a really solid basis of good will, which is essential to success.

In the light—my judgment may well be wrong—of the present international situation this is a moment for this country to stand firm and not to plunge into negotiations unprepared with

the full knowledge that the chief obstacle to their success has not been resolved.

The programme which I have outlined seems to me a not unreasonable programme. Indeed, if the desire of the two parties be to reach agreement on all subjects outstanding between them, including Spain, I am quite confident that it is the best method to pursue. It is the traditional method of diplomacy to prepare for conversations before they are formally opened. It is seldom right to depart from that traditional method, which has been tested by time and experience.

It is certainly never right to do so because one party to the negotiations intimates that it is now or never. Agreements that are worth while are never made on the basis of a threat. Nor in the past has this country been willing to negotiate in such conditions. I repeat that if our objective is to promote a Mediterranean agreement, to promote lasting appeasement, then the method which I have described is not only the best, but the only one possible, and the only one consonant with our position in the world.

I may be told that by insisting that positive progress must be made with the Spanish question before formal conversations are opened between his Majesty's Government and the Italian Government in Rome, I am asking one party to the negotiations to yield in advance certain advantages that that party now enjoys. I shall not for one moment seek to argue whether those advantages, if indeed they be advantages, are legitimate ones. But it has never entered into my conception to suggest that the Italian forces should be withdrawn from Spain alone, but only that the Italian Government should agree and carry out with others a fair scheme for the proportionate withdrawal of all foreigners from Spain.

I am conscious—that is, of course, why I stand here—that my right hon. friend the Prime Minister and my colleagues take another view. They believe in their policy, and they believe in their method, and they may be right. But if they are right their chances of success will certainly be enhanced if their policy is pursued by another Foreign Secretary, one who has complete conviction in the methods which he is being asked to employ. It may even be that my resignation will facilitate the course of those negotiations. If so, nobody will be more pleased than I.

I have spoken to the House of the immediate difference that has divided me from my colleagues. Moreover, it has recently become clear to me, and I think to the Prime Minister, that there is between us a real difference of outlook and method.

My right hon. friend has strong views on foreign policy, and I respect him for it. And I have strong views, too. Since we are, as I know, both of us conscious that those views have resulted in a divergence, not of aim, but of outlook, and of approach, it is clearly in the national interest that unity should be restored at the earlier possible moment.

Mr. Chamberlain's Reply

In order that the House may have before it as complete a picture as possible of the events which have led up to the present situation I must ask for their indulgence while I endeavour to state once again **my own views upon certain aspects of foreign policy**—views which have never altered and which have been shared by all my colleagues. On a former occasion I described that policy as being **based upon three principles**. First, on the protection of British interests and the lives of British nationals. Secondly, on the maintenance of peace and so far as we can impose it the settlement of differences by peaceful means and not by force; and, thirdly, the promotion of friendly relations with other nations who are willing to reciprocate our friendly feelings and who will keep those rules of international conduct without which there can be neither security nor stability.

It is not enough to lay down general principles. If we truly desire peace it is, in my opinion, necessary to make a sustained

effort to ascertain and if possible to remove the causes which threaten peace and which now for many months have kept Europe in a state of tension and anxiety.

I cannot believe that with a little good will and determination it is not possible to remove genuine grievances and to clear away suspicions which may be entirely unfounded. For these reasons then my colleagues and I have been anxious to find some opportunity of **entering upon conversations with** the two European countries with which we have been at variance—namely, **Germany and Italy**—in order that we might find out whether there was any common ground on which we might build up a general scheme of appeasement in Europe.

It is not necessary now to enter upon a discussion upon our relations with Germany because it is not over those that this difference has arisen. I would only observe that the visit of the Lord President of the Council to Germany marked the first attempt to explore the ground and that we hope in the light of the information which we then obtained to pursue that matter further at a convenient opportunity.

In the case of Italy there has been what my right hon. friend alluded to as a gentleman's agreement of January, 1937, an agreement which it was hoped was going to be the first step in the clearing up of the situation between ourselves and the Italian Government. Unfortunately there intervened the events to which my right hon. friend has alluded in Spain. Nevertheless there remained good reason for continuing to watch to see whether a suitable opportunity might arise in order to improve relations.

Towards the end of July, after a speech which was made by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on the 19th of that month, the Italian Ambassador (Count Grandi) informed my right hon. friend that that speech had made an excellent impression in Italy and that the situation seemed to be so much easier that he was encouraged to deliver to me as Prime Minister a message which Signor Mussolini had authorized him to make use of when he thought that the moment was propitious.

Accordingly, I arranged for Count Grandi to come to see me on July 27th. The message which he brought me from Signor Mussolini was of a friendly character. I felt that we were presented with an opportunity for improving our relations which ought not to be missed. Accordingly, I decided to take what I considered then and what I consider now to be the course which was best calculated to serve the purpose—namely, to put aside ordinary diplomatic formalities and to send a personal reply in cordial terms by way of response.

I was glad to receive from Signor Mussolini immediately a reply in which he expressed his own sincere wish to restore good relations between our two countries, and his agreement with the suggestion that conversations should be entered upon in order to ensure the desired understanding between the two countries. This latter was followed up by instructions to our ambassador in Rome to inform the Italian Government that it was hoped that conversations might begin in September.

Unfortunately, certain incidents took place in the Mediterranean which in our opinion rendered it impossible that conversations at that time could have any chance of success. Nevertheless, it is well to remember something which my right hon. friend omitted to mention in his account of past history—namely, that he was successful at Nyon in arriving at an agreement with the Italian Government about the patrolling of the Mediterranean.

Once more I hoped that this agreement might be followed by further discussions upon the Spanish situation, which in turn would open up the way for those conversations which had been the subject of the correspondence between Signor Mussolini and myself. There once again I was disappointed and the situation became clouded by the difficulties experienced in the Non-Intervention Committee over the withdrawal of volunteers, difficulties which did not arise in one quarter only—and when Italy later gave notice of her intention to leave the

League it was difficult to see how the conversations could proceed.

I think it is well to consider how these successive obstacles to conversations affected the situation as between Italy and ourselves. It cannot be denied that during all those months which have elapsed since the original interchange of letters between Signor Mussolini and myself the state of Anglo-Italian relations had seriously and steadily deteriorated. It has always seemed to me that in dealing with foreign countries we do not give ourselves a chance of success unless we try to understand their mentality, which is not always the same as our own.

It was in these circumstances, in a steadily worsening atmosphere overhanging our relations with Italy, that a **fresh opportunity** arose to break out of this vicious circle. It arose on the 10th of this month. Following on some amiable conversations between the Italian Ambassador and my right hon. friend, the Ambassador called at the Foreign Office and stated that these conversations had been sincerely welcomed in Rome and that he had been instructed to report that the Italian Government was ready at any time to open conversations with us. He added that he desired the conversations to be as wide as possible, embracing, of course, the question of the formal recognition of the Abyssinian conquest but also not excluding Spain.

In reply, the Foreign Secretary pointed out that we in this country were bound to act as loyal members of the League, but, he added, that it seemed to him that the attitude of the League, and especially that of the Mediterranean Powers, would no doubt be considerably influenced by the fact, if fact it came to be, that we and the Italian Government had come to an agreement which was a real contribution to the general appeasement. My right hon. friend emphasized that this was a factor which would have great weight with public opinion, not only in this country but also in France and in the other Mediterranean States, and, which is important, in the United States of America also.

In all this my right hon. friend was not merely expressing his own personal opinion; he was speaking for the Government as a whole, and those views which he expressed to the Italian Ambassador were particularly co-incidental with the views that I hold myself. I have always taken the view, for instance, that the question of the formal recognition of the Italian position in Abyssinia was one that could only be morally justified if it was found to be a factor—and an essential factor—in a general appeasement.

That was the view of all of us, including my right hon. friend, and it will be seen that the trend of this conversation, which I have just reported, was definitely favourable to a further discussion which would include all outstanding questions, including the question of Abyssinia. All outstanding questions, it is important to realize, did include the question of Abyssinia, and I emphasize this because of the point of view that has been expressed by my noble friend. I am sure the House will not have failed to notice that in his view the issue is one quite different from that which was put forward by my right hon. friend.

Let me remind the House that my right hon. friend said quite clearly—I took his words down at the time—that the issue is “Should conversations be opened in Rome now”? That is not the attitude of my noble friend. He says that this is not a question of detail; this is a question of fundamental principle. He went on to say that that fundamental principle was the principle of international good faith.

If that is the principle upon which my noble friend found it necessary to separate himself from us now, what has happened to alter the position since this conversation which I have described to the House? There was no reason why we should not proceed in due course to discuss with Italy upon all outstanding questions.

A week later our Ambassador in Rome reported a conversation with the Italian Foreign Minister at which the latter had

told him he had instructed Count Grandi to urge earnestly that an early start should be made with the conversations. On the same day I suggested to my right hon. friend that it would be useful if he and I had a talk with Count Grandi. My right hon. friend in his statement was anxious to put the situation as objectively as he possibly could, but I must ask him to forgive me if I say that at one point he was not quite fair. He represented to the House that the Italian Government had called on us to enter on conversations now or never, and that we were being asked to submit to a threat. There is nothing in any of the communications which passed between us and the Italian Government which, in my judgment, would justify that description.

I repeat that in my judgment, and I am sure I can say in the judgment of my colleagues—with the exception of my right hon. friend—nothing that has been said on behalf of the Italian Government would justify anybody in saying that they have used threats. It is therefore not fair to the House to suggest that they are being asked to submit to demands from another Government to which it would be derogatory to our dignity to submit.

I have stated that they informed us of their earnest desire that conversations should start as soon as possible, and it was on the expression of that desire that the conversation between the Italian Ambassador, the Foreign Secretary, and myself took place. The Foreign Secretary concurred in my suggestion, but later in the day sent me a note asking me not to commit the Government to anything specific during the conversation. As a matter of fact I did abstain from anything of the kind. When the conversation was over the Foreign Secretary and I discussed what were the conclusions that should be drawn from it. It was then, as it seemed to me, that for the first time our differences became acute. This was on Friday. I was convinced that a rebuff to the Italian expression of their desire that conversations should start at once would be taken by them as a confirmation of those suspicions which I have described—suspicions that we had never really been in earnest about the conversations at all.

I thought that if that were the effect the result would be disastrous. It would be followed by an intensification of anti-British feeling in Italy, rising to a point at which ultimately war between us might become inevitable. Moreover, I was equally convinced that once the conversations had started we should find good effects of the new atmosphere in many places, and notably in Spain, where the chief difficulty between us had lain for so long.

The Foreign Secretary, on the other hand, was unable to agree to any immediate decision. He wished to say in reply that in the opinion of his Majesty's Government the moment for the official opening of conversations was not appropriate, and that we wished to wait until a substantial withdrawal of volunteers had taken place. In particular, he insisted that we ought to have some indication from the Italian Government, such as their acceptance of the British formula for the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain—which he pointed out had been waiting for Italian acceptance for some considerable time—before we committed ourselves even to conversations. But when I asked him whether, if such acceptance could be obtained from the Italians, he would then be able to agree to the commencement of the conversations, he made it clear that his objections would still remain.

In these circumstances, with the full concurrence, and at the desire, of the Foreign Secretary I decided to summon the Cabinet for Saturday afternoon, the next day. I informed Count Grandi that I could not give him our final decision until to-day but that in the meantime it would be helpful if he could obtain from his Government such an assurance as the Foreign Secretary had spoken of. I need not recite in detail the subsequent events of Saturday and Sunday. I think the House already knows that when the Cabinet had heard the views of my right

hon. friend and myself their views leaned to my side rather than to his.

That is the end of my account of the differences between my right hon. friend on the one hand and my colleagues and me on the other on this particular issue.

There remains a further brief chapter of history which I must now relate. This morning I received a call from the Italian Ambassador in accordance with the arrangement made when we parted on Friday last. He had been in communication with his Government over the week-end, and he began by informing me that he had received from them a communication which I think I had better read to the House. It is as follows :

"The Italian Ambassador informs the Prime Minister that he has submitted to the Italian Government the proposals suggested at their meeting of last Friday and is glad to convey to him the Italian Government's acceptance of the British formula concerning the withdrawal of foreign volunteers and the granting of belligerent rights."

I have not the formula with me but I think the House is familiar with it. I think I can say that in handing me this communication the Italian Ambassador intimated that I was to regard it as a gesture on the part of his Government indicating the spirit of good will and good feeling in which they would wish to begin our conversations.

The hon. member for Plaistow says : "When they knew that the Foreign Secretary had gone." I asked the Italian Ambassador when he received this communication, and he informed me that he had received it on Sunday morning. I then informed the Ambassador, following on the meeting of the Cabinet, that I was happy to say we were ready to begin conversations and that the Italian Government would be so informed at once.

At the same time I told the Ambassador that I wished to impress upon him certain points. First of all, I told him that the British Government regarded a settlement of the Spanish question as an essential feature of any agreement at which we might arise. No agreement could be considered complete unless it contained a settlement of the Spanish question.

Secondly, I repeated that as he had been already told by my right hon. friend we were loyal members of the League, and that if we came to an agreement we should desire to obtain the approval of the League for it. I said it was essential, that it should not be possible, if we went to the League to recommend the approval of the agreement, to say that the situation in Spain during the conversations had been materially altered by Italy, either by sending fresh reinforcements to Franco or by failing to implement the arrangements contemplated by the British formula. I added that I did not believe that these intimations would occasion his Government a moment's anxiety, since I was confident that his Government would approach the negotiations in the same spirit as we should do—namely, in perfect good faith and with a sincere desire to reach agreement.

I know very well that the decision of the Government is going to be misrepresented, has been misrepresented already.

Let me make it plain that there is no question at this moment of what the terms of the agreement are to be. The question is whether we are to enter upon negotiations or to refuse even to contemplate them, and if there be anybody here who really wishes to obtain peace, do they think they can ever obtain peace by continuing a vendetta and refusing even to talk about their differences ?

I have never been more completely convinced of the rightness of any course that I have had to take than I am to-day of the rightness of the decision to which the Cabinet came yesterday. What we are seeking to do is to get a general appeasement throughout Europe which will give us peace. The peace of Europe must depend upon the attitude of the four major Powers—Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves.

For ourselves we are linked to France by common ideas of democracy, of liberty, and Parliamentary government. France

need not fear that the resignation of my right hon. friend upon this issue signifies any departure from the **policy of the closest friendship with France** of which he has been such a distinguished exponent. I count myself as firm a friend of France as my right hon. friend. The difference between him and me will never mean that there is any difference between us about our relations with France.

On the other side we find Italy and Germany also linked by affinities of outlook and in the forms of their government. The question that we have to think of is this: Are we to allow these two pairs of nations to go on glowering at one another across the frontier, allowing the feeling between the two sides to become more and more embittered, until at last the barriers are broken down and the conflict begins which many think would mark the end of civilization? Or can we bring them to an understanding of one another's aims and objects and to such discussion as may lead to their final settlement?

If we can do that, if we can bring these four nations into friendly discussion, into a settling of their differences, we shall have saved the peace of Europe for a generation.

Extract from Mr. Chamberlain's Speech in the House of Commons on February 22nd, 1938

What my argument is leading to is this, that **no business** can be possible on the lines which I have just been describing. No nation with any self-respect would accept conditions of that kind before entering into conversations. If you really mean to have conversations you cannot lay down conditions beforehand.

The choice then simply comes down to this. Are we prepared, do we desire, to have conversations or not? If we do, then it seems to me that the sooner we have them the better.

There is another argument which has been prominent in the discussion, an argument certainly well calculated to arouse strong feelings in this House and in the country. It is suggested that to enter into conversations is **a humiliation** for us. There has been talk about **sacrifices to the dictators**. The Leader of the Opposition said that I was going whining to Signor Mussolini. Jibes and taunts of that kind leave me absolutely unmoved. They convince me only of one thing, that those who make them do not realise the greatness of this country. It is a great country, it is a strong country, it is a country that is the head and centre of a great Empire, it is a country to which countless millions of people look up for leadership because they respect it. It is for a great country to do what a small or a weak country cannot always afford to do, to show magnanimity.

It is suggested that in what we have done we have had to go behind the backs of our friends. Who speaks with knowledge of what we have done, and whether we have gone behind the backs of our friends? (Hon. members: "Eden.") My right hon. friend never said anything of the kind. On the 25th of last month my right hon. friend had a conversation with the French Ministers, including the French Prime Minister, in which he informed them that we contemplated opening conversations with Italy.

We did tell our friends what we intended to do. The conversations went further than that. Not only were the French informed of our intentions, or of our contemplated opening of conversations with the Italians, but there was considerable discussion on the subjects which might be discussed when we came to open those conversations.

Without going into details, which perhaps it would be going too far to enter upon now, I think I may say that there appeared to be **complete agreement between the French and ourselves** on the subject which would then be discussed. I remember one thing in particular, which was reported as having been specially insisted on by the French, and that was that the discussions should include a settlement of the Spanish question.

I altogether repudiate any suggestion on the part of hon. and right hon. members opposite that we have done anything behind the backs of our friends or that we have not acted in full consultation with them.

It has been observed I had said nothing about **the League** or about **collective security**. I have often expressed the view that the party opposite allow themselves to be governed by phrases the actual meaning of which they never take the trouble to think out. Among those phrases is "collective security."

If I am right, as I am confident I am, in saying that the League as constituted to-day is unable to provide collective security for anybody, then I say we must not try to delude ourselves, and still more we must not try to delude small, weak nations into thinking that they will be protected by the League against aggression and acting accordingly when we know that nothing of the kind can be expected. To-day you will not find anywhere in the League any conviction that collective security can be provided by the League as now constituted. What is the conclusion to be drawn from that? I am staying in because I still have faith that the League may be reconstituted and because I still believe that there is important and valuable work for the League to do.

I doubt very much whether the League will ever do its best work so long as its members are nominally bound to impose sanctions or to use force in support of obligations. I would not change an article in the Covenant. I would leave the Covenant as it is. I would not tear up a single article of it, not even Article XVI, in the hope that some day it might be reconstituted in such a form that we might rely upon being able to use its powers for the functions for which they were originally intended. I would have it clearly understood to-day that the League cannot use and cannot be expected to use them, and that the nations which remain in the League must be saddled neither with liabilities nor with risks which they are not prepared to undertake; nor must other nations expect that the League will provide that security which it was once hoped it would provide.

I believe that if the League would throw off shams and pretences, which every one sees through, if it would come out with a declaration of what it is prepared to do, and can do, as a moral force to focus public opinion throughout the world, it would justify itself and if would be a real thing. It might draw unto itself again some of those who have lost faith in it in the past, and the future of the League might be assured for the benefit and salvation of mankind.

The party opposite have been asked what they would do in these circumstances. You may take the view that you are not prepared even to talk with those who differ from you or whose standards of public conduct you do not approve. That has been, I will not say our intention, but actually what has happened up to now. Can anybody say that we have approached nearer to peace by pursuing a policy of that kind? Can anybody say that we have taken fear out of the hearts of men? Can anybody say that we have lightened the menace that has been hanging over us? Must not everybody admit that month after month we have seemed to be getting nearer and nearer to war? I believe that the policy of the party opposite, if persisted in—this policy of holding their hands and turning their backs, of making speeches and of doing nothing—is a policy which must presently lead us to war.

There may come a time again as there have been times in the past when someone who occupies the position I hold to-day will have to face again the awful responsibility of answering the question: "Will you plunge your country into war?" I pray that that responsibility may not fall upon me, but does not an almost equally heavy responsibility lie upon the man who feels as I do that if we do not take action we may presently be faced with that frightful question, who feels that by taking action we may do something to avert it? I feel that I should fail in my duty if I failed to take that action now, as I have done.

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THE HISTORIC STATE VISIT OF THE FÜHRER TO ITALY

The Rome festivities are over. The various stages in Rome, Naples and Florence have been followed by the whole world with tension and curiosity, with feeling, expectation and criticism, and with interpretations and prophecies of the most various kinds. The vast interest raised by the Führer's visit to Italy far beyond diplomatic, political and journalistic circles immediately concerned proved that this was not a State visit, a cold representative or conventional ceremony, or a well thought-out political and tactical meeting of diplomats and statesmen, but a manifestation of two nations. The wave of enthusiasm which met the Führer throughout Italy and the cordial interest taken by the entire people in these festive days showed that, as in the case of the Duce's visit to Germany, this visit represented the proclamation of a friendship and community of sentiments between two nations and their two leaders, a community of ideas greatly exceeding in importance a coldly calculated community of interests. No compulsion and no orders could have brought together such vast crowds or caused them to make such obviously spontaneous demonstrations. This community has been more firmly welded above all by the fact that Germany and Italy, National Socialism and Fascism, have had a hard struggle to defend themselves against a flood of enmity, suspicion and abuse in order to gain what they considered to be vital necessities in the face of the stubborn resistance of a hostile world.

This demonstration also embodies the political fact and the essential political significance of these days, the result of which may be regarded as a further reinforcement and strengthening of the Rome-Berlin axis. The durability of this axis requires no alliances or treaties and no General Staff discussions. But it is based on the securest possible foundation, namely on mutual confidence, on the common ideology of two nations and on the friendship of their two leaders who require no document cupboards full of treaties but in whom, apart from a practical view and estimation of matters, there is something which extends to human and personal spheres and which grips the heart and mind.

In this respect the days in Italy were a continuation of Mussolini's visit to Germany at the end of September 1937. In the meantime the return of German-Austria to the Reich had taken place, of which so many people feared and still more people hoped that it would break the axis. But this very event proved the firmness of the axis and the deep significance of Mussolini's words—which have since come true—at the demonstration on the

May Field in Berlin: "Speak clearly and frankly, and when one has a friend march with him to the end". Mussolini has kept the word which he spoke at that time in thinking of the sanctions war and Germany's neutrality: "We will never forget this". These words were almost identical with those used by the Führer on March 12th at Linz when he thanked the Duce for Italy's attitude in those eventful days and which he further underlined in Rome with the sentence: "Just as you and your people maintained your friendship with Germany in decisive days, I and my people will show the same friendship to Italy in a difficult hour". These words are of greater weight than treaties and paragraphs.

The axis has again stood the test. The Duce and the Führer have not fulfilled the hope of a certain part of the surrounding world that was on the watch to undermine or destroy it. On the contrary, they have strengthened the axis at that very Alp frontier which, according to Adolf Hitler's bequest to the German people, is in future regarded as for ever inviolable. The Brenner, which was regarded by so many as the last hope of the estrangement of the two States, will in future no longer be a line of separation but will "serve as a bridge for mutual support and assistance". The inflammable matter which was deliberately placed between the two nations on this frontier by the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain has been definitely removed by the Anschluss. Instead of a permanent position of enmity desired by certain democracies, the two countries now stand shoulder to shoulder in Europe. The connecting link has been broken out of the ring with which in particular France has always endeavoured to encircle and suppress Germany. The connecting trench running from France to the Little Entente and thence to Eastern Europe has been destroyed, and an end has thus been put to century-old aims of the French policy of hegemony and intervention which from the time of Richelieu and Napoleon to the policy of the Third Republic has so often brought Europe to the edge of the abyss. The Berlin-Rome axis now runs from the North Sea to the Mediterranean; it was erected by National Socialism and Fascism in Berlin and has again been strengthened in Rome.

* * *

The time is now past when the European policy of certain Powers constantly aimed at preventing, first Italy, then Germany, from engaging in German-Italian cooperation. Mussolini's realistic discernment to which he gave such convincing expression in his great speech in the Chamber on March 16th, 1938 and which was the basis of his pro-

longed and stubborn struggle to release Europe from the terrible mortgage placed upon it by Versailles, also prevented him from hindering the German Reich from its constant historical development into a great national Reich, as against the view of French statesmen and diplomats that this should be the main task of Italian policy. It was on account of this that the first meeting of Hitler and Mussolini at Stra near Venice in June 1934 failed. Moreover the meaning of the Franco-Italian Befana treaty of January 7th, 1935 was to make Italy the guardian of French interests in the Danube basin and at the same time, under the watchword of "Austrian independence", to erect fortifications against Germany under Italian command. The front set up shortly afterwards at Stresa on April 14th, 1935 also mentioned Austria as a factor in a joint policy of England, France and Italy. But on the other hand the two world Powers did not desire that Italy, which had recently become a Great Power, should strengthen her position too much in the Danube basin which—without there being the slightest economic or cultural necessity—might have damaged the French position of supremacy, or in the Mediterranean where France and Great Britain foresaw a danger to their means of communication. Italy thus had her best political forces and energies tied up on the Brenner without being able to obtain definite advantages in Central Europe, while at the same time this prevented the release of Italian forces and energies for her plans of expansion in the Mediterranean and North Africa. This extremely complicated position ultimately formed a Gordian knot which could no longer be untied, but could only be cut through. Mussolini cut it through with the Abyssinian sword in his great speech in the Chamber on May 26th, 1935 with the historical words: "It is however not out of place to devote a few words to those who would gladly see us held up at the Brenner in order to prevent us from moving in other directions. The problem of Austrian independence is not an exclusively Italian problem. Fascist Italy is not thinking of limiting her historical mission to a single political problem or to a single military section such as the defence of a frontier, even one so important as that of the Brenner."

This speech, in which Mussolini showed himself to be a far-sighted and practical statesman with a deep insight into the essence of historical and national connections and necessities, was a hard blow for the peacemakers of Versailles and St. Germain and for all who thought it their duty to defend this evil inheritance.

Germany has never forgotten that Mussolini, on the basis of this attitude, at an early date and as the first of all statesmen in the camp of the former parties to the War, recognised and condemned the unnaturalness of that "order" which is connected with the name of Versailles. It is also remembered that it was Fascist Italy who, after the War, not only claimed and carried through the claim to the fulfilment of her vital rights, but also showed comprehension and respect for the justified and natural vital claims of the German nation in Germany's hard struggle towards a higher plane, and was always in favour of the abolition of reparations, the earlier evacuation of the Rhineland, the return of the Saar Territory, the revision of the treaties and Germany's military equality of rights. The vehemence with which Mussolini declined to be forced into an anti-German position on account of certain interests and described this as a misconstruction of Italy's power of judgment speaks a sufficiently clear language.

Those words were a bridge of thought between the Austrian and the Abyssinian question. The one question fell into the background for Italy, while the other became constantly more important and more energetically pursued. With the Abyssinian campaign Italy again struck out on her path of destiny which had led her to North Africa as far back as the eighties, turned from European to Mediterranean policy and, in order that she might again breathe the free air of the sea, broke the fetters imposed on her since the end of the War.

* * *

As from this time the axis soon assumed more definite outlines; in the first place in the agreement reached with Mussolini's cooperation on July 11th, 1936 and then in the Berlin discussions and the Berchtesgaden agreement in connection with Count Ciano's visit to Germany at the end of October 1936. A few days later, on November 1st, 1936, Mussolini delivered his great political speech on the Milan Cathedral square, which culminated in the words: "The vertical line from Rome to Berlin is not a line of separation, but rather an axis in which all European States can cooperate that are animated by a desire for cooperation and peace". The slogan of the axis was thus coined for the first time for the new kind of German-Italian relations. Its parallelism came sharply to the fore in the treatment of the Spanish problem, in the struggle against communism, in the colonial question, in the confirmation of the vital claims of "nations without living room" and lastly in the rejection of the Geneva ideologies. In the Spanish problem this parallelism was shown by the joint recognition of National Spain on November 18th, 1936 and in the policy in the London Non-Intervention Committee. The common struggle against Bolshevism led on November 6th, 1937 to Italy's accession to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement. Shortly before, on October 28th, 1937, on the anniversary of the march on Rome, Mussolini declared Germany's imprescriptible right to a place in the African sun, and on December 11th, 1937, in one of his historical speeches from the Palazzo Venezia, with bitter words he drew the line of demarcation between Rome and Geneva. He thus transferred to the field of practical politics what he had declared in his speech at Palermo on August 20th, 1937 after the conclusion of the manœuvres in Sicily to be the second reality of Italian policy after that of the Empire, namely that the way to Rome leads through Berlin and the way to Berlin through Rome. Then came, from September 24th to 29th the grandiose reception of the Duce in Berlin with historical speeches of the two Leaders on the Berlin May Field on September 28th. The result of this journey was expressed by Mussolini after his return in a speech from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia in the following words: "The German-Italian friendship, consecrated through the Berlin-Rome axis, has in these days entered the hearts of the two nations and will remain there".

Such a historical development, which arose out of a practical political and just appreciation of matters, was not affected by the events of March 1938. The Anschluss of Austria was regarded as a release from the tension which had troubled the relations between the two nations for the past twenty years. Moreover, the "Austrian drama" became a European crisis of clarification of the first order.

* * *

The axis has now been crowned for the second time by the Führer's visit to Italy. It is to be regarded irrevocably and immutably as a fixed component part of European policy that has to be reckoned with and accepted. It can, however, be readily accepted for its policy is always directed towards the same aim that Mussolini and Adolf Hitler put before the world in Berlin and Rome, namely peace. "Nothing will be planned here to divide a Europe which is already divided enough. There are no secret intentions and the solemn confirmation of the fact and stability of the Rome-Berlin axis is not directed against any other States". These sentiments expressed in the Duce's speech on the May Field are also to be heard in the speeches in the Palazzo Venezia regarding the aim and condition of the axis policy. The aim is to seek a system of international action which is in a position to provide effective guarantees of justice, security and peace for all. The condition is loyal acceptance of the elementary rights of every nation

to life and defence and the creation of an equilibrium based on the reality of historical forces which must form its foundation and decisive factor. Who could possibly find a threat in these words of Mussolini or in his conviction "that the peoples of Europe will in this way find tranquility and peace which are essential in order to maintain the foundation of European culture"? Or in the Führer's words that "Germany and Italy are resolved to maintain their eternal vital rights and to defend themselves against all forces desiring to oppose their natural development"? If the statesmen at the Paris Conference had acted on these principles and views when they remade the map of Europe, it would have been better for this continent at the present time.

"It is a fact that after the statements of May 7th, the last hopes must be lost that Fascism and National Socialism can be separated and played off one against the other."

With these few words the deputy of the Führer, Reich Minister Hess, in an interview with the "Popolo d'Italia" on May 9th most happily characterised the significance and scope of the historical speeches in the Palazzo Venezia.

This is the essential factor of this cooperation; the guess-work that has been going in in foreign countries as to what one party demands and what another has given misses the essence of the matter. In Rome there was no question of "giving" or "taking", or of claims and demands that had to be bargained against each other or set forth in paragraphs.

But it nevertheless makes a curious impression when newspapers such as the "Temps" find that the speeches have a definitely different undertone and proceed to draw particular conclusions from this view. The official Polish "Gazeta Polska" very rightly remarked that just as Mussolini's speech on the Berlin May Field was given a stronger political accent, the host on this occasion yielded the preference to his guest.

It may moreover be assumed that the Duce at Genoa again found the "right" tone. In this speech he clearly destroyed the hopes of those who thought that the Anglo-Italian Treaty had loosened or would loosen the relations with Germany on the grounds that the axis has now been deprived of its foundation since the agreement has put an end to Anglo-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean and in the Near East.

It is astonishing how little sense of reality is shown by these quarters who are constantly seeking for pacts and constantly thinking of the past. A fitting reply was given to them by the "Temps" on May 4th and 9th—despite a few illogical arguments and hopes for the "subsequent effects of a solution of the complex Central and Eastern European problems".

"It has been frequently stated that the Italo-German agreement is mainly based on the maintenance of the independence of Austria. This independence of Austria now no longer exists. But the agreement between Rome and Berlin continues to exist as the framework of a political system in Europe. This is the fact of which account must be taken in judging the position created in the centre of the Continent.

The real bond that unites Germany and Italy consists in the parallelism of the National Socialist and Fascist revolutions. For both dictators it is a question of defending, securing and reinforcing what they have created."

This is very true. The speeches in the Palazzo Venezia should not be understood from the limited point of view of the next few weeks or months, but as the declaration of thoughts and desires for the near and distant future that have arisen out of pre-war and post-war experiences which had the same aims and a common nature.

It is a sign of dangerous aberrations in pre-war and post-war mentality that the French General Niessel or Winston Churchill, for instance, immediately take up their pencils in order to calculate what alliance would be strong enough to have the greatest possible prospect of overcoming Germany and Italy.

As regards the expectations of differences of opinion which might be caused as a result of the Anschluss by the Danube and Balkan policy of the two countries, we would refer to the views expressed below by authoritative Italian organs.

The Cassandra warnings of Count d'Ormesson in the "Figaro" are wide of the mark and show a complete misunderstanding of the radical change in German-Italian relations, since he endeavours by digging up old worn-out reminiscences of the time before the War to prove that "Italy's greatest enemy is her ally". It is not worth while to go into this question further. In other French papers and in British Liberal and Labour quarters an attempt is naturally made to disturb the German-Italian understanding or to represent it as a danger to peace.

A more practical attitude is adopted by the leading articles in the "Times" and "Daily Telegraph" of May 9th, as follows:

"The speeches were notable for their restraint. They held the language of statemanship. They certainly did not bear out predictions of intransigence and ferocity. They contained no threats... In the light of that declaration it is evident that there is nothing incompatible between the Rome-Berlin axis and the Anglo-Italian agreement... From this historic event—which was anticipated with uneasiness in some capitals—it is possible to say that Europe may find good grounds for reassurance rather than alarm. All hopes may not have been fulfilled, but some fears have been decidedly abated."

* * *

The speeches in the Palazzo Venezia, which were so well adapted to each other, have once more indicated the foundations and conditions on which a new order of European policy is possible in the sense of the axis, namely not to make artificial calculations, but to create a new situation of mutual respect and friendship and of loyal cooperation between the nations in order to take a far-sighted view and to find ways and means of improving the political and economic position by removing all the points of friction that have proved or may in the near or distant future prove dangerous to peace.

It is true that the axis is primarily the symbol of the solidarity of two nations and States that are mindful of their vital rights but do not thereby desire to hinder cooperation with all nations of European culture, for the proction of whom the axis has become, in accordance with the will of the parties to it, a bulwark against the disintegrating forces of Communism and Bolshevism.

THE TOASTS OF HIS MAJESTY THE KING AND EMPEROR AND OF THE FUHRER AT THE BANQUET IN THE QUIRINAL ON MAY 4TH, 1938

Lo scambio di brindisi tra S. M. il Re Imperatore e il Führer, durante il pranzo di gala al Quirinale

His Majesty, the King and Emperor, addressed the following toast to the Führer :

“ Führer !

It gives us special pleasure to offer to you, our most honoured guest, a most sincere and cordial welcome.

In your person Italy greets the head of the great friendly nation, the leader who has restored to Germany her greatness and her cultural mission. Numerous and deep are the affinities of spirit and works that bind the new Italy to the new Germany and that render the friendship of the two peoples intimate and secure. This friendship is and will be in future an instrument in the service of European peace for which the Government of the Reich and our Government are cooperating so faithfully.

From the enthusiasm which greeted your journey from the Italian frontier to Rome and from the reception that our capital gave you on your arrival, you have been able to note how deeply rooted are the feelings which Italy cherishes for your person and your country.

We know that these sentiments are fully reciprocated by the German people. For this people that has made such great contributions to the civilisation and achievements of Europe and which you are leading with a firm hand to its glorious destiny, we express our keenest hopes.

We raise our glass to your health, to the success of your work to the prosperity and happiness of the great German nations.”

The Führer replied in the following words :

“ Your Majesty !

For the extremely cordial greetings just extended to me I would offer my deeply felt thanks. Your Majesty's friendly words explain the expression of sympathy with which I have been met in such a cordial manner by the Italian people in the course of my journey through Italy and in Rome itself. This was more than a merely external expression of cordial hospitality. It was a proof of the firm and intimate connection of our two nations in their ideals and aspirations. I may therefore consider myself fortunate at this moment to be the interpreter of my own people which is animated by a sincere inclination and profound friendship for Your Majesty and the Italian people. The entire German people join with me in admiring the extraordinary successes fought for and gained by Italy under the wise rule of Your Majesty and under the guidance of a reorganiser and Prime Minister of genius in all the spheres of national life in the face of a world of opposition.

Your Majesty has spoken of the close connections that bind new Italy with new Germany. The grandiose reception which I have found in this country is a proof that Fascist Italy feels that she has a sincere and permanent friend in National Socialist Germany. This mutual friendship is not only a pledge of the security of the two nations, but is also a strong guarantee of general peace.

In this spirit I raise my glass and drink to the health of Your Royal and Imperial Majesty, to the health of Her Majesty the Queen and Empress and of the Royal House, and also to the prosperity and happiness of the great Italian nation.”

Il Sovrano ha detto :

Führer !

Siamo particolarmente lieti di poter rivolgere a Voi, ospite graditissimo, il benvenuto più sincero e più cordiale.

Nella Vostra persona l'Italia saluta il Capo della grande Nazione amica, il Condottiere che ha restituito la Germania alla sua grandezza e alla missione di civiltà.

Numerose e profonde sono le affinità di spirito e di opere che legano la nuova Italia alla nuova Germania e che rendono l'amicizia dei due popoli intima e sicura. Questa amicizia è, e sarà nell'avvenire, uno strumento al servizio della pace europea, per la quale il Governo del Reich e il nostro Governo così fiduciosamente collaborano.

Nell'entusiasmo che ha salutato il Vostro passaggio dal confine italiano a Roma, e nell'accoglienza che la nostra Capitale vi ha fatta al Vostro arrivo, Voi avete potuto constatare quanto profondi siano i sentimenti che l'Italia nutre per la Vostra persona e per la Vostra Patria.

Noi sappiamo che tali sentimenti sono pienamente contraccambiati dal popolo tedesco.

Per questo popolo che ha dato all'Europa così grandi contributi di civiltà e di lavoro e che Voi guidate con mano ferma verso il suo glorioso avvenire, noi formuliamo i nostri voti più vivi.

Alziamo il calice alla Vostra salute, al successo della Vostra opera, alla prosperità e alla fortuna della grande Nazione tedesca.

Il Führer ha così risposto :

Maestà !

Per il benvenuto tanto cordiale a me espresso, prego di voler gradire il mio ringraziamento profondamente sentito.

Le amichevoli parole di Vostra Maestà spiegano le manifestazioni di simpatia con la quale, nel corso del mio viaggio attraverso l'Italia e in Roma stessa, il popolo italiano mi ha accolto in maniera così lusinghiera. Tutto ciò, infatti, era ben più che un'espressione esteriore di cordiale ospitalità ; era la prova dei saldi e intimi legami che uniscono i nostri due popoli nei loro ideali e nelle loro aspirazioni. Posso pertanto stimarmi felice di essere in questo momento l'interprete del mio popolo, il quale è animato da una sincera inclinazione e profonda amicizia per la Maestà Vostra e per il popolo italiano.

Tutto il popolo tedesco ammira con me gli straordinari successi che l'Italia, lottando contro un mondo di ostacoli, in tutti i campi della vita nazionale, ha conquistati sotto il Regno illuminato Vostra Maestà e la guida del suo geniale riorganizzatore e Primo Ministro.

Vostra Maestà stessa ha parlato dei profondi legami che uniscono la nuova Italia alla nuova Germania.

L'accoglienza grandiosa e commovente che ho trovata in questo Paese è la prova che l'Italia fascista sente di possedere nella Germania nazional-socialista un'amica sincera e indefettibile.

E questa amicizia reciproca non è soltanto un pegno di sicurezza per i due popoli, ma costituisce pure una forte garanzia per la pace generale.

In questo spirito levo il mio bicchiere e bevo alla salute di Vostra Maestà Reale e Imperiale, alla salute di Sua Maestà la Regina e Imperatrice, e della Casa Reale, come pure alla prosperità e alle fortune della grande Nazione italiana.

SPEECHES BY THE DUCE AND THE FUHRER AT THE PALAZZO VENEZIA ON MAY 7TH, 1938

Il discorsi del Duce e del Führer al Palazzo Venezia

Signor Mussolini's Speech.

Führer, it is with the most cordial joy that I, the Government, and the Italian people welcome you in this Rome which to-day receives you in the twofold glory of her tradition and her power.

Your visit to Rome fulfils and seals the understanding between our two countries. This understanding, which we have firmly desired and tenaciously constructed, has its roots in our two Revolutions, its strength in the ideal fellowship which binds our two peoples, and its historical function in the permanent interests of our two nations.

One hundred years of history—from the time when first Germany and Italy raised themselves by Revolutions and by arms to claim their right to national unity—bear witness to the parallel nature of these positions and the solidarity of these interests. In the same faith and with the same will Germany and Italy have fought to build their unity, have worked to make it sound and compact, and have redeemed themselves in recent times from the corruption of destructive ideologies in order to create the new régime of the people which is the characteristic of this century.

Along this path, traced by history, our two peoples are marching, united with loyal intentions and with that convinced trust which has been tested by the events of these years of peace and understanding between the two nations. Fascist Italy knows only a single ethical law in friendship: that which I recalled before the German people on the Maifeld. It is this law which the collaboration between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy has obeyed, obeys, and will obey.

The premises and the objectives of this collaboration, consecrated in the Rome-Berlin Axis, have been repeatedly and openly affirmed by us. Germany and Italy have turned their backs on the Utopias to which Europe had blindly entrusted her fate in order to seek between them and with others a régime of international comity which may restore equally for all more effective guarantees of justice, security, and peace.

This goal can only be reached when the elementary rights of our people to live, work, and defend itself are loyally recognized and the political equilibrium corresponds to the reality of the historical sources which constitute and determine it. We are convinced that it is along this path that the European nations will find that tranquillity and peace which are indispensable for the preservation of the very foundations of European civilization.

Führer, I still retain a deep impression of the admirable spectacle of work, peace, and strength which last autumn was offered me by your country, refreshed by you in those fundamental virtues of discipline, courage, and tenacity which create the greatness of peoples. I have not forgotten, nor will I forget, the reception that was accorded to me by yourself, by the authorities, and by the people. The most fervent wishes of myself and of Fascist Italy are extended to your mighty work of reconstruction. I raise my glass to your health, Führer, and I drink to the prosperity of the German nation and the unchangeable friendship of our two peoples.

The Führer's Reply.

Herr Hitler replied in the following words:

Duce, with deep emotion I thank you for the moving words of the greeting you have addressed to me in the name both of the Italian Government and of the Italian people. I am happy to be here in Rome, in which the powerful manifestations of young

Il discorso di Benito Mussolini:

Führer!

È con la più cordiale gioia che io Vi do il benvenuto mio, del Governo e del popolo italiano, in questa Roma che oggi Vi accoglie nella duplice gloria della sua tradizione e della sua potenza.

La Vostra visita a Roma compie e suggella l'intesa tra i nostri due Paesi. Questa intesa, che abbiamo fermamente voluta e tenacemente costruita, ha le sue radici nella Vostra e nella nostra Rivoluzione, ha la sua forza nella comunanza ideale che lega i nostri due popoli, ha la sua funzione storica negli interessi permanenti delle nostre due Nazioni.

Cento anni di storia — da quando prima la Germania e l'Italia si alzarono a rivendicare con le rivoluzioni e con le armi il loro diritto all'unità nazionale — testimoniano il parallelismo di queste posizioni e la solidarietà di questi interessi.

E nella stessa fede e con la stessa volontà che la Germania e l'Italia hanno combattuto per costituire la loro unità; hanno operato per farla salda e compatta; si sono riscattate in questi ultimi tempi dalla corruzione di ideologie dissolvitrici per creare quel regime nuovo di popolo, che è il segno di questo secolo.

Su questo cammino, tracciato dalla Storia, i nostri due popoli marciano uniti, con lealtà di propositi e con quella convinta fiducia provata dagli eventi di questi anni di pace e di intesa fra le due Nazioni.

L'Italia fascista non conosce che una sola legge etica nell'amicizia: quella che io ricordai davanti al popolo tedesco al Campo di Maggio. A questa legge ha obbedito, obbedisce e obbedirà la collaborazione tra la Germania nazista e l'Italia fascista.

Le premesse e gli obiettivi di questa collaborazione — consacrata nell'Asse Roma-Berlino — noi li abbiamo costantemente e apertamente affermati. La Germania e l'Italia hanno lasciato dietro di sé le utopie, alle quali l'Europa aveva ciecamente affidato le sue sorti, per cercare tra loro e per cercare con gli altri un regime di convivenza internazionale, che possa instaurare equamente per tutti garanzie più effettive di giustizia, di sicurezza e di pace. A questo si può giungere soltanto quando gli elementari diritti di ciascun popolo a vivere, a lavorare e a difendersi siano lealmente riconosciuti, e quando l'equilibrio politico corrisponda alla realtà delle forze storiche che lo costituiscono e lo determinano.

Noi siamo convinti che è su questa via che le Nazioni d'Europa troveranno quella tranquillità e quella pace che sono indispensabili a preservare le basi stesse della civiltà europea.

Führer! Io ho ancora vivo nell'animo lo spettacolo mirabile di lavoro, di pace e di forza che, l'autunno dell'anno scorso, mi ha offerto il Vostro Paese, rinnovato da Voi, in quelle fondamentali virtù della disciplina, del coraggio e della tenacia, che fanno la grandezza dei popoli. Non ho dimenticato né dimenticherò le accoglienze che mi furono tributate da Voi, dalle autorità, dal popolo.

Alla Vostra potente opera di ricostruzione vanno i voti più fervidi miei e dell'Italia fascista.

Alla Vostra salute, io alzo, Führer, il mio bicchiere e bevo alla prosperità della Nazione tedesca all'inalterabile amicizia dei nostri due popoli.

La risposta di Adolf Hitler:

Duce!

Profondamente commosso, Vi ringrazio per le cordiali parole di benvenuto che avete voluto indirizzarmi, a nome sia del Governo che del popolo italiano. Sono felice di trovarmi qui a Roma, città che ai ricordi del suo passato incomparabilmente glorioso unisce i segni potenti della giovane Italia fascista.

Dal momento in cui ho messo piede sul suolo italiano ho trovato dovunque un'atmosfera di amicizia e di simpatia, che mi rende profondamente felice.

Fascist Italy are united with the evidence of its incomparably glorious past.

Since the moment when I first set foot on Italian soil I have been conscious everywhere of an atmosphere of friendship and sympathy which rejoices me deeply. With the same heartfelt emotion the German people greeted last August in your person the creator of Fascist Italy, the founder of a new Empire, and at the same time a great friend of Germany.

The National-Socialist Movement and the Fascist Revolution have created two new and powerful States which to-day stand for order and healthy progress in a world of unrest and decay. Germany and Italy have thus similar interests and are closely bound to one another by their common ideology. In this way there has been created in Europe a *bloc* of 120,000,000 people who are resolved to safeguard their eternal right to live and to defend themselves against all forces which might venture to oppose their natural development.

Out of this fight against a world of misunderstanding and opposition which Germany and Italy have had to wage shoulder to shoulder a hearty friendship has gradually grown up between the two peoples. This friendship has proved its strength during the events of the last few years, which have also shown the world that it is necessary to take some account of the rightful and vital interests of great nations.

It is therefore quite natural that our two peoples should in the future continue to develop and extend in constant collaboration this friendship, which in these last years has repeatedly proved its value.

Duce, last August on the Maifeld in Berlin you quoted as an ethical principle, sacred to you and Fascist Italy, these words: "Speak plainly and frankly, and if you have a friend march with him right to the end." In the name of National-Socialist Germany I, too, acknowledge this rule. To-day I give you this answer. Two thousand years have now passed since Romans and Germans met for the first time in history as we know it. Standing here on this, the most glorious spot known to humanity, I feel it was a tragedy of fate that for a time no clear frontier was drawn between these great and gifted races. It caused untold suffering for generations. Now, after almost 2,000 years, thanks to your historic efforts, Benito Mussolini, the Roman State rises from its remote traditions to new life.

To the north of you a new German State has grown up from countless tribes. Now that we have become immediate neighbours, taught by the experience of 2,000 years we both acknowledge those natural frontiers which Providence and history have visibly drawn between our two peoples. They will give Italy and Germany not only the possibility of peaceful and permanent collaboration through a clear division of their spheres of activity, but will provide a bridge for mutual help and support. It is my irrevocable will and my bequest to the German people that the frontier of the Alps, which Nature has erected between us, shall be regarded for ever as unchangeable. I know that thus a great and prosperous future will ensue for Rome and Germany.

Duce, just as you and your people kept friendship for Germany in a moment of crisis, so I and my people are ready to show Italy the same friendship in times of stress.

The magnificent impressions I have just received of the youthful strength, the will to work, and the proud spirit of the new Italy will remain imperishable in my memory. Unforgettable, too, was the sight of your soldiers and Blackshirts, fresh from their recent victories, your well-tried Fleet, and the prowess of your magnificent Air Force. They give me certainty that your admirable constructive work, which I follow with sincerest good wishes, will lead to further great results.

I raise my glass and drink to your health, to the good fortune and greatness of the Italian people, and to our unchangeable friendship.

Con la stessa intima commozione, il popolo tedesco ha salutato nello scorso autunno nella Vostra persona il creatore dell'Italia fascista, il fondatore di un nuovo Impero e nello stesso tempo il grande amico della Germania.

Il movimento nazionalsocialista e la Rivoluzione fascista hanno creato due nuovi potenti Stati, i quali oggi, in un mondo irrequieto e disgregato, costituiscono un esempio d'ordine e di sano progresso. La Germania e l'Italia hanno uguali interessi e, per la loro comunanza di ideologie, sono l'una all'altra strettamente legate.

È sorto ora in Europa un blocco di 120 milioni di uomini decisi a salvaguardare i loro eterni, vitali diritti e a resistere a tutte le forze che tentassero di opporsi al loro naturale sviluppo.

Da questa lotta contro un mondo di incomprensione e di opposizione, che la Germana e l'Italia hanno dovuto sostenere spalla a spalla, si è sviluppata a poco a poco tra i due popoli una cordiale amicizia. Questa amicizia ha dato prova della sua solidità durante gli avvenimenti degli ultimi anni, i quali hanno pure dimostrato al mondo che degli interessi legittimi e vitali delle grandi Nazioni è necessario in ogni caso tenere conto.

È perciò più che naturale che i nostri due popoli continuino a sviluppare e ad approfondire in istretta collaborazione per l'avvenire l'amicizia che in questi ultimi anni è divenuta sempre più salda.

Duce! L'autunno scorso, sul Campo di Maggio di Berlino, Voi avete proclamato come legge etica, sacra a Voi e all'Italia fascista, il principio: « Parlare chiaro e franco e quando si ha un amico, marciare con lui sino alla fine ».

Anch'io mi associo, in nome della Germania nazionalsocialista, a questo principio e vi rispondo oggi: Da quando Romani e Germani si sono incontrati nella storia, per quanto ci consta, per la prima volta, sono ormai passati due millenni. Trovandomi qui, sul suolo più glorioso della storia dell'umanità, sento la fatalità di un destino che già un tempo non aveva tracciato chiari confini fra queste due razze di così alte virtù e di così grande valore; sofferenze indicibili di molte generazioni ne sono state le conseguenze. Orbene oggi, dopo circa 2000 anni, in virtù della storica opera da Voi, Benito Mussolini, compiuta, lo Stato romano risorge da remote tradizioni a nuova vita.

A settentrione del Vostro Paese, numerose stirpi formarono un nuovo Impero germanico. Ora Voi ed io, divenuti vicini immediati e ammaestrati dall'esperienza di due millenni, intendiamo riconoscere la frontiera naturale che la provvidenza e la storia hanno palesemente tracciato ai nostri due popoli. All'Italia e alla Germania, essa — con la netta separazione dell'ambito aperto alla vita delle due Nazioni — consentirà non soltanto la fortuna di una collaborazione pacifica, sicura e duratura, ma offrirà anche un ponte per la reciproca assistenza e cooperazione.

È mia incrollabile volontà, ed è anche mio testamento politico al popolo tedesco, che consideri intangibile per sempre la frontiera delle Alpi eretta tra noi dalla natura. Sono certo che per Roma e per la Germania ne risulterà un avvenire glorioso e prospero.

Duce! Così come Voi e il Vostro popolo vi siete mantenuti fedeli all'amicizia della Germania in giornate decisive, del pari io e il mio popolo siamo pronti a dimostrare la stessa amicizia all'Italia in un'ora difficile.

Rimarrà indelebile nella mia memoria la grandiosa impressione lasciata a tutt'oggi in me dalla forza giovanile, dalla volontà di lavoro e dal fiero spirito della nuova Italia. Indimenticabile anche l'aspetto dei Vostri soldati e delle Camicie Nere coperti di gloria recente, della Vostra flotta messa vittoriosamente alla prova e dello slancio dell'imponente vostra Arma aerea. Ne traggio la certezza che la Vostra ammirevole opera costruttiva, che seguo coi più sinceri auguri, condurrà anche in seguito a grandi successi.

Levo così il mio bicchiere e bevo alla Vostra salute, alla felicità e alla grandezza del popolo italiano e alla nostra immutabile amicizia.

MUSSOLINI'S SPEECH AT GENOA ON MAY 14TH, 1938

Comrades of Genoa !

It is with the greatest joy that as I came here today from the sea I again saw the stupendous lines of your city which has never more than at present earned the title of ruler. No less profound is my joy, after twelve years, at again coming into immediate contact with you. It is with emotion that I speak to you in front of the triumphal arch which you have dedicated to Victory and to the memory of those heroes who gained it with their pure blood and have transmitted it to us and to all future generations as a sacred and immortal inheritance. You will not be surprised if, as almost always has happened at the memorable meetings of the Fascist people, I speak to you of some questions of an international character.

On March 11th at 6 p.m. Italy again stood at the crossways and had to take a decision. From her choice might depend disorder, peace or war, and also the destiny of Europe. But as these events did not come as a surprise to us, we replied immediately and clearly "No!" to a diplomatic step which in this particular case would have been much more useless than many others.

The enemies of Italy and the anti-Fascists of all kinds were greatly disappointed and gave themselves up to an outbreak of genuine and repulsive fury. They evidently desired a collision between the two totalitarian States and even worse complications, not excluding war, even if this had opened wide the gates of Europe to the triumph of Bolshevism. Our attitude was not, as was affirmed, dictated by necessity, but by our will, and everything that has since occurred has shown that it was inspired by wisdom.

To those on the other side of the mountains who still feel disingenuous regret when they remember the events of 1934, we reply once more before you and before the entire Italian people that from that time till March 1938 much water has flowed under the bridges of the Tiber, the Danube, the Spree, the Thames and also the Seine. And while this water flowed more or less tumultuously, Italy, which was in the midst of a sanguinary and gigantic effort, was subject to those sanctions which we have not yet forgotten.

In the meantime, everything that occurred in diplomacy and politics under the general name of Stresa was dead and buried, and, as far as we are concerned, will never arise again. Italy also could afford the really extravagant luxury to mobilise regularly every four years in order to prevent the fatal conclusion of a national revolution.

Fascist Italy could not indefinitely assume the odious and useless task of the former Austria of the Hapsburgs and Metternich, namely to oppose the course of the nation towards its unity.

We have therefore not acted in this way out of fear of complications, for such fear has never found a place in our hearts. But it was rather our conscience, the sense of honour and loyal friendship towards Germany that urged us to do what we did.

At present the two worlds, the German world and the Roman world, are in direct contact. Their friendship is durable. The cooperation between the two revolutions, which is destined to place its imprint upon our century, can only be fruitful. The Italian people, in welcoming the German Chancellor, desired to give expression to this.

The words uttered in the night of May 7th in the Palazzo Venezia were listened to with sincere enthusiasm by the two nations. They do not represent a diplomatic or political declaration but they are a solemn and definite event in history.

Il discorso pronunciato dal Duce a Genova
il 14 maggio 1938

Camerati genovesi !

E' con grandissima gioia che stamane, venendo dal mare, ho riveduto i lineamenti stupendi della vostra città, che non mai come in questa epoca merita il titolo di Dominante.

Non meno profonda è la mia gioia di riprendere, dopo trascorsi dodici anni, un immediato diretto contatto con voi.

Ed è con emozione che io parlo a voi, dinanzi all'Arco che voi avete dedicato alla Vittoria e al ricordo degli Eroi che, con il loro purissimo sangue, la conquistarono e l'hanno tramandata a noi e alle venture generazioni come un retaggio sacro e immortale.

Non vi stupirete, o camerati, se, come quasi sempre è avvenuto nelle memorabili adunate del popolo fascista, io parlerò a voi di talune questioni di carattere internazionale.

Alle ore 18 del giorno 11 marzo, l'Italia si trovò ancora una volta innanzi a un bivio che imponeva una decisione. Dalla scelta poteva dipendere il disordine, la pace o la guerra, quindi il destino d'Europa. Ma poichè gli avvenimenti non venivano a noi di sorpresa ed erano stati previsti nel loro logico sviluppo, noi rispondemmo immediatamente e nettissimamente: no!, dinanzi ad un passo diplomatico che nel caso concreto era assolutamente più inutile di molti altri.

I nemici dell'Italia, gli antifascisti di tutte le risme, rimasero tremendamente delusi e si abbandonarono ad uno scoppio di autentico, per quanto imbecille, furore. Essi avrebbero evidentemente desiderato l'urto fra i due Stati totalitari, e peggiori complicazioni non esclusa la guerra, anche e se, soprattutto, avesse spalancato le porte al trionfo del bolscevismo in Europa.

Non dunque la necessità, come fu detto, ma la nostra volontà ci guidò nel nostro atteggiamento; e tutto quanto è accaduto da allora in poi dimostra che esso fu ispirato dalla saggezza.

A coloro i quali, oltre i monti, hanno ancora la non ingenua malinconia di ricordarci quanto facemmo nel 1934, noi rispondiamo ancora una volta, dinanzi a voi e dinanzi a tutto il popolo italiano in ascolto, che da allora al marzo del '38 molta acqua era passata sotto i ponti del Tevere, del Danubio, della Sprea, del Tamigi ed anche della Senna.

E mentre quest'acqua più o meno tumultuosamente fluiva, all'Italia, impegnata in uno sforzo sanguinoso e gigantesco, venivano applicate quelle sanzioni che noi non abbiamo ancora dimenticato.

Nel frattempo tutto ciò che di diplomatico e di politico passava sotto il nome globale di Stresa era morto e sepolto e, per conto nostro, non risusciterà mai più. N'è l'Italia poteva permettersi il lusso, veramente eccessivo, di mobilitare, allo scadere regolare di ogni quadriennio, per impedire l'epilogo fatale di una rivoluzione nazionale.

L'Italia fascista non poteva assumersi indefinitamente quello che fu il compito odioso e inutile della vecchia Austria degli Abshurghi e dei Metternich: contrastare il moto delle Nazioni verso la loro unità.

Non è dunque per la tema di complicazioni che noi abbiamo così agito; perchè questa tema, quando è necessario, non ha mai albergato, non alberga e non albergherà mai nell'animo nostro.

Ma era la nostra coscienza, il senso dell'onore e l'amicizia leale verso la Germania che ci consigliava di fare quanto abbiamo fatto.

Ora i due mondi, il mondo germanico e il mondo romano, sono in immediato contatto. La loro amicizia è duratura. La collaborazione fra le due Rivoluzioni destinate a dare l'impronta a questo secolo non può essere che feconda. Questo ha voluto significare il popolo italiano, accogliendo il Cancelliere germanico.

Le parole che furono pronunciate nella notte del 7 maggio al Palazzo Venezia sono state accolte dall'entusiasmo consapevole

The axis, to which we remain faithful, has not prevented us from pursuing a policy of agreements with those who sincerely desire such agreements. Thus, in March last year, we reached the agreement with Yugoslavia, and since then peace has reigned supreme over the waters of the Adriatic. We have also recently reached the agreement with Great Britain. In the depth of the dissession which represented a serious danger for the relations of the two nations, there was much misunderstanding and, we may state openly, ignorance in the pure sense of the word.

For too many foreigners Italy is the country that is badly depicted by a mediocre literature. It is high time that the Italy of arms and labour should be known; it is high time to know the Italian people who have in twenty years furnished formidable proofs of their will, culminating in the achievement of the Empire.

The last speech of the British Prime Minister is an attempt to get out of the confusion of these views and to recognise the Italy of Fascism and of the revolution of the blackshirts in all their majesty and force.

The agreement between London and Rome is an agreement between two Empires and extends from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and to the Indian Ocean. Since it is our will to keep strictly to this agreement, and since we believe that the Government of Great Britain will do the same, it may be considered that the agreement will be durable. The approval which it has found in all countries of the world is a proof of its intrinsic historical importance.

You will permit me to be circumspect as regards the conversations with France, because they are still going on. I do not know whether they will reach a conclusion, for one reason because, in an extremely important matter, the war in Spain, we are on opposite sides of the barricade. They desire the victory of Barcelona; we on the other hand desire and wish for the victory of Franco.

Comrades of Genoa!

In the last ten years Italy and Genoa have gone rapidly forward. But what we have achieved can only be considered as a stage. In the struggle of the nations and continents there is no standing still; he who stands still is lost. That is why the Fascist regime will do everything necessary to promote your sea traffic and your industrial initiative. Those who think that the struggle for autarchy, which we shall continue with the utmost force, will diminish trade are in the wrong. It cannot reduce either the quality or the volume. It is equally wrong to affirm that the regime desires to sacrifice the medium and small industrial and commercial undertakings. The contrary is the case.

The guiding rules of our policy are clear: we desire peace, peace with all. And we can state that National Socialist Germany desires European peace no less ardently than ourselves. But the peace, in order to be secure, must be an armed peace. It is for that reason that I desired that the entire fleet should assemble at Genoa, in order to show you and the Italians of Piedmont and Lombardy what is our effective force at sea. We desire peace, but we must be prepared with all our forces to defend it, especially when we hear speeches, even if they come from overseas, which give us cause for reflection.

It is perhaps not true that the so-called great democracies are really preparing a war of doctrines. But it is nevertheless well that it should be known that in such a case the totalitarian States will immediately form a bloc and will march together to the end.

dei due popoli. Esse non rappresentano una dichiarazione diplomatica e politica. Esse sono qualche cosa di solenne e di definitivo nella storia.

L'Asse, al quale resteremo fedeli, non ci ha impedito di fare una politica di accordi con colore i quali tali accordi sinceramente vogliono. Così, nel marzo dell'anno scorso, abbiamo realizzato l'intesa con la Jugoslavia. E da allora la pace regna sovrana sulle sponde dell'Adriatico.

Così recentemente abbiamo realizzato gli accordi con la Gran Bretagna. Al fondo del dissidio che pose a severo repentaglio il rapporti fra le due Nazioni, v'era molta incomprensione, e, diciamo pure, ignoranza nel senso che a questa parola si deve dare: « ignorare ».

Per troppi stranieri l'Italia è il Paese malamente dipinto da una mediocre letteratura coloristica. E' tempo, è gran tempo di conoscere l'Italia delle armi e del lavoro; è tempo, è gran tempo, di conoscere questo popolo che, in venti anni, ha fornito prove formidabili, culminate tutte nella volontà e nella conquista dell'Impero.

L'ultimo discorso pronunciato dal Primo Ministro inglese è un tentativo per uscire dal ginepraio dei luoghi comuni e riconoscere, in tutta la sua maestà e la sua forza, questa che è la nostra Italia, l'Italia del Fascismo e della Rivoluzione delle Camicie nere.

L'accordo tra Londra e Roma è l'accordo di due Imperi, e si estende dal Mediterraneo al Mar Rosso, all'Oceano Indiano. Poichè è nella nostra volontà il proposito di rispettare questo accordo scrupolosamente, e poichè pensiamo che altrettanto faranno i governanti della Gran Bretagna, si può pensare che questo accordo sia duraturo. Il consenso con il quale è stato accolto in tutti i Paesi del mondo è la riprova della sua intrinseca portata storica.

Voi mi consentirete di essere circospetto per quanto concerne le conversazioni con la Francia, perchè esse sono in corso. Non so se arriveranno a una conclusione, anche perchè, in un fatto estremamente attuale, cioè la guerra di Spagna, noi siamo ai lati opposti della barricata. Essi desiderano la vittoria di Barcelona; noi, viceversa, desideriamo e vogliamo la vittoria di Franco.

Camerati genovesi!

Durante questi dodici anni l'Italia ha velocemente camminato e Genova del pari. Ma quello che abbiamo fatto non può essere considerato che come una tappa. Nella lotta delle Nazioni e dei Continenti, non ci si può fermare: chi si ferma è perduto. Ecco perchè il Regime fascista farà tutto quanto è necessario per potenziare i vostri traffici marittimi e le vostre iniziative industriali.

Sono in errore colore i quali credono che la lotta per l'autarchia, che noi continueremo con estremo vigore, diminuisca i traffici. Ne può variare la qualità, non ne altera nel complesso il volume. Altrettanto falso è il ritenere che il Regime voglia sacrificare le medie e piccole attività industriali e commerciali. E' esattamente vero il contrario.

Le direttive della nostra politica sono chiare: noi vogliamo la pace, la pace con tutti. E vi posso dire che la Germania nazionalsocialista non desidera meno ardentemente di noi la pace europea.

Ma la pace, per essere sicura, deve essere armata. Ecco perchè io ho voluto che a Genova si raccogliesse tutta la flotta, per mostrare a voi ed agli Italiani delle due regioni più continentali, che sono il Piemonte e la Lombardia, quale è la nostra effettiva forza sul mare. Noi vogliamo la pace, ma dobbiamo essere pronti con tutte le nostre forze di difenderla, specie quando si odono discorsi, sia pure di oltreoceano, sui quali dobbiamo riflettere.

E' forse da escludere che le cosiddette grandi democrazie si preparino veramente a una guerra di dottrine. Comunque è bene che si sappia che, in questo caso, gli Stati totalitari faranno immediatamente blocco e marceranno fino in fondo.

THE EVENTS AT ROME IN THE OPINION OF THE ITALIAN PRESS

Virginio Gayda in the "Giornale d'Italia" of May 5th, 1938

The world press speaks of the "triumphal march" of Hitler through the streets of Rome and of the feverish reception given to him by the entire Italian nation from the Brenner to Rome and by the King and Queen, the Duce and the highest representatives of the Government and Party. This reception confirms for the second time in the profound consciousness of the nations those facts in contemporary history which are represented by the solidarity between Germany and Italy. With clear expression it draws aside the thick veil which those French newspapers that vainly attempt even today to stress any possible points of spiritual or political disunion between the two great associated nations again tried to draw over the frank meeting between Rome and Berlin.

Italy, that has definitely left behind her political childhood, thinks, judges and reaches conclusions solely from the point of view of her own ideas and inclinations. She no longer leaves to foreigners the representation of her interests or the expression of her real feelings. It is now established that the journey of the Führer to Italy is not only a formal act of courtesy in return for the Duce's visit to Germany, but the convinced expression of a lofty feeling and of a resolute common political desire of the Italy of Mussolini and the Germany of Hitler.

Four important reasons draw Italy to the friendly nation and its great Führer. The first of these is admiration for the Führer and his work. No other nation but the Italian can have this feeling, for no other nation but the Italian has had the same hard, bold and victorious experiences. There is also the cordial respect for the greatness of resurrected Germany, to which Italy has freely cooperated since the darkest years. In addition there is the consciousness of the affinities of the motives and objects of the two national revolutions and the vision of the snares still laid about them which can only be overcome by the solidarity of their spirit and action. Lastly, there is the concrete valuation of the common political interests which have been revealed in the course of the troublous history of Europe in the past ten years and which became definite in the system of diplomatic understanding concluded in October 1936 at Berlin on the occasion of Count Ciano's visit who, in giving formal expression to the instructions of the Duce, inaugurated the new epoch of the unity of the Italo-German front.

These four reasons are not improvised and can therefore not be altered by vain polemic attempts on the part of third parties. They are the logical consequence of the policy constantly pursued by Mussolini and Hitler. They are the natural expression of their revolutions and the result of the position produced by the course of foreign policy and the party movements of the other Great Powers.

Political discussions have taken place between Mussolini and Hitler. Active contacts have been maintained between the two Foreign Ministers. The policy of the Rome-Berlin axis continues to develop and become more deeply rooted in its functions in accordance with the new position and the joint interests of the two Powers.

Two new events of great importance have occurred on the European stage since Mussolini's visit to Germany: the Anschluss of Austria with Germany and the signature of the agreement between Italy and Great Britain. It is unnecessary to repeat that these two events cannot affect the foundations and functions of the axis. It is equally unnecessary to repeat that they are in no way connected with each other.

The Italian view of the Anschluss was expressed with crystalline clearness and definite precision by Mussolini in his great speech in the Chamber on March 16th, 1938 and there is nothing to add to it. The Anschluss was immediately recognised in Italy as the inevitable parabola of the German policy of unification which is now approaching its conclusion. This attitude of rapid comprehension on the part of Italy, which made European policy the crystallisation point of the Austrian question, immediately removed the dramatic elements from the Anschluss and surrounded it with an atmosphere of general tranquility and diplomatic adhesion.

The axis has not been shaken. The position and the relationship of the two parties have on the contrary become clearer by the solution of that problem, in which European polemics desired to discover a subject of unavoidable collision. Certain European quarters, however, would like to think that the results of the new situation in Central Europe created by Greater Germany represents a danger for Italy. Italy does not follow these vain speculations but remains true and faithful to the essential principles of the axis. These principles which have imparted a vital force to this system are based on the solidarity of the revolutions, on the common views and proposals for the constructive settlement of the problem of European peace, namely on justice and equality of rights, on mutual understanding and mutual respect for the interests and rights of the two nations and on their deliberate cooperation.

All this is perfectly clear. Equally clear are the attitude and interests of Italy and Germany as recognised by the two Governments. In Berlin they know that Italy, although she is interested in all great European problems, bases her European foreign policy mainly on her vital interests and on the two poles of that policy: the Mediterranean and the Danube and Balkan areas. In Rome they know that Germany, as a European Great Power of importance in any case, has fundamental interests in the North Sea, in Eastern Europe on the Danube and in the Balkans. These are the guiding principles for mutual respect and cooperation. They have been, moreover, laid down in the Berlin Protocols. In fact they provide for the harmony of interests and measures in the Danube basin and therefore also in Balkan Europe, where economic and cultural tasks are only to be solved in frank cooperation between free, civilised and strong nations bound together by friendship. For this reason the system of the Italo-British agreement of April 16th can be confirmed without offending or affecting the spirit and premises of the Rome-Berlin axis. It deals with the Mediterranean and comprises problems which do not lie within the sphere of the Italo-German agreements. It tends towards clarification and peace in the relations between two great European Powers and is therefore in complete harmony with the functions of the axis. The political rapprochement with England is also one of the intentions of Germany.

The lines of Italian and German foreign policy and the conditions for their constant cooperation are, therefore, firm, clear, mutually understood and cordial. They are far from those tendencies which the peculiar speculative and manœuvring fantasy on the other side of the Alps puts forward in such expressions as "offers", "concessions" or "distribution of zones of influence and power", as the subjects of the conversations between Mussolini and Hitler.

Italy and Germany have a profound respect for each other but still maintain the respect for the just rights and interests of all other nations in Europe, great or small. Their policy aims at construction and is guided by the idea of a better, healthier, more enlightened and more harmonious Europe which will, ultimately be capable of resuming its civilising mission in the world, to which each nation can and must contribute.

Extract from the Leading Article in the "Gazzetta del Popolo" of May 5th, 1938.

While the Duce received an enthusiastic welcome in Germany, and particularly in Berlin, Hitler has been received, particularly in Rome, with no less warm manifestations of sympathy and satisfaction.

No order and no pressure can bring enormous masses of people together and cause them to demonstrate with such obvious spontaneity and fervour. It is necessary to point this out because, between the visit in Berlin and the visit in Rome, two events occurred which, according to tendentious interpretations in foreign countries, must or could have affected Italo-German relations, namely the Anschluss and the Anglo-Italian agreement.

But there has been no change, and the people have shown their approval. The Anschluss was disposed of in the Duce's speech in the Chamber on March 16th. That this event was to be foreseen and that certain accidental circumstances hastened its occurrence is now a matter of general conviction. The firm and loyal attitude of Italy prevented any tendency towards complications, and the accomplished fact was thus recognised by England and France.

The agreement between Italy and England admits of no anti-German interpretations for two substantial and exhaustive reasons: 1. because Germany herself desires an agreement with England, and the German Government at a time when the axis between Rome and Berlin did not yet exist but was only a subject of discussion gave it to be understood that it would be glad to see a rapprochement between Italy and England; 2. because the Italo-British agreement relates mainly to the Mediterranean and Africa, two areas of predominant concern for Italy in which Germany is not directly interested.

But some quarters insist on prophesying that Italian and German interests after the Anschluss will unavoidably come into conflict in the Danube basin. Such suppositions are obviously dictated by the desire so frequently expressed in the French press of weakening or destroying the axis. They have at most the value of insinuations.

The Italo-German agreement is neither improvised nor decrepit, for it is based on mutual psychological and political understanding, on mutual respect for sound State and military organisation, on the spiritual affinities between the two revolutions and the two régimes and on the concordant valuation of the common political and economic interests.

The axis was not an improvisation, and before Count Ciano placed his signature under the agreements which gave it legal sanction, it was clear and agreed upon that Italy, an imperial Great Power, though participating in all the great European and world questions, was particularly interested in questions relating to the Mediterranean, and to the Danube and Balkans. In the Mediterranean Italy has a vital interest, and in the Danube and Balkan area a market that is not only economic. It was equally clear and agreed upon that Germany, a great European Power, has fundamental interests in the North Sea, in Eastern Europe and in the Danube and Balkan area.

The recognition and guarantee of these reciprocal interests is naturally an essential part of the agreements. The fact that both Italy and Germany have great interests in the Danube and Balkan zones in no way implies that they must be in conflict. It is for this very reason that they came to an agreement in order to cooperate both in the political and economic sphere.

The insinuations, therefore, which aimed at raising difficulties in order to prepare for a weakening of the axis are devoid of all foundation. But there are other important reasons which guarantee the firmness of the axis, namely the defence of the common ideals against disorder and Bolshevism, the common will to save European culture in a peaceful manner, an identical decision not to divide Europe into opposing groups and thus to encourage and assist the reconstitution of European unity and cooperation with the western democracies. The conversations between the Duce and the Führer, together with those between Count Ciano and von Ribbentrop dealt with all these questions and will undoubtedly lead to the reinforcement of the agreement which has already been so beneficial to the two countries. Political reality recognises in the soundness of the Berlin-Rome axis a fundamental element in the restoration of order and the maintenance of Europe.

Extract from the Leading Article in the "Popolo d'Italia" of May 8th, 1938.

The speeches by the two great leaders represent a decisive stage in the history of Romanism and Germanism. The two mighty Powers, fundamental elements of European civilisation, have confirmed their solidarity in a manifestation which makes history.

The statements by Mussolini and Hitler on the Berlin May Field were of the greatest political significance. The statements in the Palazzo Venezia arise out of the existence of two great peoples and are carved in indelible letters in history. This was deeply felt in the solemn tone of Hitler's words, when he stated that his political testament to the German people was to consider the frontier of the Alps, erected by nature between the two nations, as intangible for all time.

These words, though written on the paper or parchment of the protocols, deserve to be carved in bronze or marble.

An understanding of honour was reached between two great nations who met in the struggle of the revolution and the force of the restoration, who knew each other in the manly and resolute will of a new life and who respect each other in a mutual proud valuation of their forces.

Romanism and Germanism which, after two thousand years, meet in pacific, firm and durable cooperation, owe profound thanks to the two men of genius who lead them. The event in the Palazzo Venezia would have been neither possible nor thinkable on the basis of common diplomacy or in the sphere of ordinary treaties of temporary scope. If it has been possible to conclude the understanding of peace and the treaty of honour between the two nations, this is due to the greatness of mind of the two leaders, whose stature will arise above the centuries.

Just as it is difficult to summarise the meaning of great poetry, it is equally difficult to outline shortly the scope of decisive historical events. The words of Mussolini and Hitler cannot be summarised. They will become rooted in the thoughts of the people and will be transmitted as a spiritual testament to future generations.

The Duce demanded for all equal conditions of justice, security and peace which can only be achieved if the elementary rights of every nation to live, to work and to defend itself are loyally recognised and if the political equilibrium is in accordance

with the facts of historical forces by which it is constituted and determined.

In these sentences lies the mighty synthesis of a loyally understood international justice. By laying down these guiding rules Mussolini has indicated the course of a new history in Europe.

Extract from the Leading Article in the "Corriere della Sera" of May 8th, 1938

We consider it unnecessary to emphasise still further the importance of the two speeches pronounced in the Palazzo Venezia. Their unusual length, the undiplomatic clearness of their style, the vibrant tone in which they were pronounced and, in particular, the precision of their contents on which it will be difficult to cavil, are so many elements that characterise their great value. In fact they are two documents of high policy, which take their value directly from history. The entire world, that was anxiously awaiting them, will take note of them and must base itself on them in order to appreciate realistically the significance of this Rome meeting.

As had been foreseen this meeting resulted in a strengthening of the axis. The problems of common interest, examined with cordial reciprocal comprehension, were dealt with in a friendly manner and settled. A programme of joint action was examined and will be applied in cases which may appear suitable for the work of the two Governments. The friendship between the two countries has been not only confirmed, but deepened, by the conversations. It may almost be said that the axis has in a certain sense been exceeded.

Mussolini spoke of understanding: a word that translates the symbolism of the axis into precise political terms. But without wishing to quibble about words, it is above all necessary to keep to realities. These consist in the explicit statement by the Duce that *Italo-German relations are placed under the sign of cooperation*. To what end is this cooperation directed? It is to this that the expectations of the common adversaries—wavering between fear and malice—were directed, and it was on this point that the Duce wished to speak with particular emphasis. The Italo-German cooperation tends towards peace, but it must be that "just peace" which is based on the concrete, and not purely verbal, recognition of the rights of all, and that "secure peace" which can come only from direct discussions and sincere mutual agreements but not from the true or false acceptance of pacifist and collective ideologies.

To have removed the conception of peace from the utopian fields which are open to all hypocritical manoeuvres, into the field of reality and good will is the great and incomparable merit of the diplomacy of Mussolini, to which national socialist policy, by its adhesion, today corresponds and agrees.

The common character of the two speeches lies in their tone of great frankness and personal sympathy. The personal element

is only of importance when such exceptional figures of rulers appear on the stage. In the present case, more than in any other, it may be stated that the humanity of these two great personalities is the expression of the historical laws which govern the lot of their respective peoples. Indeed, two "men of providence" spoke yesterday evening to the innumerable listeners in Italy, Germany and the world. Their work is in agreement inasmuch as it does not exclude any cooperation that may bring a period of laborious peace and healthy reconstruction to a Europe that is threatened not by one, but by several crises.

From the Leading Article in the "Gazzetta del Popolo" of May 8th, 1938

The German-Italian friendship has received a new, solemn and decisive confirmation. The statements by the two leaders have a dual substantial value: sincerity and perfect adherence to reality. After two thousand years Romans and Germans have again met and have become neighbours at their natural, geographical, ethnical and political frontier, and have concluded a pact of friendship and cooperation based on mutual understanding, on mutual respect and on common interests.

Particularly in view of all these psychological and political, historical and economic, cultural and military reasons, it may be said that the German-Italian friendship is founded on granite and is therefore destined to guard the future with proud security.

Mention has been made of a block of 120 million people. That is neither an exaggeration nor a boast, but in fact the result that the two great leaders have desired and the two nations have sanctioned.

The results of the visit are clearly indicated in the two speeches, without its being necessary to follow the arbitrary conjectures of the foreign press: sincere and profound friendship and close cooperation in all fields. Even in foreign countries no other result was to be expected. All prophecies of new pacts, of the exchange of supports, of divisions of spheres of influence, and all the suggestions of alleged threats on one hand or another such as have been voiced in these days by certain irresponsible newspapers, have collapsed, together with the insinuations of those who spoke of a weakening of the axis and a cooling of the friendship.

In foreign countries the impression of the two speeches cannot be unfavourable. For there is nothing alarming in them. Italy and Germany are prepared to fight only against the disintegrating forces, just as they are decided to reject any attempt to hinder the natural development of the two countries.

The work of clearing up the European situation and the rapprochement, which has been so happily initiated by Mussolini with the agreement with England, will receive fresh impulses for continuation and extension from the visit of the Führer. Italy and Germany demand nothing more than comprehension and respect for their elementary rights.

THE EASTER ROME PEACE ⁽¹⁾

Reflections on the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16th, 1938

Rome, April 16th, 1938.

The Stefani Agency reports :

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, and the British Ambassador, Lord Perth, signed the Anglo-Italian Agreement to-day at 6.30 p.m. in the Palazzo Chigi. After the signature, Count Ciano proceeded to the Palazzo Venezia to report to the Duce."

With these brief words the public was informed on the Saturday before Easter of the conclusion of an understanding by which a three-year conflict between London and Rome was brought to an end, thus removing a source of danger of the first importance for European peace.

The marble tablets with the proud verdict against the 52 sanctionist States are still hanging on all Italian town halls. Though peace has in the meantime been restored and 34 of these States have up to the present recognised *de jure* the Roman Empire, the Italian people still retain the memory of those dark days when the Geneva sanctions machinery was used under the leadership of the British mechanic Eden with a view to "strangling" that people. "We have not yet forgotten this", cried the Duce again in his recent Genoa speech. Nevertheless, in order to remove a still greater danger to peace, he did not hesitate, after the path had been cleared by the retirement of Eden, to grasp the hand of understanding held out to him by the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, who, it will be remembered, on June 10th, 1936, at the time when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his speech in the 1900 Club in London made the proposal to remove the sanctions which had become a form of madness.

The unreal position of Anglo-Italian relations, covered by the mists of League ideals and a policy of self-interest, which had been brought about by the former Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, after the fall of his predecessor, Sir Samuel Hoare, with his realistic ideas and actions, in December 1935, is shown mainly by the fact that, immediately after his retirement on February 20th, negotiations, for which in the first place feelers had been put out, were seriously started on March 9th in Rome and, after the short space of six weeks, led to one of the most comprehensive agreements that have ever been concluded. The view taken by Chamberlain and Mussolini that the real background of the apparently deep-rooted differences between London and Rome were based rather on intangible and psychological than on material grounds proved to be correct. England had allowed herself to be driven by her League fanatics and by rabid anti-Fascist agitation into an anti-Italian feeling against which Mussolini used every political, military and propagandist means in order to maintain his position. Constant crises arose, in which a single premature step might have led to war. But he avoided such a step and, on the contrary, constantly stated in his numerous speeches that the conquest of Abyssinia involved no threat to British interests in the Sudan or Arabia, nor was the Italian support of Nationalist Spain in her fight against Bolshevism and Communism inspired by any egoistic, territorial or economic interests or aspirations. On the other hand he left no doubt that Italy, as a young and growing great nation, would not rest in advancing her claims to living room and living possibilities—which had moreover been promised by Italy's former allies though they had been forgotten after the victory—and would secure these claims by founding a new Empire and by obtaining its recognition by the other Powers.

On May 9th, 1936, after the unexpectedly rapid subjection of Abyssinia, this Empire was proclaimed by Mussolini in Rome. But, after an attempt had been made with inadequate and unsuitable means in the Anglo-Italian Mediterranean Agreement of January 2nd, 1937 and the Nyon arrangements on September 1937 which showed a certain turn in British policy, the removal of Eden from the post of Foreign Secretary was needed in order to bring about the change of course which finds expression in this Agreement.

This change of course means no more and no less than that Great Britain now recognises the Roman Empire as possessing fully equal rights. When therefore the phrase regarding the "renewal of the traditional friendship" between the two Powers is so often used, the historical fact underlying this expression entirely overlooks the present position.

This difference cannot be better formulated than was done by the "Gazzetta del Popolo" on April 17th. It writes :

"The famous 'traditional Italo-British friendship' was really a euphemistic expression signifying the obsequious dependence of Italian on British policy. The British Liberals, with Lord Palmerston at their head, regarded Italy as a kind of larger Portugal, as the great pawn in the Mediterranean that was to play its part on the great imperialist chessboard against France. And the Italian statesmen and politicians, in order to obtain British support for their efforts at unity, became entirely accustomed to regarding Italy as the decisive factor in the British game in the Mediterranean. It is true that, in the shadow of this 'traditional friendship', Italy was able to start her first Mediterranean policy and to put into effect her first African acquisitions, though naturally on condition that she did not exceed the extremely narrow limits set by London to her freedom of action. It is true that, in the shadow of this 'traditional friendship', Italy's first ships were able to put to sea, since it was natural that, in case of a European crisis, they would be used as auxiliary ships of the British navy. And the brave battalions of Saletta were able to land on the coast of Erythrea since they were very useful in holding up Abyssinians and dervishes from the Sudan while Gordon and Kitchener advanced. The 'traditional friendship' was nothing more than a formula which characterised the position between the two countries for fifty years, namely the supremacy of England and the dependence of Italy. This 'traditional friendship' has now come to an end. It was liquidated by the unanimous will of Italy which has by means of Fascism reached its complete political and military majority. Anyone who today is still accustomed to believe in or express the views of the last century is behind the times.

What at present exists between Italy and England and is expressed in the Rome agreements is something quite different. It is no longer a traditional, but a quite new, friendship, in which England expressly recognises the position attained by Italy in the world and abandons the sort of moral protectorate which it maintained during the risorgimento and which lasted for fifty years. In respect of the Italy of 1938, the ruler of Abyssinia and the victor in Spain, England has recognised that the old positions can no longer be maintained. With the unprejudiced objectivity which is peculiar to her and which has characterised British policy for centuries, she has noted that it is in her interest to deal with Italy on other terms, namely on the basis of cooperation between the two countries."

(1) See No. 14, 1938, of this Journal.

The decisive importance of the agreement itself lies therefore, as is indicated by the remarks of the heads of the two Governments, not so much in its individual provisions as rather in the atmosphere which it created. It is therefore idle to calculate, as is the habit in certain quarters, which of the two Powers has made the better bargain. England and Italy can both expect nothing but advantages from the end of the previous position of tension. Moreover, the new friendship on which the agreement is based may also be a bridge for a new agreement with other States if they desire it sincerely and without ulterior motives.

It is also a fact of fundamental importance that the work of agreement has been brought about by two representatives of different views and ideologies, the democratic and the authoritarian. The view taken for a long time past by Hitler and Mussolini that the direct method of bilateral negotiations is the only one which will give satisfactory results to both parties has again proved to be correct. The agreement therefore makes no reference to the League of Nations. This is moreover not affected by the fact that the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, brought it to the knowledge of the League Council at its meeting on May 10th. The discussion which followed, however, showed that, with the exception of the Soviet representative Litvinov and the Red Spanish Foreign Minister del Vayo, both the result and the method that led to it were approved and welcomed by all other Members of the Council.

Another characteristic of the agreement is the fact that steps are taken for its bilateral revision. In this connection the "Times" makes the following interesting remark:

"Half the troubles of Europe arise from the failure of the peacemakers to devise a workable arrangement for the adjustment of their decisions to changing circumstances. It is true that Article XIX was inserted into the covenant, but the machinery was so clumsy and ill-defined that its utilization was hardly ever attempted. There are also specific arrangements for the reconsideration of certain Articles. The lesson has been learned and it may be hoped that it will never be forgotten."

We do not need to go into the details of the agreement in view of the clear and unequivocal text which deals minutely with every particular. But even a cursory glance shows immediately that there is an essential difference between this and the Gentlemen's Agreement of January 2nd. That agreement dealt solely with a limited geographical area, namely the Mediterranean, and the academic declaration which it contained did not penetrate deeply into political problems. The new agreement goes far beyond the confines of the Mediterranean and extends from the Canary Islands to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, from Palestine to Kenya, that is to say from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and from Asia Minor to East Africa. The old British Empire and the new Italian Empire have thus for the first time agreed on the basis of moral, political and military equality of rights. In the agreement no condition is imposed on Italy which does not find its counterpart in a condition imposed on England. The individual agreements are a classical example of *do ut des*, and are typical of the British expression give and take. They have not therefore the character of an armistice, but of the conclusion of political peace.

Of the two great problems that occupied the first rank in Italian policy, the first, which had been artificially nourished by the Austrian buffer State, namely the safeguarding of the Alp frontier, has been removed by the guarantee of the Führer. There is now no uncleanness or doubt in the relations of the two countries. The second problem, namely expansion in the Mediterranean, which is based on geopolitical conditions, and the expansion in North Africa which is necessary on demographic grounds, was solved by the foundation of the new Empire on May 9th, 1936 and by its recognition in the Anglo-Italian agreement of April 16th, 1938.

In order to bring about and stabilise real peace in Europe, two new stages have been reached, thanks to the Rome-Berlin axis and the policy of the Chamberlain-Halifax Government, which takes its stand on realities and abandons fictions and illusions. It is now only to be hoped that the two sources of danger which may still menace this peace, namely the civil war in Spain and the problem of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, may be brought as rapidly and fundamentally to an adequate solution.

THE ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT OF APRIL 16TH, 1938 BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

On April 16th the Easter Agreement was the subject of a detailed debate in the House of Commons, in which the Government moved that the House should approve the results of the recent Anglo-Italian negotiations as contained in the Rome agreement of April 16th, 1938.

In the course of this discussion, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, gave a detailed account of the contents of the agreement and its previous history; in view of the fundamental importance of this speech, we give the following extracts from the text.

The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, made similar statements in the session of the League Council on May 10th in notifying the conclusion of the agreement.

After the conclusion of the discussion in the House of Commons, the Government motion was adopted by 316 to 108 votes, i.e. a majority of 208.

Extract from Mr. Chamberlain's Speech.

"I do not think it will be necessary for me this afternoon to delve very deeply into past history but at the same time if we are to obtain a proper consideration of the agreement I think it is an essential preliminary that I should say something about the conditions which prevailed before it was signed."

Mr. Chamberlain again gave an account of the development of Anglo-Italian relations from the Abyssinian conflict until April 16th, 1938, and then proceeded as follows:

"Before I come to examine the details of the agreement, I should like to say one or two words about its place in the general scheme of the Government's foreign policy. As the House has been informed on numerous occasions, the purpose of their general foreign policy is not only to establish peace

but, if possible, to restore the general confidence that peace can and will be maintained, because without that confidence no progress is possible in international affairs. We can only obtain that confidence if we can succeed in removing grievances, differences, and suspicions which may, if unchecked, lead to war. That is not a task which can be accomplished in a moment or all at once, but if we can remove the danger spots one by one we may in time find ourselves in a position to arrive at the goal at which we are aiming.

No one can doubt, I think, that before the signing of this agreement the relations between Italy and this country and between Italy and France constituted one of those danger spots. His Majesty's Government believe that that danger could be eliminated by the application of good will and common sense to problems which arose, as we believe, very largely out of want of trust and confidence between us. But to accomplish that it was necessary to face facts, however unpalatable those facts may be. It is in our willingness to face realities which we cannot change and to make the best of them.

This agreement has been designed to cover comprehensively the whole ground of relations between ourselves and Italy in certain areas of the world, and it paves the way for our future cooperation and understanding in those areas in which our interests are found to be parallel. The areas in question are the Mediterranean, the North East corner of Africa, and the Middle East. It deals with the future. It lays down certain guiding principles which should be taken to inspire our policy, not only to one another but also the policy of both of us to other Powers, and it contains, as right hon. and hon. members will have seen, four separate but correlated sections.

First of all, there is the protocol itself, signed by Lord Perth and Count Ciano, to which are attached eight annexes. Then comes an exchange of Notes between the two negotiators, and, thirdly, there is a *bon voisinage* agreement to which Egypt is a party so far as her interests are affected, and finally there is an exchange of Notes between Lord Perth and Count Ciano on the one hand and the Egyptian Minister in Rome on the other, the effect of which is to associate Egypt with two declarations in the main agreement."

The question of Palestine was not directly mentioned in the agreement and this gave rise to discussions in the British press and questions in the House of Commons. Mr. Chamberlain made the following statement on this subject:

"In case anybody should think that Palestine is purposely left out, I should like to mention that the subject of Palestine was also discussed between Lord Perth and Count Ciano, and that as a result the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has given our Ambassador an oral assurance that the Italian Government will abstain from creating difficulties or embarrassment for his Majesty's Government in the administration of Palestine and our Ambassador has given similar oral assurances that his Majesty's Government for their part intend to preserve and protect legitimate Italian interests in that country.

Mr. Dalton.—Why was this left oral and not included in the document?

Mr. Chamberlain.—I have some difficulty in saying what the reason was, but at any rate the matter was not considered to be quite of the same order as the other matters which are made the subject of written exchanges, but we ourselves are perfectly satisfied with the oral declarations which we have received, and on the other hand I think I can say that the Italian Government are perfectly satisfied with the oral declarations we have given in return."

With regard to the agreements on Spain, Mr. Chamberlain added:

"Those are important declarations. They are what I suppose are alluded to by the Opposition in their amendment as illusory

promises. I wish to state on the other hand that his Majesty's Government accept them as being given in good faith, and believe that the Italian Government intend to keep them in the spirit as well as in the letter. If you are to come to an agreement with another party with whom you have had differences, it is essential that you should approach the negotiations in a spirit of trust. Just as mistrust breeds mistrust, so does trust breed trust. I have no doubt that time will show who is right on that matter and at present we had better leave it at that."

With regard to the British attitude towards the question of Abyssinia, Mr. Chamberlain said:

"With regard to the question of the recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia I would like to remind the House that a number of different States members of the League whose loyalty to the League cannot be questioned have taken a different view on this matter from that held by his Majesty's Government. They have taken the view that collective obligations in this matter were discharged on July 4, 1936, when the Assembly of the League passed a resolution abolishing the sanctions. It is their view, therefore, that States members were consequently free to take whatever action seemed good to them in the light of their own situation, and what they considered to be their own obligations.

That is a perfectly comprehensible view, and a good number of powerful and convincing arguments can be brought forward in support of it. His Majesty's Government do not desire to criticize any States who have taken that view, but so far as they are concerned they, in common with many others, have held that this is not a question which concerns ourselves alone, but that it is one which requires consideration by the appropriate organ, the League.

The result of this difference of opinion is that some of those who took part in collective action have already recognized the Italian position in Ethiopia. Others again have taken action which implies recognition or seems to imply recognition. Others again have taken no action at all. The result of that is a confused and anomalous situation, a situation which does require clearing up. His Majesty's Government have taken the first step towards clarification by asking the Secretary-General to place an item dealing with this question on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of the Council, which they consider to be the appropriate organ.

Let me make one or two points clear. First of all our action does not mean that we condone or that we approve the methods by which Italy obtained control of Abyssinia. Secondly, it does not mean that we are going to ask the League to modify any resolution or any decision which it took during the period of the conquest. The League has expressed its judgment on the whole affair in the plainest possible terms, and there will be no going back on that. In the third place, we do not intend to ask any other State to take any action which they might deem incompatible with their obligations.

There is something further. Neither any action which we have taken, nor any action which we may ask the Council to take, in itself constitutes recognition. It neither binds us nor anyone else to recognition. The act of recognition remains within the sovereign rights of each individual State. In other words, in so far as this country is concerned the time and circumstances of recognition remain within our own discretion. I have always maintained myself, and many I think agree with me, that the only circumstances in which recognition could be morally justified would be if it was shown to be an essential feature of a general appeasement. That is the position of the Government to-day.

The Mediterranean agreement is a step towards a general appeasement.

Mr. Bellenger (Bassetlaw, Lab.).—What is the exact legal position? Is it *de facto* or *de jure*?

Mr. Chamberlain.—It is not *de jure* anyway, if the hon. member means at the present moment. On coming into force it will certainly be *de jure*. What I was saying was that the justification for recognition *de jure* would be that it was an essential factor in getting back to a general appeasement. I do not think we could feel that we had got back, or that we were taking steps towards general appeasement, unless at the same time we could see that a Spanish settlement was within reach. That is the reason why we have made this Spanish settlement a pre-requisite of the entry into force of this instrument, and a pre-requisite therefore of the recognition of the Italian conquest.

Mr. Attlee (Limehouse, Lab.).—What does the right hon. gentleman mean by a settlement?

Mr. Chamberlain.—I prefer not to give a definition of it. At this stage it would be wrong to try to define the circumstances in which one could say that a settlement had been arrived at. It may be that later on we shall get nearer the time when we can give a definition.

I cannot tell the House even when this protocol and annex will come into force. No doubt, the situation will clear itself up as time goes on."

After explaining the details of the agreement, Mr. Chamberlain said:

"I think that is all I need say on the question of recognition but I would like to tell the House that all through these negotiations we have been in the closest touch with the Dominions, who have been advised of the progress of them from the very beginning.

Then, of course, our special relations with France have naturally led us to keep her informed of our general intentions, and I think the House knows that the French Government have expressed their warm approval of our action. Not only do they approve what we have done, but they have paid us the sincerest flattery by deciding themselves to enter into conversations with the Italian Government, in the hope of concluding an agreement which, I understand, they expect to be of a similar character; and if they should be successful in that end one may say that a further step will have been taken towards the clearing of the European horizon. France is not alone in approving of this agreement, for we have had a message from the Balkan Entente, through their Chairman, of warm congratulation upon the result. I think I may say that the Press of Europe, with hardly an exception, has given a sincere welcome to this agreement; and it will not have escaped the attention of hon. members that the President of the United States has signified his sympathetic interest, and considers that this affords proof of the value of peaceful negotiations.

In this almost universal chorus of approval is it not strange to find only the two parties opposite regretting and opposing an agreement which has done so much to lighten the tension in Europe and to avert the danger of war?

For my own part I repudiate the idea that it is impossible for democracies to come to terms and to understandings with States where authoritarian ideas prevail.

This agreement proves the contrary. I myself am encouraged by what has happened to hope that we have taken only the first step towards a healthier and a saner state of things in Europe. I believe that for Italy and ourselves this agreement marks the beginnings of a new era."

After violent criticism by the two opposition parties, Mr. Butler, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied.

He said the debate had made it clear that among Opposition members there were perplexity and muddle. Their paucity of argument had obliged them to indulge in personal criticism of the Prime Minister. That really needed no answer because the leadership of his right hon. friend was clear both to the House and to the country. The effect of his policy of constructive conciliation had been eminently successful.

He (Mr. Butler) entirely repudiated the suggestion that it had been necessary to trump up this agreement to save the Prime Minister's reputation. In fact this agreement coincided with the settlement of the age-long dispute with the Irish Free State, it coincided with successful talks with the French Minister, so that the entente with France had never been more real, and it coincided with the moment when the Government was working for a trade agreement with America. It was not surprising that the Prime Minister was being known throughout the country as the man of agreement.

When Mr. Lloyd George said that the agreement would not ensure permanent peace, could he say that the Treaty of Versailles, on which so many hopes were rested, ensured permanent peace? Did the Holy Alliance ensure permanent peace? Did even the Treaty of Locarno, conceived as it was in a spirit of the highest idealism, ensure permanent peace? It was surely demanding from any treaty or agreement an extremely high standard to demand that, at the moment of signature, it should ensure permanent peace.

There had been a tendency in the parties opposite to distrust all assurances that came from the head of a Dictator State. They did not seem to envisage it as possible that an agreement could be made with the head of a State with whose internal politics they did not agree. They seemed to believe that the best way to get peace and conciliation in our time was to disbelieve, to distrust, and to malign the intentions of the heads of foreign States.

He had hoped that there would have been some expressions of hope from the parties opposite that the agreement with Italy would succeed; instead there had been long and sustained political attacks.

If we were not to have a pact because it meant alliances, what were we to have? If the three Great Powers—Italy, Germany, and Japan—were eliminated from a possible collective peace system and if the other 20 Powers were also eliminated for the same reason, it would be difficult to pick an international team. If this agreement did anything at all, it smoothed difficulties and lessened potential tension between our two great countries over a vast area.

Far from being an alliance, this pact was not directed against any other Power. Rather than increase it should tend to diminish armament rivalry.

This debate had revealed fundamental differences of spirit in the conduct of our foreign policy. The Government's wish was to clear away all disagreements and clear the ground so that the plant of peace might grow. No one wanted war, but hate—and derogatory remarks such as they had heard to-day bred hate—would never cast it from the peoples of the earth. He was reminded of some words of the younger Pitt when he had to deal with a foreign situation as difficult as the one the Government were dealing with to-day, that difficulties when they are faced with a noble and manly vigour are more than half redressed.

THE SESSION OF THE LEAGUE COUNCIL

101st Session from May 9th to 14th, 1938

One country that has been extinguished from the political map of the world, a second country that compromises with the powerlessness of the League, a third country that frees itself from dangerous collective obligations, a fourth country that announces its withdrawal—these were the main themes of discussion in this session of the Council. It must be specially stressed that they were subjects of debate. There was no question of proceedings which might have led to practical political decisions. These debates had one common denominator: the League cannot help.

In his farewell speech on May 14th, the Chilean representative, M. Edwards, gave the reason for the decline of the League which has occurred: "Out of 42 political disputes that have been dealt with by the League since it has existed, 11 merely related to the liquidation by the Council of matters arising out of the War. The other 31 disputes were settled by direct negotiations between the Parties or by other international organs, or they brought about a withdrawal from the League or were abandoned or left in suspense".

The Member States could not overlook this result. There are only two Members of the League that show conspicuous fanaticism in retaining the juridical *status quo* of the League Covenant, i.e. Soviet Russia and Red Spain.

This is the cause of the confused position which may result in every possible harmful effect, but not in such a safeguard of world peace by this institution as would inspire confidence. There are at present those who have formal right on their side under the Covenant of whom everyone knows that they pursue their own ideals and political objects. Those who are formally wrong under the Covenant today are on the one hand its founders and on the other hand its most loyal Members, who are compelled to place peace higher than the maintenance of antiquated theoretical principles.

This abnormal position is further aggravated by the desire that it should continue. Whatever may happen, whether Bolshevism gets this Geneva apparatus entirely under its influence or however often the Members pursue their own policy against the Covenant, this League must continue to exist as an organisation whose meetings are attended out of tradition and custom.

* * *

The correspondent of a Swiss daily newspaper coined the right expression for this session of the Council: a t m o s p h e r e of u n r e a l i t y.

Thirty-four States, almost all Members of the League of Nations, recognise the Italian Empire. Great Britain, in agreement with France, takes the decisive step in Geneva in order to put an end to an abnormal position. The advisors of the Negus cause him to appear. In spite of fine speeches it is decided by a majority of the Council that every Member of the League must draw its own conclusions from political facts. This is the end of the Abyssinian question. But the Council as such has not the courage or the logic to bring to its conclusion from the point of view of League law a conquest recognised by the majority of its own Members. As a result, Abyssinia will remain a paper Member of the League of Nations probably until its end. Atmosphere of unreality.

Atmosphere of unreality! That is also the case with China. The League of Nations passes a resolution expressing sympathy

for China. While in this case China is urged on by League circles of whom it is known that they again intend to set collectivity in motion for their own ends, the theoretical adherent of this principle, the Chinese representative Wellington Koo, points out the powerlessness of the League which cannot help—apart from financial support, which in practice would amount to the remittance of arrears of contributions to the League—and his speech indicates resignation at the lack of assistance from Geneva.

Atmosphere of unreality! The National Spanish victory appears before the eyes of all as a fact which will shortly occur. The Red Spanish representative, del Vayo, has nothing behind him but a certificate that he belongs incidentally to the Government against which the Spanish people have risen. In virtue of this certificate, the Red Spanish representative is permitted on this League tribune to pronounce the most offensive speeches against two of the greatest European nations. Everyone is aware of the intentions of these tribunes which act under the command of M. Litvinov, namely to extend this civil war into a European war. This is the only hope from which they can expect salvation. The establishment of Bolshevism in Spain is the last trump card in Litvinov's foreign policy. It is already clear that he has played it and lost. It is only in Geneva that it is still possible to reshuffle the cards by misleading methods of procedure, and this session of the Council presents the spectacle of M. del Vayo speaking for hours with the object of maintaining Red Spain for ever as a paper member of the League.

Atmosphere of unreality! A country that was a member of the League for eighteen years, Chile, whose representatives at Geneva were at the same time great exponents of international laws, takes up the hard struggle of conscience with a view to making the League something better than it has hitherto been. "In our view a coercive League of Nations such as we now have must inevitably be universal. If it is not, the States which are Members of it do not constitute a League of Nations but an alliance. The ideal embodied in the Covenant was the ideal of a universal and coercive League. But the developments and experiences of eighteen years are there to show that the ideal is unattainable for a long time to come. In presence of this political reality we believe the moment has come to remodel the Covenant and to make the League *de jure* what it is *de facto*. My Government regards the maintenance of the juridical *status quo* of the Covenant as fatal to peace. Chile therefore considers it impossible to continue to be a member of the League of Nations if articles of the Covenant which are not and cannot be applied remain in theory in the political structure of the League as it exists".

The "idealists" of the League gained the victory over Chile. They achieved the adjournment of the Reform Committee *sine die*. They have finally got rid of an awkward "realist" after openly maligning him as the tool of Germany and Italy.

Atmosphere of unreality! One country, Switzerland, after the failure of the sanctionist campaign against Italy, realises that her return to complete neutrality has become a political necessity, for even economic sanctions have proved to be military sanctions. Out of loyalty Switzerland brings her decisions in this connection to the knowledge of the League Council. Only the 150 % League Member, Soviet Russia, does not recognise the point of view of Switzerland and abstains from voting. Litvinov, in the tone of a schoolmaster, hides behind gracious phrases his threats and aspersions against other Members of the League. He makes such remarks as these: in case of an

aggression Switzerland has now no right to count on the help of Members of the League; a dangerous precedent has been created for "deserters", and the consequence of such "releases" and unilateral declarations is ultimately to undermine certain obligations under the Covenant and to lead to the destruction of the League. Soviet Russia as an advocate of morality! Atmosphere of unreality!

A further case of the atmosphere of unreality. Has it ever happened in the world, is there any historical proof, or can such proof be found that there is any private club, even a sports club, whose members make such statements as the following at their meetings? We have set up fine rules. When we are at home we must unfortunately apply other rules. Should this be contrary to our statutes—and we openly admit that it is—we will nevertheless give each other a certificate that we are faithful members.

We do not propose to enter into the deeper meaning of such a "democratic procedure". As far as the League of Nations is concerned, it should merely be pointed out that the Great Powers belonging to it pursue their own international policy even against the League. Consequently the loyal members still remaining are mostly the small States. But they can perhaps be glad that in their future League work they have at their disposal that "immense value of procedure" to which a Soviet newspaper recently referred when, for instance, M. del Vayo succeeded unexpectedly by means of this procedure in again bringing the Council into complete confusion, so that even the British representative, who is not so easily upset, put an end to this procedure by simply stating that M. del Vayo's draft resolution was contrary to the policy of his Government.

As it may be assumed that high policy will always be carried on elsewhere than at Geneva, the small States have perhaps only one small interesting pastime left, namely to meditate on idealistic and realistic policy. As the cases dealt with by this session of the Council—Abysinia, China, Spain and Switzerland—have already come under the heading of a dispute between "idealists" and "realists", the preparatory work of the experts will undoubtedly be of use to them. The plan is already established. Let us take the concrete case of the Anglo-Italian agreement as an example. The Member of the Council, the United Kingdom, makes a statement to the effect that it has reached an agreement with an outside party, Italy, which must be regarded as a contribution to general peace. One Member of the Council after another rises to confirm this. One Member is even so bold as to take this agreement as an example of the usefulness of the method of bilateral negotiations, upon which M. Litvinov automatically throws suspicion on the bilateral method. Then the Council passes to its agenda. Until the year 2000 the agenda will be somewhat as follows: 1. Consequences arising out of the denunciation of the Locarno agreement; 2. Fixing of the date of the next meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference; 3. Consequences arising out of Italy's "action" in East Africa; 4. Proposal by the former Red Spanish Government in respect of payment by the present Government of Spain of pensions etc. The final resolution will end somewhat as follows: the debates in these meetings have again shown the value of the League system of collective security, so that an appeal is addressed to the members to revive these methods by every means in their power.

The small States must now bear the burden which the founders of this institution placed upon it and upon the world. And today when there is so much talk of idealism and realism the Geneva atmosphere of unreality should be recognised by what was left of Wilson's first draft of the Covenant in 1920, when the League was first instituted.

In the meantime, times have greatly changed, so that at

this 101st session of the Council, the Representative of the United Kingdom had to say:

"Two ideals are in conflict—on the one hand, the ideal of devotion, unflinching but unpractical, to some high purpose; on the other, the ideal of a practical victory for peace. In an imperfect world, the indefinite maintenance of a principle, evolved to safeguard international order, without regard to the circumstances in which it has to be applied, may have the effect of increasing international discord."

But what heavy guns have been brought up by the "neo-idealists" against such an attitude! Triumph of baseness! Short-sighted collective spirit! Violated right remains right! Diplomacy against the Covenant is diplomacy against peace! Outside the Covenant is War!

The present front of the "League idealists" is indeed a most remarkable community. One thing cannot be denied it, namely the cleverness of its propaganda which is successful in suppressing historical facts.

The League Covenant is a part of the Treaty of Versailles. It is the re-insurance treaty of satiated victors as regards reciprocity in the defence of their advantage. In the name of collective security, the authors of this Covenant—and that is why the United States did not accept it—desired to draw a line under world history. This object is served principally by the fact that in the pro-League press Article 10 of the Covenant, in conjunction with Article 16, is advanced as one of its most important pillars. In the year 1938 these "idealists" take up the same position as in 1919. Article 10 still signifies for them at the present time nothing more than the sanctioning of their territorial conquests together with a demarcation of frontiers that was foolish and immoral from the point of view of the principle of nationality. It is therefore also foolish and immoral that other States, which were not so much invited as forced into the League, should be compelled under Article 16 to defend with economic and military means conquests and decisions of 1919 in which they took no part.

The sincere attempts to make something better of the League should not be denied. But they have failed and the position remains unchanged. To the surprise of many a sincere Member, it has become clearer with each fresh session that the League has served and still serves special interests, and that its prescribed duty is to place fetters on the natural development of the nations. The exclusion of Article 19 (Revision) has been in the course of years the real barometer for ascertaining who exclusively ruled this political union.

As regards this category of "idealists", historical events in recent years have shown that, in spite of everything, they have suffered shipwreck. A higher truth has come to the fore. It finds expression in the fact that the obligations towards an artificial and apparently legal construction have been found insupportable for statesmen who place peace higher than the League of Nations.

But this community of "idealists" which arranges to meet on the day of every League session in the "Rassemblement universel pour la paix" and set up watchwords for humanity and whose President is Lord Cecil and Honorary President M. Herriot, may be called remarkable for another reason. In the last few years it has acquired a fresh adherent. At one time he made them world-wide competition. But after he had started to come to Geneva and put on evening clothes, things were not so bad. But the fact that evening clothes may also be a war strategy—a sort of "Trojan horse"—is best shown by an enumeration of the speakers in the Executive Committee of the "Rassemblement universel pour la paix" which met on this occasion. The former French Air Minister, Pierre Cot, who became particularly notorious as a result of the Spanish civil war, was in the chair. The speakers at the

meeting included the French socialist and permanent League delegate, M. Gumbach, the Spanish woman communist Nelken, the French communist Cachin, the Red Spanish delegate Lopez, the Soviet Russian League delegate Shverning and the Czechoslovak deputy Kosak. The resolutions regarding Spain, Abyssinia, China and Czechoslovakia were solemnly handed over to the League of Nations. They contained the well-known aspersions against Germany and Italy and the challenges to "fascism and dictatorships". The arguments were literally the same as those advanced by Litvinov and del Vayo in the Council. "It is quite clear who is pulling the strings which have unfortunately a tragic background for the whole world. M. Litvinov, moreover, takes no trouble to hide the fact." This is the judgment given by the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" of May 12th, 1938 on the attempts of the "Rassemblement universel pour la paix" to influence the League of Nations.

Since the admission of Soviet Russia to the League, there has not been a single session at Geneva without offensive speeches against Germany and Italy. These two countries were described at the last Assembly by the Red Spanish delegate del Vayo as "hors la loi". This fact is also one of the reasons for the decline of the League of Nations which is today so obvious. Instead of discussing abnormal circumstances which the case of Abyssinia involves for the troubled spirits of the League of Nations, it would be better and more in the interest of peace for once to establish the reason why communism puts itself forward as the defender of an instrument formerly created by the victors of the "capitalist" countries and their "corrupt bourgeois" Governments. It is obvious that no one will think of this. But there is no object in insisting on the fact. For the cleaning up of the Europe created in 1919 and the securing of world peace is already being done without the help of Geneva. The chancelleries in most of the capitals of Europe have already decided upon what this session of the Council was merely able to record, namely the application of direct methods of understanding. They have won a victory over the labyrinth of the collective security system for the simple reason that the game of hide-and-seek with its hypocritical forms was bound in the long run to be disastrous to all. The Great Powers that possess the main influence in the League of Nations have themselves caused the political Geneva institute to be superfluous. For eighteen years of Geneva are eighteen years of unceasing efforts to put into force a collective security that is solely in the interest of a few States. The time was bound to come when most of the States would be faced by the alternative as to whether the only States to count in Europe would be France and her allies and also whether they could in their own interest admit that the interference of Moscow in European affairs should become more unrestrained from day to day. The founders of the League have also become its destroyers. "Collective security" has cut itself out, and that is a good thing. In this connection only is this session of the Council of any importance; in the recommendation by the majority of the Council that account should be taken of "Realpolitik" in so far as onesided decisions in certain cases are in accordance with reason and in the interests of the States

themselves, some Members have at any rate seen that it is wise not to come into hostile relations with Germany and Italy by means of those unreal League theories the egoistic application of which brought about their withdrawal. Thus the "disavowing" of the principles of the Covenant is perhaps the first ray of hope of the restoration of normal relations in particular between European countries. But the hope that peace in Europe can still be established through the intermediary of the League of Nations has become more than ever an illusion.

The "Independence Belge" of April 20th, after reviewing the position, reached the following conclusion: "A policy of peace is also possible outside the League of Nations; in fact it is at present only possible outside the League. In recent times the greatest threat to peace has been that the idea of peace has been bound up with the idea of Geneva and that peace has been regarded as the equivalent of an ideological system which, as it did not work, only led to an irksome and purely negative rigidity and immovability."

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Though on this occasion, apart from the obstruction to be expected from the Soviet Union and Red Spain, in which the enfant terrible of the League, the representative of New Zealand, joined, it was clear from the statements of the other speakers that they had learned something from previous mistakes, most of them stated that they continued to adhere to the ideals of the League. In this connection some of them probably thought less of the maintenance of the ideals than of the maintenance of the institution which was created to put those ideals into effect but which in practice in the past twenty years has grossly abused those principles.

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This failure to recognise all the demands of practical politics since the War and especially in the immediate present has led to a further withdrawal from the League. The reasons given by the representative of Chile have again shown how lightly it is overlooked in all the pleadings for the League and the accusations against its opponents that these charges are by no means directed against the idea of a peaceful and healthy community of nations such as was embodied in President Wilson's points, but against the distortion in practice which is solely adapted to certain one-sided interests in which the small nations are thought good enough to be used behind the mask of a brilliant ideal in favour of the definite egoistic special interests of the other Great Powers.

If Germany and Italy have finally reached the conviction that useful work in the interest of peace can only be performed by means of direct contact between the parties concerned, not the last reason for this is the bitter experience that in the Geneva sphere of bargaining and intrigue an atmosphere of a proper sense of community and loyal comradeship is impossible.

THE "LIQUIDATION" OF THE QUESTION OF ABYSSINIA

Speech by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have taken the initiative in placing on the agenda of this meeting of the Council the consequences arising out of the existing situation in Ethiopia. In the letter which has been circulated to members of the Council they have drawn attention to the anomalous situation arising from the fact that certain Members of the League recognise that the Italian government exercises sovereignty over Ethiopia or have taken action which might be held to imply such recognition while other States members of the League have not done so.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have desired to take an opportunity for consultation between members of the League before they, as an individual member, took a decision as to the question of the formal recognition of the Italian position.

Accordingly, I think it right plainly to state the view of His Majesty's Government that the situation is one in which members of the League may, without disloyalty, take such action at such time as may seem to them appropriate.

In raising this question at this meeting, His Majesty's Government have in view a strictly limited objective. It is far from their purpose to suggest that the Council or any member of the League should condone the action by which the Italian Government have acquired their present position in Ethiopia, and which the League in corporate action thought it right to condemn. Nor do they propose that any organ of the League should modify the resolutions and decisions which it took in the earlier stages of the dispute. On this issue we have declared our judgment in plain terms, and we cannot go back upon it. His Majesty's Government hope, however, that other members of the Council will share their opinion that the question of the recognition of Italy's position in Ethiopia is one which every member of the League must be held entitled to decide for itself in the light of its own situation and obligations.

This would not of itself impose any obligation upon member States to take steps in the direction of recognition, and His Majesty's Government would in no way wish to interfere with the freedom of choice of States in this matter. The action of His Majesty's Government themselves will, as those who are here to-day are well aware, be dependent upon the progress made in the solution of another large and difficult question, and the acceptance of the opinion held by His Majesty's Government would, in fact, merely confirm the correctness of the attitude taken by a number of States by no means unmindful of their obligations to the League, that with the adoption of the Assembly's resolution of July 4th, 1936, their collective obligations in the matter of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict were discharged.

It follows that His Majesty's Government have no desire to embark on a discussion of legal points, such as the distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* recognition, and what action in a particular case be held to amount to one or the other. There may be room for argument on these points, but His Majesty's Government would not regard such argument as relevant to the particular proposal which they desire to make, and in any case the importance of such matters clearly resides less in precise legal definitions than the political significance which is attached to such action by the interested Parties.

In approaching this problem, His Majesty's Government are themselves influenced by considerations of more general character.

Nearly two years have now elapsed since the Assembly, in its Resolution of July 4th, 1936, took the decision which resulted in the discontinuance of the action taken by the Members of the League to apply Article 16 of the Covenant. The Assembly recognised on that occasion that various circumstances prevented the full application of the Covenant, and instituted an enquiry with the object of adapting the application of the principles of the Covenant to the results of experience. Since this Resolution was passed the situation of fact with which Members of the League were then confronted has become more definitive and more stable.

I have compared the description of the situation contained in the communication from His Majesty Haile Selassie, circulated yesterday to Members of the Council, with the information on the subject at the disposal of His Majesty's Government.

This situation according to our information is that the Italian Government has obtained control of virtually all the former territory of Ethiopia, and while resistance is still continuing in certain parts of the country, there is no organised native authority and no central native administration with the slightest prospect of reconquering the country.

The conclusion follows that the only means by which the Italian position could be challenged by League Members would be by concerted military action, in other words by going to war. Such action is unthinkable, and would be proposed by no responsible person in any country. It was indeed by implication deliberately excluded by the Assembly Resolution of July 4th, 1936, and nowhere now is there any desire on the part of any Member of the League to reverse the decision which the Assembly then took, and to revert to a policy of full sanctions against the Italian Government.

I do not overlook the fact that there are many in my own country, as perhaps in others, who feel that none the less any action designed to facilitate recognition of the Italian conquest does impinge on principle, and who would, therefore, deplore the adoption of such a course. I respect, but I cannot share, their view.

Such anxiety arises in great part from the Resolution adopted by the League in 1932 in the case of Manchukuo upon the subject of non-recognition of the results of aggressive action. In that Resolution, it was agreed by all Members of the League that they would not recognise any situation, treaty, or agreement, which was brought about by means contrary to the Covenant, and if we desire to be honest with ourselves and with our fellow-Members of the League, we must not be afraid squarely to face the facts in the light of that expression of opinion.

Those who seek to establish a better world upon the basis of universal acknowledgment of League principles are clearly right to feel reluctance to countenance action, however desirable on other grounds, by which these may appear to be infringed. But when, as here, two ideals are in conflict—on the one hand, the ideal of devotion, unflinching but unpractical, to some high purpose; on the other, the ideal of a practical victory for peace—I cannot doubt that the stronger claim is that of peace.

That is the position which His Majesty's Government feel bound to adopt in the case of Ethiopia.

It is the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government that, for practical purposes, Italian control over virtually the whole of Ethiopia has become an established fact, and that

sooner or later, unless we are prepared by force to alter it, or unless for ever we are to live in an unreal world, that fact, whatever be our judgment on it, will have to be acknowledged.

In expressing their view His Majesty's Government in no way condone or approve the methods by which the Italian position in Ethiopia has been obtained, nor do they abandon in any respect the principles of the Covenant or their determination to do their utmost to secure that disputes arising between nations shall be resolved by peaceful methods and not by force. But no cause is served by vain lamentations over the past, when it is to the attempt to shape the future that the resources of constructive minds should be directed.

Meanwhile nothing is gained and much may be lost by a refusal to face facts. Great as is the League of Nations, the ends that it exists to serve are greater than itself, and the greatest of those ends is peace.

It is for these reasons, Mr. President, that His Majesty's Government have thought it right to bring this matter before the Council and to express their views upon it.

They do not, as I have said, ask for decisions on questions of principle nor do they suggest that the Council should impose on any Member of the League a particular course of action.

They hope, however, that Members of the Council will share their opinion, that the question of the recognition of Italy's position in Ethiopia is one for each Member of the League to decide for itself in the light of its own situation and its own obligations.

Speech by the French Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet

Mr. President: When it asked the Council of the League of Nations to place upon its Agenda the question of the consequences that should be drawn from the existing situation in Ethiopia, the British Government was acting under the impulse of an anxiety to which I am sure every Member of the Council, as I myself, would like to pay tribute. The British Government indeed felt that in order to re-establish in Europe an atmosphere of confidence in international co-operation (and that is our unanimous hope) it was necessary to deal boldly with a situation which for a long time had constituted a threat to the peace of the world. We are all grateful to Lord Halifax for the frankness with which he has reminded us of the facts of the problem and the reasons for the action that his Government took. This problem indeed was not one that could be solved by silence. Certain Powers, whose fidelity to the principles of the Covenant could not be doubted, had already felt that they were able to recognise the state of affairs that had been created in Ethiopia since 1936. France took the view that these initiatives taken individually were not sufficient to remove the dangers which the situation in Ethiopia entailed for peace and that it was proper that the League of Nations should once more have the matter brought before it.

I will not attempt to conceal the feelings of profound sadness with which all Members of the Council have taken up and will conclude this discussion. The presence amongst us of His Majesty the Emperor Haile Selassie indeed, so far as it is possible to do so, increases the emotion that we feel. But there is another feeling by which we are animated and by which the Members of the Council must be animated. There is one consideration which in our view entirely justifies the position which the United Kingdom representative invites us to take up. It is the feeling that everything possible has been attempted. It is the feeling that everything possible has been accomplished.

The Resolution of July 4th, 1936, solemnly proclaimed our devotion to those principles. At the same time, however, it recognised that in the face of facts and owing to circumstances the League of Nations found it impossible to ensure the integral application of the principles of the Covenant. This observation, which put an end to the measures adopted by common agreement, from that very moment restored to Members of the League of Nations their liberty to appreciate whether in the case of the Ethiopian conflict they had discharged all the obligations following from the Covenant.

At various dates certain Powers considered the circumstances which these facts seemed to them to involve. France for its part has not hitherto felt herself justified in deducing any conclusion; but to-day she thinks that it is proper and fitting to obey above all that will for peace which is the very foundation and the very soul of the League. It is to maintain peace that the League was created. The French Government is as animated by the same will for peace as the United Kingdom Government. It associates itself with the latter Government in expressing to the Council the desire that there should be recognition of the fact that circumstances henceforth make it possible for each State Member to appreciate for itself the decisions that should be taken.

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Statements were then made by the representatives of Roumania, Poland, Sweden, Belgium, Peru, Ecuador and Iran, which, in contrast with the statements by the Soviet Russian, Chinese, Bolivian and New Zealand representatives, endorsed the British point of view.

The last speaker was the President of the Council, the Latvian Foreign Minister, M. Munters. He stated first on behalf of the Latvian Government that, since sanctions against Italy had been abandoned for nearly two years, every Government must now take an independent decision regarding sovereignty over Abyssinia. As no other members asked to speak, the President declared the discussion closed and, in summing up, stated that "the great majority of the Powers represented in the Council have expressed the opinion that every State Member of the League is entitled, according to its own position and its own obligations, to decide independently the question of the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia".

This closed the discussion on the British proposal without any resolution being adopted.

It cannot be affirmed that this "liquidation" was characterised by great candour. The result will still have to pass a number of rocks of a formal juridical nature before the name of Ethiopia is removed from the list of Members of the League. At the September session, there will no doubt still be a number of fanatical collectivists who will combat with doctrinary reasons the formal establishment of the Abyssinian death certificate. On that occasion too there will be the obstruction of the Soviet Union according to plan, though the Union or its conscious or unconscious agents will hardly succeed in bringing the "Emperor Haile Selassie" in person before the Assembly as a reminder of the bad conscience of the League. He has again had the bitter experience that the League can no longer free him from the position into which it had manœuvred him. For there is no possible doubt that the Empire of the Negus no longer exists, and the Assembly will have to admit that it cannot place the lifeless letter of the Covenant above reality.

THE VICTORY OF THE SWISS NEUTRALITY IDEA⁽¹⁾

The Re-establishment of the Integral Neutrality of Switzerland

Declaration by the Swiss Federal Council of March 21st, 1938.

On March 13th the Federal State of Austria, with which Switzerland has maintained cordial neighbourly relations, ceased to exist as an independent State. The historical event which has occurred before our eyes is of the greatest significance. The desire of the peoples of Germany and Austria to unite was nothing new. Even in the last century it led to armed conflicts; this desire has now been fulfilled.

The Federal Council understands that these events have deeply moved our people. It takes the opportunity offered by the meeting of the Federal Assembly at its ordinary spring session in order to enlighten public opinion and to dispel groundless fears. The change brought about in the political map of Europe cannot result in a weakening of the political position of Switzerland. The independence and neutrality of the Confederation, on the contrary, prove to be more than ever indispensable for the maintenance of the European equilibrium. Solemn assurances in this respect have been given to us from all quarters. Their value is incontestable. None of our three neighbour States can desire or aim at the downfall of Switzerland; none of them threaten our democratic institutions which form an essential vital principle of the Confederation and its twenty-two cantons.

It is a century-old mission of Switzerland in Europe to guard the passes of the Alps in the interest of all. Switzerland covers and protects vital frontier sections of her neighbours. The desire of the Swiss nation to fulfil this task and to maintain its independence with its blood is unanimous and unshakable. Switzerland holds aloof from foreign actions. Any attack on the inviolability of her territory would be a dreadful crime against international law.

The doctrine which our country must draw from events is clear. The attempts to bring about the recognition of our complete neutrality must be continued and must lead to their goal; any ambiguity in this respect must in fact be removed. It is moreover necessary for us to endeavour to maintain correct and friendly relations in the same manner with all our neighbours. The struggle between opposing political systems in other countries does not concern our State. Every nation is free to devote itself to its own internal affairs. The Swiss nation is united and must always remain united in the will to defend the incomparable fatherland which God has given it against all to the last breath at any cost.

In these troublous times we are more than ever aware of the task allotted to us by Providence, namely that a democracy such as ours is based on the principle of freedom in order and that nothing can shake the Confederation.

Declaration by the Swiss Parties on March 21st, 1938.

All groups of the Federal Assembly approve the declaration of the Federal Council and solemnly declare that the entire Swiss nation, without distinction of language, confession or party, are decided to defend the inviolability of their fatherland to the last drop of their blood. The stronger the expression of the will of the Swiss nation to maintain their rights on the ground of responsible cooperation in the State, the more effective will this resistance be.

The Swiss nation are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices for their national defence; but military armaments would be without avail if they could find no support in the spiritual and moral forces of the entire people: unity among all members of the Confederation must gain the victory over political and economic differences, and our internal discussions must be carried on in a worthy spirit, in mutual respect for the views of others and within the framework of our democratic institutions.

The Federal Constitution has entrusted the Federal Council with the duty of watching over the external security of Switzerland, and of guarding its independence and neutrality. The Swiss nation is prepared to support the Federal Council in this

important task which must be carried out in the meaning and spirit of our democracy and in accordance with the Federal Constitution.

Trusting in a benevolent Providence which rules over the century-old history of our country, the Swiss nation is resolved with determination and courage to meet any difficulties which arise out of the seriousness of the times.

Memorandum from the Swiss Federal Council to the League of Nations, of April 30th, 1938.

By a letter of April 29th, 1938, the Swiss Government has transmitted to the Secretary-General, for communication to the Council, the memorandum referred to in M. Motta's letter of April 20th, 1938, which was circulated to the Council and the Members of the League in the document C.137.M.82.1938.V.

The text of this memorandum is as follows:

Memorandum.

When the question of Switzerland's joining the League of Nations was under consideration, she laid great stress on the necessity of preserving her neutrality within the framework of the new international organisation. On February 8th, 1919, in a memorandum addressed to the Powers assembled at Paris for the purpose of concluding peace, the Federal Council stated that the Confederation was anxious to lend its co-operation to the League, but without sacrificing a fundamental principle of its policy.

The following are some of the arguments by which it supported its attitude:

"The Confederation is entitled to emphasise the fact that its neutrality is not a neutrality which is observed in particular circumstances, but is a permanent neutrality. Its peaceful policy is based upon a principle which became established as a maxim of statesmanship early in the sixteenth century. Although the Swiss shed their blood on all the battlefields of Europe in causes not their own, yet they adopted and preserved neutrality as the guiding principle of their own policy, and embodied it in the Constitution of their own federal State. The Federal Council's declaration of August 4th, 1914, is but a repetition of a series of identical decisions taken by the Federal Diets during four centuries. The Swiss were thus the first to proclaim their faith in the high ideal which is destined to achieve its triumph in the League of Nations. This systematically pacific attitude has no parallel in history.

"The neutrality of Switzerland is not merely the result of the application of rules of international law and of international conventions. It is first and foremost the expression of the profound conviction and firm resolve of the Swiss people, who have always adhered to it with unchanging sincerity and loyalty. They would not understand the abandonment of a political maxim which has proved its value to them through a period of centuries...

"Swiss neutrality has a character of its own that distinguishes it from any other neutrality. It is one of the essential conditions of the domestic peace, the union, and hence the independence, of a nation composed of diverse linguistic and cultural elements. That diversity is precious to Switzerland, for, despite the smallness of her territory, it is the source of an intense national life.

"The preservation of this age-old institution is of as much value to Europe as to Switzerland herself. Not without reason did the Great Powers assembled at Paris in 1815 declare that 'the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, and her independence of all foreign influences, are in the true political interests of Europe as a whole. That declaration retains all its force.

"It is the duty of the Swiss Confederation to continue to be, as in the past, the faithful guardian of the crossings of the Alps...

"Neutrality alone has preserved for centuries the bond of union among peoples of different race, speech, and creed. It is through the scrupulous observance of the principle of neutrality that the Swiss Cantons have been able to develop a spirit of

(1) See No. 6/7 p. 162 and No. 9 p. 131 of this Journal.

mutual understanding based upon respect for one another's individuality. The oldest of existing republics would be happy to contribute to the League of Nations the fruits of the experience gained during the centuries of the slow and laborious development of its federative system. Only provided that she remains faithful to her traditional principles does Switzerland feel that she can take, in the best interests of all, that place in the League of Nations which is assigned to her by her history."

This special position was viewed with a sympathetic understanding by the Powers. By Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, Switzerland's neutrality was not merely recognised and confirmed, but was declared to be compatible with the Covenant as an engagement "for securing the maintenance of peace", within the meaning of Article 21.

None the less, the neutrality of Switzerland was not embodied without qualification in the League system. By virtue of the declaration made by the Council of the League in London on February 13th, 1920, whereby note was taken of Switzerland's resolve to defend her territory in every circumstance, she preserved her military neutrality, but on the other hand, she was to accept the obligations devolving upon other States Members in respect of economic and financial sanctions.

This was an important concession on the part of neutral Switzerland to the principles of co-operation on which the League was founded. Nevertheless, this restriction upon her age-old policy was not accepted without a struggle by the people and the Cantons.

The decision of the majority of the people and the Cantons was influenced by a variety of reasons. In the first place, Switzerland felt that, under a system of strict sanctions coming almost automatically into operation, there would be no essential change in her position as a neutral country; and she also believed that a large reduction of armaments, in combination with an exact mechanism of collective security, would very substantially reduce the possibility of armed conflicts. Lastly, she cherished the hope that the League would eventually come to embrace all those important countries which as yet remained aloof on account of political circumstances. That hope was expressed in set terms in the Federal Ordinance which was submitted to a popular vote on May 16th, 1920.

Circumstances have greatly changed since Switzerland joined the League. Some of the most important clauses of the Covenant have not been enforced. The system of sanctions has not operated in every case. Competition in armaments has been resumed on a larger scale than ever. Instead of becoming universal, the League has lost the participation of some important countries. The United States did not see their way to join, and four great countries, two of them Switzerland's neighbours, have withdrawn.

Such a state of affairs could not but affect the position of a perpetually neutral country. Owing to her unique situation, Switzerland cannot accept a system of optional sanctions. Her neutrality cannot be allowed to depend upon circumstances; it has been established once for all. Its strength is in its clear definition and its permanent character.

At the present day, the distinction between military and economic sanctions would prove illusory so far as Switzerland was concerned. If she resorted to economic pressure, she would be in grave danger of being treated exactly as if she had taken military action.

Switzerland trusts that the League of Nations, of which she is proud to be the home, will overcome its present difficulties. Although, in accordance with her undertaking of February 13th, 1920, she has modernised and reorganised her army, for which her people have in fact made the greatest sacrifices, she remains faithful to the League and its ideal of peace and international co-operation. She will continue to collaborate with the League in all questions in which her status as a neutral country is not involved; but she considers herself entitled to ask that her absolute neutrality be explicitly recognised within the framework of the League.

Accordingly, the Federal Council, supported by the overwhelming majority of the Houses of the Federal Parliament and of the people of Switzerland, seeks of the Council of the League, with every confidence, a declaration that the traditional neutrality of the Confederation is consistent with the provisions of the Covenant.

The Federal Government does not doubt that the Council will formally accept the foregoing declarations, and so confirm the unique character of Switzerland's neutrality.

The Report by the Swedish Representative, M. Sandler, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the League Council on May 11th, 1938.

1. By communications dated April 20th and 29th, 1938, the Swiss Federal Council raised the question of Switzerland's neutrality within the framework of the League of Nations before the Council of the League. In a memorandum attached to the second of these two communications the Swiss Government submitted its desiderata to the Council; they were also developed by word of mouth by the representative of Switzerland at the Council meeting of May 11th, 1938.

2. The special situation in which the League of Nations has recognised Switzerland to stand in its capacity of Member of the League was defined by a resolution of the Council dated February 13th, 1920. The resolution in question did not give rise to any discussion in the Assembly. It should be observed, as regards the respective competence of the Council and Assembly, that this is not a question which under the Covenant falls within the exclusive competence of either the Council or the Assembly. Both organs of the League are accordingly competent in the matter.

The Federal Council was in fact concerned that the League of Nations should consider its application at the earliest possible date.

3. The Swiss memorandum contains observations of a general character on which, in present circumstances, there is no occasion for the Council to pronounce.

The consideration which, in the Council's opinion, makes it possible to settle the case of Switzerland in the light of its special features is the peculiar position of Switzerland, with its traditional standing as a perpetually neutral Power. This neutrality, which was recognised by the Treaties of 1815, is an uncontested principle of international law. The principle was confirmed by the Treaty of Versailles in Article 435. The Council of the League of Nations in its resolution of February 13th, 1920, recorded that "Switzerland is in a unique situation, based on a tradition of several centuries... explicitly incorporated in the Law of Nations". It stated that "the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the guarantee of the inviolability of her territory... are justified by the interests of general peace".

In consideration of the position of Switzerland as a perpetually neutral State, the Council of the League agreed in 1920 that Switzerland should not participate in measures of a military character. The Swiss Government now asks the Council to go further in this direction, and to recognise that Switzerland will not participate in any sanctions whatsoever.

To prevent any misunderstanding, it should be made clear that Switzerland will not participate in any measures of the kind contemplated in Article 16, whether such measures are adopted in application of Article 16 or in application of some other article of the Covenant.

Having regard to the very special position of Switzerland, and being informed of her intention while not participating in putting sanctions into operation to continue at the same time to co-operate in every other respect with the League of Nations, the Council of the League is to-day disposed to comply with the Swiss request.

4. In accordance with the policy of abstention which it proposes to follow, the Swiss Government will not participate in decisions with regard to the putting into operation of sanctions by the organs of the League of Nations.

5. The Council of the League of Nations notes with satisfaction the assurances given by the Federal Council in London in 1920 to the effect that Switzerland is prepared for any sacrifices for the defence of Swiss territory under all circumstances, and further takes note of the strengthening of the Swiss defences of which it is informed by the Federal Council's memorandum.

6. The Swiss Government has proclaimed through the mouth of the Swiss representative of the Council its loyalty to the League of Nations and its desire to continue to collaborate with the League. The members of the Council will be in agreement in appreciating this collaboration. Accordingly, subject to the discontinuance of participation in putting sanctions into operation, the position of Switzerland as a Member of the League, and as the State on whose territory the headquarters of the League is situate, remains unchanged. To-morrow, as to-day, the position of Switzerland will remain unaltered as regards all the provisions of the Covenant except those relating to sanctions and Switzerland will continue to accord to the organs of the League all the freedom required for the exercise of their activities.

7. The representative of Switzerland has been at pains to make clear that he has no intention of dealing with anything except the case of his own country, leaving entirely unaffected the position of other Members of the League as regards the scope which they attribute to Article 16 of the Covenant.

It is obvious that the request of the Swiss Government, and any action which may be taken thereon, cannot in any way affect the positions thus taken up or prejudice any decisions which may be taken within the League.

8. I have the honour to submit the following draft resolution to the Council:

Draft Resolution.

"The Council of the League of Nations, in presence of the Swiss Government's memorandum dated April 29th, 1938,

"Having considered the requests put forward in the memorandum of the Swiss Federal Council, and explained by the representative of Switzerland at the meeting of May 11th, 1938,

"Having regard to the special position of Switzerland resulting from her perpetual neutrality which is based on age-long tradition and recognised by the Law of Nations,

"Recalling that, by its declaration made in London on February 13th, 1920, the Council recognised that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland is justified by the interests of general peace and as such is compatible with the Covenant,

"Approves the report of the representative of Sweden,

"And in these circumstances takes note that Switzerland, invoking her perpetual neutrality, has expressed the intention not to participate any longer in any manner in the putting into operation of the provisions of the Covenant relating to sanctions and declares that she will not be invited to do so.

"And places on record that the Swiss Government declares its determination to maintain unaltered in all other respects her position as a Member of the League, and to continue to give the facilities which have been accorded to the League for the free exercise by its institutions of their activities in Swiss territory."

May 14th, 1938, the day on which the League Council recognised by an unanimous vote that the integral neutrality of Switzerland is compatible with the provisions of the League Covenant, will be a memorable day in the annals of the Confederation. The age-old principle of Switzerland, which it adopted of its own free will and which was not a subject of discussion as such, has again demonstrated its vitality and reality and has been strengthened and reinforced by the action of the Federal Council. Federal Councillor Motta in particular has displayed untiring energy and perseverance in solving a problem which he regarded as essential in the interest of Switzerland, although it was much more complex than that of 1920. The skill which he displayed was noticeable by the fact that of all the Membres of the Council the only one to raise difficulties was, as usual, Soviet Russia. It almost appeared as if Litvinov wished to take a personal revenge for the courageous speech with which M. Motta in September 1934 gave the reasons of the Swiss Government for voting against the admission of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations.

Though a number of speakers in the debate on May 14th, referred to the "special situation" of Switzerland and attributed its desire for neutrality solely to "historical claims", such a view is not accurate to this exclusive extent. Federal Councillor Motta in his impressive pleading did not refrain from mentioning, apart from these historical reasons, some special reasons applicable to the present time, in particular the faulty development of the League and the dangers and disadvantages in which its members are thereby involved.

From the practical political point of view, therefore, the Swiss request for the conversion of Swiss differential neutrality into total neutrality was undoubtedly a precedent which all the arts of interpretation endeavour in vain to deny. It is true that the efforts of countries such as Holland, Belgium and the Northern countries and certain South American countries to remain outside the complications of Geneva are on a different plane from the formal legal point of view. But their tendency is the same, and that is the important point; their desire is to retain their freedom of decision and action in respect of an institution which is not in a position to make effective contributions towards a detente, much less towards a solution of urgent problems.

Germany and Swiss Neutrality

In his great Reichstag speech on May 21st, 1935, the Führer and Chancellor for the first time

made the following statement regarding Germany's attitude to Switzerland:

"We Germans have every occasion to be glad that there is a State on our frontier with a population that is to a great extent German, with great inner firmness and possessing real and actual independence."

Since that time Switzerland has not been specifically mentioned in Adolf Hitler's statements, nor in the great Reichstag speech on foreign policy on January 30th, 1937. The official Swiss quarters rightly interpreted this silence to mean that, in accordance with the former statement, respect for Swiss neutrality was a matter of course for Germany. Nevertheless the Führer and Chancellor took the opportunity of a private visit of the former President of the Swiss Confederation, M. Schulthess, to Berlin at the end of February 1937 to emphasise his declarations in the above-mentioned Reichstag speech and the desire of Germany to respect Swiss neutrality and independence. The conversation between Herr Schulthess and the Führer took place on February 23rd, 1937. On February 27th the Federal Council at Berne published the following official communiqué:

Official Communiqué of the Federal Council of February 26th, 1937

The President of the Confederation informed the Federal Council at its meeting on Friday that the former Federal Councillor Schulthess had taken advantage of a private visit to Berlin to have a conversation with the German Chancellor. This conversation took place on February 23rd. In the course of the conversation, in which the German Chancellor again emphasised his sincere love of peace, he made statements in definite terms and with great energy regarding relations with Switzerland that may be summed up as follows:

"The continued existence of Switzerland is a European necessity. We desire to live as good neighbours on the best terms with her and to come to loyal agreements on all matters with her. In my recent Reichstag speech, when I spoke of the neutrality of two other countries⁽¹⁾, I intentionally omitted to mention Switzerland because the traditional neutrality which she practises and which has always been recognised by the Powers, including ourselves, is in no way questioned. At all times, whatever may happen, we will respect the inviolability and neutrality of Switzerland. I say this most definitely. I have never given cause for any other view. I authorise you to communicate this declaration to your Government for communication to the Swiss people."

This announcement led on March 5th at a meeting of the Swiss Federal Council to an interpellation which gave M. Motta President of the Political Department, Federal Councillor and at that time President of the Confederation, an opportunity of emphasising the satisfaction expressed by the Federal Council at the Führer's statement, of pointing out its importance as an element of appeasement and a factor of universal peace, and of dissipating the rumours which had arisen in some Swiss quarters that some conditions were attached by Germany to Swiss neutrality.

It is well known that, on March 1938, after the events in Austria and the achievement of the Anschluss of German-Austria with Germany, Dr. Köcher, the German Minister at Berne, again repeated the sense of this declaration to the Swiss Government.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHILE FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Reasons for the Withdrawal given on May 11th, 1938 to the Council of the League of Nations by Mr. Edwards, Representative of Chile⁽¹⁾

Mr. President, under Article 4 of the Covenant, the Council decided to invite the Chilean representative to take part in its deliberations when the item on the agenda entitled "Application of the Principles of the Covenant" was under discussion, and my Government gratefully accepted the invitation, because it is anxious once again to explain its views on a question which it brought up two years ago.

⁽¹⁾ The official notification of withdrawal was given in the final meeting of the Council on May 14th.

It should be observed that the Chilean proposal did not bind the League to anything. The idea was simply to find out what other great Powers and certain great American countries thought about reform. None the less Chile met with all kinds of difficulties in putting her proposal through. Some turned a deaf ear, and maintained that the Covenant must not be touched. A spirit which appears to us to conflict with the very principles of the League of Nations—founded, as it was, to seek by every

⁽¹⁾ Belgium and the Netherlands.

peaceful method of international collaboration for the peace of the world—has prevailed and has been active in the course of outside demonstrations of a passive and courteous character.

The original proposals of Chile had unquestionably some chance of success at the time when they were put forward. Would they, one wonders, have been able to prevent the developments which have since succeeded, threatening peace and mutilating the League still further and reducing it to a condition of obscurity and impotence? I do not venture to pronounce on that subject; but at least my country retains the deep satisfaction of having made an effort which will be regarded now, and still more in the future, as wise and foreseeing.

In the position in which we are left after the disappointments of recent discussions at Geneva, the only practical step remaining from the body of the Chilean proposals would no longer have any meaning. An invitation to non-Member States to express their opinions on reforms which the League has refused for two years past to consider, and which it has shelved by putting an end to the labours of the Committee of Twenty-eight, would be too late.

Now that one European Great Power has withdrawn from the League and another has repeated its decision not to belong to the League, such an invitation on the part of the League would give the impression that we still continue as before, and more than before, to live in a world outside political realities.

I take leave to define what we mean by "political realities" in the light of the Covenant.

In our view, a coercive League of Nations such as we now have must inevitably be universal. If it is not, the States which are Members of it do not constitute a league of nations but an alliance involving an obligation to render economic and, on occasion, military services in its support. A League of Nations, which is not universal, cannot and should not be coercive.

The ideal embodied in the Pact was the ideal of a universal and coercive League. That is still the ideal of Chile. But the developments and experiences of eighteen years are there to show that the ideal is unattainable for a long time to come; and in presence of this political reality we believe that the moment has come to remodel the Covenant and to make the League *de jure* what it is *de facto*, namely, an international organisation of a non-coercive character.

It is none other than the equivocal situation in which the majority of States-Members are placed as a result of the provisions of the Covenant which has compelled Switzerland to press—with perfect reason, as we think—for restoration of her pre-war neutrality. There would have been no occasion for this perfectly proper demand if the League had been universal, and if the vague declarations hitherto made had been adequate to cover the responsibilities and obligations devolving on States-Members under the Covenant.

Given the present bases of the League of Nations and the deep gap by which they are divorced from the realities of the life of nations, it becomes necessary in each successive crisis to seek with a skill, which I am the first to recognise, for ingeniously elastic or dilatory formulæ in order to conceal, without avowing the concealment, the material impossibility of observing and enforcing the obligations incurred under the Covenant.

We view with apprehension this state of things. We have always made the respect of treaties the pivot of our international policy; and it appears to us to be contrary to our tradition and principles to remain bound by legal obligations which are disregarded and ignored, but nevertheless remain in force and may involve us at the most unlikely moment in serious responsibilities and consequences or in misunderstandings.

If a treaty like the Covenant is not scrupulously observed whether because it is (as I maintain it is) divorced from political realities and to that extent inoperative, or because some of its signatories are anxious to elude the obligations which it implies, or because it is found a tiresome encumbrance in the path of signatory States whose interests, like all things human, are unfortunately in a state of perpetual flux—it is useless to retain it in force and to pretend that it has a validity which it no longer commands. The political part of the Covenant is to-day no more than a legal shell with nothing in it, which creates for some who remain within the framework a dangerous illusion, while it inspires in others, who are still without, an unshakable resolve to remain outside, free of the perplexities and complexi-

ties of an institution which they regard as decaying and living from hand to mouth.

Sedatives will not save the League of Nations. A surgical operation is necessary to cut out the dead flesh of those Articles of the Covenant which are disregarded and violated again and again by the Members of the League, or left in suspense by unilateral declarations, the real effect of which is to undermine and nullify the sanctity of treaties. It is this dead flesh which poisons the organisation of the League, and will lead gradually it certainly to its death, if radical reforms are not adopted in order to adjust the legal structure of the Covenant to the experience of its eighteen years of existence and to the political realities of international life.

Such was the aim which Chile had in view in raising this question of universality, and proposing reforms to be effected in concert with non-Member States as a means of attaining this end.

Rumours have been prevalent—I know not from what source—which spread for credulous ears the suggestion that in the action which Chile has taken she has been actuated by special sympathies for certain Great Powers which have left the League for reasons which it is not for me to estimate. Narrow and ignorant persons have alleged that Chile was acting at the sole instance of the totalitarian States outside the League. Rumours so ridiculous I leave to the contempt of international public opinion.

But are we in a position effectively to contribute to the peace of Europe with the aid of the resources placed at our disposal by the Covenant? *Do we not see with our own eyes that the Great Powers are convinced that the Covenant affords no safeguards of security, and that they seek security in rearmament and in the repudiation of Article 8 which provided for disarmament?* What can a disarmed, distant State like Chile do for the peace of Europe beyond refraining from encouragement of, or contribution to, disputes and differences, and abstention from discussions and decisions provocative of such disputes and differences? Neutrality is at any rate a negative means of appeasement.

Even at the risk of repeating what I have already said, I may be allowed to say once more that the Covenant in its present form is incompatible with international realities and that if it were reformed and everything coercive in its provisions were removed, we might perhaps hope that its moral authority would do far more to prevent disputes than legal provisions which all the States Members refuse to apply in order to avoid far worse evils.

The Great Powers of Europe have been forced to admit after eighteen years' experience and one unfortunate experiment *that collective security which the Covenant was designed to create is a dangerous illusion* for an institution which is not universal and is deprived of the indispensable aid of other important States in a world that is profoundly divided. They therefore decided to reach agreement among themselves and *to seek the guarantees of peace by means of bilateral instead of collective agreements.* We are therefore glad to-day to welcome the first results and we are the first to congratulate the great Powers on returning to international political realism by following a method which was described a short time ago in three words: defence, appeasement, realism.

Chile is anxious and desirous of continuing to collaborate in the technical sphere, but at the same time she feels sure that in its present form the whole structure of the Covenant is dead and must be legally recognised as such and replaced by another Covenant more in keeping with the realities of international life.

We do not know what attitude the Council will adopt, and we await its decision with impatience before determining our own.

If our ideas are not shared by others and do not meet with the response for which we hope, we shall withdraw from the discussion without any feeling of bitterness, conscious that we have done our duty courageously and quite frankly to an institution in which we have collaborated to the full extent of our pacific ideals, an institution that we now see coming to an end in its present form with regret as great as our pleasure and satisfaction when it appeared on the international horizon like a rainbow marking the end once and for all of the settlement of international disputes by the cruel and brutal force of arms.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE STRUGGLE OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS FOR THEIR NATIONAL RIGHTS

A Documentary Report

Speech by Konrad Henlein, Leader of the Sudeten Germans,
at Karlsbad on April 24th, 1938

The Sudeten German Problem and its Solution — The Eight Demands

"In order to establish the historical truth, I will today refer to the offers of agreement which we have made on three occasions.

On October 21st, 1934 at our great demonstration in Röh-misch Leipa, when for the first time I stretched out the hand of understanding and conciliation to the Czech nation, it was simply ignored. Later, after the tremendous election result of May 19th and 26th, 1935, equipped with the legitimization of nearly 70 per cent of all Sudeten Germans, when I repeated my willingness to cooperate in the appeasement of the nations and in the development of the State, my second offer was also rejected. And when, by introducing our National Protection Bill in Parliament, I created a new and objectively concrete foundation for approaching the national problem which had become constantly more urgent, this third and most binding attempt was also rejected.

I can therefore calmly leave it to the judgment of world opinion to decide whether we Sudeten Germans or the Czechoslovak Government and the Czechoslovak people have acted more correctly. I have no intention whatever today to run the risk of a fresh rejection. Today I can confine myself to raising the problem afresh in its entirety and referring world public opinion to its significance and importance. I approach my task with the consciousness of the responsibility towards the Sudeten Germans and the whole of Europe, in order once more to call attention to and give a warning against impending dangers.

* * *

Like the German nation in the Reich, the German national groups in the old Monarchy had relied on President Wilson's fourteen

points. Their fundamental watchword, the principle of the right of self-determination of all nations, was to usher in a new and juster order in Europe. In the justified expectation that a century-old enmity would be ended and a just order would be established in the territory of the old Monarchy on the principles of equality of rights and self-determination, the Sudeten Germans looked forward to the decisions of the Peace Conference. This hope was severely disappointed by the responsible Powers of the Peace Conference. The New Europe did indeed bring the Slavonic and Roumanian peoples of the Monarchy a freedom to an extent which they did not themselves expect, but injustice and violence was used against the German national groups and the Magyar people.

In the face of this violence we declare that the Sudeten Germans have never abandoned their claim to the universal right of self-determination, because that right is inalienable and cannot be a subject for compromise.

When the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed, we Sudeten Germans also claimed this right and worked for it by constitutional means. The ignoring of these facts at the Peace Conference made the responsible Powers at the Peace Conference jointly responsible for the present untenable conditions of this State.

The twenty years' guilt of the peacemakers calls peremptorily for a change in the situation which they created. The responsibility for the peace of 1919 is borne by the western States and by Czechoslovakia as an allied Power.

According to the preliminary peace there were to be no annexations, the large and small nations were to be granted their natural rights, national claims were to be justly considered, and the nations were in future to be governed only with

their own consent. The right of self-determination was not to be a mere phrase, but a peremptory principle of action. According to points 4 and 10, the peoples of Austria-Hungary were to be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. The principle of justice was to apply to all, whether strong or weak.

If the reconstruction of European conditions had been carried out in accordance with these principles, there would be no national problem in the heart of Europe today."

* * *

Konrad Henlein went on, on the basis of the historical documents regarding the peace negotiations, to consider closely how far the Czechoslovak Government had kept at any rate the promises which it freely gave at that time regarding the treatment of the Germans. As regards the contents of Memorandum II, main document 3, he said it was an irony, after a development of twenty years, to speak of an "incarnation of modern democracy". In particular he dealt with Memorandum III, main document 6, and with Dr. Benes' note of May 20th, 1919 and compared the promises therein contained in detail with the actual legal and administrative position, and came to the following conclusion:

"However superficially the Peace Conference examined the statements in the memoranda and investigated the facts, and however little comprehension they had for the national problems involved by the foundation of Czechoslovakia, it was nevertheless clear to the Peace Conference that the problem of our German national group in the new State to be created far transcended the problem of a minority, and was therefore a special problem which could not be satisfactorily solved by the usual protective provisions for minorities. The committee of the peace makers was therefore aware that our question was not only part of the problem of the international structure of the State, but was a fundamental problem for the existence and working of the State in all spheres of life, without the solution of which a harmonious existence of the State could not be attained."

Konrad Henlein then went no less thoroughly into the so-called Minorities Protection Treaty of September 10th, 1919. "Naturally," he stated at the outset, "these provisions also apply to our protection, but without restricting the measure of our national rights or releasing the State and the Czech people from their obligation to solve the problem. But these obligations under international law have not been kept any more than the promises in the memoranda. The exhortation of the Peace Conference, in accordance with the report of May 21st, 1919, has been entirely ignored.

The provisions of the Minorities Protection Treaty, contrary to the express wish of the Peace Conference, were included only partially and in a weakened form in the Constitution as a fundamental law of the State. One of the principal protective provisions, the guarantee of real equal treatment of all citizens, was deliberately omitted.

On the basis of the Protection Treaty we have a full claim to the establishment of the fact that a number of laws which have done us serious injustice and caused us heavy losses are contrary to the treaty and to the constitution. Merely as examples I will refer to the law on land reform, the language law, the law for the protection of the Republic with its supplements, the law on the reform of the political administration and almost all political laws since 1933, in particular the law on the dissolution of political parties, the authorisation laws and, more especially, the law which quite changes the constitutional position of the State, the law on the defence of the State. To a still greater measure this applies also to the official acts of the Czechoslovak authorities. By an increasing number of laws and decrees, the recognition

and exercise of civil rights is a matter for the free discretion of the authorities.

In fact, a legal position has arisen which makes the Minorities Protection Treaty quite ineffective, because only the absolute and uncontrollable, unrestricted discretion of the authorities prevails.

The Constitution was decided upon by the so-called 'revolutionary national assembly', which was not authorised for the purpose by public general elections, but which consisted of a purely Czech committee, the so-called 'Narodni vybor'. The national groups of the new State, consisting of four and a half million people, making 34.5 per cent of the total population of the State, were not represented at all in this revolutionary national assembly.

The Constitution, therefore, did not arise out of the decision of the entire population of the State, but of only a part. The basic law of the State was thus a violation of the fundamental principle of every democracy, namely the sovereignty of the people.

According to the statements in the memoranda and according to the preamble of the Treaty of St. Germain, Czechoslovakia was proceeding to form a voluntary union of the peoples of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia together with Slovakia into a uniform and independent State. I must point out that this statement in the memorandum and this preamble to the Treaty of St. Germain constitute a historical and actual untruth.

The Sudeten Germans, after the collapse of Austria, also claimed for themselves the right of self-determination, formed their own national governments for Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia and announced to the whole world their desire for independence. The Sudeten German territory was occupied by Czech troops against the will of the Sudeten Germans a few weeks after the declaration of the Republic. No negotiations were sought with the Sudeten Germans by those who were at the head of the new State.

On June 1st, 1920, the German national representatives, after being elected to the first legal legislative National Assembly, protested by means of legal declaration. On March 4th, 1919, when the entire population of the Sudeten German territories made demonstrations expressing their desire for national freedom, this voice of the Sudeten Germans was ignored.

The dictated Peace of St. Germain created a State in the heart of Europe with a population consisting of six different races, in which the greatest nation represented only about 50 per cent of the entire population.

The fact that this 50 per cent, i. e. the Czech nation, regards the State as created solely for itself and wishes to rule over it as if it were a pure Czech national State, was bound to give rise to the most serious national and political tension. By the attempt of the Czechs to impose their political will on the other 50 per cent of the population of the State and to develop their predominant position to a constantly increasing extent, a situation was created which is now in urgent need of being cleared up.

* * *

In the past twenty years the Sudeten Germans have on various occasions tried in a pacific manner, by means of a frank understanding, to obtain at any rate a part of their rights. They have also repeatedly applied to the League of Nations as the guarantor of their rights under the Treaty. The Sudeten Germans have in the course of years sent through their authorised representatives no less than 22 petitions and memoranda to the League. But not one of them came before the Committee of Three, not one of them came before the League Council, not one of them was settled.

The Sudeten Germans recognised with bitter disappointment that this method was ho-

peless. Henceforward they will send no more petitions to the League of Nations, but will use other means to obtain their rights.

* * *

The Sudeten Germans have also tried to obtain their rights in the State itself. They have frequently endeavoured to make an arrangement with the Czechs in this State which would render possible a complete and frank adherence of the non-Czech peoples to the State.

The world is aware of that attempt by Sudeten German parties which has gone down to history under the name of 'activism' and which only recently came to an end. From 1926 until the spring of 1938, that is to say for twelve long years, German parties have endeavoured with a self-denial amounting almost to self-sacrifice to obtain at any rate the appearance of equality of rights and the scantiest material guarantees. This attempt also, which, in spite of constant humiliations and the complete absence of any success, was carried out for twelve years, was unable to move the Czechs to come to an agreement with the Sudeten Germans. The activist attempt to reach an understanding came to grief on the boundless demand of the Czechs for power, on the ideology of the Czech national State, and on the anti-German mentality of the parties dominating the State.

In view of the profound national consciousness which today inspires the entire German race, it can be a matter of surprise to no one if the 75 million Germans in the Reich take a constantly increasing interest in the fate of the great Sudeten German national group.

But it cannot at present be a matter of indifference, not only for Germany but for the whole of Europe, whether the Sudeten Germans who are suffering political and legal oppression, obtain their rights or not.

* * *

The change to be brought about must entail a fundamental departure from the idea of the National State. For the development of the State during twenty years must have taught the Czech people that there can be no Czech National State with us. If the Czech people want only a national State of this kind, they can only have it without us. If the Czech people will give up their illusions and carry out a reconstruction of the State in common with the other national groups, it must be made absolutely clear to them that the instrument of the Minorities Protection is quite inadequate to satisfy us.

We will never be content to play the part of a so-called "minority".

We are not a minority with minority rights. If we do not obtain the same rights as the Czechs, we shall no longer be in a position to assume the same duties.

A solution of the national problem while at the same time maintaining the Czech National State idea and the Czech claim for domination over the other peoples and their settlement territories is absolutely impossible. Here there is no question of negotiating or bargaining, but only a decisive No!

The codification of the existing so-called minority provisions of a legal and administrative nature into a statute can in reality mean nothing else than the further establishment of a twenty-year diminution of rights in all spheres of national, political, economic and State life, in other words the perpetuation of injustice and violence. The plan of a minority statute has, however, made two things clear to the

world: in the first place, that the Czechoslovak Government has now also realised the necessity of a legal settlement of the question of nationalities; in the second place, however, that it has still not gone so far as to tackle the problem fundamentally. Either it has not reached the stage of realising this fact, or it still thinks half-measures are sufficient.

What we have suffered, tolerated and lost in the last twenty years goes to form a single vast charge against a system which we consider it our duty to combat with all our strength.

How long will the Czechs still try to represent that dangerous view which bids defiance to all historical development that it is the Slavonic duty of the Czech people to form a bulwark of the Slavonic race against the Germans? It is dreadful to have to reach the conclusion that the Czech people have for decades been reared in a false view of history and been urged into a historical mission which they can never fulfil. The Czech people have never at any time or in any way possessed as close spiritual, cultural and economic connections with another Slavonic people as with the Germans.

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If the twenty-year anniversary of this State is celebrated this year, it must of course be understood that the Germans, after twenty years of oppression, cannot take part in such celebrations. During these twenty years the Czechs have done nothing to win the Sudeten Germans for the State in which they were incorporated against their will. The Czech people had time enough in twenty years to arrange internal conditions to the satisfaction of all peoples. But their statesmen have not fulfilled what was to be expected of them in three respects. They have not kept firstly the promises which they gave voluntarily at the Peace Conference, secondly their obligations under the Treaty of St. Germain and thirdly the legal obligations into which they entered under the Constitution. They have replaced civil and political equality of rights by a diminution of the rights of the non-Czech peoples, and the free development of all races by national, political and cultural oppression of the non-Czech population. Instead of a true democracy, the dictatorship of the Czech majority, bureaucracy and police was set up. Instead of a "second Switzerland" with satisfied nations possessing equal rights, a State was created in which at present all non-Czech peoples justly feel themselves to be unfree and dissatisfied, deprived of their rights and oppressed. Today all the non-Czech peoples and national groups from Bohemia to Sub-Carpathian Russia protest against a treatment which can no longer be brought into harmony with national self-consciousness, honour and dignity.

The mistakes and delays of the Czech administration date back to the time when the State was founded. While it was pointed out in a Czechoslovak memorandum to the Peace Conference that the general situation necessarily made Czechoslovakia a deadly enemy of the Germans, the following fundamental question must now be raised: is it desired to continue to maintain this political aim which is removed from reality and therefore dangerous, or is it desired to take account of the real historical development? If the Czech statesmen sincerely desire to enter into friendly neighbourly relations with the German people, there must be a threefold revision of the conditions under which the Czechs view world policy:

1. a revision of the Czech historical myth which is based on false ideas;

2. in particular a revision of the unfortunate view that it is the duty of the Czech people to form a Slavonic bulwark against the so-called German urge towards the East ;

3. a revision of that position in foreign policy which has hitherto brought the State into the ranks of the enemies of the German people.

At the same time, the Czech people must make up their minds that the rearrangement of their relations with the Greater German Reich is impossible without a simultaneous rearrangement of their relations with our national group.

* * *

The demands which we have to put forward on behalf of the united Sudeten Germans can be reduced to a simple formula : We shall feel ourselves to be oppressed so long as we cannot do the same as the Czechs. Everything that is permitted to the Czechs must also be permitted to us. In a word, we wish to live as free people among free people. If, therefore, there is to be a peaceful development in the Czechoslovak State, the following State and legal order must, in the conviction of the Sudeten Germans, be created :

1. Establishment of complete equality of rights and status of the German national group with the Czech people ;

2. Recognition of the Sudeten German national group as a legal body, by the grant of a position of equal rights in the State ;

3. Determination and recognition of the German settlement territory ;

4. Creation of German self-government in the German settlement territory in all spheres of public life, in so far as the interests and affairs of the German national group are concerned ;

5. Creation of legal protective provisions for those nationals who live their national life outside the closed settlement territory ;

6. Removal of the injustice done to the Sudeten Germans in 1918 and reparation of the damage caused by that injustice ;

7. Recognition and application of the principle : German officials in the German territory ;

8. Complete freedom to adhere to the German national idea and the German ideology.

In view of the recent internal and foreign political development and the increase in value and power of the Sudeten Germans, I should be entitled to extend our claims still further. I do not do so in order to prove to the whole world that the Sudeten Germans, in spite of all their bitter experience, are

prepared, by limiting their claims, to make an honest and serious contribution to the maintenance and strengthening of peace. It is now for the administration of the State and the Czech people to give the same sincere proof and to speak less of peace while doing more to promote it. But no further attempts must be made by means of fine words to give an impression of order in the State, especially to foreigners who are unaware of the facts, and to continue to evade the problem by means of superficial apparent solutions. But it would also be wrong if Czech policy were to rely solely on its alliances with France and Russia without taking upon itself a decisive share in the safeguarding of European peace.

* * *

Regardless of the State frontiers, the Sudeten Germans, as a part of the German people, with whom we always have been and still remain in indissoluble connection, could not and would not hold aloof from an ideology to which at present all Germans in the world gladly adhere. In particular we, as Germans who are in danger and who are fighting for our existence, can but adhere to an ideology the supreme law of which is the law of the community. This is a question of sentiment, the liberty of which is guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution. We also claim this liberty, without thereby placing ourselves in opposition to the principles of the State. In the same manner as the Germans of the whole world, we also adhere to the fundamental National Socialist views of life, which fill our entire feelings and thoughts and in accordance with which we shape the life of our national group within the framework of the laws.

I must state very frankly and categorically that it is intolerable to us that, under the cloak of subtle legal constructions, persecutions occur which are not aimed at criminal acts but only against that view which must today be simply described as the German view. Czech terrorists will hate us and persecute us on account of this frank adherence to the German National Socialist ideology. Genuine democrats on the national Czech side will understand and respect our adherence. For they are aware that even in this State there must be room for every honest ideology and that the Czech people themselves have to thank a uniting national sentiment for their rebirth a hundred years ago. It will therefore depend on the insight and will of the Government of the Czech people whether, on the twenty years' jubilee of the State, the conditions which are at present intolerable to us still exist or whether the Czech contribution to the peace of Europe will be made. We do not want war either within or without, but we can no longer tolerate a position which for us signifies war in peace."

At the May festival in Gablonz on May 1st, 1938, Konrad Henlein again set forth and supplemented his Karlsbad programme. This programme, he said, contained no maximum demands, but a basis that was just sufficient to bring the national problem to a solution. It was not a question of dead paragraphs, but of the vital right of the German national group, not of the Constitution but of a new and just order in the State. He could therefore withdraw nothing from his Karlsbad statements and claims. It could not be the duty of Europe to support with every means the principle of the Czech demand for rule and power against the principle of equality of rights for all peoples and national groups in Czechoslovakia, but it was on the contrary the duty of Europe to accelerate this internal appeasement.

But it is not only the Sudeten German national group that has brought its neglected national rights urgently to the notice of Prague in the last few days and weeks. Al-

most at the same time, namely on April 25th, at Budapest and May 12th, at Mährisch-Ostrau, representatives of the Hungarian and Polish national groups made demands on Czechoslovakia for national autonomy. As far back as March 29th, in the Prague Parliament the deputies Kundt for the Sudeten German Party, Szüllö for the Hungarian national minority, Wolf for the Poles and Dr. Tiso for the Slovakian autonomists made significant statements warning against apparent solutions. It is therefore possible to speak of the formation of an autonomist bloc of all non-Czech national groups.

Resurrection of the nations! Yes, but in this case not in the old Danube Monarchy but in the young Moldau republic.

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It is now the turn for the State to speak. Has it understood the signs of the times? It almost seems as if it had not, in view of recent events. Did it really think the state-

ment that three-quarters of the Sudeten Germans were behind Konrad Henlein was merely a case of the wish being father to the thought and a flight of the imagination on the part of the Sudeten German party? If so, it has learnt better from the elections on three successive Sundays which took place, as it were, with a background of fixed bayonets. After Henlein's victory with over 90 % of the Sudeten German electors, there can be no further doubt as to the national consciousness of unity and the national unity movement of the Sudeten Germans. This has moreover given sanction to the Karlsbad demands. Dr. Hodza, in expressing the opinion in his statement to the press on May 19th, that "the idyllic times of the last 15 years, which followed upon the War, are now past and the people must return to a new epoch of struggle and remain in a permanent state of alarm", does not show great comprehension for the position. These fifteen years may have been idyllic for the Czechs, but they were certainly not for the foreign national groups. For the Germans they began on March 4th, 1919, when 52 of their members paid for their belief in the right of self-determination by death. At the beginning, too, was the common legal statement of the 69 German deputies in the first Prague parliament on June 1st, 1920:

"The Germans of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia and the Germans of Slovakia had never any desire to unite with the Czechs and to form a union to create the Czechoslovak Republic... The German Sudeten territories have in fact never been asked their wishes, and as far as they are concerned the result of the peace treaties is merely the sanctioning of violence, but not a legal position... We therefore reject the fable of the purely Czech State, of the Czechoslovak nation and of the Czechoslovak language, as being in gross contradiction with the facts. We will never recognise the Czechs as the masters, and never agree to be servants in this State..."

The above remark by Hodza merely shows in a striking manner that the Prague Government has never succeeded in gaining the slightest trace of love, respect and confidence among the national groups.

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Nevertheless the moment when Konrad Henlein entered the study of the Czechoslovak Prime Minister for his first conversation was a historical one. For it signified the collapse of a formalist construction into which the Czech State had been forced from its birth and which created the grotesque position that the founder and leader of the greatest party was not received by the Government because he was not a member of parliament!

On May 19th, 1935, when the first great election victory of the Sudeten German party gave them at one blow 44 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and, in Hodza's words, put an end to the former idyll, it would have been an easy matter to restart this idyll, though of course it would have had to include all. But the authorities in Prague would not realise that this change-over in the party system of the Sudeten Germans did not raise a parliamentary problem, as was thought by the formalists, but brought the State up against the question of its existence. The historic chance of a compromise with the Sudeten German national group, which

Konrad Henlein offered to the Czechs after this election victory was thrown aside, because erroneous speculations were engaged in regarding the future development of the Sudeten German party.

Has Prague at last learnt the lesson? It is true that there is no longer any talk of a minority statute, but of a nationality statute. Dr. Krofta, the Foreign Minister, in the Brussels « Soir » and the « Intransigeant » of May 18th, even announced a charter of nationality rights. He also hinted at its contents: a résumé or codification of the minorities protection provisions hitherto applicable in a legislative act. During the elections, Dr. Benes on May 21st at Tabor and Dr. Hodza on May 26th in « Paris Soir » went a little further. The former said: "The Government is preparing some very important legislative measures which will make more perfect our present nationality system, which will confirm the actual equality of rights and political and moral equality of all citizens and all nationalities in the State, which will safeguard their justified political, economic, and cultural positions on the basis of their numbers, strength and proportion, and which will give them the guarantee that they will maintain and fully develop their nationality under all circumstances and will really be able to feel themselves equals among equals". Dr. Hodza supplemented these statements and, in reply to the interviewer, summarised the fundamental principles of the future Statute in two words: self-administration and proportionality. The Germans, who form 22 % of the population, will have access to 22 % of the positions in all fields of the State administration. And the other nationalities will have the same privileges in proportion to their numbers.

In the meantime this statute, which has almost become legendary, has been revised three times because the members of the Government could not agree, and Deputy Kundt had to state in the « Sudetendeutsche Rundschau » of June 3rd, in view of the constant jungling with the statute, that it was not yet ready. At the same time he added that a statute could not solve the necessary legal order in the State, i.e. the constitutional and legal reforms as demanded by the Karlsbad programme. As regards the bright idea of proportionality, Deputy Dr. Neuwirth stated that if it was thought the problem could be solved by a figure proportionate to the population, this was an error. The filling of 22 % of the administrative posts anywhere in the country with Sudeten Germans would not safeguard the territorial, economic, cultural and national future of the German national group. That group did not want to have dealings with the State through individual members, but as a legal body. The illusion of the national State and its people should be replaced by the idea of peoples and national groups with equal rights and the right to self-administration, that is to say, self-determination of their own common affairs and the right to an equal voice in the common affairs of others. In short a national order should be created on a different basis from that of Versailles and St. Germain which had been proved to be a danger not only for the State itself but also for European peace.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE AND ITS FOUNDATION

Documents of the Peace Conference

I. The 11 Memoranda submitted to the Peace Conference as the Basis for the Establishment of the State and the Incorporation of Foreign Territories and Peoples

It has recently been repeatedly stated in Czech circles, especially in connection with the eleven memoranda of the Czechoslovak Peace Delegation which were only made public at the end of 1937, that their representatives at the Peace Conference had little influence on the decisions of the «Big Four». Of these memoranda hitherto the text of only the third and eleventh had been published, dealing with the problem of the Germans in Bohemia and the claim for the reparation of war damage by the Czechoslovak Republic. In a series of articles in the «Prager Presse», the German organ of the Czechoslovak Government, a writer signing himself XY dealt on October 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th, 1937 with the German publication of the memoranda which had been acquired in the original French text by the «Kaiser-Wilhelm Institut für ausländisches Recht» of Berlin. They were published by the rapporteur of the Institute, Dr. Hermann Raschhofer together with the German translation (*Die tschechoslowakischen Denkschriften für die Friedenskonferenz 1919/1920*; Carl Heymanns Verlag, Berlin W. 8), in order to investigate the value under international law of these memoranda in view of the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic.

In the above mentioned series of articles in the «Prager Presse», the writer XY who, judging by the contents, must occupy a special position in Czechoslovak Government circles, made the main charge that matters which occurred eighteen years ago should no longer be stirred up.

The Czech memoranda, he says, were «politically adapted to the time»; a number of material mistakes had crept in at that time; they represented the political programme and must be regarded as political documents; moreover if these documents were compared with those of other States and nations, the great moderation and reasonableness of the Czechoslovak memoranda would be observed.

It must not be underestimated that such a confession is of particular value at the time when it is made. But it is in no case true that these memoranda were merely political documents. The memoirs of Dr. Benes «The Resurrection of the Nations» show that the present President of Czechoslovakia was himself the author of these memoranda. In order not to be taken by surprise by sudden decisions of the Great Powers, he began to prepare material for the Peace Conference. «I therefore rapidly composed, improvising and without data and literature, most of our memoranda in which I included all the peace claims. When our Peace Delegation arrived, I submitted them for its approval. Some of the memoranda were supplemented and others corrected by the members of the Delegation. When the Peace Conference suddenly asked the Delegations of the individual nations to present their wishes in writing. I was able on the next day to produce almost everything that was wanted. This preparedness bore fruit in the solution of our questions in the commissions of the Conference».

The memoranda are therefore the official demands of the Czechoslovak Delegation. To deal with them is not merely to rake up memories of the past, but rather to clear up the principles of the immediate present. Mr. XY may be right when he says that the decisions reached in Paris may have also been taken on other grounds on which Mr. Benes could have had no influence. «The historical fact

that ultimately" as Harold Nicolson, the British member of the Committee on Czech affairs, observes, "the Big Ten or the Big Five decided all important questions in camera and apparently on a quite fortuitous and irresponsible basis" is contested by no one. Even Mr. Balfour spoke of "ignoramus", of "three almighty, all-ignorant men who sat together and divided up entire continents". But it is also clear from Nicolson's notes to what extent the Czechoslovak representatives were the "enfants gâtés de l'Entente", and the minutes of the meeting of February 5th, 1919 shows not only at what length Mr. Benes spoke but also the complete identity in the arguments and information between his report and the memoranda. (Reproduced in David Hunter Miller: *My Diary at the Peace Conference*, Volume 14, page 211 et seq.)

While on the one hand Benes succeeded by his caution and skill in obtaining recognition for Czechoslovakia shortly before the armistice, his memoranda led to the Czechoslovak peace demands being practically accepted in February 1919, without regard to the Austrian note of December 13th, 1919. When it is added that it was only in May and June that the German-Austrian Peace Delegation was faced with detailed conditions, which they had simply to sign unreservedly, no one will be able to affirm that the decision regarding three and a half million Germans was taken on any other basis than that of the Czech memoranda. These memoranda are thus the foundations of a "justification" of the arbitrary annexation of German territories and peoples.

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In 1919, after the conditions of St. Germain became known, the Sudeten German people themselves applied to the Peace Conference and described their position in a memorandum. They were just as much entitled as the Czechs and Slovaks, the Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians, in view of their cultural standard and the number of their population, to claim State independence; their connection with their German brothers and sisters was however so profound that they abandoned this idea. But since they were Germans, their oppression was dictated.

"Because they were Germans"—this reason is not willingly accepted today. It is therefore a duty to tear aside the mesh of lies which, by veiling the great blame for the existing European dissension, is again imposed on world public opinion by anti-German propaganda. The memoranda, from which the following extracts are given, are documents showing the deepest hatred of Germany. If the authors of these memoranda attributed such hatred to events which occurred at the time of the great migration of nations it will undoubtedly be permissible eighteen years after they were written to bring them before those who hypocritically appeal to the principles of democracy and respect for the right of self-determination. This applies in particular to the new Czechoslovak State which has not yet agreed to reconcile itself with the Sudeten Germans as a party with equal rights. But the Czech people did not wish it. The logical result would be, in order to have peace in the State, to renounce those portions of the population that cannot be coerced. But, for strategical and other materialistic reasons,

the Czechs do not want to make this renunciation; these are reasons for which the right of self-determination of the nations has been unscrupulously violated. It is therefore possible to look in the memoranda for a reply to the question as to why bleeding wounds in Europe are left open in spite of the great dangers which they entail for all. When Wilson demanded respect for the national claims of the nations, he added prophetically that the right of self-determination was not a mere phrase, but a peremptory principle of action which statesmen could in future only neglect at their own risk. As the Czechoslovak Delegation at the Peace Conference counted on a decision to be taken on general political, economic and strategic grounds, they endeavoured in their memoranda to supply these particular grounds for such a decision, and therefore the argument of the "deadly enemy" and "arch enemy" runs like a red thread through these proposals. On reading the memoranda it becomes terribly clear in the first place how simple and ignorant the authors must have thought those who had to take great decisions on the basis of those statements and, in the second place, to what extent hatred and blindness decided the fate of the nations in 1919, so that it was unnecessary to take the trouble to allow logic to rule in the memoranda. In the name of the right of self-determination the Czechoslovak representatives demanded the destruction of century-old organic connections with a reference to "historical frontiers" of which the Czech people had their first experience in 1919. When the right of self-determination for the Czechs could not be proved even by exaggerated statistics, the memoranda went on with surprising indifference to adduce economic, strategic or historical grounds, and when even that was not convincing enough they spoke of the great "political mission" of the Czechs in the interest of the Allies whose aim it must be in future to exclude the Germans from European policy and to suppress their "urge for expansion" by a circle of Slavonic nations. This is not sheer romance, for we are taught by the remarks of French statesmen that such a front of national hatred was to be erected in Europe and its disastrous effects have not yet been overcome. The memoranda of the Czechoslovak Delegation are finally the documentary foundation of another dispute which has recently come to the fore. The Czechs have affirmed that the Czechoslovak Delegation in Paris did not promise that the new State would be founded as a kind of Switzerland. On this point we will furnish the necessary documentary material in a special section in this number.

Space prevents us from explaining our attitude in detail to the historical, geographical and statistical statements in the memoranda, although it would be of the greatest interest in clearing up the present discussions to publish these documents in extenso. For the purpose of our publication it may however suffice to publish the text of the conclusions which the authors have given briefly at the end of each memorandum and in various cases at the end of each section.

These "conclusions" furnished the construction according to which the grounds were subsequently adapted. We have, however, been obliged, in addition to these conclusions, in some cases to give extracts from the preceding matter, as we desired to show the tendencies which ultimately facilitated the decisions of a power policy.

In short, these memoranda may be said to form a kind of report on the motives of the foundation of the Czechoslovak State. They give indications of what their authors regarded as valid principles. At the same time they endeavour to determine politically the character and task of the Czech State in the midst of the European world of peoples and States, namely the alleged reparation of historical injustice, considerations of a strategical nature, the role of the Czechs as the protector of other Slav peoples, in short, definite political intentions which are to be found mainly in the fact

that Czechoslovakia must be regarded simply as a bulwark against Germanism.

* * *

The first memorandum bears the title: Czechoslovakia. Her history and civilisation. Her struggle and her work. Her importance in the world. It treats in detail of the general position of the Slavs in relationship to Germans and Romans and makes a comparison in particular of the characteristics of the Slavonic and Germanic races. Other chapters deal with the Czechoslovaks and their special position among the other Slavs in the middle ages and in the nineteenth century in view of their historical, cultural, economic and political development; on this basis the predominant mission of the Czechoslovaks in the history of the Slavs is argued, and the "idea of Slav solidarity" is advanced.

The conclusion reached is as follows:

In summing up all our remarks on the special physiognomy of the Czechoslovaks within the great Slavonic family and in the world, we may make the following statements:

1. *Thanks to their geographical position and historical circumstances, the Czechoslovaks have formed a group which stands at the head of the Slavonic nations in its historical development towards new forms of modern civilisation.*

2. *In modern and contemporary times they have as a nation reached the highest spiritual, social and economic development. Their national organism represents in the grouping and organisation of the social classes the most balanced body and that best suited to the conditions of modern life within the other Slavonic nations.*

3. *Their general position necessarily made them deadly enemies of the Germans who were their oppressors. The question whether they wished it or not did not need to be raised; they were enemies through the force of circumstances; it was their historical role. But since they were too weak, they were only able to appeal to the great principles of humanity as against their German oppressors, so that their philosophy and all their political doctrines are penetrated by a philosophical idealism without reservations and restrictions.*

4. *This position arose out of the initiative which they took in their movement for Slavonic solidarity.*

5. *Lastly, there is a final and very special point in the history of civilisation: all Slavonic nations have gone through a period of national rebirth. We have seen that the Czech rebirth was entirely different from that of the other Slavs. The other Slavs were simply oppressed. The Czechs were almost entirely exterminated; they have accomplished, as it were, the miracle of resurrection.*

It is comprehensible that this nation which has succeeded by its great struggle in all spheres of social life and especially by its spiritual and economic development in gaining the first place among all Slavonic nations, at present arises its voice to cry to the whole world that it has the right to political independence at the side of the other free nations. In this war it has done everything and suffered the worst persecutions from the Central Powers in order to merit that independence; the ultimate victory of the Entente has brought with it the complete triumph of the Czech cause.

As regards the alleged "extermination policy" practised by the Danube Monarchy, the chapter on the development of the Czechs before the War gives valuable, though unintentional, information. It reads as follows:

At the beginning of the present war, we represented a harmoniously constructed closed national formation; a strong peasant class formed, as it were, the backbone, a finely organised working class formed the limbs and was the expression of our purely democratic aspirations, a well-to-do and independent

middleclass was growing up and fought with all its might against the privileges of the Germans, a numerically strong and highly educated intellectual class represented the head. Educated in the German school, it was compelled to use German methods and German systems, but this was only a means to combat the Germans more effectively. We have solved a number of questions that are still outstanding with our Slavonic brothers, such as, for instance, the question of national education (there are practically no illiterates among the Czechs) and the Jewish question (which is of predominant importance with the Russians and Poles) etc. The Poles, moreover, have also achieved a great work, especially the Poles in the Posen district who in this respect resemble the Czechoslovaks in the method of their national work. The Slovenes are almost in the same position. The others have remain behindhand.

To sum up, we may say that the Czechoslovak national organisation is at present perfectly well balanced. Intellectually the nation is well educated, has more than 6000 Czech elementary schools, 110 secondary and higher schools, 39 commercial and industrial schools, 65 agricultural schools, art and music academies, two technical high schools and a university. Czech literature and art is flourishing, and the activity of the nation in this respect, even during the War, is astonishing.

In political respects the fate of the Dual Monarchy was decided more and more in Prague. During the War it was observable that Bohemia drew the other Slavs into open resistance against Austria-Hungary. If Bohemia today becomes independent it will undoubtedly be an exemplary State, since everything is prepared for this. It is admirably administered and in a more flourishing condition than Belgium was before the War. In economic respects the Czechs are developed to such an extent that they at present assume the first place among all the Slavs and are even victorious against the competition of German commerce and German industry. In the last twenty years this economic development of the Czechs has surprised the whole world. Thanks to their commercial firms and banking institutions they have penetrated into all the provinces of Austria and Hungary and even into the Balkans. This spiritual, political, economic and social rebirth of the Czech, in view of its rapidity and its complete success in less than a hundred years, is a unique example in history.

At the present time, therefore, we see the Czechs maintain their old position among their Slavonic brothers and continue their tradition which made them the advance guard of the great Slavonic family in the heart of Western Europe.

The second memorandum contains the territorial demands of the Czechoslovak Republic at the Peace Conference.

It reads :

The territorial demands of the Czechoslovak Republic relate to a number of very important points; these points must be cleared up in order to give an accurate idea of the Czechoslovak question in its full extent.

These problems, which include the entire Czechoslovak question, can be divided up as follows :

1. The question of the three main provinces of the old crown of Bohemia which were always Czech : Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.

2. Rectifications of the frontier of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia at the cost of Germany and Austria.

3. The question of Slovakia which was torn with violence from the Czechs several hundred years ago, was artificially separated from Bohemia and is now demanded back by the new Czechoslovak Republic on the grounds of the right of self-determination of the nations.

4. The problem of the Ruthenes of Hungary ; in view of the special position of this question we consider that the best solution would be their union with the Czechoslovak Republic.

5. The problem of the neighbourhood of the Czechoslovaks with the Yugoslavs and the necessity for the Czechoslovak Republic and the Yugoslav State to claim certain territories in which the majority of the population is German and Hungarian.

6. Internationalisation of the following routes :

(a) Elbe,

(b) Danube,

(c) Vistula,

(d) The Bratislava-Trieste railway and the Bratislava-Fiume railway,

(e) the Prague-Furth-Nuremberg-Strasbourg railway.

7. (a) The problem of the Czech population in Vienna, which represents almost a quarter of the inhabitants of the former capital of Austria, who cannot remain without protection in the hands of the Germans.

(b) The question of the Lausitz Wends, who are threatened with extermination by the Germans, and whose lot it is the sacred duty of the Czechoslovaks, as their nearest relatives, to care for.

The Danube frontier is a vital question for the Czechoslovak Republic. It cannot be the subject of any concession and it is impossible even to discuss the matter with the Magyars.

It is the only possible natural frontier between Hungary and Slovakia in these two districts. Any other frontier, in view of its inexactitude, would be a constant source of disputes, demands and provocations from one side or the other.

But—and this is essential—with this frontier the Czechoslovak Republic becomes a real Danube State. That has inestimable political and economic consequences. It places this State in a special position as regards Greater Roumania and Yugoslavia, not to mention Hungary and German-Austria. Without the Danube frontier the Czechoslovak State is deprived of a foundation that is indispensable for its future position in Central Europe, and of the power which it needs in order to protect itself (with all respect for the principles of justice and right) politically and economically against the Germans and Magyars and even against its other neighbours. The Danube is for the Czechoslovak State one of the pillars that support its entire political and economic structure.

Access to the Danube at one point or another cannot satisfy it. The Czechoslovak State must be really a Danube State. This will form its vital power and provide its real importance against the east, just as the mountainous frontiers of Bohemia provide its real physiognomy in the west against Germany.

I will be seen that moderation was not the predominant characteristic. The territorial claims went considerably further than what was ultimately accorded.

The right to Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia was based on settlements in ancient times and construed into a "sacred demand". But even this does not suffice; the memorandum continues :

If we take as the basis of our territorial claims the historical frontiers of our three provinces Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, this does not preclude the possibility of adding to this territory the territories adjoining these provinces in which a Czechoslovak population resides.

In fact this is the case in four territories : two in Prussian Silesia and the two others in Lower Austria. The Czechoslovak Republic therefore demands their annexation. These claims are based on the principle of nationality.

The grounds for the claim to the incorporation of Slovakia are simply stated to be as follows :

1. The Czechoslovaks demand the Slovak territory, which

will comprise certain areas partly inhabited by Magyar population.

2. They base this solution on statistical grounds, which prove that their own losses in Magyar territory will for the most part be thus made good.

3. The territory which they demand forms a geographical unit, and it is in particular the Danube frontier which is indispensable for the Czechoslovaks and will place the Czechoslovak State in a political and economic position that will enable it to fulfil its true role in Central Europe.

4. At bottom a frontier such as that demanded by the Czechoslovaks implies nothing more than the application of the same principle of reparation that has been applied to the Germans.

It makes a particularly grotesque impression to demand a minority statute for the Czechs in the city of Vienna and the union or complete autonomy of the scattered population of "Lausitz Wends" in Saxony and Prussia, amounting according to the memorandum to 160,000, "the remains of a Slavonic race which are nearest the Czechs in civilisation and language".

The third memorandum, "The Problem of the Germans in Bohemia", deals with the problem of the Sudeten Germans, which has today become of such importance. We do not need to enter into the statistical tricks employed with a view to proving that the number of the Germans was from 800,000 to 1,000,000 less than was commonly accepted. The figure is known today as it was then, and the object was to make the problem appear less important than it was in reality. The same object was pursued by the following arguments:

The German population along the frontiers of Bohemia is divided into three different geographical groups which have no adequate connections and no common economic interests.

The three groups cannot in view of their geographical position form administratively an autonomous province. For the same reasons they cannot be reunited with German-Austria. If they did not remain a part of Bohemia they would have to be joined up with Germany. This solution would, however, entail very serious disadvantages, and various reasons (economic, strategic, political and even democratic reasons) can be advanced which are all in favour of these so-called German territories remaining with the Czechoslovak Republic.

Finally, in order to throw dust in the eyes of the peace makers who were entirely ignorant of these geographical and ethnographical conditions, some quotations from Prague newspapers together with some statements by Czech workmen were put forward as the opinion of the Germans of Bohemia regarding the Czechoslovak State, and these one-sided documents led up to the following conclusions which have today been entirely refuted:

1. that the Germans of Bohemia are not a united and organised element aiming at a definite object;

2. that they have no leaders in whom the masses have confidence, and that there is no popular movement of real strength in Bohemia which is entitled to claim the legal principle of self-determination of its fate;

3. that, on the contrary, those of the Germans of Bohemia who are capable of giving clear expression to a political idea state that economic interests impel the Germans of Bohemia to prefer the Czechoslovak State to a Greater Germany and that the union of Bohemia with Germany is an illusion.

The next three chapters, however, certainly do not contain "genuine democratic principles", but

very material considerations. In this connection they let the cat out of the bag, for they state briefly and bluntly that it is purely economic, strategical and political grounds which make the union of the Sudeten Germans with Czechoslovakia an absolute necessity.

The conclusions state:

Economic grounds oppose a separation of the so-called German territories of Bohemia from Bohemia; if such a separation were made, 1. the economic life of the Czechoslovak State would suffer very deeply and Czechoslovakia would be in danger of becoming an outpost of Germany, and 2. these German districts would be economically ruined.

The natural frontiers which separate Bohemia from Germany are essential to Bohemia for strategical reasons. If these districts are separated from Bohemia, she will be entirely exposed to the greed of the Germans and a new field of activity will be prepared for the economic and political imperialism of the Germans.

It must also be borne in mind that the Germans in Bohemia are only colonists or the descendants of colonists.

Here also as in the case of the Magyars, the pill was to be gilded for the peace makers in Paris, and the following promises were made to them regarding the future fate of the Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic:

It is essential to have a clear knowledge as to how the Germans are treated in the Czechoslovak State. The Czechoslovak Republic is not only prepared to accept an international legal settlement which may be reached by the Peace Conference in favour of minorities, but is further prepared to go beyond such a settlement and to give the Germans all rights to which they are entitled.

The Czechoslovak Republic will be an absolutely democratic State; all elections will take place by general, direct and equal suffrage; all offices will be open to all citizens; the language of the minorities will be everywhere admitted; the right to have their own schools, judges and courts of justice will never be denied to any minority. It must be added that the Czechs, although they are aware that the Germans were granted excessive privileges under the old régime, are in no way thinking of suppressing, for instance, the schools, universities and technical high schools of the Germans, which were moreover little attended before the War.

To sum up, the Germans would have the same rights in Bohemia as the Czechoslovaks. German would be the second national language, and no measure of oppression whatever would be used against the German population. The régime would be similar to that of Switzerland.

This régime will be introduced into Bohemia, not only because the Czechs have always had a deep feeling for democracy, right and justice and loyally grant these rights even to their opponents, but also because they are of opinion that this solution which is favourable to the Germans is also favourable to the political interests of their own country and their own race.

In the 19th century they have retained much practical, and in particular much political sense. They are far too much "realists" and have too much commonsense in order not to see that violence and injustice were the causes of the downfall of Austria-Hungary and that a similar policy could only harm their own State and their race.

Conclusion: All the traditions of the Czechoslovaks admit of the conclusion that the new Republic will in no way oppress the Germans, but that the latter will enjoy a regime of freedom and justice.

Particular interest attaches to the view of the nationality principle which is summarised in the conclusion to the entire memorandum:

We have brought forward many arguments against the separation of the Germans of Bohemia from the Czechoslovak Republic. In favour of the opposite thesis we can only advance a single argument, namely the nationality principle applied in its ultimate consequences, if the language is taken as a criterion.

We respect the nationality principle, but we do not think it should be applied in cases where it threatens the independence of another nation. Then sacrifices must be made in favour of those who merit them and who offer adequate guarantees for their honour and love of peace, especially in a case such as that of Czechoslovakia and the Germans.

This tendency in favour of the Czech claims again appears in the fourth memorandum. It deals with the Polish claims to the Silesian district of Teschen which in view of its award to Czechoslovakia has for years led and still continues to lead to constant friction between that country and Poland. The same arguments are brought to bear against Poland as against Germany with a view to incorporating this district in spite of the Polish population being twice as great as the Czech.

As the nationality principle would have clearly decided in favour of Poland, the memorandum overcomes the objections felt by the Czechs themselves with the "consciousness that there is a higher justice than the mechanical application of a principle". There is no difficulty in finding pretexts to act contrary to the nationality principle in the interest of a "higher justice" in order to remove a people and territory from community with their own race and soil.

In the fifth memorandum the question of Slovakia is again dealt with in detail, and the Czechs put themselves forward as the guardians of the "Slovak branch of the race", make territorial demands for it and base them on their own reasons. The entire memorandum is nothing more than an accusation of the rule of the Magyars and their oppression of the Slovaks. But it does not hesitate to claim that over a million Magyars should be placed under the rule of the Czechoslovak State; as a certain consolation for the peace makers of Paris and in order to make them more inclined to grant this demand, the following promise is made:

that the régime which we should apply to the national minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic is a régime of the very greatest freedom; all rights which safeguard the free development of every nationality would be granted to the Magyars as to the Germans. Moreover the essential character of the Czechoslovak State will be that of a genuine incarnation of modern democracy.

The intentions voiced in the second memorandum regarding a Czech-Yugoslav corridor, the "strongest positive argument" for which is expressly stated to be the separation of the German and Magyar peoples, show clearly the hypocritical character of such promises. It is hardly compatible with the "genuine incarnation of modern democracy" to assume the mission of dividing and separating races and nations which are friendlier to each other than one would like.

« Je vous en prie, n'en parlez pas. C'est une bêtise », burst out Harold Nicolson, as he himself writes, when Benes and Kramarsch tried on February 27th, 1919, to convince him by innumerable maps of the value of this corridor. It was finally

turned down at the Peace Conference. But this attempt remains as documentary proof of the sovereign disregard of the nationality and minority rights of five hundred thousand Germans and Magyars, although even the memorandum speaks of a "dangerous" solution which is "artificial and indefensible from the military point of view". But by putting forward the bogey of a "pan-German policy of aggression and expansion" and by pretending that a European problem was involved, an appeal was made, on the grounds that "the application of the nationality principle will never be complete", to a "higher interest which categorically demands the sacrifice of a certain number of inhabitants". It need only be added that the other territorial claims, like the attempt to form a corridor, could only be harmonised with the "higher interests" which necessarily did not concern a young State so much as the Great Powers; this higher interest was thus reduced to what certain democracies have been very successful in disguising, namely the aims of their power policy. It may be some consolation at present to Europe that in the meantime economic reason has come into its own, and Yugoslavia in particular will now be glad that the Czech proposal to construct a corridor to her territory was not put into effect.

The idea of the internationalisation of the means of communication and the definite demands set forth in the memoranda with this object in view have been shattered. These demands, as is plainly pointed out, aimed at "attacking Germany at her most vulnerable point". Here again the authors of the memoranda appear in the rôle of the great European strategists who, in disregard for natural economic conditions, have only one object in view, namely the military domination of Central Europe with the help of France and her allies; for this purpose the military routes, the most important railways and water connections are valued according to their strategical importance, in order to cut of the old consolidated railway lines and connections and to propose new ones with the object of developing the encirclement of Germany.

In the sixth memorandum also we have the picture of contradictory arguments. Here the reference is to "only" 537,962 Ruthenes. What is to be done with them? The memorandum has the most original solution. They are really Russians. According to their geographical situation they are near East Galicia and Hungary. Would mankind be favourable to their fate being "Russia"? Should they be allotted to Poland? Then they would share the fate of their Galician brothers. Their "fate" would be gloomy in this case. Should they be given to Hungary? Mankind would not admit of this, for "the Magyars have oppressed all other races for centuries".

"There is a last solution: the union of the Ruthenes with the Czechoslovak Republic as an autonomous province would appear to be the best solution in the circumstances."

It must of course be admitted that the Ruthenes expressed the wish to be joined up to Galicia, but that is only a "current", for as the memorandum states, the majority of the people are indifferent.

On May 8th, 1919, the Ruthenes, after being prepared by Masaryk, entered the Czechoslovak State as an "autonomous territory".

The claim of the "Lausitz Wends" is again dealt with in the seventh memorandum, and the following conclusion is reached:

They also appeal to President Wilson's principles. They base their claims not only on historical grounds. They also claim the natural right of self-determination on the basis of

Article 4 of President Wilson's principles of February 12th, 1918.

1. *The Lausitz Wends, the last remains of a great race, have today arisen in order to bring their national and political claims before the Peace Conference.*

2. *They regard their case as one of the problems which the Conference must settle in order to fulfil the high moral duty which the world expects of it and which it has set itself; the problem of the Lausitz Wends is one of those which will show to what extent Germany will be compelled to carry out the plan of a new Europe and new humanity.*

3. *They appeal in their favour to the great martyrdom which they have suffered for centuries, to historical and ethnographical reasons and the right of self-determination of the nations.*

4. *The Czechoslovaks, as their nearest brothers, are morally compelled to bring their case before the Conference, and to support and defend them. That is their moral, and at the same time, political duty, and they beg the Conference to examine the problem with them and to provide a just, equitable and exact solution.*

This introduces into the predominant position of the nationality principle a new consideration according to which it may be the legal and political duty of a people not only to take action for the fate of its compatriots not belonging to the State and living outside the settlement district, but also to constitute itself the protector of certain political aspirations of related national groups.

With the same unconcern, the eighth memorandum demands the cession of a part of Prussian Upper Silesia, especially on economic grounds, because the Czechoslovak State could in future obtain its supplies of coal from this district.

The ninth memorandum, "The Problem of the Glatz territory", must be regarded as a remarkable document for the purely military considerations in the Czechoslovak claims to territory. In spite of the admission that "this district is in its majority incontestably German", and that "170,000 Germans" live there, the entire Glatz district was demanded.

The Czech attempt to lay hands on Glatz is part of the imperialistic dreams of its authors, and since no Czech considerations could make it credible, there is nothing more characteristic than the statement in the third paragraph of the conclusions, that "the Czechoslovak State requests the Peace Conference to examine with it what possibility would best serve the interests of the allies and of Europe". Thus they did not dare to mention Czechoslovak interests, but the interests of the allies. Here also it is obvious that the authors of the memoranda so worded them as to obtain the sympathies of the responsible statesmen at the Peace Conference.

The long enumeration of territorial claims is finally concluded in the tenth memorandum by a list of frontier rectifications desirable mainly for strategical and economic reasons; the Czechoslovak delegation expresses its willingness to concede certain territories to the neighbours concerned, i.e. Austria, Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria, but no details are given.

The eleventh and last memorandum on the claim for compensation for war damage addresses a last appeal to the Allies and points out to them the extent to which the Czechoslovak nation, by the revolt of the soldiers which destroyed the striking power of

the Austro-Hungarian army, and by the undermining work of the nation, helped the Allies to gain the victory.

1. *The Czech soldiers mutinied in masses and, as everyone is aware, from the very beginning of the War repeatedly went over with their arms and equipment to the ranks of the Allies in order to enter the army of the Entente and to fight against Germany and Austria-Hungary.*

2. *The population began to sabotage the whole economic and political life, all warlike operations and all military preparations. They systematically sabotaged all the supply measures and destroyed military works, machinery, military buildings, munition dumps and large ammunition factories. It is unnecessary to give striking examples in order to prove to what extent the spirit of sacrifice went. Sabotage was deliberately carried on in agriculture and industry in order to prevent products from reaching Austria-Hungary and Germany.*

3. *They demoralised the soldiers. Our banks organised a boycott of Austro-Hungarian securities and war loans.*

4. *The entire nation was at one; the entire nation worked quietly and silently from the beginning of the War until the final collapse.*

The Czech people, feeling themselves to be independent and enemies of the Central Powers, started work and used every means in their power to combat the Central Powers:

1. *Mass desertion of the soldiers.*

2. *Systematic sabotage of political, economic and financial life, systematic sabotage of the military works and war organisation.*

3. *Systematic demoralisation of the troops and populations.*

4. *Complete solidarity of the nation, of which no part went with the Central Powers.*

While the treason to the Dual Monarchy is thereby glorified, the counter-measures taken by the Monarchy in its struggle for existence, are naturally criticised in the sharpest terms. The measures taken against this highly treasonous attitude are mentioned in the conclusions with incomprehensible astonishment:

1. *The Czechoslovak provinces are districts under Austro-Hungarian occupation.*

2. *A terrorist rule was imposed on the Czechoslovak population and they were subject to terrible persecutions.*

3. *Requisition were made similar to those when a country is attacked, and we were deprived of:*

(a) *All provisions;*

(b) *All cattle;*

(c) *All raw materials, especially metals;*

(d) *All means of communication; at the same time the population were obliged to accept milliards of devalued bank notes, to subscribe to loans which are at present obviously valueless.*

Then comes the great appeal:

Our case is considerably strengthened by everything we have undertaken in the allied countries in order that the Central Powers might be destroyed as rapidly as possible.

We decided from the first days of the War to go with the Allies. Even at the beginning of August 1914, the present President of the Czechoslovak Republic M. Masaryk and the present Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Benes, with many of their friends, founded a powerful organisation against Austria-Hungary, which began work without delay. First the politicians were brought together, and then we went abroad in order to undertake the work of military organisation.

Everybody knows what the result was.

1. Apart from their struggle for freedom, the Czechoslovaks attempted effectively to support the Allies in their terrible struggle against Germany.

(a) They set up three armies, in France, in Italy and in Russia, which took effective part in the fight and gained general admiration.

(b) In particular they retained Siberia under the influence of the Allies and thus formed a basis for the restoration of Russia.

(c) They rendered possible the blockade of Germany by the protection of these territories.

2. Everybody today recognises these services and is clear as to the result of our actions. The leaders of the allied nations have on several occasions recognised these services.

3. On the day of the final settlement of everything that was done during the War, we refer to these words in support of our claim.

II. The Struggle for the International Legal and Political Establishment of the Czechoslovak State before and during the Paris Conference

The appeal was not in vain: The line pursued by Czechoslovak propaganda during the War, which consisted in the destruction of the Monarchy and the weakening of Germany, was also maintained in innumerable personal memoranda by Masaryk and Benes. In 1919 the decision did not go to justice but to hatred, not to the right of self-determination but to warlike plans. Even before the end of the War, the Czechoslovaks declared their willingness to assume the mission of the struggle against Germanism. Benes' article "Detruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie", with a map showing the war aims, which was prohibited even by the French censorship, showed this general line. The destruction of German soil and the tearing away of German populations from the mother country were the aim of the pamphlet "Our State and World Peace" by the Czech General Staff officer Hanus Kuffner. He demanded the division of the entire German soil in the East far beyond the frontiers of Bohemia, the extension of the three Slavonic States to the points from which German eastern settlements started in the middle ages. His more immediate aim was to bring the southern, western and northern slopes of the Bohemian-Moravian frontier into the hands of Czechoslovakia. The same ideas are reflected in the memoranda of the Czechoslovak Peace Delegation (Lausitz Wends).

"The nationality principle," writes Benes in truly Machiavellian fashion, "is applied in its main lines, while it naturally takes political and strategical necessities into account."

* * *

At the very beginning of the War, Masaryk, the President of the Czech group in the Austrian Parliament, left Prague in order to carry on propaganda for the independence of the Czechs and Slovaks in the allied countries. He was followed by Dr. Benes, at that time leader of the secret organisation known by the name of "Maffia". Its main activity may be summarised as follows:

1. Propaganda among the allies for the liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks from Austrian rule by an appeal to the right of self-determination of the nations.

2. To win over and organise the Czechs and Slovaks living outside the Central Powers for this ideal, especially those in Russia and the United States.

3. To encourage and organise the desire for independence among the Czechs in Bohemia by secret contact with the leaders in that territory.

4. To organise the hundred thousand or more national Czechs and Slovaks, who lived abroad as deserters and war prisoners, into a Czechoslovak army.

5. The creation in Paris of a National Council in order to bring about the recognition of this Council as a belligerent Power.

On November 3rd, 1916 Briand received Masaryk in Paris and the latter handed to him a "programme for the partition of the Danube Monarchy". On January 12th, 1917 the Czechs were for the first time mentioned in an official document, namely in the allied reply to Wilson's peace proposal at the end of December 1916. In this statement, the liberation of the Italians, Serbs, Roumanians and Czechoslovaks from foreign rule was demanded.

The development desired by Paris then took place rapidly. On August 17th, 1917 an agreement was concluded by the Czech National Council with the French Government for the formation of a Czech army (consisting of prisoners and deserters). This was followed on December 16th, 1917 by a decree of Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, regarding the setting up of a Czech army in France.

On December 16th, 1937, when the twentieth anniversary of the signature of this decree was celebrated at Prague in the presence of the French Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, General Husak made a speech in which he gave the number of these so-called legionaries: "It is generally little known that there were 60,109 volunteers in the Russian legions, 9368 in the French, 19,211 in the Italian, 1365 in the Serbian, making a total of 90,063. In the British army there were 1102 and in the American army 42,404 soldiers of Czechoslovak origin".

On April 21st, 1918, by means of a similar Czecho-Italian agreement, it was decided to form a Czech army in Italy, which was set up on June 30th, 1918. The anniversary of this treaty could not be celebrated to the same extent on account of the lack of Italian participation. A reference was merely made to it in an army order by President Benes on April 21st, 1938, in which a parallel was drawn between the Czech risorgimento and the Italian; the latter was however of a different kind and had a different course and did not lead to the annexation of half a dozen foreign nationalities.

After Lord Robert Cecil, on behalf of the British Foreign Secretary, had recognised the right of the Czech nation to complete independence on May 22nd, 1918, the Czech National Council was first recognised by Mr. Balfour himself on June 3rd, 1918 as the "supreme organ of the Czechoslovak movement in the allied countries" and subsequently, on June 29th, 1918 by M. Pichon, French Foreign Minister as the "first foundation of a future Czechoslovak Government". On August 9th Mr. Balfour declared his agreement with this step, and a similar declaration was made by Italy on October 3rd. Moreover the French Government in its note confirmed the present frontiers for the Czechs.

"True to the principles of respect for the nations and the liberation of oppressed countries, the Government of the Republic declares the claims of the Czechoslovak nation to be justified and well-founded and will endeavour as far as possible at the proper time to vindicate their wishes for independence in the historical frontiers of their territories which will ultimately be liberated from the oppressive yoke of Austria-Hungary."

France thus bound herself in the impending peace negotiations to take action for the creation of a Bohemian State within its historical frontiers, i.e. the whole of Bohemia, Moravia and the Austrian parts of Silesia. France kept this promise to the letter.

The United States, however, went a step further than the western Powers. They recognised the Czech National Council *de facto* as an independent Government. The note on this subject of September 2nd, 1918 makes the following statement:

"Since the Czechoslovaks, in support of their aspirations towards independence in this War, have entrusted the sovereign political power to the Czechoslovak National Council, the Government of the United States recognises that a state of war exists between the Czechoslovaks thus organised and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. It also recognises the Czechoslovak National Council as a *de facto* belligerent Government.

The Government of the United States further declares that it is prepared to enter into relations with the Government thus recognised *de facto* for the purpose of carrying on the war against the common enemy, the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires."

The propaganda carried on by Masaryk in the United States and by Benes, the Secretary General of the Czech National Council in Paris, was thus crowned with complete success. Masaryk was successful in particular in gaining Wilson and Clemenceau for his ideas.

After the *de facto* recognition by the United States, i.e. from September 2nd, 1918, the Czech National Council appointed itself the "Government of the Czechoslovak Nation" with its seat in Paris.

The creation of the Czech State as such took place, at first formally, on October 28th, 1918, after the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Andrassy had stated in a note to President Wilson that he agreed with Wilson's intention that the nations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy should themselves decide their fate. The existing National Committee in Prague took over the administration of the new State.

The most important provisions of the Law on the creation of the Czechoslovak State are worded as follows:

"The independent Czechoslovak State has come into existence . . . The National Committee, as the executor of State sovereignty, issues the following decree in the name of the Czechoslovak nation:

Art. 1. The State form of the Czechoslovak State will be decided by the National Assembly in agreement with the Czech National Council in Paris. The National Committee is the organ of the united will of the nation and the executor of State sovereignty."

(Art. 2 to 5 provide in detail that the provincial and Imperial laws remain in force.)

The National Committee was extended on December 13th, 1918 together with the "provisional constitution" to form a National Assembly. Neither organ was, however, elected on the basis of the "united will of the nation". For the National Assembly was solely an extension of the National Committee, so that the Czech and Slovak parties appointed new represen-

tatives to the National Assembly. The National Assembly, consisting of 270 members, Czechs and Slovaks, on February 29th, 1920, decided upon the Czechoslovak Constitution which is still in force.

After the Czech State was created on paper on October 28th, the struggle began regarding its territorial structure. This struggle was carried on firstly with diplomatic means by Benes and the Paris Minister Osuski before the opening of the peace negotiations, especially in the period from November 1918 to February 5th, 1919, and secondly by armed force. In November 1918 the Czechs fought with the Hungarians for the possession of Slovenia, and an agreement regarding the frontier demarcation was even reached between Slovaks and Hungarians on December 5th, 1918; this agreement was negotiated by Dr. Hodza, the present Prime Minister, who was then delegate of the new Czechoslovak Government at Budapest. This draft agreement was however immediately rejected by the Czechoslovak representatives in Paris on grounds of "better knowledge and more powerful assurances", and in view of these assurances and the material support received the Czechoslovaks conquered the whole of Slovak territory including Hungarian districts which had been represented to be "historical territories". An attempt by Hungary to reconquer them in May 1919 was unsuccessful. On June 12th the "Big Four" fixed the present frontiers, and at the end of June under the leadership of the French General Pellé these territories which contained a pure Hungarian population were conquered for the new State.

The same procedure was adopted against the German districts which had already carried out their act of union to German-Austria. The protest by German-Austria on December 3rd, 1918, with the proposal that this conquest should be submitted to a neutral arbitral tribunal, was rejected by Prague. The elections subsequently fixed by the Austrian National Assembly for March 4th were prevented by the occupation of the German districts and on May 13th, 1919, the "Big Five" in Paris recognised the annexation of the Sudeten territories.

* * *

How did this annexation take place in Paris? On October 15th, 1918 the French Government recognised Czechoslovakia as an "allied nation" and the Czechoslovak National Council as the "provisional Government" of the new State; the other allies also recognised the Government, England on September 3rd, America on October 18th and Italy on October 24th. It was at this moment that the Czechoslovaks abandoned their former demands which had been vague and cautious and brought forward their real intentions. This was done at a time when there was no longer any doubt as to the victory of the allies and the flush of victory knew no reasonable bounds. On November 4th, 1918, Dr. Benes handed in a note demanding the "occupation of strategic points" particularly in the territories bordering on Germany.

Dr. Benes' next diplomatic step was to demand the Sudeten German territories and the district of North Hungary which is ethnographically difficult to define. Dr. Benes hoped to succeed in this step with the allies by means of undecided statements put forward, however, "without reservations". Only one factor was uncertain: the development of eastern conditions. This uncertainty is clear from advice to the new Prague Government on November 5th, 1918: "Avoid disturbances and bloodshed in the German districts. It is in our interest that no news reaches here to the effect that these districts are organising themselves too independently and are absolutely irreconcilable with us. Send us

news and proofs that representatives of labour, industry and the peasants have expressed the wish to remain with us."

M. Benes was well aware how determined and irreconcilable the German population was towards the Czech attempts in spite of the collapse of the old Monarchy and in spite of the Czech legionaries. The Prague Prime Minister, Dr. Kramarsch, reported to Benes on November 15th, 1918 that "the question of German Bohemia is very acute . . . Our Germans already regard themselves as part of the German Republic".

The prevailing view in Paris regarding the frontier question is reflected in a letter from Dr. Benes to Dr. Kramarsch on November 27th: "I beg you to restrict relations with the Magyars and Germans as much as possible. Formally and officially you should not deal with them at all . . . We are recognised by the world; they are not. And the most important point is: they will not be recognised. I beg to inform you that there will be no peace negotiations with them. They will merely be informed of the peace. Any negotiations by us with Karolyi, the Hungarian President, only strengthen his position . . . I am working energetically in this direction and base myself on the fact that we are recognised and they are not . . . Nothing whatever has been said, and nothing will be said, about the Germans in Bohemia. On that you can rest assured. But that is extremely confidential." In his letter of November 28th, 1918 he wrote: "It is already certain that the Magyars and Austrian Germans at the Conference will not be let loose against us", and in his letter of November 29th, 1918: "I talked today with Pichon. He advises us for our own sake to maintain the standpoint (of not negotiating). It is therefore necessary to put an end to any official negotiations with the Germans and Magyars, on the one hand not to condescend to them and on the other hand not to attach any importance to them". On December 10th,

1918 asks Prague to have a few more days patience in the question of the Germans in Bohemia. He is certain of obtaining a favourable decision. Masaryk, he says, would also clear up the position.

This clearing up of the position took place as follows. The German-Austrian Government, in a note of December 13th, 1918 sent to the Allies through the Swiss Legation in Paris, demanded a plebiscite in the German Sudeten districts. Pichon declined this proposal and on December 21st Masaryk read his first message as President in Prague, in which he coined the expression "German immigrants and colonists".

The next act was the military occupation and the simultaneous agreements with General Franchet d'Esperay, in which France accepted the Czech proposals for a "strategical extension of Czechoslovakia", all the more because Dr. Benes explained that "it was not possible that General Franchet's armistice should grant an enemy State the right to allied territory". Dr. Benes stated with satisfaction in his book "The Resurrection of the Nations" that "it was proved by documentary evidence how important it was to have attained the recognition of the independence and of the Government before the collapse".

The occupation of the German Sudeten districts was an annexation against the will of their inhabitants. The jubilee publication of the Czechoslovak Parliament in 1928 admits this occupation. "The Government had no other course than to take decisive steps against the resistance of Czechoslovak citizens of German race with a view to safeguarding the Czechoslovak frontiers which were absolutely essential for its existence and thus preventing two Governments—the Czechoslovak and the National German—from struggling for the organisation of the administration in certain parts of the Czechoslovak Republic.

III. Vain Warnings and Protests — Official Refutation of the Memoranda

(See also the documents in No 13/1938 of this Journal on the Anschluss of German Austria, pp. 179-187.)

We have seen that the only documentary material used by the Peace Conference was that supplied by the Czechoslovak Peace Delegation. The heads of that delegation, so to speak, bombarded the Allies with maps. There is a characteristic note by Nicolson on the conversation which he had with Benes and Kramarsch on February 27th, 1919: "Benes has a mass of charts drawn for the use of children or the Conseil des Dix. I am exhausted and worn out. I am losing my nerve. 'Je vous en prie', I cry, 'n'en parlez pas. C'est une bêtise.'"

From Benes' memoirs and also from the works of Hunter Miller and Charles Seymour, it is clear that the Czechoslovak representatives constantly took the greatest care to prevent any gap in the procedure of the Conference which would allow those to speak who must have been mainly concerned with such a division of countries and peoples. In this the cautious representatives of Czechoslovakia were entirely successful. It was only in May 1919 that the German-Austrian Peace Delegation learned for the first time the extent of the decisions taken by the Allies in secret meetings, in spite of the knowledge that even on March 4th, 1919 the Sudeten German people had given heroic proof of their unanimous adherence to Germanism in the face of Czech and French machine guns and had demanded union with German-Austria. It is rare in history

that a people in times of the utmost social distress, after an exhausting four-year war and in the face of the collapse of a great State, has fought so fearlessly for union with the mother country. The protest made by this people on March 5th, 1919 is not only a proof of ideal national community, but is evidence of the manner in which international law was mercilessly and unscrupulously trodden underfoot by the allied and associated States.

The warnings and protests of the German Moravians, the German Bohemians and the Sudeten Germans, as expressed in the declarations of October 30th, 1918 and January 23rd, 1919, remained the historical evidence of the brutality of the Paris decisions. In addition they make the responsibility of the allied and associated Powers still heavier since, in spite of the knowledge of these representations, decisions were taken under which Europe has constantly had to suffer for two decades. The German groups, who had no knowledge of the Czechoslovak memoranda at that time, not only took up a position to the peace conditions but at the same time refuted the historical, ethnographical and economic statements made in those memoranda. These representations bear the stamp of truth, particularly because they had to be drawn up with the necessary regard for the mentality of the victors and could only maintain what was really unattackable and incontestable.

Extract from the Speech by Dr. Bauer, German-Austrian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the 21st Meeting of the Constituent National Assembly for German-Austria on June 7th, 1919

The Allied and Associated Powers are creating a Czechoslovak State which will contain, in addition to 6 ½ million Czechs, 3 ½ million Germans who will from the very first day resist the hated foreign rule; it will also contain two million Slovaks who, in spite of their close relationship with the Czechs, have their own language, have no historical community with Bohemia and Moravia and have a different social structure and a different cultural tradition from the Czechs. In addition to the Germans and the Slovaks, the Czech State will have nearly three-quarters of a million Magyars, half a million Ukrainians and at least 100,000 Poles. Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, Poles and Ukrainians—is this not a new Austria that is arising under the Czech flag, a new nationality State in which six nations, filled with fierce hatred to each other will be brought together and will be hindered in their entire economic, social and cultural development by the national hatred and national struggle nourished by compulsory rule and poisoning the whole of public life?

The old nationality State has collapsed although everything that is old is regarded as sacred; will the new nationality State, an artificial formation of a diplomacy based on a policy of power, be able to survive without economic community, geographic unity or common history? The old nationality State by its collapse has brought the most terrible consequences to the entire world; will the new nationality State, when it is finally shattered by the urge for freedom of the peoples, be able to collapse without setting the whole world aflame?

An attempt is made to console us by stating that the Czechoslovak Republic may become a new Switzerland in which six nations would live together in freedom and peace.

Switzerland arose out of a common struggle for freedom and not out of the compulsory dictate of a victor who subjects the peoples to foreign rule against their will. Switzerland is a voluntary confederation, not a compulsory union in which the peoples have been forced together and will be kept together by the sword of the victor.

The bloodstained 4th of March was not a Sempach or a Murten. The nationality State which was founded by force can only maintain itself by force; it must come into conflict with the urge for freedom of the peoples; its mere existence must be a source of constant danger for the peace and freedom of the nations of the whole world, just as was the existence of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

We do not envy the Czechs and Slovaks their State independence. But I am convinced that the right of the Czechoslovak nation to an independent State does not extend beyond its own closed linguistic area, and that it is not only a national interest of the German nation but a truly international interest, an interest of the peace and freedom of all the nations of Europe, that the Czechoslovak State should be limited to the settlement territory of the Czechoslovak people.

If it were limited in this way, the Czechoslovak Republic would have every prospect of the happiest economic and cultural development and could lead a free and peaceful life without endangering the freedom of other peoples. But if German Bohemia and the Sudetenland are handed over to the Czechoslovak Republic, not only will 3 ½ million Germans be deprived of their right of self-determination, not only will German Austria lose nearly all her coal mines and nearly all her textile, glass and porcelain industry, not only will our productive forces, our national capital, our economic capacity and

our taxation capacity be reduced by more than half, but at the same time a State will be created in the midst of Europe which will be a scene of the fiercest national struggle, a seat of German, Hungarian and Polish irredentism, a source of permanent enmity between two neighbouring peoples and a permanent danger for peace. We are powerless to prevent this; but at the eleventh hour we again give a warning. There exists an international solidarity of the nations; the fate of Poland and the history of Serbia have shown that the violation of a nation is the ultimate cause of the sanguinary fate of all nations.

The reason given for tearing away German Bohemia and the Sudetenland from German Austria is the geographical position of these territories. But this reason certainly does not apply to the German districts of Bohemia and Moravia which directly adjoin Lower and Upper Austria and form a closed linguistic territory with Lower and Upper Austria and the Alp territories. The cession of these territories to Czechoslovakia cannot be justified by geographical, ethnographical or economic arguments; only one argument can be advanced in favour of this demand, i.e. the historical argument, the argument of the historical frontiers. But historical frontiers are only considered to be immovable when they are in favour of the Czechoslovaks and against us.

No respect is paid by the draft peace treaty of the Associated Powers to our historical frontiers.

At the same time we doubt whether the Allied Powers are aware how badly hit we are by such a frontier demarcation.

Note from the German-Austrian Peace Delegation regarding German Bohemia and Sudetenland.

(Report by the German-Austrian Peace Delegation.)

Delegation of the

Republic of German Austria

No. 304

St. Germain-en-Laye

June 15th, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency herewith a Memorandum addressed to the Peace Conference and drawn up by the representatives of the German parts of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia, with a view to prove the injustice with which 3 ½ millions of German Austrians are threatened by the Conditions of Peace presented to German Austria.

In view of the extraordinary importance of settling satisfactorily who is to exercise public authorities in the mining basin of Austrian Silesia, I annex an additional draft Convention with this object in view.

As regards the future of the Germans in Bohemia and in the Sudetian districts, I venture to summarise the general impression caused by the Conditions of Peace all over German Austria which the under-signed Delegation is called upon to interpret.

The Allied and Associated Powers are in the course of committing a flagrant injustice towards the population of the above-mentioned territories and towards all German Austrians and to drag the Czechoslovak people itself into an adventurous and disastrous policy. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy affords an opportunity of putting an end to this unfortunate struggle between the German and Czech peoples by guaranteeing to each one of them the right to live freely its own national life. By stopping at the frontiers of the districts which really constitute the domicile of the Czechs and Slovaks, the Czechoslovak Republic could in every respect enjoy the satisfactory development of its economic as well as of its social prosperity. It would, if it contented itself with the domain of its own peoples, be one of the richest countries in Europe. Now if German Bohemia, the Böhmerwaldgau, the Sudetian country and the district of Znaim are incorporated in this happy and fertile state, if these German regions are united to Czechoslovak territory against the wishes of their inhabitants, *the former Austria*

would be replaced, in so far as the Germans and the Czecho-Slovaks are concerned, by two small states continually struggling with one another: and it must be remembered that the former Austria, however problematical its existence may have been, always assured more or less the material existence of its peoples. The Powers would thereby create in the middle of Europe a centre of civil war which might become much more dangerous for the world and its social life even than the continual ferment in the Balkans. This judgment may seem hard but it is based on the firm conviction of the German Austrian people. This conviction is unanimous and may be summed up in the following watchword "Let us leave this house which is burning, and let us join our country of origin."

The wrong which is being done to German Austria is painfully apparent to all eyes. The extent of territory and the number of inhabitants concerned are more than double the territory and population of Alsace-Lorraine. Whilst wishing to repair the wrong done to France in 1870-71, the Allied and Associated Powers are about to create a double Alsace. Whilst proclaiming the right of peoples to dispose freely of themselves they at the same time pass a sentence of political death on a population more numerous than the whole of that of Norway or of Denmark. Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to Germany after a war; that was a basis for an annexation which is now with reason set aside by the conviction inspiring international morality; it was, however, recognised for thousands of years by international law as a title of legitimate acquisition. Now the Germans of Bohemia and of Moravia and of Silesia are enslaved without ever having been in a state of war with the Czecho-Slovaks at the very moment when the German Austrians, relying on the Armistice Treaty, thought themselves in safety; as they were quite unable to defend themselves, they felt all the more bitterly the violence which was done to them. How can a people ever forget such cruel and unheard of procedure? Alsace-Lorraine passed from the dominion of a great and highly civilised nation to that of another great Power. This change was nevertheless felt to be an intolerable affront. German Bohemia on her part is however, although it formed part of a great and ancient nation, to be delivered over to a less numerous people, younger than it is as regards civilisation, and forming only a small State. 3½ millions of Germans are to be handed over to the sovereignty of 6½ millions of Czechs! The subject nation can never tolerate such domination. The dominating nation will never be able to accomplish the task set before it! Both are condemned to fight with one another in a disastrous struggle which is far more tragic than were the misfortunes which beset the former Austria, who at least was supported by the equilibrium of mutual hate caused by the different aspirations of eight different nationalities. This disastrous attempt means that after the most appalling carnage of all time the newly established state of things will be far worse and more threatening for European peace than before the war. It is impossible to estimate the disillusion and bitterness of the German Austrians in question, unless it be remembered that they were just on the point of spontaneously adopting the victorious ideas of liberty and democracy proclaimed by the Associated Powers, and that they thought that the moment had just come to establish freely with their brothers inhabiting the Alps a new German-Austrian Republic, and that at that very moment their liberty was snatched from them again and impounded by military occupation on the part of the Czecho-Slovaks; the draft Conditions of Peace ratify after the event these acts of violence; but the German people will never understand how, in view of the humanitarian declarations of the great Powers, a parliament at Prague in which there is not a single German can dispose of the fate of a German country whilst the representatives elected in that country by the free votes of the people are gagged by police measures. The people will never get over that. It will always feel the effects of such proceedings and will never be able to admit the idea that it was handed over without being consulted, by foreigners to foreigners!

The German-Austrian Peace Delegation therefore unreservedly unite with the writers of the annexed Memorandum in requesting that liberty may be restored to the said German countries, by means of elections on a basis of the free votes of the populations of German Bohemia on the one hand, and the Sudetian districts on the other, in order that in each of those provinces a constituent assembly may be called upon to dispose absolutely of the people which it represents.

The German-Austrian Delegation think that they may expect that the Peace Conference will discuss the question of the German districts of Bohemia and in the Sudetian regions, for on this question depends our fate and our future.

Memorandum submitted by the representatives of the German districts of the Sudetians in reply to the Conditions of Peace of the Allied and Associated Powers

(Extract from the Report of the German Austrian Peace Delegation.)

I

Fundamental principles of Peace

According to Part II, Article 6 of the Draft Treaty of Peace and Article 82 of the Conditions of Peace proposed to Germany, the German-Austrian territories of German Bohemia and of the districts of the Sudetians, as well as the "Böhmerwaldgau", southern German Moravia, parts of Lower Austria, the district of Neubistritz and the enclave of Iglau-Stecken are to be separated from the German-Austrian State and incorporated in the Czech State.

The German-Austrian Peace Delegation considers that one of its first tasks is to examine this part of the Conditions of Peace in accordance with the principles which have been proclaimed on many occasions by the President of the United States of America, Mr. Woodrow Wilson, principles which have become the political creed of the democracies of the Universe, have been expressly approved by the belligerent Powers, and have presided over the creation and the development of the German-Austrian Republic.

The principles in question are, in the first instance, as follows:

(1) Point Ten of the message delivered to the Congress of the United States of America on January 8th, 1918:

"The peoples of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development The day of territorial conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; as is also the day of secret covenants Every peace-loving nation which wishes to live its own life and determine its own institutions should be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression."

(2) The speech delivered at Washington's Tomb on July 4th, 1918:

"The settlement of every question, whether of territory or of national sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political relationship, must be made upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

"What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind."

(3) The speech to Congress on February 12th, 1918:

(a) Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game.

(b) Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and form a benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States.

(c) All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new, or perpetuating old, elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

(4) "The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be justice that plays no favourites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned."

II

Origin of the German-Austrian State

The essence of these principles and proclamations can be resumed in the theory that the sovereign will of the "governed" should be considered, both now and in the future, as the most decisive and most important force in the constitution of a State. In this way the formation of the German-Austrian State and its provinces was, in fact, accomplished. The representatives of the former Austrian Parliament from the German electoral districts, elected in 1911 on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage, strengthened by the general approval of the population, united themselves in a provisional national assembly of German-Austria; they proclaimed solemnly and unanimously the union of the districts inhabited by German-speaking populations in a single State and assumed the executive power. Similarly, the members of that assembly, deputies of the homogeneous districts of Northern Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, inhabited by German-speaking populations, proclaimed the creation of the provinces of Bohemia and of the country of the Sudetians, declared those provinces to be part of German-Austria, subjected them to the laws of that State and instituted provincial governments. Furthermore, German "Böhmerwaldgau" united itself with Upper Austria with which it has a common frontier, while Southern Moravia, which established itself as an independent district, as well as the district of Neubistritz and the German sections of the district of Neuhaus, united with Lower Austria which like wise shares a frontier with them and, moreover, the enclave of Iglau-Stecken joined Lower Austria.

The developments were formally sanctioned by the laws of German-Austria of November 12th and 22nd, 1918, regarding the extent of German-Austrian territory and also by the executive orders of January 3rd, 1919. In accordance with these enactments, these parts of German-Austria consist of the districts enumerated in Annex I.

III

Ethnographic conditions

In all matters concerning these districts we have to do with territories inhabited since their origin by homogeneous German-speaking populations which, except in the enclave of Iglau-Stecken, are directly connected with the regions of Europe where German peoples are domiciled and where the population of another nationality, particularly the Czech population, represents only a small percentage.

According to the census of 1910 (the only official source) the numbers of the population are as follows:

Districts	Sq. Km.	Germans	Czechs
German Bohemia	14,496	2,070,438	116,275
Country of the Sudetians	6,534	643,804	25,028
Bölmerwald	3,281	176,237	6,131
Southern Moravia	2,226	180,944	12,477
Iglau-Stecken	374	38,402	9,769
	26,911	3,109,825	162,674

The effect of the measures of violence now proposed is shewn still more clearly by the following comparisons than by the above figures:

The territory in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, inhabited by a homogeneous German population, which is nearly twice as large in area as Alsace-Lorraine and almost equal to Belgium, has a German population about twice as numerous as that of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. This population is greater than that of Norway, Denmark or Venezuela, is nearly equal to that of Finland or Chile, and is almost as great as that of inhabitants of Switzerland.

The delimitation follows everywhere the clearly recognizable natural and ethnographic lines established by common agreement in 1907 by the representatives of the two nations, at the time when the Czech and German electoral districts for Parliament were determined. *These ethnographic lines are exceptionally clear and this fact has also been recognized again and again by French scientists; they are consequently specially appropriate as a basis for the delimitation of States formed by virtue of the national idea of free determination. The clearness and precision of these natural ethnographic lines prove moreover that the Germans of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia are not of Czech race, as the Czechs allege. For in that case how could one explain the fact that the alleged process of Germanization has been so completely successful within the ethnographic frontier and has remained without any result outside that same frontier?*

Czech politicians naturally could not deny that the territories in question are inhabited for the most part by a German population: they deny, however, that the results of the official census have any value whatever by asserting that those results refer not to the nationality but to the ordinary language and that they were falsified by German influences at the time when the census was made. We, for our part, feel bound to affirm the following:

Numerous international statistical Congresses, particularly that held at St. Petersburg in 1873, rejected the application of such distinctions as national feeling or ethnical origin (which is often uncertain) and pronounced in favour of adopting as a standard the "spoken language", a characteristic of a purely objective nature. Further, the errors which might result from applying these different systems are very small and produce an equally small effect on the total result in regard to the two nationalities.

The assertion that the census was carried out under German influence can be disproved by the fact that the Austrian Government was not at all inclined, as the Czechs allege, to favour German influence, but, on the contrary, was often composed of persons hostile to the Germans. Moreover, it is clearly established that the censuses carried out subsequently by the Czechs in order to check the official figures did not produce a result appreciably different from that of the official census. Besides, the policy of German-Austria is solely directed to establishing the ethnical conditions in an indisputable manner by a plebiscite.

Czech politicians further allege that the German territories of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia have in the course of centuries lost their original Slav character by Germanization. *This assertion is false, seeing that the Germans came into this country as successors of the Celts, long before the Slavs, and that the territories which we now claim were occupied peaceably several centuries ago by the German populations which established themselves there.*

There is, therefore, no question of a violent process of Germanization,

The territories where German populations are settled today have, in fact, been an ancient German domain for centuries: the insignificant Czech minorities living therein are scattered and only came recently to the country in consequence of the rapid industrial development of these districts.

IV

The treaty of peace regarded as an act creating a new régime of public law

The German Austrian National Assembly, and also Provincial Assemblies, were moreover well aware that the establishment of definite frontiers as regards the other successor States was not completed by the fundamental laws mentioned above, although these laws were entirely based on the principles of democracy and nationality; they realised that the determination of these frontiers still had to form the subject of negotiations regarding the liquidation of the former Monarchy. But these laws were chiefly designed to create a situation in harmony with the decisions of the Congress; German Austria, having full confidence in the solemnly proclaimed principles of self-determination, believed she could expect from these decisions a solution of the pro-

blems such as would guarantee firm foundations for a social and economic order and prepare the way, in concert with the peoples, for an equitable constitutional settlement.

The German Austrian State certainly cannot be held responsible for the fact that it has hitherto been impossible to carry out the intention of guaranteeing a well arranged liquidation of the former Monarchy first and foremost as regards territorial questions. It was the Czech Government which, at the time when the Czech State was formed and developed, allowed itself to be guided by principles altogether different from those advocated by the Entente. Without resorting to General Elections, without establishing up to the present day any legitimate Authority, the Czech Government continued the war even after the Great Powers had put an end to it by the conclusion of the Armistice. The Czechs have, in fact, subjugated the German districts by force of arms. The German Austrian Government for its part, has devoted itself to the re-establishment of order in the interior, and, inspired by the formal and constantly repeated declarations of the Entente, has regarded the occupation of the German districts of the Sudetians by the Czechs as a purely provisional measure which would only remain in force until the Peace conference had reached a decision.

V

Attitude of the Sudetian Germans

The Resolutions whereby the German Districts of the Sudetians were declared to be a part of German Austria were voted by Deputies elected on the basis of direct, universal and equal suffrage, who remained the sole rightful representatives of the people at the time when the Monarchy collapsed. These Resolutions met with unanimous and enthusiastic welcome and approval. The Czecho-Slovak Government represents at the Congress at Paris districts in regard to which it cannot in any way, either now or later, boast of having the free assent or the sovereign will of the population. Despite unheard of military oppression, which even went as far as to re-establishing corporal punishment and apply it to free men and even to women, all political parties, as well as Communes and Corporations, have constantly organised demonstrations to protest against these proceedings. They have succeeded as far as was possible, in spite of the difficulties of communication and the constant efforts to gag the Press and impede the freedom of meeting, in causing their protests to be transmitted to the representatives of the Entente. These demonstrations preclude any doubt whatever regarding the feelings of the population in the German districts of Bohemia. Moreover, repeated demands have been made, although without success, that neutral Commissions should be sent to these districts so that they might be convinced on the spot of the true state of affairs; these demands furnish a further proof of the fact that the German Sudetians have only endured the Czech occupation with repugnance and under stress of military compulsion and that they are sustained by the hope that an impartial enquiry conducted by representatives of the Entente Powers would put an end to their sufferings.

There would be a terrible and disastrous disappointment if the Peace, instead of putting an end to this slavery, made it permanent.

The creation of the German Austrian Republic can, therefore, be considered the purest and (from the historical point of view) the clearest application of the democratic principles governing the modern formation of States. The most that could be done would be to submit this organic act to fresh tests by a plebiscite.

The German Austrian Delegation declares itself ready to consent forthwith to this plebiscite and reserves to itself the right to present to the Peace Congress certain proposals which would guarantee impartiality to the voting.

VI

Proceedings of the Czech Government

No doubt can remain that the proceedings of the Czech Government in the German districts of the Sudetians are in no wise in harmony with the views advocated by the Entente in regard

to the new order of affairs. These proceedings are irreconcilable either with the maxims of democracy, or with the principles of nationality, or with a lasting peace of justice. It is likewise certain that if the Peace Conference confirms this foreign domination, it will create new elements of discord for the future, elements which, according to the ideas of President Wilson, should be banished by the Peace for all time.

We affirm that the Czech government, disregarding the right of self-determination, has invaded the territories of the Sudetians upset the peaceful development and the regulation by arbitration of conditions in those countries, and made the German Sudetians the object of a policy based solely on the force of arms and having in view nothing but the material advantage of the Czech nation.

We place it on record that the Czech Government has, under cover of the Armistice, occupied German territory and subjected to its sovereignty, contrary to the principles of the Law of Nations, the German district of the Sudetians; that after overturning the existing legal authorities, it has instituted new authorities and compelled the public officials by threatening their physical existence to take the oath to the occupying State or else has driven them out or thrown them into prison. It has suppressed the free expression of the people's will.

We place it on record that the Czech government has poisoned in an intolerable way the relations between the two nations and destroyed all hope of a peaceful agreement between them. Such wounds cannot be cured. The history of the Czech people is the best proof of this.

VII

Fundamental bases of the Czech State

In any State thus organised a united political will would from the outset be lacking in a great part of the population; and this [sic] will constitute the sole basis for its peaceful development. A State incorporating not only territory inhabited by homogeneous Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian and Magyar population but also extensive districts inhabited by a German population would not be a national Czech State; it would simply be a bad copy of the old Austria, that is to say an organism characterised by the recrudescence of an evil which was thought to be finally stamped out, but on a much less extensive territory, under much less favourable economic conditions and without the historical traditions of centuries. It is to be hoped the wisdom of the Allied and Associated Powers will pay heed while there is still time to the warnings set forth above.

The proportion of nationalities inhabiting the Czech State, after deducting the Polish districts which will eventually be incorporated therein, is as follows:

Czechs	6,291,237 or 48%
Germans	3,719,147 or 28%
Slovaks	1,770,614 or 14%
Magyars	878,643 or 7%
Ruthenes	437,000 or 3%

The projected incorporation in the Czech state of districts of Lower Austria and Prussian Silesia would modify still further the proportion indicated above to the detriment of the Czech nation. If the old Austria was destined to perish because she lacked any unifying political idea common to her various races, both these lessons taught by this experience and also the magnetic force of the democratic and national idea make us foresee that the Czech State, as it is delimited by the draft conditions of Peace, will be unable in the long run to withstand the tendencies of its component parts to settle their own fate freely.

VIII

Conclusions

On the other hand, German Austria deprived of the districts which are the most important from the economic and cultural point of view would be unable to exist as an independent State and for that reason alone would find it impossible to fulfil the obligations imposed on her. But the Czech State, on the contrary, has no need of other people's possessions in order to be

assured of the means of livelihood. If this assertion be called in question during the course of the negotiations, the Delegation will be ready to submit to the Peace Conference statistical and economic data which would offer all the means available for forming judgment on the question in dispute. Moreover the international regulation of economic relations offers many means of paying good heed in future also to all desirable economic relations.

The German Austrian Delegation, convinced that the Peace Conference has the task of satisfying within the territory of the former Monarchy "all well defined national aspirations without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely at any time to break the Peace", solemnly places it on record that the Draft Treaty communicated

to it is in absolute contradiction with the sovereign will of the German Sudetians and is resented by them as the worst injustice.

The German Austrian Delegation abides by the sublime words of one of the members of the Peace Conference: "that the Great Powers have assumed in full consciousness of their act the entire responsibility for the peace and for the establishment of the reign of justice." Confiding in this promise, the Delegation ventures to submit to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the following proposal:

"The question as to which State the German population wishes to belong shall be decided by a *Plebiscite* to take place in the German Districts of the Sudetians by Communes under neutral control, in the absence of Czech troops and in accordance with a procedure to be settled."

IV. The Definite Breach of the Preliminary Peace Treaty and the Violation of the Right of Self-Determination

No particularly great evidence is required to prove that, after the recognition of Czechoslovakia as an allied State and after its "historical frontiers" had been recognised and the disputed districts had been occupied by force, the dealings of the Peace Conference with this problem from February 5th, 1919 must necessarily be of a purely academic nature. This Peace Conference met—and the personal presence of President Wilson made the fact all the more impressive—when the principle of the American prophet had already been most seriously violated. Peoples and provinces had already been transferred from one sovereignty to another as if they were chattels or pawns in a game. Although the help of Czechoslovak war prisoners and deserters had had no decisive influence on the victory of the Allies—which had only become possible by American help—the legal title of the Czechoslovaks to the possession of foreign territory and foreign peoples was based on the fact that, twenty days before the armistice, they had been recognised as an "allied Power".

Reservations were made at the Peace Conference only by the representatives of the United States against the territorial demands of the Czechoslovak delegation. But it will be seen from the proceedings of the first meetings on February 5th and 27th, 1919 that after the forceful decisions that had already been taken, the fate of the Sudeten German people which was only made known by the Treaty of St. Germain of September 10th, 1919, had already been decided *de jure* at these meetings.

The reports of these meetings therefore supply very useful information in many respects for forming a judgment of the position.

The minutes of the meeting of February 5th, which are reproduced by David Hunter Miller, show clearly that the eleven memoranda possess the fundamental importance which we attach to them for the decision taken. In a long speech Dr. Benes repeated almost word for word all the arguments which were intended to support the Czech demands and at the same time to lead astray the non-French participants in the meeting who were ignorant of the real position.

The discussions of the Committee for Czechoslovak affairs, which was set up at this meeting, began on February 27th, 1919. The minutes recorded by David Hunter Miller (Vol. 17, p. 88) read as follows:

1. Report of the Meeting of the Committee for Czechoslovak Affairs.

A — Organization.

The Commission was organised with M. Jules Cambon as president, and Marquis Salvago Raggi as vice-president. Its composition is as follows:

United States: Dr. C. Seymour, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

British Empire: Right Hon. Sir Joseph Cook, G. C. M. G., Hon. H. Nicolson.

France: M. Jules Cambon, M. Laroche.

Italy: Marquis Salvago Raggi, M. A. Stranieri.

B — Procedure.

It was decided that each Delegation present its views in general in order that questions regarding which there was a consensus of opinion should be eliminated from discussion, and that the Czecho-Slovak Delegates be called in only for the purpose of answering specific questions. The president requested each Delegation to bring a *résumé* of its opinions to the next meeting.

C — German Question.

The question of including the Germans now living in the territory which was formerly Austrian Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia was presented. It was finally agreed that the frontier as defined by the political boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia of 1914 should be accepted in principle as the frontier of the new Czecho-Slovak Republic, subject to such minor rectifications, additions or subtractions of territory, as may be found desirable on the further investigation of particular points...

The notes on this meeting by Jules Cambon, Chairman of this Committee, read as follows:

"The question was raised whether it would be advisable to give the new State the frontiers of Bohemia as fixed at the time of Austria, or whether the frontiers should be so limited that three million Germans would remain outside, a solution which would naturally increase the population of the German State.

Economically and geographically the old frontier should be maintained in the interest of both populations. The Italian delegate, who no doubt intended to put forward strategical grounds in another case in the interest of Italy, emphasised considerations of this kind in order to safeguard the security of the new State. He demanded that the mountains of Bohemia should form the frontier.

The American delegate, on the other hand, stated that his country refused to take strategical points of view into consideration.

I could not refrain from answering him—and this raised a laugh among our colleagues—that the Americans were too

disinterested in European security. When one was near the fire one had a certain comprehension for the fire brigade, and strategical considerations were of certain importance for those who were exposed to the battle every day.

The American delegate then referred to the existence of the League of Nations. I put an end to this discussion with the remark that we must nevertheless wait till the League of Nations was at work before relying on it.

It was finally decided that the Germans of Bohemia should be allotted to the new State."

The note by Jules Cambon leaves no doubt as to the fact that this decision was taken primarily on strategical grounds; it was taken against the objection of the American delegates who contested the justice of such a step by the Conference but who obviously had not the necessary diplomatic skill to insist on the maintenance of Wilson's conditions and of the provisions of the preliminary peace treaty.

This decision of the Committee for Czech Affairs signified the definite decision regarding the lot of the Sudeten Germans. We are told by Nicolson that the members of the Committees of Experts on territorial questions were of opinion that their duty was merely to prepare and facilitate the examination and decision of the Supreme Council. The territorial committees were to act as a kind of court of first instance and examine the demands put forward by the small and medium allied States in accordance with the terms of reference given them by the Supreme Council, to restrict the questions requiring decision as much as possible and to make recommendations for a just settlement. The members of these committees accordingly thought that their recommendations would be subject in the last instance to a final discussion. They obviously thought that the representatives of the conquered States would be admitted to these discussions on the basis of which a just solution would be reached.

The members of these territorial committees, according to Nicolson, had no hesitation in making compromises and recommending decisions which they hoped would not in the last instance be approved. On account of this false view the territorial committees showed a readiness to accept far more of the demands of the small Powers—which were put forward as maximum demands—than they would have done if they had known that the Supreme Council would for the most part adopt the unanimous reports of the committees without further discussion.

The Committee for Czechoslovak Affairs completed its report for the Supreme Council by March 12th, 1919. In this report also the Americans made reservations.

On March 25th after the General Committee for territorial questions had examined the Czechoslovak Committee's report and merely made some drafting changes in articles intended to be inserted in the Treaty of Versailles, the latter Committee adopted the report with these amendments on March 28th, 1919 and submitted it to the Supreme Council. The text of the report of the Committee for Czechoslovak Affairs with the draft of the provisions to be included in the Versailles Treaty is not known.

The establishment of the western frontier of the Czechoslovak State was dealt with by the Committee of Four. We have the following record of its meeting on April 1st, 1919, in which the American and French views came into conflict, though the Americans were unable to hold their own. The debate also shows clearly that the German character of the territories in question was well known, and that if the right of self-determination had been exercised by a plebiscite these districts would have declared for Germany.

* * *

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday 1st, 1919, at 3:00 p. m.

Mr. Lansing suggested that only that part of the report dealing with the frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and Germany should be considered, at it was desired to collect all the elements of a preliminary treaty with Germany. The boundaries between Czecho-Slovakia and other countries might be considered at a later stage.

M. Sonnino agreed to this procedure.

M. Cambon said that the task of the Commission had been one of considerable intricacy. It had attempted to do justice to ethnic claims but economic and strategic considerations had also to be given weight as a purely racial frontier would have left Czecho-Slovakia defenceless and economically crippled. He did not propose to explain the frontier in minute detail, as many points had been left to the decision of the Frontier Commission which would ultimately be sent to mark the boundaries. The eastern point of contact with Germany began at Neustadt.

The American Delegates objected to the whole method of drawing frontier lines on strategic principles.

M. Cambon said that it was not strategic interests but considerations of national defence that guided the Commission.

Mr. Lansing enquired whether there was any difference.

M. Cambon replied that he had himself heard President Wilson declare that the new States should be set up under conditions which would enable them to survive. The Commission had been entrusted with the task of setting up a new State in Central Europe. This State had perforce an odd shape, its territory was so narrow as to run the risk of being overrun at the very outset of hostilities. It was for this reason that the Commission had thought it advisable to reduce the glacié surrounding Glatz.

Mr. Lansing said he did not wish to debate the question of Glatz. He wished, however, to point out that the fixing of frontier lines with a view to their military strength and in contemplation of war was directly contrary to the whole spirit of the League of Nations, of international disarmament, and of the policy of the United States as set forth in the declaration of President Wilson.

Mr. Lansing observed that in this salient there were 90,000 Germans and no Czechs.

M. Cambon replied that the Commission had come to the conclusion that nature had so clearly marked the outlines of the country that it was undesirable to alter them without very cogent reasons. Further, it had thought it inadvisable to make a gratuitous offer to Germany of additional population, and thereby to create a precedent for the attribution of other Austro-Germans to the main federation.

Mr. Lansing asked whether the Commission would approve of a plebiscite in this area.

M. Laroche said that this question had been raised in the Commission, which, after consideration, had decided that a plebiscite could not be proposed in an isolated salient without extending it to the remainder of the German Bohemians. If this were done, the Czecho-Slovak State would be reduced to very slender proportions.

Mr. Lansing observed that this was not good reason to justify an injustice.

M. Laroche denied that an injustice was being done. The inhabitants of these regions were accustomed to live in close connection with the rest of Bohemia, and did not desire separation. Moreover, the German colonisation was of recent date. The result of the policy suggested by Mr. Lansing

might be that the whole of Bohemia would elect to join Germany in order not to be separated from the German Bohemians.

M. Pichon said that on behalf of France, he also had reservations to make. He could not allow Germany to be fortified by populations taken from what had been Austrian Dominions, taken, moreover, from Bohemia, which, he trusted, would remain an ally of France, and handed over to Germany, which, as far as he was concerned, still remained a country to be feared. If America refused to take into account considerations of national defence, France was not in a position to neglect them.

In Jules Cambon's memoirs we find the following note on this meeting:

"On April 1st Jules Cambon reported to the Committee of Four on the views of the Committee of which he was Chairman regarding the establishment of Czechoslovakia. The American delegate Lansing objected to the transfer of German populations to the new State. Our delegate was astonished at such a point of view. He pointed out that the ethnical question was not alone at stake, but that account must also be taken of economic and military points of view and of the habits of the German Bohemians.

Lansing said such views might justify any injustice.

I confess that I was bored by such pharisaic views. The attitude of the United States in California and Porto Rico might have served me as an argument, but I was afraid of poisoning the discussion and contented myself by stating that Czechoslovakia was territorially a weak State and was subject to the danger of being immediately cut off by an attack. Wilson had always said that viable States must be created and that national defence was an essential element of the new States."

David Hunter Miller reports that the Council of Four took the final decision even before April 8th, 1919 to fix the existing German-Bohemian frontier between Germany and Czechoslovakia in the Versailles Treaty and to reject all proposals for amendments.

* * *

Accordingly it was again on military and

general political considerations that the Supreme Council decided the fate of three and a half million Germans against their will and against the solemn treaty provisions.

Thus in the year 1919 century-old connections of historical, cultural, ethnical and economic nature were torn asunder, and three and a half million people of German race living in a closed settlement territory were first annexed by force of arms, then subjected to the sovereignty of a State which had only been recognised for a quarter of a year by certain interested Great Powers, and finally converted into a "minority" in this State, without these people being asked and without their protests being listened to, not to mention being taken into consideration.

This arbitrary act was perpetrated by the victors of the War in the name of the right of self-determination and of democratic principles and ideals.

In reply to the protests made by the Austrian peace delegation, the Austrian National Assembly and the Sudeten German districts against this violation of right and justice,¹ the peace makers of Paris had only one stereotyped answer which they also gave in the ultimatum of June 16th, 1919 in reply to the protests of the German peace delegation: "The Allied and Associated Powers categorically reject the statement that a barter with peoples and provinces has been carried on. Every territorial provision has been reached after careful and most conscientious examination of all religious, racial and linguistic circumstances. The legitimate hopes of all peoples who have lived a long time under foreign rule have been taken into consideration and the decisions have been founded in each case." At the end comes the laconic statement that the nationality principle has been followed in so far as it could be put into effect without creating the material for new conflicts.

The next chapter shows how this nationality principle was followed when it was not a case of the Czechs but of the Germans.

V. The Problem of Minority Protection

What was promised

It was only after the most important decisions had been taken in territorial questions that the Supreme Council took up the questions concerning the protection of the minorities which had been created by the new frontiers.

On May 1st, 1919, that is to say a few days before the peace conditions were handed to the German delegation, the Supreme Council decided to set up a committee for the purpose. The Supreme Council found it necessary to impose obligations on the new States, in protection of the inhabitants not belonging to the majority, as a condition for their final recognition. The last suitable moment for this was the signature of the Peace Treaties. As Sir Maurice Hankey wrote on behalf of the Supreme Council to the Secretary General of the Conference, Poland and the other new States were not to be considered as founded until the Peace Treaties were signed, since the territories of the States were up to that moment "technically" parts of Germany and Austria.

As it was not possible in the short time intervening before the peace conditions were handed to the German delegation

to draft the clauses of such a treaty, the Supreme Council merely contented itself with the introduction of Articles 86 and 93 in the Versailles Treaty under which Czechoslovakia and Poland accepted and agreed to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as might be deemed necessary by the said Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of those States who differed from the majority of the population in race, language or religion.

The insertion of these two articles was tantamount to the decision of the Supreme Council. The States concerned had no other course than to bow to this decision; they could at most make objections to the wording of individual provisions. Moreover the Czechoslovak delegation, in its third memorandum, had made observations regarding the treatment of the Germans in the future Czechoslovak State and had declared its willingness "in case of need to accept any international legal settlement determined by the Peace Conference in favour of the minorities"; the delegation even added that it was prepared to go beyond such a settlement

¹ See No. 13 of this Journal.

and to give the Germans all the rights to which they were entitled.

When the number of the Germans to be incorporated in the Czechoslovak State is considered, this claim was undoubtedly the worst violation of the right of self-determination of the nations which had been so solemnly proclaimed in the preliminary peace treaty a few weeks earlier. In this case an assurance of equality of rights and political independence ought to have been required in order to enable the Supreme Council to take any decision in favour of the Czechoslovak State. It was therefore a clever calculation to obtain the incorporation of a great foreign national group by means of such promises.

It has already been pointed out that the Committee for the new States was set up by the Supreme Council's decision of May 1st; on May 3rd, 1919 it held a meeting in which it began to discuss the provisions for a minorities protection treaty with Poland drafted by David Hunter Miller.

The report to the Supreme Council adopted at the first meeting on May 3rd, 1919 provided, in accordance with the terms of reference, that a minorities protection treaty for Czechoslovakia should be drafted and a corresponding reservation was to be proposed for insertion in the Treaty of Versailles.

The setting up of the new Committee was based on a decision by the Supreme Council. The "starting point" was not Poland alone, but the new States; moreover the Allies desired to impose the obligations in respect of the protection of minorities before the signature of the Versailles Treaty, not only on Poland but also on Czechoslovakia and the States which had obtained a considerable extension of territory.

On May 3rd, 1919 the Supreme Council approved the first report of the Committee and at the same time decided to insert the subsequent Article 86 which relates to the minorities protection treaty with Czechoslovakia. The Committee first discussed the provisions of the treaty with Poland, which was to serve as a specimen for the treaties to be concluded with the other States. This second report was adopted by the Supreme Council on May 17th, 1919. On May 19th the application of the clauses of the Polish treaty to Czechoslovakia was examined. At the meeting of May 20th, 1919 M. Berthelot, who had entered into communication with Benes and requested him to set down his verbal statements confidentially in writing, submitted the note from Benes regarding the protection of minorities in Czechoslovakia.

Benes' note reads as follows:

1. *"It is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak Government to create the organisation of the State by accepting as a basis of national rights the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republic, that is, to make of the Czecho-Slovak Republic a sort of Switzerland, taking into consideration, of course, the special conditions in Bohemia."*

2. *There will be universal suffrage under the proportional system which will assure to the various nationalities of the Republic proportional representation in all elective bodies.*

3. *The schools will be maintained by the State, throughout its territory, from the public funds, and schools will be established for the various nationalities in all the communes where the number of children, legally ascertained, proves the necessity of establishing such schools.*

4. *All public offices, in which in principle the two languages will have equal value, will be open to the various nationalities inhabiting the Republic.*

5. *The courts will be mixed, and Germans will have the right to plead before the highest courts in their own language.*

6. *The local administration (of communes and "circles") will be carried on in the language of the majority of the population.*

7. *There is no religious question in the Czecho-Slovak Republic, hence there will be no difficulties on this subject.*

8. *The official language will be Czech, and the State will be known abroad as the Czecho-Slovak State; but in practice the German language shall be the second language of the country, and shall be employed currently in administration before the courts and in the central Parliament on equal footing with Czech. It is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak Government to satisfy the population in practice and in daily use, but reserving a certain special position for the Czecho-Slovak language and element.*

9. *To express this in a different way we may say: the present state, in which the Germans had an overwhelming preponderance, will remain; only, the privileges that the Germans enjoyed will be reduced to their just proportion (for example, the German schools will be reduced in number, because they will be superfluous).*

It will be an extremely liberal régime, which will very much resemble that of Switzerland.

Paris, May 20th, 1919."

Special importance attaches to the report on Czechoslovakia submitted by the Committee for new States to the Supreme Council.

M. Berthelot read a note (Annex (A) which he had received from Mr. Benes regarding the privileges which the Czecho-Slovak State proposes to accord to minorities within its boundaries. It was observed that these facilities would be considerably more far-reaching than any obligations which would be imposed on Czechoslovakia by the Treaty.

"In continuation of the former Report, the Committee beg leave to submit the attached draft of clauses to be inserted in a Treaty with Czecho-Slovakia.

It will be noted that these are almost identical with those which have already been approved in principle for Poland, with the one exception that the two special clauses relating to the Jews are omitted. There are, of course, considerable differences in the circumstances of the two States; the Committee, however, were strongly of opinion that for general political reasons it was most desirable that the provisions presented to them should be as nearly as possible identical.

In the case of Czecho-Slovakia the minorities which have to be considered are firstly the Germans, who number about 3,000,000; secondly, the Magyars, who will probably number 800,000; thirdly, about 150,000 Ruthenians. The situation of the Magyars and of the Ruthenians is not dissimilar to that of the Germans and the Ruthenians in Poland, and they can be dealt with on the same lines.

The position of the Germans in Bohemia is, of course, completely different; they have till within recent years been the dominating influence in the State; they form a highly developed, very capable element, and, in the past, have been a very aggressive population. It is clear that the prosperity and perhaps almost the existence of the new State will depend upon the success with which it incorporates the Germans as willing citizens. The very magnitude of this task makes it one quite different in character from the mere protection of the other minorities with which the Committee have had to deal; it is one which goes so deeply into the heart of all the institution that the solution of it is probably best left to the Czechs themselves.

The Committee have received a communication from M. Benes, the representative of Czecho-Slovakia at the Peace Conference, in which he has informed them that it is the intention of the present Government to treat the Germans with the greatest liberality, and the proposals he makes go far beyond anything which the Committee would have felt justified in putting forward. Under the circumstances, therefore, they consider that it would be wiser not to make any specific reference to the Germans, and the more general propositions which are included in the draft Treaty are so moderate that it is anticipated that they

will be accepted without any demur by the Czecho-Slovak Government..."

On the basis of the decision of June 16th, 1919, the Committee sent this report to the Supreme Council. The latter approved the draft treaty on August 6th, 1919.

The final signature of the Minorities Protection Treaty took place on September 10th, 1919 together with the signature of the Treaty of St. Germain.

* * *

The above documents show that the decision of the Paris Conference was taken with a knowledge and after consideration of the promises of the Czechoslovak Delegation regarding the treatment of the Germans to be incorporated in the State. The Czechoslovak Delegation renewed the solemn promise that it had given in the third memorandum in the note which it addressed to the Committee for the new States on May 20th, 1919 and which the latter took as a basis for its recommendations to the Supreme Council. In its report the Committee drew the Supreme Council's attention to the fundamental difference between the Polish and the Czechoslovak problem: the Germans in Czechoslovakia did not form a minority in the real sense but a State-constituting national group upon whose legal position in the State not only the welfare of the State but its very existence depended. The Committee had all the less need to deal with this question as M. Benes, the official delegate of Czechoslovakia, had given binding promises in this respect. The Committee therefore confined itself to making general mino-

rity provisions and did not draw up special provisions for the legal position of the Germans. Under these conditions and assumptions the minority protection treaty with Czechoslovakia came into being. The deciding instances relied on the fulfilment of these binding promises which they had received and on which their resolutions were based.

* * *

The signature of the Treaty of Versailles by Germany and Czechoslovakia, however, also gives the German Reich a right under Article 86 to demand the execution of the minorities protection provisions not only from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, but also directly from Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia, as an allied Power, took part in the conclusion of the preliminary peace treaty which came into existence between the German Reich and the Allies through the intermediary of the President of the United States. In the American note of November 5th, 1918 the American Government communicated the reply of the allied Governments to the German offer for peace and an armistice. The preliminary peace treaty came into being by the immediate acceptance of this reply of the Allies by the German Reich. Consequently, Czechoslovakia as a party to the preliminary peace treaty with the German Reich agreed to keep to Wilson's principles regarding the right of self-determination, and the German Reich can demand that this party to the treaty should keep its promise.

THE OPPRESSION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS

The Czechoslovak Government was thus bound not only by the Minority Protection Treaty, but also by the promises which it gave in the memoranda and in the note of May 20th, 1919. The question was most admirably set forth by the present President, Dr. Benes, in his Dijon doctor's thesis: "*Le problème autrichien et la question tchèque. Étude sur les luttes politiques des nationalités slaves en Autriche*". In this work he says: "While the realists (at that time the leading party in Bohemia, with Masaryk at the head) take their stand on the principle of natural right, they are necessarily definite federalists. They wish to solve the Austrian problem and the Czech question by decentralisation, by a reconstruction of the Constitution in the federalistic and autonomous sense".

As regards the Czechs and the Germans in Bohemia, Benes wrote: "A reconciliation of the two races is really only possible, if they both enjoy complete autonomy. The one must be separated from the other. There is no other means than to make the nationalities more or less masters of their own affairs."

Before the War, Masaryk also rejected as immoral any redivision of Austria that did not take linguistic frontiers into consideration and that did not therefore bring a clear national division and constantly pointed out that only the grant of national self-administration could put an end

to the nationality conflict in Austria. He made this perfectly clear in the Vienna "*Neue Zeit*" in April, 1896: "Peace between ourselves and the Germans is possible if we recognise freedom as the so-called formal principle and social justice as the so-called material principle. Anyone who seriously desires freedom and social justice must work concretely for political autonomy. The establishment of German and Czech districts as administrative units has been frequently suggested; I entirely agree. Like Havlicek, I say: I am the master, you are the master."

The "kind of Switzerland" referred to and the "very liberal régime which will approach very closely to the Swiss" can no doubt be traced back to these views of Benes and Masaryk; that régime was promised in Memorandum No 3 and in Benes' note of May 20th, 1919 or was rather used as a pretext which more or less deceived the peace makers in Paris. In the fourth article of the series by XY in the Prager Presse, therefore, an attempt is made to invalidate this promise by legal subtleties and to bring it within the standards of ordinary minority rights. In this connection we would refer to the admirable refutation given by Professor Bruns of Berlin, Professor of International Law, in his "*Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*", Volume VII, No. 4 (Berlin-Leipzig, 1937, Walter de Gruyter & Co.).

The national groups in Czechoslovakia aim at nothing else than the realisation of this programme. But, unfortunately although both Benes and Masaryk ten years later, for the

sake of propaganda, wrote down all these fine principles regarding a federal State, they banished them from their hearts, when the Czech question was no longer the core of the Austrian problem but, on the contrary, the Sudeten German question was the core of the Czechoslovak State problem.

But it was not only the promises and obligations arising out of the above documents that were forgotten or consigned to the deepest archives of the Hradshin or Kolowrat Palace. All the fine phrases which Masaryk, Benes, Hodza, Krofta and other responsible statesmen addressed on every opportunity to the "minorities" were also forgotten or turned into valueless statements of principle which were unfortunately not followed by deeds. It is impossible to give a complete list of them: the confessions and statements in the memoirs of the two first-named: "World revolution" and "Resurrection of the Nations", Masaryk's message of October, 1928, the speeches by Dr. Benes at Brux on October 28th, 1935, at Reichenberg on August 18th, 1936, at Bratislava on September 20th, 1936, the Christmas message of December 24th, 1937, the Easter message of April 16th, 1938, the speeches at Tabor on May 21st, 1938 and at the jubilee celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the Republic on May 25th, 1938 at Prague, the speeches by Dr. Hodza on April 28th, 1927, on November 17th, 1937, on July 2nd, 1936 and March 4th, 1938 in both Houses of Parliament, the interviews in "Paris Soir" of March 29th and May 26th, 1938, the broadcast message of March 28th, 1938, the statement to the press on May 20th, 1938 and lastly the speech at Bratislava in the counter-demonstration against the congress of the Hlinka party on June 6th, 1938; the speeches by Dr. Krofta on May 21st, 1936 and November 11th and 17th, 1937 to both Houses of Parliament, the interviews in "Paris Soir" of March 27th and May 26th, 1938, in the "Soir" and "Intransigent" on May 17th, 1938 and in the "Universul" on May 7th, 1938.

The basic tendency of all these statements is the constantly repeated expression of good will and the firm determination to carry out the minority protection obligations, to solve these problems voluntarily and without compulsion in agreement and in wise cooperation with the Sudeten Germans, to stop the Czechisation policy in order to cause no bitterness. It is even admitted that mistakes have been made which must not be repeated, that the minorities policy suffers from a certain inequality and that some errors have been committed in the execution of this policy.

But such admissions are always followed by the statement that nevertheless the protection of minorities in Czechoslovakia is the "most exemplary, most democratic and most liberal" and that everything is "in the best order".

Some excellent formulae may also be noted.

For instance, Dr. Benes says:

"The Sudeten German membership of the great German cultural community is quite natural, and no State has any reason to object to it. The State is aware that the political frontier must in no way constitute a spiritual obstacle."

"People who are enslaved and deprived of their human dignity, who are denied tolerance, objectivity and good will are entitled to defend themselves. The same applies to society, the nation and the State. It is therefore my desire that all these questions should be objectively discussed between the Czechoslovaks and our nationalities and that a

solution acceptable to both parties may be sought in a friendly and reasonable manner. I am in favour of this question being tackled on both sides with all seriousness and sincerity and especially in the spirit of peace, good will, objectivity, conciliation, mutual respect and fair play.

Dr. Hodza said:

"The Czechs do not desire, but reject, any denationalisation of the minorities. A nation that has survived such oppression as the Czech will never lend itself to doing injustice to another nation, but will always be aware that the power of a State and the people's own position in the State will be the more permanent in proportion as right and justice for all, without national, social or religious distinctions, form an organic part of such State.

It is therefore the duty of the State, from the first day of its renewal, to regulate its relations with that people in such a manner that Czechoslovakia is their permanent home."

There are many references in these statements to the Government decisions of February 18th, 1937 which were to bring a "definite appeasement of the nationality struggle", namely, as Dr. Hodza stated, within a year. The Sudeten German Party of Konrad Henlein took no part in the agreement, but only the "Government parties", the so-called "activists".

As against the administrative compromise between the Czech and German Government parties of February 18th, 1937, by which certain concessions were granted to the Germans, Henlein, at a great congress of administrators at Aussig on February 28th, 1937, claimed national self-administration, an assurance of national frontiers and reparation for the wrong done to the Sudeten Germans since 1918. On April 27th, 1937 the Sudeten German Party in the Prague House of Deputies submitted six bills for the protection of nationalism, but they have not yet been dealt with in parliament.

In the agreements of February 18th, 1937, the following promises were made:

1. A legal safeguard that Sudeten German workmen and employees would be engaged in public works (and would naturally be actually employed).
2. Official posts to be given in proportion to the population.
3. The protection of German young people to be financed regularly, i.e. in proportion to the population.
4. The German school demands to be fulfilled.
5. The German communes to be given linguistic facilities in their dealings with the authorities.

It will be seen that the German parties to the agreements of February 18th were satisfied with a minimum programme.

In any case the incredulous might say that at least a start had been made. This start might pave the way, if only psychologically, for a compromise, since the Czechs were not too obstinate in various points and there was at least an honest intention and good will.

Unfortunately—to anticipate the final result—even the most modest hopes have been disappointed, and the German "activists" themselves have come to this conclusion during the past year.

Two of these activist parties, the Farmers' Union and the Christian Socialist Party, on March 22nd and 24th, 1938 put an end to the attempt which began twelve years ago, in 1926, "to achieve national appeasement in the State and

security for the vital rights of the Sudeten German national group by cooperating in the Government". They withdrew their Ministers from the Government and joined the Sudeten German Party because, as the resolutions on the subject state, "the failure of the principles adopted in February has aroused the greatest disappointment among the entire Sudeten German population, the development of recent times demands a uniform effort and the joint contribution of all the forces of the people, and the common demands of all Sudeten Germans must be fought for by a united front".

Thus the house of cards of Sudeten German activism collapsed and the Prague minority policy fell to pieces. The activist camp now only contained the German Social Democrats, in spite of their sharp criticism of this policy, but as a result of the elections they are reduced to a party group with no influence. But the Sudeten German Party, which Konrad Henlein had formed on October 1st, 1933 from the scattered political parties of the Sudeten Germans, became the strongest party in the Parliament and Senate as a result of the accession of the parliamentary representatives of the two parties mentioned.

What was really the position of this "most exemplary, most democratic and most liberal minorities policy" of the Prague central authorities?

The Orbis publishing house in Prague published in February, 1937 a pamphlet entitled: Are the Germans in Czechoslovakia oppressed? Ministerial replies to the complaints of the Sudeten German Party. This work described matters in such a way as to show that the Czechs did not place the Sudeten Germans at a disadvantage in economic, political or national respects.

This work was misleading and intended to disguise the problem of the Sudeten Germans in order to make their just complaints appear unjustified to world public opinion.

In order to refute this view and to prove how justified these complaints were a work by Hans Richter was published in April, 1937 by the University publishers, Wilhelm Braumüller of Vienna and Leipzig, entitled: Are the Sudeten Germans not oppressed in Czechoslovakia? The reply was given by Czechoslovaks of the Czechoslovak Government, not Sudeten Germans or Germans of the Reich, and they brought before the light of public opinion the oppression of the Sudeten Germans and their great distress.

Below we give some extracts from this work, which are all the more striking and conclusive as they do not come from friends or adherents of the present Sudeten German movement but from the camp of their opponents. We have not quoted from this work the terrible details of distress and misery, despair and suffering in the Sudeten German towns and villages but have restricted ourselves to general descriptions and to the conditions arising therefrom. But they are sufficient to convince any objective and humane reader of the true position in these districts.

"Sozialdemokrat", Prague. — December 24th, 1933.

"... The distress of the unemployed has become incalculable. There are people who have been unemployed for three or four years. And the number of those who earn nothing is constantly increasing. The children are crying for bread. There is no fuel in the house. Meat and fats have long been an unattainable luxury. The clothes have become threadbare. It is scarcely possible to mend them again and they cannot

be replaced. The sufferers remember the War years. At that time their lot was almost the same as now. But then famine was general. Now the stores and the shop-windows are full of goods. This increases the bitterness."

January 12th, 1936.

"Children in the Erzgebirge stay away from school, because they have nothing to eat and no shoes.

"In the Sudeten German border districts there are constant reports this winter of the distress of the population which is becoming more and more intolerable and, in connection therewith, of the sad conditions under which the young people of this district are growing up. Children are the innocent victims of a period of distress the end of which is not yet in sight. Conditions in the Böhmerwald and Erzgebirge are particularly bad. It is known from press reports that innumerable poor Germans in the Böhmerwald send their children to the numerous Czech minority schools which have been opened in recent years in the Osser district merely in order that the children may obtain an occasional plate of hot soup or a glass of milk, because they are rewarded by shoes and clothes for providing a possibility of filling a Czech minority school and justifying the existence of a Czech educational establishment. Shoes and clothes are articles which have long been unattainable for hundreds and thousands of our wretched countrymen in the Böhmerwald.

It has long been clear to those who have an insight into the conditions that matters are not much different in the Erzgebirge, near the world spa of Karlsbad, and that the distress of the population is no less evident in that district."

February 14th, 1937.

"After the collapse of the War and the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic, large sections of the German rural population placed their hopes in a new settlement of land tenure conditions. These hopes were severely disappointed by the practical application of the land reform law.

The systematic penetration of the German area with land-owners of other race had an irritating effect on the German population. In the German border districts there are thousands of small farmers and cottagers who were hungry for a piece of land. They had to look on while people with no idea whatever of agriculture came and took the land before their nose. Generally the owners of these remaining estates had the further task of looking after the opening of a Czech school, if possible with German children, and this undoubtedly increased the ill-feeling in the German districts. The effect was even worse in economic respects. Hundreds of owners of remaining land went bankrupt and used the land allotted to them for speculation purposes. It is estimated that there are at present nearly 1000 of these remaining estates that are faced by ruin. The former president of the Land Office, Vozenilek, himself stated that about 45 per cent of these estates had got into economic difficulties, although most of them bought the land dirt cheap.

Any one coming into the province at present hears dreadful stories about the economic machinations of certain owners of these remaining estates."

Hr. Richter, Mayor of Reichenberg, in his speech of welcome to M. Necas, Minister of Public Welfare. August 21st, 1935.

"Distress has reached such a point that assistance is urgently required. I am not a National Socialist, but I must say that anyone who crosses the frontier, which is situated a few hours away, and sees what work is being done there and then considers the hunger and deprivation of the unemployed in Czechoslovakia, anyone who sees the distress of the workers and the compulsory standstill of heavy industry, must necessarily make comparisons and reach the conclusion that there is not everywhere the same churchyard calm as in Czechoslovakia. It is high time to take action. The Sudeten German workmen want work and not alms, and they think they are justified in calling for the provision of work by the State. The Sudeten German population is embittered and turns away from the old parties because all their patience and loyalty are unavailing. It is high time for the State economic service to step in.

"Prager Montagsblatt". October 22nd, 1935.

"The Minister of Public Welfare, Necas, will, we learn, visit the West Bohemian distressed areas next week. After the courageous speech by the Minister at Reichenberg, thousands of unemployed hoped for an improvement in their sad lot. They are only afraid that Engineer Necas will obtain his information from officials, party secretaries and trades union people and will have no opportunity of seeing for himself the terrible position in the distressed areas in the Eger valley and in the famine districts of the Erzgebirge. We therefore recommend him to devote two days to a journey by car—like Haroun al Rashid of yore—and to study the living conditions of the population in

the industrial communes and the mountain villages of West Bohemia."

"**Volkswille**". Sozialdemokratisches Tagblatt, Karlsbad. May 31st, 1936.

"Incalculable suffering has come over the masses of the Sudeten German people. Our towns and industrial villages are like churchyards; hundreds of thousands of hard-working and industrious people have become recipients of public relief, and those who still have work earn little more than what is strictly necessary to keep body and soul together. Our people in the frontier zone live a wretched, unhappy life, and the strain on their nerves, their will to live and their strength of character must be described as superhuman."

The Social Democrat deputy Wenzel Jaksch (Government Party) in the "Sozialdemokrat", Prague. December 1st, 1936.

"In October 1935 about 62 per cent of all unemployed were in the districts with a German majority, and in October 1936 the figure had risen to 69 per cent. The last available statistics show that unemployment has declined since October 1935 by an average of 28.2 per cent for the State as a whole, while in the districts of Bohemia with a German majority it only declined by 14.9 %. It should be specially mentioned that a number of industrial and rural distressed areas in Bohemia (Dux, Gablonz, Kaplitz, Karlsbad, Marienbad, Neudeck, Tachau, Teplitz-Schönau, Trautenau) record a stabilisation of their distressing unemployment figures. Recently we noted the same phenomenon in North-Moravia-Silesia.

These distressing figures are not quoted for our private amusement or even for internal use in the party. The most primitive national justice must however begin by devoting at least the same attention to the mass distress in the German districts as to the wishes of the spirits industry. Anyone can test our statements. No interested person is forbidden to study the true position in the distressed districts. It is however not sufficient to obtain reports written by paid and, to say the least, uncomprehending control organs, but it is necessary to see for once how the victims of the crisis live in the distressed villages of the Erzgebirge and the Böhmerwald, what they have to eat, what sort of clothes and shoes they wear, and what is the state of health of the children and adults. Such checks would be extraordinarily useful. Why do those who complain of the "abuse" of the action to supply food hesitate to get into human touch with the victims of their mania for economy. In this sphere a position has arisen which is wellnigh intolerable."

Wenzel Jaksch in the Czech Review "Programm" for January 1936.

"The activist Germans are also dissatisfied with the national political results of democratic cooperation. In spite of all efforts a fundamental settlement of national political problems has not been tackled in any quarter. It must unfortunately be frankly stated that a great part of Czech public opinion tries to belittle the Sudeten German problem. The enemies of the Republic are speculating on the fact that Czechoslovak democracy is incapable of solving its nationality problems. The mere fact of the participation of the Germans in the Government is not a solution. A fundamental and conventional solution of joint national life in the Republic is very necessary. The formula coined by Svehla and adopted by Benes: "Equal among equals", should not only be used on festive occasions but should also be applied when distributing State contracts, in appointments to the public service and in the development of the cultural arrangements of each race.

Czechoslovak policy has hitherto been lacking in the firm determination to use the State not only as an instrument of power but also as an instrument of national understanding."

Wenzel Jaksch at a meeting in Bodenbach on April 26th, 1936.

"We are faced by a new discussion on the basic tendencies of Czech policy. National guerrilla warfare continues on all fronts and poisons the internal political atmosphere. Innumerable treaties are concluded with other countries, while it has been impossible internally to conclude the most modest national political agreement. At the side of the legal, there is an illegal nationality policy. It would seem that most Czech politicians did not understand the warning of May 19th. After the elections it was openly admitted that serious mistakes had been committed against the Germans. No practical results were, however, forthcoming, but, on the contrary, the policy of pinpricks was continued. Our justified complaints have encountered a wall of dead silence."

"The fundamental problems of joint national life since 1918 have either been answered in a one-sided manner or have remained unsettled. The Czech formula that the obligations to the minorities must be fulfilled cannot satisfy us. Those who wish to dispose of us as a minority should bear in mind that several nations in Europe with a smaller population than the Sudeten Germans have their own State. From the State point of view it is sheer madness constantly to send further numbers of Czechs to the over-populated German areas. We state quite openly that the discrimination against the Germans in the public service, in the language question and in the entire administration has reached a degree that is generally found to be untenable... Czech policy is faced with the internal decision whether there is room or not in its conception of the State for the Sudeten Germans."

"**Nordböhmischer Volksbote**", Sozialdemokratisches Tagblatt, Bodenbach October 24th, 1935.

"Words are too weak to describe the distress and sufferings of the young in the crisis areas. It is painful and disturbing to think how many people and how many valuable talents will be lost to a more fortunate society of the future, especially at a time when the number and health of the rising generation decide the fate of the nations. But if human assistance is not granted to the utmost extent of what is possible, we must all assume an indelible guilt in the face of the rising generation."

The Czech writer Mrs. Pujman in the Review "Přítomnost", Prague. October 19th, 1935.

"The people in the Reichenberg district are under-nourished and suffering from mass neurasthenia. Everywhere one meets famine-stricken set faces.

"It will be replied that distress in North Bohemia is the same as in Slovakia, Ruthenia etc. I am far from maintaining that distress is an exclusive characteristic of North Bohemia. But I have convinced myself that the distress in North Bohemia is of greater specific gravity. Unemployment is no longer an epidemic phenomenon there, but a natural condition, and that is a bad thing."

"**Neue Morgenpost**", Prague. November, 1935.

The Czech jurist Dr. Traub reports on the travel impressions of a delegation of Czech intellectuals to the North Bohemian frontier district.

"The impressions which we gained in the distressed areas had an overwhelming effect on the members. I can only confirm in full the report by Mme. Pujman. A considerable portion of the Sudeten German population, as a result of under-nourishment and unemployment that has lasted for years, is suffering from mass neurasthenia. Everywhere the terrible, set expression of the famine-stricken is seen. The economic basis of entire districts has been lost. We visited places in which 75 per cent of the entire adult population is without any income. Conditions as regards labour, wages, housing and health are everywhere bad. Unemployed men showed us with tears their last tattered shirt. Others said they had not had a piece of bread for three days. The most overwhelming complaints are made by the representatives of the communes and child welfare regarding the decline in physical well-being and health, especially in communes which could formerly boast of exemplary education and excellent welfare institutions. The children can no longer follow the instruction on account of under-nourishment, and those who leave school fail to find work; moreover they can scarcely do any serious strenuous work on account of undernourishment. And yet they cannot obtain any support from the State because they are not yet considered as unemployed."

"**Ceské Slovo**", Prague. — November 1st, 1935.

The editor of the newspaper, M. Hedja, reports on his impressions during a tour through the Sudeten German famine area.

"For 14 years not a single Minister of Commerce has paid an official visit to the German Bohemian industrial area. Since the beginning of the economic depression, no active Minister, with the exception of Engineer Necas, Minister of Public Welfare, has become acquainted with actual conditions or obtained direct information at first hand from manufacturers and workmen.

With whom I spoke? Industrials, manufacturers, workmen, hotel proprietors etc., all of whom complained of the lack of interest shown by Prague. Whatever the Germans do arouses suspicions among the Czechs.

It is obvious that we Czechs do not come to an agreement with the Germans. The lack of understanding is, indeed, mutual. It cannot be said of the Germans who have lived for sixteen years

in Czechoslovakia that they have approached the Czechs. The depression has further widened the separation between the two nations living in North Bohemia, more than anyone who has the fate of the State at heart can approve.

I believe that in such a case it is the sacred duty of the ruling race to take the first step. And this step must arise out of mutual recognition. It is not sufficient in winter to go to the Riesenbegirge for ski-ing or in summer to the Saxon-Bohemian Switzerland. In the first place our politicians should get to know the industrial circles of Bohemia and Moravia, not only the Czech population but the German also. It might be then clearer what appears today to be the most serious cause of the present political line of the Germans, namely that it is in the main a famine front against Prague."

"Neue Zürcher Zeitung". — December 7th, 1935.

"What impression did we obtain from our journey through the Sudeten German district? We may state frankly that it was depressing for any friend of peace and democracy, but also for anyone who is fond of the German language. We found, for instance, that even the Customs officials at Eger, that most important entrance station for the German-speaking district, could hardly speak German and could not read it. Even on the German University the inscription is in Czech. Almost all positions in the State service, posts, police, railway etc., are filled exclusively by Czechs. The taxation authorities in the German district are also exclusively in the hands of the Czechs; it is clear that this is a source of embitterment, especially as the compulsory collections which are also carried out by Czechs are often of extreme severity. The misery prevailing among the unemployed is scarcely describable. If the districts with the greatest unemployment are painted black, they correspond almost exactly to the entire Sudeten German linguistic area."

"Demokraticky Stred", Prague. — April 30th, 1936.

"It is necessary to state frankly that the German minority possesses justified grounds for complaining and for insisting on an improvement of the position of the Germans in social and economic respects. There is no doubt that the Germans have a claim to be admitted to official posts and that they should be assisted in the terrible economic distress from which the mixed area is suffering. By not bothering about the German problem, we do not remove it from the world. The less we bother about it, the more urgent and unpleasant it will become... The fact that over three million Germans live in the Republic may be unpleasant, but it does not cease to be a fact... It is impossible to deny justice to the minorities. It is therefore in the interest of the State to win over loyal citizens of German race for the Republic... That the Germans are not united at this particular moment is a great advantage... But if we continue this irresponsible lack of interest in the German problem, we shall lose even those Germans who have already been won over for the Republic."

"Přítomnost", Prague. — December 1935.

Extract from an interview with the English journalist Seaton Watson in connection with his visit to Prague.

"Consider the infernal confusion caused by British policy in the Irish question. Our action against Ireland for a long time aggravated British relations with the United States where many million voters are of Irish origin and views. Perhaps a remote analogy might be sought with the relations of Czechoslovakia to Germany, except for the great difference that the ocean lies between America and Ireland, while Czechoslovakia is situated directly on the frontiers of Germany. The Czechs should therefore study the Irish question, but as a terrifying example. In the Irish question, the English made all their concessions too late; for whenever agreement appeared to be in sight, some complication came from outside which upset it. This may serve the Czechs as a warning. The Czechs could also learn a lesson from the South African policy of the British Empire. It was proved after the Boer War that the mistakes and hostilities of the past could be made good by a reasonable peace treaty and extensive political and cultural concessions."

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These few quotations, which could be increased by many others giving the views of impartial and objective foreigners, show that the minorities policy did not aim at fulfilling the pledges assumed and the promises given, but at "Czechoslovakising" the Sudeten Germans, pushing the linguistic frontier back to the frontier of the country and erecting in the near future on the ruins of Sudeten Germanism a new Czech bastion and a centre of the Czech frontier population, as has been constantly pointed out in the Czech press. The Czech frontier population stands in the service of the expansionist policy with its diabolical system and brutal unscrupulousness, which is applied sometimes with cynical frankness and at other times with clever disguise in a manner for which no comparison can be found.

The Czech frontier population with its methods of deprivation of rights, terrorism and ill-treatment of the minorities, has recently been supplemented by the gendarmerie, the State police and the army: a mockery of the obligations and promises solemnly assumed and given by the Moldau republic nearly twenty years ago. The fine words of Masaryk: I am the master, you are the master, have since then been changed to an increasing extent and with increasing speed to the less pleasant words: I am the master, you are the servant.

THE PROBLEM OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY

Extract from the Speech by the Hungarian Foreign Minister von Kanya in the Chamber of Deputies on June 2nd, 1938

"In the first part of my speech I endeavoured to show how the hegemony of the State which got the upper hand in the Great War has definitely come to an end in view of the change in power conditions and how the equilibrium which has been so long lacking in those conditions has been restored.

I will now turn to the question of the Danube basin which is as important for the safeguarding of European peace as the relations existing between the Great Powers. It cannot be denied that there is a certain similarity between the Great Powers on the one hand and the State of the Danube basin on the other hand. The defects of the Treaty of Versailles had a disintegrating effect on the Great Powers, and similarly the Peace Treaty of Trianon makes its disintegrating

effect felt in the Danube valley. Both there and here there are strong endeavours to bridge the existing difficulties. The negotiations regarding the Danube valley only assumed a serious form in the course of last year, because the exaggerated self-consciousness of the States of the Little Entente had until then formed an insuperable obstacle. The international position of Hungary was required in order to reach the result that the States of the Little Entente showed more consideration for us and adopted a milder tone.

The negotiations being carried on with the States of the Little Entente relate to the improvement of the lot of the Hungarian minorities, the recognition of the Hungarian minorities and declarations

to be given mutually in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact. The most important element in the negotiations is naturally the question of minorities. The States of the Little Entente, in return for their great territorial gains, had assumed international obligations for the proper treatment of their large Hungarian minorities. The practical execution of these obligations, however, has been protracted and the minorities problem has therefore become the central point in the present negotiations.

I consider it necessary to explain the difficulties with which we are faced in order to make clear the slowness of the negotiations which to many people seems incomprehensible. In the first place these difficulties include unfortunately the very serious differences which the Peace Treaty of Trianon created between ourselves and our neighbours. The bridging of these differences is naturally a very difficult and delicate task. It is made still more difficult by the fact that the Little Entente came into existence exclusively against Hungary and that the anti-Hungarian character of this group of Powers still exists. The three States of the Little Entente adopt different courses in many fundamental problems. But as against Hungary they constantly follow the principle of close cooperation. We for our part, however, are not inclined to negotiate with the Little Entente as a bloc. The other side insisted, however, that the agreements to be reached individually with three States should be entirely identical. It is sufficient to glance at the position of the three States, which is in many respects materially different, to see how decisively this circumstance has hindered the smooth course of the negotiations.

The international position of the three States can really not be called identical.

Czechoslovakia did not succeed in creating correct relations with her neighbours, and the situation between her and three of her neighbours is somewhat tense.

Yugoslavia, on the other hand, created a peaceful atmosphere on all her frontiers, which is also felt by us. There is no doubt that the relations of Hungary with Yugoslavia have developed more favourable in the last two years than with the two other States of the Little Entente.

Roumania also succeeded, by dropping her pro-Russian attitude and by developing Polish-Roumanian relations, in consolidating her international position.

The position of the Hungarian minorities differs in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and is fundamentally different in Roumania. In Czechoslovakia the various minorities form the majority of the inhabitants who demand their rights with daily increasing force. In Roumania the Roumanians are, it is true, in a majority but the most numerous Hungarian majority is in that country and lives in closed blocks, and it is generally known that their lot is very bitter. Another serious difference is that Czechoslovakia has not denied the principle that the minorities question has an international political character. On the other hand, Roumania—although she has signed the international minorities treaties—adopts the principle that the minorities question is exclusively a matter of internal policy in which other States have no concern. In support of this thesis she bases herself on the fact that the Roumanian people is so penetrated with nationalistic feelings that the Government is incapable in the matter of minorities of entering into obligations with foreign States. It is useless to point to the German-Polish minorities agreement or to the fact that last year Italy

and Yugoslavia had found means of settling the minorities problem in connection with the signature of a pact of friendship.

All this shows how difficult it is to bring the negotiations on minorities questions with the three States differing so widely in their position and relations down to a common denominator. But events prove almost daily the predominant importance of the minorities question and I think everyone must agree even at the present time that this question has become an international problem which can no longer be neglected.

On this question which has been discussed for many months I would like to say a few words.

As it is by no means my intention to do anything to aggravate the position, though I might have much more to say, I will confine myself to pointing out a few important factors which show how little friendly the attitude of Czechoslovakia has been towards us for many years and with what self-restraint Hungary has replied.

At the end of the War, when Czechoslovakia with the help of the friendly Great Powers created a State in which the so-called nationalities formed the majority as compared with the ruling nation, she was also accorded extensive Hungarian territories. Many hoped that this very circumstance would cause the Czechoslovak Government to do everything to conciliate Hungary and at any rate in the economic sphere, to lay the foundations of normal relations. The official Czech policy was, however, conducted on quite different lines and was probably based on the view that the extraordinarily favourable position of the Czechoslovak Republic after the War, which rested solely on the force of bayonets, would be maintained for a long time to come. In view of this opinion, the Government dealt with the Hungarian question in a superior manner: by creating closer relations with Roumania and Yugoslavia it aspired to the position of a Great Power and cared little for the feeling ruling in Hungary. It adopted a menacing attitude towards even the slightest Hungarian agitation and constantly threatened war. The target of the extremely strong Czech propaganda was primarily Hungary. We heard long stories of the alleged backwardness of Hungary and of our constant disturbances of the peace, so that we were gradually compelled to discover the guiding hand of Prague in any serious press campaign directed against us. I need not repeat on what deaf ears the complaints of the Hungarian nationality fell in Prague.

It is self-evident that such a procedure carried on consistently for a considerable period could not rouse sympathies in Hungary for our Czechoslovak neighbour. But last year, when negotiations were finally started between ourselves and the States of the Little Entente, we gladly entered into these negotiations and suppressed our indignation at past events. I think we could not have given stronger proof of our good will.

But now, when the Prague Government found it necessary, in view of the great disturbances caused by the nationalities question, to order partial mobilisation which extended not only to the frontier against Germany but also to the Hungarian frontier, we adopted a calm attitude to this procedure—which could scarcely be called friendly—and refrained from any measure which might have further aggravated the position. We are determined to continue to follow this course which we consider to be right and proper, but the rapprochement between the two States cannot be promoted exclusively by the good will of Hungary. Hungary will not disturb the peace, but Czecho-

slovakia has so many nationalities that we shall not see what development the future holds until it is made clear what concessions the Prague Government is prepared to make to all its dissatisfied nationalities. It is obvious that it must act in the same way towards all the races. England is of opinion, which she did not fail to communicate to Prague, that it will only be possible by extensive concessions to introduce calm in the nationalities question. What we long ago pointed out, namely that the minorities question in present circumstances has become a central problem for the maintenance of peace, is now recognised by that Great Power which takes an increasing

interest in the European position and whose impartiality in this question will not, I think, be doubted even in Prague. The further development depends upon whether the Czechoslovak Government can bring itself to create a nationalities statute, which will tranquilise the numerous minorities living in Czechoslovakia and whether it will not, under the influence of certain political quarters, be drawn into rash political speculations which can in no circumstances serve the cause of peace. It depends on this whether the détente which is at present observable will be durable."

THE SLOVAK FIGHT FOR AUTONOMY

The Pittsburg Agreement of May 30th, 1938

"Slovakia for the Slovaks! We are neither Czechs nor Czechoslovaks. Consequently in the name of justice and lasting peace, we demand the autonomy of Slovakia."

These sentences form the heading to the memorandum which the two Slovak leaders and members of the National Assembly at Prague, Father Hlinka and Dr. Jehlieka, handed to the Peace Conference in Paris, on September 20th, 1919.

Nineteen years have elapsed since that memorandum got thrown on one side and disappeared—possibly without being read—among the piles of similar documents, including presumably the copy of the Treaty which has now, after 20 years, reappeared so unexpectedly for Czechoslovakia.

In the early hours of May 26th, 1938, the Polish Steamship "Bathory" anchored in the harbour of Gdynia. This event, which accorded with the ordinary itinerary of the vessel, was regarded by a minority of the population of the Czechoslovak State, which is just now the focus of political interest, as a day of greatest expectation and excitement: the fact was that there were on board some hundred Slovak 'pilgrims', who had come from the United States for the sole purpose of testifying to their solidarity with their oppressed compatriots in Europe, bringing with them, as an outward proof of this their desire, a document carefully preserved for 20 years—which had once, when the Czechoslovak State was founded, promised their compatriots living in Czechoslovakia a political, cultural and economic life their own. I refer to the so-called Pittsburg Agreement of May 30th, 1918.

Complete equality of status with the Czechs in a common State (still to be founded) had indeed been solemnly promised to the Slovaks in similar agreements concluded abroad between representatives of the two peoples, such as the Declaration of Moscow of May 16th, 1915, and the Agreement of Cleveland of October 27th, 1915.

When the Pittsburg Agreement was concluded between the American Slovaks and Masaryk, a 'ratification' had at the same time to be made with the home country itself. Thus, two days after the State was founded, on October 30th, 1918, that Declaration signed by 103 Slovak members of the National Council at St. Martin (Slovakia) came into being, in which the separation of Slovakia from Hungary and its attachment to the new Czechoslovak State was provisionally determined for a period of ten years. The clause relating to the ten-year probationary period was eliminated by the two agents of the Czech "Maffia" who achieved notoriety through the Koza-Medvecký case and the text of the Declaration was further falsified by these people by the insertion of a statement purporting to be a relinquishment by the Slovaks of their right to send their own representative to the Peace Conference.

The Slovak people was taken by surprise, but a few noble Slovak leaders like Hlinka and Jehlieka took a separate dele-

gation to Paris for the Peace Conference in the Spring of 1919, on their own initiative.

Now, through this political pilgrimage of American Slovaks to their old home, the Slovak—like the Sudeten-German—problem has reached a decisive stage.

It was through the Pittsburg document that Th. G. Masaryk, who was later to become the first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, achieved the union of the Czechs and Slovaks living in the United States. Its provisions read as follows:

"The representatives of Slovak and Czech organisations in the United States, the Slovak League, the Czech National Association and the Association of Czech Catholics have negotiated, in the presence of the Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Council, Professor Masaryk, on the Czechoslovak question and on our propagandist demonstrations held up to the present and decided as follows:

We approve the political programme, which aims at uniting the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent State of the Bohemian Provinces and Slovakia.

Slovakia shall be accorded its own administrative machinery, its own Diet and its own courts, and Slovak will be the official language in schools and Government Departments and in public life generally.

The Czechoslovak State shall be a Republic and its Constitution shall be democratic. The organisation of co-operation between Czechs and Slovaks in the United States will be extended and developed in mutual agreement, as necessity arises and in conformity with the position as it changes. The detailed provisions relating to the setting up of a Slovak State shall be left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their rightful representatives."

The coming into being of this Agreement was rightly regarded as the greatest achievement of Masaryk's propagandist activities, for it was through that Agreement and that Agreement alone, that the 7½ million Czechs acquired the basis for the justification for an independent State. 7½ million Czechs and 2.3 million Slovaks were enabled in this way to claim the right to create their own independent national unit, which Masaryk and Benes were, it is true, later to determine according to the principle of geography rather than of ethnography. It was essential that the Slav States, in which the longing for national autonomy was smouldering, should place themselves unreservedly on their side.

The text of the Agreement does indeed quite clearly reflect that longing, as also the fact that those agreements purported to be agreements concluded between two completely indepen-

dent nations with equal rights. As early as the Spring of 1916, Masaryk and Benes had founded, as refugees, together with Stefanik, the "Czechoslovak National Council" for the purpose of making propaganda among the Allies for the creation of a new State, to be erected in Bohemia on the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy. The hyphen was intended at that time to be an earnest of the fact that two nations with equal rights were involved. The division thus deliberately made between the two words Czechs and Slovaks is quite clear from the Pittsburg Agreement and, like the text of the Agreement itself, indicates in no uncertain manner the aim pursued by the Slovaks in their attachment (Anschluss) to the common State: namely, the securing of an independent life for their race and consequently administrative separation—spell decentralisation—in all departments. They desired once for all to free themselves from subjection to the centralising aspirations of another dominating State and were most certainly not anxious to jump from the frying-pan of Budapest centralisation into the fire of that of Prague. Father Hlinka, the aged leader of the Slovak autonomy movement, put it as follows: it is a political union and union of State, but not a national union, for there is no such thing as a Czecho-Slovak nation.

All this was solemnly guaranteed through the Agreement by responsible Czech representatives, who were however never desirous of carrying it out once they had attained their object: namely, by means of additions, to obtain a "majority nation" and thus to acquire, in the eyes of their patrons in the Western democracies, a title to found and govern the State.

It was already apparent at the Peace Conference at Paris that the Czechs did not intend to keep their promise. Their official representative, Dr. Benes,—now President of the Republic—managed to convince the "Big Four" that the Czech delegation was the only one entitled to represent the new political unit, and the Slovak delegation was forced to leave the Conference and France. The use of the hyphen was made a treasonable offence and severely punished. Father Hlinka and other members of the Slovak delegation in Paris, were, on their return home on October 12th, 1919, thrown into prison for "treasonable activities". All reference to the Czech promises in the Pittsburg Agreement was not only forbidden, but regarded as an attack against the security of the State and punished by law.

A similar period of suffering now began for the Slovak "brother", as for the other national groups. The exact opposite happened from what the Slovaks had hoped and been promised. They received neither their own administration nor their own Diet. They were not accorded their own Courts and Czechs was made the official language and the language of the schools instead of Slovak. Government offices in Slovakia, the Courts, schools, banks, industry and business were flooded with Czechs. The hoped-for blossoming of distinctive national characteristics was stifled by the rigid central Government in Prague. The "little brothers" not only remained little, but became poor, until even the self-controlled peasant character of the Slovaks retaliated against this sort of "new freedom" and forged itself a political instrument in the shape of the autonomy movement.

That the Czechs did not intend to keep their promise to the Slovaks is shown by a quotation from Masaryk's book "World Revolution" (page 233) in which he says:

"This Agreement was concluded in order to reassure a small Slovak minority, which dreamed of some sort of autonomy for the Slovaks. I signed it without hesitation, as it was a local agreement between the American Czechs and the Slovaks."

That this Treaty was anything but a local agreement, is shown by the text, all comment being superfluous. The non-execution of the clear provisions has since been explained by the Czechs in various ways. Immediately after the introduction of the new regime, it was explained that the Slovaks were not yet ripe for such a far-reaching measure of autonomy. Later, it was stated that the terms of the Treaty had long since been carried out. Then, when the Slovaks proved the contrary, the agreement was regarded as invalid—first of all on the ground that, at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, Masaryk was not yet President of the Republic and was there-

fore not empowered validly to sign, and then that the "Slovak League", with which the Czechs concluded the Agreement, had no legal existence at that time, as it was not recognised by the State until 1919. Finally, Masaryk himself called the Agreement a forgery, but he was compelled later, when in 1922 the Slovak League in America published the full text with the signatures, to admit its existence, although he sought to contest its validity in law on the strength of the above-mentioned and other formalist objections. These self-contradictory commentaries reflected the uncertainty of the Czechs with regard to the Slovak demands, whose unreserved fulfilment was ever and again demanded by the autonomists with unremitting tenacity though by elastic methods adapted to the political position at the moment.

The Premier, Dr. Hodza, was finally compelled to admit, in a statement to the Press on March 20th, 1938, that the Agreement, though not valid in law, was morally valid and could not therefore be jettisoned without further ado.

The Slovaks have now acquired in the Pittsburg Agreement, their Magna Charta, which has now been solemnly produced, a powerful ally before the whole world and a political instrument, which will compel Prague to return to the method of honourable negotiation, which it abandoned 20 years ago.

It must have struck the Slovaks as peculiar that, on the occasion of the reception festivities at Gdynia, Warsaw and Prague, the Czechoslovak delegations competed with the Slovak and Polish delegations in the cordiality of their greetings and expressions such as "affection and gratitude" and "deep emotion to think that they had returned to the beautiful, free and happy Slovakian land and brought with them the Pittsburg Agreement—that extremely valuable historical document" should have flowed from the mouths of official representatives.

In spite of these soft words, the Slovaks have preserved their caution and have deposited this valuable document—not in Prague, but in Rosenberg—Father Hlinka's seat—where it is being preserved by loyal Slovaks until it is called upon to play its part in achieving the final struggle for autonomy.

* * *

The gushing articles of welcome in the Czech press soon gave place to articles of a diametrically opposed character, when, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburg Agreement, the Slovak People's Party held a party jubilee at Bratislava during the Whitsun holiday, at which Father Hlinka read out the text of the "Bible of the Slovaks", invoked those of the signatories who were still living and present as witnesses to the genuineness of the signatures and received from the participants in the demonstration a solemn oath the "they would not give up the struggle until the Pittsburg Agreement had been carried out".

Following upon this, the Party Congress summarised the political demands of the autonomous Slovaks in a resolution, from which the following is a quotation:

"We thank our American brothers for their great sacrifices of blood and treasure in the struggle for the liberation of the Slav people and for their long-sighted statesmanship in laying down in the Treaty of Pittsburg the conditions of the association of the Slovaks with the Czech nation. We solemnly testify before our compatriots and before the whole world, that the Slovaks desire to live in the Czechoslovak Republic with all the rights of an autonomous people and will never cease to fight for their natural rights, which were secured to them by treaty. We reject the fiction of the (non-existent) homogeneous Czechoslovak people and will not submit to being deprived of our national rights.

We most decidedly reject Bolshevism both for our country and for foreign countries and swear to work with all our might for the liberation of the nation and of the whole world from Bolshevism.

We welcome the interest evinced by other countries in the settlement of the internal problems of the Czechoslovak Republic; we demand of the Government of the Czechoslovak State

the pursuance of an equitable policy for the solution of our internal political problems and the initiation of friendly relations with all neighbouring States; we demand that the balance be held fairly between the Slovak people and the Czech people on the basis of our national rights. We are prepared to cooperate in this work of conciliation, which would afford the Slovak people, the Czech people, our national racial groups and our common State, fair prospects of life and development for all time.

The time for the solution of the Slovak question has come and it permits of no postponement: the Slovak people will not be held responsible by posterity for any confusion of the issue or any results arising therefrom."

The most important political result of the demonstrations and consultations at Bratislava was the approval of a demand for a Law relating to the autonomy of Slovakia. One of the most essential parts of this demand is the following statement: "Slovakia is an autonomous part of the Czechoslovak Republic".


The legislative rights of the Prague Parliament shall in future extend only to common affairs of State. These common affairs comprise; constitutional questions, foreign policy, national defence (subject to the proviso that Slovaks shall in peace time serve in Slovakia only and be under a Slovak provincial command), questions of citizenship, currency, Customs, communications, postal telegraph and telephone services, administration of the National Debt and loans for common objects, taxes duties and fees in so far these are necessary for common purposes, and finally monopolies and Government concerns with the exception of the State forests, estates, mining concerns and spas situated in Slovakia. Decisions of the Prague Parliament shall however be valid only if the majority of the Deputies elected in Slovakia required in each case shall have approved a decision concerning matters of common interest. In other matters, the Slovak Deputies to the Prague Parliament shall have no right to vote. All matters however which are not expressly reserved for the Prague Parliament shall fall within the competence of a Slovak Diet to be set up on the principle of proportional representation as a result of general, direct and secret elections. The Slovak Diet shall vote on the future constitution of the Slovak (Federal) State; the officials of the Slovak administrative Departments must be Slovaks and in the common civil administrative offices the Slovaks shall be represented in numbers corresponding to the ratio between them and the total population. Judicial authority in Slovakia shall be vested in a Slovak Provincial Court and a Supreme Slovak Court. Matters affecting other racial groups living in Slovakia shall be treated on a footing of complete equality.

* * *

Many of those assembled on the historical Hviezdoslav Square must during this demonstration have been carried back in memory to the 10th of May 1848 (the year of the Revolution) when the Slovaks framed their first demands for autonomy and to the 6th and 7th of June 1861, when 6000 Slovaks from all parts of the country constituted themselves at Turocz-St. Martin "the Slovak National Assembly" and formulated similar demands.

From the Slovak Memorandum to the Peace Conference of September 20th, 1919.

The tyranny to which the Slovaks were subjected by the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a matter of common knowledge throughout the world and when, as a result of the World War, the old Empires began to totter, the Slovaks hoped that political freedom would be born for them out of the ruins of the old world: when the old Monarchy was dissolved as a result of the collapse of the Central Powers, the Slovaks enthusiastically welcomed the conception of a new Slav State, which was to be composed of the various sister nations: Czechs, Moravians,



1938 INTERNATIONALE HANDWERKS AUSSTELLUNG BERLIN 28.MAI-10.JULI

1938
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Slovaks and Ruthenes. Every Slovak was convinced that the Slovak nation would enjoy in this State a measure of autonomy in which it would be able to preserve its national character and devote itself to the development of its own culture. Indeed, we were encouraged in this hope by the promises of persons well-qualified to speak with authority and in particular by the Agreement concluded between Czechs and Slovaks residing in America and the representatives of both nations and signed at Pittsburg on May 30th, 1918.

Never has a nation been so cruelly disappointed in its hopes as has the Slovak nation. It was agreed in America that a Czecho-Slovak State should be set up, in which the Slovaks should be accorded their autonomy: their own language, a national Parliament, their own Courts and Slovak as the official language. It was decided to found a Czecho-Slovak State, in which two Nations—Czechs and Slovaks—should live in complete freedom and on a footing of perfect equality. This agreement has however never been carried out, as those who seized political power would not hear of autonomy for the Slovaks. They are doing their best to create not only a Czechoslovak State, but a uniform Czechoslovak nation, which is an ethnographical monstrosity. Instead of receiving the promised Slovak freedom, we have once again been the victims of a fresh servitude. Instead of receiving our Slovak autonomy, we have come under the Czech domination, which was substituted for Magyar domination. We have merely changed our yoke and instead of the Magyar yoke the Czech yoke has been placed on our necks and this yoke is the heavier and bitterer, inasmuch as it has been placed upon us by people who call us their "brothers".

All our woes had their beginning and origin on September 14th, 1918, in Paris, when those concerned agreed to the idea of a Czechoslovak Republic, without defining or guaranteeing to the Slovaks the political autonomy which had been promised to them. We hoped that, at a later stage in the work of the Conference, Messrs Masaryk, Benes and Kramarsch would endeavour to keep their word and incorporate in the Peace Treaty that which justice, natural rights and written agreements demanded for the Czechs.

While mention was made in the Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria of an autonomous territory of the Ruthenes South of the Carpathians, no reference to a Slovak nation or its autonomy is to be found in it. For that reason we have come to Paris in order to demand what was solemnly promised to us; and we have further been obliged to take this step by the sorry plight to which our people have been brought through Czech imperialism and selfishness.

Slovakia has simply become a colony of Bohemia and is being treated as such.

As we cannot attain our object by means of a parliamentary fight, we appeal to the Peace Conference in the confident hope that it will guarantee to us that which we were promised.

In the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye concluded on September 10th, 1919 between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, we read: "the Czecho-Slovak State agrees in a treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the insertion of the provisions which these Powers regard as requisite for the protection of those persons living in Czecho-Slovakia who are, as regards race, language or religion, distinct from the majority of the population". We therefore demand that these Powers regard us as a distinct nation from the Czechs and

protect our interests by guaranteeing us the largest possible measure of autonomy.

We base our modest demands on the following arguments:

1. Slovakia, which forms nearly half of the Czech and Slovak Republic, cannot well be governed by the Central Government in Prague not only because Prague is far away from Slovakia and difficult of access, but also because the special character of Slovakia requires a different Government from that of the Czechs—a personal and separate government.

The Czechs and the Slovaks are "brothers" who have never seen one another and were never together. These two nations are entirely different in mentality and character. The Czechs are an industrial people and the Slovaks an agricultural people; the Czechs are for the most part Hussites and the Slovaks are Catholics; the Czechs have lived with the Germans and the Slovaks with the Magyars; the Czechs are more materialistic and the Slovaks more idealistic. There is no Czecho-Slovak nation, but only a Czech and a Slovak. We are not Czechs or Czecho-Slovaks, but Slovaks and we wish to remain Slovaks. One glance at Slovak history is enough to show that Czechs and Slovaks are different nations.

2. The inhabitants of the Czech and Slovak Republic cannot work peacefully side by side, if peace does not reign in the country. Czech imperialism is causing discord between Slovaks and Czechs and thus hindering peaceful and fruitful cooperation.

3. In order to counter-balance German imperialism on the Continent it was desired to found a strong Slav (Czecho-Slovak) Republic, this Republic will however be weak, for it will be divided through Czech imperialism and the dissension occasioned thereby. It will be strong if the Slovaks receive satisfaction and are not subjected to the hegemony of the Czechs. It is therefore in the interests of European peace that Slovakia be freed from this hegemony, as otherwise there can be no lasting peace in the country.

4. The Magyar and German minorities living in the Czecho-Slovak Republic are equally bitter about this Czech hegemony.

5. The victorious Entente has granted political autonomy to the members of the Ruthenian nation living in the Czecho-Slovak Republic, although this nation is far less numerous than the Slovak, and we can therefore with all the more justification demand the same treatment.

6. Every agreement must be carried out loyally and especially an agreement sealed with blood, as was the Pittsburg Agreement. The Slovak legionaries shed their blood for the victory of the Entente and not for Czech imperialism.

7. As the Czechs constitute only one third of the population of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, this Republic can only become a centre of order and peace in Central Europe if the just demands of all nations of which it is composed are satisfied.

In order to prove to the Conference that our statements are true in every respect, we ask for a plebiscite for Slovakia, which will show the true feelings of the Slovak people. This plebiscite must not however be held under the Czech régime of terrorism, but under the protection of the Army of the Entente.

We entrust our fate to the Peace Conference. Our right to exist was given to us by our Maker and we hope that the glorious Peace Conference will secure us that right against human injustice.

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LIBERTY OF THE PRESS AND PRESS PEACE

By Reich Press Chief Dr. DIETRICH

On the essential nature of the press, National Socialist press policy, the conception of the liberty of the press, the international power of the press, responsibility and irresponsibility of the press and the way to international press peace

Text of the speech made in Berlin on March 5th, 1938 before representatives of the Diplomatic Corps and the foreign press

I am happy to have an opportunity of discussing before an audience so peculiarly qualified to appreciate problems connected with the press, questions affecting the published word which are at present exercising the minds of men more than ever before.

I say more than ever before, for a new problem has been added during the last few decades to the great political problems with which the nations have been called upon to grapple. Press questions have for long, it is true, been numbered among the most interesting problems of social life generally and the most important of those affecting the relations between nations, but never before has the press so directly and deeply affected the political events of the time, as it does to-day.

Only a few days ago, the Leader of the German nation was impelled to make this growing international problem of the press the main theme of the great speech which made such a deep impression in every country of the world. With all possible frankness and clearness he showed up the dangers and the pernicious effects of destructive press work, with the fatal influence which it is having to-day on high politics, and in this way the press as a political problem of world importance has, by one eminently qualified to speak, been thrown into the arena of international debate.

The Führer's all too well founded accusations ruthlessly showed up the negative side of international press work, but it may be that many who heard this speech realised for the first time the extent to which the press has, especially during the last few decades, become a factor of international policy. Press policy is to-day more than ever before an important constituent part of politics, both national and international. Consequently I believe that in dealing in detail with this question to-day and attempting to discuss it in all its aspects from the point of view of the pressman, I can plead justification for my demands upon your attention for the purpose of considering this subject.

The press is one of those phenomena, of which one can say that their shadow attracts the eye more readily than the light which they give, which possibly explains the fact that there are still persons honestly concerned for the future who regard the press as one of the greatest misfortunes which have ever befallen mankind and true enough it is that it might be possible to live

without it and perhaps more happily than with it, but unfortunately the times in which we live have progressed too far for such a contemplative existence to be possible. To-day the press has become one of the most important functions of modern life, without which the existence of the nations is no longer thinkable. The press is the interpreter of daily events beyond the limits of time and space and that which connects men daily and hourly with the world as it exists beyond the horizon of their own vision. The newspaper is the mirror of the world and the press is always and everywhere in the centre of events. It has been called the nurse of public opinion, the megaphone of the nations and the eye and ear of the world. To discuss the extent to which the press truly fulfils the lofty duties thus assigned to it is to open up the whole press problem of our time. But however that may be, the press is an important factor of political life. It creates the atmosphere—whether for good or evil—in which politicians have to work; it keeps pace with policy and is in some sort the propaganda department of diplomacy, and it is therefore highly significant that diplomats should be assembled with journalists here to-day.

* * *

German press policy is being largely misunderstood throughout the world, but I am convinced that, properly understood, our press policy is calculated to eliminate just those devastating effects which a mistaken conception of the press has had upon the world.

It is self-evident that it is impossible either to understand the structure of our press or to grasp the essential significance of our press policy without some knowledge of the intellectual foundations of National-Socialism and the new thought which has taken shape within its framework or the new conception of the State which it incorporates and the relations of the individual to the community, which have provided us with a new foundation for our life and enriched our thought with totally new perceptions and ideas. I have in other connections often spoken of this revolution of thought which National-Socialism has brought about in the German people.

I have pointed out that National-Socialism has overcome individualist thought as the structural intellectual defect of a whole epoch and replaced it by community-conscious thought.

In this way, whole new avenues of knowledge have been "opened up and developments initiated, of which the outsider, whose mental life runs in quite different channels, is as yet entirely ignorant. The ideas which are familiar to the foreigner and regarded as self-evident in his country and among his nation are often inadequate to enable him to follow without prejudice and appreciate with understanding the stupendous happenings in Germany. We are standing, one might say, at the crossroads of two systems of thought and that is, when all is said and done, the source of all difficulties and misunderstandings which we so often encounter in international discussion to-day. It is impossible to understand National-Socialist action by means of liberalist thought. Only those who are carried away by this new community-conscious thought or at least attempt to grasp it can understand National-Socialism, its epoch, its values, its language and its message.

What I have said here of the progress of human notions which has brought about a revolution of thought in Germany in the last few years, applies especially to the press. If we examine the premises from which criticism of National-Socialist press policy proceeds and observe the long-since obsolete and no longer applicable criteria employed here, we can hardly wonder at the misunderstandings and the hostility with which the National-Socialist conception of the press meets at the hands of so many foreigners. It is true that the press, in virtue of its development, was a child of Liberalism, but the press of the Liberal epoch is not synonymous with the conception of the press generally. The conception of a newspaper in the National-Socialist State is fundamentally different from that which the liberalist philosophy has created in the minds of many of us. The essential characteristic of the liberalist press is to be found in the fact that it conceives it to be its vocation to provide a channel of expression for individual opinion and criticism of the State and its institutions. The individual, whether as journalist or free collaborator, is here the spokesman of so-called public opinion without other authority than his own presumption or private judgment and this strictly accords with the fundamental conception of individualist thought. The National-Socialist idea of the community on the other hand allocates a fundamentally different duty to the press: namely, to bring the individual to a comprehension of the vital principles of the community. The German people have learnt that the expression "Stand together" (zusammenhalten) is the greatest treasure that lies hidden in its storehouse.

The National-Socialist Party, as the great movement for the renovation of the German nation, has learnt from its own history that the uniform political thought of the whole nation is the basis of all national and social success and that only with knowledge of the questions affecting the common destiny can come the will to solve them. It sees in the knowledge of these questions affecting the common destiny a source of power and in the press one of the most potent means of furthering that knowledge.

In the National-Socialist State, it is not the duty of the press to express the opinion of the individual in regard to the whole and to give the appearance of "public opinion" to something which is nothing of the kind: on the contrary, its duty is constantly to bring before the individual questions affecting the destiny of the community and, where he is not aware of their existence, to impress it upon him. In this way, the newspaper becomes the daily monitor of the nation—the school of political thought, whose task it is to make every citizen realize that he is a member of the community and bound up with it through all vicissitudes. In our country, we do not regard that fluctuating barometer of moods provided by ill-tempered reporting under the daily and hourly influence of a thousand and one uncontrollable individual interests as "public opinion." With us, public opinion is the true will of the people, which National-Socialism seizes direct

at its source, by virtue of the very real bonds uniting it with the people: with us, public opinion is not made, but ascertained; with us, the newspaper is not the hunting-ground of irresponsibility and unbridled criticism by a few individuals, who, in the service of anonymous interests, misuse the right of criticism to undermine the authority of the State. With us, who have better methods of keeping the State in touch with the people, the newspaper is the printed conscience of the nation and called to further the work of the State, not to paralyse it. That is quite a different conception of the press from that of Liberalism, and we are convinced that it is better.

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In the light of such a conception of the press, which is on quite a different plane from the other, the arguments adduced by our foreign critics against the German press are seen to be irrelevant. They go wide of the mark, as they are taken from the vocabulary of a liberalist philosophy, whose notions are no longer applicable to our time or to our conception of the duties of the press. The German press also ventures to criticize, but it criticizes, not what is of service to the people, but what is harmful to it. Within the obvious limits set by the vital interests of the nation, it enjoys in the long run a greater degree of freedom than the liberal press has ever possessed: it even ventures to criticize the "liberty of the press", which is lauded with all the passion of which democracy is capable, as one of humanity's most sacred possessions: not the freest pen of Liberalism dare touch this so-called "liberty of the press" and our colleagues in the editorial offices of the "freest democracies in the world" know why, but they may not say so, as such embarrassing frankness would entail a compulsory change of occupation.

I have recently proved from the history of the journalism of many countries, what the freedom of the press really is and brought historical and documentary evidence to show that the conception of the liberty of the press is one of the emptiest phrases which have ever befogged the minds of men. I have proved by the incontrovertible witness of those who claim to possess the liberty of the press in their countries, that from the day when the press first came into being until now, there has never anywhere been any liberty of the press—that indeed in those countries where it is most loudly praised, it is in most wretched case and that it is one of the greatest intellectual swindles in history.

I will recapitulate the details of one only of these complaints by members of a misused profession against the mental slavery of the liberal press (a large number of which are given in my publications), as it is a particularly clear example.

In 1913, the American journalist, John Swinton made the following frank statement at the annual session of the American Press Association:

"In America, there is no independent press, apart from the newspapers of the small country towns. Everyone knows this, but no one dares to say what he thinks about it and even if he did, it would not be published. Any man who was mad enough to write his personal opinion would soon be in the street. The duty of a New York journalist is to lie and cast himself at the feet of the God Mammon. He must sell his country and his race for his daily bread. We are the instruments and the vassals of rich people behind the scenes. We are marionettes: they pull the strings and we dance! Our time, our talents, our lives and our capacities belong to these people. We are mental prostitutes." That is a hard and savage indictment launched 25 years ago, and conditions have become no better since.

A book was recently published in New York entitled "The Washington Correspondents", which contained some very interesting matter bearing upon this subject: the

author publishes the answers to questionnaires which he had sent to several hundred journalists. The commonest answer to the question: "how far does the liberty of the journalist go?" was something like this: "Everyone knows that he has to write what the editor wants" or "they would soon be fired, if they did not give their editors what they wanted". The editor of the book, Leo C. Roston, writes in one place: "in a society where liberty is a high-sounding slogan, limited by economic reality, a clear conscience is a luxury confined to those who have enough money to refuse to compromise at the cost of their personal ideals".

This book, which was not written by us, but appeared in the United States, would make very instructive reading for all those people who consider that they are entitled to reproach us with having too little liberty of the press. Or again, they should read that sensational indictment of the American press, recently published in New York by Ferdinand Lundberg under the title "America's 60 families" and especially the chapter called: "Journalism under the domination of money", in which the liberty of the press is seen for what it is. The liberty of the press is a phantom! a notice hung out for the benefit of gullible minds! There has never been any liberty of the press and there is none to-day anywhere in any country of the world and people ought to have sufficient sense of reality to admit it. The press is always dependent and always under an obligation to someone. The only question is, "to whom"? : to irresponsible commercial and party politics, the anonymous forces of money and of the destruction of all human order and morality, or to the statesmen responsible for the lives of peoples and the political authorities of the nation?

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In 1933, when we began to build up the National-Socialist State and found that we had inherited a veritable legacy of chaos in the matter of the press, we had to ask ourselves this question, and we decided in favour of the latter answer and lost no time in acting upon our decision. The purification of the press in Germany was, so to say, the visiting card, and the reorganisation of our press in some sort the first-fruits, of the National-Socialist revolution.

If a party press, which for years waged a ruthless war against all vested press interests, had not been built up by the National-Socialist party with great trouble and at the cost of heavy sacrifices, the prestige of the press among the people would probably have been irretrievably lost! It was imperative to bring law and order into the chaos which we took over. Already on October 4th, 1933 it was possible to promulgate the Editorial Law (*Schriftleitergesetz*) and on January 1st, 1934, it came into force.

The new structure of the German press is simple and clear. In the true National-Socialist spirit, the Editorial Law shifted the centre of gravity of responsibility for the contents of the paper from the thing to the person and clearly maintained the principle of personal responsibility for the editorial part: that is, the intellectual and political contents of the paper. It is entirely in accordance with the principle of the absolute responsibility of the individual to the community that the person who writes in a paper and makes opinion should be responsible to the State and the public for his activities, and it is entirely agreeable to the German conception of law as opposed to that of the liberalist system, that the person who is free to decide as to the intellectual contents of a newspaper—who for instance edits the contributions of other collaborators and decides as to their acceptance or non-acceptance—should be personally responsible for them. The immoral principle of anonymity was thus abolished.

The National-Socialist Press Law brought the German journalist into a direct relationship to people and State, to whom,

in addition to his own conscience, he is responsible in the matter of his intellectual work, while the State secures to him the legal freedom from undue influences, necessary for the fulfilment of his duties and obligations, which influences he was formerly unable, as the weaker party, adequately to resist.

The introduction of this law marked the beginning of the new position of journalism in National-Socialist Germany and has brought about a radical change in the social position and prestige of the German editor.

It is a great mistake to think that we in Germany desired a mechanical State press, which would make the editor simply the mouth-piece and the scribe of State departments! Nothing of the kind! We want a living popular press, freely developed by the personality of the editor and brought, under the influence of his sense of duty as a journalist, to creative fruition for the good of his people!

The whole German press knows perfectly well that there is still a great deal for it to do. A personal transformation as far-reaching as that which we undertook needs time to enable the new organisation fully to adapt itself to its duties. Legal regulation was an unavoidable necessity. The radical separation of business and politics brought about by the German Editorial Law provided the first necessary condition for the recovery of our press, for that Law awoke to life in the breast of every German journalist the inner law of that higher liberty of the press by virtue of which journalism is singled out as a nobler profession than many others in virtue of its national responsibility.

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In this we see the inward power and the national significance of the press as the corollary of its international power and significance as a factor of world politics, which is the aspect I emphasised at the beginning of my remarks, and I am now speaking, as I believe, to an audience which may be presumed to take a special interest in this far-reaching problem.

The press, as I have already remarked, is a greater power in the lives of the nations than many of our contemporaries in their bourgeois wisdom imagine. It was formerly called the seventh Great Power and it has, I believe, in the last 20 years gone up a few places in the list of precedence of world political factors, for in proportion as the nations have approached nearer to one another with the help of modern communications and news service, the moods and shades of mood, the political atmosphere and political reactions within the nations have become of infinitely greater importance in determining the political decisions of the Powers. To-day, the real or imagined attitude of the nations to all great events is communicated from one country to another in the space of a few hours. Do not say: "but the wireless makes the process more rapid still". The wireless reproduces the voices of the press, which is regarded, rightly or wrongly, as the barometer of public opinion. The press is thought of as public opinion, as it has the very greatest influence upon it, and it may therefore be described as the barometer of world politics, whose indications have certainly influenced the decisions of many cabinets in the last few decades more powerfully and directly than many realise.

This power, which has been given to the press as one of the most influential of those factors of leadership in modern times which can be developed for good or evil in national relations, was appropriately described by a French diplomat as the tongue of which Aesop said that it was at once the best and the worst thing in the world. Unfortunately the bad tongue has hitherto made itself heard far more clearly in international relations than the beneficent power of the press have been able to make themselves felt. How often has the poisoning of public opinion by lies deliberately propagated through the press and by irresponsible sensational reporting most gravely jeopardised the peace

of the nations! The Führer, in his last speech in the Reichstag, put his finger on this open sore in the common life of the nations, gave the agitators and poisoners of the wells of knowledge a German answer and told the Governments that it would be a meritorious achievement, if not only the dropping of poison, incendiary and explosive bombs on the population could be prevented by international action, but also—and especially—the sale of such newspapers as had a worse effect on the relations between States than any produced by poison or incendiary bombs could be prohibited. In my speech at the last party congress at Nuremberg, I showed by means of historical documents how unscrupulous work by the press may sow hatred and unchain war between nations that love peace. And I may tell you that up to now not a single serious voice has been raised to refute these charges. It is true that I was told by certain foreign newspapers, though without any reasons being given, that I was a “singular press surgeon” and that my speech was a sign of “Nazi mentality”. This was said in the newspapers. But in private letters from many journalists I received numerous expressions of agreement which proved to me to what extent my explanations to all decent journalists who are under the compulsion of circumstances were spoken from the heart. And what is true of so many journalists is also true of so many democratic statesmen. They have for a long time realised how heavily the press problem weighs upon them, but they do not dare to tackle it. Their own freedom of the press forbids them—I might almost say on fear of their lives—to open up these problems. The fact that all those who might have a possibility of changing the conditions are compelled by their parliamentary dependence on the press to be silent involves the tragic difficulty which opposes the solution of a problem which in itself is quite simple. While in other respects in political life loud speaking is very much in favour, the silence in the democratic press in these matters resembles that of a Trappist monastery. It is only the leaders of the authoritarian Governments that have hitherto raised their voices loudly and clearly against this position.

The head of the Italian Government, Signor Mussolini, has in the last few days again pointed out to the president of the international organisation of publishers how greatly the evil of tendentious press reports is widespread. All these incorrect and untrue press reports, he said, created a spiritual condition which was not without objection and which all countries should help to remove in the interest of peace.

The President of the French Republic, M. Lebrun, at the annual meeting of the Union of French Republican Journalists on February 8th, 1937, issued an earnest warning to French editors not to abuse the so-called freedom of the press. Freedom, he said, if used without prejudice and with moderation, was good; but if people were carried away by passion and hatred, it was bad. The French editors should think of the various ways in which press policy was handled in different countries. On the one side there was something like an orchestra conductor, who harmonised everything without discord and false notes. This made the national will appear more uniform and more powerful. It was a strength which was to the advantage of the country. But, on the other hand, in countries where the critical sense was developed to excess, everyone went his own way. This involved the danger of compromising everything by exaggerated individualism and making the desired effect impossible. Thought should always be given to the regrettable consequences of inadvertent or even deliberate false reports which might endanger harmony among the nations, for which greater sacrifices than ever before must be made, and that peace which was desired by all.

At a lunch of the Foreign Press Association in Paris the French Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, spoke a few days ago against the habit of false or tendentious news and stated that the common duty of newspaper representatives of all countries was to counteract the fever which had broken out.

The press must do more for the reconciliation and union of the nations than for their separation.

According to the “Temps” of April 16th, 1936, no other than M. Herriot demanded a law against the calumnious press in the following words: “It is intolerable that in a decent country such as ours lies can be disseminated without punishment. In the reform law, therefore, two points must be taken into consideration: the obligation to sign all articles and the prohibition of abuse on the part of the responsible editor. For I consider it to be right and essential that the director of the newspaper and the writer of the article should assume the responsibility”.

The Czechoslovak President, Benesh, according to the “Prager Presse” of April 21st, 1935, asked the question: “Is it possible to overlook the manner in which the moral condition of our generation is destroyed by a press guided by revolutionary, demagogic, immoral, venal, sensational and other points of view and aims?”

The Irish President de Valera, in a speech to the Irish branch of the Institute of Journalists, answered in the affirmative the question whether the freedom of the press should be restricted or not, with the words: “The expression ‘freedom of the press’ must be given a reasonable interpretation; it must not mean the toleration of a power without responsibility. In many quarters there is a confused idea of ‘freedom of the press’. By it people propagate a confusion of the mind to which they would not expose their children in private life. The people must be protected against the abuse of press influence.”

Numerous other statesmen from every possible country have expressed themselves in similar terms, including recently the Danish Prime Minister Stauning, the Swiss Federal Councillor Dr. Meyer, and in his recent League speeches the former British Foreign Secretary Eden when he made the fitting and humorous remark: “Diplomatic successes have little value as news, while diplomatic failures have durable consequences which are heard and felt for a long time.”

The British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, in one of his recent speeches on foreign affairs in the House of Commons, said: “The might of the press for good or for evil is very great in the field of international relations, and a careful use of this power, directed by full consciousness of responsibility, may possibly have far-reaching effects, since a favourable atmosphere for the objects at which we aim may thus be attained.”

No doubt the British Prime Minister, in giving this warning, was thinking of the disastrous part played by a great part of the British press during Lord Halifax’ visit to Berchtesgaden, and of the disservice done to British diplomacy. And in fact what possibilities of understanding have not been destroyed in the last few years by the stupid sensationalism of an irresponsible press and the fabrications of obscure elements. This debt account is large, but it grows to gigantic dimensions when it is remembered what immense positive possibilities lie within the power of the press and what blessings it could bring to the human community if it were conscious of the true responsibility of its task.

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Imagine how peaceful the world would be if people not only wrote about peace, but if peace were kept in the newspapers themselves. The press could work absolute miracles in the political life of the nations. For twenty years, for instance, a League of Nations has dealt with international relations. How many diplomatic efforts, how many meetings and conferences have taken place! The result is not only small, it is deplorable. And is not the disappointment at the fruitlessness of these efforts the main reason for the political defeatism from which so many

European countries are at present suffering? How different the relations of the nations to each other might be, if they recognised the importance of the press and its possibility of action in favour of an understanding cooperation and used the power of the press for this lofty aim? It is no Utopia when I state that, in an atmosphere of mutual respect and mutual understanding created by the press, they would attain in a few months what they could not attain by other means in the course of decades. The scourge of mankind, sowing in many cases hatred and discord, which a great portion of the press has unfortunately now become, might be one of the most useful means of binding the nations together. The nations want peace and understanding with their neighbours. But the press in so many countries, though it boasts of representing public opinion, does not allow these wishes to become effective. The man in the street in many countries may justly ask why the road to the international press peace is not taken. The nations can agree on cocaine smuggling, traffic in women and the prosecution of bank robbers; why should they not take up jointly the combating of political agitation and the sabotage of peace carried out by irresponsible press elements? I should like to put this question at the present time.

I do not deny the difficulties of a solution in individual cases. They lie less in the will of the people than in the organisatory conditions and in the structure of their press. The Führer, in his Reichstag speech, gave some clear indications of the objections that there were no legal possibilities in other countries of putting an end to lying and calumny. In going further into this question, it is far from my intentions to propose any methods of carrying out any wishes and desires of my own. That is not our affair. But I may point out that in Germany and Italy practical conditions have for the first time been created by means of modern press legislation for international press cooperation. The structure of our press the main lines of which I have drawn in fact opens up for the first time a prospect of the aims attainable by an international press policy which, if it is regarded objectively and pursued without prejudice, may be made a real blessing for all nations and for mankind. Those who have recognised these practical aims and possibilities are compelled in the interest of the nations and of peace to strive for their practical achievement on an international basis. German press policy is guided solely by these considerations in endeavouring by means of bilateral written or unwritten press agreements between one country and another to pave the way gradually towards reason and understanding in the field of the international press.

The press agreements concluded by Germany with Poland and Austria serve this purpose and, quite recently, in connection with the visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister, we reached a happy "Gentlemen's Agreement" regarding mutual press relations. I may take this opportunity of pointing out that the close friendly relations between the German and Italian people are not for the least part due to the attitude of the press of the two countries which, by means of mutual friendly visits for some years past, has tightened the bonds of friendship which at present bear such rich fruits for the two nations.

German press policy will continue to pursue this path of non-aggression pacts and press agreements from country to country in accordance with the political possibilities afforded. But it must be stated in this connection that there are limits. Not limits of the good will which we possess, but limits of the possibilities of negotiation in general, limits of press morality in other countries. Just as there can be no armistice between two States of which one has a well disciplined army while the troops of the other are in the hands of condottieri who wage war on their own, there can be no peace of the press if only one part obeys national discipline while the other avoids all responsibility and is directed solely by the ano-

nymous influence of peace-destroying powers. In view of the national discipline in which our press has been educated by the National Socialist press policy and which it is always able to maintain, we are placed in a position to conclude and to keep such agreements. But what is the position in many other countries? In the case of diplomatic representations regarding unqualified attacks on our people and our State, how often is the almost stereotyped answer given: "We admit that this is a flat lie and a gross offence but, in view of the freedom of the press guaranteed under the Constitution, we have no means of taking effective action".

Such objections are quite incomprehensible to us, even from the standpoint of the most generous democratic press policy. For what is defended by such a view of the freedom of the press, is not the freedom, but the impudence of the press. In this case the State appeals to its own constitution to defend not the freedom of the press, but the freedom of abuse and calumny. As Herriot says: "It is intolerable that in a decent country such as ours lies may be disseminated without punishment." He only said what every decent person thinks in every country, for there is no Constitution which can protect such actions in the name of the people. This is obviously a case of a false interpretation of the general rights of mankind. For every Government can take steps against agitators and liars who poison the foreign political relations of the nation and thus seriously endanger the peace of their own people. The welfare of the people and the security of the State are the supreme law for democracy. In cases where the interests of the nation are endangered in the most irresponsible manner by journalists engaging in the game of poisoning the springs, every statesman should be entitled according to the written and unwritten laws of his constitution to confiscate an edition of a newspaper guilty of this crime against the nation. Countries in which such principles, which are a matter of course for every decent person, cannot be applied are not in our opinion suitable parties for press agreements.

In foreign countries the curious habit has crept in of making the German Government responsible for every word in German newspapers, while demanding from the German press that it should show a moderation amounting to self-sacrifice, for which those living under a falsely understood freedom of the press feel no compulsion whatever. There is a constant speculation on our sense of decency which does not bring the aim of a press peace one step nearer. For we will not in any case bear the blame of this irresponsible press agitation as a reward for our honest efforts. Every such attack, if it is not immediately checked by the Government of the country compels us to hit back with the same weapons. Moreover we have already given evidence that we are in a position to make our rights clearly heard. We believe that the bad habit of measuring with such unequal gauges is not to the advantage of the international press agreement. We cannot afford to be peaceful angels when the devil drives. But in that case we abide by the word: A tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye. We also can only make our contribution to the press peace if there is give and take. We cannot be expected to keep the arrows of our press in the quiver, if the mud-throwers are set in motion all around us. This point must be perfectly understood by the statesmen of other countries who regard a press peace as essential for preparing for a general political settlement. It is not of much use to give assurances of peace round the green table, while at the same time leaving the press free to carry on its campaign of agitation.

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In Germany, as in Italy, we have taken the first step by our press reform and press legislation with a view to a sound international press policy and have shown the way towards a puri-

fication of the international atmosphere. In a number of other countries also reason is beginning to make itself felt. We have recognised that the moral crisis which the world press is passing through is not to be sought so much among the journalists as among those who are their anonymous employers and prescribe their actions behind the scenes. We have drawn the consequences from this : in our Editorial Law we have liberated ideas from the invisible fetters of money and placed the journalist in a directly responsible position towards the people and the State, without touching the private economic basis of our press. By this clear and sound solution we have brought order into our journalism. It is now for the others to follow us if they take their desire for peace seriously. The methods they choose are their own affair and we do not wish to interfere with them. Just as in foreign policy, National Socialism has its own conception in the field of press policy. Just as we possess the political conviction that the peace of the world can only be safeguarded by the existence of free, sovereign and happy States, just as it is our economic creed that the working of world economy can only develop on the basis of sound national economies, the position is the same with our press policy which is guided by the principle that only a morally and economically sound national press is the pre-requisite for an international cooperation in the sphere of the press.

The reduction of the obstacles of agitation and calumny between the nations, which is in the interest of all nations and serves the well-being of all peoples, will be accomplished all the more quickly as responsible statesmen in all countries realise the will of their nations in this question and have courage to make this will felt. The alleged "freedom of the press"—which they feel obliged to respect—is a phantom, "which has no greater power than the terror which it causes". This was written as far back as 1827 by one of the first European pressmen; and people should no longer be afraid, for the sake of a meaningless slogan, to look facts in the face. The journalist who is practising his profession has for a long time recognised the true aspect of this strange freedom of the press, which for him does not exist. He is aware, in the words of an American, that "in theory the press is free, but in practice this freedom is set on one side by the power of money". The statesmen should be clear on this point when they jib at this hurdle. With the spurs of good will and an appeal to the nations' desire for peace, they will overcome it. True freedom, if it is really desired to attain it, does not lie in unbridled licence, but in responsibility. In responsibility towards the community of all nations who desire to find in the press not a separating element which incites the nations, but a binding element which serves the cause of peace.

This responsibility should be brought to the consciousness of all, both the men who direct press politics and the journalists who write the newspapers, whether they work at home in the editor's office or as correspondents abroad. We regard fruitful cooperation with the representatives of the foreign press working in Germany as the main foundation for beneficial press relations with other countries.

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Since I am under the impression that some misunderstandings exist regarding our attitude to the foreign journalists accredited in Berlin and that these have not yet been fully cleared up, I would like to say a few words on this subject. I have repeatedly expressed the conviction that journalistic fairness and national obligations in the press work of the foreign journalists can be easily reconciled. But this presupposes a certain measure of psychology and of comprehension for the position and for objective events on both sides.

We consider it to be the task of the foreign correspondent to give his countrymen an unprejudiced and true picture of a

foreign country and people. Those who look upon their duty in this manner can at all times count upon our support, for we then respect in them the publicist representatives of an organ of public opinion in their country. We will not contest their right of objective criticism if they are dominated by the will to serve truth. But those who have personal feelings, or feelings dictated by their own ideology, of aversion or even hatred against the country that gives them hospitality, which bring them into constant conflict with their professional duties and make it difficult or even impossible for them to report objectively, should not come to us as correspondents. For their distorted and tendentious reports not only harm our country but also their own and subject them to constant and justified mistrust which must sooner or later lead to a breach. We are sensitive when we observe that a foreign journalist opposes all the efforts of the politician to create good-neighbourly relations with other nations by efforts going in the contrary direction, namely to endeavour to incite other nations against us by consistently one-sided and deliberately tendentious reports on internal German events. In this case we have used the institution of expulsion, which is moreover not a National Socialist invention but a measure employed by all others and one to which journalists are everywhere subject if they violate their professional duty of decency and abuse the hospitality accorded to them. In such cases we have made use of this measure and will also do so in future.

On the other hand we appreciate the special conditions under which the foreign journalists have to do their work. We are not smallminded and are not of those who think they must regard every foreign journalist as a poisoner of the springs if he does not write exactly as a National Socialist. We are aware and count on the fact that, as a member of a foreign nation, in many respects he thinks and feels differently from ourselves, just as we expect of a German abroad that he should always remain conscious of his Germanism. We merely demand that the foreign correspondent should serve the cause of truth, should comply with his journalist duty of decency and, in the same manner as the diplomat abroad, should look upon his mission from a high watchtower, namely the responsible care for the relations between the peoples.

It is true that a newspaper cannot exist entirely without sensation. But do not the achievements of National Socialist Germany offer material enough and to spare for sensational reports? It is wrong to search diligently for the negative when so much that is positive exists. Exaggeration for the sake of sensation involves a danger of sideslipping and thus of falling an easy prey to rumours and falsehood. I would not refrain from drawing your attention to this danger.

Gentlemen of the foreign press, if I may anticipate the list of your desiderata, I know that it begins and ends with the demand for information. I desire to help you in this respect as far as I can; but you should not ask us for anything unreasonable. It is the custom of every Government to give only such information as it can in the interest of the people and State and at such time as it considers suitable. On account of this natural restriction, therefore, the journalist in all countries is always dissatisfied. Those who have themselves been journalists understand that and try to help as far as possible.

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That is what I wanted to say to you. I have done it *sine ira et studio* in front of people with whom my work will in future bring me together more than in the past. If I have succeeded in drawing your attention to the problem with which I have dealt and which I regard as one of the most important of our common political tasks, then this evening has fulfilled its purpose.

The interest which you take in these questions, Gentlemen of the diplomatic service, is of great importance for their solution. Bismarck's remark that every country must in the long run pay for the windows broken by its press, always proves true. The broken glass, Gentlemen of the diplomatic service, comes within your sphere. Gentlemen of the press, your presence is no less valuable to me. Moreover as against the diplomats I can rehabilitate you with those other words of Bismarck regarding the press: "I can make a Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs or of the Interior out of a capable editor more easily than a skilful and serviceable journalist out of a dozen privy councillors."

This is still true today. And it doubtless applies also to you, Gentlemen of the foreign press in Germany. I regard you and your cooperation in your profession not as a destructive, but as a constructive, element with a view to realising those necessities

of press policy of which I have spoken to you this evening and which have become one of the most urgent problems of international policy.

In his Reichstag speech the Führer distinguished between two kinds of journalists. I shall consider myself happy if I can always and without exception count you among those who know that they are best serving their people when they point the way of truth to them. I would therefore like to conclude with a word which perhaps best expresses those feelings which are ours in our cooperation with you, and which should always guide the journalist abroad in his work:

Respect the native land of all,
But love your own.

INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGITATION

A Danger for Peace and a Heavy Strain on International Relations

Extract from the Reichstag speech by the Führer and Chancellor on February 20th, 1938

But what does poison friendly relations between these states, (Germany, France and England) and consequently causes trouble, is the intolerable Press campaign which is being conducted in these countries under the slogan of "Liberty for expression of personal opinions". I have little use for the reiterated sentiments of foreign statesmen and diplomats who declare that there is no law in these countries to put an end to lies and calumnies. Here it is not a case of private affairs, but one concerned with the fellowship of peoples and states. And we are not in a position to make light of such things for any length of time. We simply cannot close our eyes to the effects of such a virulent campaign. If we do so, it may easily happen that in certain lands the malicious machinations of weavers of lies will succeed in arousing hatred of our country, which, if disregarded, will gradually develop into a universally hostile attitude towards us. The German nation could not possibly face this with the necessary power of resistance, since our own Press policy prevents the expression of such hostility towards these nations. And this is a grave menace indeed, and one that endangers peace. For this very reason, I refuse to tolerate any longer the unbridled and persistent scoffing and slandering to which our country and people are subjected. We shall answer these calumnies in future and that with real National Socialist thoroughness.

What has been disseminated during the last few weeks alone in the way of insane, impudent and stupid statements about Germany, is simply outrageous. When Reuter invents attempts on my life, and English papers tell of large-scale arrests in Germany, of the closing of Germany's frontiers towards Switzerland, Belgium and France, etc., of the alleged flight of the Crown Prince from Germany, of a military rising, of the imprisonment of German generals, or, as an alternative, of the march of German generals to the Chancellery, when reports are rife that Himmler and Göring had quarrelled over the Jewish question, and that I was therefore in a difficult position, or that a German general had formed contacts with Daladier with the help of intermediaries, that a regiment had mutinied at Stolp, that 2,000 officers had been cashiered, that the whole of German industry had been mobilized for war, that differences had arisen between the Government and private industry, that twenty German officers and three generals had fled to Salzburg that fourteen generals had fled to Prague with Ludendorff's corpse, that I had lost my voice, so that our cunning Goebbels was looking for a man who could imitate it and my speeches could be made by gramophone records. I fear that tomorrow this same

journalist will either doubt my identity, or else will say that I made the gestures and a gramophone was behind me, and so on. Mr. Eden boasted in a recent speech of the various liberties of his land. One special liberty he failed to mention, liberty for journalists to slander and jeer at other nations, their organizations, men and governments, to their heart's content! We might of course say all this stupidity is not worthy of being taken seriously. After all millions of foreigners in Germany see that there is not a single word of truth in it. What a contrast to the Soviet member of the League of Nations, who banishes strangers from his land, and even closes the Consulates, whilst in Germany everyone is at liberty to accumulate experiences on the spot.

But such obstacles to international amity cannot be permitted indefinitely. I am glad to state that a section of the foreign Press did not participate in the despicable attacks on the honour of other nations. But the harm caused by such incitement is nevertheless so great that in future we do not intend to tolerate it without a flaming protest. This crime is all the more serious when it deliberately aims at goading on the nations to war. I need only mention a few facts in this connection.

Let me remind you of the sudden, slanderous reports of last year when it was alleged that Germany had landed 20,000 men in Spanish Morocco. It was indeed fortunate that this infamous lie could be immediately refuted. But what would happen if such a dementi could not be made quickly enough to avoid trouble.

This list of major crimes also includes statements that Germany and Italy had formed an alliance to divide up Spain, and a recent malicious statement to the effect that Germany and Japan had made a pact to possess themselves of the Dutch colonies. Can one call this an honest trade, or still speak of a liberty which enables international criminals of this kind to keep the world in a state of constant unrest? Are not these people war-mongers and war-makers of the most infamous kind? The British Government wishes to limit armaments or ban bombing. I once proposed that myself. But at that time I also suggested that it was still more important to prevent the poisoning of public opinion by infamous articles in the Press. What has strengthened our feelings towards Italy—if that were at all possible—is the fact that in that country State leadership and Press policy follow one path. The Government does not talk of mutual understanding while the Press agitates for the opposite course.

I am sure it would be a most praiseworthy achievement were we to come to an international agreement, so as not only to prevent the use of poison, incendiary and explosive bombs, but above all to prevent the circulation of those newspapers which do more harm to the promotion of friendly relations between nations than any poison or incendiary bombs.

Since such an international press campaign is not conducive to appeasement, but must rather be regarded as a grave menace to peace among the nations, I have decided to carry on with the reinforcement of Germany's Armed Forces as a security against the day when these threats of war might actually turn into bloodshed and terror. The necessary steps were taken on February 4th and the work is being carried on speedily and efficiently. Germany at any rate has a sincere desire to restore mutual confidence between herself and all the Great Powers of Europe, as well as with other States. If this is not successful, it is not our fault. We earnestly believe that little can be expected

at this time from conferences and single conversations because of this attitude on the part of the Press. It is impossible to deceive oneself as to the following facts. The international Press campaign against peace will immediately destroy every attempt to arrive at an understanding between peoples and nations. It will immediately misinterpret or distort the meaning of every conference. It will immediately place a false light on every agreement. And there is, therefore, nothing to give one confidence under these circumstances that any good can come out of such conferences or out of such conversations, as long as governments on the whole are not in a position to act decisively because they must always consider the public interpretation placed upon their actions.

We believe, therefore, that for the time being the only practical way of arriving at an understanding is through the normal diplomatic exchange of notes, thus preventing too crude falsifications of the International Press.

REFLECTIONS ON THE MANNER IN WHICH AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NATIONS IS ENDANGERED AND PREVENTED BY PRESS POLICY

The events of the last few months and weeks and the manner in which they are treated in a great part of the world press give us occasion at the present time to revert to the speech by the head of the Reich press and the remarks on the same subject by the Reich Chancellor and Führer. At times it was as if we had been put back into the period of the Great War when the antipathy of the world was mobilised against Germany by deliberate lies regarding Germany's war guilt and her crimes in the War. "Falsehood in Wartime" was the name given by the present Lord Ponsonby to the "Amazing collection of carefully documented lies circulated in Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and America during the Great War", published by Allen & Unwin in 1928.

The carefully written book mercilessly discloses on the basis of authentic material the lies which were launched by the Governments of the belligerent States in the world press in order to inflict moral injury on the enemy. It is written from the standpoint of a man who looks down on human weaknesses with a sense of superiority; he regards falsehood as a common habit in war time and does not charge any particular nation. Human credulity, he says, perhaps exceeds the habit of lying. Ponsonby kept himself during the War free from the war psychosis and the readiness to believe war lies. He was one of the five men who, together with E. D. Morel, on November 17th, 1914 founded the Union of Democratic Control on account of his impression that the real reasons for Britain's entry into the War had been concealed by the British Government. In his book "Democracy and Diplomacy", London 1915, he stated openly that the violation of Belgian neutrality was not the real reason but only the pretext. In 1921 in an article in the "Schweizerische Monatsheften für Politik und Kultur" he adopted an attitude for the first time to the question of war guilt and declared that the forced signature of the Versailles Treaty was valueless. Since that time, both together with Morel and alone after Morel's death, he has continued his struggle against the war lies which he summarises in the present collection.

There is an informative short sentence which, in connection with the fact that is confirmed by this collection of lies, states that most of the war lies and the most dangerous of them were of Anglo-Saxon origin. He says on page 14: "The use of the

weapon of falsehood is more necessary in a country where military conscription is not the law of the land than in countries where the manhood of the nation is automatically drafted into the Army, Navy or Air Service."

Ponsonby deals first with the official reasons for Great Britain's entry into the War. He repeats what the Union of Democratic Control had seen immediately that the prompt entry of Great Britain into the War was necessitated by her commitment to France. "The denial of these secret commitments constitutes a page in the history of secret diplomacy which is without parallel."

Ponsonby then deals with the so-called atrocity stories. The tragedy of the mutilated nurse Grace Hume finally ended with the condemnation of her sister Kate Hume who had fabricated the whole story and communicated forged letters to the press. The story of the crucified Canadian was stated to be untrue by the Under-Secretary for War in the House of Commons in May 1915. Belgian babies whose hands had been cut off travelled throughout the world. No one paused to ask how long a baby would live were its hands cut off. Everyone wanted to believe the story and many went so far as to say they had seen the baby.

The lie regarding the baby rescued from German incendiaries in a burning farm at Courbeck Loo is also shown up in Ponsonby's book. The inventor of this story was the American journalist F. W. Wilson, who admitted that he had fabricated it and wrote about it as follows in February 1922 in the "New York Times":

"At the beginning of the War I was correspondent of the "Daily Mail" in Brussels. They telegraphed out that they wanted stories of atrocities. Well, there weren't any atrocities at that time. So then they telegraphed out that they wanted stories of refugees. So I said to myself: 'That's fine, I won't have to move.' There was a little town outside Brussels where one went to get dinner—a very good dinner too. I heard the Hun had been there. I supposed there must have been a baby there. So I wrote a heart-rending story about the baby of Courbeck Loo being rescued from the Hun in the light of the burning homesteads. The next day they telegraphed out to me to send the baby along, as they had about five thousand letters

offering to adopt it. The day after that, baby clothes began to pour into the office. Even Queen Alexandra wired her sympathy and sent some clothes. Well, I couldn't wire back to them that there wasn't a baby. So I finally arranged with the doctor that took care of the refugees that the blessed baby died of some very contagious disease, so it couldn't even have a public burial."

When the Pope promised to make a great protest to the world if a single case could be proved of the violation of nuns and mutilation of children, it was impossible, even by the inquiry carried out with the support of Cardinal Mercier, to prove a single case.

Ponsonby quotes two interesting statements from the United States against the atrocity stories. One is the statement by five American war correspondents against the reports published by the various commissions of inquiry set up by the allies, in particular the commission under the chairmanship of Lord Bryce which also represented suppositions and affidavits of single witnesses as absolute facts. This statement includes the following passages:

"To let the truth be known, we unanimously declare the stories of German cruelties, from what we have been able to observe, were untrue. After having been with the German army for two weeks, and having accompanied the troops for over one hundred miles, we are not able to report one single case of undeserved punishment or measure of retribution. We are neither able to confirm any rumours as regards the maltreatment of prisoners and non-combatants. We found numerous rumours after investigation to be without foundation. For the truth of the above we pledge our word of honour as journalists.

Roger Lewis, Associated Press;

Irwin Cobb, Saturday Evening Post, Philadelphia
Public Ledger, Philadelphia;

Harry Hansen, Chicago Daily News, Chicago;

James O'Donnell Bennett, Chicago Tribune;

John T. McCutcheon, Chicago Tribune, Chicago."

In the issue of the New York World of January 28th, 1915, appeared the following dispatch:

"Washington, January 27th, 1915. Of the thousands of Belgian refugees who are now in England, not one has been subjected to atrocities by German soldiers. This, in effect, is the substance of a report received at the State Department. The report states that the British Government had investigated thousands of reports to the effect that German soldiers had perpetrated outrages on fleeing Belgians. During the early period of the war columns of British newspapers were filled with the accusation. Agents of the British Government, according to the report of the American Embassy in London, carefully investigated all these charges; they interviewed the alleged victims and sifted all the evidence. As a result of the investigation, the British Foreign Office notified the American Embassy that the charges appeared to be based upon hysteria and natural prejudice. The report added that many of the Belgians had suffered hardships, but they should be charged up against the exigence of war rather than to brutality of the individual German soldiers."

Ponsonby states that the most revolting and at the same time best known and most successful war lie was that of the corpse factory, which first appeared in the Times of April 16th, 1917 and was deliberately disseminated especially in the Far East. The word "Kadaver" was deliberately transferred from the corpses of animals to those of human beings, and it was affirmed that the Germans would manufacture fat and other products from the bodies of fallen German and foreign soldiers. Ponsonby publishes this sad

chapter of loathsome agitation with full documentary material, from which appears in particular that this lie excited the minds of people till the end of 1915 when, finally, in reply to a question by Mr. Arthur Henderson in the House of Commons on December 2nd, Sir Austen Chamberlain, then Foreign Secretary, nailed the lie to the counter shortly after the conclusion of the Locarno Agreement.

Ponsonby devotes special chapters to the so-called U-boat outrage, the sinking of the Lusitania, the Lusitania commemoration medals, the doctoring of official papers, the war aims and, lastly, the slogans: war to end war, war against militarism, war for democracy, of the falsehood of which he gives striking proof.

Ponsonby says the greastest falsehood of all was "the descriptions towards the end of the magnificent, just and righteous peace which was going to be established on lasting foundations", and he gives quotations of remarks made for home consumption by British Ministers such as Mr. Asquith, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Long regarding the unselfish participation of Great Britain in the War, and compares them with the "not bad total of conquest territory".

An instructive example of the way in which a war lie is fabricated is given by Ponsonby in connection with the fall of Antwerp.

An article on the subject in the "Kölnische Zeitung" contained the following sentence:

"When the fall of Antwerp got known, the church bells were rung" (meaning in Germany).

Thereupon the following notices appeared in the press of the Entente countries:

"Le Matin": "According to the Kölnische Zeitung, the clergy of Antwerp were compelled to ring the church bells when the fortress was taken".

"The Times": "According to what Le Matin has heard from Cologne, the Belgian priests who refused to ring the church bells when Antwerp was taken have been driven away from their places."

"Corriere della Sera": "According to what the Times has heard from Cologne via Paris, the unfortunate Belgian priests who refused to ring the church bells when Antwerp was taken have been sentenced to hard labour."

"Le Matin": "According to information to the Corriere della Sera from Cologne via London, it is confirmed that the barbaric conquerors of Antwerp punished the unfortunate Belgian priests for their heroic refusal to ring the church bells by hanging them as living clappers to the bells with their heads down."

Ponsonby writes: "To cover the whole ground on atrocity stories would be impossible. They were circulated in leaflets, pamphlets, letters and speeches day after day. Prominent people of repute, who would have shrunk from condemning their bitterest personal enemy on the evidence, or rather lack of evidence they had before them, did not hesitate to lead the way in charging a whole nation with every conceivable brutality and unnatural crime."

He says there can be no more discreditable period in the history of journalism than the four years of the Great War, during which there must have been more deliberate lying than in any other period of the world's history.

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Who would not gladly refrain from excavating these souvenirs of such deliberate falsehood and cunning, and of such almost incomprehensible credulousness and foolishness, but that we are again compelled to experience and witness the same spectacle

in which the same method is again employed, though the sources are slightly different, in order to incite world public opinion against Germany.

The fact that war lies are again dug up was shown by the great celebrations with which the Rheims Cathedral, which had been severely damaged in the War and restored, was again consecrated on July 10th in the presence of the French President Lebrun and a large number of princes of the church, ministers, members of parliament, generals, diplomats, intellectuals and foreign delegations. It was reserved for the Anglo-Saxons to cast aside the lofty reserve of the French speakers and again to hint at the events of the Great War. For instance, the American Ambassador Bullitt again referred to the "murder of defenceless men, women and children". The representative of the British delegation, the conservative member of parliament MacEuwen took advantage of the events of the war which had led to the damage to the cathedral to ascribe a deliberate intention of destruction to the German adversaries of that time and said "they wanted to destroy, not only the body but also the soul".

The "Deutsche Diplomatische Korrespondenz" writes on this subject as follows:

"Everyone in Germany will fully understand that the complete restoration of a symbol such as the Rheims Cathedral represents for France should also call to mind the memories necessarily aroused by the War which brought bloodshed to all nations and was particularly terrible for France as the scene of the conflict. If, therefore, one of the speakers drew the lesson from those fateful days that everything should be done to prevent a recurrence of such events, this cannot but find an approving echo in Germany. But unfortunately these celebrations were not confined to memories and warnings of this kind.

Particular tactlessness was shown by the representative of the British delegation, the conservative member of parliament MacEuwen.

An effort should be made as far as possible to avoid controversy with regard to the method of warfare on both sides, because such memories are always calculated to arouse feelings which are comprehensible during a war psychosis but which all who desire the reconciliation of the nations and peace would wish to see finally removed. But if aspersions are cast on the honour of one party in a manner which can only be regarded as a defamation and which obviously serves the purpose of strengthening the feelings of hatred and aversion, it is a duty to go to the root of the matter and to inquire into the motives.

The fact is that the Rheims Cathedral, which has always been regarded by us Germans as one of the very greatest works of art of European culture, was situated only a few kilometres from the German front. It is also a fact that the Germans constantly noticed, or thought they noticed, that enemy observers used the favourable view offered by the church towers in order to guide the enemy fire and that enemy guns were stationed in the vicinity. Military necessities—which were at that moment decisive—gave cause to set up a defence against this to the minimum necessary extent. This was not done in order to destroy the cathedral as such or as a symbol, for which every German had the same noble feelings as the adversaries, but in order to counter a military danger. If it had really been desired to destroy this work of art, other possibilities would have existed at that short distance. Moreover a shorter time would have sufficed, for all the damage that occurred was inflicted not within a few hours but in the course of four long war years. In fact, as any impartial adversary must admit, the damage, however regrettable and tragic it may be, was mainly the effect of splinters and due to guns of small calibre, so that the building as such, although it was situated in the heart of the struggle could be spared thanks to constant consideration by the Germans. Moreover the cathe-

dral of St. Quentin, which was situated within the German lines, was subject to a more serious measure of destruction by the opponents.

A most decisive protest must be raised by the Germans against motives attributed calumniously to the German troops before Rheims which never existed and which are therefore felt to be a grievous offence. If deliberate destruction must necessarily be brought to mind, the British speaker at Rheims could and should have found more fitting examples in the recent past. For it cannot be assumed that he is unaware of the barbaric disgrace to culture with which churches of inestimable value in Spain have been destroyed out of pure love of destruction for no military purpose. But such allusions which lay nearest to hand obviously did not suit Mr. MacEuwen at this moment.

In Germany everything is done to take to heart the lessons of the War and to make good past mistakes. This also includes the attempt to cause their own people to forget many things—such as the hunger blockade against German women and children—in order not to make it more difficult to come to agreements with other nations. Germany therefore opposes all the more sharply and with all the greater contempt those who represent the inevitable hardships of the War as a sign of infamous wantonness and barbaric lack of culture with a view to setting the nations at variance."

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This post-War campaign might well be called "Falsehood in post-War time". We will not revert to the colonial guilt lie, which comes under the heading of the War lies and, together with the war guilt lie, has proved to be the hardest to kill on account of the material interests which it conceals and which endanger the German colonial claims. We will also not speak of the lies which for so many years poisoned the atmosphere in the reparations question. Nor of the legends of the "unwillingness to pay" displayed by the German nation, whose fatal policy of fulfilment in fact caused deeper wounds to the economic body of the German people than the War itself and brought the nation to the verge of a second revolution and of Bolshevik chaos, not to speak of the the world economic position which was the ultimate cause of a return to reason. We will also leave out of consideration those false assertions of the "German danger" with which the victorious Powers rearmed while at the same time disarming Germany to the point of internal and external powerlessness.

While the various stages of this paper campaign of world democracy and its press against democratic Germany would make up a bulky catalogue, this is still more the case with the press calumnies against National Socialist Germany since 1933. For even the most insignificant measure taken by Germany in the political, economic, cultural and social sphere in order to free the German people from the internal and foreign political stranglehold of Versailles has always been greeted by the majority of the democratic world press with a flood of suspicion, of tendentious and false reports, of incrimination and contempt, and has been accompanied by malevolent speculations. We need only refer to the stereotyped reports which constantly recurred at the beginning regarding the early collapse of the national socialist regime with the object of preventing any cooperation with the democracies. Quite recently, on February 24th, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, in defending his policy of mutual understanding, was compelled to refer to this foolish practice of constantly prophesying a collapse. We would also refer to the press campaign against German rearmament which was used in the armaments discussion as a threat to peace and is still a cover for the further rearmament of the heavily armed

Powers. In this connection, of course, no mention is made of the disarmament carried out by Germany in fulfilment of disarmament provisions imposed on her before she was compelled by the bad will of the others to think of her own security in a surrounding world of armaments. No mention is made of her numerous disarmament and armament proposals, of which Mr. Eden once said that, if it could, the world would now grasp them with both hands. But they had been rejected at the time with scorn. And what a fierce fire of poisonous paper bullets was released by the first successful steps of the Führer to make a breach in the ring laid by foreign policy around Germany and, by means of bilateral treaties with her neighbours, to give the German nation breathing space and liberate it still further from the fetters of Versailles. The old slogans of German militarism and imperialism were again heard in the press, particularly in those countries whose militarism and imperialism had celebrated their greatest triumphs in the economic, territorial and military provisions of the dictated peace treaties of Paris which had been put into effect for fifteen years.

These slogans became louder and louder as New Germany continued to break the fetters by which Germany had been chained in impotence to the ground. The regaining of military freedom, the reunion of the German Saar territory, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the liberation of the Reich railways, the Reichsbank and German waterways from heavy financial and economic burdens aroused storms of protests, threats and incriminations in the democratic world press.

In particular, it appears to be quite incomprehensible to French policy that the friendly bilateral agreements which Germany gradually concluded with her neighbours referred solely to their mutual relations and did not aim in any way against third parties, in contrast to the essential feature of most of the treaties concluded by Paris after the War. While French statesmen and leading persons for years undertook journeys round Germany and this was regarded as perfectly natural, the press in question was full of portentous reports as soon as German statesmen began in their turn to visit European capitals in order to improve political and economic relations with a view to releasing Germany from the permanent economic dependence and political isolation which had been the aim and desire of certain Powers and establishing her in the spheres which those Powers had considered to be their own particular and permanent interests.

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These storms therefore reached their culminating point during the Spanish civil war, on the occasion of the reunion of German Austria and in the course of the Czechoslovak nationality crisis.

Everyone still remembers the mendacious reports in the Spanish civil war regarding the landing of German troops in Morocco, the establishment of heavy guns against Gibraltar and Germans aspirations in respect of Spanish colonies. We also know from the recent proceedings taken in Paris by the notorious journalist Gerauld-Pertinax of the "Echo de Paris" against the journal "Gringoire", which had accused him of being a danger to France, what was the source of these reports which brought about a twenty-four hour crisis in the international situation, namely Pertinax himself, Madame Tabouis ("Oeuvre"), the infallible clairvoyante of the French journalistic world with the somewhat incompatible and peaceful Christian name Genoveva, and lastly the "Humanité". The danger which they represented for European peace was removed by the immediate action of Adolf Hitler and the French Ambassador in Berlin, and a few days later the falsity of these reports was confirmed from official British and French quarters. Nevertheless, similar reports again cropped up and caused the present Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, at that time Ambassador in

London, Herr von Ribbentrop, to make a number of sharp protests in the London Non-Intervention Committee. The reprehensible attempts which were constantly made to poison the international atmosphere by means of the Spanish civil war are demonstrated by the recent reports in French newspapers of the right, the "Journal des Débats", "Action Française" and again in the "Oeuvre". According to these papers, the German Government which—as a relentless opponent of the Soviet Russian authorities and their pernicious game in Spain—has hitherto endeavoured to the best of its ability, jointly with the other Powers in the Non-Intervention Committee, to put an end to the unhappy civil war, tried to counteract the present improved prospects because it was interested in prolonging the struggle. For this purpose it was secretly supplying the popular front troops with arms and ammunition with a view to tying down Italy as long as possible in Spain in order to sabotage the Anglo-Italian agreement and thus prevent a subsequent rapprochement between Paris and Rome.

The former French Premier, M. Flandin, in his broadcast speech on June 21st, rightly stigmatised the danger of the international poisoning of the springs and, in proof of this, stated that in the course of a fortnight in March he had found no less than five sensational reports in a single popular front newspaper which aimed at involving France in the Spanish conflict.

Shortly before going to press the latest mendacious report comes from London. It is again the "News Chronicle", and the "Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro" writes on the subject as follows on July 12th:

"The English newspaper News Chronicle gives great prominence to the alleged verbatim reproduction of a lecture said to have been held by a very highly placed German officer to leaders of the party regarding Germany's supposed aims in Spain. Germany is stated to have intervened in Spain in order to use it as a testing ground for her military methods, as a means of securing vital positions and of thwarting in advance British and French strategy in a possible war.

The officer in question is also said to have stated that the German aim was to separate Portugal from England. In case of need the powerful army which Franco would possess after a victory in Spain was to be thrown into the scale for this purpose. With the support of the widespread feeling in Portugal in favour of a nationalist Spain, this army would be in a position more effectively than by diplomatic means to bring into power a régime in Portugal that would be acceptable to Germany.

In connection with this incredible imputation, the "News Chronicle" publishes an article stating that neither the British nor the Portuguese Government can ignore this brutal disclosure of German aims in Spain by one of the leading men in the German army. In his lecture, it states, the German officer disclosed that the object of intervention in Spain was to bring Great Britain and France between the jaws of a pincer in a war that was regarded as inevitable. He is said to have stated that the batteries in the neighbourhood of Algeciras and opposite Gibraltar would be of great service when it came to cutting the vital communications of England and France. He is also said to have stated that the foundation of a fighting front had been laid which would be partly Italian, partly German and partly national Spanish and would run along the Pyrenees against France.

This was, it stated, diabolically frank and was not restricted to England and France but was also of concern to Portugal. In view of this evidence, Chamberlain's government was guilty of criminal negligence of vital British interests. The Government by its Spanish policy was helping the Governments of countries whose secret it was to maintain the control over a strategical position which enabled them to bring England to her knees. The Portuguese Government was also warned. If it supported

Franco's case, it would be encouraging forces which were prepared in case of need to do away with the independence of the country by force. The publication of this document should open Chamberlain's eyes.

The London newspaper that has in recent months marched at the head of the campaign of hatred and incitement against Germany excelled itself in this article. Its opposite number in France, the Paris "Oeuvre", for similar motives also published this not quite commonplace sensation. Both newspapers, however, though they naturally did not say so, took their information from the same source, namely the Moscow broadcast, which reported on this "lecture" some time ago and even gave the name of the officer, General von Reichenau. While the Moscow broadcast announced that the lecture was delivered at the War Academy in Munich, it was now stated that officers of the Reichswehr or leaders of the party formed the audience. When it is added that the Strasburg broadcast station, which also took up the news, transmitted it to its listeners as a document and written report, there are already four different versions, from which late-comers such as the London "Star", the French "Populaire", "Ordre" and "Epoque" could select what suited them best. The French trades union paper "Le Peuple" silenced any qualms of conscience by coolly stating that "even if the document was forged, its significance remained the same".

That it was a deliberate campaign of agitation and lies was shown shortly afterwards by an article published in the News Chronicle by the former French Air Minister Pierre Cot, who, as a faithful adherent of the Popular Front, made constant deliveries of aeroplanes to Bolshevik Spain. The aim of this article was neither more nor less than to incite the democracies (to which of course the Soviet Union belongs) to engage in a preventive war against the authoritarian States and in particular against Germany. It was, it said, still possible to prevent an attack on Czechoslovakia and thus to block Germany's path to the cornfields of Hungary and the oil-wells of Roumania. (This is a favourite idea of the American journalist Knickerbocker, who had had these intentions on the part of Germany whispered to him by the great "unknown" and who reported them to his North American agency in the middle of June.) The best trump card in this respect was the Russian air force which would use Czechoslovakia as a basis of action. Soviet Russian air attacks from a Czech base would be a severe blow for the German armies.

In accordance with the well-tried principle in the Great War, "Tell a lie and stick to it", the "News Chronicle" of July 15th again for the third time warms up the old legends regarding the landing of German troops, fortification engineers and technicians in Morocco opposite Gibraltar. On this occasion also General Franco's navy is manned with 5000 German marines, so that there is presumably not much room left for the Spaniards on their ships. In addition to the supply of about 250 aeroplanes which, for the sake of veracity, are enumerated according to models and kinds, there are now, it is stated, 2000 German parachute pilots in Franco's forces.

But there is system and method behind these fantasies. Their intention is to bring charges against Germany, on account of deliveries either to Burgos or to Barcelona, of intervention in the Spanish civil war and violation of the non-intervention agreement.

Apart from Germany, the arrow is also shot at Chamberlain who is charged with "criminal neglect of British interests". This neglect no doubt consists in the fact that, after infinitely difficult and prolonged efforts and negotiations, he finally succeeded on April 16th in removing the tension that had lasted for two years, in settling comprehensively the mutual points of conflict and in bringing the Spanish civil

war which has menaced European peace for a similar period towards its final solution by means of the new agreement in the London Non-Intervention Committee on July 5th, unless Moscow and its satellites in the French and British press again sabotage this solution.

Presumably the French Prime Minister M. Daladier is also to be an object of this attack since, after the Spanish popular front experiments of the Plum-Boncour Government, he has finally closed the Pyrenees frontier and—in contrast with his British colleague Chamberlain who is constantly attacked by the questions of the Labour Party in the House of Commons—cut short the attacks of the popular front deputies by the simple course of adjourning the Chamber for the vacation at an early date.

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The rapid and bloodless Anschluss which was received with complete enthusiasm by the entire Austrian people for the time being took the breath away from the agitators in the western democracies. They had not enough time to make up rumours and tendentious reports. But the moment seems now to have come for them to make up for lost time with renewed zeal. If the object pursued were not so bitterly earnest, the concentrated mass of articles in the last few weeks would seem to be madly grotesque. As usual on the occasion of these first-class contests, the parts were divided. At one time French newspapers, at another time English, Belgian, Polish and Czech newspapers, threw the ball to each other, in order that the news might be disseminated simultaneously and the real source might be disguised. A favourite means for this purpose consists in the so-called "special correspondents" as in the case of the notorious article in the "Temps" on the Berlin events of February 4th, 1938 when the Führer brought about a stronger concentration of military power and made changes in the leading posts. When such a "changing of the guard" takes place in other countries, such as Italy, England, Hungary, or even in the United States, this is a matter of course. But in Germany it must be preceded by a revolt of officers, a refusal by regiments to obey orders, and disturbances in Berlin, Pomerania and East Prussia. The source of this mysterious correspondent, who first reported his information from Basle, then from Warsaw and Cracow, has not yet been discovered. The former French Premier, M. Flandin, at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber, placed it in the Quai d'Orsay, and the then Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, promised a strict investigation. M. Flandin spoke at the time of the "guerrilla warfare of tendentious information and malicious statements by which German-French relations were poisoned", and M. Delbos replied that "he would not hesitate to combat with the means at his disposal the campaign of the press and other organs which might damage the friendly and courteous relations which France desires to maintain with all nations". These special correspondents and travellers in Germany generally sit in the editorial offices and are equipped either with official material or with gigantic instruments for seeing and hearing at a distance with which they either hear the grass grow or see visions of events of which their correspondents on the spot have nothing to report but which satisfy the desire for sensational news, if only for the purpose of increasing sales while at the same time picking holes in the "dictatorships".

But as the press apparently cannot live without sensations, Dr. Dietrich has pointed out to these seekers after sensation that they can satisfy their requirements by means of a few real sensations offered by the Third Reich in widely different spheres of social, economic and cultural life which, in contrast with the untrue sensations, are calculated not to incite the nations against each other, but to bring about an understanding between them.

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But to return to the Austrian sensations. Every correspondent must have been overcome with envy of the good fortune of his colleagues, if even a minute fraction was true of the stories which they have cabled since June 16th to the whole world from Vienna, Berlin and Berchtesgaden.

On that day the Daily Herald reported that the Führer was obliged, at the written request of 1300 members of the party in Austria, to proceed to Vienna on the 17th in order to remove serious difficulties which had arisen in the Austrian national socialist party where the best places were occupied not by Austrians but by Reich Germans. Innumerable newspapers and news agencies took up this news and embroidered it with details of other difficulties caused by the Anschluss which had led to open dissatisfaction with the "Prussian course". A Roumanian newspaper drivelled about "the dreadful spectacle of the struggle between the Prussian spirit and the soul of Latinised Austria". On the 17th, the Havas agency, and on the 18th Reuters, took up the chorus and devoted some profound reflections to the "martyrdom of Austria" which has since filled the columns of the newspapers. Then come famine demonstrations, as against which however there are other reports of hungry Reich Germans coming in crowds to Austria to eat their fill. Particular affection is shown for the city of Vienna. Its charm is said to have been destroyed and its former flourishing gardens turned into a huge fortress, which, however, does not seem to have been observed either by the Viennese or foreign journalists. In Upper Austria the peasants were said to be in revolt, because the deforestation changed the climate and endangered agriculture. As usual the "Illustrierte Krakauer Kurier", which had discovered the revolt of officers in East Prussia on February 4th, distinguished itself in this field. It was able to report very definitely that the Führer had been since the 16th at the Villa Hermes in Schönbrunn, naturally incognito though nevertheless in the company of almost all the Reich Ministers and leaders. The paper was in particularly good form, for it published the measures taken by Hitler to remove the difficulties. On the 21st there was a démenti by Havas, while the "Oeuvre" reported at the same time from Paris that the Führer had abandoned his journey because the differences of opinion between Reich Commissioner Bürckel and the Austrian Nazis could not be settled in the way he had expected. In the meantime, according to French and English newspapers on the 25th German troops were brought up in readiness in order to restore order and to suppress risings and revolts in Vienna because the Austrian police and soldiers were not reliable (according to the "Petit Parisien" some regiments had mutinied). On the 25th, however, according to the Evening Standard, Hitler did appear in Vienna, in spite of the fact that, according to the "Daily Herald" he was at Berchtesgaden and refused to receive the Austrian delegations that wanted to speak to him. In the meantime, Reich Commissioner Bürckel proceeded to Berchtesgaden or Berlin (according as it suited the paper) to ask for help. And thus it went on. The Führer was constantly on the way between Berlin, Vienna and Berchtesgaden and Reich Commissioner Bürckel constantly travelling to Berlin and Berchtesgaden without ever arriving. Towards the end of June the culminating point in this campaign of lies appears to have been reached. The Daily "Herald", which had led the dance on the 16th when it announced the visit of the Führer for the 17th, closed it on the 28th with the report that Hitler would now shortly proceed to Vienna. The more serious newspapers which had for nearly two weeks entertained their readers with horrors from Austria again became more cautious, but this naturally did not repair the damage done.

It is of course clear that this medley of mutually contradictory lies and inventions in which foreign news agencies, which

should have been particularly objective in view of their relations with official quarters, and also newspapers which are otherwise to be taken seriously took part, is not due to mere fantasy, but to method with a very definite object. It is a matter of indifference whether the plan for this agitation was hatched, according to reports from Brünn on June 7th and 8th, at an emigrant conference in Paris or not. This fact would merely throw more light on the ulterior motives. The "Figaro" and the "Daily Telegraph" gave open expression to the object aimed at by stating that the Sudeten Germans were becoming more and more convinced that a solution of their difficulties within the framework of Czechoslovakia offered them clear advantages. "The complete subjection of the National Socialists in Austria appears gradually to cause the view to be taken that a solution of their difficulties is possible without any change in the present Czechoslovak frontiers". The above false reports regarding conditions in Austria thus had Prague in view and were intended on the one hand to deter the faith of the Sudeten Germans in their German national feeling and, since Germany was weakened by these conditions, to paralyse their desire for the grant of their national rights; on the other hand they were intended to stiffen the backs of the Prague Government. A game that was as foolish as it was dangerous and that has already once nearly extended the Czech nationality crisis to a European conflagration.

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We now come to the crisis days of May 21st and 22nd when Europe was almost pushed into the abyss of a new war by means of a deliberately conducted press campaign and the excessive official zeal of certain governments in respect of a danger of war which did not exist.

Immediately after February 12th, after the conversation between Hitler and Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden, the political poisoning of the wells was begun in respect of Czechoslovakia, and the News Chronicle felt obliged to give proof of its anti-German attitude by reports regarding the massing of German troops on the Austrian and Czech frontier. This gave the Führer another opportunity, when speaking in the Munich Hofbräuhaus at a party formation festival, to show his attitude to these mendacious reports. The reports regarding the threat to Czechoslovakia increased in intensity from March 18th to April 10th, the day of the plebiscite on the Anschluss, in spite of the fact that Mr. Chamberlain had announced in the House of Commons on March 14th the tranquillising statements by Field Marshal Göring and Foreign Minister von Neurath to the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin. The folly of these reports went too far even for some French newspapers which opposed them with the warning that they rendered no service to Czechoslovakia. On March 23rd Dr. Krofta, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, called together the representatives of the foreign press in order to lecture them on the subject: Freedom of the press involves obligations. In referring them to the statements by Dr. Dietrich, he requested them to show the necessary reserve and the requisite objectivity especially when reporting from a country that gave them hospitality.

The impending communal elections in Czechoslovakia and the police and military measures taken by the Czechoslovak Government for the alleged purpose of carrying out the elections in an orderly and undisturbed manner in the Sudeten German districts and the tension to which this gave rise did not, apart from a few more or less insignificant incidents, bring any disquieting news. Then came the shooting of the two Sudeten Germans in the early morning of the 21st which showed like a flash the extreme degree of tension reached. Shortly before this and quite unconnected with it, reports of the alleged movements of German troops, were received on the 19th of May from Prague and London regarding which the British Ambassador in Berlin asked for information on the

20th and 21st. These legendary movements of troops that no one in Germany had seen but which were used by the French and British press on the 21st and 22nd in big headlines to bring the spectre of a fresh war before the eyes of their readers and the further news telegraphed between London, Paris and Prague to the effect that the Czechoslovak Government had ordered the partial mobilisation of the army left no doubt that this was a propagandist manoeuvre to construct a new war guilt lie. What was the position in reality?

The Berlin correspondent of the "Times" reported as follows:

"Except for the press campaign, which is violent, nothing appears to have been done here which could aggravate the crisis. If there have been any troop movements on a large scale, they have eluded the attention of all observers. A few precautionary measures and stoppage of leave in certain areas are all that can be discovered in the way of military preparations. The Reich Government go about their business calmly. Herr Hitler began this morning (Sunday) the construction of Munich's underground railway. His speech was wholly devoted to traffic problems."

These facts were also confirmed not only by other correspondents who had been invited by the Government of the Reich to verify them on the spot and were enabled to convince themselves of the incorrectness of the reports, but on the 23rd the British Ambassador in Paris informed the French Foreign Minister that no movements of German troops had been observed in the course of a detailed investigation on the spot. The "coup planned by the German army" proved, as Garvin stated in the Observer, to be "an artificial machination", to which, however, Prague had promptly reacted. It was regrettable that nevertheless, and in spite of the official assurances given on the 20th and 21st to the British Ambassador in Berlin, the British Government should permit the retailing of panic rumours in the British press on the 21st and 22nd and the deliberate misinterpretation of the Ambassador's visits. Unfortunately Mr. Chamberlain in his speech in the House of Commons on May 23rd, while disposing lightly of the allegations regarding the movements of German troops as stories, failed to clear up the entirely false impression caused by the combination of untrue reports and excessive official zeal and to inform the public that all the diplomatic actions of Great Britain, as far as Germany was concerned, forced an open door.

Although the "Times" (which it must be admitted had not taken part in the campaign) pointed out on the 24th that "an independent inquiry has shown that the rumours of German movements of troops on the Czech frontier are incorrect", the other newspapers and news agencies, in so far as they made any comment at all, in order not to give the lie to their own statements, covered their retreat by the further untrue report that the German troops had been withdrawn. The "détente" which was now observed was, under these circumstances, naturally not ascribed to the presence of mind, calmness and prudence of the German Government in the face of the Czech partial mobilisation and to the firm discipline of the Sudeten Germans in the face of Czech provocations and attacks. The laurels of the preservation of peace were rather placed on the head of the British Government through whose (and at the same time France's) determination "Europe had been saved from a serious danger".

* * *

In conclusion, Prague felt obliged on June 22nd to undertake a justification in an official statement regarding the reasons which led to the military measures of May 21st. The Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro reported thereon as follows:

"In view of the partial withdrawal of the military measures taken by the Czechoslovak Republic on May 21st, statements

have been made in authoritative Prague quarters regarding the reasons for these steps, with the obvious purpose of excusing a measure which would have brought Europe to the verge of war if the same nervousness had been shown elsewhere as in Prague. These statements amount to an accusation that the Sudeten Germans, by means of whispered propaganda with the slogan "The day is coming", had agitated for the possibility of a State change in the frontier districts of Czechoslovakia and undermined the authority of the State. Action by means of Czech pamphlets, the origin of which was moreover betrayed by linguistic errors and which entirely failed in their effect on account of their clumsy composition, was intended according to these statements to introduce disintegration into the ranks of the Czechs. In addition there were the repeated statements by German statesmen that it would be necessary to intervene if the alleged oppression of the Sudeten Germans continued and that sanguinary incidents would occur. In connection with the speeches made by the Führer and Chancellor and by Field Marshal Göring regarding the millions of Germans outside the German frontiers, it was stated that the conclusion had to be drawn that an intervention was intended. It was, however, true that on the other hand an assurance had been received from Germany that there was no thought of this.

But when, on May 21st, the feeling among the Sudeten Germans had reached boiling point and when news of the movements of German troops against the Czechoslovak frontier had become known, the Prague Government had to decide what it should do. In view of the above mentioned German declaration that no violent action was planned, it had, it said, confined itself to calling up one annual class of reservists together with men belonging to special troops for extraordinary exercises, without decreeing mobilisation. The right of self-defence, it was stated, must be granted to Czechoslovakia, and the Government had done no more than take measures for such defence in view of an obviously menacing position. It was not so foolish as to wish to attack or threaten the German Reich with one mobilised annual class. It had, however, been affirmed that the measure taken at Prague was intended to bring about the intervention of other Powers against the German Reich. This, it said, was absurd, for Czechoslovakia was well aware that in case of a warlike conflict in Central Europe she would in any case be the victim. The main object was to restore the authority of the State, upon which doubts had been cast, in the German district of the Republic, and at the same time to safeguard calm and security and the holding of independent elections, as it was to be feared that the Sudeten Germans would exercise undue pressure on the Czechoslovak and other parties."

It can scarcely be affirmed that the position of Prague was improved by this explanation, which resembles more than anything a rearguard action. On the grounds that "whispers" were going round in the German districts and—a matter for astonishment—the Sudeten Germans who had been oppressed for years "would exercise pressure on the Czechoslovak and other parties", the Czech General Staff called up "only one annual class of reservists" together with the special troops belonging thereto for "extraordinary exercises". (According to foreign eye-witnesses Sudetenland resembled a battle encampment.) The grounds of "news regarding German troop movements" are scarcely convincing, for Prague, as the immediate neighbour of these mythical movements of troops, was well aware that they did not exist. They were as fantastic as the plans of a "Putsch" ascribed to the disciplined Sudeten German population.

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We will not worry our heads as to whether the British Secret Service was really behind these reports of German troop movements, as at first stated by Jules Sauerwein and subsequently denied by him (and also by the Secret Service). Or as to whether,

according to Flandin's statements at a party meeting of the Alliance Democratique at Viennes (Dep. Isère), the French mobilisation order lay on the writing table of the French Premier Daladier on May 21st (this being denied by the latter).

The entire course of these days which were so ominous with heavy storm clouds shows that, apart from the evil press agitation, the procedure in other respects, arising as it did from an internally false policy of prestige, was unfair to Germany and moreover contained and still contains considerable elements of danger. The exaggerated praise given to the collective action of Paris and London, before which Germany was obliged to "recoil" the Czech "test case" which was accompanied by mutual congratulations and ended with a "victory for the collectivists", and the highly successful "general mobilisation of public opinion" might arouse in the minds of "catastrophe politicians" or—as the Times called them in connection with the flood of malicious speculations during Lord Halifax' visit to Berlin—"wire-pullers" and "warlike peacemakers" ideas of a licence with which they might again bring about a "test of strength" which the thin ice over which Europe skated without its breaking during the last crisis could no longer stand.

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That this possibility does not act as a deterrent upon the apostles of agitation, but rather as a stimulus to their activities is shown by the position they have taken up in the Spanish and Czech theatres where presumably they find better opportunities of extending the influence of another European focus of danger. Here again the Chamberlain-Daladier tendency does not suit them; for did not the latter in his speech at the banquet given by the Provençal associations in Paris on July 12th again and again praise in the strongest possible terms the honest love of peace evinced by Germany and the Führer, which even induced the "Temps" of July 15th to pay a tribute to the Government of the Reich which, by its spontaneous gesture of good-will in the critical days of May 21st and 22nd helped to remove the threatened danger to peace". Now we have in black and white in the famous daily leading article in the organ of the Quai d'Orsay, a refutation of this new crop of false rumours, according to which the Foreign Minister M. Bonnet once more spoke at a meeting of the Foreign Committee of the Chamber of these legendary movements of troops.

No sooner was this tissue of lies more or less officially unravelled, than they span another one and once again it was the busy spinner of the "News Chronicle" of July 16th who went to work with reports of "Movements of Nazi troops" and "The danger of a repetition of the events of May 21st and 22nd", after the cue had again been given by the Moscow announcer some hours before. This time the "whispered propaganda" passing from mouth to mouth among the Sudeten Germans, and now concerned with talk of a general strike after the proclamation of the Nationalities Statute, was included, and it was deduced from the decision not to hold the great manœuvres (which as every one knows are everywhere held at intervals of several years), that German troops were being secretly assembled in frontier towns and military training centres. If they had been held, they would presumably have constituted a still more dangerous preparation for war in those "war-clouded months" of July and August. "The same tactics are adopted here as in the matter of the attitude of the Führer. If he stigmatizes in his speeches this dangerous practice of playing with fire, that is a "threat" and if he says nothing, it is a "disquieting silence" still more dangerous to peace.

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All this goes to show how very much to the point and how thoroughly justified the warning contained in the sixth point of Adolf Hitler's speech in the Reichstag on January 30th, 1937 was, when he said: "it is impossible to bring about a real pacification of the nations, as long as nothing is done to stop the continual agitation of an irresponsible international clique of poisoners of the springs of knowledge and of men's minds", though this warning has unfortunately failed to bear any fruit up to the present. At the same time, it also shows that today—just, as 24 years ago—war guilt fables are invented and believed, whenever any circles in Europe consider that time and opportunity are favourable for furthering "obscure interests which shun the light of day", as Daladier recently expressed it.

Furthermore, these considerations lend weight and immediate significance to the profound truths uttered by Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich.

When all is said and done, there are no two opinions in regard to the dangers of this poisoned pen campaign and every responsible statesman and indeed every person in a public position who has any sense of responsibility knows perfectly well that irreparable damage can be done by the publication of false reports in the press. Thus for years far-sighted people in all countries have been working for measures to restrain the unbridled misuse of the press and for decent truthful reporting, which does not gamble with national requirements and international relations, whenever the machinery of disintegrating agitation is set in motion by wire-pullers behind the scenes. Unfortunately the recognition of these facts has not got beyond the stage of theoretical discussions concerning measures of improvement, and against newspapers which are in principle hostile to the truth warnings are of no use and threats of little avail, especially when their effect is immediately counteracted by assurances that "the liberty of the press" will in no circumstances be infringed.

Adolf Hitler mercilessly exposed this state of affairs in his great speech on February 20th and demanded deeds—not words. Just as certain methods of warfare are forbidden now and to be forbidden in the future—just as the use of disease bacteria and the poisoning of wells are acknowledged to be against international law—so it should be possible to place an international ban upon the poisoning of the human soul, which is incidentally so much more dangerous.

Shortly after the Führer's speech, Dr. Dietrich broke another lance when he drew the logical practical conclusions from that speech. The problem of press polemics and international press work has thus been drawn into the circle of discussions between State and State. A political question of the day of the first importance has now come up for debate, for it is no longer denied anywhere today that the press is a power which both in a good and evil sense, plays a decisive part in the problem of international peace and understanding. If this part is to be played in a good sense, the first prerequisite is the conclusion of a press peace, which does not mean that the press would or ought to be muzzled.

No one objects to foreign newspapers in Germany criticizing, provided they do not criticize for the sake of criticizing or with intent to defame. Where press lies are published for their own sake and degenerate into licence, they can no longer be said to represent legitimate national interests. Nor do they merely serve to fan the agitation against Germany and her Government, but are, as we have seen, nothing more nor less than attacks on the peace of Europe and this, as Dr. Dietrich pointed out, has nothing whatsoever to do with the liberty of the press.

Unfortunately here, as in many other fields, the League of Nations has completely failed, as the Cas-

sandra-like cries of Herriot, one of the most prominent members of the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, set up for precisely this purpose many years ago, testify. Dr. Dietrich has therefore not only launched an earnest appeal to all competent authorities throughout the world to fight for truth in the press, but also indicated the only method which can enable us to attain our object, since the collective efforts of Geneva have failed; namely, the method of bi-lateral agreements between one country and another, which has already been successfully tried between Germany and some of her neighbours. He stressed the fact that Germany, by virtue of her press policy based on the principle of personal responsibility, furnished every guarantee and opportunity for the conclusion of a press truce—an inter-governmental civil peace—with every State in which the same conditions precedent could be shown to exist. Germany honestly desires to supplement existing effective agreements with others, in so far as it is desired to achieve this object on a footing of genuine

equality. The Reich Press Chief may thus be said in some sort to have made an offer to the diplomats and journalists. The decision now rests with them or their Governments who, in view of the events of the last few weeks must have come to realize that the question can no longer be solved by words alone, and it would seem that this is less a question of ability than of goodwill.

The object in view—namely, to abandon negative desintegrating press work for positive and constructive achievements in the service of world peace is surely worth a little goodwill, for, as the former German Foreign Minister, Freiherr von Neurath, said to a representative of the Stefani Agency on May 6th, 1937 during his visit to Italy which gave rise to such wild suspicions; "it would be a blessing if the weapon of defamation could be buried and the international press would realize that its most important task was to bring the nations closer together."

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TWO YEARS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN¹

The 17th of July was the second anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, undoubtedly the most dreadful catastrophe, after the Bolshevik Revolution, that has befallen and threatened Europe. The occasion for it was the murder of the Monarchist leader Calvo Sotelo in the night from July 12th to 13th in Madrid by police officers of the special Government troops, the Guardia de Asalto. This bloodthirsty act—which was to be followed by innumerable other horrible and indescribable acts by the Red authorities and their undisciplined hordes—was not expiated by the arrest and punishment of the murderers but was rewarded by the arrest and removal of the adherents of Sotelo, and was a sign for General Franco, who had been exiled by the Popular Front Government to a command in the Canary Islands, to depart from the strict discipline and loyalty that he had exercised towards the War Ministry and to give the signal for revolt. On July 17th, under his orders, the army in Spanish Morocco which was devoted to his cause rose at his command and the first troops were landed at Cadiz on the 19th. On the 21st Franco arrived by air from the Canary Islands, while the other leader of the rising, General Sanjurjo, who was living in exile in Portugal, was killed in flying to Spain. On August 27th Nationalist Spain transferred the military supreme command to Franco and on October 7th the political leadership. These functions were again conferred on him on August 1st, 1938 by the new State Constitution (Articles 16 and 17).

In the meantime Franco's Government has been recognised by Germany, Italy, Japan, the Vatican, Portugal, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, Turkey, Hungary, Guatemala, San Salvador, Albania, Nicaragua and Manchukuo. The United Kingdom has sent a diplomatic agent to Burgos and a Franco agent is accredited in London. The same procedure is at present under consideration by other States, such as Holland and Belgium. On the other hand, a number of States have broken off diplomatic relations with the Red Spanish Government without having hitherto recognised Franco's Government.

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Since that 17th of July two years have passed. In their continuous victorious advance Franco's armies have taken one pro-

vince after another from the Red Government. Of 47 provinces 30 are now in Franco's possession. Four have for the most part fallen to him, while the Reds have only nine, and the remaining four are contested.

This is not the time and place to describe in detail the ruined towns and villages and the hecatombs of murdered people the Red troops have left behind them in their withdrawals. But these two years should have been sufficient to destroy the view in the mind of any unprejudiced person that in Spain "a conflict was being waged by the dictatorships against the democracies", if, as is done in so many quarters, the government system with which the Moscow International, which stands behind the Madrid Government, wishes to endow the Spanish people is described as a democracy. The object of this civil war was briefly described as follows by General Franco to his officers when he left his staff headquarters in Santa Cruz de Tenerife: "We have begun the struggle in order to liberate Spain from a foreign spirit and to restore her to herself. It is the fight for the future of Spain and the culture of Spain that must now be fought. What I demand from you is discipline, discipline and again discipline; faith, faith and again faith."

What discipline and faith have rendered possible for Franco since those July days and since the beginning of the rising, which was critical because unexpected for Franco, at a time when the entire military and political power was in the hands of Madrid, is now shown by a glance at the map. But Franco has conquered four-fifths of the country not only with military arms, but by means of his socialism of deeds, which he has constantly pursued, he has also conquered the hearts of the people, who have been incited against each other by years of communist, anarchist and socialist propaganda.

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The question that arises, as to why this victorious advance of Franco has not brought a definite decision and completely freed the country from the rule of Red violence and bloodshed, draws attention to another aspect of this manifold Spanish

¹ See No. 8/1938.

problem, namely the extension of the conflict, which was originally a purely Spanish concern, to an international battlefield of foreign political, military and economic interests, a battlefield which has dominated the Spanish scene for two years and threatened to extend it to a European danger.

The future historian who assumes the difficult task of defining the various laws of development of the Spanish civil war will have to start from a complicated ramification of events and their connecting links. For this war cannot be regarded as an isolated event any more than the Abyssinian war. Here also there are events correlated with other events, and possibly diplomatic action in respect of Spain is more unclear and evasive than that in respect of Abyssinia. It has already happened that questions relating to the Abyssinian campaign overlap into the Spanish problem and have at times been transferred from the periphery to the centre.

In respect of all these general political and ideological overlappings which have at times checked and at other times incited the forces of development of the Spanish crisis, the origin should not be overlooked: it is the very vigorous interest taken in this conflict from the beginning by the Soviet Union and French Popular Front quarters. The Soviet Union was impelled by reasons of world revolution, since it regarded the introduction of a Bolshevik system in Spain as a suitable jumping-off ground for the further bolshevisation of Europe, while the French Popular Front was impelled by its ideological connection with the Soviet Union and thought it was obliged to defend democracy in Spain against the erection of a new Fascist dictatorship. To these have been added recently to an increasing extent the British Labour Party and Liberal circles, who are filled with blind hatred of everything that is Fascist and National Socialist and who take every opportunity offered by the military measures that Franco is obliged to take, such as the sinking of ships carrying contraband and the bombardment of important military and strategic points by aircraft, to delay Franco's final victory and the downfall of Spanish "democracy".

Thus it happened that, a few days after Franco's rising, as the French "Œuvre" joyfully announced, the first supplies came from France to the "noble friends" in Madrid, partly across the Pyrenees frontier and partly by sea via North Spanish ports. This was the beginning of the intervention that has since become so famous. These transports of material and ammunition were soon followed by the transport of Red volunteers, from which the so-called International Brigade was formed at the beginning of October and November.

This French-Soviet Russian intervention should be borne in mind in view of the fact that in the past two years the French press and the French Government have constantly pointed out with special emphasis that it was France and, in particular, the French Popular Front Government, that first took the initiative of a Non-Intervention Agreement on August 1st, 1936, which led on September 9th to the appointment of the so-called Non-Intervention Committee in London.

But there is a further point to be remembered in this connection, namely the original attitude of England and France to the question of volunteers, which subsequently became the central point of the entire non-intervention question. As far back as the beginning of August, the Italian and German Governments, in reply to and agreeing with the French suggestion for a Non-Intervention Agreement, demanded that this should not be restricted to a prohibition of supplies of war material but should be extended to the participation of foreign volunteers. This suggestion, which was inspired by the sincere endeavour to localise the Spanish conflict completely in every respect, was not favourably received. At this particular time certain governments had the greatest difficulty in finding comprehension for an embargo restricted to war material among the Marxist groups that supported them, not to mention a prohibition of the transport of volunteers which was at that time taking place through the usual routes. In fact it was openly stated by the Government in the British Parliament as late as the beginning of December that the participation of foreign volunteers in the Spanish conflict was not contrary to the Non-Intervention Committee. It was only on December 7th, after the uninterrupted influx of volunteers to Red Spain had been followed by a similar influx to Nationalist Spain, that this question was brought before the Committee for discussion by the French and British and, on their proposal, it was decided to prohibit the volunteers.

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Then began the game of conflicting interests which has since then dominated the discussions of the Committee. While England and also France desired by this non-intervention policy to prevent the spread of the Spanish war beyond the frontiers of Spain, they counted on the war weakening the country and ending in a compromise which would leave the Iberian Peninsula politically, economically and strategically within the zone of influence of these two Powers and would possibly open up new zones. But, after the influx especially of Italian volunteers, the possibility suddenly arose of a strong Spain which would continue the war until the unconditional subjection of Madrid and would under certain circumstances subsequently have a foreign policy closely connected with that of Italy.

Presumably Paris and London had in mind past events, when in 1926 the Spanish dictator, Primo de Rivera, with an obvious dig at France, made no secret of his sympathy for Fascist Italy and rumours were circulated regarding political and military co-operation between the two States and the granting of the right to Italy to occupy the Balearic Islands in case of war, while a few years later, after the fall of Rivera and the monarchy and the seizure of power by bourgeois socialist governments in 1931, M. Herriot, at that time French Premier, made his much commented journeys to Spain in order to bring that country into closer connection with France and to negotiate a treaty for the right to purchase the Balearic Islands. The background of this French interest in Spain is constituted by the Balearic Islands with their capacity of either protecting or endangering French transports of troops from North Africa to France. The back-

ground of British interests is constituted by Gibraltar, the importance and position of which is obviously greatly influenced according to whether the hinterland is politically and economically more or less dependent on England. The former Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, expressed this in his fundamental speech at Llandudno on October 15th, 1936 when he said that a clear distinction must be made between non-intervention and indifference. The United Kingdom, he said, was not indifferent to the maintenance of the integrity of Spanish territory. A clear distinction must be made between non-intervention in Spanish affairs and intervention in which political interests were at stake. In other words, the United Kingdom would take care that its interests in the Mediterranean and in the maintenance of the communications to the Near East and to India were not endangered. One of these communications is the Straits of Gibraltar. The celebrated "guns over Gibraltar" have on various occasions given rise to critical questions in both Houses of Parliament; behind them has been for the most part not so much real anxiety as incriminations against Italy and Germany. On the last occasion, on April 7th, 1938, Lord Faringdon in the House of Lords gave a description of the suspicious military measures which must have deeply moved every Englishman who felt any concern for the British Empire and the maintenance of the free sea route of Gibraltar. The Government representative disposed of these comments with the brief remark that he was not aware of any alteration in the situation since the Government's previous statements that would justify a change of attitude on the part of the Government. Naturally guns had been added to the defences of both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar since the beginning of the civil war in Spain. On the other hand, it cannot be a matter of indifference to the present Italian Empire, as a great Mediterranean and colonial Power, if national Spanish interests are crowded out by others and, in particular, if influences and currents such as Bolshevism are established which merely serve world revolutionary aims and make Spain a source of disturbance and danger not only for the country itself but also for all the surrounding territories in the Mediterranean and North Africa. Mussolini has from the outset left no doubt that he is not pursuing any territorial aims in his support of Nationalist Spain, and could scarcely have expressed this more clearly than in the statement which he made in November 1936 to an English journalist; he said he would not have the slightest respect for the leader of a nationalist movement who thought for a moment of the possibility of sacrificing a part of the soil of his fatherland. The fight against Bolshevism and in favour of the maintenance of the peace of Europe which is threatened by Bolshevism has naturally aroused nothing but sympathy in Germany and among the German people for Franco's struggle for the freedom of Spain, while the Government of the Reich, like the Italian Government, has energetically denied all rumours to the effect that it claims any compensation for its support of Franco's cause. German and Italy, and also Portugal, have from the outset regarded the Spanish civil war as the struggle between disintegrating world Bolshevism and the forces which desire to maintain Western culture and civilisation. They have regarded Franco's struggle not merely as a rising against the "legal"

State authority, but perceived that it was a way in which this part of the old European continent might be saved from the fate of becoming a province of world Bolshevism.

Franco himself has on various occasions stated unequivocally, the last occasion being on March 29th, 1938 to a Havas representative, that the Mediterranean Statute would not be changed by actions on his part. "After our victory not an inch of Spanish territory will be separated in favour of a foreign Power."

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The diplomatic game of chess which has hitherto taken place in the London Non-Intervention Committee should be regarded and judged against the background of these aspirations. Its confusing negotiations regarding technical questions which veil the political conflicts, such as the introduction of systems of control on land, at sea and in the air, the granting of belligerent rights, the formation of blockade zones, the prevention of air bombardments and submarine torpedo attacks, have never been able to arouse much comprehension among the public. Nevertheless the overflowing of the conflict has more than once been dependent on the upward or downward movement of the Committee, and if an historical account of its proceedings is ever given, this will undoubtedly form one of the most interesting and remarkable documents of the present time.

In estimating its work, it cannot be denied that the Non-Intervention Committee has been able to steer the bark of non-intervention past all the rocks and dangers into the—for the moment—safe harbour of the agreement of July 5th, 1938. It is to the credit of non-intervention—which the Spanish crisis has introduced as a new conception into international law—that the Spanish civil war, in spite of all intervention, was able to be localised and that the explosive matter which had accumulated could be kept at a distance from the rest of Europe. A different judgment could, however, be given regarding the question whether agreement to the demand constantly made by Italy and Germany, that the two parties to the civil war should be accorded belligerent rights, would not have made the entire non-intervention procedure superfluous and at the same time brought the war to a more rapid end. This recognition of belligerent rights was rejected in the first place from the political point of view by the other Great Powers in the Committee because they entirely misjudged the actual position, even after Franco's liberating victorious career and his enthusiastic reception by the greater part of the Spanish people, and they continued to regard him as the "rebel", and the Red authorities in Madrid, who changed according to socialist, communist and anarchist influences and found support in a constantly diminishing number of adherents, as the "legal Government". This recognition of belligerent rights was also denied in the first place because it was demanded by the Soviet Union solely for Madrid, and also because it was regarded, if not by the Government at any rate by large sections of British and French public opinion according to the course of the war, as a measure in favour of Franco. If belligerent rights had been accorded, this would for instance have prevented Red Spanish troops, as recently happened in the case of an entire division (the 43rd) which had fled before Franco's advancing troops into French territory, from returning to Barcelona instead of being disarmed and

interned in France and again being used against the Nationalist Spanish armies.

Ed. Bauer wrote very pertinently on February 11th, 1938 in the "Journal de Genève" regarding the recognition of belligerent rights:

"In so far as this war is prolonged and extended on land, at sea and in the air, the fiction on behalf of which people stubbornly refuse to accord to this conflict the juridical character of a war and to grant the character of belligerent rights to the two parties will cause more and more losses and become more and more dangerous. So long as Europe refuses to recognise this war as such, it will deprive itself of the legal conditions, i.e. of the international rules, which might restrict its dangers for neutrals and mitigate its inhumanity towards the belligerents. For if belligerent rights are not recognised, there is no reason to demand that the belligerents should restrict their freedom of action in order to subject themselves to a belligerent law the recognition of which is refused them."

The "Times" also had to admit on July 2nd, 1938 that "the entire position is thus complicated from the international point of view on account of the paradox of a relentless two-year war without the parties to the struggle being recognised as belligerents".

However that may be, it has been possible, after two years, to reach what is to be hoped will be a final settlement which will be put into effect regarding the volunteers and naturally also the prohibition to send fresh volunteers and the question of the recognition of belligerent rights, to which even the Soviet Union had to agree after various trivial though unsuccessful attempts at evasion if it was not to appear openly, before a world which has hitherto been extremely indulgent, as an incurable saboteur of the entire non-intervention; this proves what the Powers could have spared themselves, Spain and Europe, if they could have arrived earlier not only at this decision but also at its execution, naturally without consideration for the Russian machinations.

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The view really taken by the Blum Popular Front Government, which boasted with particular pride of the paternity of the non-intervention idea, is shown not only by the unchecked and uninterrupted transports of men and material over the mysterious Pyrenees frontier, as proved by innumerable reports and disclosures of French newspapers, but also by the former Prime Minister Flandin in his broadcast speech on June 22nd and by Blum himself in a recent article in the "Populaire" of June 29th; the latter, when read between the lines, admits the fact that the Blum Government in a ministerial decree which was not published in the "Journal Officiel" deliberately infringed the Non-Intervention Agreement and the French law prohibiting the delivery and transit of war material and expressly permitted the transit of such material. In this article, M. Blum, referring naturally to the German and Italian deliveries, which were alleged to be much greater, said: "I have no intention of denying this fact and the support which the Soviet Government gave to the Republican Government of Spain. No one will deny that

this assistance was considerable and was of vital importance for the Republican army in the most critical hours of the war." M. Daladier, at that time War Minister, was also placed in an uncomfortable position in the meeting of the Chamber on March 23rd when unequivocal questions were put by the Right opposition parties regarding the correctness of the rumours regarding the supply of arms to Red Spain, and he had to reply by silence. As late as May 20th the correspondents of the "Times" at Hendaye and Paris reported the constant stream of war material and of volunteers to Catalonia, though not from France itself but from other countries. About the same time it became known from reports from London that the British Government had requested its Ambassador in Paris to make "friendly representations" at the Quai d'Orsay in order to draw the French Government's attention to the supply of arms to the Valencia Government. But all this did not prevent the Red Spanish Foreign Minister, del Vayo, from stating at the May session of the Council of the League of Nations that only 6000 volunteers were fighting on the side of the Government troops as against over 100,000 on the side of Franco. At the meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee on May 31st the Soviet Russian representative, Kagan, in refusing to contribute to the cost of transport of the troops to be withdrawn, gave as his reason that there were no Russian volunteers at all in Spain.

While del Vayo made these statements in the Council Hall of the League of Nations, they were denied outside in the corridors by his own delegates who, as the "Times" correspondent reported, spoke quite openly of the constant support received by Barcelona on all sides.

Blum attacked in the most violent manner the Daladier Government that succeeded him in articles in the "Populaire" for its decision to regard the "transit traffic in arms, ammunition and other war material" as contrary to the principles of the non-intervention policy, which he said, was responsible for "the downfall of Republican Spain", and thus proved the extent to which the previous attitude of France had been determined and influenced by consideration for Marxist tendencies, the threats of the communists and the pressure of the Red trades unions. It is only to be hoped that the Daladier Government will be able successfully to oppose these machinations in its own country and the cross-fire from Moscow, and will ultimately be able to escape from this defile of the Pyrenees which has proved so disastrous for the non-intervention policy.

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After long negotiations and diplomatic efforts, which were mainly concerned with overcoming the Soviet Russian resistance, the plan for more effective control in Spain was unanimously adopted. It would be wrong to deny the difficulties, especially in the "combing out" of the Red volunteers, that "army of Babel" as it is called by "Figaro", the members of which have in many cases become Spanish "citizens", and in providing security that those who are withdrawn do not return in some other way to the field of action. The pedantic withdrawal calendar makes an almost grotesque effect in its object of regulating the further course of a war that has continued for two years and proved to be rich in political and military surprises

and improvisations. This withdrawal is to be completed in 164 days. But on the 56th day after this complicated withdrawal machinery has been put into action, the most important stage will be reached, namely the recognition of belligerent rights. For it is only by this means that all the dangers of undesirable incidents can be removed and that the fence round Spain can be drawn tighter on land and at sea. It is only then that the principles of general international law will apply to the war. Then Franco will not be a "rebel" but a "legitimised belligerent", and this will give him greater freedom of action, especially at sea, in the control of the merchant ships in the service of Red Spain. The plan should therefore be received with optimism and reserve.

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Germany and Italy have now—it is true after two years—received the satisfaction that finally, after the abortive attempts with the drafts of July 14th and November 4th, 1937, the most essential means of checking the Spanish conflict, i.e. the with-

drawal of the volunteers and the granting of belligerent rights, is being seriously tackled. Under Soviet Russian obstruction and French intervention in the name of non-intervention, the crisis has for two years been moving in a vicious circle. It must be admitted that British policy and the record patience shown by Lord Plymouth, the Chairman of the Committee, in 96 meetings of the sub-committee and 30 meetings of the main committee, have succeeded in overcoming every critical position. They always found a proposal which led out of the blind alley and enabled a fresh start to be made. Though this saved Europe from a breach, it was impossible to conceal the dark sides of these tactical moves: a solution of the Spanish question was not found. On the contrary the atmosphere over the western Mediterranean became constantly darker and more threatening, and torpedoes and bombing aeroplanes created the most serious incidents which again form a danger for the execution of the agreement, as they supply water to the mills of the opposition quarters in London and Paris in their propaganda against the Governments of Chamberlain and Daladier.

ROUND THE CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN

Submarine Piracy and the Nyon Alarm

When in the middle of September last year England and France and seven riparian States of the Mediterranean and Black Sea met in the small town on the shores of Lake Geneva and agreed on a Supervision Agreement, the object was to protect merchant shipping in the Mediterranean by means of intimidation against further mysterious attacks by unknown submarines. The means of intimidation was that 60 British and French destroyers and a large number of aeroplanes were ordered to the Mediterranean with instructions to fire at and to attempt to sink any submarine caught in the act of attacking a non-Spanish merchant ship. The establishment of this vast system of protection in the Mediterranean was combined with a demonstration of Franco-British naval co-operation, of which French and British newspapers wrote at the time that it was closer than the co-operation of the two navies during the War. On September 30th Italy, which had refused to take part in the Nyon Conference on account of Soviet Russian attacks and calumnies, acceded to the agreement by means of a special arrangement in Paris and was allotted a definite supervision zone the size of which was in accordance with her claim to equality of rights with the other two Powers. This intimidating action had the effect of pacifying the Mediterranean, for there were no further attacks on merchant ships. For this reason the number of supervision vessels was reduced at the end of 1937, though the main reason was no doubt the high cost.

At the beginning of 1938 this position suddenly changed and the torpedoing of merchant ships again began to increase. After a Dutch and an Irish steamer had met with this fate one after another in the middle of January, the British s.s. "Endymion" was sunk on January 31st 16 miles south of Cartagena and therefore outside territorial waters, and eleven persons, including the Swedish control official, lost their lives. This led on February 2nd to an excited debate in the House of Commons in which Mr. Eden stated that a meeting would take place on the same day between the three control Powers, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in order not only to bring the control up to the level of October 1937 but also to strengthen it. This was done and this meeting decided to word still more strongly the firing orders issued to the Mediterranean police. In future the submarines were to be attacked and, if possible, destroyed if they came under suspicion through sailing under-water outside the territorial limit. It was not necessary for a submarine to have attacked a merchant ship, but it was sufficient that it should be travelling under-water in order to be attacked by the control ships. The intimidating action of Nyon thus assumed a more dangerous form as a result of this new measure. The immediate acquiescence of Italy proved the groundlessness of the rumours spread by Valencia and Moscow that the submarines in question were Italian. The identity of the submarines has, however, never been established.

Air War and Air Bombardment

But suddenly another weapon became more active and came into the bright light of public opinion, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries. We speak deliberately in saying that this was sudden and that it affected Anglo-Saxon public opinion in particular. It was to be foreseen that, the nearer the decision came, General Franco would make use of the weapon which in case of war every Government and every military authority

would use in order to overcome the resistance of the enemy, namely blockade and air bombardment, with a view to preventing the supply of foodstuffs and war material and destroying important military objectives and arrangements behind the lines of the opponent. This was the case in the Great War and will presumably again be the case in a future war if victory or defeat is at stake. We know how inhumanly the German nation

was blockaded in the last war under the leadership of the present apostle of peace, Lord Robert Cecil, while the French air attack on the open town of Karlsruhe was recently again sadly called to mind on the twentieth anniversary of this event. We will not stir up old wounds. It is a matter for deep regret if war measures with comprehensible aims cause suffering to innocent people, as was the case with the bombardment of Barcelona on January 30th, 1938. But, in the face of the natural indignation of the British, we should like to ask the question: Who began these bombardments? Was it not Red aeroplanes which on July 20th, 1936 rained their murderous bombs on Larache and Tetuan? As the British Member of Parliament, Sir Henry Page-Croft, wrote in the "Times" on February 4th, was it not Red aeroplanes which between July 18th and September 23rd, 1937 bombarded open towns such as Lerida, Granada, Cordova, Seville, Malaga, Segovia, Toledo, Avila, Saragossa, Teruel, Huesca, Jaca, Mocril, Valladolid and others no less than 57 times, at a time when Franco did not possess sufficient aircraft? Where was the indignation then of the Labour Party and the Liberals who at present attack Chamberlain, not so much for moral as for electioneering reasons? The Red Spanish Government itself admitted these bombardments when, at the beginning of February 1938, in view of the French and British efforts to put a stop to the bombardment of open towns, it announced that during the negotiations the air forces of the Republic would restrict itself to flights in connection with the land forces and that such flights would only be used for reconnaissance behind the lines.

There is a further point. When we read that the British Trades Unions addressed a letter to Mr. Chamberlain expressing the abhorrence of the labour movement for the dreadful massacre of men, women and children in the Spanish towns, or that the labour group of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at Geneva, at its 82nd session, made a protest expressing its profound indignation at the bombardments, we cannot recall that the same quarters and their press organs raised any objections when hundreds of thousands of civilians in Red Spanish territory outside the war zone lost their lives, not by warlike action but as the victims of sheer thirst for blood. The very people who are at present agitating for the abolition of bombardments found no cause to protest or to express their abhorrence at the deliberate horrors of Red civil warfare, but rather announced loudly their sympathy for the perpetrators, which was naturally not calculated to deter them from their barbarous practices.

In view of these facts it is a mockery for the Red Spanish Government to protest in diplomatic Notes against the bombardments and to state, as in the Note of May 28th, 1938, that it has done everything to humanise the war.

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The bombardment of the British s.s. "Alcira" on February 4th, 18 miles from Barcelona and therefore outside Spanish territorial waters, together with the bombardment of Barcelona on January 30th, brought up the entire problem of the air arm, its prohibition or restriction, and the humanisation of the war. On February 1st the French Prime Minister, M. Chautemps, spoke to the press against the bombardment of Barcelona and said it was the urgent duty of the Governments to do everything to bring about an international settlement regarding the use of the air arm. On February 2nd Mr. Eden took advantage of this appeal in order to state that the British Government had for months past requested the competent organs to examine the question, and he also referred to Adolf Hitler's proposals. He defended the British Government against the charges made on the grounds that it had prevented an international settlement being reached at the Disarmament Conference through the fact that it demanded

the permission to throw bombs from the air in outlying regions. Mr. Eden denied that this demand, whether it was wise or not, had prevented a settlement, and the "Times" supported this view in a leading article on February 4th, though it had to admit that the British attitude in this question had thereby been weakened.

After the bombardment of the "Alcira", the British Government sent a serious admonition to Franco through its Commercial Agent in Burgos, Sir Robert Hodgson, to the effect that its patience was not inexhaustible and that, if such cases were repeated, it would not merely protest and demand compensation but would exercise adequate reprisals. To this Salamanca replied that in the first place there were no proofs that the torpedoes had been launched by the National Spanish side and that in the second place all these incidents were caused by the fact that, after two years of warfare, belligerent rights had still not been accorded to the two parties and that, in the third place, the holy war of Nationalist Spain should not be confused with a colonial war.

The bombardments of ports, it continued, were moreover intended to prevent the trade in arms, ammunition and explosives and war material of all kinds, both in loading places and factories, whether on lighters or ships, without distinction of the national flag, since aeroplanes were unable to make such a distinction. Ships which did not carry contraband and deliberately entered such zones exposed themselves of their own free will to the results of their own temerity, and the attacks to which they were subject were not directed against them but against the objectives situated in enemy ports at which they called.

In reply to the constant attacks of the opposition in the House of Commons, the "Times" of May 3rd published an interesting and illuminating article by its correspondent in Riga regarding the world revolutionary aims of the Komintern, especially in Spain, and made the following comment in a leading article:

"The fighting in Spain has not been, as both Labour and Liberal speakers seem to believe, a revolt against an established Government which was actually governing the country, but a civil war resulting from the inability of the Government nominally in power to enforce respect for the law among its own followers. This inability was in large part caused by agitation fomented and directed from Moscow. Italy and Germany have not been the only countries to intervene in Spain. It is disputable even if they were the first." Opposition speakers ignore this fact.

The French newspaper "Figaro" of the 19th—more or less as a reply to the attacks made on England and France in the League Council at Geneva on May 18th by the Red Spanish Foreign Minister, del Vayo, to the effect that they were "deliberately hindering the Spanish nation in its struggle for freedom and delivering it up with bound hands to the aggressor"—wrote even more clearly:

"It is foolish to make the imputation that the sympathies of France go out to a Government of Valencia or Barcelona because it represents the Republic and democracy in its struggle against the rebels. It cannot be too often repeated that there is neither a republic nor a democracy in the Red zone, but a rule of tyrannical and anarchist organs which are tearing at each other's throats and which have as little regard for the human personality as for freedom. It is scandalous that republicans and democrats who swear by their principles do not hesitate to expose those principles in this dreadful masquerade. The only excuse for most of them is that they are unaware of the truth. Those who know the truth and do not speak it are nothing more than deceivers."

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On May 31st and June 4th, in view of the bombardment of Alicante and the sinking of the s.s. "Thorpehall", further

questions were asked in the House of Commons. Mr. Chamberlain again referred to the draft international agreement under preparation, which, he said, must be in such a form that all Governments could accept it. Mr. Butler, Under-Secretary of State, reported on the Government's intention to enter into communication with the Norwegian, Swedish and American Governments with a view to setting up a small Commission which—naturally with the agreement with Valencia and Burgos—would examine the military necessities and the damage done by the bombardments on the spot. In addition the establishment of so-called security zones would be considered. For the first time the Members of Parliament, Sir Arnold Wilson and Sir Henry Page-Croft, referred to the illegal activity of certain torpedoed merchant ships.

On June 28th the "Times" wrote on this subject as follows:

"The facts of the trade with Spain are pretty well known. The bait of profits multiplied manifold above the normal draws an ever-increasing number of British merchantmen to the coasts of Spain. When they proceed within the limit of territorial waters they pass into the war area; and there they risk destruction. They carry the Union Jack because it is usual for ships to fly their national colours. Some of the ships belong to companies which have a long and honourable record of business with the Iberian Peninsula; but many others have been drawn into the trade by the unusual profits, and are neither British ships nor manned by British crews. They have simply taken advantage of the easy conditions allowed by the Board of Trade for obtaining registry as a British vessel and the consequent right of flying a Red Ensign. It is rather ridiculous to suppose that every foreign adventurer who forms a company having its "principal place of business" somewhere in His Majesty's dominions shall enjoy at once the full rights of British citizenship in regard to his maritime property—including the right to involve us in difficulties with a foreign State. Some of the ships so employed are known to be uninsurable and fit only for the scrap-heap. If individuals care to indulge their taste for adventure and their love of gain to this extent, they must really be prepared to take their chance as to success and even survival—and to give them their due most of them are perfectly prepared to do so—and accept the British Government's ruling that they will be protected on the high seas but not when they have entered the maritime area of Spain.

By a curious paradox it is the very efficacy of the protection of the British Navy which has produced so many British victims, by drawing an abnormally large proportion of British or pseudo-British ships into the Spanish trade. There is an impression in the mind of the public that General Franco—or rather the air commands co-operating with the General—discriminates against British vessels and makes a point of sinking them rather than others. That is certainly not the case. In fact General Franco's warships have driven the vessels of some other nations off the Spanish seas, and the profitable market is now open only to those ships which are so well protected all the way to Spanish territorial waters. Hence the general eagerness to possess one. It may be hoped that the Government will pursue their plan of trying to arrange for a neutralised port to which *bona-fide* merchantmen can deliver non-contraband cargoes without fear of molestation. An entirely legitimate trade is of course still being conducted all the time with both sides in Spain; and it is the manifest duty of the Government to protect it and further it by all practicable means in the present complicated circumstances. But the difficulty here is that General Franco, not possessing belligerent rights, cannot lawfully prescribe the definition of contraband; and the Non-Intervention Committee's definition does not include motor-lorries or, of course, foodstuffs and other commodities which are essentials of war."

The circumstances and motives under which some of the British ships reached Red Spanish ports can therefore scarcely be judged according to moral points of view. At the present time other serious British newspapers also recognise the necessity for distinguishing between genuine British ships with cargoes, the admissibility of which is under control, and ships which, rightly or wrongly, merely sail under the British flag, while their owners and most of the members of the crew are not British, and which constantly carry war material to Red Spain and thus take direct part in the war. The Nationalist Spanish Government has, however, a justified interest in preventing such supplies of war material from abroad, and it would be wrong to demand that, in the interest of a few shipowners, it should renounce the measures which would appear to it to ensure a speedy end to the civil war. Those Members of Parliament who plead for increased imports of arms to Red Spain carry their pretensions somewhat too far when, in addition to refusing the granting of belligerent rights which would make the imports more difficult, they also desire to make it impossible to prevent these imports by the only other means available, namely the use of the air force.

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On June 10th the "Times" expressed its fundamental attitude to the entire question in the following words:

"It is intolerable that men who are themselves performing international duties in favour of fair play between the conflicting Spanish parties should be slaughtered by the agents of one of those parties, and the destruction of merchant vessels from the air is of course entirely against the canons of international law. The Nyon Agreement of 1937 specifically confirmed the application to aircraft of the rules of warfare which govern—or should govern—the action of submarines. An attacking warship is bound to give warning to a merchant vessel and to provide for the safety of her crew. But the warship—or aeroplane—is not supposed to attack except in case of resistance. The merchant ship is liable to arrest and to search, but not to attack unless she shows fight. That is a simple statement of the legal position, but the application of the accepted code to the circumstances of the Spanish civil war is very far from simple. The Nyon system of control, which is of course still in operation, was set up to combat the practice, which had grown to alarming proportions, of sinking merchant vessels on the high seas, and particularly on the trade routes of the Mediterranean. Although action within territorial waters was not in every case excluded, such action was in general left to the nation in whose waters the act of piracy had to be resisted; and the States which signed the Nyon Agreement did not include Spain. The Spanish Republican Government, it is true, invited the Nyon Powers to enter Spanish waters in their task of countering piratical attacks. But the fact remains that the main purpose of the Nyon Agreement was to ward off aerial attacks on non-Spanish merchant ships on the high seas—a purpose which it has admirably fulfilled.

The incidents that now create so much ill-feeling occur within Spanish territorial waters, which is to say within the war area; and they are therefore in a somewhat different category. Ships pursuing their lawful occasions on the high seas must by all manner of means be protected from attack, and the attackers be threatened with reprisals. But if merchantmen enter the war zone they do so at their own risk. It has indeed repeatedly been stated by the British Government that they were prepared to protect British shipping from unlawful interference up to the margin of territorial waters; but beyond that they must proceed at their own risk, and the merchant captains have been strongly advised not to proceed. It has also to be remembered that some of the ships that have got into trouble lately are chartered by the Spanish Government for long periods and act under the orders of their temporary masters. In many cases owners and crews are making extra money on account of the risks they run. There

is the further point that, although the Carriage of Munitions to Spain Act prohibits cargoes of war material from being carried to Spain in British ships, food, fuel and lorries are not included in the list of contraband. They are nevertheless as vital to the combatants as shells or guns.

All this is not to say that the sinking of merchant vessels at sight should be allowed. But totalitarian and aerial methods of warfare have quite outstripped the conventions which used to protect civilians and merchant seamen. The civil population seems likely to be as much the target of destructive missiles as the combatants themselves, unless new conventions can be devised and upheld."

In view of this position, which had no analogy with the sinking of ships by unknown submarines, but which involved regular warlike action on the part of the Nationalist Spanish air force, the idea of a Nyon air agreement, in which France, England and Italy would ensure the freedom of the air by means of air patrols in the same manner as they had ensured the freedom of the seas in the summer of 1937, was soon dropped after it had formed the subject of political discussions for a few days.

It was clearly disclosed by subsequent letters to the "Times" that such assistance to British ships or ships sailing under the British flag was not an altruistic or ideal question but a matter of very materialistic and profiteering interests. Admiral Keyes, in one of such letters to the "Times" on June 30th, referred to the entire procedure as a "prostitution of the British flag, which had hitherto been esteemed and respected on all seas". The former French Prime Minister, M. Flandin, also severely criticised the entire procedure in his speech before the "Alliance Démocratique" at Vienna on June 12th. He said:

"The Spanish war is the most serious menace to peace and to French security. It is incredible that a minority of the nation more or less inspired by Moscow should cause constant danger to the obvious detriment of France. As Wladimir d'Ormesson has already pointed out, official France is not neutral but shows inexhaustible sympathies for the Reds and hostility for the Nationalists.

"The successive Governments of the Popular Front have constantly tolerated a considerable transit of war material to Barcelona and Valencia. Scandalous fortunes, to which the war profit tax ought to be applied, have been built up and continue to be built up with these instruments of death. It is a mockery to be indignant about the bombardment of pseudo-merchant ships which would not call at Spanish ports except to transport suspicious cargoes. We demand that a stop should finally be put to this policy, which not only prolongs the war but also prevents us from co-operating with Italy in the détente in the Mediterranean and Central Europe, which encourages and favours war-mongers of all kinds and will to-morrow bring us up against serious difficulties in Spain, where we have so many interests to represent by our trade and our supplies of raw materials."

In the House of Commons on June 14th, 21st and 23rd, Mr. Chamberlain again explained the difficulties of the whole position. He stated in the first place that, in reply to the British representations of May 31st, General Franco had on June 5th expressed his regret. The National Spanish airmen had not had British ships especially in view but all ships lying close to military objectives. That most of the ships were British was due to the fact that many ships of other nationalities misused the British flag or had only recently been entered in the British register of shipping in order to enjoy the protection of Great Britain. The National Spanish Government, the reply continued, could not renounce the use of the air arm since the prolongation of the war was also due to the import of war

material by British and other ships. Franco had however made two suggestions in order to avoid the bombardment of ships with permitted cargoes: in the first place the formation of security zones for shipping in certain ports, and in the second place the choice of one or more so-called neutral ports outside the war zone for British ships which would naturally not have to carry war material and must therefore be under the supervision of an international control officer. Apart from the consideration of these proposals, the execution of which was not without difficulty, the examination of the entire position in other respects had shown that real protection could not be afforded to the ships in the war zone except by the active participation of England in the hostilities. But this would imply intervention in the civil war and its extension beyond the Spanish frontiers, which the Government must reject as incompatible with the principles of non-intervention. The Government therefore repeated the warnings given to ships on November 28th and 29th, 1937 to avoid the three-mile limit, as they could not expect any protection by the Government against bombardments and torpedoes within that limit.

"The fact was that there was no international code of law with respect to aerial warfare which was the subject of general agreement. There were certain rules of international law which had been established for sea and land warfare. Those rules, or the principles which underlay them, were applicable to aerial warfare and were not only admitted but insisted upon by this Government. But they did not entirely meet the case which we had to meet to-day. Mr. Noel Baker had skated very lightly over the difficulties, which were extremely formidable and for which no complete solution had yet been found. He (Mr. Chamberlain) was asked a question a little time ago on that subject, whether the Government was taking any steps to concert, with other countries, some international understanding as to the rules of aerial warfare. Some impatience was displayed on benches opposite because the Government had not yet taken such a step, but he explained then, and he repeated now, that it was no use throwing out a general invitation to other people to come and talk about it unless the Government could put before them something concrete and practical which could form the subject of discussion.

The British Government were engaged on a careful survey of the position with a view to trying to formulate a practical scheme which they could put before other countries for their acceptance or modification.

I think we may say that there are at any rate three rules of international law or three principles of international law which are as applicable to warfare from the air as they are to war by sea or land.

In the first place, it is against international law to bomb civilians as such, to make deliberate attacks upon civilian populations. That is undoubtedly a violation of international law. In the second place, targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and they must be capable of identification. In the third place, reasonable care must be taken in attacking these military objectives so that by carelessness civilian populations in the neighbourhood are not bombed. Those are three general rules which we can all accept, and which we do accept, but it is quite obvious that when you come to put them into practice they do give rise to very considerable difficulties.

We can all strongly condemn any declaration on the part of anybody, wherever it may be made, or on whatever side it may be made, that it should be part of a deliberate policy to try to win a war by the demoralisation of the civilian population through the process of bombing from the air. That is absolutely contrary to international law, and I would add that, in my opinion, if any such policy is followed, it is a mistaken policy from the point of view of those who adopt it, for I do not believe

that deliberate attacks upon a civilian population will ever win a war for those who make them.

The difficulty arises when one of the forces engaged in aerial warfare, being accused of deliberate bombing of civilians, denies, not that civilians are being bombed, but that the bombing was deliberate and alleges that they were in pursuit of military objectives. What is a military objective? Surely these are not matters which can be passed over as if they were of no importance. Suppose a church is used as the headquarters of a division. Is that a military objective or is it not?

Mr. S. O. Davies (Merthyr, Lab.). — It depends upon what side it is on.

Mr. Chamberlain. — That shows the attitude of mind with which Hon. Members approach this question. If we are to have international agreement we must not approach it from the point of view of whether our sympathies are on one side or another; we have to adopt a rather more detached spirit than that. We must try to lay down rules which will be accepted by all sides and will be carried out in practice.

When I say that reasonable care must be taken in attacking military objectives not to go outside of those objectives, it is extremely difficult in practice to determine whether in fact the dropping of bombs which have killed civilians in the neighbourhood of military objectives is the result of want of care or not. Suppose a man makes a bad shot, which is not at all unlikely with machines going at over 300 miles an hour and when, as I am informed, in taking aim you have to release the bomb miles away from its objective, it seems to me that it is extremely difficult to lay down exactly the point at which reasonable care turns into unreasonable want of care. Difficulties of this kind are great enough to baffle us in finding any easy solution, and I do not think we shall serve any useful purpose by shutting our eyes to that fact and attempting to lay down rules which do not provide for the difficulties which certainly arise in practice.

In making any proposition of the kind we have first of all to satisfy ourselves that we have obtained some practical solution of the question, and when we have done that our difficulties are not at an end, because we still have to obtain the agreement of others. Anybody who recollects what enormous difficulty there was in obtaining international agreement when the provisions for disarmament were discussed at Geneva will realise that we are by no means out of the wood when we ourselves think we have found what seems to be a satisfactory code of rules. Agreement upon matters of this kind depends very largely not only upon the reasonableness of the proposition that is put forward, but also upon the general international atmosphere which prevails at the time, and it is therefore one of the objects of his Majesty's Government so to improve that general international atmosphere that we may have a better chance of obtaining agreement as to the way in which aerial warfare should be regulated."

* * *

This firm attitude on the part of Mr. Chamberlain brought to naught all the attempts of the Opposition to launch any action against Franco, such as the seizure of National Spanish ships in British ports, the arming of merchant ships with anti-aircraft guns, the sinking of National Spanish ships as a reprisal for the sinking of British steamers, the bombardment of Palmas, the blockade of Mallorca, the recall of Sir Robert Hodgson, British agent at Burgos, and the handing of passports to the Duke of Alba, National Spanish agent in London, etc. Lloyd George finally demanded the bombardment of the alleged Italian airports on the island of Mallorca (the larger Balearic island occupied by the National Spanish Government), to which Chamberlain replied that, in spite of his 76 years, he might again hurl the country into war.

In this connection it is not superfluous to point out that, after the torpedoing of the armoured vessel "Deutschland" on control duty when many sailors were killed and wounded, when Germany fired on the fortress of Almeria, the very people who at that time criticised this reprisal in the strongest terms are at present, when it is a question of British or Red Spanish interests, demanding much more effective and extensive reprisals without any detailed investigation into the circumstances.

* * *

On June 16th the Government was again attacked in the House of Commons for its attitude in the negotiations in the Disarmament Commission in respect of the abolition of the air arm. Mr. Chamberlain stated in the first place that the demand at that time was for the maintenance of the air arm for police purposes in outlying regions and not for attacks on the civil population. The bombardment of tribes in revolt would be restricted to their habitations, while a warning of 24 hours would be given so that the families could remove to a safe place. Even in the case of war operations these warnings would be given before the start of operations, so that the non-combatants could withdraw. The "Times" endeavoured in a lengthy but not very convincing article to support Mr. Chamberlain's statements, but had to admit the possibility of difficulties since France and Italy might claim an equal right to maintain bombing squadrons for police purposes in North Africa, which could easily be transferred to Europe across the Mediterranean. Mr. Chamberlain then stated expressly that the Government was prepared to renounce the maintenance of such bombing squadrons if they were an obstacle to a general settlement.

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The culminating point in this bombardment debate was reached when the Red Spanish Government stated through its representatives in London and Paris that it would have to take to reprisals if the attacks did not cease and if the commission of inquiry proposed by the British Government did not soon begin its work. These measures would not, however, be directed so much against the places occupied by the Nationalists but, in view of the foreign intervention, against more distant objectives, i.e. principally against Italian towns. Rome promptly replied that, in this case, it would not reply with paper protests but with guns. Moscow, which presumably stood behind these new tactics of despair on the part of Valencia, would then have reached its aim of hurling Europe into the whirlpool of the Spanish civil war. Under pressure from London and Paris, for whom this challenge of a general war went too far, Valencia promptly withdrew and issued a démenti. What had been intended, they said, was not Italian towns but the Italian air base on Mallorca.

* * *

Mr. Chamberlain's efforts to set up a Commission of inquiry for controlling the bombardment of "open" towns, failed in the first place on account of the refusal of Washington. The Dutch Government, to which London then applied, made its acceptance dependent on certain conditions and when the Norwegian and Swedish Governments also raised objections, the British Prime Minister dropped his original plan.

"The House will be aware", declared Mr. Chamberlain on July 13th in the House of Commons, "that during the last few weeks his Majesty's Government have been endeavouring to form an International Commission which would be prepared to proceed to the scene of an aerial bombardment in Spain and report on the facts, at the request of the competent Spanish authorities concerned. I regret to say that it has, for various reasons, been found impossible to arrange the formation of such a Commission on an international basis. His Majesty's Government propose, therefore, in the hope that that may be acceptable to the two parties in Spain, to dispatch to France a Commission consisting of two British nationals for the purpose in view at as early a date as possible. They will only proceed on the initiative of one or other of the parties in Spain."

On July 26th, he made the following statement on the bombing of ships:

"We sent a communication to the authorities of Burgos proposing that an immediate investigation should be made into certain cases to which we had already drawn their attention and in which it appeared to us that the attack had been in fact a deliberate one. We proposed that this investigation should be carried out by two naval officers, one appointed by his Majesty's Government and the other by the Burgos authorities. If they agreed that the attack was deliberate then the Burgos authorities should make the necessary arrangements to pay immediate compensation to those concerned. If, on the other hand, the two officers were unable to agree, then our proposal was that the matter should be referred to a third party, not of British or Spanish nationality, but who should be agreed upon between the Burgos authorities and ourselves, and that he should make the final decision.

We have now received a reply from the Burgos authorities in which they said in pursuance of their desire to meet the wishes of his Majesty's Government they accept this formula and they agree that the investigation we propose should be carried out. We are now considering whether it would not be advisable to send Sir Robert Hodgson back to Spain with instructions which would cover, among other things, the detailed working out of this proposal."

* * *

Mr. Chamberlain spoke as follows on the position in Spain in his speech at Kettering on July 2nd:

"Ever since the beginning of the war in Spain my colleagues and I realised the inherent danger in the situation, that it might lead to war in Europe; and it was because of that consideration that, in conjunction with the Government of France, we decided very early upon a policy of non-intervention with the express purpose of confining the civil war to Spain and preventing it from becoming a general conflagration. We have had endless difficulties in that policy, but in spite of them all, in spite of the sneers and the jeers of the Opposition, we have succeeded in our main objects. We have kept other countries out of the war, and to-day, at long last, the British plan for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain has been accepted and we are hopeful that it will not now be long before they leave that country to Spaniards.

The situation has been complicated by the bombing by General Franco's aeroplanes of British ships entering the zone of hostilities in Spanish ports, and the Government have been fiercely denounced by those great patriots who sit opposite to us in the House of Commons for allowing the British flag to be insulted, and particularly for allowing British property to be destroyed. There is nothing like your Socialists for standing up for British property. Well now, a long time ago we gave a warning to British shipowners that, while we were intending to give them full protection so long as their ships were on the high seas, we could not undertake to protect them after they

had entered territorial waters in the zone of fighting, and we said that because, after very carefully examining all the possible means of giving them protection, we were satisfied that we could not do so without at any rate a very considerable risk of being ourselves involved in the war.

Well now, the risks which are run by these ships literally mean that the rate of freight which has to be paid is very high, and shipowners are getting as much as four and five times the ordinary rates of freight for voyages to these ports. We have given this warning. If, in spite of it and for the sake of making these profits, these shipowners still send their ships to these waters and then get bombed, is it reasonable that we should be asked to take action which might presently involve not only them but you in the horrors of war which I have been trying to describe, and you are not getting any profits at all?

I should consider that if we were to listen to demands of that kind were we should be betraying our trust to the people of this country. That does not mean that we condone bombing of ships from the air, or that we recognise an aerial blockade of ports. We have on numerous occasions made protests to General Franco about particular incidents and he has in reply given us the most emphatic assurances that it is not, and never has been, the intention of his Government to single out British ships for deliberate attacks, and if some of them have been struck—so he tells us—that is just because it is extremely difficult to ensure that a bomb dropped from a high-flying aeroplane will only hit the objective at which it is aimed and might sometimes hit other things, like ships which may be in the immediate neighbourhood.

I find it a little difficult to reconcile that explanation with some of the facts which are known to us, but perhaps, after all, Franco's airmen do not always rigidly adhere to their instructions. However that may be, it remains true that as long as this war goes on and British ships are carrying cargoes into the ports of the Spanish Government, so long the danger of incidents of this kind will remain. Much the best solution would be the cessation of hostilities altogether, and if at any time we can see any prospect of offering our services to bring that about with a reasonable chance of success, you may be sure we shall not let that opportunity pass by us."

Amplifying his statements in the House on July 26th, he said:

"There is no need for any appeal to be made to this government to take advantage of any opportunity which may occur for mediation, an armistice of anything that would bring to a close military operations which I think must shock us daily. But in all these cases there are moments when it is not only futile but may indeed be mischievous for third parties to try to intervene. I hope the House will believe that we do not intervene at this particular moment it is only because we are convinced that the moment has not come when we can intervene with success."

In these endeavours to find ways and means of settling the problem of aerial warfare and air bombardment, not only in view of the present Spanish conflict but in a general manner by means of an international agreement, it must be pointed out that even at the Disarmament Conference proposals were made by Germany in this direction. These proposals, which were at the time not taken seriously by the other Great Powers, since Germany had no air arm, were again brought forward in concrete form in point 9 of the attitude of the German Government as expressed in the speech by the Führer and Chancellor in the Reichstag on May 21st, 1935. At that time, it is true, the German air force was still under construction and was of very modest dimensions compared with the forces of the other Powers, and this was again the reason why these proposals were so lightly ignored. The entire problem would have been easier to-day and the innocent civil population would have been relieved in the

Spanish war from the dreadful strain of the bombardments, if those proposals had at any rate been taken at that time as a basis for further negotiations. The detailed proposals were as follows:

"The German Government is ready to take an active part in all efforts which are capable of leading to practical limitations of unrestricted armaments. It believes the only possible line of approach to this objective under existing circumstances is to be found in a reversion to the ideas of the former Red Cross Convention of Geneva. The German Government considers that for the present the only possible progress that can be made is along the lines of gradual abolition and outlawry of implements and forms of war which are essentially incompatible with the Geneva Convention already in existence.

The German Government believes in this connection that, just as the use of Dum-dum bullets was formerly prohibited and thereby—generally speaking—eliminated in practice, so the use of other specific weapons can be prohibited and in practice eliminated. The weapons which the German Government has in mind are all such as serve primarily to bring death and destruction, not to combatants, but to non-combatant women and children. The German Government thinks it is a mistaken and impracticable policy to abolish aircraft while at the same time allowing bombing from the air. It sees however a possibility of

banning the use of certain weapons between nations as a breach of international law, and outlawing nations which nevertheless make use of such weapons as outside humanity and all human right and law. Here again the German Government feels that progress step by step is most likely to prove successful, and suggests accordingly the prohibition of the discharge of gas, incendiary or explosive bombs outside actual areas of combat. Progress can be made with such a prohibition pending the complete international outlawry of bombing altogether. So long however as bombing is allowed, any limitation of the number of bombing aircraft is of questionable value owing to the possibilities of rapid replacement.

If on the other hand bombing as such is branded as a barbarity inconsistent with the law of nations, the construction of bombing aircraft will soon come to an end of itself as useless and superfluous. It was found possible in the past by the Geneva Red Cross Convention gradually to make an end of the practice of killing defenceless wounded and prisoners. It should be equally possible in the present by a similar Convention to prohibit, and eventually to stop altogether, the making of war by bombing on the equally defenceless civilian populations.

Germany believes that fundamental treatment of this problem along these lines would do more for peace and security than any Pacts of Assistance or Military Conventions."

The Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16th, 1938¹

As has been already pointed out, the factors which helped to make the international fronts increasingly clear-cut on the Spanish question were, from the outset, not only the sentimental and ideological antitheses, but also political and strategical considerations, which attained more and more prominence as the war went on. The Spanish question, which for geographical reasons alone constitutes a Mediterranean question, influenced ever more strongly and unmistakably the Mediterranean problems and with them the relations between the Great Powers concerned—on the one hand Italy and on the other hand France and England, and it became increasingly obvious that these Mediterranean problems with their influence on the Mediterranean policy of these Powers could not be solved before the termination of the Spanish crisis.

This fact had the most fatal influence on the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16th, 1938, whereby a compromise had been found in the matter of the Mediterranean interests of the two Powers after years of sharp conflict between them. This Agreement was welcomed at the time by every friend of peace and was founded in the main on the hope entertained by both Powers for an early victory for Franco. This hope was not fulfilled and the Agreement is now running the risk of remaining a dead letter, as did the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of January 2nd, 1937, for, though it does not require any special ratification, it can only come into force at a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments. England laid down the condition that a "settlement of the Spanish question" must first be reached and the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, in his answers to questions in the House, took his stand upon this "prerequisite", without however saying what he understood by such a settlement.

In his last speech in the House on July 26th, he made the following statement on the present position in regard to the Agreement of April 16th:

"The agreement was to come into force upon a date to be determined by agreement between the two Governments, but on April 16th Lord Perth addressed a Note to the Italian Foreign Minister in which he reminded him that his Majesty's Govern-

ment regarded the settlement of the Spanish question as a prerequisite of the entry into force of the agreement made between the two Governments. I should like to explain, because I am not sure that it is generally apprehended, why it was that we put in that stipulation.

We never regarded this agreement as simply a bilateral arrangement between Italy and ourselves. When we entered into negotiations we did so because we thought then and we are still of the same opinion that the restoration of the relations between Italy and this country to their old terms of friendship and confidence would bring us appreciably nearer to our ultimate aim, which is a general European appeasement. We felt at the time that the moral justification for our recognition of the Italian position in Ethiopia would be the knowledge that that recognition had brought with it a real contribution to the peace of Europe. We felt that while this conflict was going on in Spain under the sort of conditions in which it had been waged, the Spanish situation was a perpetual menace to the peace of Europe, and it was for that reason that we said that it must be removed from that category before our agreement was brought into force.

It is not our fault and it is not the fault of the Italian Government that that condition has not been brought about.

They have kept full faith with us in the reduction of their troops in Libya, in the cessation of anti-British propaganda, and in collaboration on the Non-Intervention Committee. We on our side have carried out our engagement to take steps at the Council of the League to clarify the position of Member States in regard to the Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia.

We cannot abandon the position we have taken up in regard to the settlement of the Spanish question, which we have over and over again declared to the House. But, on the other hand, we profoundly regret this unforeseen delay which has taken place in the completion of the agreement, and we shall do all that we possibly can to facilitate the withdrawal of the foreign volunteers from Spain in order that that country may cease to offer any threat to the peace of Europe.

Mr. Attlee (Limehouse, Lab.).—Do I gather from the right hon. gentleman's statement that what he means by a settlement in Spain is the volunteers withdrawal agreement? Hitherto we have not known what he meant by a settlement in

¹ See No. 14/1938.

Spain. Do I understand now that it is merely a question of volunteers being withdrawn?

Mr. Chamberlain.—I would like to see what happens when the volunteers are withdrawn. If his Majesty's Government think that Spain has ceased to be a menace to the peace of Europe, I think we shall regard that as a settlement of the Spanish question."

On July 27th, Lord Halifax, speaking in the House of Lords on the same subject, said:

"Let me say one word about Anglo-Italian relations, inasmuch as the Anglo-Italian agreement is closely linked with the Spanish problem. It has been a matter of great regret to his Majesty's Government that the pre-requisite governing the entry of that agreement into force still remains unfulfilled. It may be arguable that it was a fault in the agreement itself that its coming into force should be made dependent on circumstances over which neither Government *prima facie* could exercise full control. The fact, however, remains that this condition, which arose out of the fact that the agreement was designed as part of general world appeasement and is a matter on which his Majesty's Government have given definite pledges, is not one which his Majesty's Government can abandon.

I may point out that, so far as concerns the letters exchanged and the verbal understanding reached at the time of signature, we have carried out our written undertaking to take steps at the question of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia. We, on the other hand, have welcomed the good faith of the Italian Government in reducing their garrison in Libya and in abstaining from propaganda. We have been gratified, too, by the collaboration of the Italian Government on the Non-Intervention Committee.

On the other hand, we have never concealed our regret that the signature of the Anglo-Italian agreement has not resulted in an improvement in Franco-Italian relations, for one of the principal objects of our own agreement was to recreate an atmosphere of international confidence in the Mediterranean, and until Franco-Italian relations are restored to cordiality that great purpose obviously cannot be wholly achieved.

It may be that there are powerful forces in the world which are unwilling to see the old friendship restored between this country and Italy. Mischievous suggestions have been made that the agreement is designed to loosen the Berlin-Rome axis. In other quarters it has been hinted that the real object of it is to try to drive a wedge between the French and British Governments. If I may speak quite plainly, a policy based upon the hope of driving a wedge between Berlin and Rome would, I think, be as futile as would that of attempting to divide Paris and London, and I find it very difficult indeed to believe that any serious or responsible-minded person to-day can think in terms of either of those irresponsible hypotheses.

But, if hostile forces are at work, it is of great importance that neither we nor the Italian Government should be diverted by them from our main object—the bringing into force of our new agreement. If either of us has doubts or difficulties we can at any time give full and frank expression to them through the normal channels which are available to us, and in international as well as private relations incalculable harm may be done by the unnatural suppression of suspicions or by reluctance to strain friendship by frank speech.

If a friendship is not capable of standing such a strain it is not worthy of the name of friendship, and if H.M. Government and the Italian Government are able, as we hope, to invoke this spirit of confident patience to bridge the period which must elapse before the agreement can come into full force I see no reason why such delay as may be inevitable should at all mar the understanding that it was the principal purpose of the agreement to restore."

On the other hand, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, in his speech at the Milan Congress of the

Institute for the Study of International Politics on June 2nd, 1938 made the following statement concerning the Agreement.

At the bottom of many international situations there is a problem of mutual knowledge, and it is impossible to do any lasting or fruitful work unless it is founded on consciousness of the new realities which history unceasingly creates in its course. The British Prime Minister gave proof of this consciousness in the courageous and frank speech he made in the House of Commons in introducing the Agreement concluded with Mussolini's Italy on April 16.

The words of the eminent statesman have had a profound echo among the Italian people as evidence of the motives which have inspired Mr. Chamberlain and his collaborator, Lord Halifax, in their work of clarification and conciliation. The Anglo-Italian Agreement has the merit of having cleared the ground of all the residue of the past and of having placed the relations between the two Empires on a basis of clarity and loyalty, which is the only basis on which understanding between nations can be stable and firm.

Nothing is more dangerous than to conclude agreements which conceal, under ephemeral compromises, ambiguities and mental reservations. It is not in the style of Fascist Italy to enter into political combinations of this kind. It is in nobody's interest to do so. Above all it is not in the interest of peace, which, if it is to be solid, cannot be founded on a fragile network of diplomatic bargaining, but demands the recognition of respective historical positions and a clear determination to respect them.

These are the elements which give strength and vitality to the Anglo-Italian Agreement, and which fix its significance as an effective contribution to the stability and pacification of Europe, which Italy desires and realistically pursues.

The Key to the Anglo-Italian Agreement lies then in the "settlement of the Spanish question": that is to say, from the Italian standpoint, in the recognition of the Italian Empire by England. Italy has already done a good deal to prepare the way for this compromise, as has been admitted by Chamberlain and Halifax, while England's contribution has been inconsiderable, for the British Government has not yet adopted the course which would logically follow from the step taken in Geneva at its instance, whereby freedom of action in the matter of the recognition of the Italian Empire was restored to the former "sanctionist" States, for which recognition Rome is waiting, quite apart from the fact that during the months which, in the most favourable case, the application of the new plan will take, the Spanish question will continue to be the object of further agitation by the Bolsheviks, Popular Front politicians and Anti-Fascists in France and England, for which the Agreement—elastic though it is—may not be sufficiently elastic to withstand. The speculations of these elements on Italy's difficulties in the matter of her food supply and the clear answer contained in Mussolini's speech delivered in the Pontine Marshes of Aprilia point only too clearly to the dangers inherent in these attempts to undermine the work achieved. It is therefore not to be wondered at that Italy should have approached the British Government, through her Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, by way of the British Ambassador in Rome, Lord Perth, with the request, conveyed on June 4th that it would consider hastening the putting into force of the Agreement, in order to prevent its psychological effects also from being entirely counteracted by further procrastination.

The "Times" of July 7th stated that the probability of the civil war lasting a long time might make it expedient for the British Government to modify its views in regard to the interpretation of the expression "settlement of the Spanish question", so as not to be obliged further to delay the coming into force of the Agreement.

It may be true that this connection between the settlement of the Spanish problem and the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement was useful as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Non-Intervention Committee and hastened the British acceptance of the new plan for the withdrawal of volunteers and the stricter control of the land and sea frontiers of Spain: that, in other words, April 16th 1938 was a turning point for the Spanish question.

Experience has however taught us to use caution when moved to indulge in optimistic predictions in regard to future developments in Spain. Indeed, as Mr. Chamberlain has implied and Lord Halifax much more clearly intimated that, without

a similar Franco-Italian Agreement, the aim of an European "détente" cannot be realized, a fresh obstacle in the way of the enforcement of the Agreement of April 16th might under certain circumstances be encountered here which would also for the most part be ultimately attributable to the Spanish crisis. It is true enough that besides an Anglo-Italian understanding, a Franco-Italian entente is also necessary and desirable, if a general settlement of the Mediterranean problem is to be achieved on peaceful lines, but where is the reason for the failure, in spite of numerous attempts, to achieve such an understanding, to be sought?

The negotiations for Franco-Italian Agreement

On January 7th, 1935, Mussolini and the French Premier, M. Laval, signed the *Befana Agreement* in Rome, which was to relieve the Franco-Italian tension which had persisted since the end of the Great War, and establish a new balance of power in Europe. For France, this agreement signified in particular the liquidation on cheap terms of an old French debt—namely, the promises made to Italy in the secret treaties of 1915 and 1917 signed in London and St. Jean-de-Maurienne respectively, in return for her agreeing to enter the war. It is a matter of common knowledge that these and other secret treaties provided for the division of the spoils among the principal allies though the enemy had not then been defeated. When however such division really came up for discussion during the Paris negotiations, it was found that—not only had the vanquished, in their blind confidence in the high-sounding peace principles of the Allied and Associated Powers been the victims of a disgraceful swindle, but that the latter were unable to agree among themselves in regard to the spoils of war and their division. Italy in particular was then deprived of the share of Germany's colonial possessions and of the former Turkish territory which had been promised to her, while, as a cheap substitute for this, France ceded, under the terms of the Treaty of January 7th, 114,000 square kilometres of desert in Northern Tibesti and some thousands of square kilometres of uninhabited territory in French Somaliland and the Island of Dumeirah which faces it. Apart from this, the Contracting Parties confirmed the 1896 Convention relating to the status of the Italians in Tunis (notice of termination of which had been given by the French) and signed two supplementary agreements concerning disarmament and the Austrian question. Of the whole agreement, the question of whose importance in connection with the Abyssinian campaign (then about to be launched) has not yet been cleared up, nothing has remained, since the fall of the Laval Government during that campaign and its replacement by Blum's Popular Front Government with its unreserved concurrence in Eden's sanctions front, but the valueless desert and the strategically useful island of Dumeirah. As this agreement has not been denounced, it still exists in theory, but it has become a completely dead letter.

From Italy's point of view, the most offensive act of the Popular Front Government during the sanctions war was the recalling on October 31st, 1936 of the Ambassador in Rome, Count de Chambrun, on a—in Italy's view—extremely flimsy pretext, which was followed a year later—that is, after the conclusion of the sanctions war—by the recall of the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Cerrutti, by Mussolini, as a countermeasure, the vacancy at the French Embassy in Rome not yet having been filled by that date. The Popular Front Government presumably wished to show by its attitude how little importance it attached to the fostering of good relations with Rome and from then until its fall in April of this year it regarded the history of the post of

Ambassador to the Quirinal, which was vacant for two years as one of the most successful achievements of the "policy of the democratic Powers". The obviously important duty of watching over French interests in Rome was ignored during the Abyssinian conflict and still more during the Spanish crisis in favour of a policy of anti-Fascist dilettantism, which may be said to have reached its climax during the few weeks of life of the Blum Cabinet in March of this year, when, to the general amazement, including that of France herself, Paul Boncour suddenly got up at the Quay d'Orsay and with the enthusiastic approval of the Communists, Socialists and some of the Radicals, not only pleaded for loyalty to long obsolete League doctrines, but, in order to save "democratic Spain", produced from his private drawer extremely concrete plans for military intervention which came as the greatest surprise to the French General Staff. It was mainly against these plans that Mussolini directed his speech in the Chamber on March 30th, when he drew an impressive picture of the military might of Italy.

The obfuscated mass of a policy composed of ideological goals, legalistic hair-splitting and pure fictions was propelled into some sort of movement by the policy of agreement of Chamberlain and Mussolini as also by the fall of the Popular Front Government and its replacement by the realistic Daladier Government. On the day on which the Anglo-Italian Agreement was initialled in Rome—April 16th, 1938—the Franco-Italian "rapprochement" negotiations were also opened there. The French Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, M. Blondel, asked the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, on behalf of the French Government, if the Italian Government was prepared to reopen negotiations with France with a view to restoring "normal relations" between the two countries. On receiving an affirmative reply, Blondel received official instructions from Paris and the conversations then began immediately, the hope being even expressed on the French side that a preliminary conclusion might be reached before the May session of the Council of the League of Nations, if not before Adolf Hitler's visit to Italy.

Unfortunately French policy has been responsible, by various acts or omissions, for rendering worse again the psychologically favourable atmosphere created by the Agreement of April 16th. Instead of beginning the negotiations by immediately filling the post of Ambassador which had for so long been neglected, French policy took refuge behind legalistic arguments and not unnaturally gave the impression in Rome of having adopted the method of understanding through force of circumstances only—possibly under pressure from England. According to the French plan, the preliminary *pourparlers* between M. Blondel and Count Ciano were to provide a basis for the negotiations proper, which were then to be prosecuted in Rome by the new Ambassador. As however he could only present his credentials in Rome if they were addressed to the King of Italy and Emperor of Abyssinia, that would involve the recognition

of the Italian Empire, which again, according to the formalist reasoning of the French, would require the consent of the League of Nations. This consent was in fact accorded at the May session of the Council, inasmuch as freedom of action in the matter of recognition was restored to the sanctionist States which, with the exception of England and France and a few others, had already made use of that freedom. But even after it had been freed from these formal fetters, the French Government could not make up its mind to take that step and, quite recently again, it was decided at a Cabinet meeting not immediately to fill the post of French Ambassador to Rome.

In spite of the suspicious haste with which Paris desired to prosecute the negotiations, further proof of the failure to appreciate the favourable psychological position was evinced by the all too transparent references in the French Press to the "German danger" for Italy, the German "Drang nach Osten" and Italy's "precarious economic and financial position" in view of her requirements in Abyssinia and Spain, which were held to point to the fact that an early understanding with Paris was indicated from Italy's point of view.

The "Temps" of May 4th and June 22nd, wrote:

"The Rome-Berlin axis is a fact with which one must reckon just as much as with the permanent collaboration between France and England. No-one can seriously think of attempting to play off one group against another or split either of them. Common sense requires that we should face the facts as they are and endeavour to render possible a measure of cooperation between the two great Liberal Powers on the one hand and the two great authoritarian Powers on the other, as part of a general European policy, in order to establish upon firm foundations a policy calculated to ensure peace over a long period. It would indeed be vain to attempt to return to something which has finally collapsed as a result of the events of the last three years. Everything tells us to adapt ourselves to the realities of the hour, which it is in no-one's power to eliminate and to devote ourselves with equal good will to a new work of understanding and collaboration."

In the same breath however it proceeded to say:

"For the Fascist Government, this is a question not merely of prestige—of a diplomatic success, designed in some measure to compensate the Italian people for the disappointment felt over the incorporation of Austria in the German Reich and the German urge towards Central and Eastern Europe—but also of the results of the situation in which Italy at present finds herself. It is perfectly natural that the Italian Government should desire, without further delay, to receive recognition of the "fait accompli" in East Africa. On the other hand, material difficulties are being encountered in connection with the exploitation of the conquered Abyssinian Empire, for the solution of which Italy's present resources do not of themselves suffice. In Italy itself, the financial and economic position is causing serious anxiety and lastly it is natural that the prospect of the Spanish civil war dragging out for many months longer, involving as it does the maintenance of Italian military forces and large supplies of war material, should disturb public opinion on the other side of the Alps and produce a certain feeling of disquietude which the Fascist Government has every reason to wish to disperse... The diplomacy of the Italian Government will need all the flexibility for which it is noted to counteract this, as far as it is possible to do so. Its task will be rendered easier by the restoration of relations of mutual confidence with England and France, which will naturally have the effect of liberating the Duce from certain definite anxieties and giving

him greater freedom of movement within the framework of the Rome-Berlin axis, which he himself created under the pressure of circumstances, which have now, by recent events, been relegated to the past."

It is not surprising that didactic remarks of this kind did not increase Rome's willingness to negotiate, as her susceptibilities are very acute on that point. Indeed, the Duce was not long in replying to them, both in his speech at Genoa on May 14th and the appeal which he made to the peasants on July 4th standing on the threshing-machine at Aprilia in the Pontine Marshes which, thanks to his energy and initiative, have become arable land, while Count Ciano, in his speech on June 2nd at the Milan Congress of the Institute for the Study of International Politics deliberately omitted all reference to Franco-Italian relations.

Apart from these mainly psychological stumbling-blocks, other difficulties have also arisen out of the concrete programmes of negotiations elaborated by both sides which go to show that Franco-Italian understanding is by no means as simple or easy of achievement as the French Press has on several occasions implied. Certainly the Agreement of April 16th obtained for French diplomacy also a number of valuable and express undertakings from Italy in regard to the *status quo* in the Western Mediterranean and the Spanish peninsula, which it would presumably have cost Paris much time and trouble to procure for itself, but on the other hand there are a number of points which were not touched upon in the Anglo-Italian Agreement, such as the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea (the delimitation of the French positions in the light of the new balance of power in the Middle East established by the April Agreements), the settlement of the question of friendly, economic and cultural relations between Tunis and Lybia, the confirmation of the 1896 Convention concerning the protection of the Italians in Tunis, the demarcation of the frontier between French Somaliland and Italian East Africa, the revision of the 1936 Agreements concerning Italian participation in the use of the Port of Jibuti and the Jibuti-Addis-Ababa railway, the position of the Italians in France and the anti-Fascist activities of the Italian émigrés residing in France, the exchange of military information regarding armaments and fortifications in the Mediterranean, the general relations between the two fleets, etc.

The Spanish crisis has done more than any other event to render nugatory these negotiations, which have now reached a deadlock.

The cause of the prolongation of the Spanish war in the past—and this cause is presumably still operative—is no secret: it is the enormous supplies of war material and man-power which have been delivered to the Spanish Reds over the Pyrenean frontier, since Franco's advance to the Mediterranean. Without these supplies the war would, in all human probability, be over or nearly over to-day. The semi-official "Giornale d'Italia" and other Italian—and even French—newspapers have from time to time published all details of the French (and other) supplies, etc. which have entered Spain via the Pyrenees.

In his speech at Genoa, Mussolini drew a clear distinction, on the strength of these facts, between the attitude of the two countries, when he said that they were on different sides of the barricades, and already at that time expressed doubt as to the possibility of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion, as "over there they desire the victory of Barcelona, while we earnestly desire and hope for the victory of Franco."

CONTENTS

of the Resolution adopted on July 5th, 1938 by the Non-Intervention Committee together with the Plan

thereto Annexed for the Withdrawal of Foreign Volunteers from Spain, the Recognition of Belligerent Rights, and the Observation of the Spanish Frontiers by Land and Sea

(For complete text, see the English Command Paper "Spain No. I (1938) Cmd. 5793", London, H.M. Stationery Office)

The following Plan has been sent to both Spanish Parties with a view to ascertaining their attitude in regard to it. It will not be regarded as definitively accepted until both have indicated their assent. From the date on which they do so the time-limits which the Plan fixes for its fulfilment will begin to run. The Red-Spanish Government has in the meanwhile communicated its Reply dated July 26th.

I. RESOLUTION

The Resolution begins by reaffirming the obligations entered into by the different Governments under the Agreement of February 16th, 1937, in regard to such matters as the prohibition of the despatch of volunteers, the enforcement of the control on the Spanish frontiers by land and sea, and the arrangements made in the exchange of notes of August-September 1936 in respect of the prohibition of the delivery of arms. The Resolution further extends the prohibition of entry to include political agitators. It contains a reference to the nine points of the English Plan of July 14th 1937 dealing with the withdrawal of foreign volunteers, the recognition of the belligerent rights of the two parties, and the additional measures of control embodied in the van Dulm-Hemming Report. In conclusion it contains a supplementary obligation to the effect that the parties to the Agreement shall also prohibit their ships from carrying war material to Spain from ports other than those of their own country.

II. ANNEX

The Annex, which is in the nature of regulations in execution of the Resolution, is in seven Parts.

Part 1 contains the reaffirmation referred to above of the arrangements of August-September 1936 and February 1937, i.e. with regard to the list of contraband war material, the import of which into Spain is forbidden. The list specifies 15 categories of war material. The Agreement of February 1937 is also extended in such a way as to impose on the parties to the Agreement an obligation to scrutinise application by their own nationals to pass through Spain with the same degree of care as that applied to applications by such nationals for authority to visit Spain.

Part 2 contains details of the prohibition of the entry of political agitators.

Part 3 contains an extension of the Non-Intervention Agreement to prohibit the carriage of war material to Spain by ships proceeding from ports other than those of their own country.

Part 3 contains the Plan for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain.

The withdrawal of the volunteers from Spain is to take place under the supervision of an "International Board for Non-Intervention in Spain" (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") and an "International Council for Non-Intervention in Spain" (hereinafter referred to as the "Council"). The following countries are represented on the Board, the Chairman of which is the Dutch Admiral van Dulm: United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Norway, Poland, Portugal and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The financial execution of the Plan will be subject to the supervision of the Council. The withdrawal of volunteers will be entrusted to two Commissions, each of which will consist of three persons appointed by the Non-Intervention Committee with four General Staff officers and other staff attached.

The two Commissions, one of which will be attached to the Nationalist and the other to the Red Headquarters, will not be in direct relations with one another, but will each be kept fully informed by the Board in London of the progress of the Plan in the other portion of Spain.

The foreign volunteers will be transferred to Evacuation Areas to be established at points situated outside, but in the vicinity of, the ports of Palamos, Carthage, Malaga and Cadiz

at a steady rate of not less than 2,000 men per day. If the numbers of foreign volunteers serving with the two Spanish parties are equal, each Spanish party will hand over 1,000 foreign volunteers daily to the Commission concerned, who will be distributed in detachments of 500 each between the four Evacuation Areas above-mentioned. Should it be found that there is a larger number of foreign volunteers serving with one Spanish party than the other, the numbers to be handed over by the former will be increased in a proportion fixed by the Board.

TIME-TABLE OF WITHDRAWAL

The time required for the completion of the entire operation is conceived as follows:

From the so-called "zero date", i.e. the date of acceptance of the Plan by both Spanish parties, the two Commissions will at once proceed to Spain and draw up their estimates of the number of volunteers, in conjunction with the Spanish authorities, according to four categories viz. Navy, Army, Air Force, Civilians.

As soon as the progress of the work permits, the Commissions will report to London as to the date on which they will be in a position to start the actual counting of the volunteers. They will at the time report as to the numbers of wounded, sick, prisoners of war and women volunteers. As soon as the two Commissions have completed their estimates, members of each will meet in a "Joint Commission", whose task it will be to determine the proportion between the numbers of volunteers on Red and White territory respectively. The Non-Intervention Committee will thereupon inform the two Spanish parties that the withdrawal of the volunteers is to begin, and will request them to take all necessary steps to facilitate the process. The above preparatory work is to be completed by the 45th day.

The 46th day is the date on which the first daily quota of volunteers, not being sick, wounded or prisoners of war, is drafted into the Evacuation Areas. An identical quota will follow on each following day.

The first drafts of volunteers in the Evacuation Areas to the country to which they are return (home country or country of refuge) will take place on the 51st day.

The evacuation of all foreign volunteers from both parts of Spain is to be completed on the 100th day.

As from the 101st day (or earlier, if the fit and active volunteers are already all in the Evacuation Areas) the transfer of sick and wounded, prisoners of war and women volunteers to the Evacuation Areas is to take place, and to be completed not later than the 135th day.

Thereafter, the Evacuation Areas are to be closed within 7 days, i.e. by the 142nd day, leaving only a small care and maintenance staff, the rest of the staff to be transferred to France and Gibraltar. By the 147th day the staff of the two Branch Establishments of the Commissions in the Spanish Possessions and Dependencies are also to leave Spain.

Between the 101st day (by which date the evacuation of all fit and active volunteers is to be completed) and the 149th day, the Commissions are to verify that no foreign volunteers remain unevacuated, and to draw up their final reports when they have done so.

On the 150th day the Commissions withdraw to France and Gibraltar.

Between the 151st day and the 156th day the International Committee will consider the final reports of the Commissions, and decide that the scheme has been fully carried out.

On the 157th day the Commissions will be disbanded. On the 164th day the whole operation of withdrawal of the volunteers will be completed.

DETAILED PROVISIONS

What is meant by the term "foreign volunteer"?

The answer is :

(a) All persons who on July 18th 1936 were nationals of any of the countries which are parties to the Non-Intervention Agreement, and were engaged either directly or indirectly in the Spanish conflict.

(b) Any stateless persons, formerly the nationals of any of the countries above-mentioned, who have engaged either directly or indirectly in the Spanish conflict since July 18th 1936.

The Annex further deals with the case of political exiles or stateless persons who before the conflict were nationals of one or other of the countries above-mentioned but were habitually resident in some non-European country. Such persons are to rank as volunteers, if they belong to the military forces of either Party, or are under the orders of such forces, or are engaged in the maintenance of services essential to the conduct of the military operations, or are active as advisers, propagandists, or experts, or are engaged in the arms trade with either Party, with the exception of persons serving in medical or sanitary organisations or organisations of an established international character. "Repatriation" volunteers, who are nationals of countries which are parties to the Non-Intervention Agreement, will be returned to their respective countries, provided they did not leave them under an expulsion order or similar instrument. Volunteers who rank as political exiles or stateless persons, or are unable to return to their home country or to the country of their last permanent residence, are to be offered to the different countries which are parties to the Non-Intervention Agreement and, in the event of no country being prepared to receive them, are to be held in the Evacuation Areas until such time as the Non-Intervention Committee has taken a decision as to their future. Volunteers who refuse to leave Spain are to be withdrawn subject to the same conditions.

The financial arrangements of the Plan provide for division of the expenditure according as it is incurred :

(a) By the running of the international machinery,

(b) By the actual withdrawal (Evacuation Areas, maintenance costs, etc.),

(c) By the repatriation of the volunteers by sea.

Expenditure under (a) is to be divided between England, France, Germany, Italy and the U.S.S.R. Expenditure under (b) is to be borne by Germany, England, France and Italy only. Expenditure under (c) is in principle to fall on all Governments in proportion to the number of volunteers of their nationality.

Volunteers are to be repatriated via one or other of the following ports according to their country of destination, viz. London, Hamburg, Lisbon, Marseilles and Genoa.

Part 5. — Recognition of Belligerent Rights.

When the withdrawal of foreign volunteers is "working satisfactorily", the States parties to the Non-Intervention Agreement are prepared to give the Spanish Parties belligerent rights at sea in respect of ships of war or aircraft, in accordance with the established rules of international law. As there are at present no rules of international law relating to war in the air, the rights relating to naval war are to be applicable to the air arm *mutatis mutandis*.

The expression "working satisfactorily" is to mean such time as the evacuation of 10,000 volunteers by the Party with the smaller number of volunteers to the Evacuation Areas, and the simultaneous evacuation of volunteers by the other Party in the prescribed proportion, are complete. If the process of evacuation goes according to plan, that is to say, if 1,000 volunteers are evacuated daily to the Evacuation Areas by the Party with the smaller number of volunteers, with a corresponding evacuation according to the prescribed proportion by the other

Party, from the 46th day onwards, the first day the recognition of belligerent rights will be the 57th day.

Contraband.

The contraband lists adopted by the two Spanish Parties are to be brought into line with the list approved by the Non-Intervention Committee, subject to amendment at any time. It is open to the belligerent Parties to propose further amendments to the Non-Intervention Committee.

The rights of the belligerents may not be exercised in relation to ships of the countries parties to the Non-Intervention Agreement, where such ships are carrying Observing Officers or have been granted a certificate in lieu thereof by the Board. The Spanish Parties are however free to visit such ships in order to verify that they are entitled to fly the flag of a country party to the Non-Intervention Agreement, or to ascertain that the Observing Officer is on board. The same privilege extends to vessels engaged on behalf of the Board in the repatriation of volunteers from the Evacuation Areas, which fly the Non-Intervention Pennant.

In addition to ships carrying contraband, any ship will be deemed to be "unneutral" which takes a direct part in hostilities, or is engaged in the transport of troops of either Spanish Party, or is engaged in the transmission of intelligence (e.g. by wireless), or is directly chartered by the official authorities of either Party, or has on board an Agent of either Party with authority to direct her movements and is at the exclusive disposal of the authorities of one of the Spanish Parties. Such ships will rank with ships carrying contraband as blockade-runners, and the naval forces of the respective Spanish Parties concerned will be entitled to treat them accordingly.

Neutral shipping which does not enter any Spanish harbour will not be interfered with by the belligerents, even though it passes near to Spanish coasts, if it is following established shipping routes. This provision includes a prohibition of mine-laying along such neutral shipping routes.

Part 6. — Observation of the Spanish Frontier by Land and Sea. The observation of the land frontiers commences from the day on which the Commissions begin the counting of the volunteers, it being understood that this date may be expected to be fifteen days after the date of the final adoption of the Resolution. Observation on the land frontier will remain in operation in the first instance for 30 days, i.e. to the 45th day after the final adoption of the Resolution, when it will lapse if the withdrawal of foreign volunteers has then not actually commenced. It is however understood that the French Government will agree to a further period of grace of 10 days, if the failure to begin the actual withdrawal of volunteers is due to purely technical difficulties.

In addition to the observation on the land frontier, the whole sea frontier is to be under observation: for which purpose Observing Officers will be permanently established in the eight Spanish harbours of Bilbao, Huelva, Cadiz, Malaga, Carthagena, Alicante, Valencia and Barcelona.

The observation on the Franco-Spanish land frontier will be exercised in winter by 184 Observers, and in summer by 144 Observers. On the frontier between Gibraltar and Spain it will be exercised by 6 Observers, and on the frontier between Spain and Portugal in accordance with an arrangement concluded between Great Britain and Portugal in March 1937. For the observation at sea there will be 560 Observers.

The system of observation at sea by Observers appointed by the Board to accompany ships of the States parties to the Non-Intervention Agreement will be carried out in the manner followed since March 8th, 1937.

The reinforced observation at sea will begin not later than the resumption of the land observation.

Provision is made in principle for observation from the air of the land and sea frontiers, if found practicable.

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CONTENTS: 1938 Assembly of the League of Nations. Where does the League stand? — Oslo versus Geneva. — Neutrality aims within the League of Nations. Switzerland's return to complete neutrality. The change in Belgian foreign policy. Holland's neutrality problem. The aspirations of the Nordic States in the matter of neutrality. — The British Government and the League of Nations.

1938 ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Where does the League of Nations stand? What is the object of another Assembly? — These two questions jump to the eye when one studies the programme of the September sessions of the Council and the Assembly. One seeks in vain, among the many items, for any which could arouse great interest outside the League in virtue either of its subject or of the persons of those who were instrumental in placing them on the agenda. It is a repetition of the old game with which the League has, for years now, been eking out its existence, whereby every session has had to deal with the remains left over by its predecessor. This eternal adjournment of every question has not, of course, been calculated to facilitate or simplify its tasks, but merely placed upon it the additional burden of the consciousness of its own incapacity to act. By means of open adjournment or resolutions which were tantamount to adjournment, the League has meandered along through the years and it has been the curse of its policy that it has tended more and more to get over difficulties by shunning realities. With extraordinary imperturbability and indifference it has continued to weave with the old threads, which have long since proved too frail to surround the world with a network of peace, but have become a spider's web in which the great ideals have been caught and left to rot. Hardly a single attempt has been made to deal with the present confusion in the world by clear thinking or heroic remedies. Ever and again, the splendid palace in the Ariana Park with its outwardly imposing proportions has proved itself an illusion, a mirage, a Fata Morgana of the policy for which it was originally intended.

This development was due not to the impossibility of fulfilling the far from utopian ideals embodied in Wilson's peace programme, but rather to the way in which this programme was at the Paris Conference codified in the Covenant, which closely associated the League with the Peace Treaties imposed on the vanquished there, and finally to the desire of the dictators of 1919 and their successors to maintain the war mentality which stood sponsor to the League when it was founded and to make of the League the complaisant tool and exponent of their policy of perpetuating those treaties of violence. Then again, there was the tendency of certain elements, who claim the monopoly of true peace organisation and consequently also the direction of this instrument, to do spade work for certain ideologies of the most dangerous kind, whereby this "peace instrument" would finally be enabled to set half the world and the nations of the world against the other half—which tendencies caused Germany and Italy to leave the League. The fanfares of peace ideology became violent trumpetings of defiance against "breakers of the peace", to whom all those outside the League are held ipso facto to belong.

With all its patent admissions of organic weakness, the League lost not only its external authority, but also its confidence in its own viability and the disappearance of all real political activity gave rise here and there to grave doubts as to

the justification for its existence. At any rate this development led to the emergence of two phenomena:

The number of its supporters steadily dwindled and the tendency of countries to place themselves unconditionally under the subjective direction of Geneva and its machinery has already, in the case of a number of States, given place to a spirit of independence and the desire for self-determination.

Secondly, European and extra-European policy have for long been determined without reference to Geneva by powerful groups, some of whose members never belonged or no longer belong to the League and in which an attempt is being made more successfully to deal with the chaotic state of Europe and the world than had been possible by means of a policy of collective action. At any rate the dream of a League of Nations responsible for keeping international peace like a policeman has been dreamed for the last time.

An unimpeachable witness—one of the saints whose statues should adorn the columns of Geneva, the former British Foreign Minister, Eden, expressed that fact when he said, in a speech in January 1937:

"The world cannot be saved by covenants and treaties, or by political ideologies or by speeches, however much such speeches may breathe the spirit of peace."

All this fits Geneva like a glove and constitutes a declaration of bankruptcy for the pactomania, in which Geneva specialized. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, meant this and nothing else when, in his speech in the House of Commons on October 21st 1937, he disposed of the Opposition attacks on the Government's League policy by saying that there was no point in repeating parrot-like that one believed in the League of Nations, when the League was not in a position to carry out its duties and the last speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, which are given at the end of this issue, are also inspired by the same considerations. The great ideological weapon forged in Versailles has now gone blunt in the hands of those who thought to use it to guard a world which was to be unchangeable for all time.

France has also—much against her will it is true, followed this English change, although references to loyalty to the Geneva League are never absent from the speeches of French statesmen. Indeed, in her last act of foreign policy, the conclusion of a Treaty with Turkey concerning the Sanjak of Alexandretta, she had no qualms about going over the head of the League which holds the Syrian Mandate and with this bilateral agreement disavowed her hitherto loudly vaunted faith in collective agreements, outside of which there could be no salvation—and that in order to settle a dispute which the League had been unable to settle.

* * *

The two chief Members of the League, England and France, have thus declared that it is better for the present not to burden

the League with the practical solution of political conflicts. This exclusion of the League is stated to be temporary and the League is to be regarded, so to say, as the latent candidate for the post of guarantor of a universal ideal. Those who entertain such hopes forget that, in the meantime, the obligatory meetings have become the happy hunting-ground of gamblers who are not concerned with ideals, but with very material things which have nothing whatsoever to do with a genuine League of Nations policy. It is becoming more and more obvious that these two Powers have their hands full in the League endeavouring to stem the destructive activities of these gamblers and have, during the last few sessions, suffered a patent defeat.

During last year's Assembly and the two sessions of the Council this year, a number of Members officially drew a line under a period in which the League was misused in various quarters. Statements were made to the effect that it could not be the duty of the League to defend to the last ditch the interests of certain Powers arising out of the dictated Peace Treaties and that the League was not created in order to politicize against States outside. Its activities were reviewed and it was found that it was not able to arrive at a practical solution of any political conflicts, but on the contrary that its interference in local disputes only made them worse and threatened to cause them to spread to the common danger.

No-one was able seriously to pick holes in the arguments of these Members. Indeed the patience of many of them has for so long been abused that, with the exception of the Soviet Union, not a single member got up to brand as "desertion" the demand for a release from dangerous and immeasurable entanglements under the Covenant. On the other hand, it was, in view of the serious mistakes made by the League, too late to reverse the action of these States in freeing themselves from their obligations in the matter of sanctions by an appeal to their membership of the League. The fact that the return to independence, self-reliance or some other form of neutrality characterized the great development which had been mainly caused by the Geneva experiments or "test cases", was, with the sole exception of the case of Switzerland, simply noted in silence.

* * *

We publish in this issue a summary of the attempts of the so-called neutral States to free themselves from the collective system of Geneva—at any rate, as some of them say, for a time, until prospects are better with regard to the revival of the League. Even this qualification does not however alter the question: "Where does the League of Nations stand", which is rightly regarded as a matter affecting all Europe, in view of the fact that out of twenty-three European countries—not including Soviet Russia—twenty have, by their attitude during the sanctions war against Italy, in statements made after the collapse of sanctions, in parliamentary resolutions and at conferences, passed a crushing judgment upon the practice of that institution. We see from this that only three States Members can still boast of not being "deserters" and of continuing the struggle for the preservation of Geneva collective security unimpaired within the framework of Article 16: these three countries are France, Red Spain and Czechoslovakia, who, partly through alliances concluded in violation of the principles of the League and partly through ideological affinities, enjoy the support of the Soviet Union.

The South American States, with the exception of Colombia and Mexico, have drawn the logical conclusions from these considerations. Ten of them have left the League or given notice of their intention to do so, while the rest have, like the European neutrals, exposed the contradiction between the lack of universality and the demand for the retention of the machinery of

sanctions. The coming Pan-American Conference at Lima will presumably become a demonstration which will at least show points of resemblance to the Conference of the Oslo States, if it does not go beyond that Conference in the matter of results. If we look through the list of Members of the League, to see what countries remain since the retreat of the British Dominions, whose attitude is tending more and more to coincide with that of the British Government, we find the three new members—Egypt, Iran and Iraq and also Siam, whose attitude is not yet clear or who lean towards the English view or plead for Article 16, as do also Afghanistan and Liberia. Finally there remain China and Abyssinia, who represent an inglorious chapter in the history of the League, which, in the case of Abyssinia, reaches the grotesque, inasmuch as the Negus was thrown over, while the fiction of his State, embedded in the rigid provisions of the Covenant, continues to haunt the halls and corridors of the League Palace, as does the office of the long since faded Disarmament Conference, which drags on from session to session and is artificially kept alive by further adjournment.

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Under these circumstances, we are entitled to wonder what point or sense there can be in sending responsible statesmen, whose holidays and week-ends have recently been so unnecessarily interrupted, to Geneva for three weeks, though in many cases this journey in September is very sensibly combined with holiday plans. Then there is a Secretariat and a report by the Secretary-General which, under the terms of the Covenant, must be discussed even if its does not contain anything that is not already known. The truth is that these sessions are prescribed by the Rules of Procedure. Certainly no-one would have cause for indignation if, which is not likely, a member were to propose to adjourn the Council and the Assembly. There could scarcely be any objection to such a step under the terms of the Covenant, for, just as every member is at liberty for weighty reasons to ask that a session be convened, so any reasons which might make it appear expedient to call for an adjournment should be accorded equal consideration. As however, in Geneva as elsewhere, miracles do not happen but only strange things, we can drop this speculation, although, if it were realized, it might be regarded as greater evidence of the strength of the League than the convening of obligatory sessions under the terms of the Covenant.

* * *

At the coming session, Moscow will again have both feet in Geneva. Only two items of the agenda will dominate the discussions at this session (and they will be accompanied by all the boosting to which the procedure of the League lends itself when properly handled): the separate motions of the Chinese and the Red Spanish Government—the latter on the question of the protection of the civilian population against bombing from the air. In the former case, geographical considerations will probably prevent the Soviet Union from trying to launch a second League war, while in the latter case it will move Heaven and earth to obtain collective action against the "rebel", Franco, for which purpose the slogan "Protection of the civilian population" is eminently suitable. Perhaps however—and this would indeed be a ray of light piercing the clouds of Geneva—these discussions will reveal what most unbiased people outside Geneva have known for a long time, namely from whom the civilian population has suffered most—from White Spain, where unavoidable warlike operations unfortunately affect non-combatants as well as combatants, or from Red Spain, where, from sheer hatred and love of destruction, innocent people are most cruelly massacred in true Muscovite fashion.

OSLO VERSUS GENEVA

Neutrality aims within the League of Nations

Silence has been maintained as to the fact that, ever since the League of Nations was set up, there have been experts in international law who have predicted what has now become an actual political possibility: namely that the next war will be caused by Geneva, as the idea of collective security is a false idea. To draw a line under the history of the world in the name of collective security, in the interests of one's own hegemony, was not only senseless, but also immoral. In a way, it is no bad thing that the science of international law has, during the League's twenty years of activity, accumulated abundant material which goes to prove this statement.

The fact that the League of Nations has existed at all for twenty years is due to the illusion that, when it was set up, something completely new was created, which the world had not known before. In face of the present admission of its failure as a genuine practical instrument for the prevention of war or for a serious clearing of the international decks for peace, many at any rate are coming to realize more and more the very high standard reached by the Constitution of the Nations during the years of the great Peace Conferences of the Hague. By confining themselves to what was possible of attainment in this world, those concerned managed, by means of legislation concerning war and neutrality, to build up a realistic peace constitution. War was tamed and converted into a process strictly limited in space and hedged round with regulations as to the form which it was allowed to assume: the peaceful civilian population was excluded from the sphere of influence of military operations, the weapons of war were restricted, the rights and duties of the neutrals were regulated and the treatment of prisoners of war and the wounded was rendered more humane. Regulations governing publicity provided that the commencement of the war should be clearly marked by a declaration of war. It is true that this great work of peace was temporarily destroyed through the Great War, but, after the war was over, pacifist fanatics and utopians, by attempting the impossible, destroyed the possible. They desired an illusory peace constitution whereby war would be entirely abolished and for this purpose they organized the "war against war", created the flexible notion of the "aggressor" and regarded "neutrality" as treason. Everything was denounced as an attack on "peace" which aimed at changing the sacred "Status quo" of which the League of Nations became the guarantor.

That was the sort of "progress" provided by the League of Nations. It was natural and inevitable that the "vanquished" should have first recognized the Geneva instrument of "collective security" as the expression of the association of interests of the "victors". As however the Covenant of the League of Nations formed an integral part of the Peace Treaties of 1919, there was time and to spare for others to come to a realization of the fact that the conception of the Geneva peace guarantee was apt to vary with the interests of those Powers which had the greatest influence on that instrument. Everyone knows by whom the decisive influence was wielded in Geneva up to 1934: the Powers which failed to honour the undertakings which they had given in the matter of disarmament under the treaties and Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was in that year (1934) that Soviet Russia joined the League and the eyes of those who had, even after the collapse of the Disarmament Conference, continued to hug the illusion of a League of Nations as a guarantee of peace, were from that time gradually opened wider and wider from session to session. Then, with the Abyssinian War, the ball was finally set rolling and the attempts to abandon collective for individual security became more

and more the main subject of the increasingly intensive debates on the "Sanctions Article" 16. As no agreement could be reached on that Article, it was proposed, in order to save the façade, that the Covenant should be reformed, which proposal was, when it came to be discussed, defeated by the efforts of those who desired that the sanctions clauses, which had failed to supply a basis of agreement, should be amplified in the direction of greater severity towards "aggressors". The political interpretations employed in the attempts to justify this course, as also the fanatical hatred with which the League of Nations was misused by certain Powers under Soviet direction as an instrument in the hands of the "democracies" against "Fascism", finally exposed the complete unsuitability of Geneva as a responsible mediator in the interests of peace.

The first to abandon all hope of obtaining from Geneva any help in clearing up or solving European complications were the small so-called "neutral States" which had in 1920, in the honest belief that the League of Nations was a better instrument of peace than the pre-war instrument, sacrificed the great advantages of a classic neutrality on the altar of Geneva. Although these States have not yet entertained the idea of leaving the League of Nations, they have, without reference to the League or its Covenant and in no uncertain terms, stated in resolutions and declarations that their diminished confidence in Geneva has compelled them to adopt neutrality as their policy and that this course seemed to be indicated not only as the logical conclusion from considerations of "realpolitik", but also, according to their general position, their geographical situation and their historical traditions, as a happy and more or less open return to normal relations with all Great Powers. Any more detailed consideration of this movement can therefore only strengthen the conviction that international cooperation between the nations is only possible when mutual respect and the just recognition of the conditions of existence of other peoples is recognised as the indispensable prerequisite for stable and durable relations between State and State.

* * *

If we glance at the movement towards individual security which is now in full swing, we see at once that the idea of neutrality attracts like a magnetic pole, but that not everything can be called neutrality which likes to toy with that notion. As regards the "small States", we must above all not forget that, with the exception of Switzerland, it was their purpose first of all to extricate themselves from the dangerous toils in which they became involved in Geneva. The desire to keep out of the politics and disputes of the Great Powers has of itself nothing whatsoever to do with neutrality. Though it is true that conversations were held during which the principles of classic neutrality were adduced, it is only true subject to this reservation: that these States cannot all be lumped together. Just as a special characteristic is denoted by the expression "Swiss neutrality", so Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden have the most varied, strongly marked and individual formulae and conceptions of neutrality, which alone are sufficient indication of the extent to which we have departed in theory and in practice from the pre-war idea of neutrality.

The probable attitude of these States in a future war—one of the most acute problems of the day—is directly bound up with the various questions connected with neutrality. We have only to think of the number of theories which are, in the United States alone—also a "classic" land of neutrality, put forward by

the various warring parties as the one and only positive foreign policy, to realize how difficult it is, or is made, even for the neutral States to decide to tread the royal path of clear neutrality in the classic meaning of the term, which the American John Quincy Adams defined in the following pithy terms: "the neutral", he said, "avoids any appreciation of the rights or wrongs of a dispute". This is the highest conception of classic neutrality, which could only grow out of the recognition of the justice of the cause of both belligerents and, as a means of localizing the war, fulfilled an indisputable function of peace.

1. Switzerland's return to complete neutrality

To-day, Switzerland is the only country that can be said to have returned to neutrality in the most comprehensive sense of the term and—what will puzzle future historians most—for ever. In the case of Switzerland, it is no longer possible to create a legal confusion in regard to the obligations of a Member of the League of Nations in the matter of the sanctions apparatus of Article 16 of the Covenant.

We have already in previous issues dealt at length with the question of Swiss neutrality and the documentary evidence bearing upon it. It only remains for us to say in this connection that the liberation of Switzerland from her obligations in the matter of sanctions under the terms of the Council Resolution of May 14th, 1938 was communicated by the Federal Government on May 19th and 20th to Switzerland's neighbours—Germany and Italy. The official form of this exchange of notes goes to show that the process was one in which the formal side, while indispensable, assumed a place of subsidiary importance: it constituted at once a solemn notification and a cordial and unreserved acknowledgement and confirmation of the restoration of Swiss neutrality which is of great importance both for Switzerland's two neighbours and general European policy.

Germany's attitude to the "complete neutrality of Switzerland" has never wavered and found expression once more in the conversation between the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich and the Swiss Altbundesrat Schulthess on February 25th, 1937, when the former said: "we shall always, no matter what happens, respect the inviolability and neutrality of Switzerland: of that I can assure you most definitely, nor have I ever given anyone any reason to think the contrary".

Thus was the foundation-stone of peaceful relations between the German and Swiss Governments solemnly consecrated, as we are reminded once more by the terms of the reply of the German Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop, to the Swiss declaration. In this way, all former doubts were set at rest and malicious assertions refuted. Such respect for neutrality is best preserved by complete impartiality and lack of constraint in the relations between the countries which meet on a neutral frontier, and this implies the exercise of restraint in the expression of views which may arise out of the different forms of Government to be found on the two sides of the frontier. Neutrality must be fostered. This is not a concern of the Governments only: the political principle of neutrality must find expression in the life of the peoples concerned.

Identical notes addressed by Switzerland to Germany and Italy.

As Your Excellency is aware, Switzerland is ever inspired by the earnest wish to persist in the policy of neutrality which she has pursued for more than four centuries and scrupulously to observe the engagements relating thereto which are contained in the Treaties of 1815.

The Resolution of the Federal Government of March 5th, 1920 concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations, which was decided by referendum on May 16th of that year, was only drafted after the Council of the League had solemnly

stated in its Declaration of London of February 13th, 1920 that the permanent neutrality of Switzerland as an international obligation for the preservation of peace was not at variance with any provision of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Declaration of London expressly states that Switzerland is under no obligation to participate in military operations or to allow foreign troops to pass through its territory or to tolerate preparations for military operations thereon. On the other hand, she was accorded no exemption from participation in the economic and financial measures provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant. As experience has shown the uncertainty of the distinctions which it was thought possible in 1920 to draw between the various measures mentioned in that Article, the Federal Council addressed a memorandum to the Council of the League of Nations on April 29th, 1938 which I was privileged to communicate semi-officially to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, announcing the intention of Switzerland no longer in any way to participate in the application of the provisions of the Covenant of the League relating to sanctions, in view of her permanent neutrality. The Council of the League adopted a resolution on May 14th in which it noted this intention and stated that Switzerland would not be required to participate in sanctions.

The Swiss Confederation is thus released from any and every obligation which could give rise to any doubt as to her unshakable determination to remain neutral in all circumstances.

German reply of June 21st, 1938.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Your predecessor informed me in his note of May 20th that Switzerland, in the earnest wish scrupulously to observe her traditional policy of neutrality and the obligations arising therefrom, had approached the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the adoption of a resolution, which released Switzerland from any obligation to participate in the application of the provisions of the Covenant of the League relating to sanctions. To this I have the honour, on behalf of the German Government, to reply as follows:

The German Government has noted with the greatest interest that the efforts of the Swiss Government to obtain release from obligations which were in fact calculated to jeopardise the neutrality of Switzerland have been successful. The German Government welcomes this result, as it regards the unqualified preservation of Switzerland's neutrality as an important factor ensuring European peace. The Swiss Government can therefore rest assured that its desire to observe neutrality, to which it has once more testified, will always meet with the corresponding desire on the part of the German Government to recognise and respect that neutrality. I need only refer to the declarations with which the Swiss Government is acquainted, in which the German Government has already expressed its views on this subject in the clearest possible terms.

I have, etc.

Ribbentrop.

The Italian reply is couched in similar terms.

Official communication of the Swiss Federal Council of June 24th, 1938.

The Swiss Ministries in Berlin and Rome were asked to inform the German and Italian Governments that the Federal Council had addressed a Memorandum to the Council of the League of Nations dated April 20th, 1938, informing it of Switzerland's intention no longer in any way to participate in the application of the provisions of the Covenant relating to sanctions, in view of its (Switzerland's) desire to maintain permanent neutrality. At the same time it was mentioned that the Council of the League had adopted on May 14th, a resolution in which it had taken

cognizance of that intention and stated that Switzerland would not be asked to participate in sanctions.

The German and Italian Governments replied to this communication on June 21st in almost identical terms. Both expressed their satisfaction that Switzerland should have freed herself from obligations which might have jeopardised her neutrality and stated that Switzerland's desire to remain neutral would always be met by a corresponding desire on their part to recognize and respect her neutrality, which they regarded as a valuable factor of peace in Europe. Both the German and the Italian Governments referred to the statements which they had already made on that subject and took that opportunity once more to confirm.

The Federal Government noted with lively satisfaction the statements of the German and Italian Governments which had been communicated through the usual diplomatic channels and instructed its representatives in Berlin and Rome to convey its thanks for the friendly understanding reflected in these statements and for the valuable assurances contained therein.

2. The change in Belgian foreign policy towards self-reliance and independence.

The changes which Belgian foreign policy has undergone have, together with Switzerland's action, been of the greatest international importance as regards the general movement of the small States towards neutrality. Belgium was always exposed to greater dangers than other countries during European conflicts. After the war, she entered upon an all too close association with France and, in spite of the first-rate authorities on the theory of League of Nations law which she produced, was by her membership of the League inevitably drawn into the wash of French security policy, identified as it was with the policy of collective security, which the League was called upon to carry out as the instrument mainly of the victorious Powers. Not until the conclusion of the alliance between France and Soviet Russia, succeeded shortly after by that between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia (May 1936) which increased the interference of the Soviet Union in the workings of European policy still further than the accession of that country to the League of Nations had already done, did Belgium come to realize that it was high time for her to take steps to avoid being implicated in a possible fresh dispute between the Great Powers. The denouncing of the Treaty of Locarno gave Belgium an opportunity of preparing for her neutralization. On October 14th, 1936, King Leopold III delivered his memorable speech in which he declared his intention of releasing Belgium from her one-sided obligations and henceforth, with Holland and Switzerland, adopting an attitude of the strictest neutrality. In April 1937 Belgium obtained, after laborious arguments with Great Britain and France on the guarantees promised by those Powers after the German withdrawal from Locarno, the recognition of her neutrality and release from the military obligations arising out of her alliance with France and the Treaty of Locarno. On October 13th, 1937, Belgium's neutrality was granted, after an exchange of notes, by Germany also.

Belgium's relations with the League of Nations had already been loosened by the step which she took in conjunction with the other small States in the now famous Declaration of the "seven neutrals" of July 1st, 1936. This declaration, it will be remembered, dealt with the consequences of the unsuccessful sanctions war against Italy. The Governments in question reminded the League that certain Articles of the Covenant—in particular the Article on disarmament—had remained a dead letter, while others, such as Article 16 dealing with sanctions, had been applied and pointed out that, as long as the Covenant was not applied consistently and in toto, sanctions must inevitably be governed by the general rules of 1921.

That declaration was the first stage in the escape from the uncertainty attaching to the collective obligations of Geneva. Belgium, more than any other country, was endangered by Article 16, under the terms of whose 3rd paragraph she was required to allow foreign troops to march through her territory. When on April 29th, 1937 Belgium asked the Assembly of the League, through her Foreign Minister M. Spaak, for an official interpretation of the mechanism of sanctions and stated in advance that the right of troops to march through a foreign country could only be enforced with the consent of the country concerned, this view naturally met with opposition from the principle Powers. It is noteworthy that Spaak's declaration almost exactly coincided in time with similar statements made by the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Jonkheer de Graeff, at a meeting of the First Chamber on March 17th, 1937. The latter stated *inter alia* that the so-called *ex-neutrals* had made it known in their Geneva Declaration of July 1st, 1936 that in future they would most definitely take the view that they were under no obligation automatically to apply sanctions against an aggressor. There was absolutely no obligation to take military sanctions and they must reserve their attitude with regard to the question of according to foreign troops the right to pass through their country. It would be nothing short of suicide for a small country to allow foreign troops which were proceeding against one of its powerful neighbours to pass through its territory. That view was not at variance with the provisions of Article 16. As no State Member of the League was committed to military action, there could be no obligation to permit other countries to take action which must inevitably lead to complications of a military nature.

While it was finally agreed that Belgium was not automatically committed to active participation in a League war, an attempt was made, in the matter of the transit of troops, to confuse the issue. France in particular took her stand upon the unconditional character of the obligation under Article 16, paragraph 3 and managed, by means of a press campaign which was even carried on in Belgium itself, to give the impression, in spite of the rejection of the French thesis by Spaak, that the question had been solved in accordance with the French view. On the other hand the German declaration, it should be remembered, stated in the clearest terms that the obligation of non-aggression would become null and void in the event of Belgium taking part in any sort of military operations against Germany.

Thus the only "ambiguity" was on the French side and France will have to swallow the fact that, by the Belgo-German exchange of notes of October 13th, 1937, the balance was in fact restored in the Belgian question. Europe can be certain that Belgium sincerely desires to pursue a policy of neutrality in complete independence in the sense of the declarations of King Leopold III and the present Head of the Government.

In the meantime the Geneva institution has received so many rebuffs that the attempts on the part of these countries to free themselves from their collective obligations under the Covenant can hardly meet with any further opposition, apart from the tactless insults of the "apostle of the League of Nations", Litvinov. The election of Belgium to a seat on the Council had no effect on the new Belgian foreign policy, which only made its position still clearer in the direction of the loosening of relations with Geneva. Thus M. Spaak, in his speech in the Chamber on March 17th, 1938, referred to Chamberlain's statement to the effect that the League of Nations in its present state was incapable of furnishing any collective security, that it behoved them to be under no illusions on that score and that that applied especially to the smaller countries. Spaak invoked that statement as a justification of his own policy and said that it proved that the course he was pursuing was the right one. He could not be expected to make a confession of faith in the League if he did not possess such faith. As Foreign Minister, he had no right to found the foreign

policy of his country on an ideology which was already falling into disrepute.

The meetings at Oslo, which we discuss below, furnished an occasion for the provisional "winding up" of Belgium's policy with regard to the League and it was Spaak who at those meetings summarised most pertinently the views of the neutral Powers. He said that a system of collective security which did not rest on a universal organisation was ineffective and powerless: "This has compelled us to give to the Covenant of the League of Nations an interpretation which corresponds to the practice of the States Members of the League and confines our obligations to the limits of what is possible."

Belgium's neutrality has thus in many respects become an established fact. Let us however conclude our appreciation of this question of neutrality by repeating (without any desire to qualify in a negative sense what we have said) that, from a strictly scientific point of view, it is not possible to use the word "neutrality" in the classic sense in the case of Belgium any more than in that of most of the present neutrality movements. It is also true that there is no technical expression which would serve to distinguish Belgium's present legal status from her former neutrality. It is significant that Belgium was accorded, under the terms of the Treaty concluded between the Five Great Powers—France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia on November 15th, 1831 (which was subsequently replaced by the Treaties between the Great Powers and Belgium and Holland and between these two States on April 19th, 1839) the character of a neutral State and thus in some sort suffered a restriction of sovereignty. Belgium lost the *jus ad bellum* which every sovereign State enjoyed according to the international law of that day and was thus restricted in her freedom to conclude treaties, inasmuch as she lost the right to conclude any such treaties as could under certain circumstances commit her to war, while in return she was guaranteed the protection of the Great Powers, which also involved a diminution of legal status.

None of these characteristics are present to-day. Belgium's sovereignty is in no way restricted and potentially she retains the right to conclude alliances and make war, nor is there any element of protection. In his proclamation of October 14th, 1936, King Leopold stated that Belgium would in future pursue a policy whose object it would be to preserve her independence, to keep her outside all groups and avoid any participation on her part in disputes between her neighbours. At the same time she will herself defend her frontiers against any attack and prevent her soil from being misused for hostile activities against another country.

3. Hollands neutrality problem.

As regards the neutrality problem of the Netherlands, it is significant how relatively few statements have emanated from Netherlands Government circles. This attitude of reserve maintained in international communications goes to show that the Dutch people and their Government have scarcely departed at all from the traditional principles underlying their policy in regard to neutrality (in spite of their accession to the League of Nations) which is due to the fact that here, as in the case of Switzerland, there is an accumulation of historic and valued liberties of which those concerned will under no circumstances allow themselves to be deprived. While the neutrality movement of Belgium for instance has tended in the direction of a restoration of independence in the matter of foreign policy, the same aspirations have taken rather a different form in the Netherlands, inasmuch as they consist there in the determination to maintain in all things a position of independence of other countries and a particular shade of neutrality which is in some sort determined by the idea of independence.

The Netherlands have been called upon to fight for their neutrality less than other neutrals. They joined the League of Nations because the work of the League during the first few years held the promise of an extension of the machinery of arbitration and with it the peaceful solution of international disputes and for this reason the Netherlands accepted the obligations contained in the Covenant, so to say, as part of the bargain.

In any appreciation of the policy of independence towards Geneva pursued by the Netherlands, it is sufficient to bear in mind that they adopted a negative attitude to attempts made by Lord Robert Cecil in 1922/23 to extend the obligations of the Members of the League in the matter of guarantees and later maintained an attitude of critical reserve in regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1924. The discussion during the Locarno negotiations of the question of the inclusion of the Netherlands in the system of Locarno came as a surprise to many. When it became known that the French Government had, in its instructions to its delegation, recommended the inclusion of the Netherlands in the Locarno system, the then Foreign Minister, Jonkheer van Karnebeek, stated that his Government had never received any invitation to participate in the Locarno Conference.

In 1927, Jonkheer Beelaerts van Blokland became Foreign Minister. Possibly for a time he was inclined to adopt a rather less negative attitude to the question of sanctions. In any case the initiative taken by him in Geneva in 1927 in the matter of a fresh study of the problem of "arbitrage, sécurité et désarmement" was calculated to support that supposition, but he immediately stated that any such intention was as far from his mind as from that of his predecessor, and when, in 1929, the efforts to bring the Covenant of the League into harmony with the provisions of the Kellogg Pact began, Beelaerts himself sought to justify the need for extreme caution, as opposed to certain wishes expressed by the more radical elements in Parliament, by invoking the aversion felt by the Dutch people for any fresh obligations in the matter of sanctions and he behaved with equal reserve during the debates on the first Sino-Japanese dispute at the 1932 Assembly of the League of Nations.

In May 1933, Jonkheer de Graeff took over at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and soon had occasion to state his views on the principles of Netherlands foreign policy when the then British Prime Minister, Baldwin, in his speech in the House of Commons on June 30th, 1934, which created such a sensation, made his famous remark about England's frontier being the Rhine. In de Graeff's budget speech in the Second Chamber on November 20th, 1934, he referred to Baldwin's speech in the following terms:

"Baldwin's famous remark about the frontiers of the British Empire, which, for the purpose of defending the country from attack, are to be transferred from the cliffs of Dover to the Rhine, was mentioned in the preliminary budget report and in the speeches of some deputies. During the speeches of the Deputies Vliegen and van Dijk, I noted with great satisfaction that they—like the Government—took that remark very calmly and did not attach to it the far-reaching significance with which it has been invested by part of the Dutch and foreign Press. As already stated, the Government had no occasion to ask the British Government for further explanations on the subject and I am in the happy position of being able unreservedly to reassure the Chamber on this point, in so far as this may be necessary. Our Minister in London, as appears from one of the reports received from him during the last few days, was unable to suppress his perfectly natural and under the circumstances justifiable curiosity and took the opportunity of a chance meeting to obtain information from the fountain-head itself, Mr. Baldwin, who told him that his only intention in making the remark to which exception had been taken was to express the truth that, in view of the present development of air communications, the danger of an air attack could not now be regarded

as imminent only from the time when enemy aircraft were sighted on the frontiers of the United Kingdom, as in the last war, but that, in view of the great velocity now attained, the necessary warning signals would have to be given when the aircraft were reported to be over the Rhine. It had never occurred to him in that connection to think of any sort of collaboration with the Netherlands or any other Power with a view to the laying out of military aerodromes outside British territory. I have nothing to add to this "authentic" interpretation, but I would repeat once more, in view of the absurd and obstinate rumours concerning military agreements between our country and other countries, that the Netherlands will never relinquish their traditional policy and that it is a mistake to think that Netherlands territory could ever be made available for the defence of another State. We will always be prepared to bear the cost of preserving our own independence—as foreign countries are perfectly well aware—and we do not wish our country to sail in the wake of any European State or group of States."

De Graeff employed similar arguments in the First Chamber at the beginning of February 1937 in regard to the statement contained in Adolf Hitler's speech in the Reichstag on January 30th, 1937. The following is the text of his remarks taken from the parliamentary report:

Statements by the Foreign Minister, M. de Graeff

I

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to a written question by M. van Vessem (Nationaal Socialistische Beweging) based on a passage from the German Chancellor's speech of January 30th:

Our Government has not received any assurance from the German Government, addressed to it directly, in the matter of the recognition of Holland as inviolable neutral territory. The passage from the German Chancellor's speech must obviously refer to earlier public pronouncements.

II

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has now replied to the further question put by the member of the First Chamber, van Vessem. The question was whether the Minister was prepared to say to what earlier public pronouncement of the German Führer and Chancellor the following extract from his speech of January 30th obviously, in the opinion of the Minister, referred:

"The German Government has further assured Belgium and Holland that it is prepared at all times to recognize and guarantee those States as inviolable neutral territories."

The Minister stated that he assumed that the passage in question referred to the German Chancellor's communication of March 7th, 1936 to the effect that the German Government was prepared to conclude a pact of non-aggression between Belgium, Germany and France subject to the guarantee of Great Britain and Italy and to admit Holland as a party to such a treaty, if we so desired and the other States concerned agreed thereto. While the Minister is unable to explain the said passage from the German Chancellor's speech of January 30th of this year in any other way, he realizes that the communication of March 7th, 1936 and the text of the passage of which mention has been made on several occasions are not of equally far-reaching importance.

The explanations received from the German Government have confirmed the correctness of the above-mentioned assumption.

Further it appears that the German Chancellor's statement is to be regarded as an offer which is to apply in the event either of a new Western Pact being concluded and a settlement of the question being incorporated in its provisions, or of a settlement by treaty in some other form being reached, should a Western Pact not be concluded.

We thereupon informed the German Government that, while entirely appreciating the good intentions reflected in the offer, we could never entertain the idea of concluding with any country a treaty concerning the inviolability of our frontiers.

Inviolability is for us an axiom and not a suitable subject for a treaty to be concluded by us.

* * *

On March 17th, 1937, de Graeff made the following statement in the First Chamber with reference to the Declaration of the Neutrals of July 1st, 1936:

"It is clear that Article 16 of the Covenant cannot be held to place any Member of the League of Nations under an obligation to take military action. If this is so, however, it cannot oblige a Member of the League to tolerate actions by other States which would make military action unavoidable for that Member."

De Graeff further stated with regard to economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor:

"As in the case of military sanctions, we wish to reserve the right in future to form an independent judgment as to whether we shall participate in economic sanctions or not, and we desire in this way to be in a position to decide for ourselves whether participation in economic sanctions would harm the economic interests of our country to such an extent that it would be an irresponsible act on our part to join the boycott of the aggressor State."

Holland's participation in sanctions was also decided upon under de Graeff's leadership with the unanimous consent of Parliament, which regarded itself as under an obligation in the matter, as it did not wish to be disloyal to the Covenant. However, the turn taken by those sanctions caused the Netherlands Government to abandon, during the discussions on the reform of the League which followed the breakdown of sanctions, the attitude of reserve which it had hitherto maintained.

As early as the end of March 1936, the Netherlands Premier, Dr. Colijn, replied as follows, during the negotiations on the Defence Budget in the First Chamber, to the question whether the Netherlands, as a Member of the League of Nations, would, under certain conditions laid down by the League, have to accord to foreign troops the right to pass through their territory:

"In the event of action being taken against any State within the framework of League procedure, the Netherlands also will have to be convinced that that State is the aggressor and even then we can refuse to allow troops to march through our country against that State. We can only be required to allow troops to pass through if the Council of the League of Nations has unanimously decided who the aggressor is and the Netherlands Government agrees with its view."

This important statement by the Netherlands Premier was not open to any other interpretation than that the Netherlands reserved the right to reexamine even a unanimous decision by the Council in regard to the aggressor, before finally deciding as to their own attitude on the question of foreign troops being allowed to pass through their country. There is no doubt that Dr. Colijn wished, in making this statement, to proclaim, for the benefit both of his own compatriots and of foreign countries,

his earnest desire to pursue an unconditional and independent policy of neutrality.

When, after nine long meetings of the Assembly of the League of Nations in the autumn of 1936, the above-mentioned discussions on the reform of the League exhausted themselves for the most part in generalities, the remarks of the Foreign Minister de Graeff found ready listeners especially among the other small States Members of the League. He pointed out that salvation was now being sought in the extension and strengthening of regional agreements, but that the Netherlands had always declined to participate in regional alliances of a political and military character and would therefore, at that juncture also, maintain the utmost reserve in the matter. Side by side with that idea, there was another idea that was gaining ground. There was talk of abolishing sanctions altogether and converting the Covenant into a Consultative Pact. That might appear to be a retrograde step, but they should nevertheless ask themselves the question whether such a change might not be justified, if the universality of the League could be achieved in that way. For many States, the system of sanctions was an obstacle in the way of their collaboration in Geneva. The same view was expressed by M. Patijn (who succeeded M. de Graeff as Foreign Minister) during the debate on the Foreign Affairs Budget in the Second Chamber on November 30th, 1937.

That these statements were the expression of serious conclusions long since arrived at in Holland was shown by the affinity between such conceptions and the judgment of the great Dutch statesman and savant, Professor Struycken, on the League of Nations, contained in a work on the principal characteristics of Netherlands policy published in 1923, shortly before his death. "The power of the League of Nations", he says, "is still small, but our policy must be directed—not towards extending that power as quickly as possible, but on the contrary towards preventing the power of the League from increasing more rapidly than its legal machinery... Our motto must be: better a weak League than a powerful League which is not guided by justice".

The Netherlands finally learned from what happened in the Abyssinian war the lesson that even economic sanctions must either involve danger of war or remain ineffective and that a considerable weakening of the provisions of Article 16 was therefore indicated. As no change in the text of Article 16 is to be expected, the hope is cherished that it may be possible to achieve this object by way of the interpretation of that Article. This was stated by de Graeff in his speech in the Chamber on March 17th, 1937 (which we mentioned above in connection with Belgian policy in regard to neutrality) when he added that not only the ex-neutrals but other countries also were inclined to favour the method of interpretation. This view was confirmed by the Oslo Conference.

"The system of compulsory sanctions raises the question for the small States, whether membership of the League of Nations is not fraught with grave dangers for them."

It was in these unvarnished terms that de Graeff summarized his views with regard to the most recent development.

The prestige enjoyed by Dutch statesmen is shown by the fact that, at the last discussions of the Committee for the Reform of the League, the Netherlands delegate, M. Rütgers, was appointed Rapporteur for Questions connected with Article 16 on sanctions. We published an account of this report in our issue No. 6/7. Although, M. Rütger had to exercise restraint in regard to the expression of his own opinions, mention is made in this report also of the necessity for a decision bearing upon the interpretation of Article 16 in the direction of limiting the obligations under that Article, the reasons adduced in support of this

view being lack of universality, the non-fulfilment of Article 8 on disarmament and the disputes concerning the territorial *status quo* established at Versailles.

In a speech in the 28th Committee in January of this year, M. Rütgers expressed his own view or that of his Government, as published in our issue No. 9. M. Rütgers mentioned among other things that a change in the practice of the League had been effected by tacit agreement, the result of which had been that the League had developed from a society based on the principle of obligatory coercion into one based on optional coercion. Although his further statements did not imply any disagreement with provisional practice, they did create a legal situation which is difficult to reconcile with the "policy of independence" laid down. Membership of the League of Nations—that is, acceptance of Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant—involved, for the Netherlands also, a break in this policy. In the above-mentioned speech, M. Rütgers defined the view of his Government in the following unequivocal terms: "the Netherlands Government" he said, "has never desired and does not desire to-day a return to the former system of general neutrality. It still supports the system of collective security." He then referred to the manner in which practical policy must necessarily develop in view of present conditions and said: "That need not however prevent us from looking facts in the face and the fact is that the obligation to apply sanctions, as incorporated in the Covenant on the strength of hopes which have not been fulfilled and under conditions which no longer hold good to-day, cannot be regarded as any longer existing. We can say that this obligation is now dead and buried, but we must not forget that burial contains in itself the idea of resurrection".

* * *

Almost simultaneously with Rütger's statement in Geneva, another prominent Dutchman, a former League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, J. A. van Hamel, discussed the problem of Netherlands neutrality in an article in the January 1938 issue of the American periodical "Foreign Affairs" entitled "Can the Netherlands be neutral?" The striking thing about his remarks, as compared with the theoretically official view, is the greater frankness of exposition, by which we are enabled to perceive the determination of the Netherlands (not expressly admitted) to return in ever greater measure to the basic principle of neutrality. We will quote a few important passages from this article verbatim, as they are, in our opinion, calculated to throw into relief the probable future course of Netherlands policy:

"We hear from all sides the question: 'Can the Netherlands be neutral?' The reply is: 'What else at the present time can she be?' More and more she is coming back to the fundamental principle of neutrality which, after a long experience with other policies, she took as her guiding doctrine in the nineteenth century—a self-determined neutrality, begotten both of her strong sense of national independence and of her good will towards all her neighbors. She is coming back to this attitude deliberately, by the force of circumstances, after a brief sojourn in that quite different atmosphere of collective security which the Covenant of the League of Nations for a time engendered in Europe."

The establishment of the League profoundly changed the Dutch people's conception of their international position. Under the spell of the League spirit they prepared to abandon the attitude of neutral reserve to which they had learned to look for safety. They willingly shouldered the burdens of League membership in the belief that through the general acceptance of these obligations everybody's peace would be protected. True, from the beginning a few eminent skeptics expressed misgiving. The absence of the United States and of Germany was felt to leave bad gaps in the new front against war. Nevertheless, non-militarist Holland, peaceful and pacifist Holland, commercial Hol-

land, idealistic and unsophisticated Holland, greeted the new plan with satisfaction and on the whole placed her confidence in it. The general assumption prevailed that the old principles of neutrality had been superseded, for under the Covenant the Netherlands would have to side against an aggressor. The time-honored freedom of the neutral to trade with both belligerents would no longer redound to Holland's national prosperity. Her territory would not be closed to the passage of military and naval force acting under international sanction. Even her own armed force might have to participate in collective enterprises.

Holland never quite regarded these various possibilities as practical realities: the mere fact that they existed as hypotheses was supposed to be sufficient guarantee that they never would be given actual application. The juridical force of the collective menace was believed to be so imperative that law-breaking need not again be feared. The Dutch people have a very firm belief in the value of contractual obligations and in the strength of the written word. The majority of them therefore regarded the League of Nations as a definitive safeguard against international mischief. They readily went in for reduction of armaments, for arbitration and conciliation, and for all the rest of the League's program. It became old-fashioned to refer to "neutrality". And after Germany entered the League in 1926, all seemed to be for the best. A few years later came the bitter disenchantment. Collective security failed to prevent energetic governments from taking warlike action to gain their private ends. The Dutch took part in the application of sanctions against Italy, and were sadly disillusioned by the League's failure in this affair. The national state of mind altered profoundly as a result. The Dutch again found their national bark adrift in an unscrupulous and dangerous world. Holland realized that she must reconsider her plans for the defense of her vital interests.

Now the potential dangers which she faces are of two kinds: possible direct aggression by a strong Power, and the possibility that in a conflict between other belligerents she will be prevented from remaining neutral. It may be said in general that, so far as Europe is concerned, Holland is less fearful of deliberate aggression than of violations of her neutrality. The same cannot be said of the Netherlands East Indies, which lie more directly in the expansionist path of other Powers. True, the risk of aggression in Europe cannot be ruled out entirely.

What the Dutch want most is to maintain a clearly defined and rigorous neutrality. They see their country surrounded by Great Powers involved in endless complications. They see themselves as a buffer or as a possible corridor for one side or another in case those complications lead to war. They also see in the Pacific Ocean an arena of conflict. There too the Dutch East Indies are situated at the crossways, much as the mother country is in Europe. Holland does not attribute deliberate warlike intentions to any government; but she knows that if the general situation becomes delicate, her own position will be delicate also.

As the best safeguard of her national existence, Hollands has therefore returned to self-chosen and self-imposed neutrality.

It should be understood that Holland's desire to recapture her previous position of neutrality does not reflect any wish to disavow League principles as such. Her people remain sympathetic with the League's objectives and understand that to resign their membership might be taken as a repudiation of its ideals. They would not want this. But at present they can count on very little security as a result of League intervention and they therefore would not join in any eventual League action. Recent events have shown that other members hold exactly the same views. Better times for the League may perhaps come again. Holland is alive to the fact that great countries like England and France still attach importance to the League. But the Joint Declaration made in July 1936 by the

Dutch Government in conjunction with other "smaller" governments clearly stated that Holland must consider herself virtually free from the stipulations of the Covenant concerning collective economic, political or military action. This also implies freedom from the proviso concerning the passage of troops or of naval units acting for the League. The principle that Holland's territory is inviolable is thus reestablished."

These States can certainly not be blamed for not having carried their aspirations in the matter of neutrality to the point of leaving the League of Nations. They were, apart from those who were vanquished in the World War, the only ones who believed sincerely and without *arrière-pensée* in the League of Nations and its ideals and staked everything on the realization of those ideals. To-day this attitude signifies a sacrifice which, as clearly intimated in the above-mentioned statements by Chamberlain, is unlikely to bring with it any compensatory advantage. Moreover it is questionable whether such a gesture, which would be mainly moral, could in any way affect an institution which is regarded, even by these States, as nothing more nor less than a ruin or at the best as completely impotent.

4. The aspirations of the Nordic States in the matter of neutrality

During 1938 the policy of the Nordic States with regard to neutrality has, under the influence of considerations of *realpolitik*, suffered remarkable changes in its development away from earlier and more general and theoretical conceptions. The breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, the greater extent to which the Baltic and the Arctic Ocean have been drawn into the sphere of European politics, the effects of the Franco-Soviet Alliance, the war waged by the League of Nations against Italy and finally the statement of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, to the effect that small States should not allow themselves to be lulled by false hopes, as if Geneva could guarantee their security: these are substantially the factors of *realpolitik* which have in recent times led to an ever closer association of the Nordic States. Originally such association was confined to occasional conferences of Ministers of the three Scandinavian States—Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In April 1937, Finland was brought into closer contact with this circle and this marked the conclusion of the first stage of Nordic cooperation. The former improvised arrangements grew into a firm connection fostered by meetings at regular intervals. In the statement broadcast on April 27th, 1937, the Foreign Ministers of these four States especially stressed the idea of Scandinavian solidarity, which was naturally made the subject of the most varied interpretations. In several statements the public was informed that the association between those States was not based on a formal treaty and was not of a military character, but on the contrary stood out in strong contrast to *ententes* and *blocs*. These meetings were in the main spoken of as purely Scandinavian affairs, the question of neutrality in the event of European conflicts being accorded increasing prominence in the light of the general political development. This collaboration coincided in point of time almost exactly with that of other neutral States. The famous "Statement of the seven neutrals" of July 1st 1936, which was submitted to the League of Nations after the breakdown of sanctions by the three Scandinavian States together with Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain, widened the circle and finally the so-called "Oslo States bloc", whose original object was the establishment of general rules for a common economic policy, ended by creating a closer political association between Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. The first political conference of the Oslo States was

held in Copenhagen from July 22nd and 24th, 1938. It was decided to hold another meeting in Geneva before the beginning of the Assembly of the League in September so that it is to be expected that the declarations of Copenhagen will be one of the principal subjects of discussion during the coming debates in Geneva.

That the developments summarized above have not proceeded without a certain amount of friction must be obvious to all. The question of neutrality and relations with the League of Nations represent different problems for each of these countries, as is proved most clearly by the fact that the results of Oslo (which must be regarded as the last stage), while constituting a fresh political factor, did not involve the rejection of existing legal obligations under the League Covenant.

As regards the Nordic States, the disputes about collective security have given rise to far-reaching differences of opinion which have not yet been removed. It is not long since these States were torn in two between a conception of collective security hitherto defended with theoretical passion and the equally strong desire to free themselves from these ties.

One of the most important starting points for the practical considerations bearing upon the attitude to be adopted in future towards collective security was provided by the visits of the Scandinavian Ministers to Moscow. These visits brought a note of discord into the "Scandinavian Quartett", formed in 1935 to produce harmonious collaboration between Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Directly it became necessary to make a serious stand against what had hitherto existed as a hypothesis only—the inclusion of Nordic territories in the area covered by the maps of certain General Staffs—the various countries were caught, for longer or shorter periods according to the geographical position and their particular political and ideological bias, in the trap of collective security, the advantages of which were depicted to them in such bright colours by Moscow and whose illusion the Nordic Countries have been less anxious than other neutrals to discard.

While Sweden and Finland, as the immediate neighbours of the Soviet Union, at first offered less resistance to the temptations of Moscow, the others, Denmark and Norway perceived in such a friendship the danger of being harnessed to a collective system of which they could not foresee the outcome.

The "Isvestia" indirectly confirmed those fears at the time, when in a leading article it raised the question whether it was to the interest of small States to conclude bi-lateral agreements with potential aggressors in order to protect their neutrality. It was the policy of the "Fascist" States to recommend their small neighbours to place a neutral garland of that sort round them, but it was unlikely that those aggressive countries would, when the time came, respect the territorial integrity of the small countries. The latter could not therefore protect their independence and territorial security by means of neutrality, but only by a strengthening of the "potentiels de paix" or "peace front" of the other States.

However, after this short intermezzo, the steady poisoning of the international atmosphere and the incomplete and inconsistent decisions of the League of Nations immediately gave a further stimulus to the neutrality policy of the Nordic countries, as shown by a number of demonstrations in the different parliaments, by statesmen and in the Press.

A good definition of the Nordic conception of neutrality was furnished by the Swedish Foreign Minister, M. Sandler, in the following statement to the Press on the occasion of his visit to Paris on March 20th, 1937:

"People imagine that the Nordic countries are a neutral group, but I admit that I, for my part, do not much care for that expression, as it is apt to be confusing. The necessary

distinction is not always drawn between the legal and the political idea of neutrality. The legal conception of neutrality applies to war-time and neutral policy to peace-time. Speaking for myself and for my country, I prefer to speak of "neutral attitude", which may be defined as follows: Sweden is against a policy of alliances and not prepared to allow herself to be involved in combinations which would have the effect of hampering her freedom of action when she most needed it. Instead of neutral States, one should speak of States without alliances." M. Sandler supplemented and amplified these remarks in his great speech at Upsala on November 6th 1937.

The predominant view was expressed in the Liberal "Stockholms Tidningen" in July 1937, when it said that the task of keeping the Spanish Civil War within bounds was a matter for the Great Powers concerned: "Sweden's foreign political interests are confined to the Nordic and Baltic States; we have no cause to commit ourselves in any way outside the clearly defined geographical limits of this area."

At the same time, the "Göteborgs Handels och Sjöfartstidning" came out still more unmistakably in favour of Sweden immediately leaving the League of Nations and expressed the fear that the small countries would, if they remained in the League any longer, be obliged to play the dangerous and humiliating role of pawns in the English political game: "We shall become puppets in a game played according to rules which do not correspond to any accepted legal standards. We are running the risk of being involved in complications which do not concern us, but only affect the interests of the Great Powers and have nothing to do with justice or injustice. Collective security has been replaced by collective insecurity."

On June 17th, 1938, the Swedish Parliament approved by 153 votes to 43 a report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, which contained the following passage:

"The Committee desires most strongly to support the attitude adopted by the Swedish Government in the 28th (Reform) Committee in the matter of the freedom of action of States Members of the League with regard to Article 16. Naturally the Swedish Government will continue to adopt this attitude during discussions on the problem of sanctions within the framework of the League of Nations and in further discussions in the 28th Committee and on all other occasions. It is clearly desirable for Sweden to reserve her freedom of action in the matter of sanctions and this was generally recognized by the States Members to be compatible with a loyal interpretation of the present position. It will be for the Government however, in consultation with the Foreign Affairs Committee and with other Governments with which our country commonly collaborates in the League of Nations, to decide as to the time when and the form in which such recognition can best be accorded."

The same intention on the part of Norway was expressed in King Haakon's Speech from the Throne in February 1938. "Norway" he said "must always regard it as one of the tasks of her policy to keep the country out of all warlike entanglements."

The great speech of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, M. Koth, during the debates on foreign policy in the Storting in July 1937 had already left no doubt that Norway did not wish on any account to participate in the political disputes for power in Europe. M. Koth stated with brutal frankness that the League of Nations also had become an instrument of the Great Powers in the pursuit of their own interests and the small States would therefore be compelled to review their position at Geneva. The most important condition of their remaining in the League was that their neutrality should not be jeopardized by the provisions of Article 16 relative to sanctions, which had given a totally new significance

to the conception of neutrality. The gist of his remarks was that Norway and the rest of the North must under all circumstances remain neutral and should regard it as the sole task of their foreign policy to keep clear of any war in Europe.

On May 31st, the Norwegian Parliament adopted the following Resolution :

"With reference to the statements contained in the Speech from the Throne to the effect that it must ever be the aim of Norwegian policy to keep clear of warlike entanglements, the Storting holds fast to the principle that the country has a right to preserve complete and unconditional neutrality in any war which Norway does not regard as a proper subject for action by the League of Nations."

As regards Denmark, her desire for neutrality is evidenced by the fact that she did not follow the example of her Nordic friends in the matter of armaments—a fact which has called down upon her head many a reproach from the latter. In reply to the reproach that Denmark was going her own way without reference to the Scandinavian family, the Danish Premier, M. Stauning, said that military assistance had never been accorded to Denmark in times of emergency by her Nordic neighbours: indeed Sweden, Norway and Finland would not be in a position to do so. The members of the Nordic group could only give one another moral support. A member of the Minister's entourage expressed this by saying that it was no use "dressing up dwarfs as giants". Denmark's neutrality policy was based on her impartiality and on the Declaration of the Neutral States of July 1st, 1936, which was generally regarded as a moral release from the League of Nations. The Foreign Minister, M. Munch, who holds the view that the idea of the League of Nations must continue to be fostered in the direction of the universality of the League and its mission of conciliation, has always warned those concerned against making it into a league of States with similar political and social tendencies. In an interview published in the "Nationaltidende" of June 15th, 1938, he explained the fact of the smaller States remaining in the League by saying that it was a safeguard against the League becoming an alliance.

The statements in which M. Munch described the reasons for and aims of the Copenhagen Conference contained the following passage :

"Our countries form neither an alliance nor an entente. Each has her own problems. We are however sufficiently united by our common will to peace. We are determined to keep outside all disputes which might arise between the various political groups. We abhor the idea of a world war, but, if such a war were to break out, we would do our utmost to avoid being drawn into it..."

Finland also, having eluded Russian pressure, has been steadily moving nearer to the views of the other Northern countries. After the Nordic neutrality rules came into force for Finland at the beginning of June, the President of the State, M. Kallio, stated in Parliament on May 20th, 1938, with express reference to the Nordic orientation of the country, that Finland reserved full freedom of action as regards the application of the provisions of Article 16.

* * *

An important practical step in the direction of neutrality is constituted by the military neutrality rules drawn up between Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Finland and published on May 27th, after the signing of a declaration in Stockholm.

These rules substantially represent the redrafting and modernization (necessitated by the development of the technique

of war) of the old neutrality rules of 1912, which again are based on the provisions of the Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907 concerning the rights and duties of neutrals in maritime warfare. The new rules deal mainly with questions of the admission to neutral ports and territorial waters of warships belonging to belligerents and their rights and duties during their stay. The provisions regarding submarines, aircraft and wireless are new and couched in much sharper terms.

The following is the text of these rules, as published in the Geneva "Journal des Nations" of July 14th:

DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY

On May 27th, 1938, the representatives of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden signed the following declaration in Stockholm.

The Governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden,

Considering that it is desirable that the neutrality rules to be applied by them in a war between foreign Powers should be couched in identical terms,

Have, on the basis of the Declaration of December 21st 1912 on the same subject agreed upon between Denmark, Norway and Sweden, drafted the attached texts of neutrality rules, as they are to be established by each of the said Governments severally."

They agree that, in the event of one or other of these Governments desiring to alter the said rules on the strength of its experiences, as provided for in the Hague Convention concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers in maritime warfare signed on October 18th, 1907, it shall not make such alteration without, if possible, advising the four other Governments in advance in sufficient time to render possible an exchange of opinions on the matter.

In confirmation whereof, the undersigned, having been empowered in writing by their Governments, signed the above declaration and affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Stockholm, on May 27th, 1938.

In pursuance of the above declaration, the same Governments published the Neutrality Rules in June. The texts vary as regards the provisions relating to territory, but are almost identical as regards the principles which they incorporate. It will therefore suffice to reproduce one of the texts only—that of Denmark's Neutrality Rules.

Neutrality Rules.

Article 1. Warships belonging to the belligerents will be granted access to the harbours and other territorial waters of the Kingdom, subject to the following exceptions, restrictions and conditions.

Article 2. 1. Warships belonging to belligerents are denied access to the harbour and roadstead of Copenhagen and to the harbours and other waters which have been declared to be war harbours or belong to the areas under the protection of the coastal defence organizations.

2. Warships belonging to the belligerents are also denied access to inner waters, the entrance to which is blocked by submarine mines or other methods of defence.

By inner Danish waters is meant the harbours, the approaches to harbours, gulfs and bays and the waters which lie between and this side of those Danish islands, islets and reefs, which are not permanently under water. Nevertheless in the part of Danish territorial waters situated in the Cattegat, the Great and Little Belt and the Sund, which forms the natural commercial routes between the North Sea and the Baltic, only the harbours and the approaches to the harbours and the roadstead of Copenhagen are deemed to be inner waters.

3. Armed submarines belonging to the belligerents are forbidden to enter or remain in Danish territorial waters.

This prohibition shall not however apply to ships passing without unnecessary delay through the zone of the outer Danish waters which form the natural commercial routes between the North Sea and the Baltic in the Cattegat, the Great and Little Belt and the Sund, with

the exception of the roadstead of Copenhagen, through which no ships shall be allowed to pass in view of the fact that it comes under the category of inner waters; nor shall it apply to the passage of submarines which are compelled as a result of the state of the sea or of damage suffered to enter the forbidden waters and make known the cause of their presence in those waters by means of an international signal. The said submarines must leave the forbidden waters as soon as the cause of their entry has been removed. In Danish territorial waters, submarines must always fly their national flag and, except in cases of most urgent necessity, may only proceed on the surface.

4. The King reserves the right, where there are special circumstances and in order to command respect for sovereign rights and to maintain the neutrality of the Kingdom, to forbid access to Danish harbours and other zones deemed to be Danish territorial waters, in addition to those, access to which is already forbidden by the above-mentioned provisions, subject to the observance of the general principles of international law.

5. The King similarly reserves the right to forbid access to Danish harbours and docks to any warships belonging to the belligerents which have failed to abide by the provisions issued by the competent Danish authorities or have violated the neutrality of the Kingdom.

Article 3. Pirate ships may not enter Danish harbours or remain in Danish territorial waters.

2. Access to Danish waters is also forbidden to armed merchantmen belonging to the belligerents, when their arms are intended for purposes other than defence.

Article 4. 1. Warships belonging to the belligerents are forbidden to remain in Danish harbours or in Danish docks or other Danish territorial waters for more than 24 hours, save in cases of damage or of running aground as a result of the state of the sea or in the cases enumerated under Nos 3 and 4 above. In such cases, they must leave as soon as the causes of delay have been removed. In the case of damage suffered or of running aground, the competent Danish authority shall fix a time-limit which shall be sufficient to allow of the damage being repaired or the ship being rendered seaworthy. No extension of the period of stay over and above 24 hours will be accorded, if it appears that the ship cannot be made seaworthy within a reasonable period or if the damage has been caused by a warlike act of the adversary.

The above provisions relating to the limit of stay do not apply to warships exclusively engaged on a religious, scientific or humanitarian task or to military hospital ships.

2. The greatest number of warships of a belligerent Power or several allied Powers allowed to remain at the same time in a Danish harbour or dock, or in harbours or docks of the same coastal district of Denmark if that coast is divided into districts for the purpose, is three.

3. If warships of the two belligerent Parties are in a Danish harbour or dock at the same time, at least 24 hours must elapse between the departure of a vessel of the one Party and that of a vessel of the other Party, the times of departure being reckoned according to the times of arrival, in so far as the state of the vessel which arrived first is such as to allow of an extension of stay being granted.

4. A warship of the belligerent Powers may not leave a Danish harbour or dock, in which there is a merchant vessel belonging to the adversary, earlier than 24 hours before the departure of the merchant vessel. The competent authorities shall so regulate the departure of the merchant vessel as to avoid an unnecessary extension of the period of stay of the warship.

Article 5. 1. Warships of the belligerents may only repair damage in Danish harbours and docks in so far as this is absolutely necessary for their safety. They may in no case increase their military strength. In repairing damage clearly caused by warlike acts of the adversary, no assistance of any kind which the damaged vessels could obtain on Danish territory may be claimed. The competent Danish authorities shall determine the nature of the repairs to be carried out. The repairs must be carried out as quickly as possible and within the time-limit provided for in Article 4, 1.

2. Warships of the belligerents are forbidden to use Danish harbours or other Danish territorial waters in order to renovate or strengthen their military equipment or armaments or to enlarge their crews.

3. Warships of the belligerents may only take in supplies in Danish harbours or docks in order to satisfy their normal peace requirements.

4. In Danish harbours and docks, warships of the belligerents are, in the matter of supplies of fuel, subject to the same regulations as other foreign vessels. They may therefore only ship enough fuel to enable them to reach the nearest harbour in their own country and in no case any quantity exceeding that required for filling up their bunkers or their receptacles with liquid fuel. After filling up with fuel in one of the harbours or docks of the Kingdom, they may not take in a fresh provision in its harbours or docks within the next three months.

Article 6. War vessels of the belligerents are required to employ the services of pilots appointed for the purpose in all cases in which the employment of such services is compulsory. In other cases, they may not employ such pilots save in case of emergency or to escape a danger of the sea.

Article 7. 1. It is forbidden to bring prizes of foreign nationality into one of the Danish harbours or docks, save in cases of unseaworthiness, stormy weather at sea or lack of fuel or food. Any prize brought into a Danish harbour or dock for the above-mentioned reasons must leave immediately after such cause has been removed.

2. No prize court may be set up by a belligerent on Danish territory or on a ship in Danish territorial waters. The sale of prizes in a Danish harbour or dock is also forbidden.

Article 8. Military aircraft of the belligerents, with the exception of air ambulances and aircraft carried on warships, shall not be allowed on Danish territory, save under the terms of other provisions to be applied to certain areas in accordance with the general principles of international law.

The said aircraft may without unnecessary delay pass through the Danish outer territorial waters which connect the North Sea with the Baltic by way of the Cattegat, the Great and Little Belt and the Sund, and the air above that route. No aircraft is allowed to pass through the roadstead of Copenhagen or the air above it. In all cases, aircraft must, when passing, keep as far away from the coast as possible.

2. Aircraft transported on warships by belligerents may not leave those ships, as long as they are in Danish territorial waters.

Article 9. 1. Warships and military aircraft of the belligerents must observe the sovereign rights of the Kingdom and abstain from all actions in violation of such neutrality.

2. All hostile acts are forbidden within Danish territorial frontiers, including the holding up, searching and seizure of vessels and aircraft, whether these belong to neutrals or to the adversary. Any ship or aircraft seized must immediately be freed with officers, crew and cargo.

Article 10. Police and harbour police regulations regarding health, pilots, Customs, navigation and aviation must be strictly observed.

Article 11. The belligerents are forbidden to use Danish territory as a basis of military operations against their adversaries.

Article 12. The belligerents and persons in their service are forbidden to construct or use wireless stations on [Danish territory, or any other apparatus capable of being employed as a means of communicating with the belligerent land, maritime and air forces.

2. The belligerent Powers are forbidden to use their portable wireless stations for communications on Danish territory, whether they belong to the fighting forces or not, save in the case of emergency or for communicating with the Danish authorities through a Danish land or coastal wireless station or a wireless station on a vessel belonging to the Danish navy.

Article 13. All observations of movements of troops, operations or defensive measures of a belligerent which can be made from

aircraft or in any other way, in order to communicate them to other belligerents, are forbidden on Danish territory.

Article 14. 1. The belligerents are forbidden to set up fuel depots on the territory of the Kingdom or on board any ships stationed in its territorial waters.

2. Vessels or aircraft which are obviously proceeding for the purpose of supplying the fighting forces of the belligerents with fuel or other necessities are forbidden to supply themselves in Danish harbours or docks with any quantity thereof exceeding their own requirements.

Article 15. The equipping or arming on Danish territory of a ship intended to be used against one of the belligerents or to participate in warlike operations is forbidden. Any aircraft used for attacks upon a belligerent, or carrying any apparatus or material whose works or method of employment is such as to enable it to attack, is forbidden to leave Danish territory, if there is any reason to suspect that it is to be used against a belligerent Power. It is also forbidden to carry out work on an aeroplane with the intention of enabling it to depart for the above-mentioned purpose.

* * *

Now that we are acquainted with the results of the anxiously awaited Conference of Ministers of the Oslo Powers in Copenhagen of July 22nd-24th, 1938, it is interesting for the sake of comparison, to review the various opinions, desires and hopes expressed before and since that Conference.

That was the first time that, on the proposal of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, M. Mowinkel, the Oslo group had gone beyond the consideration of economic aims and met to discuss problems of foreign policy. The question of further adherence to the League of Nations was, it is clear, at once the cause and the subject-matter of these secret deliberations, the results of which had to be deduced by the public from a communiqué couched in very general terms and from after-dinner speeches and statements to the Press by those who took part in the deliberations.

It is true that before the Conference—probably to mitigate the contrast between the demonstrations in Parliament and the probable poverty of final achievements—it was pointed out that this meeting must only be regarded as the starting point of common action, for the demonstrations in the parliaments of the various countries were calculated to give the impression that they had achieved or were about to achieve a great change in their League policy—both factual and in its bearing upon international law. As no League of Nations could in practice do anything against such decisions, the question of the form in which such change would receive its international legal character was ignored.

There were indeed two examples of how boldly to achieve so-called "equality of treatment in neutrality": Belgium and Switzerland.

On the occasion of the coming conference, the most widely read Scandinavian paper, the Liberal "Stockholms Tidningen" requested the responsible statesmen of the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland to state their views on what was to be the principal subject of discussion at the Conference: namely, the tendency of the small nations to move away from the Geneva policy of "collective security" or, to express it in a positive form, their return to the old policy of neutrality. The Netherlands Premier M. Colijn, the Belgian Premier M. Spaak and the Swiss Federal Councillor M. Motta replied to this request. Each of these three statesmen, speaking for his own country, pointed out that it had been necessary to return by way of armed neutrality to a policy based on individual responsibility. They now called themselves "free from alliances" because they desired to be independent of every combination, including the association of interests represented by the League of Nations.

M. Colijn remarked that collective security was an impossible idea to-day.

Belgium and Switzerland had managed by steadfastness and tenacity to obtain recognition of their claims. The object of the meeting in Copenhagen could therefore only be to proclaim for the others also the urgent necessity of regaining their unrestricted neutrality.

On the day on which the Conference opened, the Copenhagen "Berlingske Aftenavis" summarized at length the essential points to be discussed. It said:

"The seven States are inspired by the common hope that the forces of agreement and collaboration in the world may be able to continue to determine developments, and they for their part, will be prepared to make their contribution. They have a common guiding principle in foreign policy—neutrality. Their characteristics and position show many points of difference which influence their views and attitude in the changing situations in which they are placed, but they are united in the desire not to be participants in the general political game, but to maintain their impartiality in regard to the opposing parties. It must be the aim of their policy to strengthen their position and to render it so clear and unequivocal that there may be no doubt in regard thereto and that it may inspire confidence. It will be their aim at the Copenhagen Conference clearly to lay down and elucidate the conditions and prerequisites of neutrality policy and the possibilities in regard to securing the maximum protection for that policy. Thus the question of membership of the League of Nations and the obligations arising therefrom will form one of the main subjects of discussion. Not only is the League of Nations going through a period of weakness, but it must be established upon an entirely new foundation, if it is to be enabled to make a contribution to international cooperation. In the circumstances, it is necessary, if the dangers and difficulties of membership of the League are not to be too unfairly disproportionate to the value of participation in its work, that it should be made abundantly clear that the impartial neutrality at which the Oslo States are aiming will not be restricted by their League obligations, or in other words that there is no possibility of of their being compelled, as a result of those commitments, to take part in any conflicts which might arise between the Great Powers. It is a matter of common knowledge that the prerequisites for the application of the sanctions paragraph are no longer present, but the small neutral States must guard against the possibility of being faced, in different circumstances, with an attempt to revive obligations, the fulfilment of which would involve the sacrifice of their freedom of action and cause their neutrality policy to be regarded with distrust."

What were the results of the Conference?

The communiqué issued on the negotiations reads as follows:

"The Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden met in Copenhagen on July 23rd and 24th in order jointly to examine the international situation. They are aware that this situation gives cause for disquietude, but remain confident that the nations and their statesmen will take all necessary steps to find peaceful solutions of the present serious disputes.

The countries represented at Copenhagen are prepared actively to participate in any attempt to bring about international conciliation in a spirit of impartiality and independence with regard to the various combinations.

The Foreign Ministers are not insensible of the dangers attending the armaments race and are unanimously of opinion that every possibility of concluding an international agreement which will put an end to this race must be examined. They are determined in particular to support every endeavour to prepare a convention relating to bombing from the air.

The Ministers are convinced that the continued collaboration of their countries with the League is justified and declare that their Governments are determined to observe a definite policy designed to favour an interpretation of the sanctions system which will, in view of the present position and the practice of the last few years, deprive it of its compulsory character. They are of opinion that this non-compulsory character should apply not only in the case of particular groups of States, but in that of all Members of the League.

The Ministers are persuaded that it is in the interests of the League that this right of free judgment should be expressly laid down and they are prepared to examine in this sense the report of the 28th Committee, which is to be submitted to the Assembly for its consideration. Finally, they desire that the League of Nations shall to a greater extent than before concentrate on the prevention of conflicts and on international cooperation.

The Ministers agree to leave in force the agreements on questions of common interest which have been signed by them."

This communiqué certainly came as a disappointment to many. The Copenhagen "Berlingske Tidende" for instance was by no means edified thereby and said that "its emptiness was covered by an ornamental exterior." Most importance was attached to the statement that the countries concerned desired to remain outside disputes. The intention to dissociate themselves from the attempts at political activity in Geneva may also fairly be deduced from the terms of the communiqué. The view that Article 16 should be non-compulsory, not only for certain groups of States i.e. the neutrals, but for all Members, is certainly of importance in connection with the coming discussions in Geneva and would seem to imply a wish to restrict the sphere of activity of certain States for whom that Article is not sufficiently compulsory.

Article 16 was of course the main subject of discussion at the Conference. In the meantime the question has been shelved, but has not on that account ceased to exist for those States. The "dead Article 16" will possibly now, after that Conference, exercise the minds of the Nordic peoples more than ever, for it seems to us that such a result as that achieved is to be attributed to some extent to negative considerations of a personal nature.

Many of the Ministers concerned, such as Lange, Mowinkel, Hambro, Munch, Koth and Sandler are not only statesmen of their countries, but also persons who for twenty years have been as much at home in Geneva as in their own capitals. Their personal relations with international circles and the fact that, by dint of presiding over every kind of League Committee for years, they became in some sort the creators and interpreters of League of Nations law was no doubt in part responsible for their not claiming any "special rights", such as those which Switzerland and Belgium obtained as a result of the determined attitude adopted by them. In this connection, the arguments put forward after the Conference by the Copenhagen "Politiken" to explain Munch's view seem to us very significant: it was not expedient to demand express recognition by the League of the attitude of the treaty-free States to the sanctions system as, if it were demanded and not granted, the position of those States in the League would be weakened and a refusal of this demand would inevitably and automatically lead to their withdrawal from the League.

The doubts as to how far it was expedient and possible to go and the fact that the Copenhagen Conference generally gave the impression that it was for the time being only a question of putting out feelers in the direction of real neutrality seem to be weak points in the Conference, which the adversaries in Geneva will certainly not be slow to exploit, unless the preliminary Conference which has been planned manages to make the position still clearer in this respect. Then and then only could Copenhagen be regarded as a milestone.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

From the speeches of the British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, in the House of Lords on February 17th and 24th, 1938

In so far as the speeches had been concerned with the League of Nations, there had been those who had found fault with the Government's policies for being too weak and who would have liked to go farther and act with far greater firmness, in connexion with Article XVI, and there had been those who frankly regarded that article and the other articles connected with it as dangerous and provocative and as genuine hindrances to international cooperation.

A statement made by Lord Arnold, in arguing the case for isolation, was sufficiently important to deserve specific reference. He said: "In isolation there is a very good chance of keeping out of the next war, whereas under League policy there was no such chance at all. Under League policy, whether war comes, wherever it is or whatever it is about, Great Britain is bound to be in it, and not only in the next European war but in all European wars."

He really cannot believe that that statement in these simple terms is true, and I am sure that on reflection he would agree that in these simple terms it is apt, to one less informed than himself, to be dangerously misleading.

It is important, I think, for me to remind your lordships how the Foreign Secretary some 15 months ago defined quite

clearly the military obligations of this country in a speech at Leamington. He there defined them in specific terms. I make this assertion with complete precision that there are no other military commitments for this country and that in every other case his Majesty's Government would be wholly free to act as they might in all the circumstances of the time think right.

I do not think that it is either possible, or even always desirable, for any country to state precisely when it would or would not feel it right to enter upon armed resistance. I am quite certain it is not possible.

While I share, as we all do, repugnance to war and the need for public opinion being behind any war, I cannot feel that it is either politically practicable or morally justifiable for the country to pretend that it can disinterest itself in what goes on in the great world outside.

The broad purpose of foreign policy of any Government of this country must be to pursue that which was the greatest of all British interests—namely, peace, and if at any time 100 per cent. success in that pursuit is impossible—and that is not a matter that lies wholly in the hands of the British Government—it will still remain the object of the British Government to protect as much as possible the cause of peace.

But inasmuch as the world never stands still, we have to be on our guard to see that the assertion of those principles is not

distorted into an attempt to obstruct all change, which is one of the primary laws of all human life. Not the least of the problems confronting us to-day is to make provision for the security of peace which must not exclude peaceful revision and change where such may rightly be required.

* * *

Last Thursday (February 17th) I spoke in this House on general foreign policy and the League of Nations. Every word of that speech was approved by the then Foreign Secretary. I can assure your lordships that what was our policy last week remains our policy to-day, and foreign nations would be seriously mistaken who thought that recent events betokened any change. In the course of that speech—also approved by the then Foreign Secretary, I said this:—

“Let us not forget that, whatever be the place in our philosophy we give to the League of Nations, the League of Nations itself is only a great means to the greater end of international peace, and if it is possible to reach agreements which really offer international appeasement through machinery other than the League, I can hardly suppose there would be any member of the League so short-sighted as to grudge their conclusion.”

On Tuesday last in the House of Commons the Prime Minister addressed himself to rebut this charge of desertion of the League of Nations, and spoke with great frankness upon the question of collective security. While Lord Cecil was arguing with great vigour and great force upon how terrible a thing it was for the Prime Minister to have used words suggesting to smaller nations that they could no longer rely upon collective security, the thought was passing constantly in and out of my mind whether he was quite oblivious and careless of the danger of the possibility of deceiving small nations into reliance upon support which would not, in fact, be forthcoming.

I have seen the history of Abyssinia. I believe that this country honestly tried to do its best, with other members of the League of Nations, to deal with Abyssinia. I know that those members of the League and this country failed. I know that the result of that failure was to deceive the Emperor of Abyssinia into expecting that he was going to get support greater than in fact he did receive, and I do not want to see that experience repeated.

**From the speeches of the British Prime Minister,
Mr. Neville Chamberlain, in the House of Commons
on March 24th and April 8th, 1938**

For a long time a majority of the people of this country have cherished the belief that in the League of Nations we had found an instrument which was capable of enforcing and maintaining peace. Some recent words of mine have in some quarters been taken to mean that there has been a sudden change in the attitude of his Majesty's Government, not only to the thesis that the League could give us security, but to the League itself; that we had thrown over the League, and that we had abandoned it as one of the principal elements in our policy.

I do not deny that my original belief in the League as an effective instrument for preserving peace has been profoundly shaken. That arises from the present condition of the League itself. But it has not arisen from any recent events. As long ago as June, 1936, speaking in London, I referred to the failure of the policy of collective security to prevent war, or to stop war when it had once begun, or to save the victims of aggression. I went on to say:

There is no reason why, because the policy of collective security, in the circumstances in which it was tried, has failed,

we should therefore abandon the idea of the League and give up the ideals for which the League stands. If we have retained any vestige of common sense, surely we must admit that we have tried to impose upon the League a task which was beyond its powers to fulfil.

I have not changed the views that I expressed nearly two years ago. I have not ceased to believe in the possibility that the League might be so revived and so strengthened as to serve as an effective instrument for the preservation of peace. But I say that is not the position to-day.

It may be contended that I am giving too restricted an interpretation of the phrase “collective security”. After all, for practical purposes it is not necessary for collective security to ensure the cooperation of every one of the 58 nations which still remain members of the League, provided that we can get the cooperation of a sufficient number to present a front of overwhelming power to any potential aggressor. Indeed, it might be plausibly argued that to deal with a smaller number of nations and to dispense with the somewhat slow and cumbersome machinery of Geneva might be a way of dealing with the problem of the lightning strokes of modern war or warlike operations, far simpler than the older method of collective security through the League as a whole.

I think that from the practical point of view there is much to be said for a proposition of that kind. I would make only two observations upon it. The first is this: However completely we encase such a proposal as that in the Covenant of the League, however wholeheartedly the League may be prepared to give its sanction and approval to such a project, as a matter of fact it does not differ from the old alliances of pre-War days, which we thought we had abandoned in favour of something better.

A second observation that I would like to make is that the value of such alliances as that as a deterrent to possible aggression must obviously depend upon their military efficiency—upon the numbers and equipment of the forces that can be mobilized, on their distribution in relation to the area in which they might have to be employed, and on the amount of preparation and coordination of plans which it might be possible to achieve beforehand.

But there is one conclusion which, I think, emerges from that brief review. I stress it because it seems to me to be a corollary both of the failure of the League for the moment to provide us with collective security, and also of the conditions which would alone make any form of collective security effective as a deterrent. The conclusion I draw is this: that if Great Britain is to make a substantial contribution towards the establishment of what I have described once again as our greatest interest, she must be strongly armed for defence and counter-offence.

If ever the time comes when the world establishes an international police force which will inspire us all with full confidence in its capacity to keep the peace, then there will be no need for us to trouble our heads about our own defence; it will be done for us. But until that day comes—and I am afraid it is a great way off yet—we must think first of the safety of this country and the safety of the peoples for whom we are responsible.

* * *

No, believe me, the Government have a very clear and definite foreign policy, which they keep always before them, and which they continue to pursue by various methods according to the circumstances of the time. The object of that policy is to maintain peace and to give confidence to the people, if that be possible, that peace will be maintained so that they may all go about their occupations free from a sense of menace lurking always in the background.

Our policy is based upon two conceptions. The first is this: That, if you want to secure a peace which can be relied upon to last, you have got to find out what are the causes of war and remove them. You cannot do that by sitting still and waiting for something to turn up. You have got to set about it. You have got to inform yourself what are the difficulties, where are the danger spots, what are the reasons for any likely or possible disturbance of the peace; and, when you have found that out, you must exert yourself to find the remedy.

The second conception is this: In any armed world you must be armed yourself. You must see to it that your preparations, or defensive and offensive forces, are so organized and built up that nobody will be tempted to attack you, but that, on the contrary, when your voice is raised for peace it will be listened to with respect. These, then, are the two pillars of our foreign policy—to seek peace by friendly discussion and negotiations, and to build up our armed forces to a level which is proportionate to our responsibilities and to the part we desire to play in preserving peace.

I may be asked: "Where in all this does the League of Nations come in?" "Why don't you call in collective security to your aid?" "Must we take it that those splendid ideals which animated us when the League was started have got to be abandoned?" We have never mocked at the League. We do not yield to anyone in our devotion to those great and splendid ideals. We still intend to seize every opportunity that we can find to build up and strengthen the League and to restore it to a condition in which it may once again become an effective instrument for the preservation of peace.

But to-day we have got to face the facts as they are. To-day, before we attempt to impose upon the League, from which some of the most powerful countries in the world have become alienated, the formidable task of preserving peace, we must do a little clear thinking. Collective security can only be attained by the willingness and the capacity of the members of the League to take collective action of a kind which is effective enough to stop aggression. Is the League in such a state as to be able to do that to-day?

A little while ago I asked the Opposition in the House a question—and mind you this was before the recent events in Austria. I asked them whether they could name one single small State in Europe to-day, which, if it were menaced by a powerful neighbour, could rely upon the League alone to give it collective security. They did not—they could not—answer that question, because they knew the only honest answer would be that there was no such State, because there was no such collective security available. That is not to be disloyal. The true disloyalty to the League lies in pretending that the League to-day is capable of functions which are clearly beyond its power. Do not let us be guilty of that kind of disloyalty.

Do not let us either abandon the idea of a bigger and better League in the future. Let us rather seek to create a new atmosphere of good will in the world, because that is the essential preliminary of a League that will work.

From Lord Halifax's speech in the House of Lords on July 27th, 1938

Two years ago the League of Nations had, by its withdrawal of sanctions against Italy, acknowledged its incapacity in that instance to stop a war. As a result of political developments since the foundation of the League it had become clear, even to the most loyal League supporter, that a system, which not only provided a code of international behaviour but sought to enforce that code in the world, could not be expected to function in all cases successfully unless one primary condition was fulfilled.

That was that all the principal Powers should wholeheartedly be in the League and all be subject to a general system of limitation of armaments. Until they could get a system under which all nations were prepared to forgo the statement of their sovereignty and accept universal arbitration, it was impossible for Lord Davies's court of equity to be expected to function successfully. All that could not happen unless all nations were disarmed and an international force had the field to itself.

If they had those two things happening, they would never solve the problem, unless nations believed that every other nation would keep the rules. The world to-day was not ready to make those things, which were the ideals of them all, actually real at the present time. The question arose whether it was better to preserve on paper a general and wide obligation although they might know that when the test came it might well not be found capable of fulfilling it, or better to recognize the facts and make the best of them and not lay a greater burden on the nations than they were willing to sustain. The League was to-day faced with the necessity of taking a decision that would affect its whole future.

If he thought the League was done, he would be a pessimist. In that matter he was disposed to be more optimistic than a noble lord who had spoken. He did not believe that it was beyond human ingenuity to devise means whereby the ideals of the League were preserved; with, on the one hand, its practical limitations recognized and, on the other, the way left open to make the fullest use they could, now and in the future, of its immense potentialities as an instrument of peace.

There were certain principles which must underlie a solution such as that. The primary object of the League was to prevent war. That was the negative way of stating it. The positive way was that the League should provide means of depriving any State of a legitimate excuse, if such there be, for resorting to force. Secondly, they should do all they could for the establishment of the rule of just law by strengthening the machinery for the examination and adjudication of disputes.

Thirdly, they must find means for removing potential causes of disputes and redressing injustices through the ventilation of grievances and the active pressure of public opinion. They had all on previous occasions said that human affairs could never remain static, but the change that might be natural and right must be effected by peaceful means, if the cure was not to be ten thousand times worse than the disease.

It was to that attempt to make those principles effective that this country stood pledged and by that obligation we intended to stand to the limit of our power, because we knew that on the acceptance of that more excellent way which those principles enshrined the future of the world in fact depended.

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THE STRUGGLE OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS FOR FREEDOM AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Extract from the Speech by the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler
at the Reich Party Congress at Nuremberg on September 12th, 1938

For 15 years, Germany endeavoured in vain to obtain the most natural and the simplest human rights, but these rights were denied to the German people and Empire, although the Germany of that time was not governed by Nazis, but by democrats and marxists. When the National-Socialist State had had enough of this continual oppression and ill-treatment and finally established equality of rights on its own initiative, these people complained of this on the sanctimonious ground that all that could have been achieved by mutual understanding. For 15 years they most cruelly opposed the most natural interests of the people and affronted the most elementary human dignity, drew up dictated treaties and compelled Germany to accept them by holding a pistol at her head, and then complained with a hypocritical show of indignation of "one-sided" breaches of sacred laws and the violation of still more sacred treaties. Without ever troubling about the opinion of the inhabitants, they subjected whole continents by brutal violence to their yoke. But, when Germany asks for her colonies back, she is told by those who are suddenly so concerned at the fate of the poor natives that they could not dream of relinquishing them under any circumstances to such a fate. At the same time, they have no objection to making the natives in their own colonies see reason by means of aeroplanes and bombs: that is to say, to compel the dear coloured compatriots to continue to suffer the foreign yoke which they detest. Of course these, unlike the brutal bombs employed by the Italians in the Abyssinian war, are civilizing bombs.

* * *

Thus in the National-Socialist Reich of today we are faced with the same forces and phenomena with which we as a party had during 15 years occasion to become acquainted. The general expression of the hostility of the democratic countries to Germany leaves us cold. Indeed, why should we be treated better than the Reich before us? I frankly admit that I prefer to be insulted by someone who cannot plunder me than to be plundered by someone who sings my praises. We are being insulted to-day,

but we are, thank God, in a position to prevent any attempt at plundering Germany or doing her violence. The State that existed before us was plundered for 15 years. But for this it was praised as being a brave and democratic State.

But it becomes unbearable for us at a moment when a great German people, apparently defenceless, is delivered to shameless ill-treatment and exposed to threats. I am speaking of Czechoslovakia.

This is a Democratic State. It was founded on democratic lines by forcing other nationalities without asking them into a structure manufactured at Versailles. As good democrats they began to oppress and mishandle the majority of the inhabitants. They tried gradually to enforce on the world their view that the Czech State had a special political and military mission to perform in the world. The former French Air Minister, M. Pierre Cot has only recently explained this to us. According to his opinion, the task of Czechoslovakia is in the case of war to bombard German towns and industrial works. This mission, however, is in direct contrast to the vital interests, to the wishes, and to the conception of life of the majority of the inhabitants of this State. But the majority of the inhabitants had to be quiet, as any protest against their treatment was regarded as an attack on the aims of this State, and was therefore in conflict with the Constitution. This Constitution, as it was made by Democrats, was not rooted in the people, but only served the political aims of those who oppressed the majority of the inhabitants. In view of these political aims, it had been found necessary to construct this Constitution in a manner giving the Czechs a predominant position in the State. He who opposes such encroachment is an enemy of the State, and, according to Democratic conceptions of the State, an outlaw. The so-called nation of the Czechs has thus been selected by Providence, which in this case made use of those who once designed Versailles, to see that no one rose against this purpose of the State.

Should, however, someone belonging to the majority of the oppressed people of this nation protest against this, the nation may knock him down with force and kill him if necessary or desired.

If this were a matter foreign to us, and which did not concern us, we would regard this case as so many others, merely as an

interesting illustration of the democratic conception of people's rights and the right of self-determination, and simply take note of it. But it is something most natural which compels us Germans to take an interest in this problem. Among the majority of the nationalities which are being suppressed in this State there are 3,500,000 Germans. That is about as many persons of our race as Denmark has inhabitants. These Germans, too, are creatures of God. The Almighty did not create them that they should be surrendered by a State construction made at Versailles to a foreign Power which is hateful to them, and he has not created the 7,000,000 Czechs in order that they should supervise 3,500,000 Germans or act as guardians for them, and still less to do them violence and torture.

The conditions in this nation are unbearable as is generally known. Politically over 3,500,000 people were robbed in the name of the right of self-determination of a certain Mr. Wilson, of their self-determination and of their right to self-determination. Economically these people were deliberately ruined and afterwards handed over to a slow process of extermination. The misery of the Sudeten Germans is without end. They want to annihilate them. They are being oppressed in an inhuman and intolerable manner and treated in an undignified way.

When 3,500,000 who belong to a people of almost 80,000,000 are not allowed to sing any song the Czechs do not like, because it does not please the Czechs, or are brutally struck for wearing white stockings because the Czechs do not like it and do not want to see them, and are terrorized or maltreated because they greet with a form of salutation which is agreeable to them, although they are greeting not the Czechs but each other, when they are pursued like wild beasts for every expression of their national life this may be a matter of indifference to several representatives of our democracies, or it may possibly even be congenial because it only concerns 3,500,000 Germans. I can only say to the representatives of the Democracies that this is not a matter of indifference to us; and I say that if these tortured creatures cannot obtain rights and assistance by themselves they can obtain both from us. An end must be made of depriving these people of their rights. I have already said this quite clearly in my speech of February 20. It was a short-sighted piece of work when the statesmen at Versailles brought the abnormal structure of Czechoslovakia into being. It was only possible to violate the demands of millions of another nationality so long as the brother nation was itself suffering from the consequences of the general maltreatment of the world.

To believe that such a régime could go on sinning without hindrance for ever is only possible through a scarcely credible degree of blindness. I declared in my speech on February 20 before the German Reichstag that the Reich would not tolerate any further the continued oppression of three and a half million Germans, and I hope the foreign statesmen will be convinced that these are no mere words.

* * *

The National-Socialist State has consented to very great sacrifices indeed, very great national sacrifices for the sake of European peace. Not only has it not cherished so-called thoughts of revenge, but on the contrary it has banished them from all its public and private life. In the course of the seventeenth century France took Alsace and Lorraine from the old German Reich in the midst of peace. In 1870 to 1871, after a hard war which was forced upon her, Germany demanded these territories back, and obtained them. After the World War they were lost again. The Minster of Strasbourg meant a great

deal to us Germans. When we decided finally to renounce it, it was for the purpose of serving the cause of European peace in the future. Nobody could have forced us to give up these ideas of revenge of our own accord if we had not wanted to do so.

We have given them up because we wanted once and for all to end this eternal dispute with France. At other frontiers also the Reich ordered the same determined measures to be taken, and adopted the same attitude. National-Socialism advanced, truly supported by the spirit of responsibility. We shouldered voluntarily the greatest sacrifices in the form of claims surrendered in order to preserve peace for Europe in the future, and above all in order to pave on our part the way for a reconciliation of the nations. We have acted far more than merely loyally. Neither in the Press, nor in films, nor on the stage was propaganda carried out contrary to these decisions. Not even in literature was an exception tolerated.

In this spirit I myself made an offer for the solution of the questions at issue in order to remove the tension in Europe, but this solution was rejected for reasons which we are to this day unable to understand. We ourselves voluntarily restricted our power in an important field in the hope never to have to cross swords again with the nation in question. This was not done because we could not have built more than 35 per cent. ships, but it was done in order to make a contribution towards the final lessening of tension and appeasement in a serious situation. As a great patriot and statesman in Poland was prepared to conclude an agreement with Germany, we immediately assented and implemented an arrangement which means more for European peace than all the talk of the Geneva League put together.

Germany had definitely become reconciled to a large number of her frontiers. Germany is determined to accept these frontiers as unalterable and definite, and thereby to give Europe the feeling of security, of peace. This self-restriction of Germany is obviously interpreted by many people as a sign of Germany's weakness. I wish to put this view right to-day.

I think it would hardly serve European peace if I left any doubt about the following:—The acceptance of these frontiers does not mean that Germany is disinterested in all European problems, and particularly that she is indifferent to what is happening to 3,500,000 Germans and that she does not feel with them in their plight. We quite understand that the French and the British defend their interests in the whole world. I may assure the statesmen in Paris and London that there are also German interests which we are determined to defend in all circumstances. May I remind you of my speech in the Reichstag in 1933, when for the first time I stated before the world that there may be national questions where we see our way clear before us and which I would take it upon me to fulfil, in spite of all distress and danger that may be connected with them.

* * *

No European nation has done more for peace than Germany. No nation has made greater sacrifices. But it must be realized that these sacrifices also have their limits, and that the National-Socialist State must not be confused with the Germany of Bethmann-Hollweg and Hertling.

If I make this statement here, it is done especially because in the course of this year an event took place which forced us all to subject our attitude to a certain correction. In this year, as you know, after endless postponement of any kind of plebiscite had occurred, local elections at any rate were to take place in Czechoslovakia. Even in Prague people were convinced of the untenable nature of the Czech situation. They were afraid of

the Germans joining up with the other nationalities. They thought that at last measures must be taken to influence the result of the election by bringing pressure on the conduct of the elections. The Czech Government discovered the idea that the only effective thing to do was brutal browbeating. To give effect to this they decided to make a demonstration to the Sudeten Germans of the forces of the Czechoslovak State. Above all, the brute force of Czech power must be displayed to warn them against representing their national interests and make them vote accordingly. In order to make this demonstration plausible before the election, Dr. Benesh and the Czech Government invented the lie that Germany had mobilized troops and was about to invade Czechoslovakia.

I have the following statement to make on this subject to-day. There is nothing new about making such lying statements. Last year the Press in other countries published the false news that 20,000 German soldiers had landed in Morocco. The Jewish fabricators of these Press lies hoped to bring about a war by this means.

A statement to the French Ambassador sufficed to put an end to this lie. Also the Ambassador of another Great Power was immediately informed that there was not a word of truth in this Czech statement. This statement was repeated a second time and immediately brought to the notice of the Prague Government. But the Prague Government needed this lie as a pretext for their own monstrous work, and terrorist oppression in influencing the elections. I can assure you in addition that,

first, at that time not a single German soldier more was called up;

secondly, not a regiment, or any other formation, marched to the frontier. At this time there was not one soldier who was not in his peace-time garrison. On the contrary, the order was given that anything that might appear like pressure on the Czechs on our side was to be avoided.

In spite of this, this base campaign took place in which the whole of Europe was mobilized, with the object of holding elections under military pressure: brow-beating the citizens, and thus depriving them of their right to vote. A moral justification was needed so that no one should shrink from the unscrupulousness of plunging a great State and all Europe into a great war.

As Germany had no such intention, and indeed on the contrary was convinced that the local elections would confirm the rights of the Sudeten Germans, nothing was done by the Reich Government. That, however, was made the occasion for saying, after nothing had happened, that Germany had drawn back in consequence of the agitation of the Czechs and the intervention of Great Britain and France. You will understand that a Great Power cannot suddenly submit a second time to such a base attack. In consequence I took the necessary precautions. I am a National-Socialist, and as such I am parrying every attack. I know exactly that by yielding to such an irreconcilable enemy as Czechoslovakia, this enemy could never be reconciled, but only be incited to a still higher opinion of itself. The old German Reich is a warning for us. In its love of peace it went as far as self-sacrifice without thereby being able to prevent war.

Conscious of this I took very serious measures on May 28:

1. The strengthening of the Army and the Air Force was on my order considerably increased forthwith, and immediately carried out.

2. I ordered the immediate extension of our fortifications in the west.

I may assure you that since May 28 the most gigantic fortifications that ever existed are under construction there. With the same aim in view I have entrusted the Inspector-General of German Road Constructions, Dr. Todt, with a new task. He has accomplished one of the greatest works of organization of all time.

On the construction of the defences in the west there are now working 278,000 workmen of Dr. Todt's army. In addition, there are a further 84,000 workmen and 100,000 men of the Labour Service, as well as numerous engineer and infantry battalions. The German railways are taking to these districts daily 8,000 trucks of material, apart from the materials transported by motor vehicles. The daily consumption of gravel is more than 100,000 tons. Before the beginning of winter Germany's fortifications in the west will be finished. Their power of defence is already in existence to its full extent. After completion it will comprise 17,000 armoured and concrete fortifications. Behind this front of steel and concrete, which is laid out in three, and partly in four, lines of a total depth of up to 50 kilometres, there stands the German people in arms.

* * *

These most gigantic efforts of all times have been made at my request in the interest of peace. In no circumstances shall I be willing any more to regard with endless tranquillity a continuation of oppression of German compatriots in Czechoslovakia. Herr Benesh indulges in tactics and speeches. He is trying to organize negotiations to clear up questions of procedure on the lines of Geneva and to make small concessions. This cannot go on for ever. This is not a matter of phrases but of right, that is of violated right. What the Germans demand is the right of self-determination which every other nation also possesses. It is not up to Herr Benesh to give to the Sudeten Germans gifts. They have the right to claim a life of their own just as much as any other people. If the Democracies, however, should be convinced that they must in this case protect with all their means the oppressors of the Germans, then this will have grave consequences!

I believe I am serving peace the more if I do not leave any doubts about this. I have not raised the claim that Germany may oppress three and a half million French, or that three and a half million English shall be surrendered to Germany for oppression. But I demand that the oppression of three and a half million Germans in Czechoslovakia shall cease and be replaced by the free right of self-determination. We would regret it if thereby our relations with other European nations should suffer harm. However, we are not to be blamed. Moreover, it is up to the Czechoslovak Government to discuss matters with the authorized representatives of the Sudeten Germans and to bring about an understanding in this or in that way. My business, and the business of us all, however, is to see to-day that right does not become injustice in this case, for German comrades are concerned.

Moreover, I am not willing to allow a second Palestine to be created here in the heart of Germany by the actions of other statesmen. The poor Arabs are defenceless, and perhaps deserted. The Germans of Czechoslovakia, however, are neither defenceless nor are they deserted.

I believe I must state this, especially at this Party Convention, in which for the first time the representatives of our German Austrian Legions take part. They know best how much pain it causes to be separated from the mother country. They, too, will be the first to understand the meaning of my statements to-day. They will also agree with me most enthusiastically if I state before the entire nation that we would not deserve to be Germans if we were not willing to adopt such an attitude and to bear the consequences in this or that way arising from it.

If we remember the exacting demands which in past years even small nations believed they could address to Germany, then the only explanation which we can find is their scant willingness to see the German Reich as a State which is more than a temporary upstart.

Standing in Rome in the spring of this year I realized how the history of mankind is viewed and judged in intervals which are too short and therefore inadequate. The history of a millennium comprised only a few successions of generations.

What becomes exhausted in the present can rise up again in the same time. The Italy and the Germany of to-day are proof of this. They are rejuvenated nations, which one may describe as new in this sense. But this youth does not rest on new soil but on old historic soil. The Roman Empire begins to breathe again. However, though historically infinitely younger, it is likewise no new creation in its national new form. I had the insignia of the old Reich brought to Nuremberg in order to induce not only my own nation but also the whole world to consider that more than a thousand years before the discovery of a new world a mighty Germanic Deutsches Reich existed. Dynasties came and disappeared. The outer forms have changed. The people to-day have been rejuvenated, but substantially they

always remained the same. The German Reich has slumbered for a long time; the German People have now awakened and taken their 1,000-year-old Crown to themselves. For us who are the historical witnesses of this revival there is a proud joy and a humble sense of gratitude to the Almighty. For the rest of the world it should equally be a suggestion and a lesson, a suggestion that they should study history again from a higher vantage point, and a lesson not to fall into their old mistakes again.

The new Italian Roman Empire and the German Empire are, in all truth, very old creations. People do not need to love them, but no power in the world can any more remove them.

Comrades, National-Socialists, in this hour the first Party Day of Greater Germany comes to a close. We are all filled with the powerful historical impressions of these days. Your national pride and your confidence have been strengthened in the face of this demonstration of the strength, resolution, and determination of our nation. Go on again in that trustful confidence which you for almost two decades have borne in your hearts as German and National Socialists. You have the right to be able to carry your German heads raised once again in pride. We all have the duty never to bow them again to a foreign will. May this be our pledge, so help us God.

OBLITERATED TRACKS

1. Extracts from the Messages and Declarations of President Wilson.

(a) "The peoples of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development . . . The day of territorial conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; as is also the day of secret covenants . . . Every peace-loving nation which . . . wishes to live its own life and determine its own institutions should be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression."

This is the wording of Point 10 of President Wilson's fourteen points, which he announced as a basis of a new community of nations in his message to Congress on January 8th 1918.

In his address to Congress on February 12th he further emphasised this point in the following words:

(a) "Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game.

(b) Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and form a benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States.

(c) All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new, or perpetuating old, elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world."

"The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be justice that plays no favourites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned."

Lastly, in his speech at Washington's grave on July 4th 1918 he said:

"The settlement of every question, whether of territory or national sovereignty, of economic arrangements out of political relationship, must be made upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the government, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind."

2. Extracts from the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29th 1920.

Preamble to the Constitution.

"We, the Czechoslovak people, with the intention of consolidating the complete unity of the people, of introducing a just order in the Republic, of ensuring the tranquil development of the Czechoslovak home country, of promoting the common good of all citizens of the State and of securing the blessings of freedom for future generations, have adopted in the National Assembly of February 29th 1920 the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic in the following terms:

We, the Czechoslovak people, hereby declare our endeavour that this Constitution and all the laws of our country may be carried out in the same manner in the spirit of our history as in the spirit of the modern rules involved in the principle of self-determination, for we desire to join the League of Nations as a well-formed, peace-loving, democratic and progressive member."

§ 128 of the Constitution.

1. All citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic are entirely equal before the law and enjoy the same civil and political rights without regard to their race, language or religion.

2. The difference in religion, faith, confession and language does not form any hindrance for any citizen of the Czechoslovak

Republic within the limits of the general laws, especially for appointment to the public service, to offices and dignities or the exercise of any trade or profession.

3. Extract from the Minorities Protection Treaty of September 10th, 1919

Chapter I, Article 1. Czechoslovakia undertakes to recognise the provisions contained in Articles 2-8 of this Chapter as a fundamental law. No law, decree or official measure shall be in contradiction or opposition to these provisions and no law, decree or official measure shall in future be valid except them.

Articles 2-8 prescribe the rights granted to the minorities without distinction of race, religion, confession, language, and birth. Equal civil and political rights. No discrimination in admission to public positions, offices and dignities or in the exercise of the various occupations and trades. No restrictions in the use of language. Equal legal and actual treatment and the same guarantees as for the other Czech nationals. Facilities in education in order to safeguard the mother tongue and adequate grants from public funds for education, instruction and charitable purposes.

4. Promises

In addition, there are the promises made to the Sudeten German national group by the leaders of the Czech people in numerous speeches, memoranda, articles and books, both before and after the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which they referred convincingly to the particularly humane form of Czech democracy and pointed out that they would regard and treat the Germans as "equals among equals". They said it was contrary to Czech views regarding humanity and democracy to oppress other races on account of the people to which they belonged, their race or their nationality. It would therefore not occur to the Czech Government in any way to slight the German minority, as the greatest and most important in the State, or to hinder or prejudice the majority in its national and cultural possessions and in its development. The Germans would naturally have the possibility, in proportion

to their numbers, to cooperate in Government and other official offices.

* * *

These were fine theoretical foundations on which the Czechoslovak State was erected nearly twenty years ago. After a period of less than twenty years they have been dissipated under the practice of the Czech theory of the national State and their place has been taken more and more by another principle based on this theory, namely the absorption and assimilation or extermination and destruction of the minority by the people of the State.

The State form created by Messrs. Masaryk and Benesh with their swarm of official historical and geographical acrobats, with the assistance of their friend Tardieu, thus did not become a genuine democracy of "equals among equals" but, as the French periodical "La Griffe" wrote on April 23rd 1938, a "harlequin mantle with Czechs as the centre piece surrounded by Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenes, who were torn against their will from their own countries." The penalty is now being paid, as the "Pesti Hirlap" wrote on the same day, that Benesh and his assistants used forged maps, forged statistics and twisted historical facts in order to persuade the Great Powers to assist in an "unviable abortion".

The inscription on the standard of the President of Czechoslovakia, the device of the Czechoslovak State arms, which is also cut in stone on the Huss memorial in the ancient Ring in Prague, and which is worded: Truth is Victorious, today arises as a Mene Tekel against its originators; the curse of that evil act committed twenty years ago in the hate-filled atmosphere of Paris, at present weighs not only on this unhappy State but also on Europe with its Governments and on the League of Nations, which with criminal toleration, ignorance or carelessness neglected to heal and remove in time this festering wound in the body of the peoples and States of Europe which has now come to a head so dangerously.

TRUTH IS VICTORIOUS 1918—1938

Twenty Years of Sudeten German Distress Twenty years of Czech Democracy and Minorities Policy

The following statements are based in the main on three excellent publications taken from the voluminous Sudeten German and Czechoslovak literature: "Czechoslovakia in the mirror of statistics" by Erwin Winkler, 1937, Publishers H. Frank, Carlsbad and Leipzig, "Thirty years of Sudeten German adverse balances (Verlustbilanz) 1918-1938" by F. W. Essler, University Publisher Wilhelm Braumüller, Vienna and Leipzig and "Why Sudeten German autonomy?", a résumé of the development of the German-Czech problem since February 18th 1937, by Mons, 1938, Publishers Karl H. Frank, Carlsbad and Leipzig. What makes these publications appear peculiarly suitable for our purpose is the fact that the information contained in them is based for the most part on purely official Czech data and thus provides an entirely impartial description of the plight of the Sudeten Germans and, to express it mildly, the utter lack of sympathetic understanding evinced by the Government departments at Prague, until the spring of 1938, in regard to the wishes and requirements of this group of 3 ½ million Germans.

There were three claims put forward by the Sudeten Germans: until the revolutionary events of September: complete self-determination in respect of their own affairs, an adequate share in political decisions of importance for the entire State, repara-

tion for the injustice done in the past to moral, cultural and economic possessions.

A really objective judgment as to the justice and extent of these claims can only be formed by calling to mind the great losses suffered by the Sudeten German people in the twenty years from 1918 to 1938 in all spheres of human and national life and work. It is a superficial judgment to state that the Sudeten Germans are fighting merely for a share in the power of the State. What has been happening in Sudeten German territory is much more than that: it is a fight for existence in the fullest meaning of the word, a struggle for bare existence by an entire national group in order to protect their most primitive vital and human rights against the attack of a foreign opponent. It was a defensive struggle against an opponent who knew how to make use of all State means of power and compulsion and of all the possibilities that are bound up with the exclusive possession of these means, as against

which the Sudeten Germans were unable to oppose either power or compulsion, but only their proper right and their indomitable determination to live and resist.

The following particulars, which are taken almost exclusively from official Czech sources and reports which have been previously published without contradiction and without any doubt being raised as to their accuracy, show the devastation caused by that mischievous historical lie and that false political myth which Konrad Henlein in his Karlsbad speech of April 24th, 1938 seriously and insistently stigmatised as the real cause for the disturbance of Central European appeasement; this was the origin of the completely sterile national State ideology which arose out of compulsory historical ideas, prejudices and illusions and which, in its policy of expansion, aimed at extending the Czech demographic frontier at any price—even at the price of European peace—up to the historical frontiers of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.

The Racial Distribution of the Peoples in Czechoslovakia

The following tables give firstly a review of the citizens of Czechoslovakia according to their race and, secondly, particulars regarding the settlement districts of the individual races in the provinces of the Republic, both on the basis of the last census of July 1st, 1930.

Population of Czechoslovakia divided up according to race.

Provinces and races	Nationals	Foreigners	Total Population
Bohemia :			
Germans	2,270.943	55.147	2,326.090
Czechoslovaks	(4,713.366)	18.704	4,732.070
incl. Czechs	4,683.220	—	—
» Slovaks	30.146	—	—
Hungarians	7.603	611	8.214
Russians	7.162	9.607	16.769
Jews by race	12.735	2.962	15.697
Jews by religion	—	—	(76.301)
Poles	1.195	2.368	3.563
Others	1.555	5.418	6.973
Total	7,014.559	98.817	7,109.376
Moravia-Silesia :			
Germans	799.995	23.735	823.730
Czechoslovaks	(2,595.534)	21.435	2,616.969
incl. Czechs	2,581.628	—	—
» Slovaks	13.906	—	—
Hungarians	2.860	353	3.213
Russians	4.012	1.876	5.888
Jews by race	17.267	4.129	21.396
Jews by religion	—	—	(41.250)
Poles	79.450	9.676	89.126
Others	2.570	2.118	4.688
Total	3,501.688	63.322	3,565.010
Slovakia :			
Germans	147.501	7.320	154.821
Czechoslovaks	(2,345.909)	27.145	2,373.054
incl. Czechs	120.926	—	—
» Slovaks	2,224.983	—	—
Hungarians	571.988	20.349	592.337
Russians	91.079	4.280	95.359
Jews by race	65.385	7.293	72.678
Jews by religion	—	—	(136.737)
Poles	933	6.090	7.023
Others	31.394	3.127	34.521
Total	3,254.189	75.604	3,329.793
Sub-Carpathian Russia :			
Germans	13.249	555	13.804
Czechoslovaks	(33.961)	550	34.511
incl. Czechs	20.719	—	—
» Slovaks	13.242	—	—
Hungarians	109.472	6.333	115.805
Russians	446.916	4.009	450.925
Jews by race	91.255	3.753	95.008
Jews by religion	—	—	(102.542)
Poles	159	451	610
Others	14.117	577	14.694
Total	709,129	16,228	725.357

Provinces and races	Nationals	Foreigners	Total Population
Entire Republic :			
Germans	3,231.688	86.757	3,318.445
Czechoslovaks	(9,688.770)	67.834	9,756.604
incl. Czechs	7,406.493	—	—
» Slovaks	2,282.277	—	—
Hungarians	691.923	27.646	719.569
Russians	549.923	19.772	568.941
Jews by race	186.642	18.137	204.779
Jews by religion	—	—	(356.830)
Poles	81.737	18.585	100.322
Others	49.636	11.240	60.876
Total	14,479.565	249.971	14,729.536

It will be observed from these tables that at the last Czechoslovak census 3,231,688 nationals were German and that, together with the foreigners of German race, the total was 3,318,445. The importance of this figure will be seen by a comparison with the other small countries of Europe. For instance, the total population of Latvia is only 1.9 millions, and of Lithuania only 2.48 millions. The population of the whole of Norway, at 2.87 millions, is far smaller than that of the Sudeten German territories. The total Sudeten German population is about the same as that of the Irish Free State.

Not a Minority, but a National Group.

The most important fact from the German point of view is that the Sudeten population is not scattered, but has for centuries lived as a compact settlement and has everywhere been in direct touch with the territory of the German Empire. This territory runs in an unbroken line along the German frontier to the Hungarian frontier. It surrounds the Czech territory and, with the exception of the Hungarian and Polish frontiers, all the border districts of Czechoslovakia are German. It is therefore entirely misleading to regard and treat (or rather ill-treat) such a territory as a minority. Minorities are racial enclaves, or scattered portions of a nation embedded in a foreign nation. This in no way applies to the Sudeten Germans and their territory is not an enclave (that is, an insertion), but an offshoot. It is a country connected at all points with the territory of the Reich and artificially separated from it against the will of the population—not by racial, but by political and strategic frontiers. The whole significance of the history of the Sudeten Germans until the present day has lain in their attempt not to allow themselves to be depressed to the level of an ethnical minority, but to maintain their position as a people in the political sense. Consequently, from the outset, the Sudeten German question has been a problem—not of the Germans within the Czech nation, but of the Germans living side by side with the Czechs in the same State. Therefore the solution of this problem called for other methods than the mere execution of measures for the protection of a minority, as Masaryk admitted in his message of October 1928, when he said: “in solving the minority problem in Czechoslovakia, the usual models must be discarded. Other countries have national minorities, but our minorities are of a different character. There are States whose total population does not exceed the number of our German co-citizens, who are on a high economic and cultural level”. The unique character of the problem was also unconsciously conceded by his successor, Benes, in the much discussed memorandum III, which he submitted to the Peace Conference in 1919. In that same year, Masaryk even went so far as to admit that in theory that the Sudeten Germans might demand the right of self-determination, but added that the most essential prerequisite was lacking: namely, that they were not a people, but only colonists and emigrants. The whole Czecho-German problem is therefore based on the question: “Are the Sudeten Germans a people? An ethnical community becomes a political nation (and this is

what is meant by the word people) when it develops, out of the consciousness of a historical or future common destiny, the common political will to preserve its species. It is immaterial when such will is formed. Many of the peoples composing the new States of Europe have only developed this will since the war, while in the case of the others the process of development from a linguistic unit to a political nation is not yet complete. Consequently, even if the Sudeten Germans had only evinced the will to become a people in October 1918, they would have as much claim to international recognition as the Estonians, the Latvians or the Lithuanians. In point of fact however they have been a people for centuries. Their demand for national autonomy in the new State was therefore historically, geographically and culturally justified and sanctioned moreover by the "right of self-determination", which has, since 1919, been regarded as the sacred motto of the international community of people. Furthermore, this demand constituted, from the point of view of the elimination of causes of unrest in Europe, a question of European importance and its satisfaction was indicated in the interests of the new State itself and was therefore in no way incompatible with loyalty to the State.

The overwhelming majority of Czech politicians however understand by loyalty the recognition of the State as a Czech national State and consequently of the predominance of the Czech nation over a German ethnical minority and demand abstention from the use of national political weapons against the prevailing system. The whole policy of the Czechs since 1918 follows logically from this conception. This policy is to eliminate the dangers inherent in Czecho-German differences by assimilation or, if necessary, destruction of the German element. Hence the idea spread by these politicians that there is no compact German territory, but only a mixed territory, whereby the impression is given that this mixture is caused by the German element. Implicit in this phraseology is the moral justification for the artificial Czech encroachment upon the German territory and even for the attempts at czechification of the presumably germanized, originally Slav population. It is argued in all seriousness that this "restoration" is only "an act of compensatory justice". All these conceptions are based on the historical legend of the German interlopers in the Czech State, the usurpation of originally Czech national property by the German colonists and—especially important—the consequent economic and social discrimination against the more numerous indigenous Czech population. They say in effect: "The State should belong to us and the land with all its riches." Therefore is principle every Czech established in pure German territory is a descendant of the original legendary owner, while the millions of Germans are the descendants of the usurpers.

From this conception of the national State as the possession of the Czech people inevitably follows the uniformity of collaboration between the State, the Communes and the Czech nationalist political, cultural, social and economic organizations, all of which see to it that the masses are made to subserve the interests of this system. The German is thus faced not only with the free national organizations of the Czechs, the bureaucracy and legislation, but with a comprehensive uniform front. As the Czechs know from experience that this strict concentration of all the national forces is their strongest weapon, they hinder, stifle or weaken any similar assemblage of forces on the German side and whatever still remains from the Austrian days of the national German corporations with official, professional or economic functions.

The years which have elapsed were therefore only stages in this struggle. The Czech politician Klofac unconsciously admitted the relative nature of the Czech success in 1918-1919 in

the following pithy statement: "We Czechs only require a few decades of uninterrupted development to consolidate the Czech national State."

What this means in detail will be seen by the following particulars.

The Demographic Expansion of the Czechs.

Clear proof of the demographic expansion of the Czechs is provided by comparing the results of the censuses of 1910, 1921 and 1930.

Taking the entire Sudeten territory separately, the increase in population was as follows:

	1910	1921	1930	
Germans	3,026,981	2,638,795	2,832,779	i. e. 87.4% of all nationals of German race.
Czechs	142,442	256,353	366,153	i. e. 3.8% of all nationals of Czech race.

In the other districts of the historical provinces, i.e. in the Czech majority districts, including the German enclaves with 69 majority communes, the population was as follows:

	1910	1921	1930
Germans	465,381	324,623	348,005
Czechs	6,193,191	6,474,410	6,975,367

This shows that the Germans, both in their own settlement districts and in the Czech districts, at first decreased and then again increased, while the Czechs, both in their own and in the German settlement districts, on the whole increased by various percentages. In their own settlement districts they increased from 1910 to 1921 by 4.5%, and from 1921 to 1930 by 7.7%. In the German settlement districts, however, they increased from 1910 to 1921 by no less than 80% and from 1921 to 1930 by more than 30%.

It is therefore a fact that the Czechs in the German settlement districts show a much greater increase than in their own settlement districts.

This increase in the Czechs cannot be regarded as natural on the basis of the excess of births, but there was a considerable immigration of Czechs into the German majority districts which were already densely populated. The density of the population of the entire German majority district is 115.3 inhabitants per square kilometre, while that of the remaining territory, including the large towns, is only 102.3 per square kilometre. This is of all the greater importance in view of the low fertility of the German districts and of the fact that the Sudeten district is covered by forests to the extent of 33.7%.

Tens of thousands of Czechs have left Czech districts in one decade and at the same time tens of thousands of Czechs are to be found as an immigration surplus in the German districts. The increase of the Czechs in the German majority districts according to the census figures from 1910 to 1921 and from 1921 to 1930, and the departure of Czechs within the same decades from a number of Czech districts show that this increase considerably exceeds the natural surplus of births and also what might be called "natural" immigration. These census figures indicate clearly an abnormal immigration of Czechs into the German majority districts and the regular pumping of Czech elements into the German districts, in other words a demographic expansion of the Czechs. This process has by no means diminished in the period from 1930





The Compact German Language District Its Divisions

(Census 1930)



to 1938 for which census figures are not available, but the communal and parliamentary elections during these years, including the last communal elections of May 1938, frequently showed a fresh increase in Czech votes; the Czech press in writing about the last communal elections made no secret of the fact that this had been artificially brought about by State measures and did not disguise their joy at Czech penetration into the German communes.

The Penetration of the Czechs into the Spheres of Life of the Sudeten German Territory and People.

This purely numerical penetration of the Czech population, however, also signifies a simultaneous penetration of Czechism into all the spheres of life of this districts and its national life, which is promoted by State measures of so-called "professional" expansion, i.e. a penetration into the ownership of land, the professions, education etc.; the possibility of this was naturally increased by the demographic Czech expansion in German majority districts so that in a number of communes which formerly had a German majority a Czech majority was created and thus the self-administration of these communes passed into Czech hands.

The so-called Agrarian Reform.

The first result of the migration of Czechs into German districts was the transfer of German land into Czech ownership; the smallest number of these transfers were the result of natural acquisition, and they were due to the planned purchase of German estates by the agrarian reform of 1919 with the assistance of various Czechisation societies. This agrarian reform led to the seizure in the completely German linguistic area alone of 840,218 hectares, or about 31% of this area. Of these estates 400,000 hectares have passed into Czech hands, while the total loss of expropriated German land in the entire territory amounted by the end of 1931 to about 600,000 hectares. In addition to the notorious so-called residue estate owners who were for the most part not land-dwellers, consideration was given for the most part to Czech colonists who were also not land-dwellers but were favoured not so much on account of their suitability as landowners but because they were Czechs. They carried the Czech element still further into the German district, brought hand-workers and traders in their train and penetrated the German district with Czech minorities.

In addition there was the expropriated private forest property. Considerable parts of this valuable national property were transferred to other hands and steps were taken as far as possible to prevent German communes and districts from obtaining parts of the expropriated forests in their territory. They were to be placed in "sure" hands and were given to some remote Czech commune in so far as the State did not take the greatest share.

The results of the agrarian reform were clearly reflected in the distribution of occupations in agriculture. During the period of the agrarian reform (1921-1930) the foundation of the German peasants declined while the Czech peasants increased appreciably. The independent German landowners and lease-holders declined in Bohemia by 2310, in Moravia-Silesia by 1210 and in all the Sudeten districts by 3520, while during the same period the number of Czech landowners and lease-holders rose in Bohemia by 11,049, in Moravia-Silesia by 6,478, the total increase being 18,527.

But, even without the intervention of the authorities or without land expropriation, German estates are constantly transferred to Czechs and are for the most part systematically acquired for national reasons by Czechisation societies and by Czech companies, corporations and individuals sent out by them.

The Placing of Germans at a Disadvantage in respect of Government Orders and Public Tenders.

Two further aspects of Czech expansion are the placing of Germans at a disadvantage in the case of Government orders and public tenders.

In the German majority districts, the Germans represent 84.3 % of the population and the Czechs and other races 15.7 %. But in the same districts in the period from January 1st, 1933 to November 30th, 1936, German contractors received only 18.1 % of Government orders, while Czech contractors received 81.9 %. In the period from March 1st, 1937 to October 1st 1937 20.8 % (32 contracts) were placed with German firms, 68.1 % (105 contracts) with Czech firms not belonging to the district and 11.1 % (17 contracts) with so-called mixed firms. From March 1st 1937 to January 20th, 1938 in the German majority area 23.3 % of the public works and supplies were placed with German firms, 69.2 % with Czech firms and 7.5 % with mixed firms.

In all these cases it could not be determined whether the placing of such public works and the capital expenditure involved were in just relationship to the orders given in Czech districts. The Government either gave no information whatever or did not supply figures.

The Decline in Sudeten German Economy.

The decline in the Sudeten German economy is disposed of by the Czechs in a stereotyped manner by a reference to the "crisis". But this crisis was to say the least increased by the above-mentioned measures and by all the other accompanying phenomena of Czech expansion, i.e. the crowding out of the Germans from the land, from their work and from official positions, by the resultant decline in German purchasing power, by the displacement of industry, taxation policy and other circumstances.

The values lost to Sudeten German economy by events and measures which were more or less openly dependent on national ulterior motives, by substitute and uneconomic industries, by various pressure on suppliers and contractors in the case of Government orders, can scarcely be calculated. Space is lacking to describe the national expansion in the economic sphere, to explain the manifold forms which it assumed and to enumerate the economic losses which this expansion involved. The attempts to nationalise economy in the widest sense of the word began immediately after the end of the War, and in the period from December 1918 to April 1920 the revolution parliament that had been appointed created the legal and administrative conditions to put into effect the national theory of the Czech people's first-born rights in the State in the wide economic field. In view of the mass of material we must confine ourselves to enumerating the most important measures. By means of the connections between the Government and the organised Czech masses, to which reference has already been made, the Czechs were informed in good time of the intention to separate the currency in 1919 and to repudiate the war loans, so that the entire force of the losses was borne mainly by the Germans. The distress of the German industry which was thus caused was utilised by Czech capital to set up and purchase works. The same applies to other branches of industry. In addition the Government deliberately encouraged newly founded and frequently unsound Czech undertakings as against old established firms, often with a worldwide reputation. The decisive factor during this period was the economic policy of the State, which subordinated economic necessities to the aims of foreign policy. As the German industry was an export industry in the fullest sense of the word, it was particularly badly hit by this policy,

The Change in Professions and Occupations.

It is clear that this Czech expansion gradually involved a change in professions and occupations that was unfavourable to the German element. The systematic penetration of Czech elements into individual groups of professions and occupations is in turn a contributory cause of the demographic expansion of the Czechs in the German area.

According to the official publication "Tschechoslowakische Statistik", Volumes 23 and 116, the increases and decreases in the various professions and occupations in the State in the case of Czechs and Germans in the period from 1921 to 1930 were as follows :

	Germans %	Czechs %	Total Average %
Independent	— 2.8	— 0.7	+ 0.2
Officials	+ 1.0	+ 21.8	+ 15.5
Workers (employees, workers and home workers)	+ 9.8	+ 27.8	+ 24.7
Apprentices	— 17.5	— 1.2	— 4.1
Day labourers	+ 14.2	— 51.3	— 17.5

The table shows that the position in the case of the professions and occupations listed was more unfavourable for the Germans than for the whole State averaged. While for example the "Independents" in the whole State increase by 0.2%, in the case of the Germans they show a decrease of 2.8%. While the "Officials" in the whole country increased by as much as 15.5%, in the case of the Germans they increased by 1% only. "Workers" in the whole State increased by 24.7, but in the case of the Germans only by 9.8%. "Apprentices" in general show a decrease, viz. of 4%; but in the case of the Germans the figure is 17.5%.

In the case of the Czechs the figures are very much more favourable, especially in the case of officials. The average increase of officials for the whole State is 15.5%; but the increase in the case of the Czechs is 21.8%.

If the comparison is made between Czechs and Germans only in the different occupations, the disproportions are even more conspicuous. German officials increased by 1%; but their Czech colleagues increased by 21.8%. German workers increased by 9.8% : Czech workers by as much as 27.8%. Czech apprentices decreased by 1.2% : but the decrease in the case of German apprentices, i.e. in the younger generation of handicraftsmen, was no less than 17.5%.

There is only one case in which the Germans show a higher figure than the Czechs ; and that is in the case of day-labourers. This, the lowest social class, shows a decrease in the case of the Czechs of as much as 51.3%, as compared with an increase of 14.2% in the case of the Germans.

It may be said therefore that the Czechs are forcing their way into the socially higher classes, especially the class of officials. The Germans here show a decrease, and go instead to swell the ranks of the day-labourers or even to the worst category of all, viz. the unemployed, in which their percentage is very much greater than that of the Czechs.

The case of the State officials and State employees is even more striking. That the Germans are not represented in the service of the State in proportion to their numbers in the population is admitted even by the other side. The real fact is that there has been a definite policy of reducing the number of Germans in the public services.

Thus from 1921 to 1930 the reduction of the number of Germans in Government service in the Sudeten districts was : Post Office 4045 or 41.2 %, railways 1710 or 48.5 %, army 1780

or 70.4 %, other administrations (without education) 7362 or 49 %, making a total of 31,293.

State jobs and official posts are thus a fruitful field of Czech expansion. But the fact that it is the service of the State—which according to its Constitution claims, and is under obligation, to treat all nationalities alike—in which Czech professional predominance is conspicuously evident is clear proof of the fact that the State is nothing other than the patron and protector of Czech expansion.

Czech Cultural Policy.

The main lines of Czech cultural policy are clear enough. The design is to lower the cultural level of the German masses by the closing down of German schools or the conversion of higher into lower grade establishments. The erection of schools for Czech minorities is made a pretext for admitting German children with a view to indoctrinating them with Czech ideas as a prelude to assimilation. German technical schools are closed in order to diminish the opportunities for technical training. German secondary schools are closed in order to diminish the numbers of the German higher classes and therewith the proportion of Germans in the governing class. As the admission of Germans to the public service is for practical purposes out of the question, the exercise of the liberal professions is made difficult by every kind of linguistic chicanery and administrative regulations. Access to German secondary schools is obstructed in the hope of making it possible to close more schools. The German university institutions are placed at a disadvantage by inadequate grants, by the postponement of appointments, by financial pressure against the appointment of teaching staff from outside the country. Instruction of young Germans in mining and forestry is made impossible in order to reserve all such posts for Czechs. The former freedom of students to go to Germany or Austria for study is made difficult in order to loosen the cultural bonds with the German race as a whole. German students' aid societies receive the minimum of support. Obstacles are put in the way of recognition of foreign degrees and other academic qualifications. Participation in German or Austrian cultural associations or conferences is prohibited or made difficult, in order to sever the connection with German life and thought. Similar attempts are made in the schools to reshape the outlook of the schoolchildren in a Czech nationalist sense.

A particularly instructive chapter in the history of cultural Czechisation and expansion is the case of public education. It is not merely that between the years 1921 and 1930 the German teachers' profession decreased by 580 teachers in Bohemia and 909 in Moravia and Silesia, while the Czechs increased by 3998 in Bohemia and 3595 in Moravia and Silesia—in other words that there were 1489 fewer German teachers and 7953 more Czech teachers in the Sudete countries as a whole during the period. Hand in hand with this development went the losses of the Germans in schools in the historic provinces.

The number of German schools in these provinces was :

In the year 1918 3512 primary schools.
In the year 1937 3158 "

The loss was therefore 354 schools.

The number of classes in the German primary schools was :

In the year 1918 11,068 classes.
In the year 1937 8752 "

A loss of 2316 primary school classes.

In the same area the number of German secondary schools was :

In the year 1918 108 schools.
In the year 1937 70 "

A loss of 38 secondary schools.

The number of German teachers' training colleges was :

In the year 1918	19 colleges.
In the year 1937	10 »

A loss of 9 out of 19 teachers' training colleges.

The position in the case of the Czech educational institutions was very different. Large numbers of German children attend Czech schools. They are given an education which is alien to them, are estranged from their own people, and modelled as future elements of the Czech nation. The number of German children in Czech educational institutions on October 1st, 1937 was as follows :

In all, 15,382 German children were attending Czech Kindergartens, primary schools or secondary schools in the Sudete provinces.

The distribution between the different types of school was as follows :

Kindergartens	2631
Public primary schools . .	1918
Minority and private primary schools	5454
Minority and private secondary schools	3053
Public secondary schools .	2326

The first thing that strikes the eye in the above figures is the fact that the majority of the German children concerned were not attending public schools but Czech minority and private schools.

Minority schools in the strict sense of the term as defined by law are schools within the language area of the other race. The Czech private schools are nearly all secondary schools in the wider sense of the term. They are privately conducted minority schools planted in German territory by Czech educational associations or Czechising societies (Jednotas). Many of them are taken over, sooner or later, by the State. The Kindergartens in the above table may also be called minority establishments. Those of them which are attended by German children are nearly all in German-speaking districts.

Adding together the number of German children attending the public and private Czech minority schools enumerated in the above table, we find that 11,138 German children were attending Czech minority schools, i.e. Czech schools in German-speaking districts. These 11,138 children represent 72.4 % of all the German children attending Czech schools.

This astonishingly large percentage of German children in Czech minority schools, i.e. in schools which the Czechs themselves regard as one of the best instruments of their expansionist policy, in districts where German schools are also available is the result of systematic effort. There are, it is true, a few minority schools for German children in Czech districts. In Bohemia in 1921 there were 14 such schools ; and by 1936 the number had increased by two ! The numbers of Czech children attending such schools is infinitesimal.

To complete this picture of the minority schools, take the province of Bohemia alone ; and, to simplify the matter and to confine ourselves to official figures, take the public Czech minority schools alone.

There were in Bohemia :

In 1921 . .	428 such schools with	38,583 schoolchildren.
In 1936 . .	850 »	26,509 »

The fact that the number of these schools, all publicly owned institutions, doubled their number in the course of 15 years—representing an increase of 98.6 %—while at the same time the number of schoolchildren attending them was lower by one-third, is sufficient proof that schools of this kind are no more and no less than strongholds of massed Czech penetration into German districts.

The decrease in the total of schoolchildren in these public schools since the year 1921 is explained by the fact that since 1921 the building of similar minority schools by private organisations, by the Czech educational associations and by the Jednotas has been in full swing. The decrease in the numbers of schoolchildren in the public schools in Bohemia was made good many times over by the numbers of schoolchildren in the private minority schools erected in the meanwhile.

Here again, the huge increase in the number of German children forming part of the total is a staggering feature.

The numbers in these schools were :

	German Children	Total Schoolchildren	Percentage
In the year 1918	784	38,583	2.3
In the year 1936	5067	26,509	19.1

It was German children therefore in the public Czech minority schools who made good the transfer of Czech children from the public schools to the schools of the Jednotas. Whereas in 1918 every fiftieth child in the public minority schools in Bohemia was German, in 1936 every fifth child in these (Czech) schools was German. So far had the process gone.

The same applies to the private institutions of the Czechisation association as to the State Czech minority schools and the same conditions obtain in Bohemia and elsewhere, for the spirit and the aims and objects of the whole system of Czech minority schools are everywhere identical. The cultural, racial and economic permeation of the German territory is pursued, among other methods, through the schools.

How is it that such large numbers of German children attend these purely Czech invasion schools in German districts ?

Apart from the long distances between the German schools and the accessibility of the Czech schools, which is deliberately arranged, the reason why German parents send their children to Czech schools is for the most part to be found in the fact that they are obliged to do so !

In very many cases fathers can only obtain employment if they send their children to Czech schools or would lose their employment if they did not do so. The methods of economic pressure employed by the zealous frontiersmen are infinite in their variety : loans are accorded or called in, according to which school the children attend, lease and rent are made to depend on that and the Czech school also offers tuition fees, exemption from school expenses and other relief and facilities. The need is great and so many Germans give in. Then again the attendance of Czech schools by German children is connected in innumerable cases with the fact that the fathers are State officials. Indeed, in hundreds of cases a man's employment by the State involves the Czechification of his children in a Czech school. Souls are angled for in a manner which on one occasion was even condemned by Dr. Hodza himself.

Agents of Czechisation.

The agents of this Czech penetration into the field of German life and work are, first and foremost, the State officials, Conscious of their mission as Czechs, and armed with the authority of the State, and at the same time members or officials of a Czechisation society they carry on infinite and indefatigable detail work ; secondly there are the Czechisation societies themselves which find their clearest expression in the largest formations of this kind, the Jednotas, which form the clearing house of all individual forces of Czech expansion. They are the elements of attack on the German space and their successes hitherto have been due not least to cooperation with the State authorities and to assistance and encouragement from Government offices ; on which they

exercise the greatest influence as regards appointments. The importance of the fact that the agents of the State authority are in most cases identical with the agents and executive organs of these Czechisation programmes, as drawn up in the progress reports of these societies and unions, can hardly be over-estimated. They all work for the same object: not only to maintain the Czech positions in the German districts, but above all to strengthen and increase them.

Summary.

Summed up in a few headlines, the results of the solemn promises made by the founders of the State and the method of enforcing the Constitution and the boasted legislation for the protection of minorities present the following picture:

Confiscation of over 600,000 hectares of German land, discrimination against the Sudeten Germans by "election geometry" and in the application of the system of proportional representation in the legislative bodies, gradual expulsion of Sudeten Germans from posts as officials of the State and the provinces, wholesale closing down of German schools, economic and social neglect of the German districts and consequent creation of an abnormally large amount of unemployment through the national crisis added to the effects of the world economic depression, exclusion of the Germans from Government contracts, Czechisation of the big industrial undertakings formerly in German hands and transfer of some of these to Czech districts, artificial encouragement of Czech industries at the expense of German industries, provision of Czech districts with new industries and one-sided enforcement of the regulations governing place of business in the case of new industries in favour of Czech districts, ruthless assessment and collection of taxes against the Sudeten Germans and correspondingly liberal treatment of Czech concerns, one-sided financial support and subsidizing of Czech concerns and financial institutions, refusal to accord similar state grants to German institutions of this kind, harsh discrimination against German cultural associations in favour of the Czechs, severe and increasingly restrictive employment of the censorship against the Germans as regards press, clubs and meetings, refusal to accede to German applications for the establishment of private schools, establishment of innumerable Czech schools in German territory and the holding out of inducements to German children to attend them owing to the insufficient number of Czech children, encouragement of Czech denationalization associations and toleration of unrestrained Czech expansionist activities employing State authority against Sudeten German property, creation of artificial Czech minorities in the German districts by transfer of large numbers of Czech officials and workers to those districts (preferably those with several children), discouragement of German cultural aspirations, czechification of place names, discouragement of the national education of Germans through the school curricula, dissolution of German parties and exclusion of more than half the German deputies in the legislative bodies between 1933 and 1935, ruthless enforcement in the German districts of the "Law for the protection of the State" with all the hardships entailed thereby, etc.

The Disastrous Responsibility of Geneva.

In this connection a few words may be said about the minority policy of the League of Nations and its disastrous indifference to the fate of the minorities.

As a sort of substitute for the abandoned right of self-determination, the protection of the national, religious and cultural minorities was in a number of cases transferred to the League. This task was not mentioned in the Covenant but merely in the Paris Peace Treaties and in a number of annexed treaties concluded mainly with the Austrian succession States.

There were good reasons for this. Only certain countries were to be placed under an obligation, while the main Powers would not permit of any supervision. For this reason the Covenant does not say a word about the minorities and their fundamental rights are nowhere enumerated or determined.

The minority protection of the League, as laid down in these treaties, does not however arise from any humanitarian or ethical reasons, but is based on political considerations. It was intended to contribute to the maintenance of the Paris Treaties. A protagonist of the protection of minorities, Mr. Murray, South African delegate at the second and third Assemblies of the League, stated in the latter on September 5th, 1922:

"We must take care that all elements of the population are satisfied with the new division of territory in Europe, for otherwise this new division of territory cannot be lasting."

But even this prophetic statement was, as we have seen, unable to cause the Czech Republic to treat its minorities properly and justly or to cause the League itself to see that right was done.

What is understood in Czechoslovakia by minority protection has been stated with admirable frankness by Professor Mayr in his textbook on Czechoslovak public law:

"...that the engagements of the minorities treaty assumed in the Peace Treaty are not binding and therefore in practice ineffective...., that they are ineffective in theory for the simple reason that they are in conflict with the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak State as the sole source of the legal order."

The League of Nations paid no attention to, or dealt inadequately with, the numerous serious complaints of the Germans in Czechoslovakia, and at the present time this gives the Czech press occasion to state in many cases that this attitude of the League is a proof of the good treatment of the minorities.

We may mention two examples of Geneva minorities policy from the early stages of the Czechoslovak Republic:

There is the characteristic case of the memorandum sent to Geneva in August 1920 by the German deputies and senators of the Prague National Assembly, containing serious charges against the Czechoslovak Government for violation of the provisions for the protection of minorities. It was not only not attended to but was not published.

This memorandum pointed out in the first place that the Czechoslovak State had been created by the victorious principal Powers against the will of about six million people, and therefore in open conflict with the right of self-determination and in accordance with the right of the stronger. The provisions of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain aiming at protection for the minorities were in no way calculated to protect the Germans from ill-treatment and oppression, for the will was lacking to carry out the provisions honestly and to do justice to the spirit of the Treaty. The memorandum goes on to show in detail that the legislation in the Czechoslovak State unhesitatingly violated these provisions both formally and materially. German schools were closed out of hand as superfluous and the buildings and premises used for Czech education. The provisions of the new Language Law regarding the use of Czech by the authorities were filled with the same lust for power and hatred of everything that was not Czech, and must necessarily be regarded by the Germans not only as a humiliation and provocation, but could in many cases not be put into effect. In this state of affairs, the German deputies and senators made the following charge before the whole world: "The Czechoslovak Republic, in the first year and a half of its existence, supported by national chauvinistic officials and the power of bayonets, has carried on the most brutal policy of Czechisation in legislation and administration; it has suppressed unscrupulously all real democracy and all

non-Czech populations; it has robbed them of any influence on the direction and administration of the State, so that it has become a denationalised, imperialistic and Chauvinistic State, in which the minority is governed by the majority; it is a retreat of reaction and a permanent danger for the peaceful further development of Central Europe. As the sole nominated representatives of four million Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic, therefore, the German deputies and senators request the Council of the League of Nations to cause the Czechoslovak Government to carry out the obligations towards its national minorities which it assumed in the Treaty of St. Germain and to despatch an impartial international commission to Czechoslovakia in order to examine the complaints of the German millions."

The complaints that came from Czechoslovakia were heart-rending. Read for instance the "Complaint of German large estate owners in the Czechoslovak Republic, who have received notice of the confiscation of their property as from January 1st, 1923, addressed to the League of Nations". The German League of Nations Union of that time, which handed this memorandum to the Secretary General in September 1922, described it in its covering note in the following words: "This memorandum raises a protest against the execution of the agrarian laws which is directed almost exclusively against non-Czech landowners and the denationalisation of large German tracts of land by the Czechoslovak Government which is thereby involved, since these Government measures represent a violation of the rights of the German minorities ... guaranteed by the Treaty of St. Germain."

The same note further states:

"The undersigned Union, in bringing this complaint before the Council of the League of Nations, considers that it should not let this opportunity pass of again drawing the attention of the Council to the intolerable conditions under which the German population of the Czechoslovak Republic, consisting of three and a half millions, have been living for nearly four years. Their highly developed educational system is deliberately pressed down to a constantly lower level, their linguistic rights, which are in any case strictly limited by law, are still further restricted by the practice of the State authorities, their banking and insurance systems are constantly subject to Czechisation by means of violent Government measures, the German officials, who are in principle practically excluded from the central authorities, are gradually being ousted even from the lower authorities in the purely German districts, the German place names are Czechified against the will of the German communes, the sphere of activity of the German self-administration bodies is constantly restricted under the pretext of measures of administrative reform, the possibility for the young people to earn a living is reduced by a network of Government measures. The German representatives in both houses of the National Assembly are precluded from any serious cooperation by the fetters of rules of procedure framed for this purpose, by the language regulations and by the closed front of the Czech majority parties which adopt an attitude contrary to all parliamentary custom. The gloomy feeling of impotent despair has taken possession of our compatriots, who are now also to be violently expelled from their soil."

This was the position, not only until 1923 but also subsequently. The League of Nations remained silent. It was also silent when the notorious Machnik decree of 1934, which was based on military reasons, drew a safety cordon round the Sudeten German territory to a depth of 25 kilometres, thus inflicting a fearful blow on the Sudeten Germans and striking at their very heart. Geneva gave no support to the Germans in Bohemia in their struggle against their oppressors, although that struggle had only one aim, namely equality of rights as laid down in the treaties. On the contrary, Geneva encouraged Czech policy to continue its methods of violence and measures of oppression.

If at the present time the racial struggle has become an acute danger for European peace, the League of Nations bears a great share of the blame, since it delayed action at the right time.

Matters of the Past ? — No !

Now it will certainly be objected that all these things belong to the past and that matters are in many respects very different now. The Czech press is never tired of saying that the German minority is better treated in Czechoslovakia, than are the minorities in any other country. The Germans, they say, enjoy in reality far more rights than they entitled to under the Agreement for the Protection of Minorities.

To reply to this it is sufficient to point out that it was the distress in the German frontier districts, the policy of denationalization carried on by the Czech storm associations, the "personal policy" pursued by the Government Departments, the State police and even by the military, which is inspired exclusively by Czech nationalist considerations, the fact that hundreds of thousands of people are faced with the prospect of never again finding a livelihood as Germans and the consequent bitterness and despair, that led to that tremendous revolution in Sudeten German policy as a result of the elections of May 19th, 1935, out of which the Sudeten German party founded by Conrad Henlein on October 1st, 1933 emerged not only as the only Sudeten German party qualified to speak with authority, but as the strongest party in the Czechoslovak State. In spite of this, it was not asked to form the Cabinet or even consulted with regard to its formation, but the Government simply decided that the Sudeten Germans should continue to be represented by the same parties which had just suffered such a signal defeat. This crass violation of the basic principles of democracy was the real starting-point of all the subsequent complications and was responsible for the fact that the Sudeten German problem has since become increasingly acute and dangerous.

The winter of 1935-36 with its tremendous unemployment figure enormously increased distress and consequently the danger of social unrest. Out of 662,000 unemployed in the whole country, 330,000 were a charge upon the Sudeten Germans alone: that is to say, although the Sudeten German population constituted $22\frac{1}{3}$ per cent of the total population, the proportion of unemployment was something like 49 per cent. The bitterness was increased by the policy of the Government. As a rule, local Sudeten German unemployed were not used for emergency work, which was entrusted in nearly every case to Czech contractors, who obtained their labour from distant Czech districts. Thus the Sudeten German unemployed usually had to stand idle and watch the emergency work in their own districts being carried out by Czech labour from outside. Under the pressure of these conditions and in view of the lack of comprehension still prevailing in Prague and of the warnings uttered in foreign countries which were beginning to wake up to the position, the German parties in the Government—the so-called "activists"—began to realize the dangerous part which they were compelled to play, in view of their share of responsibility for the state of affairs. Even they came to see more and more clearly that an amicable solution of the problem would only be possible, if a sincere effort were made to establish German rights on the basis of self-determination. They moved for the first time on April 26th, 1936 and finally even the Government realized that the convenient formula, whereby it had always endeavoured to deny the existence of this problem by saying that the State had given the Sudeten German everything that it was under an obligation to give them, would no longer suffice.

On August 19th, 1936, President Benes delivered his speech at Reichenberg in which, for the first time, he admitted that mistakes had been made, which should not be repeated.

The Collapse of the "Action of Appeasement" of February 18th, 1937 and its Cause.

The first step was taken by the Czech authorities on February 18th, 1937, when Cabinet decrees were issued announcing the principle of proportional representation as a measure of "national pacification". Here again, the Sudeten German Party did not participate. The negotiations were carried on behind close doors and only after they had already been concluded were the representatives of the Sudeten Germans invited to give their assent, which they declined to do. On February 20th the result of the negotiations between the whole Government and the three German parties in the Government were communicated to the press in the form of a statement by the official Czechoslovak Press Bureau.

This statement throws a significant light on Prague's idea of the right solution of a question on which "the very existence of the new State depends, as it goes to the roots of all State institutions". The essential terms are as follows:.... the Government... has examined,... is devoting its whole attention and its every effort... draws the attention of all departments... will—now as in the past—see to it... it recognizes... it will be enabled... it regards it as axiomatic... has taken all measures... is prepared, does not exclude the possibility of a more detailed consideration... will be at pains to remove any defects... is consistently loyal to the principles of a strictly equitable policy in regard to minorities..."

Thus we see that the statement consisted of nothing but cheap phrases, which certainly appeared to be conciliatory, but no one of which represented a legal obligation upon either the Government of the time or any future Government. The concessions made by the Government were expressed in the form of promises which were legally non-committal and morally binding upon the Government of the time only, while, as regards their subject-matter, they consisted partly of a repetition of earlier concessions and partly of the observance of the terms of the Constitution. For the rest they were ambiguous. They in no way constituted a first step for a later readjustment of principle between the nations composing the State, but constituted for the Germans an obstacle in the way of any subsequent demand for a comprehensive solution of the kind. They took no account of Sudeten German requirements, inasmuch as they did nothing to remove the main causes of complaint and the real causes of the national dissension.

The German parties also soon came to realize this, especially as they interpreted the provisions of the agreement in a different sense from the Czechs. The two sides understood different things by the agreement and opinions clashed, as was apparent as soon as the first practical work was undertaken. A few weeks later the representatives of the activists expressed their dissatisfaction and disappointment in sharply worded statements and demanded that the premises of concessions should be kept. The warning of the representative of the Christian-Social Party, Schütz, had almost a prophetic ring: "A State", he said, "whose statesmen are not strictly truthful, is digging its own grave", and on November 17th, 1937, the leader of the German Social-Democrats, Deputy Jaksch, attacked the use of the monstrous "Fremdwort", "proportionality", in the following terms: "German officials are more difficult to find in a Government office than a needle in a haystack." Again, during the debate on the budget at the end of the year, Landbund Deputy Böhm confirmed the continual national and economic discrimination against the Sudeten German element. There were 40,000 fewer Sudeten German State officials than there would have been if their number had corresponded to the percentage of Sudeten Germans to the total population. If it was not possible to make good the

discrimination against the Sudeten German element from one day to another, it was hoped that that would be done as soon as possible. In the Government's opinion however, it was obliged to observe the strict percentage of $22\frac{1}{3}$ in the case of new appointments only, which meant in theory that a fair proportion of Sudeten Germans to the total number of officials (600,000) would only be reached after the last supernumerary Czech officials had been pensioned off—that is to say, after the expiration of a normal official career, in 30 to 40 years.

The more than meagre results of the nominal application by the Government after February 18th of the principle of proportionality in the matter of contracts for public works and the appointment of officials and employees, which made it appear that no effect whatsoever had been given to that principle, caused the so-called German Government parties, which were elected in 1935 by rather less than 30% of the Sudeten Germans, to state again and again that the promises of February 18th had not been kept, although those parties "had made concessions bordering on self-sacrifice". During the parliamentary debate on the budget held from November to the beginning of December, a Deputy of one of the German "splinter parties" criticized the system applied in the case of appointments, the liquidation of financial institutions, the giving of contracts for constructional work and deliveries, the attempts to obtain adherents by offering inducements (Seelenfang), and the subjection of German farmers in the frontier districts to petty vexations in the matter of language and of the building of Czech minority schools. He demanded that policy should be determined by the Government and not by the "Jednotas": "a reasonable national and State policy is not to be found in the throttling of the German language, the imperilling of German livelihood or the suppression of German cultural aspirations".

On the expiry of the "year of grace" for which Dr. Hodza asked in his address to the press on March 13th, 1937, he (Dr. Hodza) endeavoured in vain to make much of the results achieved. The collapse of the policy of February 18th, (which was caused not only by administrative defects, obtuseness, arbitrary measures and lack of good will on the part of the bureaucracy and the absence of clear aims to be achieved within a definite period of time, but also—and especially—by the faulty structure of this Government decree and the attempts to make good a national injustice by purely administrative methods) was too obvious. The failure of the policy of February 18th was inevitable, inherent in its structure and unavoidably bound up in the whole system. This policy was wrecked, as Deputy Jaksch said, on the rock of a narrow conception of the national State, which those concerned continued to entertain, instead of adopting the only method which could have yielded the desired result—that of political and linguistic equality of treatment of the different nationalities.

There was however one good thing about this policy—that last disappointed hope of the activists: it led, even in the matter of parties, to the formation of a united front of the Sudeten German element. Peasants Party, Christian-Social Party and Industrial Party (Gewerbepartei) dissolved themselves, withdrew their Ministers from the Government and joined the Sudeten German Party.

Words and Deeds.

From March 1st to May 22nd, 1938.

Such is the title of a volume which appeared from the firm Karl H. Frank at the end of May 1938, the purport of which is summarised by the publisher in a short Foreword as follows.

The beginning of March 1938 marks the commencement of a new stage in the history of the Sudete-German problem. On April 24th 1938 the Sudete-Germans gave new expression to their claim for recognition of their nationality and admission of their rights to live and develop on that basis. Since the beginn-

ing of March the Czechs for their part not merely admitted the existence of the Sudete-German problem, but held out hopes through their Government—with special emphasis on the point in foreign countries—of action in the sense of a final solution of the problem.

How was it then that, at the very time when the Government was working on a full and complete settlement of the problem, the actual tension became increasingly worse, culminating in those days around May 20th when the whole world held its breath?

The following pages are a contribution to the answering of that question.

While behind closed doors, at green baize tables and on clean sheets of paper, negotiations were proceeding for a solution—of which, incidentally, we (i. e. the parties principally affected) are still without knowledge—the practical position diverged further and further from the theory. Of this practical position, that is to say, of the stark realities of everyday in the Sudetan lands during this “conciliation period”, it is now proposed to give some account.

In the pages which follow news from the daily Press of the Czech Republic during the period in question is reproduced in chronological order as it was published during the period in question. The passages quoted are either extracts or complete and literal translations of news which appeared in the Press after it had been passed by the Censor. (Censors of this number of our periodical, please note!)

It goes without saying that much more, very much more, happened during the period than appeared in the Press. The Press could only make a selection. It goes equally without saying that everything which appeared in the Press cannot find reproduction in these pages. What does appear in these pages represents therefore a selection from a number of occurrences in the Sudete-German country from day to day.

It must moreover be remembered that the Censorship greatly restricted, or entirely prohibited, the publication of a large number of other occurrences; and from the moment when these occurrences reached their culminating point, i. e. from about May 22nd onwards, reports of further incidents were banned entirely by the Censorship. Accordingly the selection which follows stops at the date in question.

In the case of some of the events here recorded, official reports were issued which conflict with the reports that appeared in the Sudete-German Press. Considerations of censorship make it impossible to discuss these official reports.

The collection of these various utterances from the Press shows with positively staggering clearness how since the date March 1st 1938, that is to say, the date on which (in their own words) the Prague Government began to study intensively the solution of the Sudete-German problem, the penetration, assimilation and oppression of the Sudete-Germans by the Czechs continued in just the same manner as before. After that date, as before, public works in German territory were entrusted to Czech contractors and Czech workers from other parts of the Republic: German workers, employees and tradespeople continued to be subjected to national pressure: and the process of Czech penetration of German districts was deliberately and conspicuously greatest in those cases where the livelihood of the population was dependent on the State or State undertakings.

The economic expansion was accompanied by cultural and political expansion. Czech schools continued after March 1st 1938, as before, to be erected in German districts; and Czech political and cultural influence continued to exert itself in the Sudete lands.

The everyday situation in these parts of the Republic was coloured and conditioned by hundreds of small acts by agents of the Czech State as well as by the Czech civilian population pushed into these districts. There was no remission of the policy of pin-pricks after March 1st 1938 any more than before. On the contrary, the number of incidents increased in the districts in question; and an irresponsible Press saw to it that the process was uninterrupted.

The seriousness of the position increased when these incidents began to assume the character of mass demonstrations against the German element, when they began to lead with increasing frequency to the use of force and bloodshed, and it was seen that the executive and the military were being used in these connections. Excesses of this kind became more and more frequent after March 1st 1938, that is to say, during the “conciliation period”. The number of persons injured rose steadily; and it was precisely in this period that the Sudete-Germans were called upon to mourn their first dead.

Such were the realities, such was the practical position, in Sudetia during the period in which the final solution of the Sudete-German problem was the object of negotiation and discussion and paper proposals.

The subsequent development since May 21st is still fresh in the minds of all. This period again resembled the preceding one. While Prague was still discussing and negotiating over the mythical nationality statute, the second, third and fourth plan, which were out of date before they saw the light of publicity, while the Hradchin and Kolovrat Palace under greater or less pressure from abroad hesitatingly and unwillingly made one concession after another when such concessions were no longer able to solve the problem, frontier guards, gendarmerie, police and militia out in the country gave further proofs of the importance attached by the Government to these inadequate concessions.

With unexampled calm, loyalty and discipline, the Sudeten German people for twenty years believed and trusted in all the fine and deceptive phrases which were intended to reconcile them with the Paris act of violence. Until the very latest times, when the terrible distress and suffering would have long ago driven any other people to open revolt, the leaders of the Sudeten Germans emphasised their willingness to agree peacefully with the Government and with the Czech people upon a way out of the situation which had arisen through no fault of theirs, in order to render possible joint cooperation for the welfare of the State. In vain. They were rejected with scorn and contempt.

The ultimate development therefore could not be held back. The last act of the Sudeten German drama is now being played on the European stage. It is taking place under the device which the Czechs unfortunately only adopted in their State arms: Truth is victorious! It is victorious not only over the events of the past, but also over the subsequent oppression and suppression of the populations handed over to Czechoslovakia with violence and lies in 1919. This truth will now ultimately help the victory of that right which was so shamelessly and openly violated in Paris, i. e. the right of self-determination of the nations.

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TOWARDS THE DECISION

Last Warnings and Admonitions Addressed to Prague

Text of Adolf Hitler's Speech in the Berlin Sport Palace on September 26th, 1938

Men and women of the German race.

On February 20, before the members of the German Reichstag I stated for the first time a fundamental demand of an irrevocable nature. The nation heard me and understood. One statesman failed to understand. He has been removed, and my promise of that time is redeemed. I spoke before the Party Congress for the second time about this same demand. Again the nation heard me. To-day I come before the nation and speak to the people as in the great period of struggle, and you know what that means.

There should remain no doubt for the world outside that at this time it is not one man, or one leader who speaks, but the whole German people. And if I am now the mouthpiece of the German people, I know that in this hour the whole people, millions strong, agree with every one of my words. This strengthens the nation and makes my oath their oath. Let other statesmen ask themselves whether this is also their case.

You all know the question which has exercised us during the last weeks and months. It is not so much Czechoslovakia; its real name is Herr Benesh. In this name is reunited to-day all that which moves millions, which fills them either with despair or fanatical determination.

* * *

How did this question reach such importance? My people, I will now repeat to you, as I have done before, the nature and aims of German foreign policy.

German foreign policy differs from that of many democratic countries in so far as it is based on a world political doctrine, which primarily aims at maintaining the German people and safeguarding its existence. We are not interested in suppressing other nations. We do not want to see other nations among us. We want to live our own life, and we want other peoples to do

the same. This doctrine leads to a limitation and restriction of our foreign policy. Our foreign political aims are consequently not unlimited. They are not defined from case to case. They are firmly laid down in the determination that they must exclusively serve the German people, to preserve it as such in the world, and to work for its existence.

What is the position now? You are aware that at one time the German nation was filled by the expression "right of self-determination of the nations" with faith in super-State assistance and it was thus caused to waive the use of its own forces to the very last moment. You are aware that the faith inspired at that time was most outrageously abused. The result was the Treaty of Versailles. You all know the terrible results of that Treaty. It is still within the memory of all of you how our nation was deprived of its arms and how the disarmed nation was subsequently ill-treated. You know the dreadful fate that overtook and pursued us for fifteen years. And you know that if Germany has nevertheless today become great, free and strong again, she has only her own strength to thank for this.

The outside world tried as long as possible to blackmail us and oppress us. From our own people a strength has emerged to end this unworthy existence, and to show the German people a way which is worthy of a great and free people. In spite of the fact that we are now free and strong we are swayed by no hatred of other nations. We bear no grudge for the past; we know that the other people are not responsible. It is a small international clique of self-seekers, who do not recoil from yoking whole peoples into their service when necessary for their mean interests. We bear in us no hatred for the outside world, and we have proved this. The German love of peace has been hardened by the facts.

Shortly after we had begun the restoration of Germany's equality of status I proposed to the world a number of agreements as a visible sign that we

harboured no wish for revenge. I proposed a limitation of armaments.

My first proposal was the demand for equality,

I said that Germany was ready—if all other countries would join in—to limit all arms and weapons, to disarm in general and, if necessary, to the last machine-gun. The world did not think it worth while to discuss my proposals.

Then came my second proposal that Germany was ready to limit her army to 200,000 men if all others would do the same, and equip it with similar weapons as other armies would have. The proposal was declined.

Germany was ready, if others would do the same, to renounce all heavy weapons, all so-called aggressive weapons, including tanks, bombers, and, if necessary, also aeroplanes as well as heavy and heaviest artillery. I went even farther. I proposed an international settlement with armies of 300,000 men for each European State. This was again rejected.

I made further proposals: limitation of air fleets, abolition of bombing, complete abolition of gas warfare, safety of the homeland which does not lie in the zone of war, abolition at least of the heaviest artillery, abolition of heaviest tanks. That, too, was rejected. It was all in vain.

After two years of making offer upon offer to the world, and achieving refusal upon refusal, I gave the order to place the German army in the best state we could reach. And I can now frankly admit we have completed our rearmament in such a way as the world has never seen before. I offered disarmament as long as humanly possible. After this had been rejected I took no harsh decisions. In this I am a National-Socialist and an old German front-line soldier.

If they do not want the world to be without arms, very well; then let the German people also bear its arms.

In the last five years I have indeed rearmed. I have used milliards of marks for this purpose. The German people must now know this.

I have seen that a modern army should be built up, equipped with the most modern equipment in existence. I gave my friend Göring the command: "Create for me an air arm which will protect the German people from every attack." Thus we built up an army of which the German people can be proud, and which the world will respect whenever it appears. We have built ourselves the best air force in the world and the best tank service.

* * *

For these five years the work has gone on night and day, in one single sphere I have succeeded in bringing about an understanding. Of this I will speak later. However, I retained the ideas of my policy of disarmament in politics. During these years I have followed a practical peace policy.

I have approached all the seemingly impossible problems with a firm determination to solve them, if conceivably possible, in a peaceful way, even when entailing greater or less danger of serious renunciations by the German people. I myself am a first-line-soldier and know how hard war is. I know the

seriousness of war. I wanted to spare the German people from it.

I considered plan after plan with the aim in view of doing everything for a peaceful solution. The most serious with which I was confronted was our relations with Poland. There was a danger of running into fits of hysteria. There was the danger that the Poles and Germans would regard each other as arch enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know that I should not have been successful if there had been in Poland a democracy on Western lines. These democracies, which are indulging in phrases about peace, are the most sanguinary war agitators. There was no democracy in Poland, but a man, and with him I succeeded within one year in coming to an understanding, which for the first 10 years removed the danger of clashes. We are all determined that this agreement shall have in its wake a lasting pacification, because the problems with which we are confronted are in eight years the same as now. We do not expect anything from one another. We recognize this. We are two nations and those nations will live and neither of them will be able to do away with the other. I recognized all this, and we all must recognize that a people of 33,000,000 will always strive for an outlet to the sea.

A way for an understanding in this respect had to be found and has been found, and this way will be further and further extended.

Certainly things became hard in the area. The nationalities and small national groups frequently quarrel among themselves, but the main fact is the two State leaderships, and all reasonable and astute persons among the two peoples and countries possess the firm will and determination to improve relations. It was a great action on my part and a really peaceful action, which is of more worth than all that chattering in the Geneva League.

I have attempted during this period gradually to bring about better and lasting relations with other nations also. We have given guarantees for the States in the West. We have assured all our immediate neighbours of the integrity of their territory as far as Germany is concerned.

That is no hollow phrase; it is our sacred will. We have no interest in breaking the peace. We want nothing from these peoples. It is a fact that these offers of ours met with ever-increasing acceptance and growing understanding. Bit by bit the peoples are freeing themselves from the blinding Geneva madness, which I should call not collective obligation to peace but collective obligation to war. They are freeing themselves from this, and begin to see problems soberly, and to be ready for understanding and desirous of peace.

I went further. I offered my hand to Britain. I voluntarily renounced ever again entering upon a naval armaments competition in order to give the British Empire a feeling of security, not because I could no longer build—let no one deceive himself about this—but simply to secure a lasting peace between the two peoples. But one thing is a preliminary condition here. It will not do that one party says: "I never want to wage war with you, and for this reason I offer you voluntarily to restrict my arms to 35 per cent."; and the other party declares from time to time: "I shall wage war again when it suits me."

This will not do. Such an agreement is only morally justified if both nations promise one another solemnly never again to want to wage war against one another. Germany has this will. Let us all hope that those who are of the same will will gain the upper hand in the British people.

I went further. I immediately told France after the return of the Saar districts to Germany, which was to be decided by a plebiscite, "there exist no more differences between France and us." I said that Alsace-Lorraine did not exist for us. This people has not been asked for its opinion during the last 10 years. We feel that this people is the most happy people, that the inhabitants of these regions are a joyous people so long as no one thinks of conquering them.

We all do not want a war with France. We do not want anything in France. When, thanks to a loyal interpretation of the treaties by France, the Saar region was returned to the Reich I at once assumed frankly that now all territorial differences with France had been settled, and we have no longer any differences with France.

Alsace-Lorraine does not exist any more for us. The best relations will prevail between France and Germany so long as the two people are working together.

After this definite renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine I turned to another problem. This was easier to solve, as their world-political doctrines had a common basis, which offered a way to a quick mutual understanding. I refer here to the relations between Germany and Italy.

The solution of this problem is only partly due to me. For the rest it is due to that unique and great man which to have as its leader is the fortune of the Italian people. Our relations have left the sphere of purely economic or political utility; they have outclassed treaties and alliances and have become a real and strong union of affections. An axis has formed itself represented by two peoples which have found themselves in a close and indissoluble friendship.

Also in this respect I have removed from the world a problem which no longer exists for us. It may be bitter for individual people, but above all there stands the interest of the whole German people, and this is to be able to work in peace. This whole activity, my racial comrades, is not a phrase incapable of proof, but this activity is strengthened by facts, which no political liar can evade.

Two problems remained. Here I had to make a reservation. Ten million Germans were outside the frontiers of the Reich in two self-contained areas—Germans who wanted to return to the Reich as their home. This figure of 10,000,000 represents no trifle. It represents a quarter of the inhabitants of France. And if France had not for 40 years given up her claim upon the few millions of French in Alsace-Lorraine, then, before God and the world, we have the right to maintain our claim upon these 10,000,000.

And somewhere there is a point, my racial comrades, at which concessions must stop, because otherwise it becomes weakness.

I had no right to stand before German history if 10,000,000 were to be simply sacrificed as unimportant. I should, then, have had no moral right to be the leader of the German people.

I have indeed, taken upon myself enough sacrifices. Here was a point beyond which I could not go. How right that was has been proved, first by the plebiscite in Austria and by the whole story of the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. A glowing avowal was made at that time, an avowal such as the rest of the world certainly did not hope for. However, we then witnessed this avowal. To the democracies a plebiscite is superfluous, even pernicious, in the moment in which it does not lead to that result for which the democracies hoped.

Nevertheless, this problem was solved for the good fortune of the whole greater German people.

* * *

Now the last problem which must be solved and which will be solved confronts us. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is the claim from which I do not recede and which I shall fulfil. God willing.

The history of this problem is this. In 1918 Central Europe was torn to pieces under the motto "self-determination of the people" and was remodelled by a few foolhardy or mad statesmen. Without paying consideration to history or to the origin of nations, to their national will, their economic necessities, Central Europe was atomized at that time and the so-called new nations were formed at will.

The Czech State owed to this its existence. This Czech State began with one original lie. The name of the father of that lie was Benesh. Then Herr Benesh appeared at Versailles and gave the assurance that there existed a Czechoslovak nation. He had to invent this lie in order to give his insignificant number of compatriots a somewhat bigger and thus more justified volume; and the Anglo-Saxon statesmen who in matters of geography and race are not always so well-informed did not consider it necessary to examine Herr Benesh's statement. Otherwise, they would have seen at once that there was no such thing as a Czechoslovak nation, but that there are Czechs and Slovaks and that the Slovaks do not want to have anything to do with the Czechs.

So these Czechs finally through Dr. Benesh, annexed Slovakia. As this State did not appear to be capable of life, they took without a second thought 3,500,000 Germans, in spite of their right to self-determination and their will to self-determination. As this was not enough, a million Hungarians must be added, then Carpathian Russians, and finally a few hundred thousand Poles...

As I speak to you here and now I naturally sympathize with the fate of these oppressed peoples. I sympathize with the fate of the Hungarians, Slovaks, Poles, and Ukrainians. But I am naturally only the mouthpiece of the fate of my Germans.

When Herr Benesh brought this State together with lies, he solemnly promised to divide the State according to the Swiss system of Cantons, for among the democracy statesmen there were some who had qualms of conscience. We all know how

Herr Benesh put into force this system of cantonization. He now began his system of terror. Even in those days the Germans tried to protest against this oppression and outrage. They were shot down, and since then a war of extermination has been carried on. In these years of Czechoslovak peaceful development well nigh 600,000 Germans had to leave Czechoslovakia for a very simple reason—because they otherwise would have had to perish from starvation. The whole development from 1918 to 1938 alone showed one thing quite clearly: Benesh was determined simply to exterminate solely the German element. He succeeded in doing this to a certain degree. He cast innumerable people into the deepest distress. He managed to make millions of people timid and cowed under the continual employment of terror. He slowly succeeded in closing up the mouths of millions.

At the same time a clarification began with regard to the task of the State as seen from an international angle. It was no longer concealed in the least that the nation was destined to be used if necessary against Germany. A French Air Minister, M. Cot, bluntly stated it a few weeks ago: "We need the State because German economy and German industry could be best destroyed by bombs from this State."

It was not we who sought contact with Bolshevism, but Bolshevism made use of this State in order to gain a channel into Central Europe.

And now a shameless action began. This State, which had only a minority Government, compelled the National Groups to follow a policy, which some day will force them to fire upon their own brethren. Herr Benesh stood up and demanded from the Sudeten-Germans: "When I make war on Germany, you have to shoot at the Germans. If you refuse to do it you are traitors, and I will have you shot." He demanded the same from the Hungarians, the Poles, and the Slovaks, whom he used for aims to which the Slovak people are indifferent. The Slovak people want peace and not an adventure, but Herr Benesh is able to make all these people either into traitors to the nation or traitors to their own people. They must do one of two things: either they must betray their own people and be ready to shoot at them, or Herr Benesh says "You are traitors and must therefore be shot."

That is the greatest piece of shamefulfulness that is thinkable. To force alien men in certain circumstances to shoot their own compatriots, just because a rotten, decaying and criminal State régime insists on such action. I can assure you that as we occupied Austria my first order was "No Czech needs even dare serve in the German Army." I will not place him before a conflict of conscience; I do not want him to do it.

Now, whoever sets himself against the whole aims of Dr. Benesh is persecuted. They must face terror, prisons, and they will be economically crushed. And the democratic world apostles cannot pretend that it does not all exist. In this State of Herr Benesh the consequences for the nationalities have been cruel. Again I speak here for the Germans. They have the greatest death-rate; their lack of children is the greatest, and unemployment there is most terrible; suicides are most numerous.

There is only one problem, and that is how long is this to last. For 20 years the Germans in Czechoslovakia looked upon all this.

For 20 years the German people has done the same. It could not help it because it was defenceless, and it could not help them to free themselves from their tormentors. Now look at those world democracies. If a traitor is being locked up, if a man is taken into preventive arrest for agitating from a pulpit against the State, Britain gets excited, America is outraged; but if hundreds of thousands of people are driven from their homes, tens of thousands are thrown into prison, if thousands are slaughtered, those brave democracies are not moved in the least.

We have learned in these years to despise them most truly.

In the whole time and to-day we never found a single Great Power in Europe with a man at its head who has as much understanding for the distress of our people as my great friend Benito Mussolini. We shall never forget what he has done in this time, or the attitude of the Italian people. If similar distress should ever befall Italy, I shall go to the German people and ask them to do for the Italians what the Italians have done for us. Then there will not be two States who are defending themselves, but one bloc.

* * *

I explained on February 20 of this year in the Reichstag that this (the condition of the Sudetens in Czechoslovakia) must be altered. The only result was that a more radical suppression was introduced. A still greater terrorism began, and the day of dissolutions, prohibitions, confiscations, etc., dawned. This went on until, finally, May 21 dawned, and you really cannot deny it, my racial comrades, it was a really eternal German patience that we showed at that time. This May 21 was already unbearable. I have already recently presented, at the Reich Party Day, the history of that month. In Czechoslovakia the elections were at last to take place. They were no longer to be postponed. Then along comes Herr Benesh and discovers a means of intimidating the Germans there—namely, the military occupation of the territories.

He even now wants to continue to maintain that military occupation in the hope that so long as his minions are there no one will dare to oppose him. It was that impudent lie—that Germany had mobilized—which had to do duty as a cover for the Czech mobilization, to palliate it and to provide a motive for it. What happened then you all know—an infamous international world campaign of provocation. Germany had not called up a single man. It had absolutely no thought of solving this problem by any military means. I still retained the hope that, at the very last moment, the Czechs would realize that this tyrannical régime could not be maintained. But Herr Benesh maintained the standpoint that anything is permissible with Germany; because he was protected by France and England nothing could happen to him; and because, above all, when all other help failed, he had behind him Soviet Russia.

* * *

That was the answer of this man: shoot down, arrest, and imprison all those whom he does not like for some reason or other. Thus there came finally my demands made at Nuremberg. The demands were quite clear. Now I have for the first time stated that the self-determination for these 3,500,000 at last—almost 20 years after Mr. Wilson—must

come into force, and that we won't wait any longer. And again Herr Benesh has given his answer : more dead, more imprisonment, and more arrests. The German element (in Czechoslovakia) gradually began to flee.

Then came England. I clearly stated to Mr. Chamberlain what we now see as the sole possibility of a solution. It is the most natural thing one can imagine. I know that all nationalities do not wish to remain with this Herr Benesh. I myself am, in the first place, the mouthpiece of the Germans. On behalf of these Germans I have spoken and have now given the assurance that I am not willing any more to stand by calmly and without acting and see these madmen, who believe they can simply mishandle 3,500,000 people, and I have left no doubt German patience is at last at an end.

I have left no doubt that it is the nature of the German mentality to be passive and patient, but then the moment comes when one must say : That is enough.

And now England and France must place before Czechoslovakia the only possible demand, to set the German area free at last and to give it up to the Reich.

However, we are acquainted to-day with regard to the conversations which Herr Benesh conducted at that time. We arrived at decision, confronted with the threats of England and France no longer to back Czechoslovakia, if the fate of the people were not changed and the regions liberated.

Confronted with this statement Herr Benesh found a way out. He admitted, "Yes, these regions must be seceded." That was his statement. And what did he do ? It was not the region which he seceded, but the Germans he now drives out. And that is now a matter where the game ends. Herr Benesh had scarcely said this when his military subjugation once more set in and in a more severe manner. And now we see the figures : — One day 10,000, on the following day 20,000, on the next 37,000. Again two days later 42,000, 78,000. Now they are 90,000, 137,000 ; and to-day they are 214,000. Whole regions are being depopulated, villages are being burned down, and an attempt is made to smoke out the Germans there with shells and gas. And Herr Benesh sits in Prague and is convinced that "Nothing can happen to me. Behind me there stands England and France." I believe, my racial comrades, that the time has now come when we must speak most plainly.

If anyone suffers for 20 years such a shame, such a disgrace, and such misfortune, nobody will be able to say that he is not peace-loving. If anyone shows intelligence as we have done nobody can say that we are eager for war. Herr Benesh is backed by 7,000,000, but here stand a people of 75,000,000.

* * *

I have now placed at the disposal of the British Government a Memorandum with the last and final German proposal. This proposal is nothing else than the realization of that which Dr. Benesh has already promised. The contents of this proposal are very simple : That region which is German according to the people, and wants to go to Germany in accordance with the

wishes of the people, will now come to Germany. That is not at a time when Benesh has succeeded in driving out perhaps one or two million Germans, but now, and that is immediately. I have stipulated only that borderline which is just on the grounds of the material—in existence for many decades—of national and linguistic distribution in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, I am more just than Herr Benesh. I do not want to exploit the power which we possess. Therefore, I fixed right from the beginning that this region will be placed under German rule, because on the whole it is populated by Germans. The final drawing of the borderline, however, will rest on the racial comrades themselves who live there. I have determined that in spite of this a plebiscite shall then take place in this region, and in order that no one shall say that this plebiscite will not be just I have chosen the Saar Statute as a basis for this plebiscite.

I was willing and am willing to let there be a plebiscite in the whole region of Czechoslovakia. However, Benesh turned against this and his friends too, turned against this. Only in individual sections. All right, I gave in here.

If you consider on principle that a plebiscite should be taken only in some disputed districts, well and good, but on both sides of the language frontier, so that no one could say that the plebiscite was not correct. I was ready to agree that an international commission should control the plebiscite. I was ready to leave the drawing of this frontier to a mixed German-Czech commission. Mr. Chamberlain asked whether it could not be done by an international committee. I was ready to agree to this. I was ready to withdraw the troops during this plebiscite. I have to-day declared my willingness to invite the British Legion for this period—while the plebiscite was going on. The British Legion made me this offer to go into this area and to maintain quiet and order there. I was also prepared that an international commission should draw up a definite frontier, and I was prepared to leave the formalities to a commission consisting of Germans and Czechs.

What are the contents of this Memorandum ? They are the practical execution of what Herr Benesh has promised under the strongest international guarantees.

But something is unacceptable to Herr Benesh. He says : "This Memorandum creates a new situation." What is this new situation ? Is it because I asked that that which Herr Benesh had promised must for once be fulfilled ? This is what Herr Benesh says is the new situation. What has that man not promised during his life ! And he has held to nothing. And now for the first time he is to keep to something.

Herr Benesh says, "We cannot leave this area." So that Herr Benesh understood the cession of this area as meaning that it should be accredited to the Reich as a legal title and at the same time oppressed by Czechs.

That is over. I have now demanded that after 20 years Herr Benesh shall be forced to face the truth. He will have to hand over this area to us on October 1. Herr Benesh now places his hopes in the world. He makes no secret of this, and his diplomats make no secret of it either. They explain : "This is our hope, that Chamberlain will fall, that Daladier will be removed, that all over the world there will be upheavals, and Soviet Russia is also our hope."

* * *

He still thinks he can evade a fulfilment of his duty.

I can only say, two men face each other—there is Herr Benesh and here am I—and we are two different people. When Herr Benesh was scrimshanking through the great struggle of the peoples, I was doing my duty as a decent soldier. And to-day, once more, I stand before this man as a soldier of my people.

I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace—simply that I cannot go back once beyond the limits of our patience. I have further assured him, and I emphasize it now, that when this problem is solved, Germany has no more territorial problems in Europe.

I have further assured him that at the moment when Czechoslovakia has solved its other problems—that is, when the Czechs shall have come to an understanding with their other minorities—I shall not be interested in the Czech State any more, and that, so far as I am concerned, I can guarantee it. We do not want any Czechs any more. At the same time I now declare to the German people that so far as the Sudeten German problem is concerned my patience is at an end.

I have made Herr Benesh an offer. It is nothing more than the execution of that which he has already accepted. Now he has war or peace in his hands. He will either

accept this offer now and give the Germans their freedom at last, or we shall go and fetch this freedom.

And one thing the world should note. During four and a half years of war, and in the long years of my political life, they have never been able to say I have ever been a coward.

I now come before my people as its first soldier and behind me the world must know marches a nation, and a very different nation from the nation of 1918. Whereas democratic scholars then managed to infect our people with the poison of democratic phrases, the German people to-day is not the German people of those days.

Such phrases to-day are like wasp stings to us. We are now immune against them. In this hour the whole German nation will unite itself with me. It will follow my will as its will, just as I regard its future and destiny as the measure of all my actions, and we will strengthen this united will just as we did in the fighting period—in that period in which, as an unknown, lonely soldier, I went out to conquer a Reich. I never doubted the final success and victory. A group of brave men and courageous women gathered round me and went with me, and thus I beg my German people: "Stand now behind me, man and man, and woman and woman." In these hours we all will become one sacred united will. It will be stronger than all distress and every danger. And when this will is stronger than distress and danger then will it break down distress and danger.

We are determined! Herr Benesh can now choose!

The Text of the German Memorandum

The Memorandum handed to the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, at Godesberg on September 23rd, 1938 for transmission to the Czech Government, is worded as follows:

Reports which are increasing in number from hour to hour regarding incidents in the Sudetenland show that the situation has become completely intolerable for the Sudeten German people and, in consequence, a danger to the peace of Europe. It is therefore essential that the separation of the Sudetenland agreed to by Czechoslovakia should be effected without any further delay. On the attached map the Sudeten German area which is to be ceded is shaded red. The areas in which, over and above the areas which are to be occupied, a plebiscite is also to be held are drawn in and shaded green.

The final delimitation of the frontier must correspond to the wishes of those concerned. In order to determine these wishes a certain period is necessary for the preparation of the plebiscite, during which disturbances must in all circumstances be prevented. A situation of parity must be created. The area designated on the attached map as a German area is to be occupied by German troops without taking account of whether in the plebiscite there may prove to be in this or that part of the area a Czech majority. On the other hand, the Czech territory is to be occupied by Czech troops without taking account of whether, within this area, there lie large German-language islands, in which, in the plebiscite, a majority will without doubt give expression to its German national feeling.

With a view to bringing about an immediate and final solution of the Sudeten German problem the following proposals are submitted by the German Government:

(1) Withdrawal of the whole Czech armed forces, the police, the gendarmerie, the Customs officials, and the frontier guards, from the area to be evacuated as designated on the attached map, this area to be handed over to Germany on Oct. 1.

(2) The evacuated territory is to be handed over in its present condition (see further details in Appendix). The German Government agree that a plenipotentiary representative of the Czech Government and of the Czech Army should be attached to the headquarters of the German military forces to deal with the details of the arrangements for the evacuation.

(3) The Czech Government discharge at once all Sudeten Germans serving in the military forces or the police anywhere in Czech State territory and permit them to return home.

(4) The Czech Government liberate all political prisoners of German race.

(5) The German Government agree to permit a plebiscite to take place in those areas, which will be more definitely defined, before at latest Nov. 25. Alterations to the new frontier arising out of the plebiscite will be settled by a German-Czech or an international commission.

The plebiscite itself will be carried out under the control of an international commission. All persons who were residing in the areas in question on Oct. 28, 1918, or who were born in those parts prior to this date will be eligible to vote. A simple majority of all eligible male and female voters will determine the desire of the population to belong to either the German Reich or the Czech State. During the plebiscite both parties will withdraw their military forces out of areas which will be defined more precisely. The date and duration will be settled jointly by the German and Czech Governments.

(6) The German Government propose that an authoritative German-Czech commission should be set up to settle all further details.

APPENDIX

The evacuated Sudeten German area is to be handed over without destroying or rendering unusable in any way military, economic, or traffic establishments (plants). These include the ground organisation of the air service and all wireless stations.

All economic and traffic materials, especially the rolling stock of the railway system, in the designated areas are to be handed over undamaged. The same applies to all utility services (gasworks, power stations, &c.).

Finally, no foodstuffs, goods, cattle, raw materials, &c., are to be moved.

Exchange of Telegrams between Herr Hitler and Mr. Roosevelt¹

President Roosevelt to the Führer :

Washington, September 26th.

The fabric of peace on the Continent of Europe, if not throughout the rest of the world, is in immediate danger. The consequences of its rupture are incalculable.

Should hostilities break out, the lives of millions of men, women, and children in every country involved will most certainly be lost under circumstances of unspeakable horror. The economic system of every country involved is certain to be shattered, the social structure of every country involved may well be completely wrecked.

The United States has no political entanglements, it is caught in no mesh of hatred. The elements of all Europe have formed its civilization. The supreme desire of the American people is to live in peace, but in the event of general war they face the fact that no nation can escape some measure of the consequences of such a world catastrophe.

The traditional policy of the United States has been the furtherance of the settlement of international disputes by pacific means. It is my conviction that all people under the threat of war to-day pray that peace may be made before rather than after war.

It is imperative for peoples everywhere to recall that every civilized nation in the world voluntarily assumed solemn obligations in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 to solve controversies only by pacific methods. In addition most nations are parties to other binding treaties placing them under an obligation to preserve peace.

Furthermore, all countries have to-day available for such a peaceful solution of difficulties which may arise treaties of arbitration and conciliation to which they are parties. Whatever may be the differences in the controversies at issue, and however difficult of pacific settlement they may be, I am persuaded that there is no problem so difficult or so pressing for a solution that it cannot justly be solved by a resort to reason rather than by a resort to force.

During the present crisis, the people of the United States and their Government earnestly hoped that negotiations for an adjustment of the controversy which has now arisen in Europe might reach a successful conclusion. So long as these negotiations continue, so long will there remain hope that reason and the spirit of equity may prevail, and that the world may thereby escape the madness of a new resort to war.

On behalf of the 130,000,000 people of the United States of America and for the sake of humanity everywhere, I most earnestly appeal to you not to break off negotiations, looking to a peaceful, fair, and constructive settlement of the questions at issue. I earnestly repeat that so long as negotiations continue, differences may be reconciled. Once they are broken off, reason is banished and force produces no solution for the future good of humanity.

The Führer to President Roosevelt :

Berlin, September 27th

Your Excellency addressed to me in your telegram of September 26 an appeal in the name of the American people in the interest of peace not to break off negotiations concerning the

conflict which has arisen in Europe, and to strive for a peaceful, honourable, and constructive settlement of the question. You may be assured that I know how to appreciate the magnanimous intentions which prompted your remarks, and that I share in every way your opinion as regards the extensive results of a European war. For this very reason I can and must renounce all responsibility on behalf of the German nation and its leaders should further developments, contrary to all my best efforts, lead in fact to hostilities.

In order to arrive at a just opinion of the Sudeten German problem, it is indispensable to turn one's attention to the events in which, in the long run, these problems and their dangers have their origin. In 1918 the German nation laid down its arms in the firm belief that the conclusion of peace with her former enemies would bring realization of the principles and ideals solemnly proclaimed by President Wilson for that purpose, and which had been equally solemnly accepted as binding by all the Powers concerned in the War. Never in history has the trust of a nation been so shamefully disappointed as was then the case. The peace conditions forced upon the vanquished nations in the treaties signed in a Paris suburb fulfilled none of the promises which had been given. On the contrary, they have created in Europe a political régime which made the conquered nations into outlawed pariahs of the world, and which must be recognized by every discerning person as untenable.

One of the points in which the character of the dictates of 1919 showed itself most clearly was the foundation of the Czechoslovak State and the drawing of its frontiers without any regard to history and nationality. In this State the Sudetenland was included, although this territory was always German and although its inhabitants, after the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy, had unanimously declared their desire for *Anschluss* with the German Reich. In this way the right of self-determination proclaimed by President Wilson as the most important principle of national life was simply denied to the Sudeten Germans.

But that was not enough. The Treaties of 1919 laid upon the Czechoslovak State definite and far-reaching obligations towards the German racial group. But these responsibilities also were ignored from the first. The League of Nations failed entirely in its task of guaranteeing the fulfilment of these obligations. Since then the Sudetenland has been waging a hard fight for the preservation of its German character.

It was a natural and unavoidable development that, after the re-strengthening of the German Reich and after the re-incorporation of Austria with the Reich, the craving of the Sudeten Germans for the preservation of their culture and for closer alliance with Germany increased. In spite of the loyal attitude of the Sudeten German Party and its leaders, their disabilities in relation to the Czechs increased. It became clearer from day to day that the Prague Govern-

¹ The same telegram was also addressed to Mr. Chamberlain, M. Daladier and President Benesh.

ment were not willing to recognize the elementary rights of the Sudeten Germans. What is more, that Government tried, with ever more violent methods, to carry through the "Czechisation" of the Sudeten country. It was unavoidable that these methods should lead to ever greater and more serious tension.

The German Government at first in no way interfered in this development. Their calm reserve was maintained even in May of this year, when the Czech Government proceeded with the mobilization of their Army on the entirely unfounded pretext of German troop concentrations. The renunciation made at that time by Germany of military measures only served to stiffen the intransigence of this Government in Prague. This was clearly shown by the course of the negotiations for a peaceful settlement between the Sudeten German Party and the Czech Government. These negotiations gave the final proof that the Czechoslovak Government were far removed from treating the Sudeten problem in a fundamental manner in order to bring about a just solution.

As a result conditions in the Czechoslovak State have become unbearable in the last week, as is generally known. Political persecution and economic oppression have plunged the Sudeten Germans in nameless misery. To illustrate these conditions it suffices to point out the following. We count at the moment 214,000 Sudeten refugees, who have had to leave house and hearth in their hereditary home and seek refuge across the German frontier, because they saw in it the only and the last possibility of escaping from the revolting Czech régime of force and bloody terror.

Innumerable dead, thousands of injured, tens of thousands of detained and imprisoned persons, and deserted villages, are the accusing witnesses before the world of the outbreak of a hostility already long apparent on the part of the Prague Government (hostility which you in your telegram rightly feared); to say nothing of the systematic destruction by the Czech Government during the past 20 years of German economic life in the Sudeten German regions, which already showed every

appearance of that collapse which you foresee as the consequence of an outbreak of war.

These are the facts which compelled me to declare in my speech at Nuremberg on September 12 before the whole world that the deprivation of rights of 3,500,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia must come to an end, and that if these people could find no justice or help unaided, then both must come from the German Reich. But in order to make a last attempt to reach this goal by peaceful means I made concrete proposals for the solution of the problem in the memorandum which I handed to the British Prime Minister on September 23—proposals which in the meantime have been published.

The Czechoslovak Government having already informed the British and French Governments of their agreement that the Sudeten German area should be separated from the Czechoslovak State and united with the German Reich, the only aim of these proposals contained in the German memorandum is to secure a rapid, sure, and just fulfilment of that Czechoslovak acceptance.

I feel convinced, Mr. President, that when you visualize the whole development of the Sudeten German problem from its beginnings to the present day, you will realize that the German Government have truly not lacked either patience or the sincere desire for a peaceful solution. It is not Germany's fault that there exists a Sudeten German problem and that from it have grown the present impossible conditions. The terrible fate of those human beings concerned in this problem allows of no further delay in its solution. The possibilities of reaching agreement on a just settlement are thus exhausted by the proposals contained in the German memorandum.

It now lies, not in the hands of the German Government, but in the hands of the Czechoslovak Government, to decide whether there shall be peace or war.

Sig. Adolf Hitler.

Extract from the Führer's Conversation with the English Journalist, Mr. Ward Price, on September 19th, 1938

The Czechs say they cannot hold a plebiscite because such a measure is not provided for in their constitution. To me their constitution seems to provide for one thing only—which is that 7,000,000 Czechs shall oppress 8,000,000 of minority peoples. This Czech trouble has got to be ended once and for all, and ended now. It is a tumour which is poisoning the whole European organism. If it were allowed to go on, it would continue to infect international relations until they broke down in fatal collapse.

This condition has lasted for 20 years. No one can calculate what it has cost the peoples of Europe in that time. It was the existence of Czecho-Slovakia as an ally of Soviet Russia, thrust forward into the very heart of Germany, that forced me to create a great German Air Force. That in turn led to France and Britain increasing their own air fleets. I have doubled the German Air Fleet once already because of the situation now prevailing in Czecho-Slovakia. If we failed to settle the crisis now, Field-Marshal Göring would soon be asking me to order it to be doubled again, and then the British and French would redouble, and so the mad race would go on.

Do you think I like being obliged to stop with my great building development schemes all over the country in order to send half a million German workmen to construct at top speed a

huge system of defence works along our western frontier? I would rather they could be employed in constructing workers' settlements, splendid motor roads, new schools, and public welfare institutions, than in raising unproductive fortifications. But while Czech oppression of a German minority keeps Europe at fever heat I have to be ready for whatever may come. I have studied the Maginot Line, and learned much from it, but we have built something according to our own ideas which is better still, and which will stand against any force in the world, if in the event of our being attacked we chose to remain on the defensive.

All this is madness, for no one in Germany dreams of attacking France. We harbour no resentment against France; on the contrary there is a strong feeling of sympathy in Germany towards her. Nor does any German want war with Britain either.

Herr Gott, what couldn't I do in Germany and for Germany if it were not for this infernal Czech tyranny over a few million Germans. But it must stop. It *shall* stop.

That French Ministers should hitherto have promised to stand by Czecho-Slovakia, was a contradiction of their own past actions. France had allowed the Saar territory to vote itself out of French control, though the Saar had for France great economic, political, and strategical importance.

Yet now some people talked of bringing about a world war for a country where they had no economic or other direct interests at stake, and did so solely in order to enable the Czechs to deny to the Sudetens what the French themselves had conceded to the Saarlanders. In the same way England had let the Southern Irish have their complete autonomy, and a hundred years ago Holland gave the Belgians their independence.

The Czechs had never been an independent people until the Peace Treaties raised them to an undeserved and artificial mastery over minorities more numerous than themselves. In the Middle Ages they had been a German principality. Two hundred years before Queen Elizabeth there had been a German university in Prague.

Modern Germany had been created by the diplomatic language used in the German Emperor's government offices in that city which he made for a time his capital.

Once, indeed, during the Hussite wars the Czechs had gained a temporary independence. They used it like the Bolsheviks, burning and ravaging, until the Germans rose and crushed them.

The creation of this heterogeneous Czechoslovak Republic after the war was lunacy. It has none of the characteristics of a nation, whether from the standpoint of ethnology, strategy, economics, or language.

To set an intellectually inferior handful of Czechs to rule over minorities belonging to races like the Germans, Poles, Hungarians, with a thousand years of culture behind them, was a work of folly and ignorance.

The Sudeten Germans have no respect for the Czechs and will never accept their rule. After the war the Allied Powers declared that Germany was unworthy to govern blacks, yet at the same time they set second-rate people like the Czechs in authority over 3½ million Germans of the highest character and culture.

If a powerful Germany had existed then, this would have been impossible, and as soon as Germany grew strong again the Sudetens began to assist themselves. The Czech Government is desperately trying to get the great European Powers divided, for otherwise the Czech State cannot go on. But it is impossible to maintain so unnatural an institution by political and diplomatic cunning.

If the Czech had possessed a great statesman he would long ago have let the Sudeten Germans join the Reich, and been content thereby to ensure that continuance of autonomy for the Czechs themselves. But Dr. Benes is a politician, not a statesman.

MUSOLINI'S WARNINGS AND ADMONITIONS

Demand for the Right of Self-Determination !

The Letter to Lord Runciman of September 15th, 1938

On September 15th Mussolini published the following article in the "Popolo d'Italia" under the title "Letter to Runciman":

"When you left London a few weeks ago for Prague the world was not clear in what capacity you had gone and with what responsibility. Was your mission official? Was it unofficial? This remained wrapped in a kind of London fog. Was your task solely one of mediation, or would it at a certain moment become arbitration? Anyway, you reached Prague with a troop of collaborators and universal attention was concentrated on you.

No-one could help admiring the zeal with which you addressed yourself to your difficult task. In the last few weeks you will have read scores of memoranda and hundreds of letters, received scores of people and conferred with the leaders of all the nationalities, for there is not only the one Sudeten problem, but a Magyar, Polish and Slovak problem. There are as many problems as the nationalities with which Benes's republic was inflated at Versailles.

I believe that in your heart you reached this conclusion—as no Czechoslovak nation exists, so does no Czechoslovak State exist.

You, Mr. Runciman, have not come among a family where there prevails that minimum of cordiality and understanding found among individuals of the same blood.

The component parts of the Czechoslovak family are of different races and cannot bear one another. They are animated not by a centripetal, but a centrifugal force. Constraint alone holds them together. If that

La Lettera del 15 settembre 1938 a Lord Runciman

Quando, alcune settimane fa, lasciate Londra per dirigersi su Praga, il mondo non ebbe chiara l'idea su quel che sareste andato a fare e in quale veste e con quale responsabilità. La vostra missione era ufficiale? Non era ufficiale? Tutto ciò rimase come avvolto in una specie di nebbia londinese. La vostra opera era soltanto di mediazione o, ad un certo momento, sarebbe stata di arbitro? Comunque voi scendeste a Praga con uno stuolo di collaboratori e su di voi fu concentrata la universale attenzione.

Tutti furono costretti ad ammirare lo zelo col quale vi accingeste alla penosa fatica. Avrete letto in queste settimane decine di memoriali e centinaia di lettere, ricevuto decine di persone, conferito coi capi di tutte le nazionalità, poichè non esiste soltanto un problema sudeto, ma uno magiaro, uno polacco, uno slovacco: tanti problemi quante sono le nazionalità con le quali a Versaglia fu «inflazionata» la repubblica di Benes.

Io credo che nel vostro intimo siate già arrivato a questa conclusione: come non esiste una nazione cecoslovacca così non esiste uno Stato cecoslovacco. Voi, signor Runciman, non siete capitato in una famiglia dove c'è un minimo di cordialità e di comprensione come fra individui dello stesso sangue. No. I «componenti» della famiglia ceco-slovacca sono di razze diverse e non si possono soffrire. Essi non sono animati da una forza centripeta ma da una forza centrifuga. Solo la costrizione li tiene insieme. Se questa costrizione cessasse, il fenomeno di dislocamento della

constraint ceased to exist, the phenomenon of Czechoslovak dislocation would be immediate and irresistible.

A Bohemia—a historical designation—should have been created at Versailles, with a homogeneous population of Czechs, but instead they preferred to 'blow up' (gonfiare) a 'Czechoslovakia'—a unit which had never existed—and thus created an artificial State which, from its birth, contained in itself the seeds of its own weakness and dissolution.

I believe, Signor Runciman, that you have seen the situation in the terms in which I have outlined it, and perhaps you ask what was there left for you to do? In fact, there was talk of your returning to London. But no. After Hitler's speech you were in a fine position, Signor Runciman.

You could act and accomplish something which would go down to history. The time for compromise is past. Carlsbad has been outstripped. Benes, as an old Parliamentarian, has lost the race.

You, Signor Runciman, ought simply to propose to Benes a plebiscite, not only for the Sudetens, but for all the nationalities that ask for it. Will Benes refuse the plebiscite? If so, then you could let it be known that England will think seven times seven before going to war simply to preserve a fictitious State, monstrous even in its geographical shape, so that it has been called the crocodile State and the sausage State.

If London let it be known that it would not move nobody else would move. The game is not worth the candle.

If Hitler proposed to annex 3,000,000 Czechs Europe would be right in moving, but Hitler does not even think of it. The writer of this letter is in a position to tell you confidentially that even if 3,000,000 Czechs were offered to him. Hitler would politely but calmly refuse such a present.

The Fuehrer is busy and anxious about 3,500,000 Germans, and only about them. Nobody can deny him that right. Nobody can oppose the accomplishment of such a duty, least of all we Italians, who have precedents of the same kind.

Courage, Mr. Runciman. Propose the plebiscite or rather plebiscites. It is a fine and delicate task. There are compact zones where a plebiscite means annexation, pure and simple, to the brother nations. There are zones where the races are so terribly intermingled that a clean cut is impossible.

Here the equalised canton régime or something like it could be applied. And this also would be the democratic tradition.

Once the plebiscite areas were fixed, the date, the methods and the system of control would have to be arranged: this control could be of an international character, as in the case of the Saar, where the results were satisfactory.

I have an idea, Mr. Runciman, that this letter will interest you. If this matter were settled, there would be another simplifying change in the map of Europe and a centre of

Ceko-slovacchia sarebbe inevitabile e irresistibile.

A Versaglia si doveva creare una Boemia — nome storico — con una omogenea popolazione di Ceki; si volle invece gonfiare una Ceko-slovacchia — entità mai esistita! — e si creò uno Stato artificioso che recava in sé sin dalla nascita gli elementi della sua debolezza e della sua dissoluzione.

Io credo, signor Runciman, che voi avete visto questa situazione nei termini in cui io l'ho tracciata. E, forse, vi siete domandato che cosa vi restasse da fare. (Si è infatti parlato di un vostro ritorno a Londra). No. Dopo il discorso di Hitler, viene il bello, per voi, o signor Runciman. Voi potete agire e compiere qualche cosa che passerà alla storia. Non è più il tempo dei compromessi. Karlsbad è superata. Benes — da vecchio parlamentare — ha perduto la corsa. Voi, signor Runciman, dovete semplicemente proporre a Benes il plebiscito non soltanto per i Sudeti, ma per tutte le nazionalità che lo domanderanno. Benes respingerà il plebiscito? E allora voi gli potreste far sapere che l'Inghilterra ci penserà sette volte sette prima di scendere in guerra semplicemente per conservare uno Stato-finzione mostruoso anche nella sua conformazione geografica, tanto che fu chiamato a volta a volta Stato cocodrillo o Stato salsiccia. Se Londra fa sapere che sta ferma, nessuno si muove. Il gioco — qui — non vale assolutamente la candela, anche se è infilata nei candelabri massonici del Grande Oriente. Se Hitler pretendesse di annettersi tre milioni e mezzo di Ceki, l'Europa avrebbe ragione di commuoversi e muoversi. Ma Hitler non pensa ciò. Chi vi scrive questa lettera è in grado di dirvi — confidenzialmente — che qualora gli venissero offerti tre milioni e mezzo di Ceki, Hitler declinerebbe garbatamente, ma risolutamente, tanto regalo. Il Führer si occupa e preoccupa dei tri milioni e mezzo di Tedeschi soltanto dei loro. Nessuno gli può contestare tale diritto. Nessuno può opporsi all'adempimento di tale dovere. Meno di tutti noi Italiani, che abbiamo dei precedenti in materia.

Coraggio, mister Runciman. Proponete il plebiscito, anzi i plebisciti. E un compito magnifico e delicato. Ci sono delle zone compatte, dove il plebiscito significherebbe l'annessione pura e semplice ai popoli fratelli; ci sono delle zone — viceversa — dove le razze si sono terribilmente frammischiate ed un taglio netto è impossibile. Qui potrebbe entrare in scena il regime delle così dette cantonalizzazioni paritarie o qualche cosa del genere. Il che sarebbe, fra l'altro, nella tradizione democratica.

Fissate le zone del plebiscito, rimarrebbero da stabilire la data, le modalità, il controllo, che potrebbe essere di carattere internazionale come già avvenne con risultati soddisfacenti nel plebiscito della Saar.

Ho l'impressione, mister Runciman, che questa lettera vi interesserà. A vicenda conclusa ci sarebbe un'altra modificazione semplificativa nella carta geografica d'Europa e la

disorder and anxiety would be eliminated. Prague, after peaceful "deflation", would be stronger and more secure and could proceed on its way with less effort, because no longer hampered by the dead weight of hostile nationalities. While it is practically impossible for Italy to pursue a policy of friendship with the present Czechoslovakia, she could do so with the Bohemia of tomorrow. Thus the new politico-territorial situation would provide a greater measure of equilibrium and fresh possibilities and—most important of all—Europe would be spared a war.

Millions of people regard the avoidance of a war as indispensably necessary.

Frontiers traced with ink can be altered with ink.

It is a different thing when frontiers have been traced by the hand of God and with the blood of men.

eliminazione di un focolaio di disordine e di inquietudine. Praga, pacificamente «deflazionata», sarebbe più forte e più sicura e camminerebbe più spedita, poiché non avrebbe più al piede la palla di piombo delle nazionalità ostili. Mentre per l'Italia è praticamente impossibile fare oggi una politica d'amicizia con la Ceko-slovacchia attuale, ciò sarebbe possibile con la Boemia di domani. Così la nuova situazione politico-territoriale determinerebbe nuovi equilibri e nuove possibilità e soprattutto l'Europa farebbe l'economia di una guerra.

Milioni di uomini pensano che questa economia è strettamente necessaria.

Frontiere tracciate con gli inchiostri da altri inchiostri possono essere modificate.

Altra cosa quando le frontiere furono tracciate dalla mano di Dio e dal sangue degli uomini.

From his Speeches to the Italian people

Trieste, September 18th.

Triestines!

For the fourth time I have the good fortune, the honour and the joy to address you. The first time was in 1918 when the vibration of the great event accomplished by victory was to be seen and felt in the atmosphere of your city. I returned in 1920 and 1921 when we were tormented by the questions of a peace that was mediocre and in some respects wrong, while the Trieste Fascist fighting units were energetically and heroically clearing your city of the many, too many, remnants of the old regime.

After many years I again return to you and have been able to see at a glance and recognise the tremendous progress made by your and our Trieste.

I have not come to raise your moral as was foolishly stated by the quill-drivers on the other side of the Alps and of the sea. You do not need this, for your moral is always high. Neither have I come to emphasise the interests and feelings of your city to the Italians, for the Italians of many generations have the name of Trieste in their hearts. I have come to see what you have done and to get an idea as to how the stages towards the attainment of this aim can be accelerated. I have come to hear you and to speak to you.

In the history of Trieste there are no particular phases which have not been also phases in the history of the common fatherland.

In 1866, when the young Kingdom of Italy, in a military alliance with Prussia, extended its frontiers to the Isonzo, superficial observers might have regarded the fate of Trieste as sealed. Sixteen years later Trieste responded with the gesture of Oberdan, while irredentism inflamed the whole Italian youth. In 1914 the Dual Monarchy cast the die, played the highest stake and lost. You experienced four years of waiting which, in their significance, were longer than the preceding fifty years. Then came victory and, with it, the political reunion with Italy. I say political reunion, because we were always spiritually united. Twenty years later, in March 1938, occurred that fateful event which, as you are all aware had been outlined since 1878. Millions of people desired it, and no one opposed it. Trieste was confronted with a new situation, but Trieste is prepared to face it and overcome it. Trieste knows that geography is not a matter of opinion and in the long run avenges itself

Trieste, 18 settembre

E' questa, o triestini e triestine, la quarta volta che ho la ventura, l'onore e la gioia di rivolgervi la parola. La prima fu nel dicembre del 1918, quando nell'aria della vostra città e nelle vostre anime c'era ancora, visibile e sensibile, la vibrazione del grande evento che si era compiuto con la Vittoria. Tornai nel 1920 e 1921, quando eravamo tormentati dalle questioni di una pace mediocre e per alcuni aspetti storta, mentre lo squadristmo triestino ripuliva energicamente ed eroicamente la vostra città dai molti, dai troppi reliquati dell'antico regime.

Dopo molti anni torno tra voi e sin dal primo sguardo ho potuto riconoscere il grande, il poderoso balzo innanzi compiuto dalla vostra, dalla nostra Trieste.

Non sono venuto tra voi per rialzare il vostro morale, così come gli stilopennivori d'oltre monte e d'oltre mare hanno scioccamente stampato. Non ne avete bisogno perchè il vostro morale fu sempre altissimo. Nè sono venuto per sottolineare dinanzi agli italiani gli interessi e i sentimenti della vostra città, perchè gli italiani da parecchie generazioni hanno il nome di Trieste nel cuore.

Sono venuto per vedere ciò che avete fatto e per vedere altresì come sia possibile di bruciare rapidamente le tappe per giungere alla mèta. Sono venuto per ascoltarvi e per parlarvi.

Non ci sono svolte particolari della storia di Trieste che non siano svolte, fasi, cicli della comune storia della Patria. Quando nel 1866 il giovane Regno d'Italia alleato militarmente con la Prussia fermò i suoi confini all'Iudrio, sembrò ai superficiali che il destino di Trieste fosse sigillato. Sedici anni dopo Trieste risponde col gesto di Oberdan, mentre l'irredentismo infiammava tutta la gioventù italiana. Nel 1914 la duplice monarchia getta i dadi, tenta la partita suprema: la perde. Quattro lunghi anni di attesa per voi, o triestini, più lunghi del cinquantennio precedente. Viene la Vittoria. Voi siete ricongiunti politicamente all'Italia, politicamente perchè spiritualmente lo foste in ogni tempo.

Vent'anni dopo, nel marzo del 1938, si compie un evento fatale, che si delineava già dal 1878, come voi ben sapete.

on all those who think it is. Trieste counts on your force. Trieste cannot, does not and will not evade the new tasks.

Triestines!

There are moments in the life of nations when the men who lead them must not decline their responsibility but must proudly assume it in full. What I am going to tell you now is not dictated solely by the policy of the Rome-Berlin axis, which has its historical justification, nor even by sentiments of friendship towards the Magyars, the Poles and the other nationalities of what may be called Mosaic State No. 2.

What I am going to tell you is dictated by a feeling of responsibility which I would call more than Italian, namely European. When the problems which history sets us are combined with such a degree of harassing complexity, the solution that must be imposed is the simplest, the most logical, the most radical, what we Fascists call totalitarian.

When faced with the problem which is at present tormenting Europe, the solution has only one name: Plebiscites. Plebiscites for all nationalities that demand them, for the nationalities that were constrained in what was intended to be the Great Czechoslovakia which today reveals its organic inconsistency.

But there is another thing to be said. Sometimes events move with the speed of an avalanche and then immediate action must be taken to avoid disorders and complications. The need for rapid action must have been understood by the British Prime Minister, who hastened from London to Munich, a flying messenger of peace, for delay not only does not help the solution, but determines the fatal clash. This solution is already beginning, despite the campaign of Moscow which penetrates into the hearts of the European peoples.

We trust that in this last hour a peaceful solution may be reached. We hope that, if that is not possible, the eventual conflict may be limited and circumscribed. But if that cannot be done and a front is formed universally for or against Prague, know that the place of Italy is already chosen.

Treviso, September 21st.

If Czechoslovakia is today in a position that might be called delicate, the reason is that it was not simply—at present it is possible to say “was”—Czechoslovakia, but rather Czecho-Germano-Polish-Magyar-Ruthene-Roumanian-Slovakia.

I must today urge that from the moment when this problem is faced, it must be solved comprehensively.

Padua, September 24th.

Comrades!

In Gorizia I stated that even if the horizon was brighter any optimism regarding the European situation must be regarded as premature. In Treviso I announced that the British Prime Minister was piloting the ship of peace towards the port, but I did not say that it had arrived. Today I add that the position resembles the weather today; this morning the sky was grey, but there are signs that the sun will soon break through.

It seemed as if with Prague's acceptance of the Franco-British plan the situation could be considered as drawing to a close. But, as often happens in so-called democratic States, the Government which had accepted the plan and had the moral responsibility for putting it into effect has resigned. It has been

Milioni di uomini lo hanno voluto, nessuno si è opposto. Trieste si trova di fronte ad una nuova situazione, ma Trieste è pronta ad affrontarla e a superarla; Trieste sa che la geografia non è un'opinione e si vendica a lungo andare di coloro che tale la stimano. Trieste conta sulle sue forze, Trieste non può voltare, non volta, non volterà mai le spalle al suo mare.

Triestini!

Vi sono dei momenti nella vita dei popoli in cui gli uomini che li dirigono non devono declinare le loro responsabilità, ma devono fieramente assumerle in pieno. Quello che sto per dirvi non è soltanto dettato dalla politica dell'asse Roma-Berlino, che trova le sue giustificazioni storiche, contingenti, nè soltanto dal sentimento di amicizia che ci lega ai magiari, ai polacchi e alle altre nazionalità di quello che si può chiamare lo Stato mosaico numero due.

Quello che sto per dirvi è dettato da un senso di coscienza che vorrei chiamare più che italiano, europeo. Quando i problemi posti dalla storia sono giunti ad un grado di complicazione tormentosa, la soluzione che si impone è la più semplice, la più logica, la più radicale, quella che noi fascisti chiamiamo totalitaria.

Nei confronti del problema che agita in questo momento l'Europa la soluzione ha un nome solo: PLEBISCITI. Plebisciti per tutte le nazionalità che li domandano, per le nazionalità che furono costrette in quella che volle essere la grande Cecoslovacchia e che oggi rivela la sua inconsistency organica.

Ma un'altra cosa va detta, ed è che a un certo momento gli eventi assumono il moto vorticoso della valanga, per cui occorre fare presto se si vogliono evitare i disordini e complicazioni.

Questo bisogno del fare presto deve essere stato sentito dal Primo Ministro britannico, il quale si è spostato da Londra a Monaco, messaggero volante della pace, perchè ogni ritardo non affretta la soluzione, ma determina l'urto fatale. Questa soluzione sta già, malgrado la campagna di Mosca, penetrando nel cuore dei popoli europei.

Noi ci auguriamo che in queste ultime ore si raggiunga una soluzione pacifica. Noi ci auguriamo altresì che se questo non è possibile il conflitto eventuale sia limitato e circoscritto. Ma se questo non avvenisse e si determinasse pro o contro Praga uno schieramento di carattere universale, si sappia che il posto dell'Italia è già scelto.

Treviso, 21 settembre

Se oggi la Cecoslovacchia si trova in un momento che si potrebbe chiamare delicato gli è perchè non era semplicemente — ormai si può dire «era» — Cecoslovacchia, ma Ceco-tedesco-polacco-magiario-ruteno-romeno-slovacchia.

Ora insisto perchè dal momento che si affronta questo problema lo si risolva in modo integrale.

replaced by a General whom all declare to be a great, too great a friend of Moscow. The first act of the new Government was to proclaim general mobilisation. In the face of this fact which comes on top of the regime of terror established by the Czechs in the Sudeten German regions, Germany has given a supreme proof of moderation. She has sent her demands to Prague and given a time limit until October 1st for a reply. The Prague Government has therefore exactly six days time to find the path of reason. It would be truly absurd and even criminal if millions of the people of Europe were to hurl themselves at one another simply to maintain the overlordship of M. Benesh over eight different races.

But it would be a very grave mistake to give a false interpretation of this patient attitude of Germany. In the democratic countries irresponsibility holds sway, for everyone tries to shift the responsibility on to the opposition party or on to his neighbour. In the so-called totalitarian States such shifting of responsibility is impossible.

The problem with which the conscience of the peoples is now faced must be solved in a complete and definite manner. There is still time for such a solution, and if a conflict should nevertheless break out there is a possibility of localising it. But in the last few days certain more or less influential parties and tendencies in the Western countries seem to have thought that the time has come to settle accounts with the totalitarian States. In this case these parties and tendencies will not find themselves faced by two separate countries, but by two countries which will form a single bloc.

Vicenza, September 26th.

Blackshirts!

If my speeches were speeches in the traditional sense of the word, I should refrain from adding to their number in your city so renowned in the fields of art and of heroism. But they are, in point of length at least, not so much discourses as direct "contacts" with the soul of the people.

Yesterday began what might be called the week of expectation and of passion for Europe. It is now universally recognized that mistakes were made in the peace treaties of 1919. I recognized that as early as the end of 1921, but would ask you not to attribute prophetic powers to me, as such are not characteristic of our race.

It was not difficult at that time to foresee what has in fact been happening in the last few days. What should be done when a mistake has been made? Rectify it! According to the wisdom handed down to us from antiquity, to err is human, but to persist in error is diabolical. Those concerned not only refuse to rectify the blunder of the inordinate distension of Czechoslovakia, but are seeking to maintain it.

And for that, the nations of Europe are to fly at one another's throats! Until the contrary is proved, however, I will not believe that what would be one of the most tragic paradoxes in the annals of the human race will happen.

Nevertheless, men conscious of their responsibilities cannot ignore any hypothesis, however absurd it may appear.

Up to the present Italy has taken no military measures, but, if the others continue to call up reservists and mass them on the frontiers and to concentrate their fleets, none of you will be surprised if Italy takes her own steps.

We have given the world proof of our resolution and of our will. We conquered the Empire, not only by fighting against the Abyssinian armies prepared and led by Europeans, but also by resisting the economic assault decreed by 52 States.

Padova, 24 settembre

Camerati!

A Gorizia io dissi che pur essendovi una schiarita all'orizzonte, ogni ottimismo per quanto concerne la situazione europea doveva essere considerato prematuro. A Treviso annunciavo che il Primo Ministro britannico stava pilotando la navicella della pace verso il porto, ma non dissi che vi sarebbe arrivato. Oggi aggiungo che la situazione ha gli aspetti di questa giornata: stamattina era molto grigio, fra poco potrebbe spuntare il sole.

Pareva che con l'accettazione da parte di Praga del piano cosiddetto franco-inglese di Londra, si potesse considerare avviata la situazione all'epilogo. Ma è accaduto quello che accade sovente nei regimi cosiddetti democratici. Il governo che, avendo accettato quel piano aveva l'obbligo morale di restare in carica per farlo applicare, si è viceversa dimesso; il suo posto è stato occupato da un generale che tutti dichiarano molto, troppo amico di Mosca. Il primo atto di questo nuovo governo è stata la proclamazione della mobilitazione generale. Davanti a questo fatto che si aggiunge al regime di terrore che i Cèchi hanno instaurato nei territori dei Sudeti, la Germania ha dato una prova suprema di moderazione, ha mandato delle richieste a Praga ed ha dato tempo sino al 1 ottobre per avere una risposta.

Ci sono, dunque, esattamente sei giorni di tempo perchè i governanti di Praga ritrovino la via della saggezza. Perchè sarebbe veramente assurdo, e aggiungo criminale che milioni di europei dovessero scagliarsi gli uni contro gli altri semplicemente per mantenere la signoria del signor Benes su otto razze diverse.

Ma sarebbe grave, gravissimo errore dare una falsa interpretazione a questo atteggiamento longanime della Germania.

Gli è che in regime di democrazia domina l'irresponsabilità perchè ognuno pensa di scaricare le responsabilità sul partito opposto, sul suo vicino.

Nei regimi cosiddetti totalitari questo slittamento di responsabilità è impossibile.

Il problema, ora che è posto innanzi alla coscienza dei popoli, deve essere risolto in maniera integrale e definitiva. C'è il tempo per questa soluzione, e se un conflitto dovesse comunque scoppiare c'è la possibilità di localizzarlo. Ma accade in questi giorni che partiti e tendenze più o meno imperanti nei paesi d'ell'occidente, ritengono che questo sia il momento opportuno per fare i conti con gli Stati totalitari. In questo caso questi partiti e tendenze non si troveranno di fronte a due paesi, ma a due paesi che formeranno un blocco solo.

Vicenza, 26 settembre

Camicie Nere!

Se i miei fossero discorsi nel significato tradizionale della parola, io mi guarderei dall'aggiungerne un altro alla serie, in questa vostra città, splendente nei campi dell'arte e in quelli dell'eroismo. Ma i miei, almeno dal punto di vista della loro brevità, non sono discorsi, sono piuttosto prese di contatto immediato con l'anima del popolo.

Si può dire che è cominciata da ieri quella che si potrebbe chiamare la settimana di attesa e di passione dell'Europa. E' universalmente riconosciuto, oramai, che nei trattati di pace del 1919 furono com-

The more paper accumulated on the desks of Geneva, the more convinced I became that the Italian people would never for a moment waver.

Today the protagonists of sanctions have disappeared from the horizon. Many of them have fallen into oblivion, or are covered with shame.

The Italian people are, after four years of severest ordeal, ready as never before to face what may come. The Italian people have in these days, my comrades, but one face: the face of calm and determination. That is the face of a strong people.

Verona, September 26th

Blackshirts of Verona!

With this majestic concourse of people accompanied by such a superb array of forces, my visit to the people of Venetia and my pilgrimage to the sacred fields of our most glorious battles ends.

Our adversaries, to whom I alluded the other day before a seething mass of the Blackshirts of Belluno—those adversaries assembled beneath the signs of the triangle and of the hammer and sickle had in these last days given open expression to their miserable hopes.

These multitudes who have responded with one voice to my demands demonstrate for all to see—that never before was there such complete, intimate and profound communion of thought between Fascism and the Italian people. This Italian people is not disorganized and soulless like many other peoples: it is powerfully united, spiritually armed and ready for material armament.

The development of the events which hang suspended over men's heads at this time enables us to sum up the position today.

The efforts made by the British Prime Minister to arrive at a solution of the present problem deserve to be recognized and appreciated. The patience displayed by Germany also deserves recognition.

The German "memorandum" is not a departure from the general lines approved in London and it is obvious that, if the Czechs were left to their own devices, they would be the first to recognize that it would not be worth while to start a war, as to the issue of which there could be not doubt.

Now that the problem has been raised by the irresistible forces of history, it must be solved in its triple aspect: German, Magyar and Polish.

If there is a man in Europe at this moment who is better qualified than any other to realize what must now happen, that man is the President of the Czechoslovak Republic. He was one of the most determined, if not one of the principal underminers of the Dual Monarchy of the Habsburgs.

At that time he spoke of a Bohemian solution, and expressly advocated this in this review "The Czechoslovak Nation". He went round discussing this idea in every place including Geneva.

Geneva is in the condition which doctors call comatose. All those who oppose Italy will end like that.

The talk indulged in at that time was weak and facile.

That has been proved by the history of the last twenty years.

Events can only develop as follows: there are still a few days in which to find peaceful solution. If such a solution is not found, it would seem that no human power can prevent a conflict. If that conflict breaks out, it may be localized for a time.

I still believe that Europe will not expose itself to fire and sword and scald itself, in order to boil Prague's addled egg.

Europe is faced with many tasks, but surely the least urgent of these is to increase the number of cemeteries so frequently to be met with on the frontier of States.

messi degli errori. Io l'ho riconosciuto fin dal 1921. Vi prego, tuttavia, di non attribuirmi delle qualità profetiche, perchè i profeti non appartengono alla nostra razza.

Era facile fin d'allora prevedere quello che sta accadendo in questi giorni. Ora, dinanzi ad un errore che cosa si deve fare? Ripararlo. Perchè secondo la nostra sapienza antica, errare è umano ma perseverare nell'errore è diabolico. Ora non solo non si vuol riparare quell'errore che si commise gonfiando smisuratamente la Cecoslovacchia, ma si vuol mantenere quest'errore.

E per questo i popoli di Europa dovrebbero precipitarsi gli uni contro gli altri. Ora, fino a prova contraria, io non credo che si possa verificare questo che sarebbe uno dei più tragici paradossi della storia umana.

Tuttavia gli uomini coscienti della loro responsabilità non possono respingere nemmeno quelle che potrebbero apparire le ipotesi più assurde.

Fino ad oggi l'Italia non ha preso alcuna misura di carattere militare, ma se gli altri continuano a richiamare dei riservisti, ad ammassarli alle frontiere, se ci sono dei concentramenti di flotte, nessuno di voi, è chiaro, si stupirà se anche l'Italia prenderà le sue misure.

Il mondo ha già avuto la prova della nostra risoluzione e della nostra volontà. Noi ci siamo conquistati l'Impero non solo lottando contro gli eserciti abissini preparati e guidati dagli europei, ma resistendo all'assedio economico che era stato decretato da cinquantadue Stati. Più si ammucchiavano le carte sui tavoli di Ginevra e più io ero sicuro che il Popolo italiano non avrebbe mai minimamente vacillato.

Oggi tutti coloro che furono i protagonisti delle sanzioni sono scomparsi dall'orizzonte. Molti di essi sono caduti nell'oblio o si sono umiliati nella vergogna.

Il Popolo italiano, dopo quattro anni di severissime prove, è pronto come non mai ad affrontare quelle successive. Il Popolo italiano in questi giorni, o camerati, ha un volto solo: il volto della calma e della decisione. Questo è il volto di un forte Popolo.

Verona, 26 settembre

Con questa maestosa adunata di popolo, accompagnata da uno schieramento superbo di forze, si chiude il mio viaggio tra le genti del Veneto e il mio pellegrinaggio sui campi sacri delle nostre gloriose battaglie.

I nostri avversari, coloro ai quali io allusi l'altro giorno davanti alla fremente adunata delle Camicie Nere di Belluno, i nostri avversari raccolti sotto i segni del triangolo e della falce e martello avevano in questi ultimi tempi dato corpo alle loro pietosissime speranze.

Queste moltitudini che hanno risposto in modo univoco alle mie domande dimostrano a tutti, dico a tutti, che mai come in questo momento fu totale, intima, profonda la comunione tra Fascismo e popolo italiano. E questo popolo italiano non è disorganizzato e senza anima come molti altri popoli; è potentemente inquadrato, armato spiritualmente e pronto ad esserlo anche materialmente.

Lo svolgersi degli eventi che tengono in questo momento sospesi gli animi, ci permette oggi di fare il punto della situazione.

Bisogna riconoscere e apprezzare gli sforzi che il Primo Ministro britannico ha compiuto per dare una soluzione al problema dell'ora.

There is however a third eventuality to be faced: that the conflict assumes such a character as to involve us directly. In that event we shall have, and can have, no hesitation.

I should add that these three phases may follow one another with great rapidity.

It is useless for the diplomats to exhaust themselves in trying to save Versailles. Versailles and the Europe constructed at Versailles, often in monumental ignorance of geography and history, are in their death throes. Their fate will be decided this week, and this week there may arise the new Europe: the Europe of justice for all and reconciliation between the nations. We who bear the emblem of the victors, are for the new Europe.

Bisogna uguale riconoscimento fare per la longanimità di cui ha dato prova fin qui la Germania.

Il « memorandum » tedesco non si discosta dalle linee che erano state approvate nella riunione di Londra. E' di tutta evidenza che se i Cèki saranno lasciati a contare sulle loro forze saranno i primi forse a riconoscere che non vale la pena d'impegnare un combattimento sul cui esito finale non può esistere dubbio alcuno.

Dal momento che è stato posto dalle forze irresistibili della storia il problema che ha un triplice aspetto: tedesco, magiaro, polacco, deve essere integralmente risolto.

Se vi è uomo in questo momento in Europa che è il più indicato a rendersi conto di quello che succede, quest'uomo è il Presidente della repubblica cecoslovacca. Egli è stato uno degli artefici più ostinati, se non maggiori, della disgregazione della duplice monarchia asburgica.

Allora egli parlava di una nazione boema. La sua rivista che si intitolava: « La Nazione cecoslovacca » sosteneva ciò esplicitamente. Ed egli stesso lo andava dichiarando dovunque ivi compresa Ginevra.

Ginevra è in quello stato che i medici chiamano comatoso. Tutti quelli che si oppongono all'Italia devono finire così.

Ora le parole pronunciate in quel tempo furono labilissime. Questi venti anni di storia lo honna dimostrato.

Lo sviluppo degli avvenimenti può svolgersi secondo queste linee: ci sono ancora alcuni giorni di tempo per trovare una soluzione pacifica. Se questa non si trova, e quasi sforzo sovrumano poter impedire un conflitto. Se questo scoppia, in un primo tempo può essere localizzato.

Io credo ancora che l'Europa non vorrà mettersi a ferro e fuoco, non vorrà bruciare se stessa per cuocere l'uovo imputrito di Praga.

L'Europa si trova di fronte a molti bisogni, ma certamente il meno urgente di tutti è quello di aumentare il numero degli Ossari che sorgono così frequenti sulle frontiere degli Stati.

Vi è tuttavia da prevedere il terzo tempo: quello nel quale il carattere del conflitto sarà tale che ci impegnerà direttamente. E allora non avremo e non permetteremo nessuna esitazione.

Debbo ancora aggiungere che la successione di questi tre tempi può essere straordinariamente rapida.

E' inutile che i diplomatici si affaticino ancora per salvare Versaglia. L'Eu-

ropa che fu costruita a Versaglia, spesso con una piramidale ignoranza della geografia e della storia, questa Versaglia agonizza. La sua sorte si decide in questa settimana. E' in questa settimana che può sorgere la nuova Europa: l'Europa della giustizia per tutti e della riconciliazione fra i popoli.

EXHIBITION

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HOME TO THE REICH !

A Testament and its fulfilment

The official declaration of the German Deputies and Senators in Prague of June 1st and 9th, 1920

"As the chosen representatives of the oppressed German people in the Czechoslovak State, we hereby make the following solemn declaration before the people of this State, all Europe and the whole civilized world, on the occasion of our entering the Czechoslovak Parliament:

On the strength of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, a State has come into being in the middle of Europe, containing about 6½ million Czechs and, among others, nearly 4 million Germans. Our representations before and during the peace negotiations were in vain: in vain our universal desire to determine the destiny of our territory in our own way. Equally in vain was our contention that such an amorphous State did not correspond to Wilson's 14 points or to the conception of democracy; that it could never know any peace and, composed as it was of impossibly heterogeneous elements, would always constitute a threat to European peace.

We representatives of the German people in the Czech State declare that the conditions and bases adopted by the Allied Powers when drafting the peace treaties were false, that this State was created at the cost of historical truth and that the Great Powers in question were deceived as to the real state of affairs.

The treaty concluded on September 10th 1919 between the Czechoslovak Republic (represented only by members of the Czech nation) and the Allied and Associated Powers is based on the assumption that the people of Bohemia, Moravia and part of Silesia as also the people of Slovakia decided of their own free will to combine and did in fact so combine in a permanent alliance in order to create a uniform, sovereign and independent State to be called "the Czechoslovak Republic".

We maintain on the contrary that the Germans of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia and the Germans of Slovakia never desired to unite with the Czechs or to form an alliance for the formation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Austrian Reichstag deputies elected in 1911, in the German Sudeten districts in 1919 expressly declared after the collapse of Austria, as the properly constituted representatives of those districts and the spokesmen of the universal will of the population (clearly expressed in innumerable popular meetings and decisions of Communes) that they desired to belong to German Austria as German Bohemia, Sudetenland, German South-Moravia and Böhmerwaldgau respectively. The Czechoslovak Republic was thus the result of a one-sided desire of the Czechs and it illegally occupied these German districts by force of arms. The population of the German Sudeten districts were never consulted and, as far as they were concerned, the peace treaties merely sanctioned a state of affairs founded on force and not on law. Even the scant measure of protection which the Allied and Associated Powers thought to accord to the Germans has been rendered nugatory by the arbitrary proceedings of the Revolutionary Assembly. The whole Czechoslovak legislation, including the imposed Constitution, constitutes an open violation of the Treaty concerning the Protection of Minorities. We hereby solemnly state that we will never recognize any of these laws as morally binding upon us. For us Germans, who took no part in the conclusion of any agreement concerning the creation

of this State, its form of Government, its relations to ourselves and that of the nations composing it to one another, the fundamental political rights and liberties of its inhabitants and its relations with the other States of Europe are today so many unsolved problems. We demand that those problems be solved simply and solely on the basis of true democracy and unhindered national freedom.

We consequently reject the fable of the purely Czech State, the Czechoslovak nation and the Czechoslovak language as being clearly opposed to the facts. We will never recognize the Czechs as our masters or submit to them as slaves in this State. Injustice can never become justice, though it prevail for a thousand years, unless it is recognized by the victims themselves by a free decision and we herewith solemnly proclaim that we shall never cease to demand self-determination for our people, that we regard this as the first principle governing all our acts and our relations to this State and that we regard the present position as unworthy and impossible of reconciliation with the principles of modern development. We hold it to be our sacred duty to bequeath this legacy to those who come after us.

In faith whereof, we hereby append our signatures.

Done at Prague, June 1st and 9th, 1920."

Proclamation by Conrad Henlein on September 15th, 1938

Compatriots !

Realizing that you have placed your confidence in me and fully conscious of my responsibility, I declare before world opinion that, with the use of machine-guns, armoured cars and tanks against the defenceless Sudeten Germans, the system of oppression employed by the Czech people has reached its climax. The Czech people have thereby shown, for all to see, that it has become definitely impossible to live with them in the same State. The experience of a régime of violence extending over a period of twenty years and in particular the heavy toll of victims during the last few days place me under an obligation to state:

1) that in 1919, we were deprived of the right of self-determination solemnly promised to us and forced into the Czech State against our will.

2) that, although we have never relinquished our claim to self-determination, we have made every attempt, at the cost of very heavy sacrifices, to ensure our existence in the Czech State.

3) that all attempts to induce the Czech people and their responsible authorities to come to an honourable and just arrangement have been wrecked on the rock of their implacable will to destruction.

In this hour of Sudeten German distress, I say to you, the German people and the whole civilized world:

We wish to live as free German men and women! We want peace and work in our home! We want to go home to the Reich!

God bless us and our just fight!

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SOLUTION AND DELIVERANCE

A Documentary Report on the Settlement of the Czechoslovak Crisis

The Munich Agreement

Text of the Agreement between Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy

Concluded at Munich on September 29th, 1938

Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into consideration the settlement already agreed upon in principle concerning the cession of the Sudeten German districts, have agreed on the following conditions and procedure and the measures to be taken, and declare themselves individually held responsible by this agreement for guaranteeing the steps necessary for its fulfilment :

1. The evacuation begins on October 1.
2. The United Kingdom of Great Britain, France, and Italy agree that the evacuation of the region shall be completed by October 10, without destruction of any of the existing installations, and that the Czechoslovak Government bear the responsibility for seeing that the evacuation is carried out without damaging the aforesaid installations.
3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.
4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territories by German troops will begin on October 1. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order :— The territory marked No. 1 on October 1 and 2, the territory marked No. 2 on October 2 and 3, the territory marked No. 3 on October 4 and 5, the territory marked No. 4 on October 6 and 7.

The remaining territories of predominantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by October 10.

5. The International Commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same Commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite.

The Commission will also fix the date at the end of November on which the plebiscite will be held.

6. The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. This commission will also recommend to the four Power—Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy—in certain exceptional circumstances minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

7. There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months of the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the options and consider ways of facilitating the transfer of populations and certain questions of principle arising out of the said transfers.

8. The Czechoslovak Government will within the period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from the military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

Munich, September 29th, 1938.

Supplementary Declaration

The heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of a further meeting of the heads of Governments of the four Powers here present.

Munich, September 29th, 1938.

Annex to the Agreement

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer contained in Paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of September 19 in relation to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

Supplementary Declaration

The heads of the Governments of the four Powers agree that the Commission provided for in the Agreement of today's date shall consist of the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France and Italy accredited to Berlin and a member to be appointed by the Czechoslovak Government.

Munich, September 29th, 1938.

Supplementary Declaration

All questions which may arise out of the transfer of the territories shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference of the International Commission.

Munich, September 29th, 1938.

A EUROPEAN ACT OF PEACE

Joint Declaration by Hitler and Chamberlain of September 30th, 1938

No More War between the Two Nations

The Führer and Reich Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, after their conversation today, issued the following joint declaration:

"We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting to-day and are agreed in recognising that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.

sig. Adolf Hitler. sig. Neville Chamberlain."

Munich, September 30th, 1938.

Statements by the French Premier Daladier and Field-Marshal Göring on the Significance of the Agreement

The Victory of Peace

A Historic Date in the Life of Europe

Munich, September 30th.

The French Premier, Edouard Daladier, made the following statement to the Paris representative of the Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro:

"I believe that the Munich meeting may become a historic date in the life of Europe. Thanks to the great comprehension of the representatives of the western Great Powers, war has been avoided and the peoples have been assured of an honourable peace.

I was glad to be able to note myself that no feeling of hatred or enmity against France rules in Germany. You can be sure that the French also have no feeling of enmity to Germany and have not had such a feeling even in the time of diplomatic tension and military preparations which we have just experienced and overcome.

The two nations must learn to understand each other in all cordiality and I am glad to be able to devote my energies to this necessary and fruitful entente.

I have already thanked the Führer, Field-Marshal Göring and the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop for the cordiality of their reception.

Please transmit my thanks also to the population of Munich."

Munich, September 30th, 1938.

Field-Marshal Göring today received one of the special correspondents of the Havas agency in Munich in order to express his pleasure that a matter which had so long kept Europe in suspense was finally settled.

"The statesmen gathered together in Munich have just won a great victory, the victory of peace. As a journalist living in Berlin, you will have observed in the last few weeks of increased tension that no feeling of hatred or chauvinism against France has made itself felt in Germany. Nothing should prevent our two great nations, who have such great respect for each other, from living peacefully side by side.

I am particularly glad to know that the French ex-combatants also take part in the international control in Czechoslovakia, for wherever the ex-combatants are there will be peace and justice.

I believe that the four countries which have taken part in the Munich meeting can be satisfied with the result achieved."

In the course of the interview Field-Marshal Göring paid a special tribute to the loyalty displayed by President Daladier during the Munich conversations.

Statement by Field-Marshal Göring to the British Journalist Ward Price on September 30th.

The Beginning of a New Era in Europe

"To-day is a day of triumph—the triumph of reason and peace. Now that the difficult and dangerous question of Czechoslovakia has been solved by direct personal contact between the heads of the Governments of the four great European Powers, it should surely be possible to settle, by the same method, any future difficulties that may arise.

The settlement concluded in Munich, will prove to have even greater importance than the solution of the Sudeten problem. It is not a question of whether Germany has made concessions on some points, or Britain and France on others. The supreme significance of the conference lies in the fact that the way has at last been found to end international difficulties swiftly and peaceably.

We look now forward to peaceful relations with Czechoslovakia.

The Munich agreement marks the beginning of a new era in Europe."

THE DELIVERANCE OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS FROM THE FETTERS OF VERSAILLES

Extract from Adolf Hitler's Speech in the Berlin Sport Palace
on the Occasion of the Opening of the Winter Relief Work 1938 on October 5th, 1938

My Germans and Comrades.

Six years ago when I took over the leadership of the Reich, one of our so-called statesmen of that time said: "This man has now taken the decisive step. Hitherto he was popular when he was in the opposition. Now he must rule, and we will see what has become of his popularity in six or eight weeks."

Since then, not six weeks, but nearly six years, have passed, and I believe that these six years have been among the most decisive in German history. The characteristic feature of this period has been the extraordinary unanimity of the German people. Anything that I have been able to attain in these six years has only been possible because the entire German people stood behind me. The problems with which we were faced could not be overcome by a single man. It was only possible to deal with these questions when one could speak, and if necessary act, on behalf of the entire German people.

We have perhaps realised this most in the months, weeks and days that lie behind us. On May 28th I set myself a great aim. It was a grave decision at that time. I believed in its realisation, and could only believe in it because I knew that the German people stood behind me and was prepared for every effort.

This unanimity is the result of an organised new German community. That is what is meant by that we National Socialists call the national community. Without this German national community it would have been impossible to master all the tasks which have been dealt with in the last few weeks.

There are many who do not understand this and who perhaps imagine that this must be the case. This is so in particular with those who do not themselves possess the strength of heart to tackle such problems. They cannot imagine that the force which has made all this possible is exclusively the force of the German national community which stands behind me, on which I can rely, and of which I know that it will not forsake me even in the worst time.

In the last few months and weeks I have undoubtedly received great help in foreign politics and in my last speech in this hall I thanked the man who stood as a true friend behind Germany: Benito Mussolini. He threw the entire force not only of his own genius but of the power behind him into the scale of a just solution.

I must also thank the other two great statesmen who at the last minute recognised the historic hour, declared themselves ready to act in order to solve one of the most burning questions of Europe and thus enabled me to offer my hand for an understanding.

But above all, my thanks go to the German people. They never abandoned me during these long months.

They have borne with stern resolution all the measures which were necessary to put into effect the just demands of the Reich. It will remain one of our people's titles to glory that, at a time when hundreds of thousands were called to work and other hundreds of thousands of our men were called to arms, there was no panic buying in Germany, not a man went to the savings bank, not a woman doubted, but the entire nation proved to be a single compact community. I must say frankly: I am proud my German people.

I hope that in a few days the Sudeten German problem will be definitely solved. By

October 10th we shall have occupied all German territories that belonged to us.

This will put an end to one of the most serious crises of Europe, and then all of us, not only in Germany, but also outside, can in this year for the first time really rejoice at the Christmas festival. It will be for us all a true festival of peace.

But it is all the more important at the present time to take the greatest care of our German national community, to fight for it, to strive after it and to make sacrifices for it. For even happiness is not given to men for nothing, but must be won by hard endeavour.

We have not attained this national community by chance. It has been erected by arduous work, first in the ranks of the National Socialist Party from which it subsequently spread to conquer the whole German nation. This German national community is in fact socialism applied in practice, and therefore National Socialism in the highest sense of the word. Everyone is under an obligation to contribute his share. But we are all subject to the precept: No one in the world will help us, unless we help ourselves.

This programme of self-help is as proud as it is manly. It is different from that of my predecessors, who constantly ran round begging for help, first at Versailles, then at Geneva, then at Lausanne or elsewhere at some Conference or other.

It is a matter for pride that we Germans are today determined to solve our problems ourselves and to help ourselves.

We must also admit to how infinitely many of our compatriots, nameless, unknown people, we owe thanks. Many hundreds of thousands of German workmen have in the last few months been suddenly torn from their occupations. One day the order came: Pack your bag, you must go to the west. A giant army of workers went out and built a wall of concrete and steel in order to protect us all and the whole of Germany. They had to leave their wives and children behind them, they had to leave their work, they had to take up new and often difficult work, they had to live in encampments and accept many living inconveniences. It is true that we tried to make all this bearable for them, but nevertheless we are grateful to all of them and also to the hundreds of thousands who moved into our barracks and our military exercise fields. We are also grateful to all the women who had to let their husbands and sons go. We thank all those who make sacrifices for us, who are quite unknown, nameless working German people. But now, thanks to all these sacrifices, we are witnessing a great historical turn of events. At this moment we must also remember those who for twenty years, in an apparently hopeless position, believed fanatically in Germany and never abandoned their German national feeling.

It is so easy here in the heart of the Reich to have German national feelings. But it is terribly difficult, in the face of constant persecution, not to be led away from such feelings and to remain fanatically true to them, as if release were coming the next day. But now the hour of release has arrived.

I myself have now cast a first glance in these territories and have been deeply struck by two impressions.

In the first place, I have often known the exultation and enthusiasm of joy. But here for the first time I saw the joy of tears among hundreds of thousands of people.

In the second place I saw terrible distress. When in England Duff Cooper or Mr. Eden say that injustice has been done to the Czechs, then these men should merely see what really happened there. How is it possible to twist the truth to this extent. I have seen entire villages that were under-nourished and entire towns suffering from poverty.

My comrades, we have now a great duty of honour to fulfil. We must accept these people in the circle of our national community and help them. Help is now necessary. That is a small token of gratitude that the German who has hitherto been able to live in the safe haven of the Reich can offer. A small sacrifice is demanded from everyone.

But I expect that everyone will fix his sacrifice according to his means and that the wealth here will show a brilliant example. It must be our pride to remove distress completely in the shortest possible time.

In a few years I want to see not a single rickety child in this country. We will devote our whole energy to caring for and raising the standard of these German comrades.

We will all consider how much we owe to this German national community, this community of mutual sacrifice. It has enabled me to solve a burning problem finally without a struggle.

What sacrifices this struggle would have caused. Let us learn from the past. Let us remember that once Germany collapsed because this community did not exist; it will only then be clear to us that no sacrifice can be too great for this community.

In this community, in which the greatest force of the nation finds expression, I

also see the strongest guarantee of peace. So long as the German people appears before the world as such a community, no one will dare lightly to declare a feud against our people. They will then all realise that they are not up against one man but against a great powerful nation.

In the history of our people the year 1938 will be a great, unforgettable, proud year. In this year the last shameful pages have been torn out of the fateful book that was once allotted to us at Versailles. Later historians will state that the German nation again rose to the level of a great and honoured nation, and that our history again became a worthy history. But it is also my belief that in this year the greatest social relief organisation must show similar results.

I expect that the winter relief work of 1938 will be in accordance with the historical greatness of this year.

It must be the ambition of all to contribute to such a monumental success, in order to show that the expression "national community" is no empty phrase.

We know that all human endeavours depend for their ultimate success on the blessing of providence. But we also know that providence only helps those who prove worthy. I believe that we have experienced so much good fortune this year that it is the duty of all of us to make our sacrifices voluntarily to this good fortune. By these sacrifices we also show our thanks to providence that has protected our people from deep distress and has in this year given to millions of Germans the greatest joy of their lives.

THE MUNICH AGREEMENT BEFORE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH PARLIAMENTS

Extract

from Mr. Chamberlain's Report to the House of Commons on September 28th and October 3rd, 1938

To-day we are faced with a situation which has had no parallel since 1914. To find the origins of the present controversy it would be necessary to go back to the constitution of the State of Czechoslovakia with all its heterogeneous populations. No doubt at the time when it was constituted it seemed to those then responsible that it was the best arrangement that could be made in the light of the conditions as they then supposed them to exist.

I cannot help reflecting that if Article XIX of the Covenant providing for the revision of the treaties by agreement had been put into operation as was contemplated by the framers of the Covenant instead of waiting until passions became so exasperated that revision by agreement became impossible we might have avoided a crisis. Therefore for that omission all members of the League must bear their responsibility.

I am not here to apportion blame among them. The position that we had to face in July was that a deadlock had arisen in the negotiations which had been going on between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten Germans and that fears were already entertained that if it were not speedily broken the German Government might presently intervene in the dispute.

For his Majesty's Government there were three alternative courses that we might have adopted. Either we could have threatened to go to war with Germany if she attacked Czechoslovakia, or we could have stood aside and allowed matters to take their course, or finally we could attempt to find a peaceful settlement by way of mediation. The first of these courses we rejected. We had no treaty liabilities to Czechoslovakia. We always refused to accept any such obligations. Indeed, this country, which does not readily resort to war, would not have followed us if we had tried to lead

it into war to prevent a minority from obtaining autonomy or even from choosing to pass under some other Government.

The second alternative was also repugnant to us. However remote this territory may be, we knew, of course, that a spark once lighted there might give rise to a general conflagration. We felt it our duty to do anything in our power to help the contending parties to find agreement.

We addressed ourselves to the third course, the task of mediation. We knew that the task would be difficult, perhaps even perilous, but we felt that the object was good enough to justify the risk, and when Lord Runciman had expressed his willingness to undertake our mission we were happy to think that we had secured a mediator whose long experience, well-known qualities of firmness, of tact, and of sympathy, gave us the best hopes of success. That in the end Lord Runciman did not succeed was no fault of his, and we, and indeed all Europe, must ever be grateful to him and to his staff for their long and exhausting efforts on behalf of peace, in the course of which they gained the esteem and the confidence of both sides.

On September 21 Lord Runciman addressed a letter to me reporting the results of his mission. The letter is printed in the White Book as document No. 1.

The House will see that during August Lord Runciman's efforts had been directed, with a considerable degree of success, towards bringing the Sudeten and Czechoslovak Government negotiators closer together. In the meantime, however, developments in Germany itself had been causing considerable anxiety to his Majesty's Government.

But early in August we received reports of military preparations in Germany on an extensive scale. These measures could not fail to be regarded abroad as equivalent to partial mobili-

zation, and suggested that the German Government were determined to find a settlement of the Sudeten question by the autumn.

In these circumstances his Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin was instructed in the middle of August to point out to the German Government that these abnormal measures could not fail to be interpreted abroad as a threatening gesture towards Czechoslovakia. They must, therefore, increase the feeling of tension throughout Europe, and that they might compel the Czechoslovak Government to take precautionary measures on their side. The almost certain consequence would be to destroy all chance of successful mediation by Lord Runciman's mission and perhaps endanger the peace of every one of the Great Powers of Europe.

This, the Ambassador added, might also destroy the prospects of the resumption of Anglo-German conversations. In these circumstances it was hoped that the German Government might be able to modify their military measures in order to avoid these dangers.

To these representations Herr von Ribbentrop replied in a letter in which he refused to discuss the military measures referred to, and expressed the opinion that the British efforts in Prague had only served to increase Czech intransigence. In face of this attitude his Majesty's Government, through the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who happened to be speaking at Lanark on August 27, drew attention again to some words I had used on March 24 in this House. He declared that there was nothing to add to or to vary in the statement which I had made. Perhaps I may just refresh the memories of hon. members by reading that statement of March 24 once again:—

"Where peace and war are concerned, legal obligations are not alone involved, and, if war broke out, it would be unlikely to be confined to those who had assumed such obligations. It would be quite impossible to say where it would end and what Governments might become involved. The inexorable pressure of facts might well prove more powerful than formal pronouncements, and in that event it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries, besides those which were parties to the original dispute, would almost immediately become involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven, devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty, and determined to uphold them."

Towards the end of August further events occurred which marked the increasing seriousness of the situation. The French Government, in consequence of information which had reached them about the moving of several German Divisions towards their frontier, took certain precautionary measures themselves, including the calling up of reserves to man the Maginot Line. On August 28 Sir Neville Henderson had been recalled to London for consultations. A special meeting of Ministers was held on August 30 to consider his report and the general situation.

On the 31st he returned to Berlin, and he gave Baron von Weizsäcker, the State Secretary at the Wilhelmstrasse, a strong personal warning regarding the probable attitude of his Majesty's Government in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia particularly if France were compelled to intervene. On September 1 the Ambassador saw Herr von Ribbentrop and repeated to him, as a personal and most urgent message, the warning he had already given to the State Secretary of the previous day.

In addressing these personal warnings through Sir Neville Henderson, and in making the reference to Czechoslovakia contained in the Chancellor's speech on August 27, his Majesty's Government desired to impress the seriousness of the situation on the German Government without risking a further aggravation of the situation by any formal representation which might have been interpreted by the German Government as a public rebuff, as had been the case in regard to our representations on May 21. His Majesty's Government also had to bear in mind the close approach of the Nazi party congress at Nuremberg, which was to open on September 5 and to last until the 12th.

* * *

It was to be anticipated that the German Chancellor would feel himself compelled to make some public statement regarding the Sudeten question, and it therefore appeared necessary, in addition to warning the German Government of the attitude of his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, to make every effort in Prague to secure a resumption of negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten representatives on a basis which would give hope of a rapid and satisfactory settlement.

Accordingly, his Majesty's Minister at Prague saw Dr. Benesh on September 3, and emphasized to him that it was vital in the interests of Czechoslovakia to offer immediately and without reservation those concessions without which the Sudeten question could not be immediately settled. His Majesty's Government were not in a position to say whether anything less than the Carlsbad programme would suffice. They certainly felt that the Czechoslovak Government should go forthwith and unreservedly to the limit of concession. Lord Runciman strongly supported Mr. Newton's representations to Dr. Benesh, and both Lord Runciman and Mr. Newton drew Dr. Benesh's attention to the importance of reaching a settlement before Herr Hitler's expected pronouncement at Nuremberg, and to the dangerous international situation resulting from the German military preparations.

Dr. Benesh responded to these expectations which were made in the best interests of Czechoslovakia, by putting forward proposals afterwards known as the Fourth Plan, which were communicated to the Sudeten German representatives on September 6. In Lord Runciman's opinion this plan embodied almost all the requirements of the eight Carlsbad points and formed a very favourable basis for the resumption of negotiations. In forming this opinion he was guided partly by his own examination of the Czech Government's plan, and partly by the favourable reception that was accorded to it by the Sudeten negotiators.

Since the opening proclamation of the Nuremberg Congress had not contained any reference to the Czechoslovak question, and the recent attitude of Herr Hitler and other leading German personalities indicated that Germany welcomed the continuation of negotiations in Prague, the prospects of a satisfactory solution of the Sudeten question on the basis of autonomy within the Czechoslovak State appeared not unpromising on the publication of the Czechoslovak Government's Fourth Plan on September 7.

The publication of the Fourth Plan was unfortunately, however, immediately followed by a serious incident at Mährisch-Osttau. It would appear from the investigations of the British observer that the importance of this incident was very much exaggerated, but the immediate result was a decision on the part of the Sudeten leaders not to resume negotiations until this incident had been liquidated. Immediate measures were taken by the Czechoslovak Government to liquidate it, but further incidents took place on September 11 near Eger, and in spite of Lord Runciman's efforts to bring both parties together negotiations could not be resumed before Herr Hitler's speech winding up the Nuremberg Congress on September 12.

On September 9 the Cabinet met to consider the situation, and decided to take certain precautionary naval measures, including the commissioning of mine-layers and mine-sweepers, and on September 11 I made a statement to the Press, which received widespread publicity, stressing in particular the close ties uniting Great Britain and France, and the probability, in certain eventualities, of this country going to the assistance of France. On the morning of September 12 the Cabinet met again. They decided that no further action could usefully be taken before Herr Hitler's speech at Nuremberg that evening.

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In his own speech on September 12 Herr Hitler laid great stress on the defensive military measures taken on Germany's western frontier. In his references to Czechoslovakia he reminded the world that on February 22 he had said that the Reich would no longer tolerate further oppression or persecution of the Sudeten Germans. They demanded the right

of self-determination, he said, and they were supported in their demand by the Reich. Therefore, for the first time, this speech promised the support of the Reich to the Sudeten Germans if they could not obtain satisfaction for themselves, and for the first time he publicly raised the issue of self-determination. He did not, however, close the door on further negotiations in Prague, nor did he demand a plebiscite.

As the speech was also accompanied by pacifying references to Germany's frontiers with Poland and France its general effect was to leave the situation unchanged, with a slight diminution of the tension. The speech, however, and in particular Herr Hitler's reference to German support for the cause of the Sudeten Germans, had an immediate and unfortunate effect among those people. Demonstrations took place throughout Sudetenland, resulting in an immediate extension of the incidents which had already begun on September 11. Serious rioting occurred. Martial law was immediately proclaimed in the affected districts. On the evening of September 13 Herr Henlein and other Sudeten leaders assembled at Eger and sent a telegram to the Czechoslovak Government declaring that they could not be responsible for the consequences of martial law and the special Czech emergency measures if they were not immediately withdrawn.

Attempts made by Lord Runciman's mission to bring the Sudeten leaders into discussion with the Czechoslovak Government failed, and on September 14 Herr Henlein issued a proclamation stating that the Carlsbad Points were no longer enough and that the situation called for self-determination. Thereupon Herr Henlein fled to Germany. In these circumstances Lord Runciman felt that no useful purpose would be served by his publishing a plan of his own.

The House will recall that, by the evening of September 14, a highly critical situation had developed in which there was immediate danger of the German troops now concentrated upon the frontier entering Czechoslovakia to prevent further incidents occurring in Sudetenland, and fighting between the Czech forces and the Sudeten Germans, although reliable reports indicated that order had been completely restored in those districts by September 14. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia might have felt compelled to mobilize at once and so risk provoking a German invasion. In either event German invasion might have been expected to bring into operation French obligations to come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia and so lead to a European war in which this country might well have been involved in support of France.

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In those circumstances I decided that the time had come to put into operation a plan which I had had in my mind for a considerable period as a last resort. One of the principal difficulties in dealing with totalitarian Governments is the lack of any means of establishing contact with the personalities in whose hands lie the final decisions for the country. So I resolved to go to Germany myself to interview Herr Hitler and find out in personal conversation whether there was yet any hope of saving the peace. I knew very well that in taking such an unprecedented course I was laying myself open to criticism on the ground that I was detracting from the dignity of a British Prime Minister and to disappointment and perhaps even resentment if I failed to bring back a satisfactory agreement. But I felt that in such a crisis, where the issues at stake were so vital for millions of human beings such considerations of that kind could not be allowed to count. Herr Hitler responded to my suggestion with cordiality, and, on September 15, I made my first flight to Munich, and from thence I travelled by train to Herr Hitler's mountain home at Berchtesgaden.

I confess I was astonished at the warmth of the approval with which this adventure was everywhere received but the relief which it brought for the moment was an indication of the gravity with which the situation had been viewed. At this first conversation, which lasted for three hours, and at which only an interpreter was present besides Herr Hitler and myself I very soon became aware that the position was much more acute and much more urgent than I had realized.

In courteous, but perfectly definite terms, Herr Hitler made it plain that he had made up his mind that the Sudeten Germans must have the right of self-determination and of returning if they wished to the Reich. If they could not achieve this by their own efforts, he said, he would assist them to do so, and he declared categorically that rather than wait he would be prepared to risk a world war. At one point he complained of British threats against him, to which I replied that he must distinguish between a threat and a warning, and that he might have just cause of complaint if I allowed him to think that in no circumstances would this country go to war with Germany when, in fact, there were conditions in which such a contingency might arise.

So strongly did I get the impression that the Chancellor was contemplating an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia that I asked him why he had allowed me to travel all that way, since I was evidently wasting my time. On that he said that if I could give him, there and then, an assurance that the British Government accepted the principle of self-determination, he would be quite ready to discuss ways and means of carrying it out; that if, on the contrary, I told him that such a principle could not be considered by the British Government, then he agreed that it was of no use to continue our conversations. I, of course, was not in a position to give, there and then, such an assurance; but I undertook to return at once to consult my colleagues, if he would refrain from active hostilities until I had had time to obtain their reply. That assurance he gave me, provided, he said, that nothing happened in Czechoslovakia of such a nature as to force his hand; and that assurance has remained binding ever since.

I have no doubt now, looking back, that my visit alone prevented an invasion, for which everything was ready; and it was clear to me that, with the German troops in the positions they then occupied there was nothing that anybody could do that would prevent that invasion unless the right of self-determination were granted to the Sudeten Germans, and that quickly. That was the sole hope of a peaceful solution.

I went back to London next day. That evening the Cabinet met, and it was attended also by Lord Runciman, who at my request had also travelled from Prague that same day. Naturally his Majesty's Government felt it necessary to consult the French Government before they replied to Herr Hitler, and accordingly M. Daladier and M. Bonnet were invited to fly to London for conversations with British Ministers on September 18.

During these conversations the representatives of the two Governments were guided by a desire to find a solution which would not bring about a European war and therefore a solution which would not automatically compel France to take action in accordance with her obligations. It was agreed that the only means of achieving this object was to accept the principle of self-determination, and accordingly the British and the French Ministers in Prague were instructed to inform the Czechoslovak Government that the further maintenance within the boundaries of the Czechoslovak State of the districts mainly inhabited by Sudeten Germans could not continue any longer without imperilling the interests of Czechoslovakia herself and of European peace. The Czechoslovak Government were therefore urged to agree immediately to the direct transfer to the Reich of all areas with over 50 per cent. Sudeten inhabitants. An international body was to be set up to deal with questions like the adjustment of frontiers and the possible exchange of populations on the basis of the right to opt.

The Czechoslovak Government were informed that to meet their natural desire for security for their future his Majesty's Government would be prepared as a contribution to the pacification of Europe to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. Such a guarantee would safeguard the independence of Czechoslovakia by substituting a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of the existing treaties with France and Soviet Russia, which involved reciprocal obligations of a military character.

In urging this solution upon the Czechoslovak Government the British and French Governments took account of the probability that the Czechoslovak Government would find it prefe-

nable to deal with the problem by the method of direct transfer rather than by means of a plebiscite which would involve serious difficulties as regards other nationalities in Czechoslovakia. In agreeing to guarantee the future boundaries of Czechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression his Majesty's Government were accepting a completely new commitment as we were not previously bound by any obligations towards Czechoslovakia other than those involved in the Covenant of the League.

The Tchechoslovak Government replied on September 20 to these representations by suggesting that the Sudeten dispute should be submitted to arbitration under the terms of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of 1926. The British and French Ministers in Prague were, however, instructed to point out to the Czechoslovak Government that there was no hope of a peaceful solution on this basis, and in the interest of Czechoslovakia and of European peace the Czechoslovak Government was urged to accept the Anglo-French proposals immediately. This they did immediately and unconditionally on September 21.

That Government resigned on September 22, but it was immediately succeeded by a Government of national concentration under General Sirovy, Inspector-General of the Army, and it has been emphasized in Prague that this Government is not a military dictatorship and has accepted the Anglo-French proposals.

We had hoped that the immediate problem of the Sudeten Germans would not be further complicated at this particular juncture by the pressing of the claims of the Hungarian and Polish minorities. These minorities have, however, consistently demanded similar treatment to that accorded to the Sudeten minority and the acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals involving the cession of the predominately Sudeten German territories has led to a similar demand for cession of the territories predominantly inhabited by Polish and Hungarian minorities being advanced by the Hungarian and Polish Governments.

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However, on September 22 I went back to Germany, to Godesberg on the Rhine, where the Chancellor had appointed a meeting place as being more convenient for me than the remote Berchtesgaden.

Once again I had a very warm welcome in the streets and villages through which I passed demonstrating to me the desire of the German people for peace. On the afternoon of my arrival I had my second meeting with the Chancellor.

During my stay in London the Government had worked out with the French Government arrangements for effecting the transfer of the territory proposed and also for delimiting the final frontier. I explained these to Herr Hitler. He was not previously aware of them, and I also told him about the proposed guarantee against unprovoked aggression.

On that point of a guarantee he made no objection, but said he could not enter into a guarantee unless other Powers, including Italy, were also guarantors. I said I had not asked him to enter into a guarantee, but I had intended to ask him whether he was prepared to conclude a pact of non-aggression with the new Czechoslovakia. He said he could not enter into such a pact while other minorities in Czechoslovakia were still unsatisfied, but hon. members will see that he has since put his views in a more positive form, and said that when they are satisfied he will then be prepared to join in an international guarantee.

At this particular time, however, no further discussion took place between us on the subject of a guarantee. Herr Hitler said he could not accept the other proposals I had described to him on the ground that they were too dilatory and offered too many opportunities for further evasion on the part of the Czechs. He insisted that a speedy solution was essential on account of the oppression and terrorism to which the Sudeten Germans were being subjected, and he proceeded to give me the main outlines of the proposal which he subsequently embodied in a memorandum, except that he did not in this conversation actually name any time limit.

Hon. members will realize the perplexity in which I found myself, faced with this totally unexpected situation. It was a profound shock to me when I was told at the beginning of the conversation that these proposals were not acceptable and that they were to be replaced by other proposals of a kind which I had not contemplated at all.

I felt that I must have a little time to consider what I was to do. Consequently, I withdrew, my mind full of foreboding as to the success of my mission. I first, however, obtained from Herr Hitler an extension of his previous assurance that he would not move his troops pending the results of the negotiations. I, on my side, undertook to appeal to the Czech Government to avoid any action which might provoke incidents.

I have seen speculative accounts of what happened on the next day which have suggested that long hours passed while I remained on one side of the Rhine and Herr Hitler on the other because I had difficulty in obtaining this assurance from him about the moving of his troops. I want to say at once that that is purely imaginary. There was no such difficulty. I will explain in a moment what did cause the delay, but the assurance was given readily and it has been, as I have said before, abided by right up to the present time.

We had arranged to resume our conversation at half past eleven the next morning, but in view of the difficulties of talking with a man through an interpreter and of the fact that I could not feel sure that what I had said to Herr Hitler had always been completely understood and appreciated by him, I thought it would be wise to put down on paper some comments upon these new proposals of his and let him have them some time before the talks began.

Accordingly, I wrote him a letter, which is No. 3 in the White Paper, which I sent to him. I sent that soon after breakfast and it will be seen that in it I declared my readiness to convey the proposals to the Czechoslovak Government, but I pointed out what seemed to me to be grave difficulties in the way of their acceptance. On the receipt of this letter the Chancellor intimated that he would like to send a written reply. Accordingly, the conversations were postponed.

The reply was not received until well into the afternoon. I had hoped that this delay might mean that some modification was being worked out, but when I received the letter, which is No. 4, I found to my disappointment that, although it contained some explanation, it offered no modification at all of the proposals which had been described to me the night before. Accordingly I replied, as in document No. 5, asking for a memorandum of the proposals and a copy of the map for transmission to Prague, and intimating my intention to return to England.

The memorandum and the map were handed to me at my final interview with the Chancellor, which began at half-past 10 that night and lasted into the small hours of the morning, an interview at which the German Foreign Secretary was present as well as Sir Neville Henderson and Sir Horace Wilson, and for the first time I found in the memorandum a time limit. Accordingly, on this occasion I spoke very frankly. I dwelt with all the emphasis at my command on the risks which would be incurred by insisting on such terms, and the terrible consequences of a war if war ensued.

In spite of these plain words, these conversations were carried on on more friendly terms than any that had yet preceded them, and Herr Hitler informed me that he appreciated and was grateful for my efforts, but that he considered that he had made a response since he had held back the operations which he had planned, and that he had offered in his proposal to Czechoslovakia a frontier very different from the one which he would have taken as the result of military conquest.

I think I should add that before saying farewell to Herr Hitler I had a few words with him in private, which I do not think are without importance. In the first place he repeated to me with great earnestness what he had said already at Berchtesgaden—namely, that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe, and that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other races than Germans.

In the second place, he said again very earnestly that he wanted to be friends with England, and that if only this Sudeten question could be got out of the way in peace he would gladly resume conversations. It is true he said, "There is

one awkward question, the Colonies, but that is not a matter for war," and, alluding to the mobilization of the Czechoslovak Army, which had been announced to us in the middle of our conversations and had given rise to some disturbance, he said, about the Colonies, "There will be no mobilization about that."

* * *

I returned to London on September 24, and arrangements were made for the German Memorandum and map to be communicated directly to the Czech Government, who received them that evening. On Sunday, the 25th, we received from M. Masaryk, the Czech Minister here, the reply of the Czech Government, which stated that they considered Herr Hitler's demands in their present form to be absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable. This reply was communicated to the French Ministers Mr. Daladier and Mr. Bonnet, who arrived that same evening and exchanged views with us on the situation.

Meanwhile, as a last effort to preserve peace I sent Sir Horace Wilson to Berlin on the 26th with a personal message to Herr Hitler to be delivered before the speech that Herr Hitler was to make in Berlin at 8 o'clock that night. The French Ministers entirely approved this initiative and issued a *communiqué* to that effect at midday. Sir Horace Wilson took with him a letter—No. 9 on the White Paper—from me pointing out that the reception of the German Memorandum by the Czechoslovak Government and public opinion in the world generally had confirmed the expectation which I had expressed to him at Godesberg.

I therefore made a further proposal with a view to rendering it possible to get a settlement by negotiation rather than by military force—namely, that there should be immediate discussions between German and Czechoslovak representatives in the presence of British representatives. Sir Horace Wilson arrived in Berlin on the afternoon of the 26th, and he presented his letter to Herr Hitler, who listened to him but expressed the view that he could not depart from the procedure of the Memorandum as he felt conferences would lead to further intolerable procrastination.

I should tell the House how deeply impressed on my mind by my conversations with Herr Hitler and by every speech he has made is this rooted distrust and disbelief in the sincerity of the Czech Government. That has been one of the governing factors in all this difficult story of negotiation.

The next document in the White Paper refers to a conversation which I had with M. Masaryk as to whether the Czechoslovak Government would take part in such conference as I had proposed to Herr Hitler, and the Czech Government replied accepting the proposals under certain conditions which are set out in their letter.

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Now the story which I have told the House brings us up to last night. About 12.30 I received from Herr Hitler a reply to my letter sent by Sir Horace Wilson. It is printed in the White Paper. The reflection which was uppermost in my mind when I read his letter to me was that once more the differences and the obscurities had been narrowed down still further to a point where really it was inconceivable that they could not be settled by negotiations.

So strongly did I feel that, that I felt impelled to send one more letter to the Chancellor. I sent him the following personal message:

"After reading your letter I feel certain that you can get all essentials without war and without delay. I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once to discuss arrangements for transfers with you and representatives of the Czech Government, together with representatives of France and Italy if you desire. I feel convinced that we can reach agreement in a week. However much you distrust the Prague Government's intentions, you cannot doubt the power of the British and French Governments to see that the promises are carried out fairly and fully and forthwith. As you know, I have stated publicly that we

are prepared to undertake that they shall be so carried out. I cannot believe that you will take the responsibility of starting a world war which may end civilization for the sake of a few days' delay in settling this long-standing problem."

At the same time I sent the following personal message to Signor Mussolini:

"I have to-day addressed a last appeal to Herr Hitler to abstain from force to settle Sudeten problem, which I feel sure can be settled by a short discussion and will give him the essential territory, population, and protection for both Sudetens and Czechs during transfer. I have offered myself to go at once to Berlin to discuss arrangements with German and Czech representatives, and, if the Chancellor desires, representatives also of Italy and France. I trust your Excellency will inform the German Chancellor that you are willing to be represented and urge him to agree to my proposal, which will keep all our peoples out of war. I have already guaranteed that Czech promises shall be carried out and feel confident full agreement could be reached in a week."

In reply to my message to Signor Mussolini I was informed that instructions had been sent by the Duce to the Italian Ambassador in Berlin to see Herr von Ribbentrop at once and to say that while Italy would fulfil completely her pledges to stand by Germany, yet, in view of the great importance of the request made by his Majesty's Government to Signor Mussolini, the latter hoped Herr Hitler would see his way to postpone action, which the Chancellor had told Sir Horace Wilson was to be taken at 2 p.m. to-day, for at least 24 hours so as to allow Signor Mussolini time to re-examine the situation and endeavour to find a peaceful settlement.

In response Herr Hitler has agreed to postpone mobilization for 24 hours. Whatever views hon. members may have had about Signor Mussolini in the past, I believe that every one will welcome his gesture of being willing to work with us for peace in Europe.

This is not all. I have something further to say to the House yet. I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me to meet him at Munich to-morrow morning. He has also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier. Signor Mussolini has accepted and I have no doubt M. Daladier will also accept. I need not say what my answer will be.

Mr. Chamberlain on the Declaration of September 30th, 1938

At the beginning of his second speech in the House of Commons on October 3rd, Mr. Chamberlain first gave a short account of the Munich meeting and its result, and went on to express his thanks to the other three statesmen.

"The German Chancellor, in consenting at the last moment to discuss with the representatives of the other Powers, made a real and substantial contribution.

With regard to Signor Mussolini, his contribution was certainly notable and perhaps decisive. It was on his suggestion that the final stages of mobilization were postponed for 24 hours to give us an opportunity of discussing the situation, and I wish to say that at the conference itself both he and the Italian Foreign Secretary, Count Ciano, were most helpful in the discussions. It was they who, very early in the proceedings, produced the memorandum which Mr. Daladier and I were able to accept as a basis of discussion. It think that Europe and the world has reason to be grateful to the head of the Italian Government for his work in contributing to a peaceful solution.

M. Daladier has in some respects the most difficult task of all four of us because of the special relations uniting his country and Czechoslovakia, and I should like to say that his courage, his readiness to take responsibility, his pertinacity, and his unfailing good humour were invaluable throughout the whole of our discussion."

"Ever since I assumed my present office my main purpose has been to work for the pacification of Europe, for the removal of those suspicions, and those animosities which have so long poisoned the air. The path which leads to appeasement is long and bristles with obstacles. The question of Czechoslovakia is the latest and perhaps the most dangerous. Now that we have got past it I feel that it may be possible to make further progress along the road to sanity.

My right hon. friend (Mr. Duff Cooper) has alluded in somewhat bitter terms to my conversation last Friday morning with Herr Hitler. I do not know why that conversation should give rise to suspicion, still less to criticism. I entered into no pact. I made no new commitment. There is no secret understanding. Our conversation was hostile to no other nation. The object of that conversation, for which I asked, was to try to extend a little further the personal contact which I had established with Herr Hitler and which I believe to be essential in modern diplomacy.

We had a friendly and entirely non-committal conversation, carried on, on my part, largely with a view to seeing whether there could be points in common between the head of a democratic Government and the ruler of a totalitarian State. We see the result in the declaration which has been published in which my right hon. friend finds so much ground for suspicion. What does it say?

There are three paragraphs. The first says that we agree in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. Does anyone deny that? The second is an expression of opinion only. It says that we regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of the two people never to go to war with one another again. Once more I ask. Does anyone doubt that that is the desire of the two peoples?

What is the last paragraph?

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.

Who will stand up and condemn that?

I believe there are many who will feel with me that this declaration signed by the German Chancellor and myself is something more than a pious expression of opinion. In our relations with other countries everything depends on there being sincerity and good will on both sides. I believe that there is sincerity and good will on both sides, and that is why to me its significance goes far beyond its actual words.

If there is one lesson which we should learn from the events of these last weeks it is this—that lasting peace is not to be obtained by sitting still and waiting for it to come. It requires active positive efforts to achieve it. No doubt I shall have plenty of critics who will say that I am guilty of facile optimism, and that a better plan would be to disbelieve every word that is uttered by rulers of other great States in Europe. I am too much of a realist to believe that we are going to achieve our paradise in a day. We have only laid the foundations of peace. The superstructure is not even begun.

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For a long period now we have been engaged in this country on a great programme of rearmament which is daily increasing in pace and in volume. Let no one think that because we have signed this agreement between the four Powers at Munich we can afford to relax our efforts in regard to that programme at this moment. Disarmament on the part of this country can never be unilateral. We have tried that once, and we very nearly brought ourselves to disaster. If disarmament is to come it must come by steps, and it must come by the agreement and the active cooperation of all countries. Until we know that we have obtained that cooperation, and until we have agreed on the actual steps to be taken, we here must remain on guard.

When, only a little while ago, we had to call on the people of this country to begin to take those steps which would be necessary if an emergency should come on us, we saw the magnificent spirit that was displayed. The naval reservists, the Territorial Army, the Auxiliary Air Force, the Observer Corps obeyed the summons to mobilize readily. We must remember that most of these men gave up their peace-time work at a moment's notice to serve their country. We should like to thank them.

We should like to thank also the employers who accepted the inevitable inconvenience of mobilization. I know that they will show the same spirit of patriotic cooperation in taking back all their former employees when they are demobilized. I know that although the crisis is passed they will feel proud in the knowledge that they are employing men on whom the State can rely if a crisis should return.

While we must renew our determination to fill up the deficiencies that yet remain in our armaments and in our defensive precautions so that we may be ready to defend ourselves and make our diplomacy effective yes, I am realist, and I say with an equal sense of reality that I do see fresh opportunities of approaching this subject of disarmament opening up before us, and I believe that they are at least as hopeful to-day as they have been at any previous time. It is to such tasks, the winning back of confidence, the gradual removal of hostility between nations until they feel that they can safely discard their weapons one by one, that I would wish to devote what energy and time may be left to me before I hand over my office to younger men.

Lord Halifax on the "Miracle of Munich" Extract from his speech in the House of Lords on October 3rd, 1938

It is just eight weeks ago since my noble friend, Lord Runciman, with such great public spirit, went out in the hope if not in the expectation of finding some way of accommodation in Czechoslovakia. His Majesty's Government and the world owe to him and his staff a great debt—and certainly it was through no lack of effort on their part that his mission failed.

The noble viscount then reviewed the course of events, and referred to the "miracle" of Munich. He continued:—

"From the first two principles, I think, have been in conflict in the British mind. The first has been the necessity, in the light of what has been the liberal inspiration of every political experiment our own people have made, of somehow meeting the claims preferred on behalf of the German populations, and, secondly, has been the feeling that whatever might be said about these abstract claims their determination by force was in the long run destructive of European order and of those relationships between nations on which alone security can rest.

It has accordingly been the purpose of his Majesty's Government to do their best to distinguish where there must be distinction, to reconcile where they might be reconciled those two conflicting claims. We were accordingly prepared to go to unusual lengths in placing pressure upon a friendly and independent Government to accept the Anglo-French proposals for full cession of Czech territory down to the German majority population line. These proposals had been based as to the execution of their detail—the adjustment of frontiers, the questions arising out of the exchange of populations on the basis of the right to opt—by an international body, including a Czech representative, and it was partly because the Godesberg Memorandum had not any equivalent provisions for those vital purposes that we felt it was impossible to press their acceptance upon the Czechoslovakian Government."

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After contrasting the Godesberg Memorandum with the plan agreed to at Munich the noble viscount continued: I shall be asked by noble lords opposite why we consented to the omission of Russia. I would venture to repeat here what I said to the Soviet Ambassador a day or two ago. Five days ago it seemed to us vital if war was to be avoided somehow or other to get matters on a basis of negotiation, but if we were to face the facts—and nothing was to be gained but everything was to be lost by not facing them—we were obliged to recognize

that in present circumstances the heads of the German and Italian Governments would almost certainly—at least not without preliminary discussion, for which there was no time—be reluctant to sit in conference with a Soviet representative.

But the fact that it was impossible if we were to talk to the German and Italian Governments in those days at all to include the Soviet Government directly in the conversations in no way signified any weakening of the desire on our part, any more no doubt than on that of the French Government, to preserve our understanding and relations with the Soviet Government.

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The other matter on which I must speak is the guarantee referred to in the annex to the Munich agreement and which found a place in the Anglo-French proposals on September 19. There we said that his Majesty's Government would be prepared as a contribution to the pacification of Europe to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of Czechoslovakia against any unprovoked aggression. One of the principal parts of such a guarantee would be the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a joint guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of the existing treaties involving reciprocal obligations of a military character.

I understand and largely share what will be the feeling of many of your lordships as to the assumption by this country of a new and difficult commitment concerned, as it may be held, with something that is not a direct or vital interest of this country. I can anticipate from another quarter the criticism that a guarantee given at the very moment that existing treaty and Covenant obligations had failed to prevent the quasi-forcible disruption of the Czechoslovak State proclaimed by inference its own futility.

Both criticisms are weighty and must be met. As to the first, we felt that if we were, in conjunction with the French Government, to press the Czechoslovak Government to accept proposals so drastic as those which we thought it right to lay before them in the Anglo-French plan in order to preserve Europe as a whole from war, we were bound ourselves to make a counter-contribution to balance the reduction of Czechoslovakia's defensive strength. In no other circumstances, I think, could we have felt morally justified in pressing that Government to go so far.

Lastly the guarantee itself is reinforced and buttressed by two other vital elements. Germany and Italy have expressed their readiness to guarantee Czechoslovakia when the other minority questions have been settled; and, secondly, Great Britain and Germany have mutually expressed a desire to resolve any difficulties that may arise between them through consultation. In these circumstances I hope that your lordships will be prepared to take the view that we were right to feel a moral obligation to play our part in this guarantee even in face of the natural objection that we were taking on behalf of this country a new liability.

There are of course a great many questions connected with this guarantee that will require more careful consideration than it has yet been possible to give them. Such will be whether these forms should be joined up further, what States should be invited to assume those obligations, and the circumstances in which these obligations should be held to arise. These matters and possibly others will be matters for an early exchange of views between the several Governments concerned.

It must not be forgotten that, in the event of war, whatever forces the French, Russians, and we might have been willing to employ, nothing could have saved Czechoslovakia from devastation, or have protected many thousands of her sons and daughters from sudden death. We could, no doubt, have engaged in a war of indefinite duration, but if we had won no statesman drawing the boundaries of the new Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the Treaty of Versailles.

That brings me to the question of treaty revision for which Article 19 of the Covenant purported to make provision. I have said before that unless we can regard the world as being set in a mould rigid and unalterable we were bound to expect change—change that would always be right if justice and peace were all we sought. Yet we must

in fairness admit that the provisions of Article 19 have not been made effective.

* * *

I do not underestimate the gravity of the events which in such swift passage have crowded one upon the other in the last few weeks. I am conscious of all that has to be added to the debit side, but if the whole matter is fairly weighed I cannot doubt, for Czechoslovakia herself as for the world, where the balance rests. And apart from the sheer avoidance of the catastrophe of war and all that would have meant for men and women and children of every nation that would sooner or later have been dragged to take a part in this dance of death, there are certain things of which we should be utterly wrong to underestimate the significance.

The mutual confidence between the French Government and ours, strong as it was before, emerges stronger from these days. Beyond that we have witnessed the emergence of forces more powerful than we expected to condemn resort to war. From every part of the world, led by the President of the U.S.A. and given constructive form in the response to the Prime Minister's request by Signor Mussolini, the moral point was made clear that, when brought to the very edge of disaster, the feelings of all nations, not only our own, have drawn back from the edge and shown faith in the power of negotiation.

Is it a small thing that the German and British Governments declare they will never permit war between one another and their determination to employ the method of consultation in any differences that may rest between them? No man, of course, can predict the future and no declaration can absolve a nation like ours from doing whatever is necessary to secure itself against all eventualities, and, indeed, one of the principal lessons of these events is that the diplomacy of any nation can only be commensurate with its strength and that if we desire this country to exercise its full influence in world affairs the first thing we have to do is to ensure that it is in all ways fully and rapidly equipped to do so. I have no doubt that at the appropriate time your lordships may wish to give fuller consideration to the issues involved in that principle.

There will, no doubt, be those people who will maintain that immediately to attach weight to such declarations as that to which the German Chancellor and the Prime Minister have set their names is to lay up for ourselves certain and disastrous disappointment. Time alone will show. I have never felt able to take the view of the inevitability of war which is perhaps very easily taken by those who are fortunate enough to have no final responsibility. He is a very rash man who would attempt to write history before the time. Rejoicings in all countries have shown how the people have acclaimed these results of the method of conference which brought them back from the very brink of war.

There has been in Germany a spontaneous outburst of public feeling. Herr Hitler has had a great triumph, and I for one would grudge him nothing of the triumph which he knows to be accorded not only for what he has gained but for the contribution which he made to settlement through agreement in preference to the arbitrament of catastrophic war. When I see in Munich not only a conference at which hard terms were imposed on Czechoslovakia but an occasion on which it was found possible by discussion to effect a real abatement in the claims made and in which all the nations taking part contributed to win a real victory for reason and understanding over the forces of unreason, hatred, and mistrust—there is not one of your lordships who will not hope that what has been done will prove only a beginning of more promising approach to other problems which may stand in the way of friendly and fruitful cooperation.

In the final sitting of the House of Commons on October 6th, the motion to approve Mr. Chamberlain's policy was adopted by 366 votes to 144, that is to say with a majority of 222 votes.

THE WORLD CHANGED BY MUNICH

FRANCE MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEW SITUATION

Extract from M. Daladier's statement in the French Chamber on October 4th, 1938

In the course of the last few weeks, the world wondered with anguish whether it was not going to be plunged into war. Today, in rendering to you an account of our action, I can say that in this crisis we have saved the peace.

When our Government was formed, the Sudeten problem had already arisen. The realisation of the Anschluss had suddenly made it acute. The Czechoslovak Government had already announced the publication of a nationalities statute, and Herr Henlein formulated the demands of the Sudeten Germans in eight points.

The drama had begun. From the very first we have tried to prevent events from drawing us into the irreparable. At that time I publicly defined the position of my Government on various occasions. I said: "We are animated by two equally strong sentiments: the desire not to be forced into military action and the wish not to go back on our word if this hope was unfortunately disappointed."

In London M. Bonnet and I, at the end of April, informed the British Government of our anxiety and the manner in which we contemplated an appeasement in Central Europe. We were glad to note that the British Government were not indifferent to these problems. We together fixed the bases of cooperation. In our view we should not wait before taking action until the facts had been accomplished and until we had to suppress them with bloodshed or to submit to them with shame. We should rather forestall events and endeavour to prevent them.

We were therefore able to take common action immediately the crisis of May 21st arose, and I would remind you that that crisis was overcome thanks to the effective assistance rendered by the good will for peace of all the Powers concerned.

From the end of the month of May to the beginning of September there was a kind of international truce. But in the Sudeten area rising passions were preparing fresh events.

Then, in a spirit of friendship we advised the Czechoslovak Government to make considerable, just and rapid concessions to the Sudeten Germans within the framework of the State. The action of the British Government went parallel with our own. Lord Runciman's mission to Prague gave rise to a great hope by bringing about direct contact between the Czech statesmen and the leaders of the Sudeten Germans.

It should however be noted that the proposals of the Czech Government, which were constantly enlarged, and the claims of the Sudeten Germans, which constantly became more far-reaching, never synchronised.

At the beginning of September, after the closing speech of the Nuremberg congress, and Herr Henlein's announcement of the breaking off of negotiations between the Sudeten German delegates and the Government at Prague, the situation seemed for the first time to be irreparably compromised.

The German claim was violently affirmed. It was based on the people's right to self-determination. It was addressed to the popular conscience by means of the descriptions contained in the German press of the terror which was said to reign in the Sudeten districts.

Were the forces of war to be victorious over the forces of peace? I never thought for a moment of abandoning myself

or my country to a blind fate which would have made the march of events independent of the will of man.

In the night from September 13th to 14th I got into touch with Mr. Neville Chamberlain. I told him that it was advisable to substitute direct meetings between the responsible men for the procedure of diplomatic steps and notes. The British Prime Minister, who also had the same feeling, proceeded to Berchtesgaden.

Through his conversation with Herr Hitler, Mr. Chamberlain was able to judge and estimate the extent of the German claims. On Sunday, September 18th, he informed us of his impressions and convictions. We met in London and discussed the question. We examined the maps. The British Government informed us of the opinions of Lord Runciman. I do not need to say with what emotion we learned that the British observer had sincerely concluded that it was impossible to make the Czechs and the Sudetens live together any longer, while all our efforts had been directed towards the evolution in Czechoslovakia of a federalism which would have ensured the integrity of the territory. But we had to face facts. We were faced by the following alternative: We had either to say "No!" to the German claims and thus force the Czech Government into an uncompromising attitude and the German Government into aggression and bring about an armed conflict which would have soon meant the destruction of Czechoslovakia. Or we could try to find a compromise. If the first hypothesis had proved correct, who could say that the integrity of Czechoslovakia would have been maintained after a terrible coalition war, even a victorious war? We have chosen peace.

The Franco-British plan of London was the result of that choice. But at the same time as we submitted painful proposals to Czechoslovakia, we gave her the undertaking of Great Britain to join with us in an international guarantee.

On leaving London we had the feeling that our plan would raise an indignant protest in Prague and would be accepted in Berlin. The Czech Government, with heroic devotion to the cause of peace, accepted the plan. But at Godesberg, Herr Hitler in his interview with Mr. Chamberlain and in his memorandum made fresh demands in the form of methods of application.

Thus the development of the negotiations towards a compromise, which had begun by the decision of Mr. Chamberlain and myself to bring about direct contact with the German Government, was checked in the night from September 23rd to 24th. During the days that followed Europe advanced hastily towards a rupture.

* * *

During these days of anguish, two main currents appeared in our country. Both were found within each party and within each tendency and it may even be said that, as events progressed, they fought for a place in the conscience of every Frenchman. Some placed their hope in negotiation, others in uncompromising firmness.

As for myself, as head of the Government, from the first minute I recognised in both movements the infallible instinct of the French people. I felt that truth lay in the synthesis of these two currents and not in their contradiction.

What the people of France desired was to avoid the irreparable. The irreparable was German aggression. That aggression, under the terms of the treaty, would have set the aid and assistance of France in motion. We should have asked you to meet the engagements of France.

In order not to be surprised by an act of violence, we decided, in view of the development of German preparations, to take a number of military measures which were not intended as a kind of provocation but which aimed at enabling the country to meet all eventualities. We took all steps for effective defence. Our military leaders placed our forces in a position to fulfil their supreme duty towards our country.

In London, where we again conferred with the British Government, General Gamelin gave technical details as to the measures we had taken and on those which circumstances might compel us to take.

Both British and French were decided as to their common desire for peace and their common desire to oppose an aggression.

On the evening of September 26th it was stated in an official press communiqué in London that, if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, France would come to her assistance and that "Great Britain and Russia would certainly be at the side of France".

While the powerful, generous and reasonable voice of President Roosevelt issued an appeal for a pacific settlement from the United States, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, in complete agreement with ourselves, addressed a further communication to Chancellor Hitler.

On September 27th Sir Horace Wilson returned to London bringing the reply of the Führer. It left little scope or time for negotiation. In the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain himself stated that the Chancellor had informed the British messenger that he was determined to act on the following day, September 28th, at 2 p.m.

We had only a few hours left. Mr. Chamberlain's broadcast speech warned the world of the seriousness of the situation. We resolved to make a last effort. In the night from the 27th to the 28th we asked our Ambassador in Berlin to request Chancellor Hitler for a personal audience and our Ambassador in London to request Lord Halifax to instruct the British Ambassador in Rome to ask Signor Mussolini to support the idea of convening a conference.

At 11.15 a.m. on September 28th M. François Poncet was received by Chancellor Hitler and, on behalf of the French Government, made definite proposals for immediate and practical application. Herr Hitler did not reject these suggestions, but reserved the right to give a written reply.

On his side, Mr. Chamberlain proposed a last effort for the meeting in Germany of the heads of Governments of the four great western Powers. M. Mussolini forcefully and successfully supported this request. He obtained a decisive result, namely the adjournment of German mobilisation for 24 hours.

* * *

Herr Hitler immediately issued invitations for the Munich meeting.

I accepted this invitation. It was not a case of entering into questions of procedure or formulating counter-proposals. It was a case of saving the peace which some people had thought was definitely destroyed. I said "Yes!" and I regret nothing. I should have preferred that all the Powers concerned should be present. But rapid action was necessary; the least delay might be fatal. Was not a frank conversation with Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini of greater value than all the proposals or all the written discussions?

You are aware of the results of the Munich meeting, which was more in the nature of a useful conversation than a formal conference.

We have avoided recourse to force. There is no doubt whatever that we have brought about in four countries the plebiscite of peace. In view of the spontaneous warmth of the reception given in Berlin, Rome, London and Paris by the people of the four capitals to the heads of the four Governments, and the innumerable testimonies which reached them all from the towns and villages of their countries, how is it possible to doubt for a moment the immense relief felt by the people and their attachment to peace?

It was an effective victory of peace, a moral victory of peace; that is the first point which I wish to stress.

It was also a human victory, since the Munich agreement, thanks to mutual concessions and the good will of all, is a definite improvement on the Godesberg memorandum.

* * *

And now, gentlemen, why have we succeeded in stopping war at the very moment when it seemed ready to break out? Why, in view of the real sacrifices to which we have agreed, have we been able to place to our credit a certain number of guarantees and advantages no less real than I have just described to you?

Because, in these difficult negotiations, we have always shown our desire for justice and our loyalty. Because we have negotiated as men for whom the negotiations were not only an inevitable phase of this great international drama, but the veritable path of peace.

I must add immediately, with the same conviction, that if our negotiations have been successful we owe it above all to the fact that we based them on the manifestation of our strength. Let no one misunderstand me; I do not mean that our strength was a means of intimidation or pressure. It is impossible to think of intimidating Germany any more than of intimidating France. But to give proof of one's force is to place oneself in a position to discuss as between equals. It is only possible to discuss with a man or with a nation if one has first won his respect.

I felt the respect of Germany for France on my arrival at Munich.

Here I must render to the country the homage which is its due. At the first call, with admirable spontaneity in which seriousness took the place of the enthusiasm of former times, young troops and former combatants of the great war hastened to the colours and in a few hours reconstituted that insuperable barrier which has always protected the destiny of the fatherland. On our frontiers to which the soldiers came like a flood the population which would have had to suffer most accepted without a murmur the burdens of security placed upon them by the military authorities. I thank them in the name of France.

The respect that our country imposed during this time on all the nations surrounding it, that respect which is based on the memory of fights that have divided or united us, that respect which one ex-combatant can refuse to another ex-combatant whatever the colour of his uniform during the war, that respect which is always inspired by a nation that is both virile and pacific—it is our duty to feel that respect for the great nation that is our neighbour, that was our adversary and with which we desire to establish a durable peace.

No doubt our conceptions of life differ profoundly from those which inspire Germany and Italy today. But other

countries whose conceptions are also different from ours live on good terms with us. Whatever political forms they have adopted, the peoples have an identical love of peace. The important matter at the present moment is to unite all the pacific good will that exists in the world. If I have just recalled the feelings which the people of France have for the people of Germany, and which many of my predecessors have stressed from this platform, that does not mean that we contemplate abandoning existing cooperation. There is no question of our substituting new friendships for old friendships. In the interest of peace we wish to add to these old and well-tried friendships the support of new or renewed friendships. I know that in this work we can count on the friendship of France and Great Britain, which recent events have made still more confident and active.

* * *

May I admit, Gentlemen, that the other day when I arrived at Le Bourget, in the midst of the spontaneous joy of the people of Paris, which corresponded to the joy of the peoples of Berlin, Rome and London, I could not help feeling a sort of uneasiness? It occurred to me that peace is not a definite conquest, but must be defended from day to day. I am, of course, sensitive to the expressions of joy of the people. But, as the head of the Government, I must only think of the future of the country. A peace that has been saved cannot be the signal of abandonment; on the contrary, it must mark a fresh advance of the energies of the nation.

I say with all the conviction of which I am capable that if the country was to give up, and if the maintenance of peace was merely a matter of carelessness for it, we should go rapidly towards an anxious future. For my part I cannot agree to lead France towards such a future. The most precious possession, and the one which permits of every hope, has been conserved for us. We have peace. Let us keep it and establish it on unshakable foundations.

It is possible that at Munich the world changed its appearance in the space of a few hours. France must respond to this new situation by having a new feeling of her duties.

The greatest crime towards the country would be to give polemics the preference over determination. I should perhaps be entitled more than anyone else to state what disturbed me during the last few weeks and what could endanger the efficacy of my action. I have the duty more than anyone else of setting an example. At the beginning of this statement I considered the two main currents that have traversed our country during this crisis as the convergent manifestations of one and the same will. I no longer wish to distinguish them from each other. They have mingled in that admirable movement which has caused all the sons of our country to join the colours whatever their social conditions, their beliefs and their particular convictions.

Now all Frenchmen who desire the salvation of France must consider themselves in a state of permanent mobilisation for the service of peace and of the fatherland. The first duty of everyone is to work with all his strength in the place that he occupies. We shall only maintain peace if our national production enables us to speak as equals with the peoples that surround us.

We shall only maintain peace if we have sound finances, and a balanced budget, and if we can count on all the resources of the nation.

We shall only maintain peace if we finally work out the bases of a general settlement, if we organise Europe and the world on new principles and if, after having avoided war in the centre of Europe, we push it back wherever it has broken out.

We shall only maintain peace if we consolidate the union of hearts and minds which have just been united in a common anguish. Anything that excites hatred, anything that opposes Frenchmen to Frenchmen, can in future only be considered as treason.

This country needs a moral transformation. It has been reunited for a few days around its mobilised forces; let that union not be frittered away in vain quarrels.

In order to bring this great task of restoration to a successful conclusion, the Government must be in a position to act. We have decided to ask you for the means of such action. It is for you to grant or to refuse such means. But know that the interest and very life of the fatherland is at stake.

On October 5th, 1938 a vote of confidence in M. Daladier was given in the Chamber by 535 votes to 75 (including 73 Communists).

THREE DECISIVE DOCUMENTS¹

The following three documents, extracted from the British White Book, really contain everything that was unfortunately not expressed in the above speeches. These speeches contain rich garlands for Dr. Benesh's Government and for its peace-loving, conciliatory attitude, and also regret for the hard fate that overtook the Government and the country. But one looks in vain for a single word regarding the twenty years of distress and suffering of the Sudeten Germans, the policy of oppression on the one hand and the dilatoriness and sabotage on the other hand which Prague carried on with every available means until the last days and even hours. Even on September 22nd, that is to say after the "unreserved" acceptance of the Franco-British proposals and before the Godesberg meeting, Dr. Benesh said on the Prague wireless: "We have adapted our attitude to the situation and I regard the further development without anxiety; for I have my plan and will not let myself be diverted from my

path. Our people know that they must struggle and I repeat that I have a plan. Our political line is fixed and we will adapt it to the situation." This was the same attitude towards the latest development as had been observable during the months of negotiations with the Sudeten Germans, for which Dr. Benesh issued the slogan: "We will change not the spirit but the methods of our minorities policy." "Our President has a plan" was joyfully stated in the headlines of the Czech press, and these were followed by praise for the policy of plans carried on for years by which Dr. Benesh evaded a settlement of these burning problems. He thought he could still at the last moment continue

¹ Extract from the White Book of September 28th submitted by the British Government to the House of Commons: Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia (H. M. Stationery Office, Cmd 5847).

this "planned" procedure by bringing in the Hague Court or some other conference, in which he could have brought into play the well-trying practice of procrastination so often used on the Geneva stage, with the inevitable result of withdrawing protection from the Sudeten Germans and endangering European peace. These three documents, therefore, throw a bright light on the justice of the demands put forward in the Godesberg memorandum.

**Extract from Lord Runciman's Letter to Mr. Chamberlain
on September 21st, 1938²**

Lord Runciman first gives a short account of his mission and of his efforts until September 16th, the date on which he was made to realise that, in view of the development and of the increased tension between the Prague Government and the Sudeten Germans, his mission must be regarded as having failed. He concludes this part of his report with the view that the chief blame for the failure of the negotiations must be ascribed to the radical Sudeten leaders, and then continues as follows:

"I have much sympathy, however, with the Sudeten case. It is a hard thing to be ruled by an alien race; and I have been left with the impression that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last 20 years, though not actively oppressive and certainly not "terroristic," has been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discrimination, to a point where the resentment of the German population was inevitably moving in the direction of revolt. The Sudeten Germans felt, too, that in the past they had been given many promises by the Czechoslovak Government, but that little or no action had followed these promises. This experience had induced an attitude of unveiled mistrust of the leading Czech statesmen. I cannot say how far this mistrust is merited or unmerited; but it certainly exists, with the result that, however conciliatory their statements, they inspire no confidence in the minds of the Sudeten population. Moreover, in the last elections of 1935 the Sudeten German party polled more votes than any other single party; and they actually formed the second largest party in the State Parliament. They then commanded some 44 votes in a total Parliament of 300. With subsequent accessions, they are now the largest party. But they can always be outvoted; and consequently some of them feel that constitutional action is useless for them.

Local irritations were added to these major grievances. Czech officials and Czech police, speaking little or no German, were appointed in large numbers to purely German districts; Czech agricultural colonists were encouraged to settle on land transferred under the Land Reform in the middle of German populations; for the children of these Czech invaders Czech schools were built on a large scale; there is a very general belief that Czech firms were favoured as against German firms in the allocation of State contracts and that the State provided work and relief for Czechs more readily than for Germans. I believe these complaints to be in the main justified. Even as late as the time of my mission, I could find no readiness on the part of the Czechoslovak Government to remedy them on anything like an adequate scale.

All these, and other, grievances were intensified by the reactions of the economic crisis on the Sudeten industries, which form so important a part of the life of the people. Not unnaturally, the Government were blamed for the resulting impoverishment.

For many reasons, therefore, including the above, the feeling among the Sudeten Germans until about three or four years ago was one of hopelessness. But the rise of Nazi Germany gave them new hope. I regard their turning for help towards their kinsmen and their eventual desire to join the Reich

as a natural development in the circumstances.

At the time of my arrival the more moderate Sudeten leaders still desired a settlement within the frontiers of the Czechoslovak State. They realized what war would mean in the Sudeten area, which would itself be the main battlefield. Both nationally and internationally such a settlement would have been an easier solution than territorial transfer. I did my best to promote it, and up to a point with some success, but even so not without misgiving as to whether, when agreement was reached, it could ever be carried out without giving rise to a new crop of suspicions, controversies, accusations, and counter-accusations. I felt that any such arrangement would have been temporary, not lasting.

This solution, in the form of what is known as the "Fourth Plan," broke down in the circumstances narrated above; the whole situation, internal and external, had changed; and I felt that with this change my mission had come to an end.

Further, it has become self-evident to me that these frontier districts between Czechoslovakia and Germany where the Sudeten population is in an important majority should be given full right of self-determination at once. If some cession is inevitable, as I believe it to be, it is as well that it should be done promptly and without procrastination. There is real danger, even a danger of civil war, in the continuance of a state of uncertainty. Consequently there are very real reasons for a policy of immediate and drastic action. Any kind of plebiscite or referendum would, I believe, be a sheer formality in respect of these predominantly German areas. A very large majority of their inhabitants desire amalgamation with Germany. The inevitable delay involved in taking a plebiscite vote would only serve to excite popular feelings, with perhaps most dangerous results. I consider, therefore, that these frontier districts should at once be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany, and, further, that measures for their peaceful transfer, including the provision of safeguards for the population during the transfer period, should be arranged forthwith by agreement between the two Governments.

The transfer of these frontier districts does not, however, dispose finally of the question how Germans and Czechs are to live together peacefully in future. Even if all the areas where the Germans have a majority were transferred to Germany there would still remain in Czechoslovakia a large number of Germans, and in the areas transferred to Germany there would still be a certain number of Czechs. Economic connexions are so close that an absolute separation is not only undesirable but inconceivable; and I repeat my conviction that history has proved that in times of peace the two peoples can live together on friendly terms. I believe that it is in the interests of all Czechs and of all Germans alike that these friendly relations should be encouraged to re-establish themselves; and I am convinced that this is the real desire of the average Czech and German. They are alike in being honest, peaceable, hard-working, and frugal folk. When political friction has been removed on both sides, I believe that they can settle down quietly.

For those portions of the territory, therefore, where the German majority is not so important, I recommend that an effort be made to find a basis for local autonomy within the frontiers of the Czechoslovak Republic on the lines of the "Fourth Plan," modified so as to meet the new circumstances created by the transfer of the preponderantly German areas. As I have already said, there is always a danger that agreement reached in principle may lead to further divergencies in practice. But I think that in a more peaceful future this risk can be minimized.

This brings me to the political side of the problem, which is concerned with the question of the integrity and security of the Czechoslovak Republic, especially in relation to her immediate neighbours. I believe that here the problem is one of removing a centre

¹ A similar letter was addressed by Lord Runciman to President Benesh on September 21st, 1938.

of intense political friction from the middle of Europe. For this purpose it is necessary permanently to provide that the Czechoslovak State should live at peace with all her neighbours and that her policy, internal and external, should be directed to that end. Just as it is essential for the international position of Switzerland that her policy should be entirely neutral, so an analogous policy is necessary for Czechoslovakia—not only for her own future existence but for the peace of Europe.

In order to achieve this, I recommend:

(1) That those parties and persons in Czechoslovakia who have been deliberately encouraging a policy antagonistic to Czechoslovakia's neighbours should be forbidden by the Czechoslovak Government to continue their agitations; and that, if necessary, legal measures should be taken to bring such agitations to an end.

(2) That the Czechoslovak Government should so remodel her foreign relations as to give assurances to her neighbours that she will in no circumstances attack them or enter into any aggressive action against them arising from obligations to other States.

(3) That the principal Powers, acting in the interests of the peace of Europe, should give to Czechoslovakia guarantees of assistance in case of unprovoked aggression against her.

(4) That a commercial treaty on preferential terms should be negotiated between Germany and Czechoslovakia if this seems advantageous to the economic interests of the two countries.

This leads me on to the third question which lay within the scope of my inquiry—namely, the economic problem. This problem centres on the distress and unemployment in the Sudeten German areas, a distress which has persisted since 1930, and is due to various causes. It constitutes a suitable background for political discontent. It is a problem which exists; but to say that the Sudeten German question is entirely or even in the main an economic one is misleading. If a transfer of territory takes place, it is a problem which will for the most part fall to the German Government to solve.

If the policy which I have outlined above recommends itself to those immediately concerned in the present situation. I would further suggest: (a) That a representative of the Sudeten German people should have a permanent seat in the Czechoslovak Cabinet; (b) that a commission under a neutral chairman should be appointed to deal with the question of the delimitation of the area to be transferred to Germany, and also with controversial points immediately arising from the carrying out of any agreement which may be reached; (c) that an international force be organized to keep order in the districts which are to be transferred pending actual transfer, so that Czechoslovak State police, as I have said above, and also Czechoslovak troops, may be withdrawn from this area.

Hitler's Reply to Mr. Chamberlain on September 23th

Godesberg, Sept. 23, 1938.

A thorough examination of your letter, which reached me today, as well as the necessity of clearing up the situation definitely, lead me to make the following communication:

For nearly two decades the Germans, as well as the various other nationalities in Czechoslovakia, have been maltreated in the most unworthy manner, tortured, economically destroyed, and, above all, prevented from realising for themselves also the right of the nations to self-determination.

All attempts of the oppressed to change their lot failed in the face of the brutal will to destruction of the Czechs. The latter were in possession of the power of the State and did not hesitate to employ it ruthlessly and barbarically.

England and France have never made an endeavour to alter this situation. In my speech before the Reichstag of Feb. 22, I declared that the German Reich would take the initiative in putting an end to any further oppression of these Germans. I have in a further declaration during the Reich Party Congress given clear and unmistakable expression to this decision.

I recognise gratefully that at last, after 20 years, the British Government, repre-

sented by your Excellency, has now decided for its part also to undertake steps to put an end to a situation which from day to day, and, indeed, from hour to hour, is becoming more unbearable. For if formerly the behaviour of the Czechoslovak Government was brutal, it can only be described during recent weeks and days as madness.

The victims of this madness are innumerable Germans. In a few weeks the number of refugees who have been driven out has risen to over 120,000. This situation, as stated above, is unbearable, and will now be terminated by me.

Your Excellency assures me now that the principle of the transfer of the Sudeten territory to the Reich has, in principle, already been accepted. I regret to have to reply to your Excellency that as regards this point, the theoretical recognition of principles has also been formerly granted to us Germans.

In the year 1918, the Armistice was concluded on the basis of the 14 points of President Wilson, which in principle were recognised by all. They were, however, in practice broken in the most shameful way.

What interests me, your Excellency, is not recognition of the principle that this territory is to go to Germany, but solely the realisation of this principle, and the realisation which both puts an end in the shortest time to the sufferings of the unhappy victims of Czech tyranny, and at the same time corresponds to the dignity of a Great Power.

I can only emphasise to your Excellency that these Sudeten Germans are not coming back to the German Reich in virtue of the gracious or benevolent sympathy of other nations, but on the ground of their own will based on the right of self-determination of the nations, and of the irrevocable decision of the German Reich to give effect to this will.

It is, however, for a nation an unworthy demand to have this recognition made dependent on conditions which are not provided for in treaties nor are practical in view of the shortness of the time.

I have, with the best intentions and in order to give the Czech nation no justifiable cause for complaint, proposed—in the event of a peaceful solution—as the future frontier, that nationalities frontier which I am convinced represents a fair adjustment between the two racial groups, taking also into account the continued existence of large language islands.

I am, in addition, ready to allow plebiscites to be taken in the whole territory which will enable subsequent corrections to be made, in order—so far as it is possible—to meet the real will of the peoples concerned. I have undertaken to accept these corrections in advance.

I have, moreover, declared myself ready to allow this plebiscite to take place under the control either of international commissions or of a mixed German-Czech commission. I am finally ready, during the days of the plebiscite, to withdraw our troops from the most disputed frontier areas, subject to the condition that the Czechs do the same.

I am, however, not prepared to allow a territory which must be considered as belonging to Germany, on the ground of the will of the people and of the recognition granted even by the Czechs, to be left without the protection of the Reich. There is here no international power or agreement which would have the right to take precedence over German right.

The idea of being able to entrust to the Sudeten Germans alone the maintenance of order is practically impossible in consequence of the obstacles put in the way of their political organisation in the course of the last decade, and particularly in recent times. As much in the interest of the tortured, because defenceless, population as well as with regard to the duties and prestige of the Reich, it is impossible for us to refrain from giving immediate protection to this territory.

Your Excellency assures me that it is now impossible for you to propose such a plan to your own Government. May I assure you for my part that it is impossible for me to justify any other attitude to the German people. Since, for England, it is a question at most of political

imponderables, whereas, for Germany, it is a question of primitive right of the security of more than 3,000,000 human beings and the national honour of a great people.

I fail to understand the observation of your Excellency that it would not be possible for the Czech Government to withdraw their forces so long as they were obliged to reckon with possible invasion, since precisely by means of this solution the grounds for any forcible action are to be removed.

Moreover, I cannot conceal from your Excellency that the great mistrust with which I am inspired leads me to believe that the acceptance of the principle of the transfer of Sudeten Germans to the Reich by the Czech Government is only given in the hope thereby to win time so as, by one means or another, to bring about a change in contradiction to this principle.

For if the proposal, that these territories are to belong to Germany is sincerely accepted, there is no ground to postpone the practical resolution of this principle. My knowledge of Czech practice in such matters over a period of long years compels me to assume the insincerity of Czech assurances so long as they are not implemented by practical proof.

The German Reich is, however, determined by one means or another to terminate these attempts, which have lasted for decades, to deny by dilatory methods the legal claims of oppressed peoples.

Moreover, the same attitude applies to the other nationalities in this State. They also are the victims of long oppression and violence. In their case, also, every assurance given hitherto has been broken. In their case, also, attempts have been made by dilatory dealing with their complaints or wishes to win time in order to be able to oppress them still more subsequently.

These nations, also, if they are to achieve their rights, will, sooner or later, have no alternative but to secure them for themselves. In any event, Germany, if—as it now appears to be the case—should find it impossible to have the clear rights of Germans in Czechoslovakia accepted by way of negotiation, is determined to exhaust the other possibilities which then alone remain open to her.

Hitlers Reply to Mr. Chamberlain of September 27th

Berlin, september 27th.

I have in the course of the conversations once more informed Sir Horace Wilson, who brought me your letter of Sept. 26, of my final attitude. I should like, however, to make the following written reply to certain details in your letter:

The Government in Prague feels justified in maintaining that the proposals in my memorandum of Sept. 23 went far beyond the concession which it made to the British and French Governments, and that the acceptance of the memorandum would rob Czechoslovakia of every guarantee for its national existence.

This statement is based on the argument that Czechoslovakia is to give up a great part of her prepared defensive system before she can take steps elsewhere for her military protection. Thereby the political and economic independence of the country is automatically abolished. Moreover, the exchange of population proposed by me would turn out in practice to be a panic-stricken flight.

I must openly declare that I cannot bring myself to understand these arguments or even admit that they can be regarded as seriously put forward.

The Government in Prague simply passes over the fact that the actual arrangement for the final settlement of the Sudeten German problem, in accordance with my proposals, will be made dependent not on a unilateral German petition or on German measures of force, but rather, on the one hand, on a free vote under no outside influence, and, on the other hand, to a very wide degree on German-Czech agreement on matters of detail to be reached subsequently.

Not only the exact definition of the territories in which the plebiscite is to take place, but the execution of the plebiscite

and the delimitation of the frontier to be made on the basis of its result, are in accordance with my proposals to be met independently of any unilateral decision by Germany. Moreover, all other details are to be reserved for agreement on the part of a German-Czech commission.

In the light of this interpretation of my proposals and in the light of the cession of the Sudeten population areas, in fact agreed to by Czechoslovakia, the immediate occupation by German contingents demanded by me represents no more than a security measure which is intended to guarantee a quick and smooth achievement of the final settlement.

This security measure is indispensable. If the German Government renounced it and left the whole further treatment of the problem simply to normal negotiations with Czechoslovakia, the present unbearable circumstances in the Sudeten German territories which I described in my speech yesterday would continue to exist for a period the length of which cannot be foreseen.

The Czechoslovak Government would be completely in a position to drag out the negotiations on any point they liked, and thus to delay the final settlement. You will understand after everything that has passed that I cannot place such confidence in the assurances received from the Prague Government. The British Government also would surely not be in a position to dispose of this danger by any use of diplomatic pressure.

That Czechoslovakia should lose a part of her fortifications is naturally an unavoidable consequence of the cession of the Sudeten German territory agreed to by the Prague Government itself. If one were to wait for the entry into force of the final settlement in which Czechoslovakia had completed new fortifications in the territory which remained to her, it would doubtless last months and years.

But this is the only object of all the Czech objections. Above all, it is completely incorrect to maintain that Czechoslovakia in this manner would be crippled in her national existence or in her political and economic independence. It is clear from my memorandum that the German occupation would only extend to the given line, and that the final delimitation of the frontier would take place in accordance with the procedure which I have already described.

The Prague Government has no right to doubt that the German military measures would stop within these limits. If, nevertheless, it desires such a doubt to be taken into account the British and, if necessary, also the French Government can guarantee the quick fulfilment of my proposal.

I can, moreover, only refer to my speech yesterday in which I clearly declared that I regret the idea of any attack on Czechoslovak territory, and that under the condition which I laid down I am even ready to give a formal guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia. There can, therefore, be not the slightest question whatsoever of a check to the independence of Czechoslovakia.

It is equally erroneous to talk of an economic rift. It is, on the contrary, a wellknown fact that Czechoslovakia after the cession of the Sudeten German territory would constitute a healthier and more unified economic organism than before.

If the Government in Prague finally evinces anxiety also in regard to the state of the Czech population in the territories to be occupied, I can only regard this with surprise. It can be sure that, on the German side, nothing whatever will occur which will preserve for those Czechs a similar fate to that which has befallen the Sudeten Germans consequent on the Czech measures.

In these circumstances, I must assume that the Government in Prague is only using a proposal for the occupation by German troops in order, by distorting the meaning and object of my proposal, to mobilise those forces in other countries, in particular in England and France, from which they hope to receive unreserved support for their aim and thus to achieve the possibility of a general warlike conflagration.

I must leave it to your judgment whether, in view of these facts, you consider that you should continue your effort, for which I should like to take this opportunity of once more sincerely thanking you, to spoil such manoeuvres and bring the Government in Prague to reason at the very last hour.

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THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE NON-GERMAN ETHNICAL GROUPS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The struggle of the Sudeten Germans for their national rights and their return to the Reich and the crisis in the Czechoslovak State occasioned thereby have inevitably had corresponding and natural repercussions among the other national groups after their vain attempts for decades to obtain the fulfilment of the promises made to them and the violations of Prague's treaty obligations over as long a period.

It can be a matter of surprise to no-one to-day that the mistakes and shortcomings implicit in these encroachments extending over so many years have now been avenged. Never before in history has the incapacity of a system of Government been more bitterly and unanimously condemned as has Prague's rule over foreign and even kindred populations; not only the Sudeten Germans, but also the Poles and the Hungarians and even the "State peoples" (Staatsvölker)—the Slovaks and Ruthenians—look back with feelings of contempt at the last 20 years, which they were asked to spend in the Czechoslovak Republic.

In the meantime, the world has come to realize that the solutions of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon were blunders and that the only possible conclusion to be drawn from this, in view of the obligations assumed by the victors and later by the Czechs themselves—obligations which have not only not been honoured, but have been cynically violated, is, to deprive the Czechs of any claim to rule foreign national groups, to allow the latter to determine their own destiny, not only in the vital interests of these groups themselves, but also in order by the establishment of law and justice, to put an end to a state of affairs which had become intolerable for all concerned and whose maintenance could only have led to a catastrophe.

National-Socialist Germany, while of course primarily concerned here with its own people, respects and seeks in principle to further the rights of the other nations and national groups exposed to arbitrary treatment and persecution in the Moldau Republic and consequently takes the view that, apart from the liberation of the Germans, a general solution must be found

capable of satisfying the legitimate demands of all others and thus converting what is at present an element of disturbance in Central Europe into a factor of tranquillity calculated to enable the nations to live together in peace to the benefit of all.

In our special issue (No. 17/18) we showed how, under the stimulus of Prague's so-called minorities policy, which became ever more intolerable as time went on, the nations and national groups affected formed a united front in self-defence, with a view in the first place to achieving what was then their object: namely, to obtain autonomy within the Czech State. This object was rendered nugatory by the tactics of procrastination and evasion employed by Prague in connection with the solution of the Sudeten German problem and the measures for the oppression and destruction of the German element which continued to be applied during the negotiations clearly showed that it was too late for any solution from within and that only by union with the German Reich—and that without delay—could a fresh civil war on the Spanish model, and consequently a European catastrophe, be avoided.

The Munich Agreement recognized this fact—not only in the case of the Sudeten Germans, but also in that of the Polish and Hungarian national groups, as appears from the Additional Declaration of the German and Italian Governments to the Agreement of September 29th, 1938, to the effect that they would associate themselves with the guarantee assured by France and Great Britain in respect of the future frontiers of the Czechoslovak State only after settlement of the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities which, under the terms of the further Additional Declaration of the Four Powers, must be carried out within three months after the conclusion of the Agreement, or at the latest by December 29th, 1938.

It was therefore to be expected that, after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement, Poland and Hungary and also the Slovaks and Ruthenes (Carpathian Russians) would vigorously pursue their aims which, in the case of the first two, were no longer confined to autonomy, but were directed towards secession and reincorporation in their home countries.

THE CZECHO-POLISH DISPUTE CONCERNING TESCHEN

Poland acted with especial promptitude. The territory in question was in this instance a comparatively small one: the former Silesian County of Teschen situated on the other side of the Olza, whose Polish population is estimated in Poland at 200,000, while according to the Czech census it is only 80,000. Its main source of riches is its "black diamond fields" and, apart from the liberation of the Polish national group, its annexation adds to the strength of Poland—economically, strategically and politically.

The most important economic assets of the newly acquired Polish territories are to be found less in the predominantly agrarian district of Teschen itself than in the industrial area round Freistadt. It comprises the district of Karwin and Orlau, which, with its valuable household coal and first-rate foundry coke represented the most important metallurgical resources of Czechoslovakia and formed, together with the mining district of Zwinow-Witkovitz, an indivisible economic unit. The acquisition of this area gives Poland control of the coal and coke supply of Eastern Central Europe. Besides this industrial centre, the great foundries at Trzyniec, south of Teschen in the immediate vicinity of the Kaschau-Oderberg railway, have been incorporated in the Polish State. Further, the area between Oderberg and Jablunkau, now enclosed by the Polish frontiers, is of decisive importance from the point of view of communications. The main lines of the railway system of Eastern Central Europe intersect in this area, which forms the junction of the Hamburg-Oderberg and Leningrad-Oderberg lines, the point of departure for the railway lines to Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, Vienna and Trieste and the line connecting the Polish coalfields with the South and South-East. In this area is situated the Kaschau-Oderberg railway—the main line of communication between Czechia and Slovakia and hitherto a vital artery of the Czechoslovak State. Whosoever controls this area holds the key position of the highest importance from the point of view of communications. Its centre is at Oderberg—hitherto the largest railway station in Czechoslovakia, for which Poles and Czechs fought fiercely in 1918/1919. Oderberg is the gate through which the North and South-bound goods and transit traffic of a number of European States must pass and is one of the most important railway junctions of Eastern Central Europe.

This increase in economic power will naturally have political consequences. Poland's position in Southern Europe has been appreciably strengthened. Poland has in effect approached much nearer to the Danube area than appears from the geographical situation. The Polish eagle on the Jablunkau Pass may, after the elimination of Czechoslovakia as a political barrier, the practical liquidation of the Little Entente and the exclusion of Soviet Russian influence, gain in power of attraction. Poland may prove to be a factor to be reckoned with in the coming regroupment of South-Eastern Europe.

There is however a further reason for the steps taken by the Polish Government: the distrust with which Warsaw always regarded the alliance concluded between Prague and Moscow on May 16th, 1935—a distrust which even found expression in warnings addressed to Prague on the subject. This alliance, with its serious dangers for Europe and especially Southern and South-Eastern Europe, was regarded in the same light in Poland as in Germany.

* * *

The Polish Government, in the notes sent to Paris and London on September 20th and to Prague on September 22nd, drew attention to the Polish minority, as it was termed in the official communication. A semi-official communication stated more explicitly that the question was of the same nature as that of the Sudeten Germans and would have to be settled by the same methods. The sense in which that was to be understood

was shown by the Polish note to Prague of September 30th which contained, among other things, a demand for the return of Teschen-Silesia by October 2nd. Prague capitulated and a Polish communiqué was issued on October 1st which read as follows:

"The Polish note of September 30th which contained *inter alia* the Polish Government's demands in regard to the return of Teschen-Silesia, was to-day accepted in toto by the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic. In accordance with the text of the Polish note, the territory of Teschen will be handed over to the Polish military authorities by 2 p.m. on October 2nd. The evacuation and transfer of the districts of Teschen and Freistadt will be effected within ten days.

The delimitation of the other territories and the procedure to be adopted for the plebiscite in those territories and the financial settlements involved will be dealt with by negotiation with the Czechoslovak Government. That Government will immediately take steps to release the Poles serving in the Czechoslovak army and to liberate political prisoners of Polish nationality.

The Polish Government has noted with great satisfaction the termination of a painful conflict between two nations, which has found a peaceful solution in accordance with the peaceable intentions of the Polish nation."

* * *

In the early afternoon of Sunday October 2nd, 1938, while the German troops were entering the liberated Sudetenland to the acclamations of the population, the two representatives—the Polish General Malinowski and the Czech General Hrabzsyk, who had met on the bridge over the Olza at Teschen, were preparing for the entry of the Polish forces into the territory of the former Duchy, which followed immediately afterwards. In conjunction with the political defeat of Prague accomplished by Adolf Hitler after a dispute which shook all Europe for a week, Poland was enabled by independent and determined action to achieve the object demanded ever more impetuously by the Polish people: the union with Poland of "Silesia beyond the Olza".

The chief credit for this development is due to the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, who was not only decorated with the highest Polish order by the President of the State Moscicki, but was for the first time surrounded by a cheering throng of people outside the Brühl Palace, the President's residence in Warsaw. The time is over when such things as the dispute over the Westerplatte in Danzig in March 1933 caused Poland seriously to entertain the idea of a war of intervention against Germany, after which, in view of the vacillating attitude of France, Marshal Pilsudski swung the rudder round and piloted the Polish ship of State into the harbour of agreement with Germany. Colonel Beck long since foresaw the present position and adapted Poland's attitude thereto. He refused to listen to the blandishments of Moscow or to allow his French ally to commit him to helping Czechoslovakia. As for the warnings uttered in regard to Moscow's obligations arising out of her alliance with the Moldau Republic, he was convinced that the Soviet Union was neither able nor willing to fight and when, shortly before Poland's action, the Soviet sent a note in which it threatened to denounce the Russo-Polish Pact of Non-Aggression and to intervene if Poland marched into Czechoslovakia, he administered a sharp rebuke to Moscow.

We will close this section with an historical reminiscence. When the Conference of Ambassadors sanctioned the theft of Teschen on July 28th, 1920, the National Council of Teschen coined the phrase: "history will one day pronounce judgement on this deed." The judgement has now been pronounced. In the case of Teschen also, the wrongheaded policy

of Prague did everything possible to hasten and facilitate the pronouncement of this judgement and the resultant act of repatriation.

The Theft of Teschen twenty years ago

The little province of Teschen was part of Silesia, which had belonged to Poland since the 10th century. In the 11th century several principalities, including the Principality of Teschen, came into being in Silesia as a result of the splitting up of territory for dynastic reasons, but all these principalities remained part of the Polish Kingdom. Not until the 14th century did the Principality of Teschen go to the Bohemian Crown. The relationship was however purely dynastic and the population remained Polish and continued to foster its national culture. After the seven years war, the Principality of Teschen and the province of Troppau remained with Austria and formed a special 'Crown Land' which had nothing in common with the Kingdom of Bohemia. During the Austrian period, Teschen sent Polish deputies to the Vienna Parliament. At that time, the Czechs showed no interest in Teschen.

On May 16th and 17th, 1918—during the world war—a conference of delegates of the Polish and Czech deputies to the Vienna Parliament was held in Prague to negotiate on the question of the future Polish-Czech frontier. It was agreed that this frontier should run between the territories settled with Poles and Czechs. The Polish communes were to be included in Poland and the Czech communes in the future Czechoslovakia. The disposal of the mixed communes was to be decided by a Czech-Polish commission. It should be mentioned that, during these negotiations, the Czechs never invoked the so-called historic right to Teschen of the Crown of St Wenceslas.

The Prague Agreement was however broken by the Czechs a few months later when, behind the backs and without the knowledge of the Poles, they pressed the Allied Powers to allocate to them the whole of the Province of Teschen. An agreement was concluded between France and the Czech National Council on September 28th, 1918 under the terms of which France promised the Czechs to assist them in regaining their freedom and establishing an independent Czechoslovak State within the limits of its old historic frontiers.

No-one in Poland was aware of this first breach of faith on the part of the Czechs. On October 12th, 1918 the representatives of all political parties and organisations met at Teschen and passed a resolution in which they declared in favour of union with Poland.

After the Emperor Charles' manifesto of October 16th, 1918 a National Council was formed in Teschen, with three Polish deputies to the Vienna Parliament at its head. On October 27th, 1918 this National Council summoned a Popular Assembly in Teschen, which was attended by 40,000 people, and passed another resolution demanding the unconditional surrender of the Principality of Teschen to Poland.

When on October 30th, 1918 the Heads of Communes (*Ge-meinevorsteher*) placed themselves under the National Council, the Austrian civil and military authorities also entrusted the National Council with the conduct of administrative affairs. It is true that in the district of Freistadt the Czechs endeavoured to seize power, but they were prevented from doing so by the Polish population. The Poles, who regarded themselves as bound by the Prague Agreement of May 18th, 1918, would not submit to the Czechs. Negotiations were held between the National Council and the representatives of the Czech population, which resulted in the conclusion at Polnisch-Ostrau on November 15th, 1918 of an agreement providing for the division of the Province subject to the consent of the Governments in Warsaw and Prague. Under the Agreement, Poland was allotted a territory of 1762 square kilometres and a population of 293,661. This population was composed, according to the Austrian census of 1910, of 207,092 Poles, 63,418 Germans and 16,433 Czechs. The Czechs obtained 519 square kilometres and a population of 141,160 : 99,171 Czechs, 26,750 Poles and 13,498 Germans.

This Agreement was noted by the Warsaw Government, and by the Narodny Vyor Ceskoslovenski, the provisional Czechoslovak Government in Prague. On November 28th, 1918, the Province was divided by a decree of the Warsaw Government into three electoral districts. The elections were to be held on January 26th, 1919.

That sufficed to make the Czechs suddenly to remember their so-called historic rights to the Province of Teschen. On December 7th, 1918, the Narodny Vyor suddenly declared that the whole of Teschen should be placed under the Prague Government and invoked in this connection the Franco-Czech Agreement of September 28th, 1918. On December 12th, the Czechs informed the Polish National Council that the Agreement of November 15th, 1918 was null and void, as, though binding upon the Narodny Vyor, it was not binding upon the Czech Government. We see how, here also, the same methods were employed as those whereby the Czechs declared the Czechoslovak Treaty of Pittsburgh invalid.

In the meantime the Czechs were preparing for the military invasion of Teschen. Poland was at that time in an extremely difficult military position, as all her available troops were fighting on her Eastern frontiers against the Bolshevik menace. In Teschen, there were only small forces of police and volunteers. In order to give their acts the semblance of legality, the Czechs endeavoured to get the Allies present in the territory, and especially French officers of the Inter-Allied Commission, on their side, which they somehow or other managed to do. On January 23rd, 1919 a Czech Colonel in French uniform went to the Polish military authorities in Teschen and demanded, in the name of the Allied Powers, that the territory of Teschen should be evacuated. When the Polish Commandant declined to act on his own responsibility, he was given two hours in which to confer with the Warsaw Government, whose reply was in the negative. The Czechs advanced even before the period of two hours had elapsed. These Czech troops were commanded by the French Colonel Gillain and other Allied officers. In spite of the intervention of the Commandant of the Allied Military Mission, General Barthelemy, who does not seem to have taken a very strong line, the Czechs crossed the Polish frontier at Oderberg at 1 p.m. on January 23rd with 16 battalions, the Poles having only two battalions available altogether. The battles, which lasted for a few days, terminated on January 30th at Skocow, where the Poles managed to hold up the Czech march. It was however impossible to take advantage of this success, as the Poles were unable to send any reinforcements to the new critical front. In any case the attitude adopted by the Allied Powers would have precluded this. Poland consequently agreed to a truce, under the terms of which the Czechs were required to evacuate part of the territory occupied by them. There were long drawn-out negotiations and various agreements, which were broken or rendered unworkable one after the other by the Czechs. Even the intervention of an inter-allied commission, which was entrusted with the settlement of the dispute, was unsuccessful. The Commission showed some understanding of the real conditions in the territory, but the Czechs, who were always backed up by the French members, rendered any arrangement impossible and opposed all the decisions of the Commission. On May 7th, 1919, the Polish representative to the Allied Commission Zamorski, protested against the systematic violation of the Agreements by the Czechs.

Finally, there was the Czecho-Polish conference at Cracow, which began on July 20th, 1919. The Poles demanded a plebiscite in the disputed area. This was opposed by the Czechs and the negotiations had to be broken off on July 28th, so that the question was referred once more to the Peace Conference. The overwhelming majority of the International Commission—England, Italy, Japan and the United States—proposed a solution approximating to an earlier decision, but France desired a solution more favourable to the Czechs and opposed the decision. Consequently, the Interallied Commission had to prepar-

a fresh report proposing a plebiscite for the territory of Teschen. The Supreme Council finally adopted this proposal and decided accordingly that the plebiscite should be held on September 27th, 1919. A plebiscite commission was appointed, whose French chairman, Count Mannerville, turned out later to be extremely biased in favour of the Czechs. The Plebiscite Commission, which was composed of new members who had little knowledge of local conditions, played fast and loose in Teschen and did whatever the Czechs wanted. Consequently disturbances were constantly breaking out and were brutally suppressed by the Czech gendarmerie, which was retained in the country in violation of the agreements and the resolutions of the Supreme Council. On May 19th, 1920, the Commission proclaimed a state of emergency and set up military courts throughout the territory of Teschen. The Poles realized that there could in the circumstances be no question of a fair plebiscite and agreed to submit the dispute to a court of arbitration. Benes agreed and even declared himself satisfied with the person of the arbitrator. That was at the time of the Polish victories in the East and of the Polish occupation of Kiev and when, some weeks later, the fortunes of war were reversed, Prague again broke its word and withdrew its agreement to arbitration.

Poland's military position appreciably deteriorated and the Warsaw Government appealed to the Allied Powers for assistance and, in July 1920, representatives of the Allied Powers went to Spa to discuss the question. As a condition of such

assistance however the Poles were required to submit to the decisions of the Supreme Council in the matter of the delimitation of their frontiers. The assistance of the Allied Powers, who took their obligations no more seriously than the Czechs, was for the most part conspicuous by its absence, as the few ammunition convoys to Poland were held up by the Czechs. The French attitude towards these treacherous proceedings was so mild that Prague saw no reason to revise its policy.

Then followed the verdict of the Conference of Ambassadors on July 28th, 1920. The province of Teschen was arbitrarily divided. Over half the territory—that is, 1270 square kilometres with 293,380 inhabitants, including all pits and factory plant—was allocated to the Czechs. Even the mountainous district of Jablonkow, in which, according to the Austrian census of 1910, there were 153 Czechs, was separated from Poland for strategic and transport reasons. 200,000 inhabitants of Teschen, who had for centuries proclaimed their racial connection with Poland not only by words but also by deeds, were deprived of the right of self-determination and handed over to the Czechs.

* * *

We will not describe in detail the twenty years of purgatory endured by the Teschen Poles. Here also, the Czechs have for the last two decades pursued their policy of czechification à outrance and employed the same methods as against the Sudeten Germans.

THE AUTONOMY OF THE SLOVAKS AND RUTHENES

Prague decided to accord full autonomy within the Republic to the Slovaks and Ruthenes (Ukrainians and Carpathian Russians) almost as promptly as it made up its mind to accede to the Sudeten and Polish demands.

The understanding with the Slovaks was reached on October 7th after negotiations between the representatives of the various Slovak parties at Ziliana on October 6th, which led to a joint declaration calling for the promulgation by October 28th at the latest of a constitutional law providing for the autonomy of Slovakia and conforming to a draft text which was also decided upon: Prague not only appointed a number of new Slovak ministers to posts in the Central Government, but also established a Government of Slovakia and appointed the Minister Dr Tiso as its Head. As the tragedy of fate would have it, the indefatigable champion of Slovak autonomy, the aged Father Hlinka, was called to his rest only a few months before and so was never to see the fruits of his twenty years struggle for the fulfilment of the Pittsburgh Agreement.

* * *

On October 11th, Prague also accepted the demands for autonomy drafted by the Ruthenes on October 8th at Ungvar (Uzhorod) on the Slovak model and set up a Government of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, whose Head, M. Brody, has, as a result of differences over the Hungarian question, since been deprived of his office and replaced by Father Volosin.

Here again, a long-standing injustice has been remedied. The Czechs had based their claim to Carpathian Ruthenia on various arguments. This territory, which had been oppressed by the Hungarians must on no account go back to Hungary, nor could it be annexed by Poland, as it was not known if the latter would include Eastern Galicia. Carpathian Ruthenia should form a convenient corridor between Czechoslovakia and Rumania (to complete the encirclement of Hungary) as also between

Czechoslovakia and Russia or the Ukraine in the event of a rising by the last-named. The inclusion of Eastern Galicia in Poland upset the latter calculation and the Czechs finally took their stand on the decision of a "rada"—a meeting of Ruthenes at Presov which demanded the inclusion of the territory in Czechoslovakia under certain conditions. They forgot however to mention that, at about the same time, three "radas" had been held, one of which, at Huszt, demanded unconditional incorporation in the Ukraine, while that held at Ungvar (Uzhorod) demanded the maintenance of Hungarian Sovereignty. Not only was the meeting at Presov the least well attended, but it was held on Slovak territory and under the protection of Czech troops.

It is a matter of common knowledge that Masaryk's propaganda in the United States during the war was addressed to the Ruthenes among others and that the Agreement of Seranton was concluded in November 1918 with the Ruthenes living in America—an agreement analogous to the Pittsburgh Agreement, which was regarded by the Entente as the expression of a desire for the voluntary inclusion of the "autonomous Ruthene territory" in the Czechoslovak Republic on a federalist basis. Indeed, the separation of this territory from Hungary was effected on that basis. Articles 19-23 of the Czechoslovak Minorities Agreement dealt with that territory, though the claims of the Ruthenes were—already there—considerably whittled down. There was no mention of a State, but only of an autonomous unit, whose linguistic, religious, material and administrative autonomy was guaranteed under the authority of a Governor who, though responsible to the Ruthenian Diet, was appointed by the President of the State. The Ruthenes have in fact never received this autonomy. The Prague Government put off granting it again and again on all conceivable and conflicting pretexts: first it was said that the Ruthenes were not yet ripe for it or sufficiently cultured to be able to govern themselves, which was in flat contradiction to the Czech statements at the Peace Conference; then it was said that the Ruthenian Parliament could not be formed, because that province had not

yet been finally delimited. When however the Ruthenians demanded its delimitation, Prague replied that it could only be carried out by the future Ruthenian Parliament. In short, the Prague Government employed the same methods against the Ruthenes as against the other foreign national groups. Time after time, public opinion was skilfully kept in ignorance of the

claims and complaints of the Ruthenes, by means of a strict official censorship. This is, be it remembered, a territory of approximately 650 square kilometres and a population (in 1920) of over 600,000; of whom 62% are Ruthenes, 18% Hungarians, 3% Slovaks, 2% Germans, 2% Poles and, according to Czech statistics, 13% Jews.

THE HUNGARIAN CLAIMS

Hungary's Hardest Period

The Dictated Peace of Trianon and the Injustice of 1919-1920

1. The « Peace » Negotiations of Trianon.

In his work entitled "The Truth about the Preliminary Discussions of the Treaty of Trianon", Dr. Stephan Czako writes:

"The Great Powers, having concentrated their efforts on preparing the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of Trianon did not receive from them all the attention which it deserved. It is regrettable that, while the Great Powers were engaged in the work of the treaty to be concluded with the German Empire, the preparation of the conditions of peace with Hungary was literally taken over by the States adjoining Hungary. These States, which were closely concerned, raised their voices very high and took upon themselves a leading role in this work. Instead of thinking about the future peace of Europe, these States endeavoured to take as large portions as possible from the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Of all the representatives of the succession States interested in dividing up the Danube Monarchy, the founders of the newly constituted Czech Republic were the most active and attached themselves faithfully to the theory propounded by the active propaganda of Mr. Benesh even before the War, the slogan of which was "Destroy Austria-Hungary".

The former monarchy has been effectively destroyed, and with it pre-War Hungary. In addition, it is a well known fact that Hungary, despoiled and abandoned among the countries of Europe, was at grips with the Bolshevik revolution immediately after the armistice."

It is indeed a well known fact that Count Karolyi, who was in power at the time of the armistice and on the arrival in Hungary of the troops of Franchet d'Esperey, ordered the Hungarian troops to retire and sink their arms, either because he relied on the promises of the Entente or because he pursued a personal ambition. "I do not want to see any more soldiers", he cried. Thus enormous territories the fate of which was not yet decided were evacuated in advance without any possibility of reconquering them. This position was henceforward not unconnected with the excessive claims of the three neighbours of Hungary which refused to leave once these territories had been occupied. It was the moment that Karolyi chose to hand over the power to Bela Kun.

In David Hunter-Miller's work entitled "My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents"—a valuable source for historians since it represents the first publication of the details of the negotiations, in 22 volumes, on the basis of stenographic notes—we find on page 304 of Volume IV information which tells us a good deal about the technique and the strict "punctuality" which presided over the preparatory work. There is a facsimile of a

letter addressed by one of the principal delegates to Mr. Hunter-Miller. On a scrap of crumpled and partly torn paper an illegible scribble tells Mr. Hunter-Miller of certain rectifications to be made in the Hungarian frontiers. On page 338 of the same volume we find a similar scribble on a piece of paper like those used by waiters in restaurants for making out their bills. This piece of paper contained nothing other than an improvised drawing in pencil showing to what State the three Hungarian comitats of Torontal, Temes and Krasso-Szöreny should henceforward belong. These documents are sufficiently revealing; they show how carelessly the delegates scribbled on paper, without knowing the local conditions, geographical facts, the ethnographic and economic problems of the territories and populations whose fate and future existence depended on their decisions.

In his volume "Les Coupables", written in 1935, Henri Pozzi observes:

"The Conference of Trianon—in which Wilson, who was already suffering the first effects of the psycho-physiological failing which was to remove him before his time, refused to listen to Lansing and gave carte blanche to Colonel House, in which Clemenceau did not know the first word of the problems which the Conference was called upon to solve⁽¹⁾, in which Lloyd George and the Italians with all the overseas plenipotentiaries were the dupes of faked documentation⁽²⁾—the Conference gave Benesh everything he asked for without discussion.

In view of the immensity of the general report drawn up by the Chairman of the sub-committee, André Tardieu, the enormous mass of statistics, comparative returns, maps, investigations, graphs, memoranda, minutes, petitions and documents of all kinds which accompanied it, all those who were perturbed by the precipitation and the kitchen smells which they were requested to taste and approve, recoiled in terror.

Any checking or control would have been impossible. The task would have been superhuman.

This was what André Tardieu and his Slav associates counted on. Any discussion or rectification was thus avoided."

The most important of the evidence given by the notes of Mr. Hunter-Miller is the definite fact that in the meetings of the Delimitation Committee and the Supreme Council the territorial clauses of the future Treaty of Trianon were drafted in their final form at the beginning

(1) "He (Clemenceau) has no ideas regarding the future of Central Europe.... he knows little of the great questions and nothing of the files...." (R. Poincaré: "Victoire et Armistice", pp. 399 and 68.)

(2) All the documentary material supplied to us by certain of our Allies during the peace negotiations was mendacious and faked. We came to decisions on forgeries... (Lloyd George: Speech at Queen's Hall.)

of May. On the other hand it was only on December 1st, 1919 that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers invited the Hungarian Government to send its delegates to Neuilly furnished with the necessary powers to conclude peace. As a result of this invitation, the members of the Hungarian peace delegation, with Count Albert Apponyi at their head, proceeded at the beginning of the year 1920 to Neuilly, where the peace conditions were handed to them on January 15th, 1920.

The Hungarian delegation addressed a large number of notes to the Conference containing all the details of the questions involved and representing a vast scientific value. The Conference gave its reply to the Hungarian notes on May 6th, 1920, and this reply was accompanied by the famous covering letter of M. Millerand. More than a year had thus elapsed between the day when the decisions were taken at the Quai d'Orsay, without Hungary being heard, and the date of the signature of the Treaty of Trianon on June 4th, 1920. From the meetings of the sub-committees, that is to say from January 1919, until the date of M. Millerand's covering letter (May 6th, 1920) there was time enough to study the Hungarian point of view. Mr. Hunter-Miller's notes show almost minute by minute that everything would have been useless. At Trianon the Hungarian delegation was presented with a "*chose jugée*" which it would in no case have had the means of modifying. In the drawing rooms of the Quai d'Orsay, M. Benesh and his friends succeeded in getting the Great Powers to accept resolutions without appeal, which could no longer be shaken by the arguments of the Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian delegation could only do one thing: sign.

But Mr. Hunter-Miller's notes also now show the meaning of M. Millerand's covering letter and fully explain it. When it is realised that the decisions taken at the Quai d'Orsay were without appeal, the tenour of M. Millerand's covering letter can cause no surprise whatever. It is also not surprising to note that the signatures under the Treaty of Trianon on the part of the Great Powers do not include any of the persons who took part in the discussion of the Hungarian problem at the Quai d'Orsay. Instead of President Wilson, who had in the meantime returned to his country where he was moreover openly disavowed, and instead of Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and the other principal delegates, the ambassadors of the Great Powers in Paris sat round the table at which the Succession States were on the other hand represented by the same persons who had taken part eighteen months earlier in the discussions behind closed doors at the Quai d'Orsay. Mr. Wilson left before the great victory of his life, the triumph of his fourteen points, had been sealed. But as for MM. Benesh, Titulescu, Pashitch and company, they persevered to the end. It was as if they had felt that this peace was really their work. Mr. Hunter-Miller's notes show very clearly the share of the responsibility assumed by M. Benesh and his colleagues.

Mr. Hunter-Miller, the first of memorialists, shows us the modern technique of applied immorality, by means of which a mortal wound was inflicted not only on the accused who had never been heard, but also on universal moral order.

The accounts of the American diplomat show amply on several occasions that the committees of the Peace Conference decided more than once in the space of a few minutes the fate of territories with thousands of years of history and the destinies of several million people, without blinking an eyelid and without showing the slightest scruple."

* * *

While it is correct to state that the Czech delegation did not obtain all the territory which it claimed, nevertheless:

1. Hungary, which comprised 21 million inhabitants before

the War, including Croatia-Slavonia, and 18 ½ millions without that territory, was reduced to 8 millions, while the Hungarians (Magyars) are a people of nearly 11 million.

2. Out of 10 ½ million inhabitants thus taken away from Hungary proper, there are more than 3 million pure Hungarians.

3. Hungary thus lost a third of her Magyars.

4. Each of the Hungarian territories annexed to neighbouring States comprises 30 % of Hungarians.

5. If we consider the whole of the territories removed from Hungary, less Croatia-Slavonia which was already autonomous in 1914, it will be seen that out of the total of 10 ½ million inhabitants which they contain, the Magyars are the most numerous, namely 3,300,000; after them come the Roumanians with 2,900,000, the Slovaks with 1,800,000, the Germans with 1,500,000, the Yugoslavs with 750,000 and the Ruthenes with 400,000.

6. Former Hungary comprised 54 ½ % of Hungarians (i.e. an absolute majority) and 10 ½ % of Germans, making a total of 65 %; there were therefore only 35 % of other races. In admitting that, in cases where the frontier could not be drawn on an ethnical basis on account of its complexity, sacrifices would be compensated on both sides, an equitable compromise should therefore have removed only 35 % of the inhabitants from Hungary. But the Treaty of Trianon removed 63 % or nearly double. Instead of being reduced by a third Hungary was reduced by two-thirds.

7. But, of these 3 million Hungarians annexed to neighbouring States, nearly two millions could have escaped from foreign domination without any kind of geographical difficulty because they are in direct contact with the Hungary of Trianon.

8. In order to destroy a Hungary in which the Hungarians formed 55 %, a territory in which there are only 48 % of Slovaks was transferred to Czechoslovakia, together with a compact block of 813,000 Hungarians in a zone in direct contact with Hungary along the entire frontier in which they form 90 % of the population, making a total of 3,568,000 inhabitants of which there are 1,865,000 (52 %) Hungarians, Germans and Ruthenes (1,072,000 Hungarians).

9. A plebiscite would never have sanctioned such transfers. The only plebiscite which took place, in a small district with a majority of foreign races, on the contrary confirmed the Hungarian desire of the population.

10. Even by waiving the plebiscite, which would possibly have given back to Hungary certain districts with other races whose interests gravitate towards her because they are too much separated economically and geographically from their national centre (Ruthenes, Eastern Slovaks, Bihar Roumanians), even by confining oneself to the ethnical limits of the compact block of Hungarian population, the rectification would give back to Hungary all round the new frontier—except on the side of Austria, on the Drave and on two or three points of the Roumanian frontier—a strip of territory of a width varying from 15 to 70 kilometres including in present Czechoslovakia the towns of Pressburg, Nyitra, Liva, Losanc, Rimaszomlab, Rozsny, Kassa, Ungva and Munkacs. This northern strip, if returned to Hungary, would indeed remove 1,000,000 inhabitants from Czechoslovakia (7 ½ % of the population), but hardly as much as 50,000 Slovaks, or less than 3 % of all the Slovaks.

The Peace Conference not only very frequently confused the peoples' right of self-determination; it also to a great extent distorted the very principle of nationality for economic or strategic reasons, by taking away strips of territory from the compact Magyar block and granting them to neighbouring States. These strips of territory, when added together, form an imposing total. These two mistakes have been combined. In other words, not only does the new frontier not coincide with that which would have been fixed by a plebiscite, but it

also does not coincide with the language limit; it goes beyond this and forms a third and more internal line. It leaves outside Hungary a first zone of Hungarian territories, then a zone of territories of other races whose interests are so closely connected with Hungary that there would have been no doubt of their decision if they had been consulted. It is therefore based neither on ethnography, nor on the sentiments of the population, nor on their interests—of which moreover they are the only judges. This is the case in particular with the inhabitants of the western border of the Transylvanian Alps, which are already in the Hungarian plain, with the Ruthenes of the Southern Carpathians, and with a majority of the Eastern Slovaks, to the east of the Tatra, inhabitants of the valleys running into the upper Theiss.

In short, in the first place a secular geographic and economic unit was destroyed, namely pre-War Hungary, the Carpatho-Danubian basin, of which all the waterways except two converged towards the plain of the middle Danube and of which all the frontiers except in the east were clearly traced by nature, i.e. the chain of the Carpathians, the lower Danube, the Drave; the unity of this territory is immediately evident to anyone who glances at the physical map of Europe. In the second place, having thus created artificial and economically untenable political units, an attempt was made to catch up with nature and to enlarge these units in order to confer on them their geographical justification; the economic structure which had been destroyed on a large scale was re-formed on a small scale and the injustice of these frontiers was further exaggerated in order to give them a local economic value; Czechoslovakia was given as a "strategical frontier" the bank of the Danube and the Ipoly, while Bohemia belongs to the Elbe basin and the Slovaks themselves nowhere go as far as the Danube, the two banks of which are German above Pressburg and Hungarian below. These arbitrary frontiers were thus pushed further than arbitrary demands, in order to gain beyond them a new natural frontier.

2. The Czecho-Yugoslav Corridor.

However enormous his victory was, Benesh considered however that the essential had escaped him.

On November 6th 1918, he quoted in the "Times" the very terms of Masaryk's memorandum and renewed the demand of the Czechs for a "Corridor" which would give a direct connection through the ruins of former Hungary for the Slavs of Czechoslovakia and the Slavs of Yugoslavia and would realise the dream for which Sazonov, Izvolski and Tsarist Russia had started the War.

On December 7th Masaryk was received by M. Raymond Poincaré and pleaded the cause of the "corridor" with him. Masaryk, who had been warned by Tardieu of the sentiments of Poincaré who was in favour of maintaining an Austrian State to balance Prussianised Germany, was moreover extremely cautious and merely spoke in general terms.

A few weeks later, on January 13th and 27th 1919 in the Subcommittee for settling the fate of the Austro-Hungarian peoples, and again on February 5th at 3 p.m. in the plenary meeting of the Conference, Edouard Benesh clearly stated this demand for a common Czech-Yugoslav frontier.

His arguments, which were taken up by Vesnitch and Trumbitch, the representatives of Belgrade, were energetically supported by André Tardieu.

In order to justify the demand put forward by Edouard Benesh, André Tardieu pointed out that the existence of this corridor would make the Hungarians definitely powerless by cutting their country in two. This would give such an absolute guarantee of future peace and such certainty that no force of revenge could ever arise in Budapest against the peace dictated by the victors, that it seemed impossible to him not to comply with Benesh's wishes.

The Czechs felt sure of success.

They failed.

Indeed nothing could overcome the opposition of Lloyd George and Lord Balfour in whom the hereditary distrust of the British for Slavism was suddenly aroused, nor that of the Italians who were not unaware that Benesh and Osusky were supporting with all their strength behind the scenes the Serb claims to the Adriatic territories promised to Italy by the London agreement.

A very few months after his failure in the Conference, Benesh, who had received from Paris the assurance that the Conference of Ambassadors was taking no further interest in the conflict, proposed to the Serbs to take common military action against Hungary in order to create the "corridor" by force.

He was in agreement with Vesnitch who had just replaced the aged Pashitch at Belgrade as head of the Serbian Government and also with Trumbitch, and he had promised the Roumanians all the Hungarian territory that the Allies had refused them at Trianon.

His calculations again encountered an unexpected obstacle.

Pashitch, who was still dazzled by the good fortune with which his country had come out of the great adventure of the War, was determined to take no more risks. And the influence of Pashitch, although he was temporarily not in power, remained preponderant at Belgrade⁽¹⁾. Benesh met with a definite refusal.

3. A Fairy Tale.

At the Peace Conference, the Czech delegates always spoke of the "Czechoslovak" people and nation when they simply meant the Crown of Bohemia and its former territory including Silesia and even Lusatia; since 1526 and especially since the battle of the White Mountain (1620) this crown had however become a purely juridical notion and was included in the list of titles of the Emperors of Germany and later of Austria; moreover and more especially these former territories of the Crown of Bohemia never included Slovakia.

In addition they were impudent enough to start talking immediately of a Czechoslovak nation as if such a nation had ever existed, in spite of the fact that Czech and Slovak are two distinct languages.

The Czechs thus played two games very skilfully. By means of contradictory geographic, economic and strategic arguments (natural frontiers) on the one hand and ethnical arguments (right of self-determination) on the other hand, they obtained territories which ought never to have been granted to them; the claim to German Bohemia was a violation of the nationality principle while the claim to Slovakia was a violation of the geographic principle, since Hungary, which represents a geographic unit unparalleled in history, has always had the Carpathians as her natural frontier. But the Czechs, not content with using these two kinds of incompatible arguments, in addition violated their own principles, since, after claiming the historical and natural frontier in Bohemia and the ethnical frontier in Slovakia, went beyond the latter very definite line and, under economic and strategic pretexts, formed a new natural frontier, the Danube frontier, where the Slovaks had never been.

Under the title: "L'homme a qui tout a réussi", M. Tibor Eckhardt writes in the "Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie":

"As it was scarcely possible to base an independent State on the Czech linguistic area with its seven million inhabitants, the fiction of the "Czechoslovak national unity" had to be created. Since in the case of the Sudetens the right of self-determination was unfavourable to the Czechs, the historic right had to be invoked. But this same principle was opposed to the dismemberment of the Kingdom of St. Stephen and at once precluded all the Czech claims to northern Hungary. Accord-

(1) "Military action against Hungary, which Benesh proposed to us at the time, would have raised the whole question again. For us, it would have been madness." (Pashitch to Stefanovitch, Dec. 11, 1923.)

ingly, as regards Hungary the historic right had to be waived and economic and strategic arguments had to be put forward in order to obtain as much Hungarian territory as possible. But this was still insufficient to obtain distant Ruthenia. At this point M. Benesh was helped by the idea of the Pan-Slav corridor; when Galicia subsequently fell to Poland instead of to Russia, he still succeeded in keeping this corridor which, however, led nowhere and became a blind alley. But all these principles and rights which replaced each other at will were still insufficient to satisfy the gratuitous claims of Czechoslovakia. It was necessary deliberately to mislead the Peace Conference in order to obtain *inter alia* the annexation of a million of Hungarians of pure blood. Here again M. Benesh was lucky. A sad revolution had just deprived Hungary of her force of action at the very moment when the Hungarian-Czech frontiers were established. He thus succeeded in creating a veritable monster State spread out across the map of Europe, which opposed a barrier to the evolution, the economic traffic and the peaceful contact of all the neighbouring peoples. A glance at the map of Europe would have been sufficient to prove to anyone the absurdity of the new situation. But the authors of the Peace Treaties were blinded by the dust thrown up by M. Benesh. He thus succeeded in obtaining for seven million Czechs a country of fourteen million inhabitants and in creating on the basis of the right of self-determination a new State in which the majority of the population feel ill at ease and can even decree by parliamentary means the dissolution of the State. M. Benesh' work thus inherited all the faults of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy without being able to boast of its advantages; it is full of intrinsic contradictions and would never have come into being without Mr. Benesh' good luck."

As the Czechs were given everything they asked for, they would have been wrong to feel squeamish. They put forward four successive plans, each one claiming more than the last. The number of annexed Hungarians rose from 300,000 to over a million.

The Czech delegation thought it could do what it liked, so great was the influence it possessed in Paris. This influence which was due to the constant and repeated contact with all the leading circles of the Entente during the last years of the War, has survived the Peace Treaty for nearly twenty years, and it is a well-known fact that M. Benesh in particular has enjoyed at Geneva a role out of proportion to the size of his State.

In his work entitled: "Les Coupables", Henri Pozzi writes in this connection: "Despite the promises which they had received, the bargains they had concluded, the complicity which they had obtained from the two men whom they considered the masters of the Peace—Clemenceau and Wilson—the unscrupulous politicians and jobbers who spoke and negotiated at Trianon in the name of the "small allies" did not believe up to the very end in the full extent of their extraordinary luck.

"It's a fairy-tale", said Masaryk constantly in November 1918 on the "Carmania" on which he came back to Europe, where our victories were to cause, him an obscure little University professor, to be received as the head of a State.

The Czechs in particular who had done everything, made all sorts of combinations and taken all sorts of decisions for four years—both for themselves and for others—and who had so skilfully taken the place of Tsarism which had disappeared, in order to claim all the Austro-Hungarian remnants which our Government had undertaken to hand over to Russia, who had shown every audacity and every cynicism in the "preparation of the peace", and whom nothing could stop when there were no blows to be received—and there were none at Trianon, not even moral blows, since the Hungarians were never allowed to take part in the discussions—were unrecognizable to their friends.

In the face of the triumph which exceeded all their hopes, the help given them on all sides, and the ridiculous ease with which they were able to take more and more, they were somewhat disconcerted."

On this subject the following three quotations from William Martin's book, "Statesmen of the War", give an excellent summary of this position:

Dr. Benes had not much to contend with in Paris. Once the principle of the Czecho-Slovak state was accepted—and it had been accepted in advance—no one thought of refusing it the extent of territory to which it was entitled. Dr. Benes' talent lay in the way in which he convinced his hearers from the outset that he was asking for no more. And he succeeded so well that every one vied with him in zeal on behalf of his demands and that eventually he was given more than he claimed. He was even given Ruthenia into the bargain, solely because no one knew what else to do with it!

I am astounded at the way in which they give me everything I ask. It is too much. I can't decline to pass on my countrymen's claims and I am never refused anything. I ask myself how far this can go." (Dr. Benes said at the time to one of his friends.)

"Dr. Benes said to me once: 'A state is not built up in a day. My country, in order to achieve its economic and moral unity, has need of twenty years of peace.'"

4. The Victory of Injustice.

"It is sufficient to cast a glance at the map", Aristide Briand admitted on June 7th, 1921, "to see that the new frontiers of Hungary are not in accordance with justice."

Nearly all the signatories of the treaty of June 4th already shared this view.

The excesses of injustice committed at Trianon had become so evident less than a year later that the United States, in signing their separate peace with Hungary on August 29th, 1921 did so without taking account of her new frontiers.

Even in France, the Senate, disturbed by the revelations of M. de Jouvenel, M. de Lamarzelle, General Bourgeois and M. de Monzie, who had confirmed and given definite shape to the charges brought before the Chamber of Deputies on June 7th against the decisions of Trianon by M. Margaine, M. Lénail, M. Paul-Boncour and the rapporteur of the treaty himself, M. Daniélou, had refused on July 11th, 1921 to ratify definitely the Treaty of Trianon. It had only ratified it subject to the reservation that the French Government would cause all the errors and all the injustices which had been pointed out to be revised.⁽¹⁾

The British have not become revisionist through sentiment but under the pressure of evidence.


The amicable reparation of the flagrant injustices of the treaty of 1920 indeed appears to them as the sole means of avoiding the realisation of such reparation by force.

"It is not possible for England to become a guarantor of the frontiers laid down at Trianon in 1919", said the Labour Minister Philip Snowden at Locarno, and one of the loftiest and most representative consciences of British thought, Lord Asquith, added: "Let us hope that the authors of the Peace Treaty have not been so foolish as to think that they were establishing an eternal or even durable peace...."

"A great number of the Hungarian claims are justified", said Lloyd George on June 30th, 1920 to the President of the Roumanian Council, Vaida-Voevod, "and we must try to find a platform for agreement with them."

⁽¹⁾ "In the face of all those who have given their children that France may be more beautiful after the victory, I do not feel that I possess the sad courage to put my signature under such a treaty." (De Lamarzelle, July 11th 1921.)

Hungarian frontier hitherto.
North frontier of the area inhabited by 50 to 100 % Hungarians (1910 census).
Divergences at the Czech census of 1930.
Divergences at the 1880 census.



Towns with over 75 % of Hungarian population.
Hungarian towns with population under 75 %.

Ungarn
Slowaken
Karpato-Ruren
Deutsche Rumänen
Rumänen
Sub-Carpathian Russians
Slovaks
Hungarians

Explanation of the Signs and Meaning of the Map

(According to Hungarian sources)

The map of modern Slovakia, reproduced on this page from Hungarian publications, gives a general picture of the districts inhabited by Hungarians on the basis of the three censuses, the figures of which were referred to in the course of the negotiations. The census figures of 1910 were taken as a basis in the occupation of the German districts of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia and the transfer of the territories to the Reich. According to the principle laid down at the Munich meeting, these census returns were also to be applied in the case of Hungary, since it was not right that the violent demographic changes of the last twenty years should form a basis of the just settlement aimed at. Injustice cannot be taken as a legal basis. The census figures of 1880 and those of 1930 obviously give more favourable results for the views of the Czechoslovak delegation, for according to these figures not only would considerable frontier districts inhabited by Hungarians remain under Czechoslovak rule, but also eight Hungarian towns (Ěrsekújvár, Léva, Losonc, Rimaszombat, Rozsnyó, Kassa, Ungvár, Beregszaz — Neuhäusel, Lewenz, Lucenec, Gr. Steffelsdorf, Rosenau, Kaschau, Ungvar, Beregsas) which had a majority of over 75 % Hungarians according to the 1910 figures and even at the present time—after twenty years of foreign rule—have an almost purely Hungarian population.

In many places the last three lines coincide. Hungary desires with slight exceptions the 50 % language frontier of 1910, or 1918, on the basis of the same principles as those applied in the case of the Germans and Poles.

The Hungarian linguistic area comprises 12,940 square kilometres, and the area of the Schütt island 1838 square kilometres. In the linguistic area with an absolute Hungarian majority the population in 1910 was 1,034,714, and in the area of the Groszer Schütt 105,418.

5. The Covering Letter.

On May 6th, 1920, M. Alexandre Millerand, President of the Conference of Ambassadors which had succeeded the Peace Conference on May 9th, 1919, transmitted to the Hungarian Delegation the final text of the peace conditions.

It was accompanied by an autograph letter.-

"If an inquiry on the spot" wrote M. Millerand, "reveals the necessity of modifying the frontier lines fixed by the Treaty, and if the frontier commissions consider that the provisions of the Treaty contain an injustice on any point whatever, Hungary can appeal to the League of Nations."

"The Allied and Associated Powers" added the President of the Conference, "are in agreement that the League of Nations, if requested by one of the parties concerned, can offer its services to obtain by an amicable settlement such frontier rectifications as the Commissions consider desirable.... The Powers are confident that this procedure provides a suitable method of correcting any injustice in the demarcation of the frontiers...."

The undertaking was quite definite.

It is true that M. Millerand himself, fifteen years later, categorically denied the importance attached to it not only by the Hungarian revisionists but also by the former signatories of the Treaty themselves who were undoubtedly in an excellent position to know and to speak the truth.

"My letter of May 6th, 1920", said in fact the former President of the Republic to the newspaper *Az Est* of Budapest, "never aimed at opening the door to any possibility of revision..."

As a matter of fact, the covering letter signed by M. Millerand which promised that changes would be made in the line originally fixed at Trianon if, as a result of investigations on the spot, it was found that it did not correspond at various points to ethnical and economic requirements, remained a dead letter for the delimitation commissions.

Indeed, at the same time as the Supreme Council gave Hungary reason to hope for some concessions by means of the covering letter which left the door open for possible rectifications, it secretly cancelled this promise by a private communication to the delimitation commissions instructing them to follow as closely as possible the line of the Treaty without taking into account national, linguistic or religious considerations. Such was the duplicity of the masters of Europe.

Accordingly the commissions made only insignificant changes in a frontier nearly 2000 kilometres in length, and these were for the most part annulled by other changes made in favour of the succession States. In reply to the observations submitted by Hungary to the Peace Conference, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers replied that any change would have had more serious consequences than the disadvantages pointed out by the Hungarian delegation, that a plebiscite would not "appreciably" change the frontiers drawn at Trianon, and lastly that the ethnical conditions of Central Europe did not enable the political frontiers to be made to coincide throughout their length with the ethnical frontiers. The truth is that they have been made to coincide nowhere except at three or four points. Moreover the very letter which granted the possibility of changes precluded in advance the more important changes which would have called into question the general line laid down by the Treaty, which had to serve as a basis and remain sacred.

M. Pozzi writes on this subject:

"The Hungarians, trusting in the word of France, signed the peace on June 4th, 1920 at the Petit Palais de Trianon.

Three weeks had not elapsed before M. Millerand himself, in an imperative and "strictly confidential" document, declared null and void the undertakings which he had just assumed officially on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers.

On June 22nd, 1920, in fact, M. Millerand gave all the delimitation commissions operating in Central Europe the order not

to let themselves be guided "by any consideration whatever calculated to involve the slightest rectification in the frontier lines as established at Trianon on memoranda and documents.

None of the commissions that were thus forbidden to be guided by the "covering letter" of May 6th, had moreover as yet had this letter communicated to them.

It was never communicated to any of them."

6. The Paléologue Episode.

The ink of the treaty was scarcely dry when the offensive of the Russian armies against Poland took place.

On June 24th, 1920, the red armies were at the gates of Warsaw. The very existence of Poland was in danger and, with it, the entire work of victory.

Four days earlier, in obedience to orders from Prague, the Socialist government of Vienna decreed the economic boycott of Hungary. By starving the Magyar people, for whom the Austrian railwaymen refused to transport supplies, Prague hoped, on the eve of the decisive attack of the Russians against the divisions of Pilsudski, to bring about a popular revolution in Budapest.

Once the Polish barrier had been removed, the Bolshevik flood would irresistibly spread across Germany. Then an event occurred the consequences of which might have been incalculable for the future of Europe and the safety of our country.

By a note discussed in the Council of Ministers and approved by the President of the Republic, the French Government, which was determined at any cost to save a situation which already appeared almost desperate, asked the Hungarian Government for any military assistance which it could give against the Reds.

In exchange for the assistance which she would grant to Poland, the French Government offered Hungary the revision of the treaty which it had signed only twenty days earlier at Trianon.

"The French Government", said the note of June 24th, which was inspired and drafted by the former Ambassador at Petrograd, M. Maurice Paléologue, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was handed to Admiral Horthy, Regent of Hungary, by our High Commissioner at Budapest, M. Fouchet, "in application of the Peace Treaty, and guided by the declaration included in the covering note addressed by the Allied and Associated Powers on May 6th to the Hungarian Delegation to the Peace Conference, is prepared to offer its good offices for any step towards a friendly agreement between Hungary and her neighbours with a view to eliminating all causes of friction to the common satisfaction of the Parties concerned."

It was indeed no longer the time for diplomatic phrases and half-measures.

Paris had learned from a sure source—by means of documents the origin and official character of which left no doubt as to the accuracy of their statements—that the Government of Prague had decided to facilitate the access to Hungary and Austria of the victorious Soviet armies, as soon as the Polish defeat was completed.

For this purpose a free passage would be granted to them through Eastern Slovakia and Ruthenia.

In proportion as the triumphant success of the Reds appeared to be confirmed, an intense pro-Russian agitation raised the working masses of the industrial centres of Silesia and Bohemia and gradually took possession of all the regiments of Czech nationality. Twenty towns in Bohemia celebrated the bombardment of the suburbs of Warsaw with illuminations.

In its desire to save Poland and to preserve Europe at any cost from a Bolshevik invasion, the French Government had moreover gone even further in June 1920 than appeared from reading the diplomatic phrases of the Rote.

It had in fact not hesitated to instruct its High Commissioner, M. Fouchet, to guarantee verbally to Hungary, in addition to "its good office for any step", the recovery of Ruthenia and the greater part of Slovakia in return for her military assistance to Poland.

With a unanimity which might have been surprising if one had not known by which leaders it was inspired, all the adversaries of revisionism and, in particular, the person most directly and deliberately responsible for the "mistakes" of the Treaty of Trianon, André Tardieu, have maintained the most complete silence regarding the Paléologue note and the step taken by Fouchet.

At Prague, on the other hand, a summary—forged in its essentials—of these negotiations, was published in 1921 by M. Benesh himself.

Benesh had been informed immediately by some of the informers at his disposal at the Quai d'Orsay of the despatch and exact text of the French note of June 24th. He had also been informed—both by Paris and by the intelligence service which he had succeeded in arranging with the High Commissariat at Budapest—of the tenour of the proposals transmitted verbally to the Hungarian Government by M. Fouchet. For the moment he had been cast down by the imminence and immensity of the disaster which threatened his work. But he soon recovered. On June 27th, in a personal telegram, he informed M. Ninchitch, the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the secret negotiations entered into between the Governments of Paris and Budapest. He requested him to join him in an immediate step with the French Government. The reply from Ninchitch, which was also telegraphic and personal, only reached Benesh on July 29th. The Serbian Minister, on the advice of the aged Pashitch, who had never been able to overcome his aversion for Benesh, had prudently preferred to await the result of the battles around Warsaw. When the Russians had been put to flight, he advised Benesh to make an immediate vigorous protest to Paris. But he did not offer to take part in it. On this same 29th of July Benesh had just sent a circular note of protest against the French step to all the signatories of the Treaty of Trianon. In his haste he even addressed it to the United States, the only one of the former Allies that had not signed the Treaty. The Government of Washington was, moreover, the only one to acknowledge receipt of his protest, though without a word of comment.

At the same time Benesh had asked the Quai d'Orsay direct for explanations. Faithful to the system which he had always hitherto found successful—and which he has also since found to succeed—the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs adopted a high tone. He demanded the immediate cessation of the negotiations between Paris and Budapest, the withdrawal and cancellation of the Paléologue note, the disavowal of the verbal offers transmitted to the Hungarian Government by the French High Commissioner in Hungary, the departure from the Quai d'Orsay of M. Maurice Paléologue, and his replacement by a man entirely devoted to himself, Philippe Berthelot.

If he did not obtain satisfaction on all these points, Benesh threatened that Czechoslovakia would abandon the French alliance.

The Russian peril, which had been crushed by Pilsudski, had disappeared. France did not wish under any circumstances to break the web of alliances and friendships on which she counted to assure her political and military hegemony against any offensive return of the vanquished and against any opposition of her war allies.

Lastly and in particular, the influence of the politicians and the great journalists who, before and during the first half of the War, had been faithful to Raffalovitch and Izvolski, but had joined up since 1917 with Czech Slavism, the heir to the imperialism and financial methods of Tsarism, was then at its

height at the Elysee and Quai d'Orsay. Both intervened strongly with a view to the Prague ultimatum being accepted.

* * *

In again calling to mind events that occurred twenty years ago, we have not desired to open old wounds but merely to show how lightheartedly and even criminally the negotiators in Paris and its suburbs played with the life and fate of the nations and also with the future peace of Europe. One is almost tempted to forgive the Czechs a good many things, when one sees how easy everything was made for them and how even advantages were pressed upon them, while those who had to take the decisions did not worry about the consequences. It sounds like a bad joke when Harold Nicolson, in his book about the peacemakers, relates how the thousand-year old Hungarian Kingdom was divided up on May 8th, 1919 by tired, half-asleep diplomats and how the right of self-determination of the nations was trampled underfoot. But this fantastic picture is in entire agreement with the description given by the aged head of the Hungarian delegation, Count Apponyi, in his memoirs of the meeting on January 15th, 1920 when for the first time he stood in the clock gallery of the Quai d'Orsay before the members of the Supreme Council who were drunk with victory to the point of rudeness. Apponyi spoke not only as the representative of gagged Hungary which could be violated openly and with impunity, but also as the spokesman of world conscience to the men who had assumed a terrible burden of responsibility for the future. In his statements he warned them with prophetic words that the dismemberment of Hungary would sharpen the period of contradiction and crisis. "Never was such portentous power placed in the hands of a group of nations and their representatives, and the Conference should bear in mind that, with all its power, it would ultimately have no control over the consequences which would develop from their action." On the basis of the principle of international justice and freedom of the nations which the Allies had so loudly proclaimed, the aged Count demanded the right of self-determination. "We would sincerely and honestly submit to the decision of the nations that have lived together with us for centuries. But they must be asked."

But it was all of no use. Apponyi who, together with his delegation, was treated for weeks in Paris as a prisoner, describes in his memoirs how he had to stand facing the window like an accused person in front of the representatives of the Great Powers who sat veiled in shadow like judges on their high chairs. He could only see the sullen aspect of Clemenceau in the side light. He was listened to, but he knew that no one paid any attention to what they heard.

In order to veil their claims which were based on a policy of power, the Czechs at the Paris Conference demanded the Slovak territories in the name of the nationality principle and of the right of self-determination of the nations, together however with a considerable strip of pure Hungarian territory. They arbitrarily made these Slovak territories into a historical unit, Slovakia, which had never existed as such. The fifth of Benesh' notorious memoranda, under the heading "Some pages from the history of Slovakia", therefore contains frequent references to the "Slovak branch of the Czechoslovak nation", and even to "Slovaks as a branch of the Czech nation". This is a very arbitrary theory, for there has in fact never been a Czechoslovak State that would have brought closer together these two branches of the Slav race which are undoubtedly related to each other. The statement is moreover refuted by the fact that since Palacky all Czech historians admit that the penetration of Hungarians into the Danube basin for a thousand years prevented on the one hand the union of the Southern and Northern Slavs and on the other hand the combination of the Czechs and Slovaks to form a single State. The memorandum went on in an equally arbitrary

manner, in the chapter "The Geography of Slovakia" to define the frontiers of Slovak territory artificially and in accordance with anything but the right of self-determination, naturally without being disconcerted by the fact that Slovakia as such had hitherto never existed either as a State or as a province.

It is, in fact, admitted in the memorandum that "the Magyars live in compact masses in the south-east of Slovakia", and also that "the incorporation of these territories in the Czechoslovak State might be regarded as a violation of the right of self-determination." "We admit this and leave the judgment in this question to those who are called upon to take the decision, in which they will take into account the vital necessities which arise for a nation such as the Slovaks." Then follows a comment on these vital necessities. "For centuries these Slovak territories have been subject to brutal oppression and the Magyars ultimately succeeded to a great extent in driving out the Slovak element. In now claiming this territory, it is merely a question of a reparation that has been long due to us."

The Czechs are not shy in producing arguments, and the memorandum therefore sets itself the task of replacing the "forged" Hungarian nationality statistics by its own which naturally arrive at quite different results and reduce the number of Hungarians living in Slovakia by about 400,000 while increasing the number of "Czechoslovaks" by a similar figure. But even these statistics admit that 860,000 Hungarians would remain within the new frontiers.

* * *

It was solely with a view to a power policy that the Czechs desired in 1919 to incorporate this Upper Hungarian district in their State. By so doing they deliberately drove a wedge between the old historic Polish-Hungarian frontier. They intentionally drove this wedge as far east as possible in order at first geographically and later politically to seek cover for their rear in Soviet Russia and also to obtain a direct but quite artificial connection with distant Roumania by means of a railway existing on purely Hungarian territory. In this way the ring was closed round Hungary and the germ of the Little Entente was created. In these twenty years the Czechs tried in every way to bind the annexed Upper Hungarian territory, Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Russia, to Prague, to the head of the crocodile figure, in the knowledge that their patched Bohemian forest fortress, without the eastern territory, could not assume the desired future position in Central Europe, which, according to Benesh, implied opposition to Germany.

It was on this principle of unconditional enmity to Germany which has remained valid since the foundation of the State that the southern frontier of Slovakia against Hungary was drawn. At the Czech demand it was advanced to the Danube to include Pressburg and then cut in an easterly direction straight through purely Hungarian territory.

7. Some Examples of the Demographic Policy Pursued by the Czechs towards the Hungarians.

From the ethnical point of view, the position in Czechoslovakia, according to official figures, was as follows:

Czechs 7,446,732 (50.56%), Germans 3,318,445 (22.53%), Slovaks 2,309,972 (15.68%), Hungarians 719,569 (4.89%), Ruthenes 568,941 (3.86%), Jews 204,799 (1.49%), Poles 100,332 (0.68%), miscellaneous 53,053 (0.31%).

There were in all 14,721,813 inhabitants with six different languages not including the languages of the Roumanians, the gypsies, the Armenians and the Jews.

According to the official figures themselves, therefore, it is correct that the Czechs formed the absolute majority of the population. But these official figures were not accepted as authentic by any of the non-Czech nationalities.

As far as the Hungarians are concerned, in 1919 when the territory was transferred the figure was estimated at over a

million. Of this number more than 700,000 lived in direct contact with the State of Hungary created by the Treaty of Trianon. Instead of a million, however, the Czech statistics calculated only 738,000 Hungarians in the entire territory of Czechoslovakia, and in 1930 the statistics showed only 681,000 i.e. a reduction of 57,000 or 8.4%.

In Slovakia alone, according to the Czech census of 1919, there were not more than 692,831 Hungarians, in 1920 only 634,827 and in 1930 only 371,988. The number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia was therefore artificially reduced by the census both at the time of the signature of the Peace Treaty and also from one census to another. This result is impossible in the case of a stable, healthy and fertile population. When it is further considered that only the Hungarian officials emigrated in greater or smaller numbers after the signature of the Peace Treaty, it seems even more impossible that the bulk of the exclusively agricultural population could have decreased to such an extent, when it is notorious that this rural population remained in their villages.

While, therefore, the Hungarians in Slovakia at the time of the Peace Treaty constituted 30% of the population, they would have fallen from 21.48% according to the Czechoslovak statistics of 1920 to 17.58% in 1930, i.e. to half the original figure and would thus not have attained the percentage necessary in order to enjoy minority rights. Similarly, the absolute figure in Sub-Carpathian Russia, even according to Czech statistics, increased from 103,000 to 109,000, while the percentage fell from 17.35% to 15.44%.

By means especially of the partition of districts, the Czechs managed everywhere to bring the percentage of Hungarians below 20% so that, even in the districts where they formed a majority, they lost the advantages which the law provided for the minorities attaining this percentage in the various towns and districts.

When this position is considered more closely, it is seen that in the districts and towns in which the Hungarians formed more than 90% of the population in 1921 they dropped to 83 to 74%. In several others, where they reached the proportion 70 or 80%, they dropped to less than 66%, and thus enabled the Government to forbid the use of Hungarian as a subsidiary language in the administration of these districts. As regards, in particular, the main towns of Pressburg, Kaschau and Ungvar, the position was as follows:

In Pressburg the Hungarian population is reported to have fallen from 31,705 in 1910 (40% as against 45% Germans, 10% Slovaks and 0% Czechs) to 18,890, in spite of the absolute increase in the population between these two dates from 78,000 to 123,000; the proportion thus fell from 40% to 15% while the Slovaks or Czechoslovaks in the same period rose from 11,674 in 1910 according to the Hungarian census to 27,397 in 1919, and according to the census to 37,038 in 1921 and 60,013 in 1930.

In Kaschau the number of Hungarians fell in 20 years from 33,350 to 11,504, from 75% to 18% (the population of this town having almost doubled), while the Slovaks increased sixfold, i.e. from 6548 to 42,245 or from 14.8% to 66.04%.

The position is Ungvar is even more paradoxical, since it has a considerable Jewish population. In 1910, out of a total of 16,919 inhabitants, there were 13,590 Hungarians, i.e. more than 80%; the number is now reported to have fallen to 4499 or 17.8%. If we include the Jews which, according to the Czech census, amounted to 5897 or 23.30%, it will be seen that the total proportion of Hungarians and Jews at present amounts to only 40%, i.e. half the figure of 1910. During the same period the Slovaks, who formed only a trifling proportion of the population in 1910 (1219 or 7.2%) although their ethnical territory extended to the gates of the city, increased eightfold and now number 8030 or 31.7%, so that they are much more numerous than the Ruthenes themselves whose

capital is Ungvar, (6260 or 24.74%) than the Jews (5897) or than the Hungarians (4499) who have thus been relegated to the fourth place in a purely Hungarian town.

The position is similar in the other towns. For instance the Hungarians in Neuhausel have dropped from 91.5% in 1910 to 46.46% in 1930, in Lucenec from 82.2% to 27.49%, in Gross-Steffelsdorf from 89.7% to 47.95%, in Lewenz from 90.5% to 41.1%, in Rosenau from 89.7% to 50.56%, in Neutra from 59.4% to 4.59%, in Beregsas from 96.2% to 52.21% and in Munkatsch from 73.4% to 22.54%.

On comparing the results of the censuses of 1921 and 1930 it will be seen that in these ten years all the nationalities increased except the Hungarian. The greatest increase is shown by the gypsies and the "foreigners". In Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Russia the number of gypsies jumped from 8417 to 31,980. As regards the "foreigners" in Sub-Carpathian Russia, which is by its nature the most inaccessible territory, the official statistics show 16,230 as against 6860 in 1921 and in Slovakia 75,600 as against 42,340 in 1921.

All this is explained when it is learned that in reality the "foreigners" of these districts are no other than the original inhabitants, who in the course of years were deprived of their Czechoslovak citizenship and thus became stateless. One must also wonder how many Hungarians are included among the gypsies in order to reach the figure of 31,980 and how many are included among the Jews, the number of whom in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Russia amounts to no less than 156,000, while

in Bohemia-Moravia, a territory three times as large and one that has always had a considerable Jewish population, there are only 30,000.

The tactics of the new masters consisted in reducing the number of persons belonging to the minorities by increasing the number of the minorities. For this reason the nationalities of gypsies and Jews were invented. At the same time the Jews were only counted among the German and Hungarian minorities, while the Jews who spoke Czech or Slovak were counted as Czechoslovaks.

Lastly it was possible by the name test to denationalise people with a stroke of the pen; thus names with a Slav sound went to increase the Czech or Slovak majority. Moreover in Czechoslovakia and Sub-Carpathian Russia, the census forms are not filled in by the inhabitants but by the gendarmes and huissiers, and the object of this procedure is to reduce as far as possible the percentage of the minorities, especially the Hungarian minority.

Finally, by means of a special law, in the entire frontier zone (to a depth of 25 kilometres) where the minorities live in compact masses, any inhabitants who are regarded as "suspicious" cannot acquire or keep either land or buildings and are also immediately driven from their homes even if their families have lived there for centuries. Lastly, the Government has established Slovak schools in the heart of the Hungarian linguistic districts in order to denationalise the young generation and to press back the language frontier as far south as possible.

THE HUNGARIAN DEMAND FOR REVISION

Nem, nem, soha! No, no, never! That is part of the inscription on the garlanded monument on Liberty Square in Budapest erected in memory of the territorial losses imposed upon Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon and that is the burden of many other inscriptions on monuments and memorial tablets. The Hungarian people have never ceased to proclaim to the world the injustice of Trianon and to demand its redressment.

The nature of these demands for reparation follows logically from the above: restitution of the territories in which Hungarians have lived and settled for a thousand years. Hungary wisely confined herself, like Czechoslovakia, to historical claims—i.e. those of the crown of St Stephen, as Czechoslovakia to those of St Wenceslas.

On September 29th, the hour of freedom struck for the Hungarians handed over to Czechoslovakia by the Treaty of Trianon and on October 9th the Czecho-Hungarian negotiations began at Komorn (Komárom). The position of the two parties had however shifted in the meantime, when, after the recognition of the autonomy of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, Prague in some sort dropped out and left the negotiations to the two autonomous Governments which, from bring friends of Hungary and members of a common front against Prague, became adversaries and fought tenaciously for as small a loss of territory as

possible. They employed the same tactics as the Czechs had employed against the Sudeten Germans and submitted ever more far-reaching proposals—though in rather more rapid succession. The main subjects of dispute were possession of the towns on the Northern limits of the territory settled by Hungarians and the plebiscites in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the latter being demanded with a view to the possible establishment of a common frontier with Poland, also desired by Warsaw. These plebiscites were however flatly refused by the autonomous Governments and M. Brody, who was disposed to favour such a plebiscite, was, as we know, dismissed by Prague.

The Komárom negotiations broke down, after the first few days, over these profound political cleavages and the differences of opinion as to whether the figures of the 1910 census should, as the Hungarians desired, be adopted when estimating the extent of the reincorporation of Hungarian populations and territory, or, as the Slovaks and Ruthenes demanded, those of 1930. A violent battle of notes ensued, intensive diplomatic activity being at the same time maintained between Berlin, Rome, Budapest, Warsaw, Bucharest and Prague, which finally, in view of the unyielding attitude of both parties and the resultant acute and dangerous tension in the territories under dispute, led to the proposal and acceptance of a Germano-Italian Court of Arbitration, which met in Vienna on November 2nd 1938 to pronounce its verdict.

Documents

1. The Munich Decisions and Hungary.

**From the Broadcast Speech by the Hungarian Premier
Bela v. Imrédy, of October 3rd, 1938.**

"My Hungarian brothers! Mighty forces wrestled on the stage of life and the whole world watched with bated breath the headlong course of events. Then, when it seemed that nothing could any longer avert a fatal collision between the forces,

the determined will, wisdom and honest insight of a few men performed a miracle in 36 hours and unravelled the situation which had appeared incapable of solution. That act of disentanglement truly deserves the epithet "peaceful", as it did not bear in itself the deadly seed of corruption and of the past but was established on the only possible basis of any lasting peace: justice.

We Hungarians are however primarily interested in the destiny of Hungary and when we examine the shape which that destiny has assumed during the last few days we see that there are two questions to which this nation's soul seeks an answer—which we must seek together and united, as in every great Hungarian issue. These two questions are: has the Munich decision had any result from the Hungarian point of view; and are we Hungarians satisfied with that decision?

Has the Munich decision had any result? Yes, my Hungarian brothers, and a very important result. Four European Great Powers have by their signatures placed on record the existence of justified Hungarian claims which must be satisfied on the occasion of the redetermination of the fate of the nationalities living in Czechoslovakia and the necessity of redressing the injustice committed twenty years ago through ignorance exploited by hypocritical propaganda, when that State was founded. We must not esteem lightly this result which but a few months ago we barely ventured anxiously to contemplate, but rejoice over it, as we are entitled to do, as a step in the right direction.

Without going into the merits of this individual or that or the part he was called upon to play within our frontiers in the achievement of this aim, we can say without fear of contradiction that a foreign policy, which has procured powerful friends for this country and has been responsible in no small measure for the fact that those friends have stretched out the hand of friendship to one another, has not been fruitless.

The support accorded to us by these two powerful and friendly nations acting in complete agreement with one another and upon which we can certainly rely in the future, brought us this remarkable result. Every Hungarian owes his sincere thanks to the Leaders of those nations—the two men of steel, who by their steadfast policy, all compelling will-power and dynamic driving-force have directed a fresh living stream into the turgid waters of European policy.

The second question also requires an answer: are we Hungarians satisfied? I can say at once that we are not satisfied, as no Hungarian can be satisfied as long as justice, in whose name the fate of the various nationalities living in Czechoslovakia must be settled afresh and who began her march at Munich, has not come into her own as regards the affairs of Hungary also.

Hungary's attitude to the settlement of the Czechoslovak question has, from the outset, rested without wavering on clear, simple and incontrovertible foundations of principle: namely, on the contention that this new settlement of the national groups living in Czechoslovakia must be effected on the basis of self-determination and equality of treatment.

We cannot be content with any decision which would be to our disadvantage. We have always kept that guiding principle before us and shall continue to do so until the question is solved. All those concerned can be quite sure that we shall shrink from no difficulties in giving effect to our view.

Hungarian policy has given many proofs that it desires to achieve its aims by peaceful means. Peaceful intentions are not however synonymous with supine resignation. The road that leads to our goal may be likened to a narrow mountain path with gaping chasms to right and left: on one side the abyss of irresponsible adventure, on the other that of cowardly abdication. I know that we have succeeded up to the present in keeping to this narrow path without giddiness or hesitation and I trust the star of my nation that we shall continue to progress along that path.

After much weary trudging, we reached the shelter of the Munich negotiations and now we set out once more upon the difficult and stony path. I know that one nation is following us. Our responsibility for remaining upon the right path is tremendous and I am aware that, in order to reach our goal, we must keep to the same path.

2. After the break-down of the negotiations at Komarom. The plebiscite in the forefront. The Hungarian reply to Prague of October 24th, 1938.

The Hungarian Government confirms in its note the statement of the Czechoslovak Government to the effect that the proposal transmitted on October 22nd was designed to form the basis of the fresh negotiations and that the possibility of subsequent alterations was reserved, and declares as follows:

1. It notes with satisfaction that the two Governments are in agreement in regard to a considerable part of the Hungarian demands and consequently proposes that the Hungarian troops be permitted to occupy the undisputed territories within a fixed period. It would not regard any further procrastination as justifiable.

2. It further notes that there are still appreciable differences of opinion between the two Governments, mainly in connection with the extent of the territories to be excluded from reunion with Hungary. The differences refer in particular to those towns which, with the exception of Pozsony (Pressburg), were inhabited by an overwhelming majority of Hungarians. It is accordingly obvious that Hungary could not waive her claim to those towns even in deference to the spirit of the Munich agreements. Nevertheless the Hungarian Government desires once more to furnish proof of the utmost conciliation in the interests of peace and therefore requests that a plebiscite be held in those districts situated between the ethnological frontier proposed by the Hungarian Government and the frontier line offered by the Czechoslovak Government, this plebiscite to be terminated by November 30th.

Only such persons would be permitted to participate in the plebiscite as were resident in the districts concerned on October 28th, 1918, or were born there before that date. In the map attached to the note, the territory still in dispute is divided into eight sections. The plebiscite would be held by sections.

The Czechoslovak troops would be required to evacuate these districts by November 1st and the administration of the districts would be handed over to international organs by November 15th.

As none of the nationalities had an absolute majority in Pozsony in 1918, the Hungarian Government proposes special conversations, to be held after the present negotiations.

Certain relatively unimportant differences of mainly local significance, to which no reference is made in the request for a plebiscite, could be settled by direct negotiation between the two Governments.

3. The Hungarian Government is desirous of establishing the foundations of such a stable position as would render possible the peaceful collaboration of all the nations settled in this part of Europe. In the opinion of the Hungarian Government, this object could be attained only if all the nationalities including the Little Russians (Ruthenes) were enabled to decide their own fate through the medium of an internationally controlled plebiscite. Only after fulfilment of this condition could Hungary assume any guarantee in respect of the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia.

4. Should the Czechoslovak Government be unable to agree to the proposals for a plebiscite, as set forth above, the Hungarian Government is, for its part, prepared to submit to arbitration both in respect of the whole territory in dispute and on the question of the right of self-determination of the nationalities mentioned in point 3. Germany and Italy would arbitrate in the most important districts, while in part of the Eastern districts the decision would rest with a court of arbitration on which, besides Italy and Germany, Poland would also be represented. Both parties would be required to state in advance that they would abide by the verdict of the court.

In conclusion, the Hungarian Government calls attention to the dangerous tension caused by the present position and to the fact that it replied to the Czechoslovak proposal within 48 hours and it expresses the hope that the Czechoslovak Government will act with similar promptitude.

The Premier, Dr. v. Imrédy, explains the Hungarian note at a Press Conference.

The Premier began by referring to the events which had led up to the crisis and proceeded to give a complete account of the negotiations carried on with the Czechoslovak Government on the question of the Czechoslovak Hungarian territories. He reminded his hearers that, side by side with the arrangements concluded during the Munich Conference in the matter of the German claims, the representatives of the four Powers present had signed an Additional Agreement concerning the Hungarian minority providing that, in the event of no agreement being reached within three months by the Governments in question in the matter of Hungarian nationality, the representatives of the four Powers present should meet again to examine and settle the question.

On that foundation, he said, is based the diplomatic action of the Hungarian Government, which began immediately on October 1st with a request to the Czechoslovak Government to resume the negotiations. After the receipt of a reply signifying the latter's consent in principle, the Hungarian Government proposed two days later that the negotiations should begin on October 6th, 1938. At the same time the Hungarian Government requested the Czech Government to proceed to the fulfilment of certain demands including *inter alia* the liberation of political prisoners and the handing over of two places on the frontier, the latter being required as an symbolic act or earnest of the cession of the territories to be reunited to Hungary. As a result of the resignation of the Head of the Czechoslovak State and the Government crisis in Czechoslovakia, the institution of negotiations was delayed and these began three days later—on October 9th, 1938—at Komárom. On the first day of the negotiations, the Czech Government made a satisfactory statement in regard to the liberation of the political prisoners and two frontier posts—Ipolysag and the little station of Satoraljaujhely—were handed over to the Hungarian troops.

On the first day of the negotiations at Komárom, the Hungarian delegation immediately transmitted the Hungarian proposal, since when it has not substantially departed from its terms. The Hungarian proposal is entirely inspired by the spirit of the Munich decisions. It is a matter of common knowledge that the four Great Powers took their stand on the so-called racial, ethnical principle and adopted as their point of departure the consideration—which originated in the mind of the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich—that the peaceful co-existence of the various races could be ensured in the most satisfactory manner only if the frontiers of States were made to coincide as far as possible with the ethnical frontiers. Consequently this principle must also be observed in the matter of the Czechoslovak Hungarian territories. This needs to be stressed, as the whole of our present action can only proceed on the Munich basis: that is, a racial basis. It is not a matter of applying a certain measure of historical justice or maintaining our historic claims to such territories as were torn from us, but of drawing the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Hungary in accordance with the areas settled by the various races.

The Hungarian proposal is based on the known position with regard to the population of those territories. As the territories involved are those of which we were, even from an ethnical point of view, unjustly deprived, we were compelled to go back to the position in 1918 and the Hungarian Government consequently demanded the return of those territories which were, according to the 1910 census, the last census prior to the test year (1918), mainly settled by Hungarians. The Hungarian Government immediately provided the Czechoslovak delegation in Komárom with a map in which these districts were demarcated. It further informed it that Hungary would be unable to assume a guarantee unless she were satisfied that the remaining territory of Czechoslovakia and its form of

government accorded with the wishes of the populations remaining within its frontiers: that is to say, that Hungary could not guarantee the Czechoslovak frontiers, as contemplated in the Munich Agreement, before effect had been given to the right of self-determination of all the nationalities inhabiting Czechoslovakia.

Not until the fourth day of the conversation at Komárom, i.e. October 12th, did the Czechoslovak delegation proceed to deal with the proposals on their merits. The first counter-proposal made by the Czechoslovak delegation involved a departure from the principles which the Prague Government had already recognized at the earlier diplomatic negotiations and *de facto* recognition of which had been accorded in the form of the return of Ipolysag and the little station of Satoraljaujhely. In this first proposal, the Czechoslovak delegation contemplated granting a large measure of autonomy to those of Hungarian nationality living in Czechoslovakia. Naturally the Hungarian delegation rejected this proposal, whereupon, after a special conversation, lasting only a few minutes, the Czechoslovak delegation made a new proposal in which it offered the 'Island' of Schuett, but without the North-West end. This proposal also was immediately rejected by the Hungarian Government. The next day—the 13th—the Czechoslovak delegation produced a new proposal which, though containing far-reaching territorial concessions, were certainly not acceptable as a basis of negotiation. The Hungarian delegation then asked the Czechoslovak delegation if it had another proposal to make which would go further to meet the Hungarian claims and, as no reply was received, a short statement was read to the effect that we regarded the negotiations as closed and the same evening the Hungarian delegation left Komárom. Our attitude was perfectly natural, especially as it was obvious that, in view of the attitude of the Czechoslovak delegation, there could be no hope of achieving any useful result by further negotiation.

It is scarcely necessary for me to describe in detail the diplomatic activities of the last few days, as we all have a lively recollection of them still.

These were accompanied by military measures. We called up five more "classes", as it was to be assumed that the negative attitude of the Czechoslovak delegation was due to lack of military equality, the Czech army being on a mobilization footing, while our army is at little more than normal strength.

Under the influence of the diplomatic steps taken by the Hungarian Government, a process was set in motion which resulted in the proposal received from Prague during the night of October 22nd. That proposal constitutes a substantial approximation to those principles on which the Hungarian proposal is based. It should be mentioned that this proposal made by Prague is largely the outcome of the diplomatic action undertaken by the Great Powers with whom we are on friendly terms and that we owe the deepest thanks to Germany, Italy and Poland.

This proposal by Prague agrees, as regards large portions of the frontier, with the frontier line proposed by us. It does, it is true, claim a few mixed-language districts and adopts, in the matter of some important towns, an attitude which cannot possibly be reconciled with ethnological principles, but can only be defended on economic and political grounds. The proposal is thus negative in respect of important districts. In particular, big towns like Pozsony, Nyitra, Kassa, Ungvar and Munkacs would, according to this proposal, fall outside the frontier line and thus go to the remaining territory of Czechoslovakia.

The Premier then commented upon the communiqué issued by the Hungarian Government and made the following statement in this connection:

"The plebiscite has been demanded by the Hungarian Government, because we are conscious of the justice of our cause, the Hungarian data correspond with the facts and we are quite

confident that the plebiscite will prove that our attitude is justified.

The map attached to the Hungarian note divides the disputed areas into eight sections and the plebiscite would be held for each of these sections separately.

We do not despair of being able to settle the question peaceably on the basis of those principles laid down in Munich and steadfastly borne in mind by the Hungarians from the outset. Should it however so happen that our truly peaceable proposals are not accepted, the Hungarian Government is, now as before, determined to obtain its just rights by every means at the disposal of the nation."

3. After the Rejection of the Plebiscite: The Arbitration Proposal

The Czech Reply of October 26th, 1938

The Czechoslovak Government has carefully and thoroughly examined the proposals of the Hungarian Government which Your Excellency was good enough to communicate to me in your Note No. 39 of October 24th.

The Czechoslovak Government ventures again to observe that the present negotiations can only relate to the question of the Hungarian minorities. As points 1 and 2 of the Protocol to the Munich agreement of September 29th, 1938 only mention the Hungarian and Polish minorities, other ethnical questions must remain outside the scope of the present negotiations. As far as the Hungarian minority is concerned, the Czechoslovak Government continues to be inspired by the sincere desire that a frank, speedy and complete solution should be reached. For this purpose it submitted on October 22nd proposals relating to the whole of the compact Hungarian racial area. These proposals were submitted as a general basis for the new negotiations, the possibility of subsequent modifications being reserved.

As these proposals were not found satisfactory by the Hungarian Government, the Czechoslovak Government agrees that the question of the Hungarian minority should be submitted to the arbitration of Germany and Italy as the signatories of the Munich agreement.

It should be left to these two Powers to decide whether other arbitrators are to be appointed. Should these two Powers accept the Hungarian Government's proposal relating to Poland, the Czechoslovak Government proposes that Roumania should also take part in the arbitration.

The arbitral award should fix the procedure and dates for the evacuation of the ceded territories by the Czechoslovak troops and authorities and their occupation by the Hungarian troops and authorities. The Czechoslovak Government proposes that a Commission consisting of Hungarian and Czechoslovak military experts should meet immediately in order to prepare for and accelerate the execution of the requisite measures.

The Hungarian Reply of October 28th, 1938

The Royal Hungarian Government regrets that the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic has passed in complete silence over the question of the plebiscites proposed by the Hungarian Government. This attitude on the part of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic has surprised the Hungarian Government all the more as its proposal was entirely in accordance with the spirit of the Munich agreement by which the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic was guided in its previous negotiations.

The Government of the Republic makes the assertion in the above-mentioned Note that "the present negotiations can only relate to the question of the Hungarian minorities", since "points 1 and 2 of the Protocol to the Munich agreement of September 29th, 1938 only mention the Polish and Hungarian minorities". While it is correct that the text of these agreements only mentions the Germans, Poles and Hungarians, it can never-

theless not be denied that the agreements in question have established the principle of the right of self-determination of the peoples as the basis for the reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Republic. Consequently the right to decide their own fate by a plebiscite cannot be denied to the minorities that desire to make use of this right. The Hungarian Government, while regretting that the Government of the Republic takes a different view, feels compelled to maintain its attitude.

The Czechoslovak Government has stated in the above mentioned note that it is prepared to accept the arbitration of Germany and Italy, which, in the view of the Hungarian Government, implies the obligation to comply with the arbitral award of the Powers in question from the outset.

It is natural that the competence of the arbitrators should only extend to the contested areas and not to territories with regard to which the two Governments have already reached an agreement and the occupation of which by Hungarian troops has already been proposed in the note of October 24th.

In the view of the Hungarian Government, questions relating to the composition and activities of the Court of Arbitration should be left to the Great Powers concerned.

As regards the proposal that "the arbitral award should fix the procedure and dates for the evacuation of the ceded territories by the Czechoslovak troops and authorities and their occupation by the Hungarian troops and authorities", the Hungarian Government takes the view that this proposal can only relate to the contested areas.

Accordingly the Hungarian Government is prepared to accept the proposal regarding the initiation of direct discussions immediately between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak experts with a view to preparing for and accelerating the execution of all requisite measures. For this purpose the Hungarian Military Attaché in Prague is entering into immediate connection with the competent Czechoslovak military authorities.

The Royal Hungarian Government notes with satisfaction that the Czechoslovak Government is inspired by the sincere desire to bring about a frank, speedy and complete solution.

The Hungarian Government reminds the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic that from the beginning of the negotiations it has always attached the greatest importance to the speediest possible solution of the frontier dispute outstanding between the two States and that it has rejected any responsibility for the consequences which may ensue from any delay in the negotiations.

4. The German-Italian Court of Arbitration

The Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro reports from Berlin:

Since it has proved impossible to settle the problem of the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia and the question of an equitable ethnographical boundary delimitation between Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the last few weeks by direct negotiations between the two Governments, the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments have applied to the German and Italian Governments with a request that they should settle these questions by arbitration.

The Reich Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, on the occasion of his visit to Rome, has also discussed this question with the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and has already informed the Italian Government that Germany agrees in principle to such settlement by arbitration. The Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments having already stated that they accept the arbitral award unreservedly as the final settlement and will put it into execution without delay, the German and Italian Governments have now decided to give the arbitral award.

The Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and the Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano will therefore meet on November 2nd in Vienna. The Hungarian and Czechoslovak Foreign Ministers are invited to proceed to Vienna on the same date.

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ECHOES AND REPERCUSSIONS OF THE MUNICH PEACE ACT

Documentary Gleanings

Germany's Demand: Moral Disarmament and Disarmament of War Agitation

1. Extracts from Three Speeches by the Führer and Reich Chancellor

Munich, November 8th, 1938.

"Today we can look back on a great historical success. It is seldom granted to one generation to fight such a great fight and in addition to experience success. That is a special reward of Providence for us all. In looking back to the past, therefore, we will more than ever take the decision not to give up our old principles and virtues. In other words, we will be watchful and observant. Our experience has been too bitter and painful for us ever to lightly place any trust in the siren voices that come from the other side.

I only believe in the rights that we ourselves are able and determined to use for our protection. In the second place, I only believe in the reward which one has earned oneself. Nothing is given gratuitously to a nation in this world.

It would be a fine thing if the world took counsel with itself and took a new path, of general pacific justice. We should be glad to see signs of such a change of heart. But for the moment all I see is a world that is arming and everywhere threatening. It is said: "We have now found a new basis for a more peaceful development; therefore we must rearm." I do not quite understand this logic, but I do not protest against it. When I read every day in foreign newspapers that our armaments profoundly disturb the surrounding world, I can only say one thing: the non-rearmament of the German nation would disturb me. The armaments of the others do not disturb me. For on one thing there can be no doubt. If the world covers itself with arms, the German people will not walk the earth armed only with the palm of peace. In that case we will do everything necessary to secure peace for ourselves.

When the complaint is made that we place too little faith in peace assurances, I must refer back to my recent speeches. We do not make so bold as to meddle with the constitutions of others. It is not my desire that National Socialist principles should be applied by others. Let them stick to their democracy and we will stick to our National Socialism. But when it is said: "we naturally meant that the dictatorships and not the German and Italian peoples should be destroyed", I can only give one reply. This could have only been said before November 1918,

but not after November 1918. A collapse such as Germany experienced then as a result of her simple faith will not occur again in the next thousand years.

It is not long since there was a discussion in the British House of Commons on civil aviation, and a new civilian aeroplane was declared to be particularly useful. An opposition member shouted: "It is to be hoped that this aeroplane can carry bombs to Berlin". We know what that means. It may be said that this was only an opposition member. In reply I say that according to the constitution of the democracies, the opposition of today may be the Government of tomorrow. In fact this is commonly the case.

We are very grateful that the leading men in France and England dissociate themselves from these ideas and wish to live on good terms with Germany. We have said more than once that we want nothing from these countries but the return of the colonies that were illegally taken from us. But I have always stated that that is naturally no case for war. It is, we affirm, a question of justice and of the genuine intention of rendering possible good-neighbourly conditions. Otherwise we have no claim on these countries and we demand nothing from them. We would merely like to do business with them, that is to say, we want to carry on trade with them. When they talk of understanding, we do not know what we should come to an understanding about.

But one thing must be kept in mind. In France and England at present there are certainly men at the helm who want peace. But other men make no secret of the fact that they want war against Germany. I am compelled to state this dispassionately before the nation and to draw the consequences. Tomorrow Mr. Churchill may be Prime Minister. If a British Opposition leader states that he does not want to destroy the German people but only the régime, this comes to the same thing, for no one can destroy the régime without destroying the German people. If anyone says he wants to free the German people from the régime, I reply: "For the German people you are not competent to speak." If any man is competent to speak

for the German people, gentlemen of the British parliament, I am that man.

The German régime is an internal affair of the German people, and we decline any schoolmasterly inspection. Moreover I imagine that we have achieved more than these gentlemen and that we have in the first place put our State in order, which is more than can be said of all countries in the world.

I am therefore compelled to take into consideration the mentality of those who do not rule today but who may rule tomorrow and who leave no doubt as to their inner thoughts. The German people will understand why I warn them and why I am so determined to take all measures to be assured against any attack.

I am determined to ensure the security of the Reich to the utmost and I know that the entire German people will agree with me in this. Without any doubt it means sacrifices. But it is better for us to assume these sacrifices than to have to make contributions, or as they were formerly called, reparations, to foreign countries. There can therefore only be one decision for us, namely that which I spoke of at Saarbrücken. We are at all times prepared for peace. We have also not broken the peace. But we are also at all times prepared for defence, for manly and resolute defence.

If anyone tells me that we want to make history, not by legal means but by force, I can only say that present-day Germany has not refused to acquire her rights by negotiation. Year after year we tried by negotiation to attain our rights. English Members of Parliament in particular have no right to doubt this. For we have concluded a treaty with England by negotiation. If the others did not go with us, it was not our fault. But it must be affirmed that National Socialist Germany will never go to Canossa. We do not need to do that. If the rest of the world obstinately rejects the attempt to let justice prevail by means of negotiations, then it can cause no surprise that we should secure our rights by other means if we cannot obtain them by normal means. When these British advocates of world democracy assert that we have this year destroyed two democracies, I can only ask: what is meant by democracy? Who has the right to speak in the name of democracy?

Has God handed over the keys of democracy to Messrs. Churchill and Duff Cooper?

Is this written on the tables of the law that are in the possession of the British Opposition? Democracy is, in our view, a régime that is borne by the will of the people. I became Chancellor of Germany according to the rules of parliamentary democracy. I was the leader of by far the strongest party. According to the rules of parliamentary democracy I received at that time an absolute majority and—Mr. Churchill may doubt it—at the present time the unanimous approval of the German people. I have not set aside two democracies this year but I might almost say that as an arch-democrat I have removed dictatorships, namely those of M. Schuschnigg and M. Benesh. I endeavoured by peaceful means to prevail on these two dictatorships to bring about by means of democracy the right of self-determination for the people concerned. This attempt failed. I then used the force of the German nation to restore democracy in these countries, that is to say, to give freedom to the oppressed people.

The British Members of Parliament will no doubt be well informed about the British Empire, but they are not at home in the affairs of Central Europe. They have no knowledge of the position, of the events and of the conditions. They will not and should not take this remark as an offence; we also have not such an exact knowledge of matters in India, or in Egypt, or even in Palestine.

But I should consider it advisable if these gentlemen would concentrate the vast knowledge which they possess and the unflinching wisdom that is peculiar to them at this moment—let us say—on Palestine. For what is happening there smells very much of force and very little of democracy. But I only mention this as an example and by no means as a criticism, for I am only the representative of my German people and not the advocate of others. In that I am unlike Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, who are the advocates of the whole world.

I am only the representative of my people. Here I do everything that I consider necessary, and if Mr. Churchill asks how the head of a State can cross swords with a British Member of Parliament, I reply: Mr. Churchill, you may feel honoured. From the fact that in Germany even the head of the State does not hesitate to cross swords with a British Member of Parliament, you can see how highly British Members of Parliament are esteemed by the German people.

Moreover I am not the head of a State in the sense of a dictator or monarch, but I am the Leader of the German people. There is no doubt that I might have taken quite different titles.

I have remained true to my past and will continue to do so as long as I live, for I do not want and have no intention of being different. That satisfies me. Mr. Churchill and these gentlemen are deputies of the British people and I am the deputy of the German people. The difference is that Mr. Churchill has only received the votes of a fraction of the British people, while I may say that I represent the entire German people.

In appealing to you, my old comrades, and with you the entire German people, to be on your guard, I am fulfilling a sacred right. In these few years I have obtained great successes for the nation. The nation must understand that I am always mindful of its security. I do not wish that, at the end of my days, my eyes should close with the same gloomy prophecies as was the case with Bismarck. I wish that what has been so painfully acquired should be maintained for ever by the mighty force of the entire German nation."

Weimar, November 6th, 1938.

"It may be possible to speak of a miracle when one considers this development. All the old Party comrades who experienced this gigantic development can only look back with emotion to these and to the great events which have since occurred. But, on looking back, what appears to us almost as a miracle is nothing more than the reward for immeasurable and indefatigable work. For we National Socialists can affirm in the face of German history that never have more fervent efforts, greater work and greater sacrifices been made for the German people than in this period of the struggle of our movement for the Germans.

Now we have received our reward from Providence, just as formerly the Germany of 1918 received her reward. At that time she received her share of the blessings included under the common idea of "democracy". The Germany of that time clung to the hopes which were perhaps more strongly expressed by the American who assured us of a peace in which there would be neither victors nor vanquished. After the German people had laid down their arms in their faith in these theories, they learned that democracy in practice is not the same as in theory.

When today parliamentarians or politicians dare to assert that Germany did not keep her treaties, we can only give them one reply, namely that the greatest breach of treaty of all times was committed against the German people. Everything that was promised to Germany in the 14 points, on the basis of which the Germans laid down their arms, was subsequently broken.

In 1932 Germany was faced by definite collapse. The German Reich and people seemed to be lost. But then came the German rebirth. It began with a change in faith. While all the German parties before us believed in forces and ideals which lay outside the Reich and our people, we National Socialists steadfastly retained our faith in our own people and adhered to the ever

valid principle that God helps those who are prepared and determined to help themselves.

Instead of all those international factors—democracy, popular conscience, world conscience, League of Nations, etc.—we have placed a single factor, i.e. our own people. But this people had to be freed from its division and dismemberment. Thus arose the National Socialist Party with the order and the task to remove this medley of political associations and to replace it by a single power: the power of a movement. This National Socialist Party thus became the bearer of the German national community. It was clear to us all that this national community could not be attained in a day but that for many decades and perhaps for always the individual man must be trained for this national community. We have carried on this educational work since the foundation of the Party and in particular since we came into power.

But nothing is perfect in this world, and no success can be regarded as definitely satisfactory. We will therefore not assert today that what we have attained is in itself the desired ideal. We have set ourselves an ideal, in accordance with which we are educating the German people, generation after generation. Thus National Socialism will develop more and more from a political confession to a real national education.

A second task was the movement for the creation of a selection of new leaders and the training of a new class of leaders. Only the wilfully blind can today dispute that the political leadership of the German nation is different internally and externally from what it was five, ten or fifteen years ago. The umbrella-carrying types of our former bourgeois parties are extinct and will never return. To those who still remember them with a tear in their eye, I can say only one thing: this movement has been given its present leadership as the result of a hard struggle, but the leadership of the future of which we are at present drawing the main lines has a totally different appearance. It will be a body of the firmest determination and the most unscrupulous activity, so that in 30, 40 or 50 years it will be impossible to imagine that things have ever been different. The party is the guarantor of this leadership of our people.

But our third creation is the new defensive power. From the first day I adopted a principle, namely that the German is either the first soldier in the world or he is no soldier at all.

We cannot and will not refrain from being soldiers. We will therefore be the first. As a peace-loving man, I have endeavoured to give the German people such defence and such arms as are calculated to persuade others to peace.

But there are people who reproach the hedgehog for having quills. They should surely leave this animal in peace. No hedgehog has ever attacked unless it was itself threatened. We should like to take this as an example. No one should come too near us. We want nothing but our tranquillity, our possibility of work and the right of our people to existence, we want the same rights as others claim for themselves. This should be understood particularly by the democratic States for they are constantly talking of equality of rights. If they talk of the rights of the small States, how can they be indignant if a great State claims the same rights? The assurance and guarantee of this legal claim is our National Socialist defensive power. In this sense I have made a change in our foreign policy and have approached those States who, like ourselves, have been compelled to claim their rights.

In reviewing the results of our actions today, I can only say: Judge for yourselves whether we have not attained immense results with our principles. But we will therefore never forget what made these successes possible. When certain foreign newspapers write today: "You could have got all that by negotiations", we are well aware that the Germany that existed before us did nothing else but negotiate constantly. For fifteen

years they negotiated and yet lost everything. I am also prepared to negotiate, but I leave no doubt of the fact that I will not allow German rights to be curtailed either by negotiation or by any other means.

Never forget, German people, to what you owe your successes, to what movement, to what ideas and to what principles. In the second place, always be cautious and always be on your guard. It is very fine to talk of international disarmament, but I am suspicious of a disarmament in arms so long as there is no disarmament in spirit.

A certain custom has developed in the world of dividing the nations into so-called authoritarian, that is to say, disciplined, States and democratic States. In the authoritarian or disciplined States it is taken for granted that foreign nations are not abused or slandered and that there is no war agitation. But the democratic States are not democratic for nothing, that is to say all these things are permitted. In the authoritarian States incitement to war is out of place, for the Governments are obliged to see to it that none takes place. But in the democratic countries the Governments are obliged only to uphold democracy, which means freedom, if necessary, even to incite to war.

I have recently mentioned three of these international warmongers. They have felt themselves hit, not at all on the question of principle but only because I dared to mention them by name. Mr. Churchill said he is of opinion that the German Government must be set aside with the help of those internal German forces which would perhaps gladly put themselves at his disposal for that purpose. If Mr. Churchill has less to do with emigré circles, that is to say with traitors who are in the pay of foreign countries, and more with Germans, he would realise the entire madness and stupidity of his language.

For I can assure this gentleman, who seems to live in the moon, of one thing: there is no force in Germany which could turn against the present régime. In Germany there is only one force, the force of the German nation, with its leaders and followers, its defence and its arms.

But there is one thing I will not dispute with these gentlemen. We have naturally no right to demand that other nations alter their Constitutions. I have only the duty, as Leader of the Germans to take account of these Constitutions and the possibilities to which they give rise. A few days ago the deputy Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons declared: 'I desire that Germany and Italy shall be destroyed.' Naturally I cannot prevent the democratic game bringing this man into the Government in perhaps two years' time, but I can give this assurance: I will prevent him from destroying Germany. And just as I am certain that the German people will prevent the plans of these gentlemen succeeding, I know that the Italian people also will take care that they do not succeed.

I believe that from these international hopes there can only be one lesson for us, namely to stand firmly together and to stand firmly with our friends. The more we in Germany succeed in forming a single community, the smaller will be the prospects of these war agitators, the closer shall we combine with the State which is in the same position as ourselves, namely with Italy, and the less desire will they have to pick a quarrel with us.

Looking back in spirit on the year 1938, we can only be filled with the deepest pride and the greatest joy. Germany has become greater in the most natural and the most morally unimpeachable way. Millions of our compatriots whose only dream and whose only aim it was to return to Germany have entered our community. They will now help to bear the Reich and to serve it as loyal members, because they have been in the best position to judge what it means to be separated and abandoned. But this year is also a year of great obligations for us. We must learn from it and decide never to depart from the path of success.

If others speak of disarmament, we are also prepared to disarm, but on one con-

dition, that there must first be a disarmament of war agitation. But so long as the others merely talk of disarmament, but continue their infamous war agitation, we assume that they only want to steal our arms and again to reserve for us the fate of 1918-19. Then I can tell Mr. Churchill and his friends one thing; that happened once but never again.

I began my path with a firm belief in the German people. What else would at that time have saved us from despair? I believed in the German people, in its inner value and therefore also in its future. Today that faith has been justified in a wonderful manner. In the past year it has merely been strengthened. How wonderfully our people have stood the test in the past five or six years! Has not everything been fulfilled that I prophesied from year to year and that we all yearned for? How wonderfully our people behaved in the last few weeks and months! You can believe me, my comrades, I am so proud and happy to be your Leader. Particularly in the last few weeks our German people have shown a glorious picture of firm determination such as I learned to know in the worst days of the War. There has been no nervousness, no haste, no uncertainty, no feeling of despair, but confidence and the most loyal obedience. Every single man and woman knew that destiny might demand from them the extreme effort. It was this resolution and calm which spared them the extreme effort. Destiny did not challenge us, because it knew we were strong. Let us take this as a lesson for all future time. Then nothing can happen to our dear Germany, either now or in all eternity, Germany! Sieg-Heil."

Saarbrücken, October 9th, 1938.

"In the midst of these great days and events I come to you Gau in the conviction that no one is able to show more understanding for the last few weeks than yourselves. You, men and women of the Saar, have yourselves experienced what it means to be separated from the Reich, but you have also experienced the joy of reunion. You also suffered for nearly twenty years all the pain of separation and were more than joyful when the hour of freedom finally struck and you were able to return to our common Great German Reich. Millions of Germans in Sudetenland have had the same experience and have now experienced the same jubilation with which you were formerly filled.

At the beginning of this twentieth year after our collapse, I took the decision to bring back to the Reich the ten million Germans who were still outside our frontiers.

I was perfectly aware that this return could only be achieved by our own strength. The rest of the world could not and did not wish to see that here, in opposition to the so-called right of self-determination, ten million people were separated from the German Reich and were oppressed on account of their Germanism. And they could not and did not wish to understand that these people had only one great longing: to return to the Reich.

These international citizens of the world, who have pity on every criminal who is brought to book in Germany, were deaf to the misery of ten million Germans. This world is still filled with the spirit of Versailles. Let it not be said that the world has been released from it. No! Germany has released herself from it.

A stern decision had to be taken. There were also weaklings among us, who perhaps did not understand that. But it is obviously at all times to the honour of real statesmen to take such a responsibility.

A number of conditions were necessary in order to bring about this solution.

The first was the inner unity of the nation. In taking my decision I was convinced of being the leader of a manly people. I know what perhaps many in the rest of the world and a few even in Germany do not yet appear to know, namely:

that the people of the year 1938 are not the people of 1918. No one can overlook the vast educational work carried out by our ideology. At the present day a national community has arisen of a force and strength such as Germany has never yet known. This was the first condition for the success of such a struggle.

The second was the national armament for which I have worked fanatically for nearly six years. I am of opinion that it is cheaper to arm before events than to lie unarmed at the mercy of events, and then pay out to foreign countries.

The third assumption was the making secure of the Reich, and here you yourselves are the witnesses of a mighty work which is drawing to completion in your immediate neighbourhood. I need give you no details of this. I express but one conviction—that no Power in the world will succeed in breaking through this wall.

And, fourthly, we have won for ourselves friends abroad. That axis of which people abroad have so often felt entitled to make fun has in the last two-and-a-half weeks not only shown itself to be abiding, but proved that it has survived even the worst hours.

We are happy that this work of the year 1938, the reunion of ten million Germans and about 110,000 square kilometres of territory in the Reich, could take place without bloodshed, in spite of the hopes of so many international agitators and profiteers.

In referring to the cooperation of the rest of the world in this placeful solution, I must mention in the first place the only true friend we possess today: Benito Mussolini. We all know what we owe this man. I would also mention the two other statesmen who endeavoured to find a way and who concluded with us that agreement which secured their rights for many million Germans and peace for the world.

But the experiences of these last eight months can and must only strengthen us in the determination to be cautious and to neglect nothing that must be done for the protection of the Reich.

We have opposite us statesmen who—and we must believe this of them—desire peace. But they rule in countries whose inner construction makes it possible for them to be replaced at any time by others who have not the same eye for peace. And these others are already there. In England Mr. Chamberlain only needs to be replaced by Mr. Duff Cooper, Mr. Eden or Mr. Churchill and we know for certain that the aim of these men would be to begin a new world war immediately. They make no secret of the fact, but openly express it.

We also know that in the background still lurks that Jewish international enemy who has found his State basis and expression in Bolshevism. In addition we know the power of a certain international press which only lives on lies and calumnies. That compels us to be on our guard and to be mindful of the protection of the Reich. At all times ready for peace, at all times ready for defence!

I have therefore determined that the development of our fortifications in the west, as announced in my Nuremberg speech, shall be continued with renewed energy. I will now include in these fortifications the two great areas which lay hitherto in front of our fortifications, the Aachen and Saarbrücken areas.

As a strong State we are at all times prepared to conduct a policy of understanding with our neighbours. We demand nothing from them. We desire nothing but peace. We want only one thing and this applies especially to our relations with England. It would be well if people in England would gradually give up certain airs of the Versailles period. We will no longer tolerate governessy guardianship. Inquiries by British politicians regarding the fate of Germans or citizens of the Reich within the frontiers of the Reich are out of place.

We do not trouble about similar matters in England. The rest of the world might at times have sufficient reason to worry about their own national affairs or, for instance, about events in Palestine. For our part, however, we leave it to those who feel called by God to solve these problems and merely observe with amazement how quickly they reach their solutions.

We should like to advise these gentlemen to deal with their own problems and leave us alone. This is also in the interest of world peace. We ourselves have great tasks before us. Vast cultural and economic problems must be solved. No nation can need peace more than we do, but no nations knows better than we do what it means to be weak and to be at the mercy of others.

Comrades! In this year a great work of national unity has been accomplished: the re-establishment of a proud, strong and free German Reich.

2. Speech by the German Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop, before the Foreign Press Association in Berlin on November 7th, 1938

Herr von Ribbentrop began by saying that he and his Department quite understood the special requirements of the Press. He was afraid that he would have to disappoint those who expected him to give them a detailed exposition of the aims of German foreign policy, as he was leaving almost immediately for Munich to take part in the celebrations there. He was compelled in fairness to say that recently there had been a change for the better in the reports by the foreign press correspondents in Berlin which, in his opinion, was due to increasing insight and growing appreciation of the fact that National-Socialism was a popular movement. If, as he hoped, that development continued, foreign correspondents would be fulfilling their real mission and rendering a valuable service to good relations between their countries and Germany.

"It will, however", he said, "need a great deal of good will and painstaking work to make good the damage which has in this respect been done to the German nation in past years. The result of this can be seen in the great campaign of agitation which is still being carried on against Germany abroad. The way in which the Sudeten problem was handled was an almost classical example of a campaign of agitation of this nature and of the damage which an irresponsible Press can do. I should like briefly to recapitulate what happened.

(1) The nations know that the only sensible solution is the return of the Sudetenland to Germany and that the time is more than ripe for this solution. A certain international Press proclaims the contrary to be the case, and begins a campaign of agitation to prevent this solution. The Czechs, taking courage from this invent the story of German mobilization, in order to mobilize themselves on May 21. Germany does nothing and watches this unusual game in dignified calm.

(2) The fact that Germany takes no action is immediately seized upon by these international Press agitators to accuse her of weakness and of climbing down before the threats of the Western Powers. This went so far that private visits by Germans to the Western capitals were represented as peace overtures by Germany, who was afraid of Western wrath. The attempts of Press agitators to pave the way for war against Germany become more and more open. But Germany still remains calm and prepares for every eventuality.

(3) The Führer declares that the Sudetenland must now, one way or the other, come to Germany, and makes his military preparations. The war Press abroad screams itself hoarse. At this moment, taking no notice of all this agitation, the heads of the Governments take matters into their own

You yourselves have had to experience so much suffering, that you understand that I am concerned for the future of the Reich and appeal to the entire German people to be always on their guard and prepared. It is like a miracle that we have been able to experience a new German rebirth in so few years. It might have been quite different. We will always bear this in mind and renew our determination to serve this Germany, man for man, woman for woman; we will set aside all personal interests at any moment when the greater interest of our nation and Reich demands it.

For the second time I stand amongst you. The first time your jubilation was an expression of your joy at reunion. Today you are experiencing the jubilation of other millions of Germans who have also returned to the Reich. We will all join with them in their faith in our glorious united German Reich. Germany—Sieg Heil."

hands. The Munich Agreement is brought about, the Sudetenland is allotted to Germany in complete peace. And on their return the heads of the Governments are received with loud cheers by their peoples.

One thing is quite clear; in the first place a certain international Press succeeded in the face of all justice and common sense in making a world problem out of the Czech problem, when all it concerned was the vital interests of Germany alone; in the second place—when it was clear that the iron determination of the Führer stood in the way—this Press did all it could to egg the nations on to go to war for this reason and against their will. And perhaps they might have been successful, if, instead of Chamberlain and Daladier, those war agitators whom we know only too well had been at the helm in these countries and had endeavoured to banish their fearful dreams by unleashing a preventive war.

It is to be hoped that the conclusions drawn from recent events will be that on the one hand Germany was completely prepared for such a possibility, and that, on the other hand, the success of this warmongering would have meant the destruction of the authors' unsuspecting nations.

I should like further to mention the particularly regrettable fact that during the crisis a number of Governments made no efforts to persuade the Press of their countries to report the news calmly and objectively. I am convinced that every Government can, if it wishes, make sure that news reports are true to the facts. On the other hand, we have unfortunately observed on many occasions that Governments, instead of exerting a calming influence, have even helped to increase the excitement and added fuel to the fire. We have observed with surprise that a number of Governments did a sorry service to peace by adopting a one-sided attitude and increasing the unrest and the further such Governments were removed from the theatre of events, the greater was their tendency to behave in this way. We have seen that a number of Governments issued proclamations which were not in accordance with the facts, and were also entirely unsuited to calm people's minds or to enlighten them as to the true circumstances. These proclamations were obviously intended to be a means of exerting pressure or bluffing other Governments in the course of the diplomatic discussions of the past weeks.

In this connexion I wish to state that Germany was very much in earnest during this period, and that if a solution had not been found in Munich at the eleventh hour the Führer would have freed the Sudetenland by force of arms.

A further example of the terribly destructive effect which a campaign of hate can have upon a people is provided by the story of the "Martian giants of Princeton" with which you are all familiar. Amusing as this incident is in itself, it nevertheless has a serious aspect. The mass hysteria caused by the broadcast play was, in the last analysis, only a consequence of the war psychosis produced in the American people by the references to Germany in a certain section of the Press.

I will now say a few words about the mission of the foreign correspondents in Berlin. I believe that the majority of the correspondents of foreign papers here endeavour to report reasonably and impartially. We realize too that during the recent crisis, they did not always have an easy task, and I know many cases in which reliable and impartial reports by foreign correspondents about Germany were either not printed at all by their editors at home or were printed in a distorted form. Moreover, a false report fabricated in the editorial office of a foreign newspaper was recently served up to the foreign reader as an original report from Berlin. That the attitude of this editor was in glaring contrast to the real mind of his own nation in those days and that editors of that sort entirely misestimated the feeling among the German people is abundantly clear today. I hope that this too has been realized and that in future those concerned will lend a more willing ear to the reports of the foreign press correspondents in Germany.

If it is asked how such a complete misunderstanding of a perfectly natural situation by a considerable portion of the Press is possible, I should say that—apart from the press which systematically agitates against Germany in the service of Bolshevism—the cause is to be found in the prevalence of an over-intellectual attitude on the part of those who run the papers. By seeking to approach political events in a spirit of abstract intellectuality, they apply a false criterion to such events. This often has very serious results and leads to totally false political conclusions. The true journalist must nowadays be in touch with the people. If he loses touch with the pulse or the soul of the people, he can never interpret political reality or political activity.

This naturally applies especially to foreign correspondents, as a foreign correspondent must not only keep his hand on the pulse of his own nation, but know the country in which he works inside out, its activities and its aspirations. Only in this way can he be an honest mediator between his own people and the country whose hospitality he enjoys and unless he is such a mediator he cannot be a valuable coadjutor of diplomacy. We know of so many cases in history where the work of a great journalist has been of signal importance from the point of view of the policy of his country and I therefore welcome the fact that the foreign correspondents in Berlin are gradually showing more appreciation of the activities and aspirations of the German people. I hope that in this way the work of the foreign correspondents in Germany will help more and more to reveal in its true proportions the tremendous recovery made by Germany in all fields since the National-Socialist Party came into power and to interpret future German foreign policy to the world.

Is it not perfectly natural that a strong and healthy people should in the end have refused to be oppressed and

should have rallied round the Leader, when he appeared? Abstract power politics are not as our adversaries abroad often declare, the distinguishing mark of National-Socialist Germany, but the unification of our German nation and the safeguarding of that nation within the frontiers of a strong empire have always been the decisive considerations in National-Socialist foreign policy. The Führer's feat in performing this miracle in less than six years is sometimes depicted abroad as the result of "ruthless power politics". Nothing could be further from the truth, as Germany was rendered completely helpless and defenceless by Versailles. Not ruthless power politics, but an assembling in National-Socialism of all the spiritual forces of Germany on a scale unprecedented in history, the heroic determination of the German people to make every sacrifice, its belief in the Führer and its unity have freed Germany. In this way only was it possible for a world Power to arise out of the Germany of before 1933—the Germany of weakness and impotence.

Gentlemen, you have witnessed this creation of a completely new and mighty Germany. A feeling of pride fills the heart of every German today after those years of humiliation and oppression when he realizes that Germany is unassailable for all time.

In the consciousness of the inner power of her 80,000,000 people, Germany's future is now secured. Over and above this, Germany can rely on the firmly founded friendship of other Powers. The Rome-Berlin axis, the connexion of German and Italy with Japan in her successful struggle against Bolshevism, our friendly relations with Poland—those pillars of German foreign policy are to-day the guarantees of order and peace in Europe and the world.

Under the sign of this new order and of the deep friendship between Fascist Italy and National-Socialist Germany and their two great leaders, the Führer was able to accomplish the great historic act of the peaceful incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland—10 million Germans—in the German Reich. This incorporation, without a drop of blood shed, is an event unprecedented in history, whereby the millennial desire of the German people was fulfilled.

A further sign of the confidence of the nations in this new European order and in the approach of Fascism and National-Socialism to European problems is the fact that the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments a few days ago appealed to the Axis Powers to bring about a settlement by arbitration in the century-old conflict over the delimitation of the northern frontier of Hungary. What the League of Nations could not accomplish in 20 years required only one day in Vienna. Thus Vienna prepared the ground for a new cooperation and peaceful reconstruction in the south-east of Europe. The arbitral award made by the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and myself, after mature deliberation and careful weighing of all interests, has now definitely established the frontier between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on an ethnographic basis.

The award also proved that after the settlement of the Sudeten question Germany is not governed by any feeling of revenge or hatred towards Czechoslovakia, but that the German Government took pains both to safeguard the interests of friendly Hungary and to deal with Czechoslovak interests in a loyal and just manner. If the Czechoslovak Government are prepared, after the final delimitation of the frontier, to take the new situation fully into account and to undertake a complete reorientation of their policy towards Germany, it will be possible to bring about a settle-

ment with this State and a final appeasement between the two nations.

The position of the Third Reich as a world Power is now definitely established. But this does not mean that Germany does not share the desire for a settlement between the interests of the various Powers. In this connexion it may here be recalled that it was the Führer who invited the Powers to Munich in September in order to find a peaceful way out of the crisis. In the same spirit, at the desire of the British Prime Minister, the Führer made with him on the day of his departure the famous Anglo-German peace declaration.

We were all the more astonished that the first answer to the spirit of Munich took the form of the slogan: "Peace is saved, therefore arm to the utmost." The new armament fever in several countries is accompanied by renewed efforts on the part of incorrigible war agitators. In this connexion we must note with regret that these war agitators, fearing that Germany's well-known and uncompromising legal demand for the return of the former German colonies might be fulfilled, are carrying on in the African Press an amazing propaganda against Germany and everything German.

Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax have with

wise insight given a clear rebuke to all these English war agitators and their endeavours to drive the nations apart. The Prime Minister of France, M. Daladier, and his Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, have likewise made speeches in the last few weeks which have found a sympathetic echo in Germany. It may be expected that in the further pursuit of the path entered upon with England at Munich, new possibilities of better understanding between Germany and France as well will result and will take an appropriate form. In this sense the desire of the French Foreign Minister for sincere collaboration between Germany and France has been welcomed by us. The newly confirmed settlement between Italy and Great Britain is in the same direction.

This attitude on the part of the responsible statesmen in London and Paris admits of the hope that reason may after all gain the upper hand over the war agitators in the western democracies. In his speech at Weimar yesterday the Führer condemned the activities of these war agitators with relentless vigour and logic. As against these activities the German nation stands united and firm behind its Führer: strong and alert, always ready for peace but without fear of war, and always resolved to preserve the vital rights of the nation against any one.

MUNICH AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS IN THE OPINION OF THE BRITISH CROWN AND RESPONSIBLE BRITISH MINISTERS

Extracts from the Speeches from the Throne by George VI on the occasion of the closing of the Parliamentary Session 1937-38 on November 4th and the opening of the 1938-39 Session on November 8th, 1938.

"I have followed with deep anxiety the developments of the grave crisis through which Europe has just passed. Throughout the whole period My Government, in close accord with the French Government, made every endeavour both in Prague and in Berlin to ensure a lasting and peaceful settlement of the problem of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. Their efforts were ably assisted by a mission of investigation and mediation in Czechoslovakia, headed by Viscount Runciman.

In view of the increasing gravity of the crisis the Prime Minister on the 14th September decided to fly to Berchtesgaden in order to establish personal contact with the German Chancellor. This initiative was followed on the 22nd September by a further visit by the Prime Minister to Godesberg. At this stage the prospect of a peaceful settlement seemed almost to have vanished, but at the last moment the Prime Minister made a proposal to the German Chancellor for a Four-Power Conference. Signor Mussolini gave valuable support to the suggestion, and on the 29th September the German Chancellor, the French President of the Council, the Head of the Italian Government, and the Prime Minister met at Munich and came to an agreement. The settlement thus arrived at was accepted, with a dignity that has earned general admiration, by the Government and people of Czechoslovakia.

The cause of peace was powerfully aided by the timely action of the President of the United States of America. The desire of all peoples not to be drawn into war with one another is manifest and significant, and everywhere men and women share with Me, I am convinced, a feeling of deep thankfulness that the imminent peril was thus averted. I pray that, with the passing of this peril, a new era may have opened for Europe.

During this period of anxiety it became necessary to put into force certain measures, including the mobilization of the Navy, the calling out of a considerable portion of

the personnel of the auxiliary Forces and the initiation of certain precautions against air raids. All these arrangements were carried out with admirable promptitude. In every department of national life men and women alike came forward to serve their country. I was proud to observe the calmness and determination displayed by all My people and I thank them for their spirit of service.

The continued strengthening of our defences has required additional taxation, which has been accepted as necessary by the country.

Defence requirements have engaged the unremitting attention of My Ministers, and are being reviewed in the light of recent experience.

I have given My assent to a Measure requiring local authorities to prepare schemes of air raid precautions for their areas. Such schemes are an essential part of the defence organization of the country."

"My relations with foreign Powers continue to be friendly, and my Government will do all in their power to promote the development of good understanding in the spirit of the joint Anglo-German declaration made at Munich on September 30 last.

The agreement negotiated last April between my Government and the Italian Government will now shortly be brought into force. I believe that this action will confirm the traditional good relations so happily and so long subsisting between our two countries, and thus further the cause of European peace.

Although the equipment and expansion of my Defence Forces are now making rapid progress, the emergency through which we have passed had shown that certain deficiencies in our military and civil defence preparations remain to be remedied.

The problems of civil defence, including that of the effective utilization of the resources of the nation for national voluntary service, will in future receive the undivided attention of a Minister, the Lord Privy Seal."

The Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, in the House of Commons on November 1st 1938.

In the first part of his speech the right hon. gentleman (M. Attlee) asked a number of questions and made a number of comments upon what he considered to be the consequences of the Munich agreement. There was one statement to which I must take exception. He described the Munich agreement as a great defeat for this country and France and the cause of law and order. If the right hon. gentleman really believes that I am still sorry that he should say so publicly. It is not one of the characteristics of the totalitarian States, at any rate, that they are accustomed to foul their own nests. I do strongly deprecate all the statements made by persons in responsible, or even in irresponsible, positions who take opportunities of broadcasting to the world or to other countries in particular that their own country is in a state of decadence.

Others have gone a great deal further than he has done, but the observation which he has made gave me an opportunity of expressing an opinion which, I think, is very widely held. I do not regard the Munich agreement as a defeat either for the democracies or for the cause of law and order. On the contrary, the Munich agreement was an attempt to carry out by discussion between two Powers representing democracies and two Powers representing totalitarian States an agreed solution of a problem of which the only other solution appeared to be the use of force. Instead of using force, the agreement has been carried out in an orderly manner.

It is quite true that there are many things which followed which none of us would approve of, which all of us would wish to have done differently. That is quite true, but hon. members should consider that, as the Foreign Secretary said on another occasion, we had to choose between hard alternatives; and when you find fault, as you may justly find fault, with the solution which has in fact been carried out, do not forget what the alternative was and what the effect of the alternative would have been upon Czechoslovakia itself.

After all, the Munich agreement, which was come to in the course of a comparatively short time, measured by hours, could not be expected to deal in itself with every detail of the operation that was contemplated. All that we could do at Munich was to lay down certain general outlines, and to leave to an International Commission the task of filling in the details. The right hon. gentleman criticizes the International Commission in the carrying out of that task. I say again that we may not like the solution, but I would ask the right hon. gentleman not to forget what the alternative was; and if he was not prepared to accept the alternative, which was the use of force we must recognize that we had to accept the alternative, disagreeable though it may be in many respects.

The right hon. gentleman spoke, among other things, about the boundaries which are to be laid down between the new State of Czechoslovakia and Germany. By the fourth article of the Munich agreement there was imposed on the International Commission the duty of determining the extent of the territory, outside the four zones which were to be occupied by German troops by October 7, which being preponderantly German in 1918 should be occupied by Germany by October 10. The time was short, but the International Commission decided that in order to ascertain the limits of that territory they must get as near as they could to the position in 1918. That was in accordance with the method of taking the plebiscite in the Saar district. The right hon. gentleman says that they went back much farther than 1918, they went back to 1910, and that no justification has ever been given for going back to a period so long ago as that.

I do not know that there has been any opportunity, on any previous occasion, for giving that justification, but of course the answer is very simple. There was no census in 1918, and as there were no reliable figures for that date the International Commission were obliged to go back to the last date for which there were reliable figures, and that was 1910. That was the reason why the census of 1910 was taken as a basis.

The reason was because the basis was taken as the position in 1918, the argument being—I am not saying this is my view, I am only explaining the basis on which it was taken—that the position had been deliberately changed since 1918 by the intro-

duction of Czechs into areas which in 1918 were predominantly German, and therefore if a census had been taken later than in 1918 it would not have met that particular objection.

Once the Czechoslovak Government had accepted that decision of the International Commission, which they did on October 13, it became apparent that there was no longer any need for plebiscites, and the Germans and the Czechs agreed that the line which had been determined in accordance with that basis should be the provisional frontier, but that it should be subject to examination and modification, not only in accordance with strictly ethnographical considerations, but also taking into account economic considerations. It will be observed that in consequence of that agreement the line may be modified, not only in those areas in which under the original agreement there would have been a plebiscite, but that the whole line from one end to the other may be reconsidered.

Another point to which the right hon. gentleman addressed himself referred to the rights of optants. He said that the clause referring to optants was entirely illusory. I do not know what right he had to say that. I do not know whether he is aware of the present position. Under article 7 of the Munich agreement it provided that a German-Czech Commission were to settle the details of this right of opting. They were to determine ways of facilitating the transfer of those individuals who wished to exercise the right, and also any questions of principle which arose out of the transfer. This is a subject of considerable magnitude, because we are informed that there are something like 580,000 Czechs now in German territory and something like 250,000 Germans in Czech territory. I can only say that that is a matter which is left to this German-Czech Commission, and they have not yet, I understand, formulated any conclusion, but when they do they will bring them to the notice of the International Commission.

I am not yet in a position to add anything on the subject of guarantees to that which has already been said by the Minister for the Coordination of Defence (Sir T. Inskip). The position remains exactly the same, and it cannot be cleared up until the whole question of minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled. The House will remember that it was stated that Germany and Italy would be ready to enter into a guarantee on the question of Czechoslovakia when the question of minorities had been settled. Our original offer was to enter into an international guarantee, but what the terms of that guarantee will be and who will be the partakers in that guarantee is not a question on which I can give the House any further information today. Before anything is settled, the terms of such a guarantee and the names of those who are taking part in it would be brought before this House.

I am sorry that Mr. Attlee thought it necessary to suggest that the activities of Dr. Funk, who is the Minister concerned with economic questions, should be concealing some political motive. It is this attitude of constant suspicion—nothing can be done by anybody but what somebody or other finds concealed in it something sinister or evil—which is very largely the cause of the want of confidence existing in Europe to-day.

What, taking an economic view, is the position of Germany in relation to the States of Central and South-Eastern Europe? Geographically, she must occupy a dominating position there. She does now. In so far as those States are agricultural in character the nature of the trade between them and Germany is complementary. They can supply Germany with raw materials and food-stuffs in return for articles of manufacture which Germany is so well fitted to supply, but I do not see any reason why we should expect that fundamental change is likely to take place in those regions.

So far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, the industries in the ceded regions were industries mainly exporting in character, and they suffered a good deal in competition from Germany. It is quite true that she has ceded also valuable supplies of raw materials, such as coal, lignite, and timber, but so long as she is able to import those raw materials there is no reason, so far as I can see, why her industrial position should be worsened. Exchanges of goods over the frontier between Germany and Czechoslovakia are likely to be mutually beneficial. I do not imagine that there will be difficulty put in her way in importing raw materials.

So far as this country is concerned we have no wish to block Germany out from those countries or to encircle her economically. It is true that we have certain trade interests there ourselves, and of course we mean to maintain those trade interests; and indeed, in that respect, we shall have the good will of the countries themselves. Although their natural market is to be found chiefly in Germany, nevertheless they can, as a rule, only obtain payment from Germany, either in the form of goods—a barter arrangement—or in the form of block marks. That does not suit them. They want free currency so that they may import other materials and things which they cannot get in Germany. Therefore, they do desire at least a certain proportion of their trade to be done with other countries, and for that reason we shall have their assistance and good will in our efforts to maintain our trade.

Do not let us suppose that there necessarily must be economic warfare between Germany and ourselves. There must be some competition. Competition is a thing that we thrived on in the past. It is not in our interest to see any part of the world remain poor. If by means of international trade between Germany and these countries the economic position of these countries is improved you may be quite certain that we shall get our share of the trade. They may not buy exactly the same things from us as they buy from Germany, but they will buy from us those articles which we are most fitted to supply. In my view, there is room both for Germany and for us in trade with those countries and neither of us ought to try to obtain an exclusive possession of their markets.

Generally on the military side we have not yet completed the consideration of the review which we have made, but there will be an opportunity in the new Session of Parliament to have a full debate on this subject. I would like, however, to make two general observations on the subject now. I want hon. members to remember that our programme of rearmament is a five-year programme, and that we are now only in the third year of that programme. Therefore, to argue that because everything has not been completed in the third year the programme had broken down is to lose sight altogether of the fact that it was never intended to be completed in three years. I doubt whether it would have been possible, if we had endeavoured to do so at the beginning of the programme, to squeeze a five-year programme into three years, but to conclude our review does bring up the special urgency of certain parts of that programme and the necessity for reinforcement of certain weak spots, which, if they were allowed to continue, might jeopardize the effectiveness of the whole system which we have built up.

Therefore we have to address ourselves to this point. The measures which it will be necessary to take will undoubtedly add to the total cost of armaments as we had hitherto contemplated. That brings me to my second observation, which concerns the use which is to be made of these armaments. I tried on October 5 to give as clear an exposition as I could of the Government's policy, but I regret to observe that since then doubts have been expressed in some quarters both at home and abroad as to whether this review, this bringing up to standard of the scale of our armaments, is consistent with the peaceful professions which we are expressing at the same time.

I do not know why any different standards should be applied to this country in that respect than to other countries. But I do repeat here categorically what I have so often said, that we have no aggressive intentions against Germany, or any other country. Our sole concern is to see that this country and her Imperial communications are safe, and that we shall not be so weak relatively to other countries that our diplomacy cannot enter upon discussions upon an equal footing.

There is nothing further from our minds than entry upon a new armaments race. In talking about the Munich results it seems to me that the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Attlee) forgot the last act at Munich, which after all is not the least important one. That declaration, which was signed by Herr Hitler and myself, and in which we recorded our belief in the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again, and expressed our own intention that the method of consultation should be the method adopted to deal with other questions which might concern us, and our intention also to continue our efforts to remove every possible source of difference, seems to have dropped out of sight lately. I myself feel that in that declaration, if it is properly and suitably followed up, lies the chance of a new era of peace in Europe. When I signed that document I meant what was in the document. I am convinced that Herr Hitler meant in too when he signed it, and I am equally convinced that those views express the views of the majority of the people both in Germany and this country.

Let there be no mistake, let there be no doubts as to our policy and our intentions. It is our firm determination that there shall be no sitting still and waiting for peace to come. We must take active and positive steps towards that end. The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Attlee) asked whether we were to wait always until war threatened before we thought the time was ripe for discussion. No, Sir, that is the whole point of the policy which we are pursuing. Too often delays have taken place in the past, and we should not wait until a crisis becomes acute before we try to settle it. But we should try to consolidate the good will of the four Powers when they assembled at Munich, and we should endeavour to restore European confidence by the removal of fears and suspicions.

The ultimate aim of this Government, as I believe it must be the ultimate aim of every Government, whatever its complexion may be, is the improvement of the standard of living of the people. It is difficult to reconcile that with the continued piling up of armaments; therefore we should always have that in mind. What we are aiming at is, first, the limitation of armaments by agreement—for unilateral disarmament will help nobody—and in the end their practical abolition. That is looking very far ahead. I shall not see it, but I do not see why we should not get to the first stages of it if we pursue a consistent and persistent policy.

We shall never get far unless we can accustom ourselves to the idea that the democracies and the totalitarian States are not to be ranged against one another in two opposing blocs, but that they can, if they choose, work together, not merely for the settlement of differences after they have arisen, but also for the operation of a constructive programme—a programme which will facilitate the international exchange of goods and the regulation of international relations in various ways for the good of all. That is the policy which is sometimes called the policy of appeasement. That is the policy to which this Government intends wholeheartedly to devote itself.

**Mr. Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons
on November 3rd.**

**Extract from his Speech moving the Ratification of the
Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16th, 1938.**

— Yesterday, in speaking of the declaration signed at Munich by Herr Hitler and myself, I said that I thought that, if it were suitably followed up, it might well be found

to contain the seed which would ultimately develop into a new era of confidence and peace in Europe. Somewhat the same idea was expressed in different language by the Leader of the Opposition when he asked whether we must always wait for subjects of difference between nations to give rise to threats of war before we considered them ripe for peaceful discussion and negotiation.

Since we made an agreement with Italy on April 16, I am glad to think that there are no differences between our two countries. But it is clear that if the improvement in our relations which so markedly followed upon the conclusion of that Agreement is to be maintained, the delays in putting the Agreement into force, which have already lasted for more than six months, cannot be indefinitely prolonged.

It is not necessary for me this afternoon to discuss the merits of the Agreement itself. The terms of the Agreement were debated in this House last May. On May 2 a motion, which was moved by me, of approval of the Agreement was carried by a large majority. I am well aware that the Opposition resisted the motion then, and naturally I do not expect them to have changed their views, but the question we have to consider to-day is not whether this is a good agreement or not. That has already been settled so far as this House is concerned. The question we have to consider is whether the time has now come to put it into force, and whether the preliminary condition which I laid down as essential before the Agreement could be put into force has now been fulfilled.

The House will remember very well what that condition was. It was that we should be able to consider that the Spanish question was settled, and I explained last July why we had thought it necessary to make that condition. I said then that, in our view, the justification for the formal recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia was to be found if we could feel that recognition would constitute an important advance towards the general appeasement of Europe, and it was because we felt at that time that the conflict which was going on in Spain under the then existing conditions did constitute a perpetual menace to the peace of Europe that we felt that it must be removed from that category before we could ask Parliament to agree to the Agreement being put into force.

Since that time a good many efforts have been made by various members of the Opposition to get me to say exactly what I meant by a settlement in Spain. I have always refused to give any such definition, not because I wanted to evade any proper duty which fell upon me, but because I did not feel that I could give such a definition in the absence of more knowledge than I possessed of what might be the future developments in the Spanish situation.

But perhaps hon. members may recollect that on July 26 last, in answer, I think, to an interruption by the Leader of the Opposition relating to the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain, I used these words:

"I would like to see what happens when the volunteers are withdrawn. If his Majesty's Government think that Spain has ceased to be a menace to the peace of Europe. I think we shall regard that as a settlement of the Spanish question."

Since then a great deal has happened. Already, even at that date, all the Powers represented on the Non-Intervention Committee, including Italy, of course, had accepted the British plan for the withdrawal of volunteers, and if that plan is not in operation to-day, it cannot be said that that is the fault of Italy. It cannot properly be said. Again, since then the Spanish Government have announced their intention of withdrawing the International Brigade. When I was at Munich Signor Mussolini volunteered me the infor-

mation that he intended to withdraw 10,000 men, or about half the Italian infantry forces, from Spain, and since then those men have in fact been withdrawn.

I have no doubt that hon. members will represent that Italian men and pilots and aircraft and other material still remain in Spain, and so also there remain men and material of other than Italian nationality in Spain on one side or the other; but we have received from Signor Mussolini definite assurances, first of all, that the remaining Italian forces of all categories will be withdrawn when the Non-Intervention Plan comes into operation; secondly, that no further Italian troops will be sent to Spain; and thirdly—in case this idea had occurred to anybody—that the Italian Government have never for a moment entertained the idea of sending compensatory air forces to Spain in lieu the infantry forces which have now been withdrawn.

These three assurances, taken in conjunction with the actual withdrawal of this large body of men, in my judgment constitute a substantial earnest of the good intentions of the Italian Government. They form a considerable contribution to the elimination of the Spanish question as a menace to peace. But these are not the only considerations which weigh with his Majesty's Government. Some hon. members, with that eternal tendency to suspicion which I am afraid only breeds corresponding suspicion on the other side, persist in the view that Germany and Italy have a design of somehow permanently establishing themselves in Spain, and that Spain itself would presently be setting up a Fascist State.

I believe both those views to be entirely unfounded. When I was at Munich I spoke on the subject of the future of Spain with both Herr Hitler and Mussolini, and both of them assured me most definitely that they had no territorial ambitions whatever in Spain. I would remind hon. members that when, in September, Europe was apparently faced with the prospect of a new major war, General Franco made a declaration of his neutrality and stated that he would not violate the French frontier unless he was attacked from that quarter.

It seems to us that the events which took place in September put the whole Spanish conflict into a new perspective, and if the nations of Europe escaped a great catastrophe in the acute Czechoslovak crisis, surely nobody can imagine that, with that recollection fresh in their minds, they are going to knock their heads together over Spain. In my own mind I am perfectly clear that the Spanish question is no longer a menace to the peace of Europe, and consequently that there is no valid reason why we should not now take a step which obviously would contribute to general appeasement.

In the realm of international affairs one thing generally leads to another and if any justification were required for the policy of the Government in closing our differences with Italy it surely can be found in the action of Signor Mussolini when, at my request, he used his influence with Herr Hitler in order to give time for the discussion which led up to the Munich agreement. By that act the peace of Europe was saved. Does anybody suppose that my request to Signor Mussolini to intervene would have met with a response from him or indeed that I could even have made such a request if our relations with Italy had remained what they were a year ago?

There is one other point which I ought to mention, because it seems to me to weigh heavily, although I think unnecessarily, upon certain minds, and that is the propriety of the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia. I wonder how far those who hold that view are prepared to carry their reluctance. Are they prepared to withhold

recognition in perpetuity, because if they really were so I am afraid they would very speedily find themselves in complete isolation. I would like to remind them that, in the first place, the council of the League of Nations, by a large majority, last May expressed the unqualified view that it was for each nation to decide for itself whether it should or should not accord this formal recognition.

Further, I would remind the House that of all the countries in Europe there are only two—namely, ourselves and the Soviet Government of Russia—which have restricted themselves to *de facto* recognition. The latest country to recognize formally Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia is France, and their new Ambassador is to be accredited to the King of Italy and the Emperor of Ethiopia. We intend to follow the same course as France, and accordingly new credentials will be issued to our Ambassador (Lord Perth) on similar lines, thereby according legal recognition to Italian sovereignty. Perhaps the House would like to know that, on being informed of our intention to take this course, the French Government not only raised no objection but they stated that they welcomed generally anything that would contribute to the improvement of Anglo-Italian relations.

It is perhaps unnecessary to tell the House that, in accordance with what has now become the usual routine, the Dominions have been kept fully informed of our intentions, and I am very glad to be able to read to the House two messages which I have received from the Prime Minister of Australia and the Prime Minister of South Africa. Both messages recognise that the step which His Majesty's Government proposes to take relates not only to the relations between ourselves and Italy but must be regarded as representing a policy which I have so frequently had occasion to lay before the House.

I ask the House to accept this motion, and in doing so I am satisfied that the House will definitely be improving the prospects of peace as a whole. Let us put an end here and now to any idea that it is our desire to keep any State at arm's length, and let us remember that every advance that we may make towards removing possible causes of friction upon one subject makes it easier and very probable that we can deal more satisfactorily with those that still remain unsettled.

Mr. Neville Chamberlain at the Guildhall Banquet in London on November 9th.

"First of all I should like to get rid of the idea that at Munich there was a clash between different systems of government and that the result was a victory for one side or the other. Now of course you always get enthusiasts who are more royalist than the king, and who make claims which are in no way sponsored by their leaders. They are like the claims which are put forward in war time when, as you may read any time now in our newspapers, both sides declare that in the same action they inflicted a crushing defeat upon their adversaries. By a curious perversion sometimes we get an equally extravagant claim that it was the speaker's own side that suffered defeat and humiliation. I confess that, for my part, I do not understand a state of mind which desires to advertise the defeat of its own country. At any rate I, who happened to be there—can tell you that at Munich there was no clash—there was no question of a victory or defeat for either side. And I think if we are wise we shall find that one of the most gratifying features about Munich was that four Great Powers, owning different systems of government, were able to sit down together to agree without quarrelling upon the

main outlines of a settlement of one of the most thorny and dangerous international problems of our time.

If we are able to do that, does it not encourage us to think that it must be possible for such Powers to agree on other things as well—to agree, not only on preventing disaster, but on creating happiness and prosperity for all their peoples by mutual aid? For every leader in every country, whatever may be his political creed, must surely put as the first of his aims the improvement of the lot of his fellow creatures. In such meetings personal contacts are made which may prove of the greatest value.

In the days before the date at which most of our modern history books begin it was possible for a nation to live in isolation and to develop its civilization without interference from outside. But to-day we must all of us take account of our neighbours, and unless we can find some understanding of their ways of thought we shall never make real progress or secure stability for ourselves. For my part I prefer our British political system, with the wide extent of freedom which it gives to the individual to any form of government which subjects the will of the individual completely to the authority of the State, which means, of course, to the authority of those who for the time being represent the State. But it does seem to me entirely contrary to the spirit of democracy to attempt to deny to any other nation the right to adopt any form of government they may prefer. It seems to me all the more inappropriate to do so because history shows us that forms of government do not remain unchanged. Alterations, modifications, even reversals, have taken place in every generation in some country or another, and there is no reason to suppose that even to-day any of us have reached the final and unalterable stage.

After those preliminary observations I should like to turn to the foreign policy of his Majesty's Government, and I shall make no apology for repeating things that have often been said before, because there are some people who persist in saying that they have never been told what the foreign policy of the Government is. In the first speech that I made after I became Prime Minister I summed up the aims of his Majesty's Government under four heads. The first was to maintain peace; the second, to make this country so strong that she should be treated everywhere with respect; the third was to promote the prosperity of industry, and thus provide employment for our people; and the fourth was to work steadily for the improvement of the conditions of the people. Those still remain the aims of the Government, and the policy of the Government must be adapted from time to time to existing conditions in order to achieve them. I can only deal to-night with the first two, but I may say in passing that they are essential to the others. We shall secure neither prosperity nor welfare unless we have peace and the strength to maintain it.

I want to emphasize this point. To lay down an aim is one thing; to achieve it is something quite different. If you want peace you have got to do something more than sit down and hope for it. The Americans have an expression—doubtless you are familiar with it—which, as American terms so often do, conveys its meaning without explanation. They talk of a "go-getter". Well, I want this Government to be a go-getter for peace. That does not mean that we want to go and interfere with other people's business or to undertake the role of policemen-in-ordinary to the world. But if we see peace threatened we shall use any influence that we may possess to save it, and if war breaks out we shall take any opportunity that we can to stop it. For in these days it is difficult to confine war to the source of its origin, and once it begins to spread it is harder still to control its boundaries.

I feel all the more convinced of the soundness of this policy because I believe that the influence which this country can exert for peace is more powerful than that of any other that I can think of. It arises partly from our geographical position,

lying a little apart from Europe; partly from our widespread connexions through the Empire with the whole world; partly, no doubt, from the vastness of the resources at our disposal; but, above all, because there is a general recognition that, fundamentally, what we are seeking is peace, security, and justice for all under the rule of law and order, reason and good faith.

Now that the crisis is over, it is very easy to find fault with the solution, but the fact is that in the situation with which we had to deal it was not possible to present the ideal solution as the alternative to force. We were dealing with a situation which had arisen from forces which had been set in motion nearly 20 years before, and the surgeon who has to deal with long-neglected wounds or disease must cut more swiftly and more deeply than he who is dealing with the first symptoms. If the settlement at Munich imposed upon Czechoslovakia a fate which arouses our natural sympathy for a small State and for a proud and brave people, yet we cannot dismiss in silence the thought of what the alternative would have meant to the peoples not only of Czechoslovakia, but of all the nations that would have been involved. I have no shadow of doubt in my mind that what we did was right. In doing it we have earned the gratitude of the vast majority in Europe and even in the world."

**Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for Home Affairs,
at Clacton-on-Sea, on October 20th, 1938.**

I do not hold the view that democracies cannot live side by side with dictatorships, or dictatorships with democracies. A very wise statesman, Sir Edward Grey, insisted time after time upon the need of friendly relations with Governments whose internal policies were disapproved by British public opinion. Following therefore in Sir Edward Grey's footsteps I warmly welcomed the declaration made at Munich on September 30.

I am convinced that friendly relations with England have always been a cardinal point in Herr Hitler's policy. And I am also convinced that without friendly relations between England and Germany there can be no stable peace in the world.

But I go farther, and I say that from my own personal experience I can confirm this opinion. In June, 1935, I signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement on behalf of the British Government with Herr von Ribbentrop, the Führer's representative in London. I was greeted with a storm of criticism in the House of Commons and I was told by speaker after speaker upon the Opposition side that not only was it a crime to make any agreement with a dictator, but that it was worse than a crime—a blunder—for no dictator ever kept his word.

I am here to-night, as the man who, as Foreign Secretary, made the treaty and as the man who was afterwards First Lord of the Admiralty and who had the best means of knowing whether or not it was being carried out, to say that Herr Hitler has kept the Agreement, an Agreement that you will remember restricts the German Fleet to 35 per cent. of the British Fleet, and has kept it in the letter and in the spirit.

Here, indeed, is a concrete fact that cannot be denied. Here, indeed, is a concrete fact that entitles me to attach the greatest importance to the declaration made by Herr Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain. Here, indeed, is a concrete fact that convinces me that with patience, restraint, and a readiness to understand our respective points of view it is possible to fill up the trenches that have been dividing Europe into hostile camps and once again to create a comity of nations upon which a stable peace can be restored to suffering humanity.

**Mr. Ramsbotham, Minister of Pensions, at Lancaster
on October 29th, 1938.**

The Minister of Pensions said the critics of the Government's foreign policy should be asked to state what different action they would have taken in the crisis.

Would they have treated Herr Hitler as bluffing, although he categorically told the Prime Minister that rather than desert the Sudeten Germans he would have risked a world war? Would they have gambled on that being only an empty threat? Then they would have been gambling with the lives of 50,000,000 people. And who was best able to judge whether Herr Hitler was bluffing: the man who was negotiating with him face to face, or the critics who were sitting in their armchairs at home—many of whom, it may be, had never carried out any negotiations more important than bargaining with the proprietor of a seaside boarding-house?

Nothing had been more contemptible than the attitude of those petty-minded persons who for years had been hurling defiance and insult from the Press and from the platform against the dictators, and in the same breath doing their utmost to prevent their own country from rearming or recruiting.

He was prepared to admit that the Government delayed rearmament up to and beyond the edge of risk; but it did not lie in the mouths of their political opponents to criticize them, for when the Government came reluctantly to the conclusion that one-sided disarmament was no longer possible, their opponents and the noisy band of half-baked theorists and intellectuals that represented them on the Opposition front bench in the House of Commons did their best to stir up public opinion and prejudice against the change of policy which events had forced on the Government. And now they were trying to pose as critics of whatever defects there might be, and there were many, in the degree of rearmament which had already been achieved. If it was a sin to have deferred rearmament, it was not for Satan to reprove.

And for what would a war have been fought? We should have been fighting to prevent some 3,500,000 Germans living on the borders between Germany and Czechoslovakia from joining their own kith and kin. But in the last Great War we had fought to prevent people of other races from being dominated and governed and, it may be, oppressed by people of a different race. It was for that reason—it was called the principle of self-determination—that we smashed the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Unhappily at the end of the War the victorious Allies did not carry out that principle thoroughly or justly, and in order to provide what the French military command thought necessary to secure a strong frontier for the new State of Czechoslovakia against Germany, the Allies agreed, in spite of bitter protests, to place a very large number of Germans under the control of the Czechs, whom they had cordially despised and detested for generations. Thus the frontier between the two countries was drawn not by statesmen, but by soldiers—and such frontiers were never likely to be permanent. We should have entered such a conflict with divided hearts and consciences. Our men would have been asked to sacrifice their lives for a principle which none of us could defend—the antithesis of the self-determination for which we had fought 20 years ago.

Of the Government's critics the only logical ones were those who advocate the preventive war. Those critics believed in what was called power politics, a policy in pursuance of which Great Britain has always to take sides against the biggest military power in Europe and intervene to destroy it whenever the occasion seems suitable and there

is a reasonable chance of victory. That policy led up to the Great War of 1914, and had it not been for the intervention of the Prime Minister would have led up to the Great War of 1938.

In any event he believed the doctrine of preventive war—the policy of fighting now in case you may have to fight later on at a greater disadvantage—to be an utterly criminal doctrine, and if that were ever to be British policy he would do his utmost to prevent anybody from supporting it.

The Government would not follow any of these dangerous policies because we were turning away from the old system of power politics. We were going to do what ought to have been done long ago; try to remove the causes of grievances and the feelings of injustice that might still remain, and substitute peaceable and friendly feelings between ourselves and the great German and Italian nations for the acrimonious bickering and friction which the Opposition desired to perpetuate.

He trusted that Britain would take the lead in the policy of reconciliation in Europe, and he felt sure that the working classes would support the Prime Minister's policy, for upon them always fell the brunt of war.

**Lord Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
at Edinburg on October 24th, 1938.**

There may be some who will be disposed to underrate the value of that statement (the Hitler-Chamberlain declaration), but if its spirit can be kept alive and sincerely made, the basis by both sides of mutual approach, may it not turn out to be a larger thing for the world than many doubters are to-day prepared to think? Smuts, speaking 10 days ago, said: "We hope the favourable opportunity now existing will not be allowed to pass without another resolute and determined effort to secure such a settlement. Lost opportunities have been largely responsible for the worsening of European conditions in recent years. The mistake should not be repeated."

I do not hesitate to say that if the German and the British nations could really succeed in reaching understanding it would be the strongest guarantee that could be devised against the dangers to which the world has been brought so close.

I hope indeed that the rectification of frontiers according to the racial distribution of population which is now taking place in Central and South-Eastern Europe may contribute to stability and peace. What we are now witnessing is the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, for which provision was made in the Covenant of the League, but which has never till now been made effective.

But if this country is to play its full part with others in securing peace it must be able to speak with equal weight. One-sided armament and one-sided disarmament are both impossible and give no help to peace. And therefore we must take all measures—already taken months ago by Continental countries—that are essential to our strength and safety. We have no reason to apprehend attack, but if other nations have found it wise to take such measures, it is not for them to reproach us when we follow their example. We have obligations in all parts of the world, which certainly do not diminish, and those obligations we have to meet.

It is sometimes argued by our critics that the policy of his Majesty's Government to work for peace, and the faith in the possibility of their efforts being successful, is inconsistent with the determination to build up the defensive armaments of the country. If you preach peace, it is said, and if you are prepared to rest your efforts upon the belief that others are as sincere as yourselves, what is the sense of spending all these millions in a competitive race of arms.

Such an argument rests upon a complete misconception both of Government policy and of what I believe to be the common sense of the matter. No one would, of course, pretend that any declaration between statesmen can of itself bring a remedy to all our ills. Nor can anyone say for certain—because it is given to no man to foretell the future—whether or not our hopes of peace can be fulfilled, for this depends on many things which are not within our own control. But that it is right to make the attempt, I can have no kind of doubt.

To refuse to make it is indeed in effect to accept the position that war is inevitable, and that therefore it is futile to waste your time and energy on what is foredoomed to failure. I could never take that view. It seems to me a gospel of pure fatalism, and must impel you to strengthen yourself against the certain war by defensive alliances of the old pattern, call them by what name you will. That in present circumstances must in turn lead straight to the division of Europe into antagonistic blocs, and bring more close the catastrophe against which it professes to prepare.

Rather do I hold that there is a growing sense everywhere that war, quite apart from its horror and damage, unsettles more than it settles: and that accordingly there are strong forces at work which will make any country think once and twice before resorting to it.

The world that we desire to see is a world in which all nations may exist side by side, their just rights respected by all, and differences resolved by free discussion. A world in which the men and women and children can live decent lives, no longer haunted by the dread spectre of war, that stalked the world a month ago.

Yet, if we are to succeed in bringing the world into smoother waters, we must face frankly the three possibilities that the future seems to hold. The first is war. The second is an armed peace. The third is a peace of understanding. We wish to escape the first, and we wish to achieve the third; but it may be that, just as Dante made the entry into Paradise through the war of Purgatory, so we, if we are to reach the true peace, have to pass through the stage of armed peace to get there. For let us remember peace will not come, like Christmas, just by waiting for it. Peace is not a passive thing: just as good is all the time an active struggle against wrong, so peace must be an active struggle against the things that make for war.

Our own course is clear. We must lose no opportunity of helping forward, so that they may take substantial shape, the results of the personal contacts established between Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves at Munich. In doing so we shall not abandon old friends in the search for new. But we do intend if we can to improve our own relations with all who are willing to improve their own relations with us, and if we can to work for a general understanding in which all can meet on common ground of mutual tolerance and respect.

**Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the House
of Commons on October 5th, 1938.**

Sir John Simon said the truth of the matter was that the State of Czechoslovakia was created in its original form after the Peace Treaties in defiance of the principle of self-determination.

Yielding to strategic calculations and disregarding the Wilson principle, a decision was reached by which Europe was storing up terrible trouble for herself.

When the Peace Treaties were being drawn up and the lines of frontier were being settled very comforting assurances were given that "the Germans in this area will have in Bohemia exactly the same rights as the Czechs. We should never employ any irritating measures against the German part of the

population. The régime would correspond to that of Switzerland. He continued :

“ It seems to me that it is regrettable that it was not possible to secure a peaceful adjustment of frontiers before this.

References have been very rightly made to Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but it is right to realize how very weak and flimsy that Article really was. I think I shall carry with me the view of Mr. Eden in saying this: The framers of the Treaties of Peace were no doubt aware that some of the frontiers they had drawn might in turn need to be altered. But all they felt they could do was to include in the Covenant Article XIX.

In practice that Article has proved ineffective for any practical result, largely for two reasons. First of all every State must be prepared to let the resolution be passed; a single vote against it, even the vote of the State that is going to lose its territory, would mean that the resolution is lost. The requirement of unanimity in fact has operated to fix and crystallize frontiers which undoubtedly ought to have been readily altered.

The second difficulty is that even if the Assembly could get such a resolution carried unanimously the States concerned would still have to arrive at their own agreement as to what should be transferred and the way in which it should be transferred before revision could be carried out. Lord Lothian has strongly emphasized the point that the League of Nations is not a super State which is able to impose its authority on its members. Therefore, what is involved in the peaceful transference of territory without causing trouble is that the sovereign State should voluntarily and without pressure give up an area which it very naturally would desire to keep.

While I admit that the solution that has been obtained is open to all sorts of challenges and criticisms let us at least recognize the real character of the difficulty to be solved, and how seldom in the history of the modern world it has been solved without war. It is true that the Agreement at Munich was reached under the pressure of the alternative of instant invasion, but is that reason enough for rejecting the Agreement and preferring that Europe should be plunged into war? I do not think so.

If the question is whether we are willing to enter into friendly consultation, in conjunction with France and Italy and Germany,

upon the problems of Europe, then I say most emphatically that it has in fact been a dominant aim of the policy of the Prime Minister and the Government to see whether it is possible, instead of maintaining an unbridgeable gulf for all purposes between democracies and dictatorships, in the interests of European peace for them and us to live side by side.

But if, on the other hand, the question is whether we are contemplating an exclusive Four-Power Pact—I think that that was what my right hon. friend (Mr. Eden) wanted to be reassured upon—which will attempt, in disregard of other States great and small, and without communication with them, to impose its will upon Europe, then I say on behalf of the Government with equal emphasis that that is not, and never has been, the policy of his Majesty's Government.

If outstanding differences are to be resolved it must be on the basis of the free communication with all European Powers. It is certainly important to secure the cooperation of the smaller Powers of Europe. They are always valuable allies for peace. Our object is to buttress and strengthen peace in every way we can, and it does not in the least follow, because you have close contacts with France or Germany or Italy, that this precludes close contacts with other nations too.

We may, I think, disregard those self-confident persons, if such there be, who feel sure that if they had been at Munich they would have handled the matter much better than the Prime Minister. The real test is this: We are at peace to-day. How many among us are there who, if we could, would undo what was then done—would reject the settlement to which the Prime Minister put his hand on Friday and instead—because it was the only alternative—would have flung the world into the cauldron of immediate war? Why, there are some people who are so confident that war will come in the end that they seem to prefer to have the certainty of it now. That is the creed of utter despair.

There are other people who imagine that by loudly threatening war we can escape ever having to fulfil our pledges. That indeed is a very dangerous doctrine. For my part I reject both the doctrine of the inevitability of war and the theory of the effectiveness of bluff. I call upon the House to show its confidence in the policy of the Prime Minister. He has never given up hope, and has thereby started a movement which may have an immense development, which we hope and pray may save the world for peace.

FRANCE AND THE MUNICH AGREEMENT

I.

The Munich Results in the Congress of the Radical Socialist Party at Marseilles.

Extract from the Speech by the French Premier, M. Daladier, on October 27th, 1938.

When we look at the situation in Europe and the world today, what is the fact which dominates all the others—the factor which surpasses in importance and magnitude all other factors? It is this: that peace, that seemed to be lost, has been preserved and that it is in peace that we are called upon to solve all these problems.

I need hardly remind you that, during the last few weeks, this peace has been threatened by many perils. I need not enumerate the events that led up to the European crisis which brought us to the brink of catastrophe or tell you at the cost of what efforts and sacrifices we managed to solve it.

What I would like to repeat once more with all the emphasis at my command is that, for our whole European civilization, our ideal of liberty, our country and for Czechoslovakia herself, the position arising out of the Munich agreements is preferable to that which would exist today if war had not been averted.

As I stated in the Chamber, I perfectly well understood the struggle waged in every French breast during that crisis, as I went through it myself, but today I cannot admit the right of anyone to speak of the capitulation of France. I have weighed up and am fully aware of the consequence of that agreement, but I know that we did not give way to compulsion and that if at Munich I had been presented with an ultimatum and had not been able to make my voice heard and to discuss on a footing of equality, I should have returned to Paris and called upon the nation to resist. The act accomplished at Munich was an act of reason.

Nor do I understand, or rather I understand only too well, the campaign being waged against an agreement which, when it was signed, was ardently desired in all countries by the men and women who, if recourse had been had to brute force, would themselves have paid with their blood and tears. When I try to be guided in my statements by considerations of reason and, ignoring as far as may be both applause and invective, to think only of the permanent interests of the country, I am moved to indignation when

I see how certain people regard these events as a proper subject for polemics.

Am I not justified after all in saying that, when perils were accumulating and the advent of the dreaded event seemed to be a matter of hours or minutes, some who had been and have once more become the protagonists of a policy of firmness amounting to intransigence displayed a wavering purpose, not to put it more strongly. I will admit the right to criticize of those only who can remind me that, during those tragic hours, they told me to go to war rather than agree to any sort of compromise or of those who heard of my departure for Munich without a feeling of relief. What sort of hypocrisy is this which consists in striking attitudes and preaching sermons after the danger is over and in keeping silence and trembling when determination to persist to the end is required?

There is, it is true, one party which can honestly say that it has always been in favour of intransigence even at the risk of war and that it was opposed to negotiation. That party is the Communist Party, which has expressed its attitude of complete opposition by its votes in the Chamber and by its daily insults throughout the country.

The violence and intransigence of that party went far towards paralysing my action. When its newspapers and its speakers discourteously attacked Mr. Neville Chamberlain who was working for the preservation of peace in a spirit of faith which was beyond praise, do you not think that that did not weaken France's position? When they challenged the French Government every other day, was that designed to facilitate our efforts? When they thundered anathemas against Governments with whom we were engaged in most perilous negotiations, did they not by so doing run the risk of hampering those negotiations and precipitating us into war? When they say now that the partial mobilization of our forces was only a means of covering up our retreat, they are deliberately telling the most abominable lie, because, if ever the masses were hoodwinked into believing this to be true, this might make it impossible ever again to have recourse to that measure which, I repeat, largely helped to preserve peace.

We are not taken in by the indictments of the leaders of the Communist Party. While Frenchmen generally responded courageously to their country's appeal and merit the gratitude of the nation, I should like to say that the political attitude of the Heads of the Communist Party was not calculated to support the Government in its policy of firmness, but was designed to wreck that policy and the same applies to those whose deliberate attempts, during those critical weeks, to undermine the morale of the nation were smashed on the rock of the national dignity.

When one wishes the Government to save peace and honour, one does not publicly deny the possibility of its doing so. One does not say that the country is incapable of resistance when it is not true. One does not attack the persons of those responsible for national defence.

We have maintained peace and the dignity of France.

We are resolved to persevere.

Our policy will correspond with the fundamental interests of our country and will be adapted to the realities of the new situation which has arisen.

The fundamental interest of France is the maintenance of her own security. But French security does not consist exclusively in the integrity of our continental frontiers, but is dependent upon freedom of communications between the home country and the Empire.

Speaking here in Marseilles, which is not situated on the edge of France, but lies at the very heart of the French Empire and is in some sort the vital link between France and her colonies, I should like to say that France is an Empire. Beyond her continental frontiers, there lies a vast

zone of security as precious to her as the home country itself, upon which her future to a large extent depends and we regard that zone as inviolable.

This does not mean to say that it constitutes the sole basis of our national future. Far from it France's sphere of influence will always extend beyond her most far-flung borders.

France will continue to make her presence felt everywhere. Everywhere she will associate herself with every effort made for justice and for peace. As I stated in the Chamber, she will endeavour to supplement old friendships with new and resuscitated friendships. She will bring undiluted good-will to bear upon the discussion of all problems. She holds the view that, in so far as each and every country wills to act with prudence and justice, peaceful settlements can be reached wherever disputes arise. As regards her relations both with Germany and with Italy, she is convinced that, so long as both sides are concerned exclusively with the defence of their national interests, agreements can be reached which will contribute in no small measure to the work of strengthening peace. The same applies to the good relations between France and the friendly nations of Eastern Europe.

French diplomacy is based in the first instance on close cooperation between France and Great Britain: cooperation freely chosen, founded on common ideals and interests and grounded in mutual respect and equality. This cooperation does not exclude any other. We are open to all possible understandings. When, in Munich, I heard the heart of the German people beat, I could not help thinking as I had thought at Verdun, in the midst of the war, that, in spite of all difficulties, there were compelling reasons for mutual esteem between the people of France and the people of Germany, which should lead to loyal collaboration.

I have always ardently hoped to see such collaboration. Whatever the differences between their political systems, the two nations who have so often been at grips with one another on the battlefield, should understand that, nowadays, war is never a solution and that it is possible to settle all problems by means of a loyal understanding between the nations.

That is the method whereby we should be able to preserve peace.

We have made sacrifices for that peace, but we do not wish it to be disfigured or represented as the first stage on the road towards renunciation. For that peace put an end to a crisis which had lasted for twenty years. It would have been easier and less costly to do this some years ago. All regrets are however superfluous, provided that the peace which has been saved represents for France at once the end of past errors and the beginning of a new epoch.

Such a decision can only be effective if it rests on the strength of the nation; if, when taken by the Government, it is ratified by the whole people and if the great hope aroused in all hearts is accompanied here and now by the determination of all to work for the common good and to respect the laws of the Republic.

Extract from the Speech by the French Foreign Minister, M. Georges Bonnet, on October 30th, 1938.

"The international crisis virtually existed when the present Government was formed. The problem of German minorities in Czechoslovakia, like so many others, was already acute. It had in fact existed ever since the Treaty of Versailles.

In 1919, during the treaty negotiations, there was a heated discussion concerning the Sudeten Germans. The Social-Democratic Chancellor of Austria, Renner, said at the time, when protesting against the provisions of the treaty: "the Czechs will never be able to absorb the German minority and the German minority will never allow itself to be absorbed by the Czech majority. A focus of civil war will be created in the centre of Europe, which will emit sparks likely to become much more dangerous for the world than was the continual ferment in the Balkans".

Subsequently, heated disputes arose on several occasions between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs, as reported by our Minister at Prague since 1921.

A latent antagonism existed which was inevitably fanned first by the economic and military revival of Germany and then by the Anschluss.

After the Anschluss, Czechoslovakia, surrounded by enemies and cut off as she was in the heart of Europe from Russia, France and Great Britain, was between the jaws of a pair of pincers which might at any time close and crush her.

Immediately upon coming into power the Daladier Government realized that the Czechoslovak question was beginning to assume menacing proportions.

The Anschluss was achieved on March 13th, the Daladier Government was formed on April 10th and on April 24th Henlein made known at Carlsbad the eight points of his programme whereby he claimed a very large measure of autonomy for the Sudeten Germans.

Forewarned and fully realizing the ordeal with which it was faced, the French Government constantly endeavoured to settle these disputes, which no longer concerned Czechoslovakia alone, but were threatening the peace of the world.

It was at once clear to the Government that the first thing to do was to endeavour to bring Great Britain's attitude and our own into line with one another—and that both in the diplomatic field and, for the event of war, in the military field also.

Such an attempt was the more necessary that the British Ministers had frequently voiced England's disinclination to tie her hands with pacts—especially in Central Europe, where the innumerable internal quarrels and the diversity of conflicting nationalities rendered her especially unwilling to give formal undertakings.

We therefore went to London on April 28th and 29th, when M. Daladier delivered, in the presence of our English friends, a speech characterized at once by its clarity and its moving appeal. We succeeded during our conversations, by virtue of the frankness and earnestness of our representation and of the sentiments of friendship for France entertained by Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, in obtaining from Great Britain an undertaking to assist France in settling a question in which she (Great Britain) was under no treaty obligation to intervene.

England's position was defined with admirable clearness on September 28th by the British Prime Minister himself.

I should like to point out that England, in evincing her solidarity with us, does not give France 'carte blanche'. She does not say in effect: "Do what you like and we will follow you blindfold". The British Government has consistently maintained that, though it has clearly defined obligations for the event of a threat to the integrity of France's frontiers and although, in such a case, it is committed to placing its forces at our disposal immediately, that does not apply to Czechoslovakia to which it is not bound by any definite engagement. It is primarily desirous of acting in a mediative capacity and can we ignore the immense step forward which such an offer of mediation implied for us? For the first time, Great Britain agreed to take an active part in the settlement of the Czechoslovak question and afforded to France the assistance needed to enable the maximum effect to be given to our treaty alliance with Czechoslovakia.

Gentlemen, we must remember the circumstances in which our treaty with Czechoslovakia was concluded on October 16th, 1925.

I was a member of the Government at the time and I still remember Aristide Briand forcefully describing the nature of the Locarno Pact which he was bringing us, and of the supplementary agreements—especially that with Czechoslovakia. Briand was speaking in the spirit with which he and all of us were inspired—that of the League of Nations and collective security.

If Czechoslovakia were the victim of aggression, all the States Members of the League, including Italy, Poland and the Little Entente, would have to rally to her assistance.

In 1938 we were faced with an entirely different situation. In the absence of collective solidarity even as between the neighbouring countries, the fate of Czechoslovakia essentially depended on the possibility of her obtaining assistance from France, who was far removed from the Czechoslovak frontiers.

France could thus do nothing effective without the support of England and that support she obtained at the Conference of April 28th, on the strictly defined and limited conditions which I have just mentioned.

M. Bonnet then recalled the crisis of May 21st, the advice given at the time to Czechoslovakia by France, Lord Runciman's mission, the Nuremberg Congress and the sanguinary incidents of September 13th and continued as follows:

"It was then that the French Government thought of an interview between the responsible heads of the Governments concerned and Mr. Chamberlain had the same idea. The next day, in full agreement with us, he went to Berchtesgaden to see the Chancellor of the Reich and his visit raised immense hopes among the nations of the world. Yet there are people with short memories who are asking: 'Why was that done?' The answer is: 'because negotiations had reached a deadlock, war was imminent and it was imperative to act without delay'. During the conversation at Berchtesgaden, the Chancellor informed Mr. Chamberlain that he was prepared to accept a peaceful settlement on the basis of the right of self-determination. Mr. Chamberlain returned to London and asked us to go and see him.

We were in London on September 18th and 19th. At the very beginning of that conference, the British Ministers informed us of the conclusions arrived at by Lord Runciman. There was, in his view, no possibility of conciliation between the Germans and the Czechs. The Sudeten Germans would have to be allowed to determine their own fate: that was the only solution 'as it was vain to hope that Sudeten Germans and Czechs could continue to collaborate in the same State.'

That is the crux of the problem. To deal with this affair of minorities, for which the Covenant of the League of Nations had provided a procedure of amicable settlement, we jointly approved on July 19th the suggestion to send a mediator and I repeat with all the emphasis at my command that all had agreed to such mediation—even those who are today criticizing the fruits of that mediation.

What else could the French Government have done? How, after having based the peace treaties on the right of self-determination of peoples and after having on so many occasions defended that right in the course of her history, could France have refused to apply the principle involved, when its free application had been recommended by the mediator?

We knew moreover that the Czechoslovak Government preferred territorial concessions to a general plebiscite.

We accordingly gave priority to that procedure, but we wished, in order to compensate Czechoslovakia for the painful sacrifice which she was called upon to make, to secure Great Britain's guarantee for her new frontiers and we had some difficulty in obtaining such a guarantee, which cost the British Ministers long and difficult discussions among themselves as to

whether they could or could not commit Great Britain on that point.

The Franco-British plan was accepted by the Prague Government. Czechoslovakia herself realized that the adoption of the plan was the only means of avoiding the forceable intervention of Germany.

It was equally clear that the rejection of the plan would result in England declining to show any further interest in the Czechoslovak question. As the British Prime Minister said in the House of Commons, British public opinion would never have agreed to its Government going to war to prevent the Sudeten Germans from coming under another Government at their own desire.

Mr Chamberlain left for Godesberg on September 22nd in order to inform Herr Hitler of the Franco-British proposals, but you have not yet forgotten those days of stress and strain.

Herr Hitler stated that he desired to occupy the territories with a German minority on October 1st. Mr Chamberlain returned to London. The Czech Government rejected Herr Hitler's memorandum and ordered general mobilization. We paid another visit to London where, once more, we confirmed the complete agreement existing between our British friends and ourselves. On September 27th mobilization was decreed in Germany and the entry of German troops into Czechoslovakia was announced for Wednesday the 28th at 2 p.m.

This time war seemed inevitable, all means of preventing it having been apparently exhausted. Mr Neville Chamberlain himself, whose courage commanded the admiration of all, seemed to have lost all hope.

My friend Aimé Berthod mentioned just now the diplomatic steps which we took during the night of the 27th to the 28th in addition to completing our arrangements for the military security of the country.

Throughout the world, efforts were made to preserve peace. President Roosevelt sent two messages, for which we are profoundly grateful to him.

While our Ambassador, M. François Poncet, handed to the Chancellor the plan drafted by the French Government the previous night—the first plan which was not rejected by Germany, Mr. Chamberlain proposed a Conference of Four, for the acceptance of which Signor Mussolini successfully pleaded with the Chancellor.

The next day came the meeting at Munich.

It was only natural that, once the danger was over, everyone should have resumed his right to criticize and used it to the full.

We have heard a volley of reproaches from men who successively accepted the rearmament of Germany, the occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland zone, the fortification of that zone and the Anschluss of Austria.

Well, I will reply to those reproaches and criticisms.

It has been said that lack of firmness on the part of the French Government was responsible for the failure of the British Government to follow us blindly in this affair. You have had an opportunity, during my speech, of deciding for yourselves that that is very far from the truth. We were determined to carry out our engagements and we said when we formed our Government: "if Germany has recourse to violence in Czechoslovakia, we will not tolerate it, and our sincerity was sufficiently attested by the military measures which we took, and who will deny their scope and value? Those measures were taken at the beginning of August; by September 5th the reservists were occupying the fortified sectors. In a fortnight, 700,000 men and 25,000 officers were called to the colours: the army was more than a million strong.

Was that bluff? To say so would be to insult the French Government.

The Government appealed to the devotion of all its citizens, because it was determined to keep its word and not passively to allow any resort to force.

Our British friends have never been in any doubt as to our determination, as what we have said to them has never varied. Does anyone really believe that the Prime Minister would have gone to Berchtesgaden on the 14th and to Godesberg on the 22nd and mobilized the fleet and technical services of the Air Force, if the British Government had believed that France would stand on one side and that the conflict would be localized?

Great Britain knew that we would oppose the invasion of Czechoslovakia as resolutely as we were seeking a compromise.

Let no-one add to the accusation that France has not kept her word by saying that France allowed herself to be trapped by a German manoeuvre to intimidate her.

When one saw all the documents one after the other, when one thought of the 32 German divisions massed on the Czechoslovak frontier; when one followed in Paris and in London from day to day and hour to hour, not to say from minute to minute, the constantly increasing tension between Prague and Berlin and between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs, one could not doubt that that with which we were faced was war! a lightning war involving the invasion of Czechoslovakia on three fronts and her destruction in a few days.

No-one can deny then that the Munich Agreement, which incorporated the Franco-British plan of London, saved peace.

Let no-one say: 'peace is the easiest thing in the world to have and the thing which can be defended with the least effort.' That is not true.

When every force is loose against peace, it is less difficult, and in appearance more noble, to allow oneself to be entangled in the fatal machinery of war. Statesmen who wish to preserve peace are called upon to make an effort which must be sustained at constant pressure, to put up a very hard fight and often to show signal courage.

But how is this peace, which we have preserved at the cost of so much effort and sacrifice, to be organized?

There are already those who mutter: 'You have only postponed the danger, which will be with you again in a few short months'.

Whether this is so or not depends on France. What should her ideal be? What ought the basis of her policy to be?

We earnestly desire that France may remain the country of liberty and tolerance, where no citizen of good-will is excluded from the national community, whatever his religion or social status."

After testifying to his loyalty to the principles of the League of Nations and discussing the crisis through which the League was passing, M. Bonnet went on to define the bases of France's foreign policy. "The corner-stone of her policy of peace", he said, "is the Franco-British entente: that is to say, friendship between France and Great Britain, of which we were acutely conscious during the crisis, when the French Government was collaborating with the British Government day by day and hour by hour..."

But apart from this traditional friendship, there is the problem of our relations with other Powers. One thing is certain: it is impossible for the nations of Europe to continue to live in the present atmosphere of uncertainty. It is impossible that we should have no other future to offer our children than a still more murderous war than the last.

That is why we hope that the Munich Agreements will lead to a better understanding and a less strained atmosphere. Especially do we desire that normal relations may be established between France and her neighbours. A month ago in the Chamber and yesterday at our Congress, M. Daladier spoke in moving terms of the relations between France and Germany. 'I was conscious of Germany's esteem for France', he said, 'immediately upon my arrival in Munich'. This esteem is founded on the fact that France is known to be prepared to

combat anything which runs counter to her vital interests or to the cause of justice. We hope that loyal cooperation may be found possible between France and Germany and that the fear of a conflict, which would in a very short time destroy all the progress made at such great sacrifice both in Germany and in France, may be removed in both countries.

Normal relations have just been restored between France and Italy. This is a great source of satisfaction to us, as no-one desires more heartily than ourselves the strengthening of the bonds of traditional friendship between Italy and France.

We earnestly hope that the general European detente will have its effect on Spanish affairs. This war, during which the sons of Spain have once more shown such incomparable courage, has already lasted nearly two and a half years. For our part, we remain faithful to the policy which France has pursued for the last 30 months.

We are convinced that the settlement of the conflict which is tearing Spain to pieces will become possible when all foreign volunteers have been withdrawn and the Spaniards are left alone, face to face. Then, we are sure, mediation will be successful and peace will be restored. France, who has always entertained feelings of fraternal solidarity with the Spanish people, will neglect no effort to collaborate with the other nations in the reconstruction of that noble country.

That, in substance, must be our diplomatic policy today.

There is nothing in such a policy that cannot be entirely reconciled with France's especial friendships: viz with the U.S.S.R., Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Belgium.

Thus we believe that the Munich Agreements can and should be the prelude to determined efforts to initiate a peaceful organization of Europe, but this ideal, to which we are passionately attached, can in our opinion only become a reality, in so far as steps are taken to prepare in Europe a better economic organization than that with which she is so pitifully struggling along today.

We must make no mistake however: France will only be able to make her peaceful voice heard in the concert of the nations if she has recovered her whole power and restored her full discipline.

Citizens! Ardently attached to peace as we are, we shall never admit that France should purchase it at the price of the virtual renouncement of her rights or the denial of her traditions".

From the report on French foreign policy by the Senator and former Minister Berthod to the Marseille Congress.

M. Berthod's report contains a review of the September crisis, accompanied by comments on the criticisms passed on the attitude of the French Government.

"We have been told", he said, "of the incomparable value of the Bohemian quadrilateral. 'Who owns Bohemia owns Europe' some exclaimed with Bismarck, while others employed a metaphor which had some success and regretted the destruction of the aircraftcarrier of Soviet Russia which had inserted itself like a wedge into the heart of Germany in the neighbourhood of her big cities—Dresden, Munich, Leipzig and the capital of the Reich.

This whole system has broken down; no-one will deny that. But would it not be better to ask ourselves how much of it still existed long before the Munich Agreement and would it not have been very much better to ask ourselves that question earlier?

Is it so certain that this system corresponded with the true interests of France and with what must be her task and her mission in the world today? And, now that that system no longer exists, should we try to reconstruct it on a fresh basis, as some say, or should we seek to direct the efforts of the nation into a different channel?

This Bohemian quadrilateral! For how many days would it have been able to resist, when the German armies, already in control of Austria, had begun their invasion from the South?

Is it not rather the case that the first step taken by the Czech armies would have been the, at any rate partial, evacuation of

the fortifications in the Sudeten Mountains (that Czech Maginot line on which so much talk has been expended), to avoid being taken in the rear and running the risk of being surrounded?

What real assistance would our agreements, our alliances (all that complicated tissue of conventions and agreements concluded and patiently accumulated by us without sufficient care being taken to reconcile them with one another or to give them some measure of coherence) have brought us in the hour of peril? Would not our ally Poland have attacked our other ally Czechoslovakia or forceably prevented the U.S.S.R.—also allied to us—from intervening, while Yugoslavia prudently abstained from any action and Roumania, like France, racked her brains to find a way of playing the dangerous game of reconciling the claims of contradictory friendships?

The time has come for us to ask ourselves, in the case of every one of our engagements, what essential interests of the country it serves and—more important still—what possibility we have of honouring it, if the need to do so should arise. Certainly France cannot disinterest herself anywhere and certain it is that she cannot renounce any of her friendships; but a friendship is not necessarily a military alliance committing the destiny of the country over long periods without possibility of discussion, regardless of all developments in the structure of the world or changes in the balance of power.

Would it be such a bad policy to follow the British practice of strictly limiting our definite and unqualified engagements to those cases where the vital interests of our country were at stake, while not refusing to intervene elsewhere, if circumstances demanded, though at the same time reserving that right (which no nation can easily forego) of weighing up, before taking action, the importance of the interests at stake, the possibility of obtaining assistance, the position of the armies, the chances and the possible price of victory? Should we be laying ourselves open to the charge of being 'little Frenchmen' and resigning ourselves to the prospect of France 'taking a back seat' if we were to say that for us, as a Western, maritime, African and colonial nation, the development of our magnificent Empire was of more importance than the ungrateful rôle of gendarme—not to say banker—which, in the flush of victory, we imagined we were called upon to play wherever the prestige of our armies allowed us to do so?"

After expressing the opinion that France's commitments must be revised, M. Berthod developed the argument that Munich was not a solution, but a beginning:

"However that may be", he said, "it was in some sort as the hope of a new policy opening up fresh possibilities for the consolidation of peace that the country, in spite of conflicting ideologies and different political institutions, welcomed the meeting at Munich between the heads of the four great Western Powers.

This hope will not be easy of fulfilment. That is a fact which certain speeches which have been made on the other side of our frontiers will not allow us to ignore, but as long as its fulfilment does not appear impossible, we are in duty bound to work for it. Is it not the case that there can be no true peace in Europe as long as a loyal agreement has not been reached between France and Germany? And if, in making war, it is, as I have said, indispensable to come to

an understanding with one's friends, is it not, when making peace, even more indispensable to come to an agreement with one's enemies?

Surely our aim should be simply to endeavour in the first place to solve the most thorny problems on our frontiers with the nations most directly concerned in the sincere hope that, once this first stage has been successfully overcome, it may be possible and easy to arrange more extensive conferences with the other Powers, great and small, and to conclude more general agreements calculated to bring a little more order into the affairs of the world now fallen into such complete chaos. Then, no doubt, it will be possible to give effect to the proposal for an international conference, which is being advocated in so many quarters.

II.

Extract from the Speech by the French Foreign Minister, M. Georges Bonnet at the American Club, in Paris on November 11th, 1938.

"As regards the Munich agreements, I quite understand that, as might have been easily foreseen, once the dangers were past the critics resumed their freedom.

In fact, the Munich agreements are in conformity with the principles expressed by the American Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull in the note which he addressed to the Powers on July 16th, 1937 "recommending the settlement of the problems that arise in international relations by means of negotiations and pacific agreements".

This method was particularly necessary as the incorporation of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia had given rise to strong protests at the Peace Conference. Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State and American delegate, had stated in particular on April 1st, 1919 that the proposed delimitation of the Czechoslovak frontier "was contrary to the spirit of the League of Nations and to the principle of disarmament and was in formal opposition to the policy of the United States which desire a just peace".

I know that our action has been perfectly well understood, with you in particular, by all the men who have the burden and responsibility of government.

The American Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, said on October 5th:

"But we Americans all share the feeling of universal relief that war has been averted.

Can anyone doubt that the will for peace displayed by the world in the last few days has been an active factor in the prevention of the conflict? Today, more perhaps than at any other time during the past twenty years, the nations are given an opportunity of establishing a new world order based on justice and right.

Peace is not negative. It is not simply the momentary abstention from recourse to war. Peace, in its very essence, is positive. Permanent peace can only be achieved by a return of the nations to the following precepts: respect for the pledged word, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, settlement of disputes and revision of treaties, when necessary, by means of pacific negotiations in a spirit of equity rather than by recourse to force or under the menace of force, respect for the rights of other nations.

If it were now possible on such bases to find a solution for all these tragic conflicts which still envenom Europe and the Far East and thus to render less probable in future the outbreak of conflicts, the moral sufferings of an incalculable number of men and women in the last few days will not have been in vain."

Who would not applaud these beautiful and moving words? I am well aware that the American statesmen often ask us to take the step which they consider essential, namely to reach a durable agreement between the various States of Europe.

We have had occasion to state that this is also the desire of the French Government."

III.

Munich and French Foreign Policy in the Opinion of two Frenchmen.

In addition to the above statements by responsible French statesmen, we reproduce below the statements of two Frenchmen representing political and intellectual France, which appear to us to be worth reading on account of their attitude not only to the events of September but also to the German-French problem as a whole, since they deal with it quite frankly and with a clear view of realities and of the mistakes of French policy committed against Germany in past years.

Extract from an Article by the Socialist Deputy Louis L'Heveder in the "Populaire" of October 31st, 1938.

The violent tornado which has swept Europe in connection with the German-Czech conflict has revealed in the working classes and the Socialist Party such disagreement and such disturbances as to impose the task of clarification and a sincere effort of mutual understanding at the present time on all socialists who wish to see their party arrive at clear and practical rules around which it would be possible to group all the sound elements of our national activity for the greatest good of French democracy and peace.

As far as I am concerned, I will speak with complete frankness, as I have already done at Royan.

I have never advocated the so-called "revolutionary defeatism" or the "insurrectional strike in case of war".

A pacific nation may not find in other peoples a desire for agreement corresponding to its own; despite concessions, it may be brutally attacked, brutally invaded, either in its home territory or in its colonies; it may be compelled to defend itself and I have therefore always affirmed my attachment to the principle of national defence.

As a partisan of the simultaneous, progressive and general disarmament of the peoples, I consider on the other hand that it is impossible under present circumstances to recommend the unilateral disarmament of France, which might appear to certain foreign governments, not as an example, but as a temptation.

But, having admitted this, I state categorically that, in view of the terrible progress of war technique, the most legitimate war, even a war of national defence, can no longer be considered by the people who are forced to organise it as anything but a solution of despair.

On these points, I am sure, all Socialists are in agreement and it remains for them to find means of ensuring peace without endangering the integrity of the national territory and without sacrificing the liberty and political independence of their country.

For my part I consider that it is in the direction of a general agreement of all nations, whatever their internal regime, in the international organisation of the distribution of raw materials and trade, in a possible "redistribution" of colonial territories and mandated territories, that it will be possible to find the first elements of that moral disarmament of all peoples which is an essential condition of their material disarmament.

An international conference must be organised and convened as soon as possible for studying and settling all international disputes in a pacific manner.

This conference could of course consider the colonial problem as a whole, and I believe that the vast majority of Frenchmen, though they do not yet accept our ideal of the internationalisation of colonies, since the idea is not yet sufficiently ripe, would on the other hand have no objection to a return to Germany of the territories that were taken from her after the War and which were placed under our mandate.

This conference might also consider certain problems relating to national minorities which, as recent experience has shown, may create a danger of war if they are allowed to get worse without being equitably and peacefully solved in time.

In this connection, without belittling the importance of certain historic, strategic or economic considerations invoked by various nations in order to maintain national minorities under their rule, I would state that these considerations are in my view not predominant and I remain faithful to the principle "of the right of self-determination of the peoples" boldly proclaimed from the platform of the Chamber by Jean Longuet on September 18th, 1919 during the discussion on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.

It would be dangerous to convene a conference with the ulterior motive of sabotaging it by an unyielding attitude or by premeditated demands.

It will be clear to everyone that its success will depend to a very great extent on the relations of France and Germany, and on this point I wish to state everything I think at the risk of upsetting certain prejudices.

For years the foreign policy of France has been dominated by fear of the Germans. Our leaders have remained true to the "traditional policy" of France which consisted, not in trying to find a pacific and tolerable "modus vivendi" with prolific and active neighbours, but in endeavouring to "encircle" them by contracting military alliances with various nations against them, alliances which in modern terminology are called "pacts of mutual assistance".

Our policy thus followed the spirit of Cardinal Richelieu's policy. I have not the feeling that it has served the interests of our country or the cause of peace and, however that may be, the collapse of what imprudent strategists called the "Czechoslovak bastion" has just dealt it a terrible blow.

For these reasons I firmly believe that France must try to come to a direct understanding with the people against which she is in increasing danger of coming to war in future if, by the carelessness of our leaders, we are compelled once more to choose between a general conflagration and a precipitate withdrawal before fresh German demands.

There is no question of our country presenting itself before Germany in the guise of a mendicant. France possesses a rich historical tradition, a high culture, a power of creation and renewal great enough to apply to the great German nation on equal terms and to seek a frank agreement over the flood of misunderstandings, enmity and even hatred which has accumulated between the two peoples for centuries, and also over the ideological divergences of which I do not under-estimate the danger.

It is in this direction and, in my opinion, in this direction only, that France, Germany and European civilisation can find the path of hope and the conditions of their common salvation.

If the policy of Franco-German understanding succeeds it may ultimately create an atmosphere of international concord and detente which will in the long run render useless the pacts of mutual assistance to which our country has given its signature.

Moreover some of these pacts, even at the present time, do not give us any real security, since they are not only incapable of guaranteeing us against war but because their literal application might lead us to contemplate armed intervention for interests which are not ours and for reasons why our public opinion would not properly understand.

I consider that the first duty of the French Government after the Czechoslovak shock should have been to reconsider all these military alliances and to denounce all those which constitute more of a danger than a protection for France.

I declare equally definitely that I cannot in any case accept the idea of a so-called preventive war or a fantastic policy which would consist in hurling us into war with or without reason in order, we are told, to prevent an unavoidable war which would be waged under worse conditions for our country. There is no unavoidable war.

It is more important than ever to keep our nerve and our reason and not to assist the development of war psychosis which goes to the heads of our countrymen like the vapours of inferior alcohol.

Until our pacific efforts succeed, we must bear the very heavy sacrifices necessitated by national defence.

It is only by the unanimous determination of Republican France to declare peace to the entire world and to speak with serenity, without exaggeration and without fear to the peoples who do not yet understand it, that we can find the conditions of a sound and prolonged peace pending the final peace.

Extract from a Speech by the French Author, Jules Romains, at the Congress of the French Union of Ex-Servicemen at Toulouse, on October 30th, 1938.

The crisis of 1914 has left us with a dreadful precedent. It forced many people to the conviction that from a certain moment neither good will nor reason can prevail to prevent a conflict. The last days of September 1938 have, on the other hand, taught us that it is never too late, that an international situation is never desperate and never escapes from the control of the human will, that even a centimetre from the abyss offers sufficient room for escape and therefore that this human will which has so often shown itself determined to bring about war is also capable of preventing it.

But these September days have also brought another revelation which was not counted on to this extent and with such general application. It is a revelation which is in itself a new factor and which cannot fail to make its influence felt in all future reflections and negotiations of statesmen. I mean the attitude of public opinion in all countries at the moment of the greatest tension and the repercussions of the Munich agreement on the masses of all capitals.

This vast movement of joy was followed with bewildering rapidity by deep disappointment and a relapse to black night. This psychological revulsion of feeling occurred almost to the same extent among our British friends and merely corresponded to a feeling which was widespread even before the Munich agreement in the United States and in the various countries that were more or less in sympathy with our cause.

Though such a relapse is surprising and even disturbing from various points of view it is not unexplainable. Public opinion, after feeling almost boundless joy at the immense fact that peace was saved, that war would not break out and that the catastrophe was prevented, calculated the price that had been paid for peace, the extent of the victory which the other side had won without a struggle and the devastation which this victory had brought to the position of Europe and of France. Having once started on the downward slope of disappointment, it is difficult not to take a still darker view of matters. "This exorbitant price has not even procured us peace. On the contrary, we have furnished the enemy of tomorrow with an unbelievable increase in strength, and we have removed what might be the most serious obstacle to his nefarious designs. He will now attack us when it suits him with much greater prospects than before; and we shall no longer have the choice between a war undertaken under the worst conditions and more shameful further disasters."

Now that the waves of enthusiasm and disappointment have succeeded each other in our minds, it is time for reason alone to speak. It is not out of place to consider things as they are. It is a testimony of the respect in which I hold my exceptional audience that I make this investigation without regard for anyone.

In the first place, let us dissipate a first false idea which has recently become widespread in various quarters, especially on the left and extreme left. Were you not told that during the week which ended at Munich, we let ourselves be bluffed, that we gave away much more than was necessary, that if we had said: No! Hitler would have drawn back at the last minute, and that we should have saved peace, Czechoslovakia and our political situation in Europe? All that I know enables me to state that this is not true. Hitler would have marched.

Those who speak in this way must realise what they are asking for in retrospect and what they regret that we did not do. They regret that we have not been at war for the last thirty days. Possibly they are right from the point of view of pure historic realism. Perhaps it would have been advantageous to wage war at that moment. But then they should say so. They should tell it to the people instead of saying that our Governments, i.e. the British and the French, collapsed on account of an imaginary fear. They should say it because it is the truth. The rest is propagandist lies.

Can we affirm that Munich was a success for us? This would obviously be difficult. After reflection I admit that Munich was hard to swallow for our national pride, for our democratic idealism and for our sense of our collective interests. I would even go further and agree that, from one point of view, the matter looks like a capitulation. But what I maintain is that in September 1938 there was no other means except to show criminal indifference by playing with the lives of millions of men, and with the fate of the country and of civilisation.

The mistakes were not made in September 1938, but go much further back. It would be an unending task to enumerate them and I have no intention of doing so. But it is essential that the most important of them and those which have had the greatest influence on recent events should be present to our minds. I mention merely as a reminder the mistakes of the peace treaties. They should, however, not be overlooked. In particular it should not be forgotten that Czechoslovakia, in the form in which it was created, was one of the mistakes of these treaties, and a mistake with very little prospect of being rectified of itself. Although the Czechs had formally promised autonomy to the nationalities—which was unfortunately not imposed upon them in the treaty itself—they had no desire to grant such autonomy, as was proved by their hesitations and pretexts which still continued twenty years later in spite of the evidence of the German peril and in spite of the advice which we showered upon them. They flattered themselves that they could assimilate these nationalities. This was a chimera.

In addition, there were the mistakes of our behaviour towards Germany. I am entitled to speak of them, for I have denounced them for fifteen years. There were two policies which could be defended against vanquished Germany: one was the Machiavellian policy of cynical realism which would have consisted in keeping Germany weak and under guardianship by every possible means. There was another policy, which was in harmony with the principles and the reasons for which so many men died and in conformity with the spirit of the League of Nations of which we gladly flattered ourselves to be the champions, namely to accomplish the material and moral promises of peace; to seek sincerely reconciliation with the German people; after disarming them to disarm in our turn; to prove that we had not lied in proclaiming the era of definitive peace; to proceed to a reasonable and prudent revision of the injustices contained in the peace treaties under the aegis of the League of Nations whose authority would thus have grown unceasingly instead of having appeared too often in its best years as a legal rhetorical shield behind which we practised a shameful imperialism; to institute close economic cooperation between the peoples, victors and vanquished, on the continent and in the colonies; to prepare a free and fraternal European federation of which we should have had the merit of being the initiators.

Of these two policies—and I do not need to tell you that I would prefer the second—we followed neither. We followed incongruous and discontinuous parts of both. We were weak without being generous. More than once we gave the impression that we were lacking in sincerity. With groans we allowed concessions to be dragged from us, and this meant that they were useless and even dangerous for us because nothing was obtained in return. We favoured conditions in Germany that were bound to provoke a national movement of rising and revenge which we had not the energy to stop while we still had the power to do so. Having found it natural that Germany should adopt the regime which our behaviour towards her had rendered inevitable, we did not understand to come to an agreement with her at a time when we could do so not only on an equal footing but even with a margin of considerable superiority.

I am always struck by the silence that reigns in France regarding the note of April 17th, 1934, so famous among well-informed people, which, in the opinion of all those who are acquainted with the affairs of Europe, is one of the capital mistakes of French policy for the last twenty years. I say policy and not diplomacy. For once—and it was not the only time—diplomacy leaned to the right side. I have seen flegmatic diplomatists grind their teeth in rage at the thought of the stupidity of this note. Perhaps the silence under which it has been buried is due to the fact that a number of eminent men of different parties were considered jointly responsible for it. In short, this note was a reply to a proposal by Chancellor Hitler who had at that moment scarcely started the rearmament of Germany and who had not yet openly released himself from the clauses of the treaty. The Chancellor offered us a reciprocal limitation of armaments while leaving us a substantial margin of superiority and asking us to choose for ourselves the method of control which we wished to have applied reciprocally. It was at that time that Chancellor Hitler said to one of his intimates: "Some day I may have my statue on the bank of the Rhine with the words on the pedestal: To the founder of Franco-German friendship."

In the light of present events, I do not need to show how many fears, useless sacrifices and paralysing crises such a pact would have spared our country and Europe, or how our refusal of it without discussion placed us in a bad moral position. In April 1934 we replied that France preferred to guarantee her own security. "Very good", said Hitler, "I will also look after my own. The French have just proved that all their talk about disarmament was not meant seriously. They will see." And we have seen.

But now, gentlemen, on the morrow of Munich, what shall we do? What prospects remain for us? The problem is not difficult to state. How shall we permanently avoid a general war? How shall we prevent France from slipping to a lower rank? All the rest is secondary.

A system that we had worked on for a long time has collapsed. The Leagues of Nations practically no longer counts. We killed it ourselves at the end of 1935. Our alliance in the centre and east of Europe are disappearing into thin air. Our possible adversary is stronger than ever.

Our alliances—I do not speak of England which has been our only solid and effective ally since the war—our alliances and semi-alliances have cost us dear and brought in very little. They have cost us many milliards, many responsibilities and embarrassments and much danger. They have prevented us from proceeding to the necessary revision of the peace treaties, and they are certainly partly to blame that we have such difficulty in finding the right way to talk to Germany.

THE RECOGNITION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE BY ENGLAND AND FRANCE ON NOVEMBER 16TH AND 19TH, 1938

After the House of Commons had authorised the British Government on November 3rd, 1938 by 345 votes to 138 to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16th, 1938 into force (see in this connection Mr. Chamberlain's great speech of November 3rd), it was brought into force by means of a declaration signed by the Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano and the British Ambassador Lord Perth.

"Whereas a protocol was established between the Italian Government and the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on April 16th, 1938 regarding questions of interest to both countries,

Whereas the agreements and declarations annexed to this protocol were signed on that date by the Government mentioned,

Whereas this protocol provides that the agreements mentioned are to come into force on a date fixed jointly by the two Governments,

The Undersigned, authorised by their Governments to this effect, declare that the agreements and declarations contained in the protocol in question come into force today."

This declaration was preceded by the handing in of the new letters of credit of the Ambassador, Lord Perth, on which the following protocol was established:

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Galeazzo Ciano, received the British Ambassador, Lord Perth, who informed him officially that his Government had decided to recognise Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia. For this purpose he handed to him, for transmission to his August Ruler, the new letters accrediting him the Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Great Britain to His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia.

Count Galeazzo Ciano took note of the communication and requested Lord Perth to transmit to the Government of His Majesty the King of Great Britain the expression of the Fascist Government's appreciation of this step."

Exchange of Telegrams between Mussolini and Chamberlain.

"At the moment of the entry into force of the Agreement of April 16, which placed on a firm and lasting basis the relations of friendship and collaboration between our two countries, I wish to renew to you the expression of my satisfaction and of that of the Fascist Government, and to send you personally my friendly and cordial good wishes. Mussolini"

"I am deeply grateful to your Excellency for the message in which you have courteously expressed your satisfaction and that of the Italian Government at the entry into force of the Agreement of April 16.

Like you, I am convinced that with these Agreements we have once again placed the relations between our two countries on a basis which will permit them to work together in friendship for the good of all peoples.

I am grateful to your Excellency for the personal expression of good wishes which you have addressed to me, and which I cordially reciprocate. Chamberlain."

The recognition of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia by the French Government took place on November 19th, 1938, when the newly appointed Ambassador to the Quirinal, M. François Poncet, handed to King Victor Emmanuel III the note accrediting him as French Ambassador to the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia.

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK-HUNGARIAN DISPUTE

The Arbitral Award of Vienna of November 2nd 1938.

The Text of the Decision.

"In pursuance of the request made by the Royal Hungarian and the Czechoslovak Governments to the German and the Royal Italian Governments to settle by arbitration the outstanding question of the areas to be ceded to Hungary, and in pursuance of the notes exchanged on the subject between the Governments concerned on October 30th 1938, the German Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, Count Galeazzo Ciano, have today met at Vienna and, after a further discussion with the Royal Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Koloman von Kanya, and the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Franz Chvalkovsky, have given the following arbitral award in the names of their Governments:

1. The areas to be ceded by Czechoslovakia to Hungary are marked on the annexed map. The demarcation of the frontier on the spot is confided to a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission.

2. The evacuation of the ceded territories by Czechoslovakia and their occupation by Hungary begins on November 5th and is to be concluded by November 10th. The individual stages of the evacuation and occupation together with other details are to be fixed by a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission.

3. The Czechoslovak Government will take care that the ceded territories are left in an orderly condition on evacuation.

4. Individual questions arising out of the cession of territory, in particular questions relating to nationality and options, are to be settled by a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission.

5. Likewise, detailed provisions for the protection of persons of Magyar nationality remaining in the territory of Czechoslovakia and of persons of non-Magyar nationality remaining in the ceded territories are to be agreed upon by a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission. This Commission will take particular care that the Magyar national group in Pressburg is given the same position as the other national groups.

6. In so far as the cession of territories to Hungary involves disadvantages and difficulties of an economic or transport character for the territory remaining with Czechoslovakia, the Royal Hungarian Government will do everything possible, in agreement with the Czechoslovak Government, to remove such disadvantages and difficulties.

7. Should any difficulties or doubts arise in the execution of this arbitral award, the Royal Hungarian and the Czech Governments will immediately consult with each other. Should they be unable to reach an agreement on any question, such question will be submitted to the German and Royal Italian Governments for final decision.

Vienna, November 2nd 1938.

Sd. Joachim von Ribbentrop. Sd. Galeazzo Ciano.

A Protocol to the Arbitral Award.

A protocol to the arbitral award was concluded and signed not only by the arbitrators but also by the Foreign Ministers of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It reads as follows:

"In pursuance of the request made by the Royal Hungarian and the Czechoslovak Governments to the German and the Royal Italian Governments to settle by arbitration the outstanding question of the areas to be ceded to Hungary, and in pursuance of the notes exchanged on the subject between the

Governments concerned on October 30th 1938, the German Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, Count Galeazzo Ciano, have today met at the Belvedere Castle at Vienna and given the desired arbitral award in the names of their Governments.

For this purpose they have invited to Vienna the Royal Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Koloman von Kanya, and the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Franz Chvalkovsky, in order to give them an opportunity in the first place again to explain the point of view of their Governments.

This arbitral award, together with the map mentioned in paragraph 1, has been handed to the Royal Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs. They have taken cognizance of it and have again confirmed, on behalf of their Governments, the statement which they made on October 30th 1938 that they accept the arbitral award as a final settlement and that they undertake to carry it out unconditionally and without delay.

Done in the German and Italian languages in quadruplicate.
Vienna, November 2nd 1938.

v. Ribbentrop. Count Ciano. v. Kanya. Chvalkovsky.'

The Proceedings at the Meeting.

At the beginning of the meeting the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop spoke as follows:

"I have the honour to welcome you in Vienna on behalf of the Reich Government. I greet in particular the Foreign Minister of Fascist Italy, my friend Count Ciano, together with the Foreign Ministers of the Kingdom of Hungary and of Czechoslovakia.

The Kingdom of Hungary and Czechoslovakia have appealed to the arbitration of Germany and Italy regarding the frontier delimitation between their two countries. The Government of the Reich and the Royal Italian Government have responded to this appeal. The Italian Foreign Minister and myself have met here today in order to reach this decision. I regard it as of particular symbolic importance that Italy and Germany can devote themselves to this lofty and responsible task, especially in this house of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Two hundred years ago this Prince of Italian race and German statesman and general brought freedom, peace and justice to the peoples of the South East of Europe.

It is our task today to fix the definite frontier between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on a ethnographical basis and to find a solution for the questions connected with it. The arbitral award given by us is binding and final and is recognised in advance by Hungary and Czechoslovakia as a definite settlement. The standpoint of the two Governments is already known to us in essential points from the negotiations which have been carried on. I nevertheless consider it advisable that the representatives of the two Governments should briefly summarise and explain their attitude to the question, so that all the arguments may be carefully weighed before the arbitral award is given. Before asking the representatives of the two Governments to speak, I would first call upon the Italian Foreign Minister."

Count Ciano then made the following speech:

"I have the honour to greet you most cordially on behalf of the Fascist Government. I express my sincere thanks to my friend von Ribbentrop, the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the cordial reception given me in Vienna. The Rome-Berlin axis, in acting as a court of arbitration at the request of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments, has set itself the aim of making a further important contribution to the efforts already made for the peace and reconstruction of Europe.

I am sure that our efforts will be crowned with success and that the Vienna meeting will lead to a new order and a new era in Central Europe on the basis of that international justice which we have always striven for and desired."

A German-Italian Declaration.

Vienna, November 2nd. (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro). In the Belvedere, in which the German-Italian Court of Arbitration gave its award on Wednesday, the following joint declaration was made by the German Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, Count Galeazzo Ciano, to the representatives of the German and foreign press:

"The Rome-Berlin axis has today acted as a successful arbitrator in an international dispute of great importance and extraordinary complexity. It has thus again proved itself to be a factor of peace and order in European politics. In this South-East European area the injustice of the treaties of 1919 resulted in a permanent source of disturbance. This state of affairs has now been brought to an end by the impartial arbitral award given by the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy after carefully hearing the two parties and discussing the matter.

The arbitral award has arisen out of the spirit of mutual friendship between Italy and Germany and the sense of responsibility for the peace of Europe.

We hope that the relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia will now be re-established in the spirit of peaceful and good-neighbourly cooperation, and this will be all the more possible as the new epoch in the relations between the two countries is based on the principle of complete justice."

The Concluding Speeches.

Vienna, November 2nd. (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro). After the announcement of the arbitral award and the subsequent signature of the protocol, the Reich Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, stated in a concluding speech that the Italian Foreign Minister and himself, after carefully considering all the matters of importance for the questions in dispute, had fixed the frontier in such a way as, in the opinion of the arbitrators, to constitute a just settlement. He hoped that conditions in this area would develop in the sense of complete appeasement in which the two countries could live in a spirit of true friendship and good-neighbourly relations with each other.

The Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, added to Herr von Ribbentrop's words his sincere thanks for the cordial reception which he had received in Vienna and expressed his satisfaction that on this occasion also the Rome-Berlin axis had again proved its value in the sense of the stabilisation and appeasement of conditions. After careful consideration the two arbitrators had found a solution, of the objectiveness and justice of which they were convinced. It was now for Hungary and Czechoslovakia to draw the practical consequences in the sense of stabilisation and cooperation in order thus to serve the peace of Europe, to which the Rome-Berlin axis had on this as on other occasions furnished a substantial contribution.

Thereupon the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop, closed the meeting.

The New Frontiers.

The following is the literal text of the unofficial communication relating to the drawing of the new frontiers:

The new State frontier between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Czechoslovak Republic as fixed by the arbitral award of the German and Italian Foreign Ministers given at Vienna on November 2nd is roughly as follows:

Starting from the old State frontier south of Pozsony (Pressburg), the new frontier crosses the Pozsony-Érsekújvár (Neuhäusel) railway line at Cseklész, then runs north from the railway line, and, north-west of Érsekújvár, branches off to the north-east until it reaches the railway line Léva-Zólyom (Lewenz-Altsohl) north of Verebély (Vrable). East of Léva, the new frontier crosses the Ipoly territory and runs about 30 kilometres north of the former frontier. It then turns sharply to the north

above the Losonc-Rimaszombat (Lucenec-Gross-Steffelsdorf) line (which towns are thus also restored to Hungary) and then north-east to include the town of Jolsva, when it branches off to Rozsnyo (Rosenau) and closely follows the Niederzips frontier territory.

From here it turns north again, includes the town of Kassa (Kaschau) and then runs south-east for about 30 kilometres, reaching the former Hungarian frontier near the railway junction of Sátoraljaujhely. The new frontier then runs due east turning north at a point immediately above the town of Ungvár (Uzhorod), which now once more belongs to Hungary to drop sharply to the south-east and then run immediately to the north of Munkács (Munkatsch). North-east of the Roumanian frontier, it runs south-east, reaching the former State frontier at the railway station of Halmi on the Roumanian border.

Of the towns under dispute, Slovakia receives Pozsony as its capital, and also the old bishopric of Nyitra (Neutra) and Russinsko (Ruthenia) receives Nagyszöllös with the neighbouring villages. Hungary receives the towns of Érsekijvár, Léva, Losonc, Kassa, Ungvár and Munkács.

It is stated in the last paragraph of the communication that, under this frontier settlement, the whole territory settled by Hungarians returns to Hungary. Where in view of special circumstances it was impossible to draw an exact ethnographical frontier, the interests of both parties were carefully considered.

The Hungarian Foreign Minister Kolomon von Kanya on the arbitral award of Vienna.

Extract from the speech in the Hungarian Parliament on November 12th, 1938.

"The Vienna Conference met on November 2nd. The arbitral award, as we know, restored to us about 12,600 square kilometres with a population of 863,000 according to the 1910 census or, according to the 1930 census, 1,030,000.

In the light of this result, I will now endeavour to examine the extent to which it has been possible to achieve the fulfilment in practice of those principles which we adopted as our guide when these extremely difficult negotiations were set on foot.

As has been stated, the Government regarded the most rapid possible settlement of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak negotiations as its principal task.

We were able to achieve the reduction of the maximum period of three months, laid down in the Munich Supplementary Protocol for the termination of the negotiations, to about six weeks.

We held fast to the principle that we could not tolerate any such departure from the procedure adopted on the occasion of the settlement of the German and Polish minorities problems as would constitute discrimination against Hungary. We protested whenever any attempt was made to adopt any but ethnical considerations when seeking a solution of the dispute. We managed to carry our point that the settlement should be based on the 1910 Hungarian statistics. It is a matter of common knowledge that the situation obtaining in that year was adopted as a basis for the settlement of the Sudeten German question.

We have never abandoned our principle that durable peace in this part of Europe can only be assured by the uncompromising application of the principle of self-determination.

We have solved the question peaceably. The Hungarian Government drew up its demands after careful and detailed study and we should consequently have been the last to shrink from maintaining them by means of a plebiscite. We never for a moment doubted that such a plebiscite would be favourable to us and, as this method could not be employed in view of the opposition of the other side, we entrusted the solution of the dispute with the utmost confidence and assurance to the German-Italian Court of Arbitration which did in fact grant nearly 90 per cent of our demands. The proof of the justification of

our demands thus furnished is all the more compelling, as the arbitrators naturally attached the greatest importance to the necessity of arriving at an impartial decision based exclusively upon principles of concrete justice. There are many, including myself, who maintain that it was necessary, in the interests of a definite settlement, to make onerous sacrifices, but we made those sacrifices in the hope that the Vienna award would herald the dawn of a happier epoch in this part of Europe and enable the nations who have for centuries been settled here to live in peace together—and withal to find ways and means of establishing close collaboration with one another.

We for our part were always most ready to do everything in our power to further this object.

We do not desire to dominate other nations, but with them to serve human progress and European peace.

There can be no doubt, as I believe, that our international position has improved as a result of our ability to procure an increase of territory by peaceful means, whereby the approved foreign policy pursued by successive Governments in the course of years was tested in the hour of trial and not found wanting, while our existing friendships remained unshaken.

During the recent months of crisis, we have had experience of the active sympathy of the 'axis Powers'—Germany and Italy—as also of our old friend Poland."

Hungary and the Rome-Berlin axis.

From a conversation between the Premier, Dr. v. Imrédy and the editor Virginio Gayda on November 17th, 1938, published in the "Voce d'Italia", the Sunday edition of the "Giornale d'Italia".

In the sphere of foreign politics at any rate, we can say that the hostility to Hungary displayed by the Little Entente has become much less intense. The dynamic power generated by the Italy of Mussolini and the Germany of Hitler has been responsible for this change. That can in any case be accounted a benefit from our point of view, but neither that circumstance nor the increase in territory can have any effect on our policy. Our policy reposes, now as before, on the Rome-Berlin axis and, if there is any change to be noted, it is that we are taking our stand more resolutely than ever on the policy of that axis. Sentimental considerations have, as a result of the events of the past few months, been reinforced by the bonds of gratitude.

Hungary was perhaps the first country to take up the struggle against Bolshevism and Hungarian policy has, under the wise régime of Nicholas v. Horthy, never once swerved a hair's breadth from that path or lent itself to any bargain or compromise with Communism. The anti-Bolshevist attitude which forms the ideological link between the two axis Powers still commands complete recognition, appreciation and approval in Hungary. A strong nationalist spirit, cultivation of the military virtues and love of race are characteristic features of Hungarian national life, all of which, with the necessary adaptations in each case, are regarded as the fundamental principle of the Fascist and National-Socialist Powers. The tenacity and sense of responsibility with which the two powerful and friendly powers tackle and solve these questions—the manner in which the problem of the territory inhabited by Hungarians but belonging to Czechoslovakia has been discussed and settled in a few days, although we had been knocking on the door in vain for 19 years without being able even to get the question placed on the Agenda of the League under Article 19 of the Covenant: all this cannot but reinforce with feelings of gratitude and admiration the bonds which hold us to these two great Powers.

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PAN-AMERICAN UNION AND PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCES

I.

Reflections on the VIIIth Pan-American Conference at Lima.

The bright little publications of the "Bulletin of the Pan-American Union", on a cursory perusal, give the impression rather of a business prospectus. There are advertisements, pictures of business firms, and on the first page of each number will be found the same text enumerating objects of an economic character which are, as it were, offered on advantageous terms. When translated into political terms, the meaning would be somewhat as follows: "Dear Sirs, we have at the present time an excellent Treaty of Friendship to offer which, in view of the strained relations between your country and the neighbouring country, is of special value to your Government as offering an excellent means of returning to normal relations. As you are aware, the X Government has already been supplied by us and has been well pleased. We enclose testimonials, etc., etc."

The Americans, with their usual moderation, will probably approve such an attitude. Economic affairs have always come first with them, and why should the political relations between States which do not carry the "ballast of a millennial past" be settled on substantially different terms from economic questions which are really of paramount importance.

But the celebrations with which the conferences of the Pan-American Union have been opened show that the moderation in views in this particular case is neither intended nor applied. It comes to grief on the fact that not only the Anglo-Saxons are concerned but also the Latin-Americans.

The best explanation of the first impression of moderation in dealing with matters must therefore be attributed simply to the fact that the original task of the Union was to settle economic questions. The idea of a "Customs Union" developed into the "Commercial Bureau of the American Republics", and was subsequently further extended, while becoming less definite, into an "International Bureau of the American Republics". It was only at the Fifth American Conference in 1923, the first to be held after the War, that the Union was represented as an association of the American States to attain cultural, intellectual and social aims, and finally it has become popular in recent times, though not without violent resistance, to place the purely political significance in the foreground and to speak of an "American League", as opposed to the "Geneva League".

We deal below in greater detail with this development. Even if it were found to be inadvisable to speak of a central trade agency, it cannot be denied that the respectable list of

67 treaties and conventions gives evidence of a "good firm". The American Journal of International Law (April 1938) gives an excellent summary which we reproduce below. It relates to collective and regional agreements concluded exclusively between American States.

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When President Monroe on December 2nd, 1823 proclaimed the principle that the Latin American Republics which had just gained their freedom by a national rising against Portugal and Spain, should no longer be the subject of colonisation by European Powers and that this would be guaranteed by the United States, the foundations seemed to be laid for a mental and political development of the two Americas in complete solidarity of their interests. This spirit also prevailed at the first Pan-American Conference held at Panama in the year 1826 at the suggestion of Simon Bolivar, the great American champion of liberty. It met with no success as very few States attended it. The next few years showed that the separating factors far outweighed the common interests between the Union and the Latin American Republics. The efforts subsequently made by a number of American Presidents to follow the spirit of 1823 by promoting in particular economic and commercial relations between North and South America met with no success. For a number of years no Pan-American Conference had been convened, when in 1889 a Conference of this kind again met at Washington and substantially changed the position of the United States in the world. For they proceeded to advance from the phase of a colonising conquest of their own continent to that of an imperialistic extension of their power.

Nothing seemed more natural than to apply this extension of power in the first place to the black republics of South and North America. But this necessarily involved a fresh interpretation of the Monroe doctrine and in 1895 the formula was adopted that the sovereignty of the United States no longer extended to North America alone, but (with the exception, however, of Canada) to the entire American continent. This new doctrine was soon followed by practical politics and, with the growth of American power, the pressure of the big brother in the north was increased from year to year, while during the period of "dollar diplomacy" and the "policy of the big stick" under Presidents McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt and Taft, the relations between North and South at times went almost as far as open enmity.

All the decisions of this Conference of 1889 merely remained on paper since they were not ratified, and the only tangible result was the foundation of the Bureau of the American Republics, which was subsequently given the name Pan-American Union and was endowed by Carnegie with a magnificent palace in Washington.

The Conferences held since 1889 have avoided bringing the differences to a crisis and have, in spite of everything, kept alive the Pan-American idea.

The War naturally brought about a great change in this connection. But Wilson did not succeed in leading America away from her old policy into a new path in respect of Latin America, and his successor, Mr. Coolidge, coined the famous saying that American sovereignty existed wherever there was an American citizen. President Hoover by his good-will journey to South America was the first to prepare the ground for the new policy of good neighbourliness which Franklin D. Roosevelt took as his guiding principle.

Before the War the main task of the Pan-American Union lay in the solution of purely economic questions, to which were added in the course of time problems relating to the social and intellectual development of the American continent. The Union had, moreover, always stressed the fact that it would not place any political questions on its agenda. Though it is true that in the course of its early past the Pan-American Union attained considerable results in the adjustment of economic interests and the inter-State coordination of social and cultural institutions, it is equally true that political questions also played a part in these Conferences. For they constantly dealt with questions of international law, especially with the settlement of disputes. The apparent contradiction in the American statement that the Union held aloof from political issues is no doubt mainly due to the view generally held in America that law and politics have no connection with each other and that therefore questions of international law did not represent political activity.

Questions which in the European view are definitely political in character played a predominant part at the Pan-American Conferences after the War. This was mainly due to two general tendencies of development. The economic liberation of the South and Central American States was substantially promoted by the War and strengthened the tendencies towards independence existing in these countries in respect of the big brother in the North. The second main tendency was supplied by the establishment of the League at Geneva and its organs, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Labour Office. A number of South American countries acceded to the League of Nations, some giving their cooperation solely to the League but not to its organs; some took part in the work of the International Labour Office while others who were regarded as non-Members of the League nevertheless signed obligations aiming at international peace, such as the Kellogg Pact.

These two tendencies show the lack of uniformity and difficulty in the foreign policy of the American States and also the new problems which arose out of over-lapping obligations for the maintenance of purely American peace. It was unavoidable that, in the course of time, this dual membership of the Pan-American Union and of the League should make itself felt and this connection played a predominant part until the last Conference at Buenos Aires.

Of the American States it was the United States themselves who took the initiative of increased cooperation with the Latin-American States, and it may also be noted that, in particular with the entrance into office of the present American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a new era of Pan-Americanism was inaugurated by the President's announcement on March 4th, 1933 of the policy of "good neighbours". The United States had already removed a considerable number of barriers in order to attain this object and had thus dispelled the former justified mistrust. Shortly after he came into office, President Roosevelt showed by deeds that he did not intend to follow

the policy of his predecessors in respect of American influence. The first step in this direction was the treaty with Cuba on May 29th, 1934, in which the United States agreed to the annulment of the Platt amendment and thus abandoned any interference in the internal affairs of the island republic. There was also the agreement with Haiti concluded on July 24th, 1934, under which the American training officers and the American naval forces were withdrawn from Haiti. To this category also belongs the above mentioned treaty regarding the Philippines. Mention may also be made of the treaty with Panama of March 2nd, 1936, which restored the sovereignty and independence of Panama while preserving American interests.

Lastly, by the conclusion of commercial treaties with Brazil, the Argentine and some smaller States, President Roosevelt was able to attenuate the deep-rooted suspicion of the United States which still exists in South and Central America and thus to create the economic conditions for political cooperation.

All this showed that Roosevelt seriously meant his message to Congress in January 1934, when he solemnly announced the end of "dollar diplomacy" and American interventionism.

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This preparatory work, which the rest of the continent was able to regard as practical proof of an active new policy in the direction of Pan-American community, though it fell in with Roosevelt's intentions of uniting all American interests in a large-scale economic and pacific policy, nevertheless did not enlighten the participants as to the question—which was also of the greatest importance to the rest of the world—whether the American continent would in future remain aloof from non-American affairs. This question might be supplemented by a number of variations. For instance, will the League of Nations be able to count in future on the cooperation of America? Will any ultimate success be attained by certain American tendencies which regard an American League of Nations as a more effective means of securing general peace?

The isolation from other continents is really a question for America as to the maintenance of the present policy or the inauguration of a new policy in respect of importance economic and political interests. The accession to the League of Nations by most of the South American States after the War meant political support for these States as against the United States. This measure of precaution, moreover, has not lost its meaning as a result of Roosevelt's new policy. The American members of the League of Nations have, it is true, had increasing cause for feeling a grievance against the League in the course of recent years. But the withdrawal which some of them decided upon ultimately depended on the question as to what the attitude of the United States would be. In fact the cooperation of that Power in the League in the future remained entirely unsettled. Though the United States reserved freedom of action in respect of steps taken by the League, they had nevertheless in course of time become an important co-worker. The Kellogg Pact inaugurated this cooperation; the effect of American declarations on the Disarmament Conference will also be remembered; the Hoover Government moreover dealt with the Leticia dispute conjointly with the League; later the United States sent their delegates to the international Labour Conference, and lastly it is significant that President Roosevelt recommended accession to the Permanent Court of International Justice. It was therefore possible to speak of a constantly growing cooperation on the part of the United States.

Nevertheless the policy of the United States was not uniform in this connection. This is best shown by the difference in the treatment of the last two inter-American conflicts. As mentioned above, the United States cooperated with the League of Nations in the Leticia conflict between Colombia and Peru. In the Chaco conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia, however, in which the differences and conflicting interests were immeasurably greater, the United States accepted the invitation to cooperate with the

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay and worked out the protocol of June 12th, 1935 to end the war at the Peace Conference of Buenos Aires without the League of Nations.

It is only after this time, and not least as a result of this success but also of the events of the Italo-Abyssinian war, that there are signs—in particular the neutrality laws of August 23rd, 1935—of a more uniform policy of the United States representing a withdrawal from non-American affairs and a greater emphasis of American community. It may be observed in passing that this tendency was promoted by economic interests and that this policy is to be regarded not least in the light of the increasing economic participation of Japan and Germany in the South American markets.

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Some details may be given of the policy and work of the Union in connection with the eighth Pan-American Conference which opens on December 9th at Lima.

The American Under-Secretary, Mr. Sumner Welles, according to a report of November 7th, 1938 from Washington, in speaking of this Conference, said that it would have an extraordinarily important character. The world situation made it more necessary than ever before to exclude any trace of misunderstanding between the American republics. The United States Government had a permanent and growing interest in the general programme of inter-American cooperation. The consultative system created at Buenos Aires must be strengthened; this was a vital point for all American nations. American freedom, independence and future welfare might depend on the maintenance of American solidarity.

The necessary steps would, he said, be taken to place the United States in a position to defend themselves at all times against any aggression and to be prepared to join with their democratic friends in the New World so that this hemisphere might be spared any menace.

The question arises whether inter-American policy at this Conference will show any great change. Will it create an American League of Nations in accordance with the proposal already made by the Dominican Government which—it is an open secret—was inspired by the United States? The putting of such questions implies standing in the midst of the political tension which at present exists between North and South America, with the exception of Canada. Little notice has been taken, and little comprehension has been shown, of the fact that certain South American States, whose League policy is almost identical with that of Chile, have not drawn the same conclusion and turned their backs on the Geneva League. The explanation is not far to seek. It is to be found in three ideas: the desire for independence, the rejection of Imperialism and the new American Monroe doctrine. Every Latin American State thinks in this connection of the great northern neighbour, the United States. This is the case even today. As a rule their adherence to the League has no other foundation than the desire to counterbalance the influence of Washington.

It would be wrong to exaggerate this difference. In many respects there have been improvements in the relations between North and South America.

On the other hand, however, there can be no question of a completed development. It may merely be pointed out that—partly as a result of the political tension in Europe—it has been shown by the speeches of North American statesmen how glad they would be if the Monroe doctrine could be revived in a somewhat modernised form. But the South American States will not give up their connection with Europe, especially in respect of their commercial relations. The reaction of the United States to the "Japanese Monroe doctrine" shows, however, to what extent the era of imperialism still persists, in which the South American States cannot have any interest.

These are in main lines the boundaries of Pan-Americanism. But within these boundaries a great field of cooperation remains open and the Pan-American Union has become in the course of time the great regulator of American affairs.

II.

Review of the Pan-American Conferences.

An excellent summary of the work of the first six Pan-American Conferences is to be found in the Inter-Parliamentary Bulletin, the organ of the Inter-Parliamentary Bureau at Geneva (Year 1928, Nos. 5 and 6, and year 1929, No. 1), which gives a brief general picture, and which we have utilised in the following statement.

The real origin of the Pan-American movement lies in the efforts made by Secretary of State James G. Blaine to unite the independent states of the American continent in a common action "for the consolidation of peace and the advancement of their prosperity". He considered that the first condition for the realisation of his plan was the creation of an American Customs Union. By a special decree of the Congress of the United States the President was empowered to call a Conference with the Republics of Mexico, of Central America, of South America, of Haiti, of the Dominican Republic and of Brazil.

Secretary Blaine in his invitation of 1881 for a conference of the American States gave "considering and discussing methods of preventing war between the nations of America," as one of the purposes for the meeting. This aim was also stressed by the United States Congress when in 1882 it requested the President to call a conference of the republics on this continent "for the purpose of discussing and recommending for adoption to their respective Governments some plan of arbitration for the settlement of disagreements and disputes that may hereafter arise between them."

The First Pan-American Conference, in which the representatives of 18 countries took part, sat at Washington from October 2nd, 1889 until April 19th, 1890. Its agenda consisted mainly of economic questions the most important of which were Point 2: "The creation of a Customs Union" and Point 7, which already contained a draft arbitration agreement. The results of the deliberations are to be found in the nineteen resolutions which later were all modified by the work of the following Conferences. The only important event was the foundation of the "International Union of American Republics" whose central office, situated at Washington, was to serve as the "Commercial Bureau of the American Republics" to receive, co-ordinate and publish all information relating to economic, commercial, juridical and Customs questions. The Bureau was placed under the direction of the Secretary of State of the United States.

The Second Pan-American Conference, which was invited by the Mexican Government, only met on October 22nd, 1901 at Mexico and sat until January 22nd, 1902. Seventeen states took part in it. The "Bureau of the American Republics" was re-organised and was placed under the direction of a Council composed of the diplomatic representatives of the American States at Washington, and of the Secretary of State of the United States. The countries which had not been present at the First International Peace Conference at The Hague signed a protocol of adherence which the United States and Mexico undertook to transmit to The Hague. The Convention relating to "changes to be made in the code of public and private international law of America" was only ratified by three states and was therefore of no importance for the future. On the other hand, three treaties dealing with inventors' patents, the extradition of criminals and the procedure for arbitration in cases of pecuniary claims, have gradually come into force as each ratification—they are not very numerous in all—took place. Another treaty for compulsory arbitration presents an interesting precedent. It was signed by nine states and is still in force between

the six governments which ratified it (Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, San Salvador and Uruguay).

In accordance with a decision of the Mexico Conference, the Third Pan-American Conference was held at Rio de Janeiro where the delegates of all the American Republics, with the exception of those of Haiti and of Venezuela, held their deliberations from July 21st to August 26th, 1906. The institution, which up till then had had only an economic character, was now transformed into an "Organ for the co-operation of the American Republics" and was called in future "International Bureau of the American Republics." In fixing its programme, juridical questions were preferred to economic ones; the conventions adopted relate to problems of nationality, of pecuniary claims, of inventors' patents and of the codification of international law. For this last object an international committee of jurists, composed of delegates from all the signatory States, was formed. We shall give some details below as to its activity. The Congress also recommended to the different Governments that they should support the conclusion of a general arbitration treaty in view of the second Hague Conference.

The Fourth Pan-American Conference was called at Buenos Ayres and sat from July 12th to August 30th, 1910. Bolivia was the only country not represented, its absence being due to the arbitral decision given by the President of the Republic of Argentina in the matter of the conflict between Bolivia and Peru relating to the territory of Acre, and which was unfavourable to Bolivia. The "International Bureau" was converted into the "Pan-American Union" as it now exists. The agenda and the final Act of the Conference, which includes four conventions and twenty resolutions, raised problems of an economic, cultural, intellectual, sanitary and juridical nature.

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The Fifth Pan-American Conference, which had been fixed for 1914, could not be held in that year owing to the outbreak of the European war; it only met in 1923. At this Conference, held at Santiago de Chile from March 25th to May 3rd, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico were not represented. Relations between Mexico and the United States had been broken off, on account of the Mexican Government not being recognised by Washington, and Bolivia and Peru were in conflict with Chili on the question of the provinces of Tacna and Arica. The agenda of the Conference consisted of nineteen points among which, for the first time, were questions of a political nature. These purported to promote a better understanding between the Republics of the American continent; they also raised the problem of the encroachment of non-American powers on the rights of an American nation and of the reduction and limitation of the budget of land and sea forces. This latter point only gave rise to a vague and insignificant resolution which had no consequences. The two other questions met with the resistance of the United States delegates who emphatically opposed any "continentalisation" of the Monroe doctrine, or, in other words, the formation of an American League, as proposed by Mr. Bruns, the former Uruguayan President. Nevertheless, the opposition, which consisted mainly of the States belonging to the Antilles and to Central America, led by Costa Rica, obtained some small successes with regard to the organisation of the Pan-American Union. The representation of the countries at the Conferences and within the Council was in future to be based on the rights of each country; the Council was to choose its President itself and its Vice-President. From that time onwards the Secretary of State of the United States was always nominated as President, and the Vice-President was chosen from the States members of the Union in alphabetical order. We shall see later that at Havana a fresh impulse was given to the "de-diplomatisation" of the Pan-American Union.

The programme of the Vth Conference proposed to ascertain the best method of assuring a more extensive application of the principle of the judicial or arbitral solution of inter-American disputes. The negotiations in this connection resulted in a treaty "to avoid and prevent conflicts between the American States". This so-called Gondra Treaty, concluded on May 3rd, 1923, represented a development of the idea of the Bryan Treaties which were concluded in 1913 and 1914 by the United States with numerous other Powers and also with other American republics and which contained the obligation to submit all disputes to a permanent international commission for inquiry and report and not to start mobilisation until six months after the report is transmitted to the parties. The Gondra Treaty did not however originally provide for permanent inquiry commissions but for commissions which should only be appointed for "investigation and study" at the time when the dispute arose. But in addition to these inquiry commissions, two permanent commissions in Washington and Montevideo are provided for, consisting of the three eldest members of the diplomatic corps; their function was at first restricted to receiving the application of one of the States to convene the investigation commission and to communicate it to the other party.

Among the 67 resolutions relating to cultural, economic and sanitary questions, we shall mention those which placed the efforts for codification on a new basis. The International Committee of Jurists created by the third Pan-American Conference had held its first meeting in June 1912 at Rio de Janeiro. It instituted six sub-committees for the separate study of the principal chapters of public and private international law. The work so enthusiastically begun had been interrupted by the war of 1914.

In the months of April and May 1927, the International Committee of Jurists met for the second time at Rio de Janeiro. It proceeded to the study of the draft proposals which had reached it from several quarters.

The deliberations lasted five weeks, the result being published in a bulky code of private international law containing no less than 437 articles and, 12 draft separate proposals relating to international law. The Code is divided into four books dealing with civil, commercial, and penal international law, and the law of procedure. The twelve draft proposals on public international law relate to the following subjects:

The fundamental bases of international law; States; The status of aliens; Treaties; The exchange of publications; The interchange of professors and students; Diplomatic agents; Consuls; Maritime neutrality; Right of asylum; Obligations of states in event of civil war; The pacific settlement of international conflicts.

The proposals of the committee were submitted for discussion at the Sixth Pan-American Conference.

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The Sixth Pan American Conference was solemnly inaugurated in the National Theatre of Havana on January 16, 1928. Mr. Coolidge, President of the United States, had thought it necessary to be present in person, accompanied by the Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg. Events in Nicaragua had, indeed, created a nervous tension in the relations between the Anglo-Saxon power of the North and the Spanish-American States of Central and South America, and in the second half of 1927 an adjournment of the Conference had been advocated in some quarters. The warning was however not heeded and for five weeks the representatives of the governments of the twenty-one States of the Pan American Union, all of whom were, for the first time, represented, pursued their deliberations on the smouldering volcano of North American intervention in Nicaragua, under the daily dread of a fresh eruption. This delicate question was never actually the object of an open debate, it

we except one single incident, but the United States nevertheless felt themselves from the very beginning forced into what may be called a defensive position. That position was silently and successfully held, with all the diplomatic skill which characterises him, by the leader of their numerous delegation, Mr. Hughes, who at the time of the Fifth Conference had been Secretary of State. The speech of welcome read by President Coolidge to the members of the Conference was for this reason too a message of good will towards the twenty "independent and equal sister-Republics of America". The address of welcome from the Cuban President Machado was animated by the same spirit. Both heads of State indulged in a wealth of generalities on the nature of Pan Americanism; these need not be recorded here.

The work of the Conference was then distributed among eight Committees in the following manner: Organisation of the Pan American Union; International Law; Private International Law; Problems of Communications; Intellectual Co-operation; Economic Problems; Social Problems; Treaties, Conventions and Resolutions of previous Pan American Conferences.

To these Study Committees properly speaking was added a so-called "Committee of Initiative" for the preliminary consideration of new proposals. This body performed its duties with great success by setting aside all matters which could give rise to conflicting political opinions.

At the Fifth Pan American Conference the Member States of the Pan American Union had agreed in future to place their mutual relations within the organisation on the firm basis of a convention. The Council of the Pan American Union was therefore requested to prepare a draft to this effect for the next Conference, and it was the chief task of the First Committee to deliberate upon this draft. A glance through this document suffices to show that its articles are no more than a codification of the practices consecrated by previous Pan American Conferences. This undeniable deficiency is comprehensible when one reflects that the draft was prepared by the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, that is to say by the accredited diplomatic representatives of the American States, whose field of activity is strictly limited by their official position. Accordingly, at the very beginning of the sitting of the Committee the Mexican delegation proposed radical amendments: That the States members of the Pan American Union need not necessarily be represented on the Board by their diplomatic agents at Washington. That the offices of President and Vice-President of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union should be filled by representatives of the American Republics in alphabetical order. That the office of Director-General should rotate annually among the chairmen of the Pan American Committees established in the American Republics, also in alphabetical order, and, finally, that it should be clearly indicated that the Pan American Union had no political powers whatsoever. The leader of the delegation from San Salvador, Dr. Guerrero, presented the following draft preamble:

"1. The Republics of the American Continent declare that the Pan American Union is based on two inalterable principles: the recognition of the autonomy and of the mutual independence of all the States and their absolute juridical equality."

"2. Pan Americanism consists in the moral union of the American Republics, which union is based on mutual respect and on the right they have acquired to complete sovereignty."

Dr. Puyrredon, the leader of the Argentine delegation, maintained that the Pan American Union could only be based on a convention of an economic nature. He recalled the original aim of Secretary Blaine and on this ground insisted on the following addition to the proposed preamble:

"Since economic co-operation is an essential factor for the attainment of this aim, the signatory States should work for the suppression of unjust barriers and artificial and excessive protection which make the exchange of natural products difficult or which are liable to prevent a reasonable freedom of trade

between the American nations, without thereby granting privileges or exceptional favours."

This proposal, which had the full support of the Argentine Government, was obviously directed against the high tariff policy of the United States which had in recent years seriously affected the sale of Argentine products. Argentine's demands found no support.

The Convention of the Pan American Union which was finally adopted consists of fourteen articles. The preamble which precedes them embodies the principles contained in Dr. Guerrero's proposal. According to it, the Pan American Union is henceforth to be considered as a moral union of the American States for the promotion of cultural, intellectual and social ends. They agree to develop the joint co-operation and solidarity proclaimed by successive Pan American Conferences by the following means:

1. Periodical Conferences to be held regularly at intervals not to exceed five years.

2. The Pan American Union, which has its seat in Washington and which is under the direction of a Governing Board composed of the representatives of the Member States who may be appointed from the diplomatic representatives of the respective countries in Washington.—This formula was a concession to the demands of the Mexican delegation, but that delegation was less successful as regards its proposal that the presidency should be renewed annually in alphabetical order. The practice followed up till then of a yearly election was maintained.

3. Any other body which may be created as a result of a special agreement between the American States.

The Governing Body appoints the Director-General who is entrusted with the administration of the Pan American Union, and an Assistant Director who holds the office of Secretary to the Governing Board.

It is an advantage to the continuity of the work that the Mexican proposal for the annual rotation of the office of Director-General was not adopted. A new feature is the provision that the Director-General shall submit to each plenary Conference a detailed report of the work accomplished since the last Conference by the Pan American Union. On the other hand another parallel which appeared in the draft proposal was not adopted. It was proposed that Member States might withdraw from the Pan American Union after a notice of two years, whereas the regulation now in force provides that a State may withdraw at any time, but must pay its quota for the period of the current fiscal year. The Governing Board is to determine each year the quota to be paid by the Member States on the basis of the latest official statistics of population. Art. 6 defines the functions of the Governing Board and of the Pan American Union and expressly stipulates that they shall not exercise functions of a political character. Thus, in contrast to the League of Nations, the technical nature of the organisation of the Pan American Union is clearly stated and emphasized. This prescription is no more than a consecration of the practice which resulted in the deliberate exclusion at all the previous Conferences of political questions. The functions which remain within the scope of the Pan American Union are therefore the following:

1. To compile and distribute information and reports concerning commercial, industrial, agricultural, social and educational development in the American Republics.

2. To compile and classify information referring to the Conventions and Treaties concluded among the American Republics and between these and other States.

3. To assist in the development of commercial, industrial, agricultural, social and cultural relations between the American Republics.

The Second Committee had the task of examining the proposals for codification of international law made at Rio. A general outline

of these proposals has already been given above; the majority of them were adopted by the Conference without any notable alterations.

The convention on the Status of Aliens was, in the words of the Chilean Dr. A. Alvarez, drafted "in accordance with the needs of the American Continent; in other words it endeavours to assimilate foreigners to nationals". It gives the State the right to establish by means of laws the conditions under which foreigners may enter and reside in their territory. Foreigners are subject to the jurisdiction of the local laws. They cannot be obliged to perform military service, but they may be compelled to perform police, fire-protection, or militia duty in the case of natural catastrophes. They are liable for taxes which apply to the population generally. States must grant to foreigners all the individual guarantees and the enjoyment of the "essential" civil rights. They may for reasons of public order or safety expel aliens, whose countries are then required to receive them. Foreigners must not meddle in the political activities of the citizens of a country. When the convention was signed the United States made a reservation relating to military service of foreigners in case of war.

The Convention on Treaties aims at laying down general rules for the conclusion, coming into force and expiration of treaties between the American states. A treaty is to cease to be effective when it has become incapable of execution. A treaty may also be declared ineffective when the motives which prompted its conclusion no longer exist. If a party to a treaty who has denounced that treaty does not obtain the consent of the other parties, he can apply to an arbitral tribunal. On this point Bolivia made a reservation demanding that all treaties, even those called final, may be declared ineffective on the ground that "they, like all human agreements, are liable to error, since there exists nothing immutable or eternal", and that those treaties whose execution are "not reconcilable with the existence, independence and dignity of a State, and which are injurious to its prosperity and trade" should also fall under the heading of "incapable of execution".

"The Convention on Diplomatic Agents meets the demands and the democratic standpoint of our Continent". The preamble declares that the status of diplomats should be in conformity with commercial, political and international conditions and should correspond to the new tendencies. It emphasises the fact "that diplomatic agents do not in any case represent the person of the chief of the State, but only their government". Immunity may only be claimed in connection with the official functions of the agent, and it seems desirable that the agent himself or his country should waive his immunity where non-official matters are concerned. It is admitted, however, that modern tendencies are in conflict with the deeply rooted customs of different countries, so that the Convention can only be regarded as a temporary solution. Its details may be passed over, but it should be noted that one article expressly forbids interference with the domestic or foreign policy of the State in which such agents exercise their functions.

A similar draft relating to the duties, rights and immunities of Consuls was also given the definite form of a convention at Havana.

By the insertion in the Havana Convention of the Montevideo agreement relating to the right of asylum, that agreement became valid for all the members of the Pan American Union. States are forbidden to grant asylum to persons suspected of crime or condemned for common crime, or to deserters from the army or navy, but asylum granted to persons accused of political crimes must be respected. It can however only be granted in urgent cases and only for a space of time absolutely necessary for the person who has sought asylum to ensure in some other way his safety. These are the outstanding points of this Convention, which was not signed by the United States

on the ground that they do not recognise the doctrine of the right of asylum as forming part of International Law.

The fact that the London Declaration on Maritime Law was stillborn and that the world war made the vague achievements of the Hague Conference illusory increase the interest of the Pan-American Convention on Maritime Neutrality. Its preamble lays down the principle that the States "should contribute by the offer of their good offices or their mediation to putting an end to the conflict, and that the fulfilment of this duty shall not be considered as an unfriendly act". If war cannot be avoided, then "neutrals have a common interest in seeing that their rights are observed by the belligerents". Neutrality is defined as the "juridical situation of States not taking part in hostilities." "It creates rights and imposes duties of impartiality." These are further elaborated in the Convention, which takes into account the fact that "international solidarity demands the continual observance of the freedom of commerce". The document is divided into four sections dealing with the freedom of commerce in time of war, the duties and rights of belligerents, the rights and duties of neutrals, and the fulfilment and sanction of laws of neutrality. Generally speaking, the stipulations are a re-statement of the juridical principles codified at the Hague and London on the basis of previous experience, but a few are more progressive. Submarines are subject to the general rules relating to the searching of merchant ships; if they cannot capture the ship while observing these rules, they shall not have the right to attack or destroy the ship. The provisions relating to warships remaining, arming and provisioning in neutral ports are also made applicable to armed merchantmen. The United States, and after them Cuba, adopted a reserved attitude with regard to this point. Under Art. 2 neutral States are not bound on behalf of either belligerent to prevent the export or transit of war material. The second paragraph of the same article makes the following concession to Bolivia: "Transit may be allowed where, in cases of hostilities between two American nations, one of the belligerents is an inland country possessing no other means of obtaining supplies, provided that the vital interests of the country of transit are not affected." Naturally Chili, whom this provision chiefly concerns, made a reservation. The chapter headings in which, in the case of belligerents, duties are placed before rights, whereas in the case of neutrals emphasis is first laid on the rights and then only on duties, would seem not to be accidental. It is a conscious expression of the tendency of the American Continent to regard peace as the chief consideration of their international relations, and to treat problems of war only incidentally.

The Duties and Rights of States in event of civil war form the object of another draft convention. They are to see that nothing is done on their territory to start or to foment civil war in another State. Rebel forces crossing the frontier must be disarmed and interned. So long as the rebels are not recognised as belligerents, traffic in arms and munitions of war is to be prohibited. When they have been recognised as belligerents the rules relating to neutrality become applicable. On the initiative of Argentina special provisions relating to piracy were added to the draft prepared at Rio. By the terms of those provisions the term of piracy applied by a government to rebel ships is not binding upon the other States. The Mexican delegation proposed for discussion that the constitutional government should, for reasons of public security, proceed to the closing of ports occupied by rebels. This was energetically opposed by the leaders of the Argentine and Cuban representatives who, undeterred by their situation as representatives of governments, defended revolution as a means of liberation, progress and civilisation: "Let us leave something to the revolutionaries; let us not only think of the governments. Let us leave something too for the people, since salvation for them often lies in revolution." In view of this opposition the Mexican proposal was withdrawn.

The first two drafts of the international Committee of Jurists of Rio relating to (1) the Fundamental Bases of International Law and (2) States, were referred back, after lively debates within the Committee and private attempts at agreement within a sub-committee, for further consideration by the Seventh Pan American Conference, which met in 1933 in Montevideo. Opinions were widely divided with regard to the conception of "non-intervention" arising out of the discussion of Art. 3 of the project on States. This article runs as follows: "No State may intervene in the internal affairs of another".

A majority of the Latin-American states favoured an unqualified statement condemning intervention in any form whatsoever; and in an effort to stem the tide Mr. Hughes eventually made an address that was regarded as of more than ordinary importance because of its declaration that the United States had not permanent designs on Latin-America; because it frankly attempted to place responsibility for United States interventions on the internal conditions of Latin-American countries; and "because it constitutes perhaps the only open defence made in an international conference of the intervention policy of the United States".

"We want no aggression", Mr. Hughes declared in this address. "We want no aggression against ourselves. We cherish no thought of aggression against anybody else. We desire to respect the rights of every country and to have the rights of our country equally respected. We do not wish the territory of any American Republic. We do not wish to govern any American Republic. We do not wish to intervene in the affairs of any American Republic. We simply wish peace and order and stability and recognition of honest rights properly acquired so that this hemisphere may not only be the hemisphere of peace but the hemisphere of international justice..."

This, Mr. Hughes observed, was a principle of international law, and international law "cannot be changed by the resolutions of this Conference. International law remains. The rights of nations remain, but nations have duties as well as rights."

The last codification project of the Committee of Jurists related to the Pacific Settlement of International Conflicts. It consisted of five parts providing for good offices and mediation, commissions of inquiry, conciliation, friendly composition and arbitration. The Conference had not sufficient time left at its disposal to make a thorough study of the text. All the delegations declared themselves enthusiastically in favour of the adoption of compulsory arbitration. A sub-committee called it the "keystone for the maintenance of peace on the Western Hemisphere" and adopted a resolution which, in its preamble, "condemns war as an instrument of national policy for the American Republics in their relations with one another", and by which the Republics of America adopt compulsory arbitration as a means for the peaceful settlement of their international disputes of a juridical character. It was decided that a conference on conciliation and arbitration should meet in Washington within the year to give a practical form to this principal "with a minimum number of exceptions made unavoidable by the independence and sovereignty of the States and the interests of States not parties to the convention". For this purpose the Governments were to appoint jurists as plenipotentiaries. The Convention finally to be signed was to be completed by a "an open Protocol for progressive arbitration which will permit of the maximum development of this beneficial institution".

At the Conference of American States held as a result of this resolution at Washington from December 10th, 1928 to January 5th, 1929, two further agreements were concluded on January 5th, 1929. The first was a General Inter-American Conciliation Agreement, by which the inquiry commissions mentioned in the Gondra Agreement were at the same time given the character of conciliation commissions while the permanent commissions

at Washington and Montevideo were requested to investigate the dispute until the meeting of the actual inquiry and conciliation commissions.

The second was the General Inter-American Arbitration Agreement, the value of which was however weakened by numerous reservations, although it only refers legal questions to arbitration and excludes disputes relating to the exclusive competence of a State or affecting the interests or actions of a State not a party to the agreement.

In the last sitting of the Sixth Pan American Conference the Mexican delegation unexpectedly presented a resolution against aggressive warfare, which Mr. Hughes immediately warmly supported, with the result that it was applauded on every side. It declared that the American Nations must always be guided by a common endeavour for justice and the good of all, and that the most dangerous obstacle in the way of that co-operation is the use of force. There is no international conflict which could not be solved by peaceful methods if those concerned sincerely desire it: "Wars of aggression are an international crime against mankind" and therefore every aggression is declared to be unlawful and is forbidden, and the American States undertake to solve by peaceful methods every conflict arising amongst them.

Finally, mention should be made of the general principles approved at Havana with regard to International Law. These decisions will definitely determine the character of the further work of codification within the Pan American Union.

The International Committee of Jurists will henceforth consist of three permanent Committees, one in Rio de Janeiro for Public International Law, one in Montevideo for Private International Law, and one at Havana for comparative legislation and unification of legislation.

The methodical instructions given for the work of these bodies are unmistakably drawn from the experience of the Committee of Experts of the League of Nations. They are to compile lists of matters ripe for consideration, submit them to the various governments for an expression of opinion, classify the answers, again submit the question to the Governments, request the opinion of the national International Law Associations, and finally, when a preliminary draft proposal has been outlined, to send all the material collected to the Pan American Union, which will submit it to the Executive Council of the American Institute of International Law for scientific study. For commercial, financial and navigation questions the technical collaboration of the High Inter-American Commission is to be sought. As soon as the reports of these scientific institutes have been received the Governments may call a meeting of the Committee of Jurists or place the problems on the agenda of a forthcoming international conference, provided that all the documents have been submitted for examination at least a year before. The three Committees named above are to be formed by the governments from the members of their respective national societies of International Law, by which is meant the local branches of the American Institute of International Law. They are to communicate with the various governments and with the Executive Council of the Institute through the Pan American Union. At an appropriate moment a committee of jurists should be appointed to study the unification of the civil legislation of the countries of America, principally Latin-America.

It is worth noting that by these decisions the original plan for complete codification is abandoned and the earlier lack of technical and methodical preparation remedied.

* * *

The seventh Pan-American Conference, which met from December 3rd to 26th, 1933 at Montevideo and was attended by all the 21 American Republics with the exception of Costa Rica, did remarkable work.

Of the Final Act, which comprised 104 resolutions and 7 agreements, we may in the first place draw attention to those

dealing with moral disarmament or the cooperation of the American republics in the intellectual sphere. In the first place there was an agreement on the teaching of history providing that in future all incorrect statements which might create aversion to other American republics should be removed from the history books. For this purpose an Inter-American Institute for history teaching is to be founded at Buenos Aires.

As regards other decisions concerning intellectual cooperation mention may be made briefly of the formation of an Inter-American Journalists Commission, the encouragement of wireless, the unification and promotion of the exchange of professors, the preparation of an agreement on Inter-American copyright, the creation of an Inter-American bibliography and the preparation of a uniform American civil code.

In the social sphere the most noteworthy resolutions related to the formation of a Pan-American labour organisation with its seat at Buenos Aires. This is to consist of the Pan-American Labour Conferences and the Pan-American Labour Office and to supplement the work of the International Labour Office at Geneva by dealing with peculiarly American problems. The creation of this organisation would probably constitute considerable competition with the Geneva Labour Office. But it will no doubt take a long time before this recommendation is put into effect. There are numerous other decisions in the sphere of social policy, and a particularly large number of economic and financial problems were dealt with at Montevideo.

Great space in the discussions was claimed by political and legal questions. The South American Anti-War Pact (Saavedra-Lamas Pact) proposed by the Argentine was much discussed. It is one of the fundamental peace treaties of the American continent and one which has not merely remained on paper but has been ratified. It was pointed out in a special resolution that some American republics had not yet acceded to the Gondra Treaty (1923), the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), the Inter-American Mediation Treaty (1929), the Inter-American Arbitration Treaty and the South American Anti-War Pact (1933).

An Additional Protocol of December 26th, 1933 to the Inter-American Conciliation Convention of 1929 gives to the commissions at Washington and Montevideo provided for in Article 2 of the Agreement the character of "Permanent diplomatic inquiry and conciliation commissions".

In a further decision it was emphasised that the offer of good offices or mediation by third States should never be regarded as an unfriendly act. Good offices or mediation must not however come into question if other methods of settling the dispute provided for in a special agreement between the parties are being applied.

The material on the question of the definition of the aggressor and the position of the neutral Powers in the case of a conflict was referred to the Inter-American Juridical Commission for further consideration.

A very long resolution related to the procedure for the codification of international law, for the consideration of which it was proposed to appoint an international committee of experts and national codification committees in the various American republics.

A draft Peace Code consisting of 104 articles, submitted by the Mexican delegation to the Conference, was merely transmitted to the American republics for information.

On the other hand, drafts regarding various special questions made substantial progress and the most interesting result of the Conference in this field was the Agreement regarding the Rights and Duties of States, of December 26th, 1933.

A number of important provisions, in particular regarding recognition, refusal of the right of intervention, equal status of foreigners with nationals, refusal to recognise any territorial

acquisition gained by force, and the refusal of any military occupation, are laid down in this catalogue of the rights and duties of States. The path towards an agreement on the principle of the non-recognition of territorial acquisitions gained by force contained in Article 11 was opened up in particular by the declaration made on August 3rd, 1932 by the 19 American republics in respect of the Chaco conflict. The United States of America also signed the agreement on the rights and duties of States.

Article 8 states categorically: "No State has the right to interfere in the internal or external affairs of another State." The United States delegation in signing the Convention did so with a reiteration of the reservation it made at the December 22 meeting of the Committee. This reservation is contained in a declaration of Secretary Hull, which opens by stating that "the policy and attitude of the United States government toward every important phase of international relationships in this hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear and definite than they have been made by both word and action, especially since March 4". Mr. Hull then referred to the statement made by President Roosevelt which expressed the disposition of the United States government to say that "under our support of the general principle of non-intervention as has been suggested, no government need fear any intervention of the part of the United States under the Roosevelt administration". He no doubt referred merely to one kind of intervention, namely armed intervention. For in his address to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation on December 28th, 1933, a few days after the close of the Conference, he said that only if lack of order caused the other nations of the Continent to be drawn in, the matter would become one for the entire Continent in which they were all neighbours.

Then follow a number of agreements regarding nationality, the grant of political asylum, the surrender of criminals and resolutions regarding the acceleration of ratifications of the Pan-American Union and the reinforcement of its ideas.

Relations with the League of Nations were the subject of lengthy discussions behind the scenes. As Spain, Portugal and France, and the League itself, had sent observers to Montevideo, the question of the official admission of these observers was raised. On the proposal of the American Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, a sub-committee dealt with the question whether observers of organisations or non-American States could be admitted to the Pan-American Conferences, whether such observers, if admitted, could attend private meetings and in what way the cooperation of the Union with organisations or non-American States could be assured. The reply to these questions was referred to the next Pan-American Conference at Lima and the Governing Board was requested to prepare the final discussions on these questions.

III.

The Extraordinary Pan-American Peace Conference at Buenos Aires.

Shortly after the state of war between Bolivia and Paraguay came to an end in October 1935, Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, suggested to Mr. Augustin Justo, President of the Argentine, on January 30th, 1936 that he should convene an extraordinary inter-American Conference at Buenos Aires.

The Conference would determine, the note states, "how the maintenance of peace among the American republics may best be safeguarded—whether, perhaps, through the prompt ratification of all of the inter-American peace instruments already negotiated; whether through the amendment of existing peace treaties in such manner as experience has demonstrated to be most necessary; or perhaps through the creation by common accord of new instruments of peace additional to those already formulated,

These steps furthermore would advance the cause of world peace, inasmuch as the agreements which might be reached would supplement and reinforce the efforts of the League of Nations and of all other existing or future peace agencies in seeking to prevent war."

* * *

The Chaco dispute provided the opportunity for convening the eighth Pan-American Conference, which was held from December 1st to 23rd, 1936 at Buenos Aires.

President Roosevelt, in his above-mentioned note, deliberately referred to two directions in the tasks of foreign policy in the American Continent: the solution of problems connected with the internal, inter-State relations of the American Continent, and a consideration of the extent of the obligations which the American States are willing to assume in future in respect of their contribution to the maintenance and development of peace in the whole world.

The Beginning of the Conference.

The historical importance attached to the Conference in the United States could not be more aptly illustrated than by the President's South American journey. Though he had not yet recovered from the fatigue of the election campaign and in spite of the work which awaited him in Washington, he exposed himself to a long sea voyage in order at the end of November to visit the President of Brazil for one day, to speak at the opening celebrations of the Conference on December 1st, and again after a stay of only one day to start the long voyage back to the States.

The President's initiative was however cordially welcomed by all the American States. The ending of the Chaco conflict, the League crisis caused by its unfortunate sanctionist policy, the aversion to the internal European conflict and hatred and the determination not to be drawn into it, were sufficient grounds for convening the Conference before its due time.

State Secretary Hull submitted in his speech on December 5th to the Pan-American Conference at Buenos Aires a number of proposals which were "not only to make war impossible on the American continent but to constitute a peace policy to which the nations outside the American hemisphere could adhere". Some of the points of this programme, such as the ratification and extension of the existing anti-war pacts or the suggestions in respect of the exchange of goods were primarily suited to the special American conditions and requirements. Others, however, which related to the promotion of pacific sentiments and the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and justice, were of more general importance and reflected a lofty moral view of the necessities of the life of the nations. Special interest and great practical importance attached to the proposal for regulating the attitude of the American States in case of war. This opened up a problem on which the main interest of the Conference was concentrated, and its treatment at the same time offered the European observer interesting possibilities of comparison, since the very questions of the securing of peace and the prevention of war are of the utmost importance to the European continent.

A comparison of Mr. Hull's programme with the Geneva methods indeed shows to the full the difference between the American and the Geneva conception. While the theories which have grown up in the soil of Geneva aim at securing peace by the organisation of war against war, the compulsory waging of collective warfare, that is to say by the automatic extension of war, in America the basic idea is the pacific settlement of disputes. The deeply rooted aversion to the application of force in the life of the nations has long found expression in the international law of the New World in the development of the idea of arbitration and in pacts renouncing and condemning war. From these fundamental considerations—and from the experience of the War—the neutrality policy of the United States has arisen. Mr. Hull's remarks show that it is to be logically continued by

the conclusion of a Pan-American Neutrality Agreement in which the entire American world would bind itself to neutrality in case of war. In practice that would have meant that, in case of conflict, the entire American continent would impose an embargo on arms and goods against the belligerents. Mr. Hull based this proposal on interesting arguments. He spoke first of giving up "possibly tempting war business" and gave it to be understood that at the present time in America the idea of gaining economic advantages from warlike conflicts is rejected as dangerous and immoral—a view by which Germany was also governed in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. In addition Mr. Hull expressed the view that neutrality is fundamentally a positive value, particularly as a "powerful means of ending a war".

This gives express recognition to a view which in post-War Europe under the influence of the Geneva ideology has most unjustly been to a great extent forgotten. The theorists of indivisible peace have endeavoured in every way to bring international discredit upon the notion of neutrality which was inconvenient to them. In their eyes neutrality is equivalent to forgetfulness of one's duty to the community of States. One need only recall the difficulties experienced by Switzerland in order that, when entering the League, she should not entirely forfeit her traditional neutrality policy which was recognised as of value for European peace, and be at any rate released from taking part in military sanctions. The charges which were levelled at Switzerland at that time have recently been levelled against other States which, in view of the dangerous compulsion and obvious abuse of the Geneva doctrine, preferred to base their foreign policy more on the idea of neutrality and independence, in order thereby to serve not only themselves but the general peace.

In this connection, characteristic proposals are being made to reform the League by strengthening Article 16 to such an extent that no State—whether it wishes or not—can remain outside a war. For these apostles of peace—such as Mr. Litvinov—neutrality is not a valuable means of preserving peace or at any rate of localising war, but is on the contrary an obstacle to the realisation of "mutual assistance" and must be removed by means of the reform of the Covenant.

The object therefore was to go beyond the inter-American assurances of peace and to reach joint action on the part of the 21 American States in order to exercise a positive influence on the maintenance of world peace.

The President's opening speech on December 1st, was far-reaching in this respect, although his comparison of a disrupted Europe arming against itself and a united, peaceful and happy American continent must be regarded as somewhat too simple. What European statesman would not be happy if he could speak in the name of the only Great Power existing in a radius of several thousand miles and possessing undisputed predominance on that continent, or in the name of a continent which offers its population unlimited space and possibilities, on which there are not thousands of years of history and the consequent national tension and the coast of which is guaranteed by two oceans from a great part of the troubles and dangers that constantly disturb the European continent? In spite of this, the American continent has not been spared warlike complications, imperialistic aspirations and many serious social and political disturbances.

In his speech the President reminded his hearers that once an American President crossed the sea which led to the tragic error of Versailles. "It is not the aim of this Conference to conclude alliances, to distribute the spoils of war, to divide up countries or to treat human beings as if they were pawns in a game, but to continue the blessings of peace." This is on the one hand a severe judgment on the Peace of Versailles which founded the policy subject to these strictures, and on the other hand a destructive judgment of the European policy which has not only been unable to make good the damage done at Versail-

les, but has even increased and aggravated it. In this connection it is impossible not to think of the League of Nations, of what it was destined to become in the mind of its creator and of what the great ones who have become its master have made of it and of world peace.

* * *

When the Conference began its practical work, in addition to the North American proposals, a further number of 115 drafts were tabled, the most important of which was one by the Argentine Foreign Minister continuing the so-called Saavedra-Lamas agreement of 1933 which for the first time had introduced universal tendencies into American politics; its fundamental idea was, while adopting a joint attitude of solidarity against a peacebreaker, to preclude any direct or indirect intervention in the affairs of other States on the grounds that this constituted an unwarranted menace to peace.

The Results of the Conferences and their Significance.

What is the significance of the results of the Pan-American Conferences in the light of the above-mentioned interests between the United States and the Central and South American States on the one hand, and the policy of Pan-Americanism in respect of its future attitude towards the rest of the world and the League of Nations on the other hand? To reply to this question, account must be taken primarily of the following agreements out of the total number of 63 conventions, resolutions and recommendations.

The first Agreement for Maintenance and Preservation of Peace does not contain everything desired by those who advocated it, in the first place the United States. At least two unofficial drafts clearly called for a Permanent Consultative Committee consisting of the 21 Foreign Ministers, for which provisions were to be laid down regarding procedure, the execution of its decisions, etc. Such a Permanent Consultative Committee would have been the counterpart of the Geneva League Council—and for that reason it did not come into existence. Some of the Latin American States have from the outset rejected the idea of constituting a body that would compete with Geneva. The only result therefore was the quite general establishment of a consultation to discuss possible cooperation in the case of action to preserve peace on the American continent. Instead of special mechanism to attain this object, the fulfilment of the engagements assumed in the various treaties is demanded in accordance with the "rules of international morality".

The organisation of inter-American peace is also promoted by two other Conventions. The first is the Agreement for the Prevention of Controversies, by means of which bilateral permanent mixed commissions are appointed consisting of specially qualified representatives of the signatories. These commissions must examine the causes of possible conflicts and submit proposals in order to reach a peaceful settlement.

The Agreement on Good Offices and Mediation represents a new procedure, in which a prominent American citizen is requested to offer his good offices or mediation in a dispute which cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic channel. This citizen is selected from a list of persons of which each Government appoints two of its nationals who are prominent on account of their upright character and juridical qualifications.

The so-called Neutrality Agreement, which primarily contains a summary of the above-mentioned five treaties, also did not come up to the hopes of the United States. For President Roosevelt, in order to realise his Pan-American peace and neutrality policy, was anxious to include the entire continent in the legislation aimed at by the United States themselves, which, in opposition to the events of the Great War and the previous conceptions of neutrality and freedom of the seas, automatically provides for the renunciation and prohibition of the supply of munitions and the grant of credits to the two or more belligerents.

Instead of such an undertaking of neutrality with all its decisive results, by which the Members of the League among the American States would naturally have come into sharp conflict with their duties under the League Covenant, merely an optional procedure was adopted which was further restricted by the fact that it was made dependent on the internal legislation of the individual States. The reservations made by some States in respect of this agreement show particularly clearly the limits within which a future general American neutrality policy will be bounded.

The question naturally arises immediately whether it has really been possible to bring the obligations under Articles 11 and 16 of the League Covenant, which in case of an international war forbid any declaration of neutrality, into harmony with the position created by the Neutrality Agreement. The reply is obviously in the negative, since the neutrality provided for in the above cases and in accordance with Article 7 is legally ineffective for the American Members of the League.

The most important agreement for inter-American relations is undoubtedly the so-called Non-Intervention Agreement, which has no reservations and is worded simply and clearly; it raises the Monroe doctrine from its onesidedness in the former policy of the United States to a multilateral obligation for all States. It implies the renunciation by the United States of the claim to a special position—almost that of a protective Power—as contained in the previous interpretation of the Monroe doctrine and the recognition of the complete equality of rights of the other States of the Continent.

This creates one of the most essential foundations for the further development of Pan-Americanism, the tendency of which—according to the reservation of the Colombian delegation—even amounts to placing the intervention of one State in the affairs of another on a level with an aggression and its collective defence.

The same applies to the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American solidarity, which reads:

The Governments of the American Republics, having considered:

That they have a common likeness in their democratic form of government and their common ideals of peace and justice, manifested in the several Treaties and Conventions which they have signed for the purpose of constituting a purely American system tending towards the preservation of peace, the proscription of war, the harmonious development of their commerce and of their cultural aspirations in the various fields of political, economic, social, scientific and artistic activities;

That the existence of continental interests obliges them to maintain solidarity of principles as the basis of the life of the relations of each to every other American nation;

That Pan Americanism, as a principle of American International Law, by which is understood a moral union of all of the American Republics in defence of their common interests based upon the most perfect equality and reciprocal respect for their rights of autonomy, independence and free development, requires the proclamation of principles of American International Law; and

That it is necessary to consecrate the principle of American solidarity in all non-continental conflicts, especially since those limited to the American Continent should find a peaceful solution by the means established by the Treaties and Conventions now in force or in the instruments hereafter to be executed,

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace

DECLARES:

1. *That the American Nations, true to their republican institutions, proclaim their absolute juridical liberty, their unqualified respect for their respective sovereignties and the existence of a common democracy throughout America;*

2. *That every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation provided for in the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace, signed at this Conference; and*

3. *That the following principles are accepted by the American community of Nations:*

(a) *Proscription of territorial conquest and that, in consequence no acquisition made through violence shall be recognised;*

(b) *Intervention by one State in the internal or external affairs of another State is condemned;*

(c) *Forcible collection of pecuniary debts is illegal; and*

(d) *Any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever its nature or origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or unrestricted arbitration, or through operation of international justice.*

Lastly, in the field of commercial policy, the two following resolutions may be mentioned :

That the Governments of the American Republics reaffirm the statement enunciated by the Seventh International Conference of American States that "the principle of equality of treatment stands and must continue to stand as the basis of all acceptable commercial policy";

That each Government declare its determination to bend every effort, having in mind the different national economies, towards the objective of enforcing in all the phases of its general commercial policy the peaceful and equitable principle of equality of treatment, and recommends that the Governments of all countries adopt this principle in their commercial policies, and in accordance therewith suppress as soon as possible all discriminatory practices including those arising in connection with import license systems, exchange control, and bilateral clearing and compensation agreements.

1. *That the American States abstain, so far as possible, from raising or augmenting tariff barriers and every other kind of restrictions which directly or indirectly hinder international trade and resulting payments;*

2. *That immediately, and to the extent that the several national economies permit, a policy of abolishing and gradually reducing the said excessive or unreasonable prohibitions and restrictions upon international commerce be undertaken and carried forward by each of the said States, through the conclusion or revision of bilateral economic or commercial Agreements and Treaties and through unilateral action by each country;*

3. *That these recommendations become effective as early as possible in order that the Eighth Inter-American Conference to be held soon in Lima, and the Economic Financial Conference, which is to be held in Santiago, Chile, may mark a definite step towards a system of greater freedom in international commerce; and*

4. *To invite all Governments which do not participate in this Conference to follow the policy proposed in the present recommendation.*

* * *

The most essential aspect of the results of the Buenos Aires Conference lies not so much in the decisions and agreements as in the spirit in which they were reached, the further removal of mistrust and the promotion of good will on all sides. The United States were wise enough not to reduce this factor by showing disappointment at the lack of achievement. The further Conferences of the future will therefore obtain new impulses from this "Extraordinary Conference" and the American regional tendencies will no doubt gain ground if Europe and the League of Nations continue to show internal dissension and disagreement.

Though some American States no longer spoke of the "American League of Nations", it is worth remembering that President Roosevelt at a press reception of journalists, in reply to a question on this subject, unequivocally rejected the idea of the entry of the United States into the League. The Americans therefore refrained from voting on the recommendation that the American Members of the League, who are signatories of the Paris Agreement, the Saavedra-Lamas Agreement and other agreements which may be reached in future, should request the American non-member States who are parties of the above agreements to cooperate with the League of Nations in co-ordinating these various agreements with the League Covenant and in measures to prevent war and to settle international conflicts by pacific means.

While it is expressly stated in the Neutrality Agreement that nothing in the Buenos Aires agreements may affect the rights and duties of the States, the problem of Pan-

America and the League of Nations has not been solved and will again come up for discussion at the Lima Conference together with the Permanent Consultative Committee.

Conclusions.

It will be seen from the above that a Continent has achieved considerable work in the course of years. But this does not involve the right—which has been so often claimed—to assume the tone of a moralist in speaking to Europe. Not only are many things infinitely easier for the New World than for the Old. The latter can even assert without boasting that the New World can still learn much from it. Moreover, as we mentioned above, there are still a number of difficult questions to be cleared up between the north and south of the American continent—questions that can be comprised in the words: Pan-Americanism, imperialism and the Monroe doctrine. A glance at the American press and periodicals shows only too clearly that, in spite of all the efforts of the United States, these questions occupy the central position not only for the North Americans but also for the South Americans and that, especially before and after the Pan-American Conferences, they dominate the field of discussion and relate not merely to definitions but to actual facts.

What is Pan-Americanism?

An interesting definition has been given in the number of April 1938 of the American Journal of International Law by Joseph B. Lockey, Professor of History at the Californian University at Los Angeles. "Pan-Americanism: One author calls it an advocacy, another an idea, another a sentiment and still others an inspiration, a tendency or a doctrine. Obviously it does not fall indifferently into all these categories. If it is a sentiment merely, it is less than a doctrine; if it is a doctrine it is more than a tendency and to call it a tendency is not the same as to say it is an inspiration or an idea. Moreover none of these clarifications when considered separately seems to fit the case."

In the American review "World Affairs" of January 1934, J. Fred Rippey, in order to throw light on the conception of the Monroe Doctrine, wrote as follows: "The fundamental motive is the desire to safeguard our security. In its original form the Monroe Doctrine contained merely an statement of the types of European activity in the New World that were considered dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, in other words menacing to its security. These types of activity as originally envisaged were three in number: 1. the establishment of new colonies in America; 2. the setting-up of European protectorates in the New World, and 3. interference of any sort in the internal politics of American States. From time to time, as new types of European activity in America have been conceived as threats to our security, the Monroe Doctrine has been expended to embrace them also. And after Japan became one of the Great Powers the doctrine was applied to Japan as well as to Europe.

"The new types of activity which were considered dangerous to our security were as follows: 1. the transfer of territory in America from one European Power to another; 2. the transfer of territory even voluntarily from an American State to an European or Asiatic State; 3. the transfer of naval bases in America, and 4. the employment of force by Non-American Powers in the collection of damages or contracts."

The North Americans have also to defend themselves against the charge of imperialistic intentions. This is done in detail in the above mentioned article by Professor Lockey.

As regards the annexation of Louisiana and Florida, Professor Lockey wrote that as regards the expulsion of the population the country was only thinly populated and already inhabited in part by Americans; moreover they had a common boundary with the United States with which they

were more closely connected than imperialistic provinces with the sovereign power. In the case of Texas and California, the population was mainly American. The Senate did not give its approval of the Dominican attempt. The Spanish possessions in the Far East and in the New World fell to the American forces without resistance and without difficulty. Cuba, in spite of limitations, had retained her place in the family of nations. As regards the Philippines, the sovereignty of the United States would disappear in 1944. In the case of Puerto Rico Professor Lockey admits the appearance of imperialism on a small scale. He observes in this connection that one swallow does not make a summer and a small island does not make an Empire. This is, he says, a small territory with a population of one and a half millions. Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands cannot be counted. The interventions in Havana, Cuba and Nicaragua cannot, he says, be regarded as imperialism but as an armed conflict.

Lockey observes that the repeated interference had inspired doubt and fear in other American States and he adds: "If interference in the international affairs of our neighbours is not yet entirely at an end, it is undoubtedly in the process of coming to an end."

There are a considerable number of cases of which Lockey tries to give an explanation. In some cases he maintains it was not imperialism but intervention, in others it was not interference but the maintenance of interests, and when it is admitted that in one or two cases the action has the essential features of imperialism, he says the object is too small to cause any excitement. Still, for those who were the sufferers the memory remains, together with a feeling of mistrust and caution.

Lockey also goes into the charge of economic imperialism. He refers in the first place to the milliards of dollars invested in the Latin American countries in the form of loans, to the oil interests in Mexico, the copper industries in Chile and Peru, the sugar interests in Cuba, the banana industry in Central America, and the innumerable American banks and industries in the Latin American countries.

"Despite this formidable array the asserters of economic imperialism do not contend that the whole Hispanic area is the economic province of the United States. To contend that the United States is free from imperialism is not to contend that it is free from the evils often associated with imperialism. The evils exist without imperialism and doubtless imperialism can exist with few of these evils."

Can the South American States really agree so entirely that a period must come for them when they must share a hermetically closed life solely with the big brother in the North? This necessarily raises the further question as to when the United States recently reverted to a hundred per cent Pan-Americanism. Reference may be made to two facts which speak volumes. The economic crisis in the United States and the development in the Far East have compelled the great neighbour in the North to refrain from the traditional exercise of pressure on Latin American States. How long that will be the case is the big question which the southern "sister republics" are asking themselves.

* * *

There are many signs that the Pan-American world is still far from having realised "eternal peace". The Americans should not adopt the naive method of asserting that this American peace is threatened from outside. With such arguments the fruitful cooperation of the American countries within the Pan-American Union may be destroyed by this policy, especially if it were to be the cause of turning the Pan-American Union into an armour-plated Monroe Doctrine.

IV.

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE DECISIONS AT BUENOS AIRES.

Convention for the maintenance, preservation and reestablishment of peace.

The Governments represented at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace,

CONSIDERING:

That according to the statement of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the President of the United States, to whose lofty ideals the meeting of this Conference is due, the measures to be adopted by it "would advance the cause of world peace, inasmuch as the agreements which might be reached would supplement and reinforce the efforts of the League of Nations and of all other existing or future peace agencies in seeking to prevent war";

That every war or threat of war affects directly or indirectly all civilized peoples and endangers the great principles of liberty and justice which constitute the American ideal and the standard of American international policy;

That the Treaty of Paris of 1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact) has been accepted by almost all the civilized states, whether or not members of other peace organizations, and that the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of 1933 (Saavedra-Lamas Pact signed at Rio de Janeiro) has the approval of the twenty-one American Republics represented in this Conference,

Have resolved to give contractual form to these purposes by concluding the present Convention, to which end they have appointed the Plenipotentiaries hereafter mentioned...

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I. — *In the event that the peace of the American Republics is menaced, and in order to coordinate efforts to prevent war, any of the Governments of the American Republics signatory to the Treaty of Paris of 1928 or to the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of 1933, or to both, whether or not a member of other peace organizations, shall consult with the other Governments of the American Republics, which, in such event, shall consult together for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful co-operation.*

Article II. — *In the event of war, or a virtual state of war between American States, the Governments of the American Republics represented at this Conference shall undertake without delay the necessary mutual consultations, in order to exchange views and to seek, within the obligations resulting from the pacts above mentioned and from the standards of international morality a method of peaceful collaboration; and, in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics, such consultation shall also take place to determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory states, if they so desire, may eventually cooperate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American Continent.*

Article III. — *It is agreed that any question regarding the interpretation of the present Convention, which it has not been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, shall be submitted to the procedure of conciliation provided by existing agreements, or to arbitration or to judicial settlement.*

Article IV. — *The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The original convention shall be deposited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic which shall communicate the ratifications to the other signatories. The Convention shall come into effect between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they have deposited their ratifications.*

Article V. — *The present Convention shall remain in effect indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one years' notice, after the expiration of which period the Convention shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounces it but shall remain in effect for the remaining signatory States. Denunciations shall be addressed to the Government of the Argentine Republic, which shall transmit them to the other contracting States.*

In witness whereof, the above mentioned Plenipotentiaries sign the present Convention in English, Spanish, Portuguese and French and hereunto affix their respective seals, at the City of Buenos Aires, Capital of the Argentine Republic, on the twenty-third day of the month of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

Reservation of Paraguay.

"With the express and definite reservation in respect to its peculiar international position as regards the League of Nations."

Additional protocol relative to non-intervention.

The Governments represented at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace,

Desiring to assure benefits of peace in their mutual relations and in their relations with all the nations of the earth, and to abolish the practice of intervention; and

Taking into account that the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, signed at the Seventh International Conference of American States, December 26, 1933, solemnly affirmed the fundamental principle that "no State has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another",

Have resolved to reaffirm this principle through the negotiation of the following Additional Protocol, and to that end they have appointed the Plenipotentiaries hereafter mentioned...

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I. — The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties.

The violation of the provisions of this Article shall give rise to mutual consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment.

Article II. — It is agreed that every question concerning the interpretation of the present Additional Protocol, which it has not been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, shall be submitted to the procedure of conciliation provided for in the agreements in force, or to arbitration, or to judicial settlement.

Article III. — The present Additional Protocol shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The original instrument and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic which shall communicate the ratifications to the other signatories. The Additional Protocol shall come into effect between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they shall have deposited their ratifications.

Article IV. — The present Additional Protocol shall remain in effect indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice after the expiration of which period the Protocol shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounces it but shall remain in effect for the remaining Signatory States. Denunciations shall be addressed to the Government of the Argentine Republic which shall notify them to the other Contracting States.

In witness whereof, the above mentioned Plenipotentiaries sign the present Additional Protocol in English, Spanish, Portuguese and French and hereunto affix their respective seals, at the City of Buenos Aires, Capital of the Argentine Republic, on the twenty-third day of the month of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

Convention to coordinate, extend and assure the fulfilment of the existing treaties between the American States.

The Governments represented at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace,

Animated by a desire to promote the maintenance of general peace in their mutual relations;

Appreciating the advantages derived and to be derived from the various agreements already entered into condemning war and providing methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes;

Recognizing the need for placing the greatest restrictions upon resort to war; and

Believing that for this purpose it is desirable to conclude a new convention to coordinate, extend and assure the fulfilment of existing agreements, have appointed plenipotentiaries as follows:

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I. — Taking into consideration that, by the Treaty to Avoid and Prevent Conflicts between the American States, signed at Santiago, May 3, 1923, (known as the Gondra Treaty) the High Contracting agree that all controversies which it has been impossible to settle through diplomatic channels or to submit to arbitration in accordance with existing treaties shall be submitted for investigation and report to a Commission of Inquiry;

That by the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on August 28, 1928 (known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris) the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another;

That by the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, signed at Washington, January 5, 1929, the High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the procedure of conciliation all controversies between them, which it may not have been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, and to establish a "Commission of Conciliation" to carry out the obligations assumed in the Convention;

That by the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, signed at Washington, January 5, 1929, the High Contracting Parties bind

themselves to submit to arbitration, subject to certain exceptions, all differences between them of an international character, which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy and which are juridical in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law, and moreover, to create a procedure of arbitration to be followed; and

That by the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, signed at Rio de Janeiro October 10, 1933 (known as the Saavedra Lamas Treaty), the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that they condemn wars of aggression in their mutual relations or in those with other states and that the settlement of disputes or controversies between them shall be effected only by pacific means which have the sanction of international law, and also declare that as between them territorial questions must not be settled by violence, and that they will not recognise any territorial arrangement not obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by force of arms, and, moreover, in a case of non-compliance with these obligations, the contracting states undertake to adopt, in their character as neutrals, a common and solidary attitude and to exercise the political, juridical or economic means authorized by international law, and to bring the influence of public opinion to bear, without, however, resorting to intervention, either diplomatic or armed, subject nevertheless to the attitude that may be incumbent upon them by virtue of their collective treaties; and, furthermore, undertake to create a procedure of conciliation;

The High Contracting Parties reaffirm the obligations entered into to settle, by pacific means, controversies of an international character that may arise between them.

Article II. — The High Contracting Parties, convinced of the necessity for the co-operation and consultation provided for in the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace signed by them on this same day, agree that in all matters which affect peace on the Continent, such consultation and co-operation shall have as their object to assist, through the tender of friendly good offices and of mediation, the fulfilment by the American Republics of existing obligations for pacific settlement, and to take counsel together, with full recognition of their juridical equality, as sovereign and independent states, and of their general right to individual liberty of action, when an emergency arises which affects their common interest in the maintenance of peace.

Article III. — In case of threat of war, the High Contracting Parties shall apply the provisions contained in Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace, above referred to, it being understood that, while such consultation is in progress and for a period of not more than six months, the parties in dispute will not have recourse to hostilities or take any military action whatever.

Article IV. — The High Contracting Parties further agree that in the event of a dispute between two or more of them, they will seek to settle it in a spirit of mutual regard for their respective rights, having recourse for this purpose to direct diplomatic negotiation or to the alternative procedures of mediation, commissions of inquiry, commissions of conciliation, tribunals of arbitration, and courts of justice, as provided in the treaties to which they may be parties; and they also agree that, should it be impossible to settle the dispute by diplomatic negotiation and should the States in dispute have recourse to the other procedures provided in the present Article, they will report this fact and the progress of the negotiations to the other signatory States. These provisions do not affect controversies already submitted to a diplomatic or juridical procedure by virtue of special agreements.

Article V. — The High Contracting Parties agree that, in the event that the methods provided by the present Convention or by agreements previously concluded should fail to bring about a pacific settlement of differences that may arise between any two or more of them, and hostilities should break out between two or more of them, they shall be governed by the following stipulations:

(a) They shall, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (Saavedra Lamas Treaty), adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude; and shall consult immediately with one another, and take cognizance of the outbreak of hostilities in order to determine either jointly or individually, whether such hostilities shall be regarded as constituting a state of war so as to call into effect the provisions of the present Convention.

(b) It is understood that, in regard to the question whether hostilities actually in progress constitute a state of war, each of the High Contracting Parties shall reach a prompt decision. In any event, should hostilities be actually in progress between two or more Contracting Parties, or between two or more signatory States not at the time parties to this Convention by reason of failure to ratify it, each Contracting Party shall take notice of the situation and shall adopt such an attitude as would be consistent with other multi-lateral treaties to which it is a party or in accordance with its municipal legislation. Such action shall not be deemed an unfriendly act on the part of any state affected thereby.

Article VI. — Without prejudice to the universal principles of neutrality provided for in the case of an international war outside of

America and without affecting the duties contracted by those American States members of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties reaffirm their loyalty to the principles enunciated in the five agreements referred to in Article I, and they agree that in the case of an outbreak of hostilities or threat of an outbreak of hostilities between two or more of them, they shall, through consultation, immediately endeavour to adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude, in order to discourage or prevent the spread or prolongation of hostilities.

With this object, and having in mind the diversity of cases and circumstances, they may consider the imposition of prohibitions or restrictions on the sale or shipment of arms, munitions and implements of war, loans or other financial help to the states in conflict, in accordance with the municipal legislation of the High Contracting Parties, and without detriment to their obligations derived from other treaties to which they are or may become parties.

Article VII. — Nothing contained in the present Convention shall be understood as affecting the rights and duties of the High Contracting Parties which are at the same time members of the League of Nations.

Article VIII. — The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their constitutional procedures. The original convention and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, which shall communicate the ratifications to the other Signatory States. It shall come into effect when ratifications have been deposited by not less than eleven Signatory States.

The Convention shall remain in force indefinitely; but it may be denounced by any of the High Contracting Parties, such denunciation to be effective one year after the date upon which such notification has been given. Notices of denunciation shall be communicated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic which shall transmit copies thereof to the other Signatory States. Denunciation shall not be regarded as valid if the Party making such denunciation shall be actually in a state of war, or shall be engaged in hostilities without fulfilling the provisions established by this Convention.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries above mentioned have signed this Treaty in English, Spanish, Portuguese and French, and have affixed thereto their respective seals, in the City of Buenos Aires, Capital of the Argentine Republic, this twenty-third day of December, of the year 1936.

RESERVATIONS

Reservation of the Argentine Delegation.

In no case, under Article VI, can foodstuffs or raw materials destined for the civil populations of belligerent countries be considered as contraband of war, nor shall there exist any duty to prohibit credits for the acquisition of said foodstuffs or raw materials which have the destination indicated.

With reference to the embargo on arms, each Nation may reserve freedom of action in the face of a war of aggression.

Reservation of the Delegation of Paraguay.

(Same Text)

Reservation of the Delegation of El Salvador.

With reservation with respect to the idea of continental solidarity when confronted by foreign aggression.

Reservation of the Delegation of Colombia.

In signing this Convention, the Delegation of Colombia understands that the phrase "in their character as neutrals", which appears in Articles V and VI, implies a new concept of international law which allows a distinction to be drawn between the aggressor and the attacked, and to treat them differently. At the same time, the Delegation of Colombia considers it necessary, in order to assure the full and effective application of this Pact, to set down in writing the following definition of the aggressor:

That State shall be considered as an aggressor which becomes responsible for one or several of the following acts:

a) That its armed forces, to whatever branch they may belong, illegally cross the land, sea or air frontiers of other States. When the violation of the territory of a State has been effected by irresponsible bands organized within or outside of its territory and which have received direct or indirect help from another State, such violation shall be considered equivalent, for the purposes of the present Article, to that effected by the regular forces of the State responsible for the aggression;

b) That it has intervened in a unilateral or illegal way in the internal or external affairs of another State;

c) That it has refused to fulfil a legally given arbitral decision or sentence of international justice.

No consideration of any kind, whether political, military, economic or of any other kind, may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression here anticipated.

V. SUMMARY OF THE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED AT THE PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCES

FIRST CONFERENCE (Washington, 1889-90)

No Treaties or Conventions signed.

SECOND CONFERENCE (Mexico, 1901-02)

1. Pecuniary Claims (In force 5 years)
2. Extradition
3. Practice of Learned Professions
4. Formation of Codes of International Law
5. Protection of Literary and Article Copyrights
6. Exchange of Publications
7. Patents, Industrial Drawings and Models and Trade Marks.
8. Rights of Aliens
9. Obligatory Arbitration

THIRD CONFERENCE (Rio de Janeiro, 1906)

10. Status of Naturalised Citizens
11. Pecuniary Claims (Expired December 31, 1912)
12. Patents, Trade Marks, Literary and Artistic Property
13. International Law (Codification)

FOURTH CONFERENCE (Buenos Aires, 1910)

14. Patents
15. Trade Marks
16. Literary and Artistic Copyrights
17. Pecuniary Claims

FIFTH CONFERENCE (Santiago, 1923)

18. Prevention of Conflicts (Gondra Treaty)
19. Publicity of Customs Documents
20. Trade Marks and Commercial Names
21. Nomenclature for the Classification of Merchandise

SIXTH CONFERENCE (Habana, 1928)

22. Status of Aliens
23. Asylum
24. Consular Agents
25. Diplomatic Officers
26. Maritime Neutrality
27. Rights and Duties of States in event of Civil Strife
28. Treaties
29. Commercial Aviation
30. Literary and Artistic Copyright
31. Private International Law
32. Pan American Union

SEVENTH CONFERENCE (Montevideo, 1933)

33. Nationality of Women
34. Nationality
35. Extradition
- 35 A. Optional Clause annexed to the Convention on Extradition
36. Political Asylum
37. Revision of History Textbooks
38. Additional Protocol to the Conciliation Convention (1929)
39. Rights and Duties of States

CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE (Buenos Aires, 1936)

40. Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace
41. Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention
42. Prevention of Controversies
43. Good Offices and Mediation
44. Fulfilment of the Existing Treaties
45. Pan American Highway
46. Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations
47. Interchange of Publications
48. Artistic Exhibitions
49. Peaceful Orientation of Public Instruction
50. Facilities for Educational and Publicity Films

CONVENTIONS SIGNED AT OTHER PAN AMERICAN CONFERENCES

51. Inter-American Conciliation (Washington, 1920)
52. Inter-American Arbitration (Washington, 1929)
53. Progressive Arbitration—Protocol (Washington, 1929)
54. Anti-War Pact (Rio de Janeiro, 1933)
55. Trade Mark and Commercial Protection (Washington, 1929)
56. Registration of Trade Marks—Protocol (Washington, 1929)
57. Electrical Communications (Mexico, 1924)
58. Sanitary Code (Habana, 1924)
59. Regulation of Automotive Traffic (Washington, 1930)
60. Most-favored-nation clause in commercial treaties (Washington, 1934)
61. Artistic Institutions and Historic Monuments—Rørich Pact (Washington, 1935)
62. Movable Property of Historic Value (Washington, 1935)
63. Declaration relative to Foreign Companies (Washington, 1936)
64. Repression of Smuggling (Buenos Aires, 1935)
65. Tourist Passport and Transit Passport for Vehicles (Buenos Aires, 1935)
66. Transit of Airplanes (Buenos Aires, 1935)
67. Pan American Commercial Committees (Buenos Aires, 1935)

	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CHILE	DOMINICAN REP.	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	UNITED STATES	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
1.	S	S	NS	Rd	Rd	NS	S	S	R	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	NS	S	Rd	Rd	S	NS
2.	S	S	NS	S	Rd	NS	S	S	Rr	Rd	Rd	S	S	S	S	NS	S	S	S	S	NS
3.	S	Rd	NS	S	Rd	NS	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	NS	S	Rd	S	S	NS
4.	S	R	NS	S	S	NS	S	S	R	R	R	S	R	S	S	NS	S	S	S	S	NS
5.	S	S	NS	S	Rd	NS	S	Rd	R	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	NS	S	S	Rd	S	NS
6.	S	S	NS	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	R	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	NS	S	S	Rd	S	NS
7.	S	S	NS	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	R	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	NS	S	S	NS	S	NS
8.	S	Rd	NS	R	S	NS	S	S	R	Rd	Rd	NS	Rd	S	S	NS	S	S	NS	S	NS
9.	S	S	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	R	NS	Rd	Rd	NS	NS	Rd	NS	NS	S	R	NS	R	NS
10.	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	NS	Rd	Rd	D	NS	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rd	S	NS
11.	S	S	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	NS	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rd	S	NS
12.	S	S	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	NS	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	S	S	S	NS
13.	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	NS	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	NS
14.	S	A	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S
15.	S	A	Rd	S	D	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	D	Rd	D	S	D	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S
16.	S	A	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S
17.	S	A	Rd	S	Rd	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S
18.	S	A	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	ARd	Rd	Rd	Rd	ARd	Rd	Rd	Rd
19.	S	NS	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	R	Rd	S	NS	S	Rd	Rd	NS	Rd	Rd	S
20.	S	NS	Rd	S	S	Rd	S	Rd	S	S	S	Rd	S	NS	S	S	Rd	NS	Rd	S	S
21.	S	NS	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	R	Rd	S	NS	S	Rd	Rd	NS	Rd	Rd	S
22.	S	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rdr	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rdr	Rd	S
23.	S	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	R	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	NS	Rd	S
24.	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd ¹	Rd	S	S	S	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rd	Rd	S
25.	S	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rdr	Rdr	Rd	S	S	S	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	S	Rd	Rd
26.	S	Rd	S	R	S	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rd	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rdr	S	S
27.	S	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rdr	Rd	S
28.	S	S	Rd	S	S	S	S	Rd	Rd	NS	S	Rd	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	S	S	S	S
29.	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	Rdr	Rdr	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rd	S	S
30.	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	S	S	Rd	S	Rd	S	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	S	S	S	NS
31.	S	Rdr	Rdr	S	Rdr	Rd	Rdr	Rd	Rdr	Rdr	Rd	Rdr	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	NS	S	Rdr
32.	S	S	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rd	Rd	Rd
33.	S	S	Rd	Rd	NS	S	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rdr	Rdr	R	S	S	S	Rd	S	NS
34.	NS	NS	ARdr	NS	NS	NS	Rd	NS	Rd	NS	NS	NS	Rdr	Rdr	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	S	NS
35.	S	NS	S	Rd	NS	S	Rdr	Rd	Rd	Rdr	Rd	S	Rdr	Rdr	R	S	S	S	Rdr	S	NS
35A.	S	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	S	NS
36.	S	NS	Rd	Rd	NS	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	R	S	S	S	NS	S	NS

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¹ Reservations not accepted by the United States.

	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CHILE	DOMINICAN REP.	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	UNITED STATES	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
37.	S	S	S	Rd	NS	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	R	S	S	S	NS	S	NS
38.	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	Rd	Rd	R	NS	ARd	R	R	Rd	R	A	NS	NS	Rd	S	NS
39.	S	NS	Rd	Rd	ARd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	S	Rdr	S	S
40.	S	S	R	R	S	S	S	R	Rr	R	S	S	Rr	Rd	R	S	S	S	Rd	S	Rd
41.	S	S	R	R	S	R	S	R	Rr	R	S	S	R	Rd	R	S	S	S	Rd	S	Rd
42.	S	S	S	R	S	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	R	S	S	S	Rd	R	S	S	Sr	Rd	S	S
43.	S	S	R	R	S	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	R	S	S	S	Rd	R	S	S	S	Rd	S	S
44.	Sr	S	R	Rr	S	R	S	R	R	Rr	S	S	Rr	Rd	R	S	Sr	S	Rdr	S	S
45.	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	R	S	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	S	S	Rd	S	S
46.	S	S	R	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	S	S	S	S	S	R	S	S	S	Rd	S	S
47.	S	S	R	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	R	S	S	S	S	R	S	S	S	S	S	S
48.	S	S	R	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	R	S	S	S	Rd	R	S	S	S	Rd	S	S
49.	S	S	R	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	R	S	S	S	Rd	R	S	S	S	NS	S	S
50.	S	S	R	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	R	S	S	S	S	R	S	S	S	NS	S	S
51.	NS	S	Rd	R	R	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd
52.	NS	S	Rd	Rr	S	Rd	Rdr	Rd	Rdr	Rdr	Rdr	Rd	Rdr	Rdr	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rdr	S	Rdr
53.	NS	S	S	S	S	R	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	S	S	S	S	Rd
54.	Rd	AR	Rd	ARdr	A	ARd	Rdr	ARd	ARdr	ARd	ARd	ARd	ARdr	Rd	ARd	ARd	S	ARd	ARdr	Rd	ARd
55.	NS	S	S	Rd	S	Rd	S	S	S	NS	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	S
56.	NS	S	S	S	S	Rd	NS	S	S	NS	NS	Rd	Rd	S	S	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	NS	S
57.	S	NS	S	S	S	S	NS	Rd	S	S	S	NS	NS	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	NS	S	NS
58.	R	ARd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	ARd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd	AR	Rd	R	Rd	Rd	Rd	Rd
59.	S	S	S	S	S	NS	S	Rd	Rd	S	S	NS	Rd	Rd	S	S	S	Rd	S	S	S
60.				S		Rd					S				S	S			Rd		
61.	S	S	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	Rd	S	Rd	Rd	S	R	Rd	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	Rd
62.							Rdr		S	Rd	Rd				Rd	S				S	
63.							Sr		S	S					S			S			Rd
64.	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	Rd	S
65.	S	S	S	S	S	NS	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	NS	Rd	S
66.	S	S	Rd	S	S	S	Rdr	S	Rd	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	S	S	S	S	Rd	S
67.	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	Rd	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	Rd	S

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MEMEL

HER STRUGGLE FOR HER RIGHTS AND FREEDOM

The Results of the Sixth Memel Landtag Election on December 11th, 1938

25 : 4

The Unequivocal and Crushing Election Victory of Memel Germanism and its Significance

The march towards freedom has begun. Right must remain right, even in the case of Germans. These were the slogans to be found on the banners stretched across the streets in the course of the election campaign.

These two sentences expressed the feeling with which the Memellanders went to the polling booths on December 11th. German and free. Under this slogan they gained the victory with 25 seats for the Memel Unity Party, the Cultural Union, against 4 seats for the Lithuanian parties.

Much has been said and written about the significance of these elections in foreign countries. But in order to understand it correctly, a glance must be cast at the history of Memel since the War. This is done below to some extent by means of documents.

We may call to mind briefly that the Memel territory, consisting of three Prussian districts with a population of about 150,000, was separated from Germany by the dictated Peace of Versailles and placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. It was administered by France on their behalf. In January 1923, when the Ruhr struggle began, Lithuanian soldiers dressed in civilian clothes entered and occupied the Memel territory. After prolonged negotiations the sovereignty of Lithuania over the territory was acknowledged. But it was promised a far-reaching autonomy in a Statute guaranteed by the Allies, together with a legislative assembly, the Landtag, and an executive government. In this way the Memel Germans were to be guaranteed the possibility of freely establishing and developing their inner life.

But the Memel German people never attained the freedom guaranteed by this Statute. From the very first day Lithuania did everything she could to lithuanianise the territory as rapidly and thoroughly as possible. While the civilian Lithuanian Governor of Memel refused to the constitutional representatives of Memel autonomy any serious application of the statutory rights, the military commander suppressed the last remains of free Memel life when, on December 17th, 1926, martial law

was proclaimed; this was due to purely internal Lithuanian circumstances arising out of the Kovno party struggle and in no way connected with Memel and was to remain for twelve years as an unparalleled monstrosity in the history of European States. Volumes could be filled by a detailed description of the Lithuanian rule of violence. That rule, and with it the distress and suffering of the Memel Germans, reached its culminating point in the year 1934. At that time it was considered in Kovno that the time had come to put an end to the hated autonomy and all the forcible means at the disposal of the State were used against the Memel Germans. The parties were dissolved, all political activity was rendered impossible, the Landtag was crippled and at the beginning of 1934 nearly 150 leading Memellanders were prosecuted and one year later four of them were sentenced to death, two to penal servitude for life and the remainder to a total of 470 years penal servitude. For years the condemned persons remained in prison, while the other Memel Germans remained under martial law which was only annulled in the night from October 31st to November 1st, 1938 and the freedom of the press, of meetings and of conscience guaranteed in the Statute was thus restored.

In spite of the indignation which this period of moral and physical suffering was bound to arouse among them, the Memellanders pursued their path with complete discipline, and maintained and defended their Germanism in the firm belief and unshakable hope that the hour of delivery would once strike for them. For fifteen long years they fought for the respect for their autonomous rights with the legal means at their disposal. The Geneva League had guaranteed the Memel Statute as it had guaranteed so many other minority agreements. But the representatives of the Memel Germans handed in to the signatory powers of the Statute one memorandum after another giving irrefutable proof of oppression in violation of the treaty. These did not receive serious investigation any more than the complaints of the Sudeten Germans. Germany was powerless and these complaints could be lightly dismissed. The geographical and historical ignorance of the statesmen, which was responsible for so many foolish paragraphs of the Paris dictated peace treaties, also stood at the cradle of the Lithuanian State. For

a long time they did not know what to do with the Memel territory. There was some talk in Geneva at a later date of the "German minority in Lithuania" when this territory was mentioned, though the Lithuanians did not obtain more than five seats in the Memel Landtag at the elections in 1925, 1927, 1930 and 1935, while the number of the German seats fluctuated between 23 and 27. And this in spite of all possible election and other manoeuvres on the part of Kovno with a view to reducing the number of German voters by artificial means and raising the number of Lithuanian voters.

After the very first election the Lithuanian Prime Minister Voldemaras expressed his disappointment in the following words: "This election is the first clear sign that the territory is directed against Lithuania and wishes to return to Germany."

Unfortunately this observation led to no result and it was necessary for the position created at Versailles to collapse before any change took place in the attitude of Kovno towards the Memel problem.

It found its first external expression in the cancellation of martial law. In the old German city of Memel, Borussia again stands on her high pedestal and at her side the busts of the men of Prussia's great historical era have again been set up which the Lithuanians in their lust for destruction had torn down in the hope that they might thereby eradicate for ever a portion of German and Prussian history. The names of the streets can again be read in German and in the railway station the word "Memel" has replaced the word "Klaipeda" which had surprised and puzzled many a foreign traveller. This change was also noticeable in the conduct of the election which on this occasion was carried out with less friction and in a more objective manner than in 1935 when many attempts were made to influence and hinder it.

It has finally been realised that for fifteen years a policy was practised in the Memel territory which was in harmony neither with the necessities of wise statesmanship nor with the provisions of the Memel Statute. Finally also all faith and hope was abandoned of continuing the struggle for the maintenance or incorporation of the Memel Germans in the maze of legal sophistry regarding the interpretation of the Statute in common with brutal methods of assimilation or extermination.

It was thus proved at the last election and in that which immediately preceded it that the Lithuanian coating which the Kovno authorities and their representatives in the city and territory of Memel had endeavoured to give before the eyes of the world was only a thin veneer. The Memel Germans during these years tended more and more to become a compact unit with an open and firm acceptance of national socialist ideas.

On this occasion the Memel Germans went to the polls in a compact body. The elections were however merely a formality, for the decisions had long been taken at heart. It was no longer a question of a mere parliamentary election, but of a plebiscite on the question: German or Lithuanian.

This question has been answered unequivocally in the German sense, and it will now depend solely on the Lithuanian authorities whether they will draw the conclusions demanded by the change in the political situation in Central Europe and the fundamental formation of German-Lithuanian relations.

The national freedom and independence of the Lithuanian people have never been called into question by the Germans, for National Socialism respects foreign nationalities. The vital national and economic interests have in themselves nothing to do with the Memel question. But in so far as they can be

supplemented and supported by Germany, no effort will be spared within the framework of good and friendly relations. The leader of the Memel Germans, Dr. Neumann, spoke in a conciliatory tone to the Lithuanians, so that the problem can be dealt with and solved in accordance with its real importance, without passion or unjustified desires.

On the other hand, no one can blame the Memel Germans if they entertain doubts as to the seriousness, sincerity and durability of the good will, expressed in recent statements by members of the Government in Kovno, finally to bow to facts and to settle the dispute. During the years of suffering confidence has disappeared. It has been proved too often by bitter experience that what was given yesterday can be again taken away tomorrow under worse conditions as soon as circumstances appear to be favourable in the view of the Government at Kovno. In any case a clean sweep must be made, for the Memel Germans can no longer be satisfied with half measures, and what is to be done must be done quickly. The political consequences of this election go far beyond those of former elections. The international constellation has changed and the entire perverted political structure of the Memel territory has lasted long enough to prove its absurdity. Experience of the Memel Statute has merely shown that it does not form a suitable basis for the fulfilment of the national desires of the population and is not in a position to create permanent and smooth relations between the Reich and Lithuania. The compulsory situation created by the coup d'état of 1923 led to a curious and complicated state of affairs the elastic and vague provisions of which completely obliterated the boundaries between autonomy and sovereignty and raised difficulties for Lithuania not only in respect of internal affairs but also in the field of foreign policy. The two neighbouring States, Estonia and Latvia, when concluding the Baltic Pact with Lithuania on September 12th, 1934, excluded the assistance provided for in "specific cases" which primarily include the Memel problem.

From this point of view it is surprising that certain western Powers suddenly remember their role as guarantors, which they had assumed in the Memel Statute but which they had forgotten during the period when the Memel Germans suffered the greatest distress. It is indeed remarkable that they express the hope that Berlin will respect the Memel Statute, after they have paid little or no attention to the violations of the Statute by Kovno for over ten years, not to speak of the rape of this territory which they illegally tolerated. The international treaty law of the victorious Powers came to naught in the same manner as the principle of the inviolability of treaties. Their role as guarantors is therefore ill suited to them at present and it would be desirable, in the light of recent experience, that they should leave the solution of the problem to direct negotiations between those most nearly concerned, instead of trying to reduce the natural claims of Germanism in a network of retarding and procrastinating negotiations.

After all it is for the Germans to decide about Germans. The refuse still left by the Treaty of Versailles must be cleared away. Past experience teaches us with certainty that no war will break out on account of this Treaty. War could only break out so long as Germany had nothing more to say in European affairs. Germany will take part in particular in decisions regarding German affairs and will no longer tolerate dictation.

The attitude of the Lithuanian Government in the face of this fresh expression of the desires of the Memel territory will be of supreme importance for the future development. The Lithuanian Government must in the first place understand that the mistakes committed by Lithuania in the past cannot fail to have consequences. Apart from the denial of certain guarantees, the Lithuanian Government by means of its system undoubtedly contributed decisively towards accelerating the

development which has now taken place. On the other hand the entire German nation has at heart no hostile feelings towards the Lithuanian nation and will show complete comprehension for its future prosperity. To that extent the political expression of opinion of the Memellanders may now also lay the foundation for a fruitful and better development of the relations between the two peoples and put an end to old differences.

But the time is short and the authorities in Kovno will do well to clear up the position before the meeting of the newly

this grave charge. Presumably neither Czechoslovakia nor Lithuania would have used such methods if they had not been under the protection of those who by these means carried on their traditional policy of hegemony. In view of this incontestable fact it makes a ridiculous impression that precisely Germany should be charged with carrying on a policy of hegemony, although the foreign policy of the Third Reich has clearly proved in practice that the territorial demands have only referred to purely German territories.

There is also a Memel lie and in addition a moral Lithuanian guilt, and these must be borne in mind at the moment when a



Map of the Memel Territory

elected Landtag, which is to open forty days after the elections, that is to say at the latest by the end of January.

* * *

We have pointed out above that the action on the conclusion of peace was dictated by anything but democratic principles or respect for the right of self-determination by the former Allies. It cannot be too often stressed, in view of the active anti-German propaganda which is still being carried on, that in the case of Memel also a tissue of lies was woven around the facts, in the same way as forged documents were concocted regarding the war guilt lie, the hundred thousand Frenchmen in the Saar and the Germans who emigrated to Bohemia. These lies created the grotesque position that German territories which had for centuries been the bearers of culture among other nations on the borders of the Reich were oppressed by the latter by the worst methods once they had obtained sovereignty. Like Czechoslovakia, Lithuania cannot be absolved from

decisive change is taking place for Lithuania and the Memel people. This is not due to any feeling of revenge but to the fact that the public opinion of the world has been and is being poisoned against everything German.

We have selected as the first of the documents on this subject the speech by the leader of the Memel Germans, Dr. Neumann, in the evening of December 10th. This speech, together with the further documents, clearly shows to what extent the violation of the Memel territory and its German population was carried before the eyes of the international guarantors and with their tacit consent.

The Leader of the Memel Germans on the Elections of December 11th.

Dr. Neumann referred in the first place to the programme which he had published in 1933 as the leader of the then "Socialist People's Community of Memel". "At that time" he said, "the party was forbidden because our growing influence

announced the sole claim to leadership in the Memel territory and thus threatened to destroy all the dreams of the chauvinistic Great Lithuanian circles. At that time they stated quite openly that the moment had come to crush autonomy. For this purpose a scandalous action was staged. The external removal of autonomy did not succeed, but the internal undermining of autonomy was carried on with all the means at the disposal of the State. Martial law, special laws, State protection police, bribery to enormous amounts, a system of regulations intended to place free will in a position of complete dependence, the suppression of our cultural life—all these things were intended to destroy our national feeling. As the Lithuanian representative once openly stated at the Hague, autonomy was to be converted into a transitional provision for the definite incorporation of the Memel territory into the Lithuanian State."

Dr. Neumann continued: "We respect every national culture. But our struggle is aimed at the clique which has brought all the harm to our home country. Our home country must again be free. That is our right, it is doubly so because it is confirmed in the Convention and in the Statutes. We must find the way. Everywhere careful detailed work was carried out and our claims became louder and stronger. The year 1938 laid its spell upon us, and unmistakable demonstrations and demands were made in the Landtag. The external union was then made in the cultural union. The direction assumed by the political will was expressed in the establishment of the Memel German list. The union is free from party politics, but is to be regarded as political in so far as it is a representative picture of Memel Germanism and determines its action in a National Socialist spirit."

After describing the Sports Union as the keeper of order in the Memel territory, Dr. Neumann continued: "The year 1938 is coming to a close. It has brought the disappearance of frontiers erected by the Treaty of Versailles and has thus eliminated sources of permanent unrest for European peace. The leaders of the great nations of Europe have helped right to conquer and the clouds of war which had gathered over Europe to be dispelled. The year 1938 now puts to us the question: Who are you? (Enthusiastic shouts: "Germans".) At the elections on December 11th you have an opportunity of declaring to what culture and to what nation you will belong. You know my programme. I only promise you one thing: work is being done; in return I only ask of you one thing: have confidence in me and be united among yourselves. You will give me your vote, but at the same time you will give a sacred promise that you will follow me, that you will pay attention to no provocation and that you will continue in discipline and strict order to tread the long path of twenty years ago which we have followed with superhuman patience. For our part we will show the world that it is possible to help right to conquer."

Dr. Neumann then turned to the "immigrated Lithuanian comrades" who earned their bread and had established their homes here. "Your leaders", he said, "whisper in your ears the most terrifying things and make you the maddest promises, but not one of them will or can take care of you. You are

marching in four parties. You can do what you will, all you will have in the end will be a few votes and a sorry bargaining. 116 representatives are clamouring for your confidence, and none of them will give even a trace of security. Social welfare has been created by us, the entire social progress is ours, and we give you the assurance that the worker has also a right to bread. Consider yourselves, you immigrant workers, where has the labour policy of your representatives led you? You were not certain for a minute whether it was your leaders' pleasure to keep you here or to give you notice again. You were only national political figures for them, nothing more, whether you belonged to Lithuanian unions or not. But for me, you are not figures, numbers or cattle, but men for whom I have to take action, for I have been through your prison as a National Socialist. I also respect your national feeling and demand from you the measure of respect that is our due. It is only on the basis of mutual respect that it is possible to reach a favourable development of all our mutual relations and normal mutual understanding. This applies both to our relations here in the territory and also to the relations of Memel with Lithuania. It would be foolish to belittle the Lithuanian cultural state; where centuries of development are lacking, this cannot be compensated in twenty years. However that may be the farmyard in Great Lithuania, however poor it may be, is the subject of unreserved respect. It has withstood the attack of the Slavonic spirit and, with German help, has saved Lithuanian culture from serfdom. To those who pretend to bring culture from outside I would say very frankly: take good care of this farmyard. This is the tragedy of our fate: an industrial territory that belonged to a highly developed industrial State was to be incorporated into a newly formed State which had its origin in unimaginable simplicity and obvious backwardness. That was bound to lead to conflicts unless consideration was given to the higher development of the territory. So long as there was a certain boom in the prices of agricultural products exported to Germany, the unnatural connection of these two territories was tolerable. But when prices began to fall, especially at the beginning of the autarchic economy, a disaster was inevitable. We were formerly prepared also to approach the altars of liberty of the reborn Lithuanian people, but only as free men. Instead of respect being shown for our desire for an understanding, we were treated with opprobrium. They alone bear the responsibility that we have turned away and are now fighting for our freedom and rights. We are still Lithuanian citizens according to the letter, but inwardly there is no further connection with Lithuania.

The Memel territory is a German cultural land and we are its children. Sieg Heil!"

HISTORICAL EVENTS FROM 1919 TO 1935

With a frankness which can cause no offence to the Lithuanians—since the German and Lithuanian cultural elements are as different as black and white—Dr. Neumann in this speech has explained the profound and only true reason why the Memellanders cannot be "assimilated" by the Lithuanians. If a comparison is made, the reason is found to lie in the social and cultural position. But such a comparison was already made by an international commission in 1923. A perusal of the report of this commission proves that certain States were not acting in ignorance when, especially since 1926, they caused the Memel population to tread the path of suffering under

martial law which is comparable with the position of the Sudeten Germans that was fortunately again brought before the eyes of the world in the Runciman report.

The Entente replied to the German covering note of June 16th, 1919 in the following terms:

"The Allied and Associated Powers deny that the transfer of Memel is incompatible with the principle of nationality. The area in question has always been Lithuanian. The majority of the population are Lithuanian by origin and language."

This was a brutal violation of the right of self-determination of the nations. It passed over in silence the contents of the German covering note which was worded as follows :

"Article 99 demands the surrender of a strip of territory in the north of the province of East Prussia comprising the districts of Memel, Heydekrug and parts of the districts of Tilsit and Ragnit. The inhabitants of this territory, including those whose mother tongue is Lithuanian, have never desired to be separated from Germany. They have at all times proved to be a true component part of the German community of peoples. As regards the linguistic conditions in those districts, according to the census of 1910 only the district of Heydekrug of which

The German Government must therefore reject the surrender of this territory."

In order to prove the enormous injustice of the transfer of the Memel Territory which took place as a result of false information, we only need consider the view of the Entente Powers four years later, as expressed in the Report by the Extraordinary Commission of the Conference of Ambassadors of March 6th, 1923, the Commission which had to collect the basic facts for fixing the Memel Statute and which consisted of MM. Clinchant, Fry and Baron Aloisi. This report states *inter alia* :



Copperplate Engraving of the German City of Memel in the Year 1684

55 % of the population speak Lithuanian, shows a small non-German speaking majority. In the district of Memel only 44 %, in the district of Tilsit 23 % and in the district of Ragnit even only 12 % of the population have Lithuanian as their mother tongue. The entire territory moreover is predominantly German according to the number of the population. There are about 68,000 Germans as against only about 54,000 Lithuanian-speaking inhabitants. In particular Memel is a purely German city ; it was founded in the year 1252 by Germans and has never throughout its history belonged to Poland or to Lithuania ; just as in the south the East Prussian frontier has remained unchanged since the year 1422. It should be pointed out that even the inhabitants who have Lithuanian as their mother tongue almost all speak German perfectly and even use this language among themselves. Their is no movement for connection with the Lithuanian population of the former Russian Empire apart from a small group which carries no weight, especially as the Lithuanian population living in the former Russian Empire is Catholic while that of the German territory is Protestant.

Extract of the Report to the Conference of Ambassadors by the Extraordinary Commission at Memel

The Extraordinary Commission sent to Memel by the Conference of Ambassadors does not propose, in this report, to dwell upon the laborious negotiations which have been carried on with the rebel leaders in order to enable the Principal Allied Powers to decide freely on the future of the Territory. The difficulties of the Commission's work and the results achieved have been made sufficiently clear in the telegrams sent by it to the Conference. It will merely endeavour to bring out, with the aid of enquiries prosecuted on the spot, the truth regarding certain extremely involved questions in connection with Memel which have been deliberately obscured or distorted by Lithuanian diplomacy and propaganda, and it will submit to the Conference of Ambassadors, together with a number of impartial documents, certain ideas which may perhaps be of assistance in the negotiations on the status of Memel.

In order fully to understand the views and the aspirations of the people of Memel,

we must glance briefly at the history of the Territory.

Memel is the oldest German town in East Prussia and has never belonged to Lithuania. In the thirteenth century a number of Knights of the Brotherhood of the Sword, a branch of the Teutonic Order, came from Riga and established a colony and a fortress on the site of the town. At that time the population of the northern part of the Territory was Latvian, and that of the southern part Lithuanian. Lithuanians, Latvians and Old Prussians are racially allied, all belonging to the Baltic family. It need hardly be observed that this race has no connection with the Slav. The population of the Territory has been very largely teutonised, and that of the town is almost exclusively German. This is perfectly natural, for the German frontier has not shifted for five hundred years.

This fact is of great importance; it involves consequences which were brought to the notice of the Commission. The latter was anxious, however, to investigate them in person and therefore travelled by road as far as the Lithuanian frontier.

The eastern frontier of the Memel Territory, which coincides with the former Russo-German frontier, marks an abrupt and sudden change from one civilisation to another, with at least a century in between them. It is the true frontier between west and east, between Europe and Asia. On this side education has been so general that there are no illiterates, even among the peasants, many of whom speak both Lithuanian and German. The country is covered with a network of well-kept roads leading to villages of comfortable, well-built houses. The land is cultivated by modern methods. The small-holding system has been developed side by side with the system of large farms.

On the other side of the frontier, the country-people live in the direst poverty. Only those who have been in the Russian army have even the rudiments of education. Roads are almost unknown. The peasants know nothing about clearing and manuring the land and let it lie fallow for two years before resuming cultivation. Their wooden huts are small and dirty. Agrarian reform has resulted in general disorganisation, and if it is carried to a conclusion, it will ruin the large properties of Lithuania, which are already in considerable danger. Only on these properties is farming at all organised at the present time. There are other difficulties. The population of Great Lithuania is Catholic, whereas that of the Territory is Protestant. The Lithuanian language has developed differently on the two sides of the frontier.

Many Lithuanians who belong to Memel fear the consequences of annexation to Great Lithuania without secure guarantee of autonomy. They know that annexation will mean military service, heavy taxation, an increase of 400 % in the cost of living (partially due to the imposition of extremely high Customs dues), the disorganisation of economic life, and that system of bribery and concessions which is common to all countries formerly included in Russia.

Though all the prominent Germans which the Commission has met were in favour of a popular vote on the question of the independence of the Territory, no prominent Lithuanian member of the Taryba wished for the plebiscite. This fact is a more convincing proof than any statistics that the majority of the population is not Lithuanian.

These are the suggestions which the Commission wishes to lay before the Conference of Ambassadors. The Commission is aware that under the present circumstances it will be extremely difficult to induce the Lithuanians to accept them. The latter will not welcome Allied intervention in their relations with the Territory, for their ultimate object is annexation pure and simple. The Commission has been in contact with the Lithuanians long enough to know that negotiation with them is exceedingly difficult. They are impervious to reason and recognise no argument but force. Obstinate and defiant, they pursue their immediate aims with an eagerness which makes them blind to their true interests.

For these reasons, the Commission thinks it desirable to call the attention of the Conference of Ambassadors to the necessity of placing the organic Statute of Memel under the supervision of the League of Nations.

Paris, March 6th, 1923. (Signed) Clinchant, Aloisi, Fry.

Nothing need be added to this report. The Entente countries were however aware of this racial position prior to the investigation of this Extraordinary Commission. As far back as the Paris Conference of November 3rd/4th, 1922, M. Laroche, the French chairman of the commission which subsequently made preparations for transferring the sovereignty of the Memel Territory to Lithuania, said to the Memel delegation: "We know that you all wish to return but we shall be able to prevent it."

Was it surprising that, in view of such unsurpassed cynicism, the Lithuanians should take up the slogan of a French representative in order to put an end to any further attempts at discussion by means of an action closely resembling a comedy?

On January 10th, 1923, the day when the French troops occupied the Ruhr, the Lithuanian Government clothed its troops in civilian clothes and set up an insurgent government under the demagogic slogan: "Down with French foreign sovereignty".

At the present time the question is permissible as to how far the then Head Commissioner of the Memel territory, M. Tetisné, the representative of the Allied Powers, was deceived when he issued the following proclamation after the Lithuanian incursion:

Inhabitants of the Memel Territory!

In the name of the Allied Powers, I again raise the most solemn protest against the sanguinary "coup de main" which has been carried out against the Memel Territory.

I declare expressly that the Allied Powers intend to continue to exercise their authority over the Territory.

Memel, January 16th, 1923.

The Head Commissioner

Representative of the Allied Powers
Petisné.

Whether he was deceived or in secret connivance, it remains a fact that the lawbreaker was presented with the sovereignty over the Memel territory.

Counting on human forgetfulness, Lithuanian propaganda endeavoured to represent the "coup de main" carried out at that time by the Lithuanian Government as a myth. One has not to rely on German sources in order to ascertain the truth regarding the events of January 10th, 1923. It is sufficient for this purpose to turn to League Document C. 664, M. 295, 1923, VII, in which the following facts are established by the Commission of the Conference of Ambassadors.

"Notwithstanding the denials of the members of the Lithuanian Government and its representative at Memel, there can be no doubt that the rising of January 10th was conceived, prepared and carried into effect by the Kovno Government. It may be well to call attention to the dates. On January 3rd, M. Zilius, Lithuanian Representative at Memel, left for Kovno accompanied by M. Simonaitis, afterwards head of the Rebel Government. During the conversations which took place on January 4th, the attack upon the Territory was decided upon. Orders were immediately given by the Lithuanian Ministry of War, and officers and men of the regular army, wearing civilian clothes instead of uniform, embarked on January 6th by order of the military authorities for an unknown destination. The leader of the rebel army, who signed the proclamations posted up in the "Territory" under the name of Boudrys is, in reality, Colonel Polowski. The Commission described him by his real name and rank, and be made no protest. It should be added that the "volunteers" are supplied with arms, ammunition and rations by the Kovno Government. Much of the money for the enterprise comes from Lithuanians in America.

The date on which the rising was decided upon is also worthy of note. It was January 4th. News of the first results of the Paris Conference regarding Reparations had then reached Kovno.

From the outset, the Lithuanians employed comparatively large military forces. It is estimated that from two to three thousand of the regular army crossed the frontier of the Territory. The Kovno Government thought it necessary to make this display of military forces against a single company of French Chasseurs because it was aware that its "volunteers" would not be supported by the majority of the population in the territory—would, indeed, find support only from some of the Lithuanians in Memel. These were the "Taryba", who, according to statements made to the Commission by M. Yankus, Chairman of the Committee of Public Safety, and virtual head of the Taryba, did not exceed eight to ten thousand in number before the events of January 10th."

* * *

The indisputable truth about Memel was however published to the world by the result of the first elections to the Memel Diet on the basis of the Memel Statute. At these elections, which took place under Lithuanian rule on October 19th, 1925, the German parties (comprising Germans and Lithuanians) obtained about 58,000 out of 62,000 votes. The German parties obtained 27 out of 29 seats. In the previous year at the elections for the municipality of Memel, the German parties obtained 13,300 votes (40 deputies) out of 14,000 votes. At that time, M. Voldemaras, subsequently Prime Minister, wrote: The elections are the first clear indication that the territory is directed against Lithuania and desires to return to Germany." The subsequent elections, in spite of the oppression of the German element, in spite of Lithuanian immigration and of the martial law declared in the territory, gave proof of the overwhelming desire of the Memellanders for the maintenance of their German nationalism. Thus, the second elections to the Memel Diet, held on August 30th, 1927, resulted in 47,000 votes out of 54,700 in favour of the German parties, and 25 seats out of 29. The subsequent elections brought no change in the majority, and it was only in 1932 that the Lithuanian parties returned 5 deputies.

German rights in the Memel Territory and their violent distortion were also described in an article, published by Anton Smetona, President of Lithuania, in the "Lietuvis" No. 49 of December 11th, 1925:

"In the small Memel Territory, Great Lithuania has hitherto achieved no success whatever... It is obvious that, after Memel was assigned to Lithuania, our Government did not succeed in taking the will of the majority in Memel into account. We had frequent occasion to observe that the policy of our Government was unsuitable...

It is not we of the opposition, but our ruling parties, that rejoiced at obtaining an "acceptable" Statute from the Conference of Ambassadors. We were at that time against the Constitution because it was dictated by foreign States. But once it has been signed by the Government, it must be fulfilled; if we do not fulfil it, the case of Memel will be referred to the League of Nations, and our ruling parties will then give way in every respect and pay for their faults with interest at the cost of Lithuania. In the eyes of the world we shall be again compromised. Why should that be necessary? If we make ourselves ridiculous at Kovno, that is as it were our own affair. We can assume that the foreigners do not notice it. Memel is a little window through which we can look out at the world, but through which also the world can look in and see our good and unfortunately also our bad qualities. We must therefore be careful of every step and see that it does not lead us astray and is in conformity with the Statute.

But we are compromised the most among the Memellanders; we must remember that the territory is not Dannewitsch, Schaulen or any other part of Lithuania, but Memel, which belonged to Germany for 700 years, and that the bonds of the past bind it to Germany. The connection with Lithuania is a thing of the present in which we live. It is for us to influence the case in our favour. Everyone is well aware how strong are the tendencies which lead to Germany. Moreover it is no secret that we have received the territory by the grace of the Treaty of Versailles and the Conference of Ambassadors. This fact does not strengthen, but weakens, our position in Memel. The grace of treaties is unstable; it does not involve rights, for the grace of politics depends upon its humour, and if there is any change in this respect the matter might turn out differently from our expectations.

Consequently, the Lithuanian Government, in order to strengthen the bonds between Memel and the rest of Lithuania, should endeavour to gain the confidence of the Diet. Whatever the political views of the Diet, the main point is that it should show loyalty to the State. We know that this opinion of ours will displease one group or another of our authorities. But all people who are faithful to the State will doubtless agree with us...

... The territory could only be separated from Germany and assigned to Lithuania by force of arms. If that is so, the right of the sovereignty of Lithuania over the Memel Territory ultimately depends on Germany. The policy of Lithuania towards Germany must therefore be a policy of mutual understanding.

Our Government's policy has not hitherto taken these real facts into account."

Nevertheless, after the "coup de main" Lithuania had to accept the Memel Statute of May 8th, 1924 prepared by the Conference of Ambassadors. Since that time it has never paid any attention to this Statute.

Of the 15 Directorates which the Memel Territory has had since 1923, there have only been 2 which have possessed the confidence of the Chamber of Representatives in accordance with Article 17 of the Statute, and there has not been a single Chamber of Representatives which has lived through the statutory legislative period of three years. According to Article 12 of the Statute, the Governor, in agreement with the Directorate, has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Representatives. For the purpose of such dissolution, therefore, the Governor instituted special Directorates of the small Lithuanian minority which were docile to him, until the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague of August 11th, 1932 put a stop to this practice. It decided that the Chamber of Representatives could only be dissolved by a Directorate which already had the confidence of the Chamber of Representatives.

The Governor then adopted another practice. Contrary to the provisions of the Statute, he closed the sessions of the Chamber of Representatives without the consent of a constitutional Directorate. Even during the session it was made impossible for the Memel Chamber of Representatives to exercise its constitutional activity in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. The legislative work was constantly prevented by the fact that the Governor vetoed almost all laws passed by the Chamber of Representatives. According to Article 16 of the Statute the Governor's right to veto the laws of the Chamber of Representatives is limited to three cases, namely if the laws exceed the autonomous competence, or infringe the Lithuanian constitution or international treaties. The Governor has not kept to this provision and has quite arbitrarily vetoed most of the laws. It has happened that, after the reasons

for the veto have been removed, various laws have been vetoed for the second or third time for constantly fresh reasons. This has been the case, for instance, with the Memel revalorisation law.

The autonomous rights of the Memel inhabitants were very greatly restricted by the introduction of the state of siege in the Memel Territory in 1926. This took place without the Memel Territory having given any grounds for such action. The state of siege in the Memel Territory was introduced not on account of any danger to the Senate, but for the purpose of excluding the civil autonomous authorities. The state of siege was also practised in an entirely onesided manner; while the Lithuanian parties and organisations and the Lithuanian press had complete liberty, everything was prohibited to the German Memel organisations. The political parties of the Memel inhabitants were not allowed to hold meetings and the cultural organisations could only do so after their agenda had been approved by the war commandant. All meetings were moreover supervised by the representatives of the war commandant. The press was under the strictest censorship and could only publish the news provided by the Lithuanian Telegraph Agency. The reports of the meetings of the Memel Chamber of Representatives, the speeches of the deputies, and even the publication of the agenda of the Memel Chamber of Representatives, and the publication of articles of the autonomy Statute, were suppressed by the seizure of the Memel German newspapers. There was nothing left of the freedom of meetings, societies, press, conscience and speech guaranteed to all citizens of the Memel Territory by Article 33 of the Statute.

Reference may also be made to the limitation of the Memel judicial autonomy, the removal of educational autonomy, and the serious disputes which arose out of the provisions of Article 35 of the Statute, and also to the violation of the guaranteed equality of treatment of the two languages. According to Article 35, the Lithuanian Government is obliged to assign a certain proportion of the receipts from customs, excise and monopoly taxes to the Memel Territory for the maintenance of the autonomous departments, since all revenue-earning departments such as the railways, customs and posts are within the competence of the Lithuanian Government, while all spending departments are within the competence of the autonomy. The dispute regarding this proportion has lasted for years and has only been settled temporarily by the mediation of an expert of the League of Nations.

When the new Landtag Elections of September 29th, 1935 were impending, the Lithuanian Government made preparations for them in a manner which obviously aimed at preventing free polling. On the one hand it arranged an artificial mass immigration into the Memel territory and on the other hand deprived Memellanders of Lithuanian citizenship. A change was made in the election law which represented a real curiosity and in practice amounted to a sabotage of the election.

According to this law every voter had, not one vote, but as many votes as there are deputies to be elected to the Chamber, in this case 29. On the day of the election, in the polling booth, the voter was handed a block consisting of as many ballot papers as there were candidates of all parties. The voter must select 29 ballot papers from them. Several hundred candidates had put up for the impending election. Consequently the voter must select the ballot papers of the candidates for whom he wished to vote. This naturally took considerable time. As there were about 1000 voters for each voting district in the Memel territory and each voter required at least five minutes to record his vote, the election would take 5000 minutes, which was equivalent to 83 hours or 7 days of 12 working hours. Under the law, however, voting could only take place on one day; consequently the Lithuanian Election Commission had

ordered that each polling booth should have so many tables that there should be one table for every hundred voters. In some districts there were about 2000 voters. In these cases, therefore, there would be at least 20 tables for the voters and a few tables for the district polling commissions. Rooms of this size were not to be found everywhere in Memel. It had also been provided that the ballot papers were not to be counted by the district polling commissions immediately after the election, but by the Election Commission in Memel. Hitherto there had been 211 voting districts in the Memel territory, and they required from two to three hours to count the ballot papers. On the basis of only one and a half hours and 200 voting districts, this represented 300 hours' work carried out by the district polling commissions. This time was required for counting the votes when only one ballot paper was handed in by each voter. On this occasion each voter handed in 29 ballot papers, so that the time required should be 29 times as long. If we assume that only ten times as much time was required, the Election Commission would have to count for $300 \times 10 = 3000$ hours, or 300 days of 10 working hours.

The Führer and Reich Chancellor protested against these attempts in his speech of May 21st, 1935 as follows:

"Germany has nothing to gain from any European war. What we want is freedom and independence. Such being our aims, we were ready to conclude pacts of non-aggression with all our neighbours. If we make an exception to this attitude in the case of Lithuania, that is not because we want a war with Lithuania, but because we cannot enter into Agreements with a country which ignores the most elementary laws of human co-operation. It is pity enough that, owing to the scattered distribution of the European peoples, cases are frequent where it is difficult in practice to draw boundaries in accordance with the limits of nationalities. It is pity enough that certain treaties purposely left nationalities out of account. But at least it is not necessary that human beings, who have already had the misfortune to be torn from the people with which they are kin, should on top of that be tortured and ill-treated. I read some weeks ago in a great international newspaper a remark to the effect that Germany was big enough to waive her interests in the Memel territory. The noble philanthropist who made that remark forgot one thing: and that was the circumstance that 140,000 human beings have after all rights of their own, and that the point is not whether Germany wants them or not, but whether they themselves want to be Germans or not. They are Germans. They were torn from the Reich by an act of aggression committed in peacetime and sanctioned after the event; and, because they now cling in spite of all to their German racial character, they are persecuted, tortured and ill-treated in the most barbarous manner. What would be said in England or France if such a melancholy fate were to befall nationals of either of these nations? If a feeling of kinship with their own race on the part of men who have been separated from that race against all right and nature is to be treated as a crime, that means the denial to human beings of a right which is conceded to every animal—the right, namely, to feel attachment to its old master and to the old life lived together in common. Of this right 140,000 Germans in Lithuania are deprived. It is under these circumstances out of the question for us, so long as the responsible guarantors of the Memel Statute are themselves unable to bring Lithuania back to some regard for the most elementary of human rights, to enter into any Agreement with that country."

In spite of everything, this election of September 29th, 1935 again resulted in an overwhelming victory of the Memel Germans. But unfortunately this fact brought no change in the position of the Memel Germans until the elections of 1938.